Diplomacy & Crisis News

Caleb Larson

Tu-160M, Europe

Though the Tu-160’s relaunch is being heralded in Russian media as a great triumph, the reality is somewhat less rosy.

One of Russia’s older bombers is relaunching for modern combat.

Although the Tu-160 first flew in the early 1980s, during the depths of the Cold War, Russia is remaking one of the largest and fastest Soviet bombers.

The United Aircraft Corporation statement covering the Tu-160M explains how difficult it was to restart the bomber’s production line while incorporating some modernized components.

“As part of the implementation of the program under the state contract between the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia and Tupolev, the design documentation for the Tu-160M aircraft has been fully digitized in a short time, the vacuum welding technology for titanium products has been restored, the production of airframe units has been resumed, a new cooperation has been formed from leading industrial enterprises in the field of metallurgy, aircraft construction, mechanical engineering and instrument making, the main part of which is part of the State Corporation Rostec.”

Out with the Old, in with the New

A Russian official explained that UAC “restored the full production cycle of the Tu-160, but already in the M modification, using modernized engines, modernized aircraft control systems, navigation systems, and weapons control systems,” no small feat considering the original Tu-160’s engines were the most powerful combat aircraft engines ever built.

This latest Tu-160’s engines are thought to be an evolution of the original Kuznetsov NK-32 engines that the manufacturer, Tupolev, claims boost fuel efficiency by a whopping 13 percent.

“The modernization of the Kazan Aviation Plant played an important role in restoring the production of unique aircraft: the equipment of the shops, the flight test base was updated, the world’s largest installation for electron beam welding and vacuum annealing of titanium was put into operation” Denis Manturov, minister of industry and trade of the Russian Federation explained.

“Today we see significant prospects for the Tu-160 platform: further development will make it possible to use it for new types of weapons, including promising ones.”

Why relaunch old production lines for a Cold War-era bomber when Russia has other, newer options available? The Tu-160s relaunch story is, in fact, a decade old.

Hopes were high for Russia's next-generation PAK DA stealth bomber, which on paper is somewhat akin to the United States B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, a stealthy flying-wing design. However, unlike the United States B-2—or new B-21 Raider—Russia's PAK DA design has not been realized, though a few prototypes may exist.

Until Russia is able to rectify problems with the PAK DA design, the new and improved Tu-160M will serve as an interim bomber.

Though the Tu-160’s relaunch is being heralded in Russian media as a great triumph, the reality is somewhat less rosy: Though re-engined and digitally upgraded, the Tu-160 remains, in essence, a Cold War-era design pressed into service in the twenty-first century.

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest. A graduate of UCLA, he also holds a Master of Public Policy and lives in Berlin. He covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society for both print and radio. Follow him on Twitter @calebmlarson

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Travis Pike

Guns,

Will the United States ever adopt a bullpup rifle?

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Bullpup service rifles are more than a simple fad.

You can learn a lot about the differences in national cultures by looking at the service rifles they issue their troops. In some ways, different countries, continents, and cultures take turns swapping in advancements in small arms technology. The United States has led the way with peep sights and semi-automatic battle rifles. Large parts of western Europe lead the way with general issue optics. Germany started the assault rifle craze, but Russia pushed it ahead.

As a result, it sometimes takes time for new and improved elements of weapon design to become ubiquitous around the world. But with that in mind, one type of firearm that has quickly become prevalent across large parts of the world in recent years is the bullpup rifle.

Yet, in North America, the bullpup never really caught on. The U.K. has the SA-80 series of rifles. France has the FAMAS. Austria, Ireland, and Australia love the Steyr AUG. And China, Israel, Singapore, and Croatia all have domestically produced bullpup rifles of their own. Bullpups have this futuristic quality to them, and it’s hard to deny that futurism does have a bit of an appeal.

In fact, there’s an old joke that goes, “Bullpups are the future…and they always will be."

In reality, the first bullpup seemingly dates back to the Curtis rifle of 1866. Then, in 1901, the Thorneycroft carbine saw life. The Thorneycroft was a somewhat practical design that mixed a bolt action 303 British rifle with a bullpup stock. In 1977, the Austrian army broke new ground by adopting a bullpup, specifically the Steyr AUG, as their service rifle that they dubbed the Stg 77.

But what’s the point of the bullpup? Is it really the rifle choice of the future, or is it just another rifle fad that will eventually go the way of the Dodo (or the Advanced Combat Rifle)?

What Is a Bullpup Rifle?

