EUFutures Research Network Workshop
Litigation Strategies at a Time of Digital Transformation: New Directions of EU Law
(Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA, 2 May 2024)
How can we explain the successes and failures of interest groups in the European Union (EU) when they choose to litigate in the digital field, bottom-up?
On 2 May 2024, a group of academics and early-stage researchers gathered in Science Po Grenoble – UGA to try and find an answer to the question above, to open a wider conversation on the emerging issues of litigation at a time of digital transformation, and even more broadly, to discuss the future direction of EU (digital) law. Kindly organised by the UACES/James Madison Trust funded EUFutures Research Network, the workshop provided a forum for both senior and junior scholars to exchange ideas and build synergies. Speakers included: Maria Tzanou (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield), Kris van der Pas (Postdoctoral researcher, Tilburg University), Maria Magierska (PhD Researcher, European University Institute), Oles Andriychuk, (Professor of Law, University of Newcastle), Giulia Gentile (Lecturer in Law, Essex Law School), Ivanka Karaivanova (PhD Researcher, European University Institute), Sarah Tas, (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University), Adrian Kuenzler (Assistant Professor, Zürich University), Mathieu Fasel (Phd Candidate, University of Lausanne), Elaine Fahey (Professor of Law, City, University of London), Sabine Saurugger (Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA, PACTE) and Fabien Terpan (Professor of Law, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA, CESICE).
The event consisted of four ‘strategically’ compiled panels, which provided a diversity in terms of legal fields but also heterogeneity in the research stage of participants. For the more junior scholars, in particular, the workshop delivered a calm environment to present their research and gain valuable feedback on their ongoing projects, either doctoral or post-doctoral.
The first panel’s overarching objective was to shed light on strategic litigation in the context of EU data protection law. Covering a broad array of legal knots under the procedural arrangements laid down in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the panel questioned what the main features and characteristics of this strategic litigation are, what makes data protection litigation ‘strategic’ and what this litigation potentially has missed out (Tzanou). The conversation then turned to explore why the actors of strategic litigation do (or do not) choose an EU (extra-)legal avenue through the lenses of the utilisation of the EU remedies system by civil society actors in the field of data protection (Van der Pas). Finally, the panellists highlighted the role of NGOs as a specific player and their role as ‘early flaggers’, ‘protectors’ and ‘quasi-enforcers’ of the GDPR, arguing that their conduct effectively places them as indispensable actors in the political and legal procedures’ setting (Magierska).
The second panel combined presentations on fundamental rights law, consumer protection law and competition law. Ultimately, it was suggested that the EU case law on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ application in the digital environment offers interesting insights on the experimentalist theory on the effectiveness of human rights, whereby the long-term nature of the impact of fundamental rights appears nonetheless at odds with the fast-paced dynamics of the digital environment (Gentile). A conceptual argument was made that contrary to what is stated is the Digital Markets Act (DMA) itself and to what is acknowledged in EU law more generally, the DMA does not envisage a comprehensive, but a selective –and thus only public – enforcement (Andriychuk). It was further claimed that such interventionist and all-inclusive rules can only be justified by ‘public policy’, ‘societal interests’, ‘political reasonableness’ considerations. A similar plea was put forward with respect to consumer protection where evidence of the EU’s intervention in the domestic enforcement of EU law was presented, most recently with the Digital Services Act (DSA), which, de facto, devotes the majority of its provisions to the administrative regulation and channels enforcement into the public domain (Karaivanova). By looking into specific examples of constraints in the judicial protection on digital consumer’s matters, the potential of the national public authorities to fill the litigation gaps in the domain was demonstrated.
The DSA and DMA were also the focus of the discussions during the next, third panel. It was highlighted that while there are a significant number of cases relating to data protection brought forward by NGOs, there is a relative scarcity of legal actions concerning content moderation (Tas). However, the DSA is expected to considerably stir collective actions against online platforms for the flaws of their content moderation systems, removing some of the procedural barriers faced by NGOs in the past. The DSA is certainly trying to better protect users and guaranteeing legal certainty across the European single market. (Fazel). However, the fact that it has become the sole reference text on digital regulation for social media platforms places all the more weight and responsibility on the DSA and its implementation. The conversation then took a turn to competition law with a novel take on the recent CJEU jurisprudence relating to Big Tech companies (Kuenzler). It was argued that while the competition law investigations are not necessarily explicit in recognising the distinct role of consumers in concentrated markets, the investigations are in fact best understood as an effort to ‘clear the channels of consumer influence’. By doing that, they will further be able to allow digital markets to benefit from an intensified extent of administrative action taken on behalf of consumers.
The fourth and final panel, on the one hand, considered EU Law as global governance, focusing on movements of consumers between regimes, strategic litigation by Big Tech across jurisdictions and Big Tech’s lobbying across jurisdictions with respect to regulatory standards (Fahey). On the other hand, the panel highlighted that even though the EU external commitments are rarely challenged by the Court, this was not the case with the EU-US frameworks for data transfer (Saurugger and Terpan). And not only that they were challenged but they were successfully challenged – the CJEU, through rulings indirectly triggered by public interest groups, invalidated the Safe Harbour and later the Privacy Shield. But how can we explain the success of litigation strategies while so many factors pushed in the opposite direction? Answering this question will provide an understanding of the conditions leading to successful litigation strategies, especially those pursued by public interest groups, in the EU and beyond.
