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Over the last decade the economic prospects facing European workers have changed. For most, it’s been a change for the worse: less job security, less wage growth, more low-paid work, erosion of pensions and healthcare, and increased fears about future employment prospects, particularly for young people.

The ‘gig economy’ – in which people hold several temporary, part-time or on-demand jobs rather than working for a single employer – is a new element with an uncertain future impact on the labour market. But it must be seen in the context of the longer-term trend of rising labour market insecurity and inequality that has plagued Europe for more than a decade.

The gig economy – also known as the online platform / on-demand / collaborative / sharing economy – involves only a very small portion of the total European workforce, according to the best available data. While claims abound that large numbers engage in such work, evidence shows those assertions typically refer to a wide range of ‘independent work’, of which only a small portion is arranged through online platforms.

It is nonetheless part of a continuum of erosion of long-standing employment relationships that are based on open-ended contracts between workers and employers that provide important rights and social benefits. The rise of involuntary part-time and involuntary temporary work, and increasing use of subcontracting, undeclared work and disguised employment relationships, means that gig work is part of larger challenge facing Europe.  Policy responses should address the need for an overall rebalancing of rights and social protection for working people and tackle the widespread erosion of quality employment.

Forces contributing to this erosion include the huge expansion of the global labour force after China joined the global economy and the Soviet-led communist bloc collapsed, and technological change that reduced demand for certain types of labour while increasing the types of work that could be shifted across borders. These changes shifted bargaining power away from workers and towards employers.

This supply and demand change is global, but the impact on working and living standards has varied widely between countries. That is because outcomes in labour markets depend on the rules set by national governments and the steps they take to define rights, support incomes and steer their economies in ways that take account of the needs of working households.  Some governments have failed to address these needs and instead adopted policies that favour owners of capital, already beneficiaries of the structural shift in labour supply and demand. The European Commission has the power to set minimum standards or guide states’ actions, but in general its reaction has been fragmented at best, and at worst indifferent to the increasing difficulties facing working households.

“Policies should address the need for an overall rebalancing of rights and social protection for working people”

Policy solutions include labour laws, social protection systems and macroeconomic measures. Labour laws and regulations must enshrine clear and broad definitions of employment that cover full- and part-time work, temporary and open-ended contracts, and non-standard forms of work.  They must make it difficult for employers to evade labour laws or avoid the payment of social insurance contributions – a practice facilitated by engaging workers on short-term contracts or short hours, or misclassifying employees as independent contractors.  It is important that labour laws avoid introducing ‘cliff edges’ whereby workers can be denied rights and benefits if they work less than a certain number of hours or have a limited-term contract.

With respect to labour engaged by online platform firms for their own profit, that too is employment and it must be defined and treated as such. Clarifying and closing loopholes in the definition of employment would guarantee the ability of all workers to organise and bargain on their own behalf and benefit from social insurance, including those in the gig economy.

The proposed European Pillar of Social Rights – a European Commission plan to ensure fair employment opportunities, working conditions and social protection – should provide a strong and unambiguous guarantee that the status of employee will be accorded to all who labour for remuneration under the control or direction of others.

Social protection measures have also been weakened by the fragmentation or denial of such employment relationships. Pensions, unemployment insurance and (in some countries) health insurance systems that depend on contributions by employers and employees have been cornerstones of the economic security of European working households for half a century or more. They have underpinned economic stability and prosperity.

But these automatic ‘stabilisers’ have been undermined by employers who no longer contribute because they use temporary contracts, reduce hours below qualifying minimums, misclassify employees as independent contractors or simply do not declare work performed for them. Many firms that profit from gig work have avoided making social contributions altogether, robbing people of the security to which they are entitled.

Insurance schemes are now underfunded at a time when ageing populations and persistent high unemployment have made them more essential than ever. Clarifying the breadth of the employment relationship is a necessary step towards restoring the financial integrity of these important social benefits and ensuring that they provide coverage for current and future generations.

“The political shocks of 2016 should not have been a surprise, given what has been happening in European labour markets”

The fact that some workers may have multiple employers or work intermittently can be easily addressed through the electronic software that currently tracks their work, authorises payments and takes profits.  It is simply a matter of using laws and regulations to require companies to do this and updating national social insurance systems to receive such data and contributions. Such updates could also be linked to reporting and collection of other taxes, which would help to level the playing field between responsible employers and evaders.

It is also important to reform the non-contributory social benefit schemes that are funded from general revenue. These safety nets will always be needed for those people who cannot participate in social insurance or whose low income histories make the benefits from those schemes inadequate. Built-in thresholds that cut off social benefits when recipients start to work should be replaced by graduated eligibility, providing both adequate income security and positive incentives for participating in the labour market.

A supplementary EU-wide unemployment insurance scheme should be created to support countries or regions during periods of high unemployment. This would be analogous to the United States’ federal unemployment scheme, which has been credited with boosting economic recovery.