In case you aren’t a military technology nerd, you might see a group of guns called bullpups and wonder exactly what’s going on. Well, bullpup rifles are rifles with the action located behind the trigger. Most rifles have the action, or their functional mechanisms, in front of the trigger. Along with the action, the magazine often sits behind the trigger as well.

Rifles, shotguns, and even pistols can be bullpups. Albeit, I only know of one traditional pistol that uses a bullpup layout. In the military world, the weapon most commonly used in this configuration is a rifle, as rifles typically benefit most from this sort of design.

The primary benefit of using a bullpup design is that the overall length of the weapon can be much shorter without reducing barrel length. Barrel length can be incredibly important with rifle calibers. For example, the 5.56 caliber round is designed for a 20-inch barrel. Anytime the barrel gets shorter, the rifle loses ballistic capability… But a traditional rifle with a 20-inch barrel, like the M16A4, is quite long, which makes urban warfare (entering and exiting doors, buildings, rooms) more difficult. The longer your weapon, the tougher it is to maneuver in tight spaces.

A bullpup rifle can be extremely short and compact but still retain its barrel length because it places the action behind the trigger. Most bullpups with 16-inch barrels can be the same length as an Mk 18 M4A1 Carbine with a 10.3-inch barrel. Again, smaller rifles work better in close quarter’s combat, in and out of vehicles, and stay out of the way for non-front line troops like artillerymen.

Something like the Israeli Tavor can give you a proper rifle barrel for engagements out to 300 to 500 meters and still be small and maneuverable. An Mk 18’s short 10.3-inch barrel drastically reduces the weapon’s overall capabilities outside of a CQB (Close Quarters Battle) environment. In other words, a bullpup rifle can be shorter than a conventional rifle, allowing for good performance both in close quarters and at longer ranges.

The Benefits and Downsides of a Bullpup

While length is the most critical benefit, there are other considerations. First and foremost, the weight is shifted mostly to the rear in a bullpup rifle. Thus the weight sits against the shoulder. This helps balance the rifle and makes it much easier to hold up for longer periods of time. Additionally, bullpups are much easier to fire one-handed and to even hold one-handed while using the other hand for various tasks, and that matters when you’re spending extended periods of time in a combat zone.

The shorter distance between the action and the butt plate also tends to mitigate muzzle rise. This makes the weapon easier to control, especially when rapid firing or firing full auto. Bullpup infantry automatic rifles have been produced as part of the AUG and SA-80 series rifles, and they make it easy to see the benefits of a bullpup layout.

We can’t get a free lunch, though, and everything that’s much better at one thing is sure to be worse at another. One of the primary downsides to adopting bullpup rifles is the placement of the shooter’s cheek in relation to the action. First, should a catastrophic failure occur, the user’s face is more likely to be injured.

Second, bullpups often eject empty casings out of the right-hand side. This produces a problem for lefties as they tend to take casings to the face. That being said, some do allow you to swap the ejection ports or eject casings downwards.

Another issue is the placement of magazines. Being placed so far rearward makes reloads less intuitive. Slow reloads suck, especially if you are laying down suppressive fire. On top of that, the long linkage required to run from the trigger to the action often creates a rather crappy trigger situation. Though, in recent years companies have produced much better bullpup triggers than in the past.

Are Bullpups Really the Future?

Sure, for some countries. I do believe bullpup service rifles are more than a simple fad. In fact, General Dynamics introduced their own bullpup rifle and infantry automatic rifle in the Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapons, or NGSW, competition. That may have been a fluke in the hunt for America’s next top boomstick, but it could also indicate that Uncle Sam may be warming up to the idea. Plenty of countries seem happy with their bullpups, but it’s also interesting to see a variety of special operations forces turning to Stoner-designed or derivative rifles instead. In other words, they’re sticking with tried and true approaches to traditional rifle design, making changes and modifications to what’s proven to work.

To date, the United States has leaned toward the latter approach as well, but the times, they are a’changin’.

Will the United States ever adopt a bullpup rifle? I don’t see it happening, but the world is a crazy place, and I’ll never say never.

Travis Pike is a former Marine Machine gunner who served with 2nd Bn 2nd Marines for 5 years. He deployed in 2009 to Afghanistan and again in 2011 with the 22nd MEU(SOC) during a record-setting 11 months at sea. He’s trained with the Romanian Army, the Spanish Marines, the Emirate Marines, and the Afghan National Army. He serves as an NRA certified pistol instructor and teaches concealed carry classes.