All in all, the conference demonstrated, firstly, how integration through law in the EU has shifted decidedly towards a court-centric perspective. Secondly, it successfully bridged the gap between the most recent developments of EU digital law and the established routes of litigation strategies of interest groups. Finally, it tried to predict the future direction of the EU digital transformation following the emergence of the Single Market to a Digital Single Market and considered the potential successes of strategic litigation. The conversation will continue during the UACES Annual Conference in Trento, Italy in September 2024. The contributions will be published at the end of 2024 in the Nordic Journal of European Law, Special Issue 4 entitled ‘EU law in the era of digitisation: on strategic litigation causes, actors and processes’.
The post Workshop Report: Litigation Strategies at a Time of Digital Transformation: New Directions of EU Law appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
This piece was originally posted as part of the UK Election Analysis project. Do visit for lots of other pieces on all aspects of the 2024 General Election.
Given that the past decade of British politics has arguably been shaped by the question of Europe more than any other single issue, one might have expected to find the matter to be front and centre in the election campaign. The economic and social consequences of Brexit still reverberate, with profound dissatisfaction among the general public about how it has been handled and with previously strong advocates on both sides of the Leave-Remain divide still very present in the political debate. And yet, Brexit and present and future relations with the European Union (EU) were almost entirely absent from both the long and short election campaigns. How might we explain this and what consequence will it have for the new government?
Nothing to see here; move along
To some extent, the difficulties of European policy for the government provided a strong reason not to dwell on the topic in the post-Johnson period: the issue had been caught up with the ex-Prime Minister and both Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak wanted to change the conversation as part of an attempted refresh. For Sunak, the conclusion of the Windsor Framework deal in early 2023 and then the publication of the Strengthening the Union Command Paper in February (which opened the door to the resumption of the Northern Ireland Executive) drew a line under matters, allowing him to argue the fundamentals of the relationship with the EU were now settled and agreed.
For their part, Labour had long been content to let the Conservatives tear themselves up over Brexit and as they rose in the polls, there appeared to be an incentive in not pushing any particular line on the issue, mostly for fear of alienating disillusioned Leave/Conservative voters. As much as there were some grumbling on all sides about the policy of ‘make Brexit work’, it offered some reassurance that improvements could be made, without overturning the basic choice made in the 2016 referendum.
The result was a tacit ceasefire on the issue between the two main parties: neither leader voluntarily used the topic in their head-to-head TV debates – even the question asked about it in the final debate saw minimal discussion – and there were only passing mentions in the fine print of the manifestos.
Moreover, smaller parties also seemed to have made a similar decision. The Liberal Democrats and Greens retained their position of rejoining the EU, but neither put it at the heart of their campaigning, in stark contrast to 2019. On the other side of the debate, Reform UK also subsumed European matters into one small part of their general critique of mainstream politics, their manifesto more a list of complaints than a policy.
The only exceptions were found in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The SNP was more proactive about the failure of Brexit as part of Westminster’s failure of Scotland and about the need for EU membership as part of an independent Scottish future. In Northern Ireland, the Windsor Framework produced much self-justification from the DUP and criticism from the TUV, as well as being prominent across the community as a key part of the economic and political landscape.
Perhaps the best marker of all of this came on 23rd June, the eighth anniversary of the referendum vote. Whereas in previous years there had been notable amounts of public debate and discussion, this time there was only a half-hearted probing of Labour’s policy.
What happens in Brussels doesn’t stay in Brussels
As much as the key political figures in the election did not want to discuss relations with the EU, it is also clear that the new government will not have so much choice in the matter.
The European Political Community summit at Blenheim Palace on 18th July will be an early reminder of this, as Prime Minister Starmer welcomes leaders from across the continent and will have to decide how much he offers beyond warm words. While there will be understanding that he has only just entered the job, his ability to start delivering on action will also be noted.
Part of this might involve movement on a new security pact with Germany, modelled on the Lancaster House arrangements with France, for which Labour has already laid some groundwork. But this bilateral move will not remove the need to engage on issues as diverse as carbon pricing, fishery quotas, Northern Ireland consent to the Protocol and the general review of the main EU-UK treaty in the coming 18 months. Despite Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s flash tour of European capitals immediately after the election, talk of a non-binding security pact with the EU leaves matters very open.
Add to this the potential changes the EU itself will be undergoing in the next period of time and it is clear that not having an active interest and engagement with European affairs might prove to be a false economy for the new government. The consolidation of the radical right in the European Parliament and the constraining of the French political system following the legislative election, as well as the general day-to-day production of new EU legislation, will all produce impacts on the UK, which remains unavoidably exposed to the developments of its closest and largest neighbour. Whether Labour has an effective playbook to manage this will become apparent soon enough.
The post The sleeping dog of ‘Europe’: UK relations with the EU as a non-issue appeared first on Ideas on Europe.