On a macroeconomic level European austerity has strongly depressed demand for labour and kept unemployment rates high in most countries. EU, national, and Eurozone austerity measures also reduced income and social safety nets for low- and middle-income households in many countries, further spreading economic hardship. This has left many people desperate for incomes and more likely to accept precarious employment, having a further negative impact on the labour market situation and household anxiety in Europe.

And this leads to a larger point: what does the European Union represent today for middle- and low-income European households?  For young adults who want to work but are unable to find good jobs? For distressed regions and communities across the Union? The political shocks of 2016 should not have been a surprise, given what has been happening in European labour markets for the last decade or more. There were only two surprises: that the political protest took so long to materialise and that, so far, only right-wing demagogues have taken advantage of the widespread economic anxiety.

Meanwhile many centre-left and centre-right governments and the EU continued to give unjustified support to so-called ‘market-based responses’ – measures that increased returns to capital holders who were already gaining larger shares of national incomes based on global and technological forces. Many people predicted that this self-reinforcing vicious circle would provoke social unrest or a political backlash. And now it has. Europe is truly at a crossroads.

The European Pillar of Social Rights presents an opportunity to adjust the course in ways that would be visible and comprehensible to the European public. If we are serious about tackling the economic malaise and insecurity facing much of Europe, the steps on employment status and social protection systems proposed here should be adopted swiftly, implemented as a matter of urgency and aggressively enforced.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / Flickr – Jon Crel

The post We must tackle long-term job insecurity, not just the excesses of the ‘gig economy’ appeared first on Europe’s World.

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Nicola Sturgeon’s bold move on Monday threatens to reopen a diplomatic dilemma that the Spanish government thought was dead and buried. Should a second referendum lead to a break-up of the UK, a new independent Scotland would request to stay inside (or instantly rejoin) the EU. For that, it would need the support of all remaining member states, including Spain.

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China’s New Maritime Silk Road policy poses geostrategic challenges and offers some opportunities for the US and its allies in Asia-Pacific. To offset China’s westward focus, the US seeks to create a global alliance strategy with the aim to maintain a balance of power in Eurasia, to avoid a strong Russia-China or China-EU partnership fostered on economic cooperation. For the EU, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative by improving infrastructure may contribute to economic development in neighbouring countries and in Africa but present also risks in terms of unfair economic competition and increased Chinese domination. Furthermore, China’s behaviour in the South China Sea and rebuff of the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in July 2016, put the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at risk with possible consequences to freedom of the seas. Increasing relations with China could also affect EU-US relations at a time of China-US tension. To face these challenges, a stronger EU, taking more responsibility in Defence and Security, including inside NATO, is needed.
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Plenary sessions : Polish MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NA) will receive a “commensurate penalty” for his unacceptable remarks about the gender pay gap, as soon as an investigation into them has been completed, promised President Tajani at the opening. This language, which “offended every woman in this house” will not be tolerated, he insisted, to loud applause.

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Plenary sessions : Polish MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NA) will receive a “commensurate penalty” for his unacceptable remarks about the gender pay gap, as soon as an investigation into them has been completed, promised President Tajani at the opening. This language, which “offended every woman in this house” will not be tolerated, he insisted, to loud applause.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Ever since the rise of the Christian Democrats (CDA) in the beginning of the 2000′s, the issue of ‘Normen en Waarden’ has been a topic in the elections. Jan Peter Balkenende was the first to frame the problems in Dutch society as the result of individualistic attitudes propagated by the preceding cabinets. As with a lot of electoral rhetoric, there was no precise definition of what the problem was, but to be sure the answer was a return to ‘Dutch Values’ (Normen en Waarden). A standard question in interviews and election debates has since been: ‘Dear party leader, what do you see as Dutch Values?’ And today, it is not Geert Wilders, but the current leader of the same party who brought up the idea of having Dutch children  stand to attention and sing the national anthem with hand to heart.

Normen en Waarden is identity politics in its most embryonic form. At the same time, it’s more complicated than that. Let’s take a few minutes to explore the Dutch identity.

Proud to be Dutch? In football, perhaps.

No Dutch national in my department at the University of Groningen would even think about describing himself or herself as ‘Dutch’. There is, outside of football, no such thing as ‘proudly Dutch’. My favourite description remains: ‘Being Dutch means that your practical approach to life and politics leads you to dismiss idiotic questions such as “What does it mean to be Dutch?” ‘ But why is it so difficult to discuss Dutch identity? As a legal scholar, I would like to leave the issue of shared language and history to those better equipped to discuss that point, and content myself to propose a constitutionalist view on this.