This article was first published by Sandboxx.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Syrian Civil War,

Germany pursued the case under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

At the first trial concerning war crimes since Syria’s civil war began a decade ago, Anwar Raslan, a former colonel in the Syrian Army, was convicted of committing crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison.

Raslan’s tribunal had been held in Koblenz, a city in southwest Germany, two years after Raslan was arrested by German police. Raslan originally sought asylum there in 2014.

German authorities accused Raslan of complicity in crimes against humanity during his tenure in “Branch 251,” the Syrian secret service. Prosecutors claimed that he was personally involved in supervising the torture and sexual assault of at least 4,000 political dissidents and presided over the deaths of nearly 60 prisoners.

The German court opened its session in April 2020. During the trial’s 106 separate hearings, more than 80 witnesses were called to testify about Branch 251’s activities and Raslan’s role in them.

The trial also featured pictures taken by “Caesar,” an anonymous Syrian military photographer who defected in 2013 and smuggled out more than 50,000 photographs documenting terrible conditions and abuses in Syrian prisons. His photographs led to war crimes accusations and contributed to the United States’ decision to impose significant sanctions on Syria under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

During the trial, Raslan’s state-appointed lawyers suggested that the colonel, who defected from Syria in 2012, had never personally engaged in torture and had attempted to help prisoners when possible.

Although the trial concerned a Syrian being tried for crimes against other Syrians that took place within Syria, Germany has claimed a right to hold the trial on the basis of “universal jurisdiction,” a legal principle stating that countries have an obligation to try serious crimes regarding human rights and other universal principles. A similar principle has been used to try heads of state accused of war crimes at international tribunals.

Raslan was originally tried alongside Eyad al-Gharib, a former Syrian intelligence officer who also participated in activities at Branch 251. However, al-Gharib, who was lower in rank than Raslan, had his case separated. Al-Gharib was also convicted of complicity in crimes against humanity and sentenced to four and a half years in prison.

Raslan’s criminal charges were much more expansive. His sentence of life in prison is the most severe punishment in the European Union’s criminal justice system. In a personal statement delivered at the end of the trial, but prior to the verdict’s announcement, the former colonel claimed that he was prepared to accept the court’s decision.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

TNI Staff

North Korean Military, Asia

Scary stuff.

Here's What You Need to Remember: North Korea is also modernizing its armored forces—but the mechanized troops are not the main focus of the regime in Pyongyang. 

While analysts often focus on the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s arsenal of ballistic missiles, the real threat emanating from the North comes in the form of heavy artillery and special operations forces, which could wreak havoc on the South. In the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang’s ground forces are the greatest threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the U.S. forces stationed there—short of nuclear weapons.

“With 70% of the Ground Force positioned south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, North Korea is maintaining a military posture capable of conducting a surprise attack at any time,” reads the South Korean Ministry of National Defense 2014 defense white paper. “In particular, the 170 mm self-propelled guns and 240 mm MRLS [multiple launch rocket systems] in forward positions are capable of surprise, massive concentrated fire on the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA). The 300 mm MRL currently under test development by North Korea is able to reach the middle part of the ROK considering its maximum firing range.”

Additionally, North Korea has reinforced its artillery forces with 122mm towed MLRS systems in the coastal area near the West Sea coast and near the frontlines. The North Korean artillery pieces would be protected by covered trenches to enhance their survivability during combat operations. Altogether, the South Korea estimates that the North has some 8,600 pieces of tube artillery and 5,500 MLRS batteries available to its forces.

Meanwhile, North Korea is also modernizing its armored forces—but the mechanized troops are not the main focus of the regime in Pyongyang. “Equipment modernization is also constantly pursued, such as replacing the existing T-54 and T-55, the main tanks of the armored and mechanized units, with the Chonma-ho and Songun-ho tanks,” the white paper reads. The DPRK has more than 4,300 tanks and 2,500 other armored vehicles at its disposal according to South Korea.

Other than North Korea’s massed dug in artillery forces, Pyongyang’s enormous and well training special operations forces are the most dangerous threat facing the United States and the South. According to U.S. military sources, Pyongyang’s special operations troops are well trained and well equipped and pose a significant danger.

“Special operation forces are currently estimated at 200,000 strong. The special operation forces have a diverse array of strategic, operational, and tactical units, including the 11th Corps, the light infantry division of the forward corps, and light regiment of the forward divisions,” the South Korean white paper reads. “The role of these special operation forces is extended to cover infiltration into the forward and rear areas to strike major units and facilities, assassinations of key personnel, disruption of rear areas and hybrid operations. Infiltration is to be made during a war through underground tunnels, holding areas for infiltration in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), submarines, Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCACs), AN-2 aircraft, helicopters and various other methods.”

Though technologically backwards for the most part—in the event of war—the North Koreans could inflict severe damage to South Korea and the U.S. forces stationed on the peninsula.

This article appeared earlier. It is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

M1 Abrams Tank, Indo-Pacific

The first vehicles from the new Australia-U.S. contract will be delivered in 2024 and are expected to enter service in 2025.

Australia has committed to an arms import deal with the United States to purchase 120 tanks and other armored vehicles.

As reported by the Sydney Morning Herald, Australia seeks to procure seventy-five M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs), twenty-nine explosive-clearing assault breacher vehicles, seventeen assault bridge vehicles, and six armored recovery vehicles as part of a $3.5 billion deal.

“The M1A2 Abrams will incorporate the latest developments in Australian sovereign defence capabilities, including command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems, and benefit from the intended manufacture of tank ammunition in Australia,” said Australia’s Minister for Defense Peter Dutton. “The introduction of the new M1A2 vehicles will take advantage of the existing support infrastructure, with significant investment in Australian industry continuing in the areas of sustainment, simulation and training.” The Australian government clarified that its M1A2 tanks will be of the SEPv3 revision, featuring an improved communications suite, streamlined maintenance protocols, an Ammunition DataLink (ADL) with airburst rounds, and a new Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) setup. The latest version of the M1A2, the SEPv4, is expected to enter testing in 2021.

According to the Australian Defence Magazine, Chief of Army Lieutenant General Rick Burr argued that modernized tanks are essential to the Australian Armed Forces’ interoperability with joint and coalition forces. But the Sydney Morning Herald reported that some Australian security experts are skeptical of Canberra’s procurement decision, noting that heavy armored vehicles do not contribute to the air and naval capabilities crucial to a major military conflict with China. “Tanks are always one of those controversial things - you either love tanks or you hate them,” said Marcus Hellyer, a senior analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. “The issue is not so much ‘should we be getting tanks?’ The issue is we are spending $30-$42 billion overall on armoured vehicles. Is that the right balance of investment across the [Australian Defense Force] ADF?”

The first vehicles from the new Australia-U.S. contract will be delivered in 2024 and are expected to enter service in 2025. The deal comes amid mounting military tensions between Canberra and Beijing, as Australia seeks to build a web of regional defense partnerships to balance against the Chinese Communist Party’s growing geopolitical ambitions. Australia signed a security treaty with Japan, dubbed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), earlier in January. Canberra also entered into the AUKUS trilateral security alliance with Washington and London last year. The alliance, which is widely seen as a measure to contain China, has drawn sharp condemnation from Beijing, with a top Chinese Foreign Ministry official charging that AUKUS "seriously undermines regional peace and stability and intensifies the arms race".

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

There is widespread fear of an escalation of the current Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict into a large and prolonged inter-state war in Europe. This could lead West European governments to agree to Putin’s key demand of reneging on NATO’s future inclusion pledge for Ukraine and Georgia. Should this happen, the West needs to compensate the two countries for the de facto broken 2008 Bucharest NATO summit promise. Ukraine and Georgia as well as Moldova can be provided with official EU membership perspectives and an assurance that Brussels will start accession negotiations once the three republics’ Association Agreements have been implemented.

In his yearly large press conference on 23 December 2021, Vladimir Putin has raised the stakes of Russia’s current confrontation with the West. In barely coded language, the Russian President has announced that Moscow will increase its military posture in Europe, and extend its current covert military invasion of Ukraine: “We must think about the prospects of our own security. We have to keep an eye on what is happening in Ukraine, and on when they might attack.” Putin is threatening Europe with a major war in its east, if Moscow’s demand for “security guarantees” from the West is not met.

This request is as ridiculous as Russia’s alleged worries about a Ukrainian offensive. Russia controls the world’s largest territory, is one of the two supreme nuclear-weapons states, and has one of the three biggest conventional armies. It is thus one of the militarily most secure countries in the world. The Kremlin recently extended Russia’s territory and has the capacity to erase the whole of humanity several times. Yet, Putin and his assistants represent Russia as a beleaguered underdog in fear of deadly assault from outside.

 

Playing Mad

Russian government officials and propaganda outlets are, on a daily basis, hammering into national and world public opinion the message that the Russian state is under an existential threat. Allegedly, NATO’s current cooperation programs and possible further enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus are posing fundamental risks to the future of the Russian nation. They are nothing less than “a matter of life and death for us,” in the words of the Kremlin’s official spokesman Dmitriy Peskov.

To be sure, few people outside Russia are buying into the Kremlin’s paranoid narratives. It is not the tale about NATO, however, but its deep resentment that the Russian leadership is communicating. Putin is purposefully signaling that he may be losing his mind, could snap, and might press the button if provoked. In 2018, the Russian president said: “An aggressor should know that vengeance is inevitable, that he will be annihilated, and we would be the victims of the aggression. We will go to heaven as martyrs, and they will just drop dead.”

Having had to deal with Russian imperialism for centuries, most East Europeans will see through the calculation behind the Kremlin’s warmongering. The US and UK too may not be impressed by Putin’s arguments. They might instead note the risks emanating from Russia’s continued undermining of the worldwide regime to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is an official nuclear-weapons state, legal successor of the USSR, and, as such, together with the US and UK, a founder of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite far-reaching obligations emerging from this status, Moscow has, since 2014, put the purpose of the NPT on its head. Rather than providing security for non-nuclear weapons states, such as Ukraine, the NPT’s provisions have been transmuted into an advantage of an official nuclear-weapons state. The NPT guarantor Russia has increased its territory at the expense of a country forbidden to acquire atomic arms, under this ratified treaty. Moreover, Ukraine had, in the early 1990s, the world’s third larges nuclear warheads arsenal, but chose to give it not only partially, but fully up, in exchange for US, UK, and Russian security assurances, in the now infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum, attached to the NPT.   

The fundamental incoherence and blatant contradictions in Russia’s current stand may not impede its psychological effectiveness in Western Europe, however. Among continental European political and intellectual elites, geopolitical naivety about the functioning of international affairs and simplistic pacifism oblivious of the reasons for war and peace are widespread. It is thus likely that various West European publics, above all the German, will eventually succumb to Russia’s shrill demands.

 

The German Predisposition

Germany is neither a nuclear-weapons state, nor a member of the UN Security Council, nor a signatory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, nor an exporter of any weapons to Ukraine. The German government has thus little contributed in the past and little to offer in the future to increase Ukrainian hard security. Instead, Berlin has, during NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 prevented, the start of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s accession to the North-Atlantic alliance.

The opening of the first Russian-German Nord Stream pipeline in 2011-2012 lowered Russian dependence on Ukraine’s gas transportation system. Nord Stream as well as Turk Stream, a new pipeline through the Black Sea that started operation in 2020, have deprived Kyiv of one of its key instruments of leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. The Nord Stream-2 pipeline scheduled to become operational in 2022-2023 would end any Russian future need for Ukrainian gas transportation capacity and fully free Putin’s hands regarding the recalcitrant “brother nation.”

Despite its ambivalent role in Eastern Europe, Germany has taken in the past and may also in the future assume a lead in the EU’s relations with Russia. Traditionally conciliatory German and other continental West European approaches to Russian imperialism could thus again trump more consistent and principled Western approaches towards Moscow. We might soon see a replay of the scandalous Germany- and France-promoted re-admission of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This controversial 2019 decision was an embarrassing reversal of the initial position that PACE had taken after the start of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. The Russian PACE delegation had been banned from the Assembly in 2014, and none of the conditions for Russia’s readmission had been met five years later. Yet the delegation again became a full part of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in summer 2019.

A similarly awkward West European backtracking could now be in the wings concerning the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit declaration, in which the North-Atlantic alliance had announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become” its members. NATO’s enlargement decisions are taken by full consensus meaning that each member country has the possibility to veto the accession of a new state to the alliance. Against the background of their 2019 behavior in the Council of Europe, it is possible that countries like Germany and France will, regarding NATO’s position toward Kyiv and Tbilisi, show now inconsistency similar to that about Russia’s membership in PACE.

Berlin, Paris, Rome, or/and other West European capitals may start sending public signals that Ukraine’s and Georgia’s future accession to NATO is conditional upon Russia’s agreement, or that the Alliance’s 2008 promise to them was not meant seriously, or even that the crucial message of the Bucharest declaration is null and void. Such a signal would cause disappointment throughout Eastern Europe and constitute a blow to the credibility of NATO. Still, such a course of events seems entirely plausible in view of Putin’s manifest determination to keep Ukraine in Russia’s orbit, and against the backdrop of earlier West European dovishness vis-à-vis the Kremlin.

 

The EU as an Alternative to NATO

If it indeed comes to a new self-denigration of the West and its fundamental values, it would be important that Western Europe does, at least, some reputation repair in Europe’s East. Regarding an im- or even explicit reversal of the North-Atlantic alliance’s 2008 entry promise to Ukraine and Georgia, various forms of bi- or multilateral damage control could be imagined. One can consist of a replacement of a serious NATO accession prospect with an official and written EU membership perspective for Ukraine and Georgia. The offer could be extended to Moldova which is also part of these three countries’ so-called Association Trio within the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, and has, like the other two, undesired Russian troops on its territory. An explicit EU membership perspective could especially smoothen Ukraine’s already third betrayal by the West, in the form of the devaluation of the 1994 NPT founders’ Budapest Memorandum, 2008 NATO members’ Bucharest Declaration, and 2014 demonstrative exclusion of Russia from PACE.

The announcement of an official EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova would not be a big step, in fact. The three countries already possess fully ratified and especially far-reaching EU Association Agreements (AAs). The complicated multi-year implementation of the three AAs de facto constitutes a veiled preparation of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for accession to the Union. A principal inconsistency of the three Agreements signed in 2014 has always been their lack of a membership prospect. The exceptional depth of the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, via the AAs, into the EU’s economic and legal space, is in contradiction to the absence of a statement on the eventual aim of the vast approximation program that these three Agreements are meant to bring about.

Moreover, the EU’s unofficial constitution, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, already states, in its Article 49: “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 [respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities] and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” There can be no doubt that Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are European countries. Georgia, for instance, has one of the oldest Christian churches in Europe.

An official announcement that the three associated countries have the opportunity to become full members of the EU would thus be little more than explicating an already promulgated general provision. In substance, it would change little in the Union’s future relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Sooner or later, the three countries would have – in case they implement their AAs successfully – received official EU membership perspectives, in any way.

Symbolically, however, an official and written confirmation by Brussels of the EU accession prospect for the Association Trio already today would be important. It will constitute an especially appropriate gesture to Ukraine and Georgia once various West European countries start to soften, subvert, or sneak away from, NATO’s 2008 membership promise. A public commitment by the EU could function not only as a psychological compensation, as well as a demonstrative re-affirmation of Western values and solidarity concerning democracy in Europe.

It could also represent an alternative security-political framework for Ukraine and Georgia, as the EU has recently also become an official defense Union. The 2007 EU Treaty’s new Article 42.7 says: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.”

The EU’s mutual aid guarantee is still a weaker security instrument than Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for NATO, to be sure. The EU does not primarily constitute a military alliance and excludes the US as, since 2016, also the UK as nuclear powers. Brussels prefers to use soft rather than hard power in its foreign affairs. Still, the Union’s considerable economic leverage and conventional military strength as well as France’s nuclear capability mean that the EU is, by no means, a mere paper tiger. Against this background, accession of the Association Trio to the EU would lift the three countries out of the geopolitical grey zone they are currently in.

 

Taking the Wind out of Putin’s Sail

Such a course of events would force Putin into a domestic and international oath of disclosure. The EU is perceived as far less threatening around the world, including in Russia’s population, than NATO (whose alleged aggressiveness is a misperception too). The Union’s enlargement cannot easily be portrayed as an existential military security risk to Russia. This makes the Union’s enlargement less geopolitically significant than NATO’s. It would be more easily justifiable vis-à-vis Russia whose various political and other representatives, before and under Putin, have made numerous and even today make occasionally pro-European statements.

Geopolitical dovishness and fundamentalist pacifism are widespread in Western Europe, including Germany. It is to be expected that the coming months will see a softening, in one way or another, of NATO’s 2008 membership commitment to Ukraine and Georgia. The consistency and coherence of NATO’s and its member states’ public communication have already suffered in the past. While the Bucharest Declaration may remain formally in place, the alliance’s credibility could decline even further in 2022. An EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova can save the West’s and especially Western Europe’s face.

Such an announcement would pose a complicated conceptual challenge, to the neo-imperialist Russian elite. The Kremlin’s appetite for inclusion of post-Soviet states and especially of Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence would, to be sure, remain in place. In fact, an EU membership perspective for Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine may be seen as more threatening to the powerholders in the Kremlin than NATO’s accession promise. In view of the high popularity of Europe in Russia, it would suggest to ordinary Russians that the future of post-Soviet states is not predetermined by their common past as parts of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. The Kremlin would thus be as opposed to accession of Ukraine to the EU as to NATO.

Yet, the so-far dominant apology for Russian neo-imperialism – namely, its alleged defensiveness – would become implausible in the case of EU expansion. Conjuring up the image of an allegedly existential security threat to the Russian nation would not easily work regarding a possible new enlargement of the EU to the east. A public offer by Brussels to Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau of the possibility of a future accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to the EU would create an ultimately unsolvable ideological conundrum for Moscow. It would revitalize the all-European integration process, bolster the international reputation of such countries as Germany and France, as well as energize domestic reform processes in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

 

Andreas Umland is an Analyst in the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press in Stuttgart. This article was first published by the French website Desk-Russie.EU.

 

Expected Coverage of Russian S-500 Missile Systems From Kaliningrad, Central Province and Crimea – Militarywatchmagazine.com

Lemberg, known today as Lviv under Ukrainian rule and Lvov/Lwow under former Polish administrations, was the principal city of the region of Galicia that is now split between Ukraine and Poland. The city of Lemberg was the historical name when that region was under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After being part of the front during First World War, Galicia switched hands between several different nations with many of the same residents often experiencing the horrific changeovers, ethnic conflicts, war and genocide. With the end of the Second World War, the region was officially ceded to Stalin’s Soviet Government and many of the residents expelled from their home region. Ethnic tensions were often the catalyst for the various bouts of violence, and were used as a cause de la guerre for regional power politics.

A foreshadowing of further military conflict in the region has been the focus on news reports regarding Russian relations with Ukraine. Russia looks to be seeking a reset of its boundaries in an effort to boost local support for its Government and play on national concerns of historic threats to Russia coming from Western powers. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, nations that were once controlled from Moscow and acted as a physical barrier to Germany and NATO were now becoming part of NATO. This placed NATO weapons and radar systems closer to Russia’s borders. The Ukraine, as one of the largest countries in Central/Eastern Europe, was always a large barrier between Russia and the West. Ukraine was always the focus of Moscow’s leadership in negotiations with NATO, placing Ukraine at a distance when NATO had no reservations accepting Poland, the Czechs or Hungarians into their fold.

Modern Russian expansion policy often takes place for tactical reasons, but is shrouded in claims of ethnic divisions in border regions between local people and local citizens of Russian descent living in the disputed territories. Conflicts between Russia and Georgia were based in this policy and lead to a short conflict. Russia assaulting and occupying Crimea also came from a similar catalyst, but it was well regarded as a strategic move as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was always stationed at Sebastopol; even when under Ukraine’s Government, and is considered a key historic battle ground for Russia’s Government and people.

With Russian influence waning in Ukraine’s Government after the 2014 elections, Russian support for separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine started to mirror Russian moves on Crimea a few months earlier. While political tactics lead to a takeover without much violent conflict in Crimea, heavy fighting took place between Russian supported forces and Ukrainian Defence Forces in the Donbas region. The conflict spilled outside the region and garnered international attention when Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot down by a SA-11 BUK missile over the disputed territory, killing all abroad while the flight was peacefully making its journey from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

News of the larger conflict was reduced when the shooting down of MH17 occurred. In the past, international condemnation of the Soviet Union when its SU-15 fighter plane shot down a Korean Airlines 747 with two missiles lead to a permanent scar on Soviet relations with the rest of the world in the 1980s. This is said to have contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, and President Putin likely was aware of this effect. Blame for the act was mixed with hidden information and spin, and created a blueprint for hiding the blame for these types of murders by military equipment when it occurred again over Iran in January of 2020.

The focus on relations with Russia changed drastically as Russia gave direct military support to Syria in combatting what they likely saw as fascist elements trying to overthrow the Assad Regime after months of gains by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The US and other allies rhetorically opposed Russia’s increased influence in the Middle East, but did little to counter it, and coordinated with Russian Forces to avoid conflict and perhaps target their mutual enemy. Power politics in the Middle East shifted with Russian Armed Forces participating in the conflict, and showed that the US and Europeans were no longer to be depended on for full support. The long term effect was not only to legitimise Russian Foreign Policy actions in the region, but also took the focus off the Donbas and made US Foreign Policy appear as it was entering a phase of decline.

With a weak United States after the Afghanistan pullout, Russia is likely taking the opportunity to rearm and renegotiate the terms of its historical deal post Soviet Union in Europe. Russian fuel to Western Europe, combined with their influence in the Middle East and modernising military with S-500 missiles has been countered by US military aid to Poland and Ukraine, but has received little attention by media in the United States over the last few years. The Donbas has almost become a forgotten issue outside of Eastern Europe, and current posturing by President Putin may be successful as Americans would never support sending troops to fight in a muddy field in Ukraine when they have daily local political drama to contend with, to Russia’s benefit. While the value of the Donbas region may be limited to a large country like Russia, the current state of global affairs may the the biggest catalyst for the conflict, and Russia is likely using it to expand its distance from NATO to gain local support. Its a situation that will not be resolved by foreshadowing a hot war, insults, nor lost lives of soldiers or locals, but through appropriate and measured foreign policy measures.

Though much has changed in the years since the end of the Second World War, much of the thinking in America’s mainline foreign policy has remained the same. Many Americans look out into the world as if the United States was the lone nation capable of taking on the world’s most daunting challenges, and, as a consequence, many expect the U.S to address major problems independent of cooperation from other nations. The reality, however, is that times have changed- while the United States remains the world’s greatest power, the rise of China, India, and Brazil, and the consolidation of Europe has given rise to a slowly growing list of nations or blocs that are capable of playing a significant role in true global governance. 

Faced with the prospect of rising powers, including some potential rivals, the United States has two meaningful options. First, the U.S. could choose to face this new reality head on and work collaboratively with emerging nations. Or, second, The United States could ignore the development of these nations and potential partners, instead attempting to carry the same amount of global responsibility with relatively less capacity.

Despite important questions about China’s continued rise, the world is slowly returning to a bipolar, or even multipolar order. Put more directly, the gap in “power” (defined as economic, military and even soft power) between the United States is smaller today than it was at the end of the Second World War, or even at the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that today’s America is somehow weaker than the United States was in the 1950’s or 80’s- instead, it is meant to highlight the fact that other nations have grown more quickly between now and those historical moments.

In light of this, it is more important now than it has been at any time in recent memory for the United States to double down on its diplomatic efforts. India and Brazil have both seen astonishing growth since the 1980’s, and both nations have strong, if sometimes flawed, democracies. It is already important to have cooperation from these nations on global issues like climate change and halting the withdrawal of democracy globally. As these nations continue to develop both economically and politically, it will prove even more important for the United States to have a positive relationship with both countries. 

A similar thing should be said about America’s partnerships with the nations in Europe. The troubling situation along the Ukrainian border proves the value of NATO membership, and it comes at a vital moment for Europe following a changing of the guard in Germany and the recency of Brexit.The United States would be wise to resolidify its commitment to NATO and work to promote a politically unified, democratic Europe. Through close relations and thoughtful negotiations, European partners may continue to increase their contributions to NATO.

While these developments have presented new opportunities, they also present a new set of challenges. China has emerged as a global power with undeniable influence and a global vision that is at odds with the Liberal free-market tendencies of the United States. Russia, though certainly not a rising power, has interfered in American elections and continues to disrupt international norms. Other nations like Iran and North Korea, present threats to international stability in a more acute way. Non-state actors like ISIS present a new sort of threat entirely.

Perhaps it is possible that continued economic development in China creates a middle class that actively desires democracy, as some predicted in the early 2000’s. Maybe China’s economy will stall out, and the famed “Grand Bargain” between the CCP and the Chinese people will collapse. It is also entirely possible that China will continue its economic development in the face of the harsh civic and political repression suffered by many Chinese people. In any event, a strong web of partnerships and alliances for the US could serve to both entice China into better behavior or, at a minimum, deter the worst imaginings of China’s global ambitions. A similar list of potential outcomes could be suggested for each of the other problem areas mentioned above, and in every circumstance, the United States will be more effective having strong and consistent partners. 

I have been careful to focus on the upsides of what could take place if the United States walks face first into the emerging bipolar world, but the downsides of failing to do so can be summarized pretty simply. If the United States attempts to take on the full weight of international leadership without cooperation from a long list of committed partners, it will result in overextension, which could bring about the sort of decline that presents a real threat not only to America’s international interests, but to democracy more broadly.

This is why it is important for individual Americans to participate in elections, and remain informed about important issues in both domestic and foreign policy. The next few decades represent a turning point in so many important ways, as climate change, the retreat of democracy, and the rise of China, India, and Brazil all come to a head. Faced with so much uncertainty and so many opportunities, the United States would be wise to make as many friends as it can.

—
Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

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