Let us accept that most national identities are merely social constructs. A way to differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’. There are many ways in which this can be done. One of the most prominent ways in which identity is formed is through an (implicit) social contract. The Jewish people are probably one of the oldest examples. They have a contract with God, giving laws and binding them as a (his) people. The American Constitution is a similar contract, between the people and itself. ‘We, the people {…}’. Although history has made it problematic for Germans to approach national identity in the same way, the contractual character of the ‘Grundgesetz’, the freedoms it protects and the position of the Constitutional Court strongly contribute to form the social bond across the nation.

Conversely, when identity becomes problematic, we see a reliance on these contracts in an attempt to secure unity. For the time being, the Catalans are kept within greater Spain through reliance on clauses in the Constitution. In the ‘Better Together’ campaign in the UK, the history of the ‘Act of Union’ surfaced multiple times.

Constitutions are, amont all the other things that they can be, the testament of one singular moment in which a people have declared that they are one. They do so by declaring what values they share. (To put it a bit more honestly, constitutions tell the story of why you are better than all your neighbours, who can therefore NOT be part of your club.) Strangely, the Netherlands, despite plenty of suitable moments in their history, never explicitly put into writing ‘who we are’.

The ‘Plakkaat van Verlatinghe’ – not really a constitution.

Recently, the leader of the Christian Democrats referred to the ‘Plakkaat van Verlatinghe’, our Declaration of Independence of 1581. Fair enough, but the Plakkaat is actually a very pragmatic declaration listing the reasons to secede from the Spanish crown. Later, when the end of the Napoleonic era brought a fear in the Dutch well-to-do and nobility that we needed to have a monarchy to secure stability, there no ‘national moment’ either behind the introduction of the monarchy. If anything that identity was forged after Willem I (to whose patronym, by the way, we owe the orange jerseys of our football team) was put into place. The constitutions from 1815 until 1848 reflect this practical approach. They deal with organising the state, the relationship between King and Parliament, and a very short rights catalogue. Where the other nations of Europe were in the throws of revolution, identity shaping events, we were going the other way.

The value of the constitution remains ambiguous to this day. It is not a social contract amongst the Dutch. The values that lie therein are of a practical nature, all can be moderated and limited as it suits the situation. Dutch children are rarely taught what constitutional values mean. And why should they? The Dutch courts are prohibited from testing laws against the constitution. There is no possibility for constitutional review. All discussions on this point are, in a very Dutch and practical manner, waved away. Dutch courts can make use of international treaties to test acts by government, thereby securing rights. But that means that courts are implementing outside values, not Dutch ones. Nor is there a Constitutional Court which can pronounce on what Dutch constitutional values are. From the perspective of the constitutionalist, it isn’t possible to say what it means to be Dutch, because the Dutch have never taken the time to write it down.

Does it at all matter? On the one hand, the debate on Dutch identity has never really bothered citizens to a great extent, the ambiguity seems to suit them well. To most voters, the discussion will therefore remain a purely hypothetical one. I would dare say that even if the CDA forces the point of mandatory anthem singing, most people will just not do it. On the other hand, the rise of populism has made it clear that there are some problems with the Dutch system. We say that we hold certain values dear, but there is no way in which to enforce them. A populist majority can implement discriminatory laws without engaging with the constitution. If judges oppose them, they may be blamed as ‘enemies of the people’, as the UK and the US are now teaching us. It has been said that since the ‘Golden Age’ the Netherlands have benefited from borders that were open to people, ideas and money, but this isn’t reflected in any (judicially enforceable) system. Dutch children are told that racism and discrimination are prohibited, but if we need to tell them why, there isn’t an easy document to which we can point: “Yes it is also in the constitution, but that doesn’t really matter. However, please have a look at these bylaws that implement international agreements.”

The hilarious ‘Netherlands Second!’ clip (click on the picture). Is self-mocking irony typically Dutch?

If the Dutch really want to know what it means to be Dutch, they should try and write it down. Without a text of reference, the political debate about the identity question is as vague as it is useless. This being said, in the current climate writing this text would certainly not be a walk in the park, and I would not recommend opening such a debate right now. Until today, the ambiguity and flexibility of our national identity has served us rather well.

The post What makes the Dutch Dutch? A constitutional perspective. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Dealing with riots in Rotterdam and being compared to the Nazis by the Turkish president was probably not how Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte expected to spend the final weekend before the Netherlands’ general election. But Dutch politics are rarely predictable.

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Britain’s decision to leave the European Union will mark a ‘reset’ moment for immigration policy.

In her major Brexit speech at Lancaster House in January, British Prime Minister Theresa May vowed to prioritise immigration control in any deal she strikes with the EU. This ended speculation that free movement may continue in some form, and closed the door on continued membership of the single market.

But while control over immigration will be one of May’s ‘red lines’ in the negotiations, she has also said that she wants to get the best possible deal for the economy, which means maximising access to European markets.

So while Britain’s policy on EU migration looks certain to change, a constructive new deal with the EU, covering both trade and immigration, has not been ruled out. From a British perspective the deal must work in the interests of our politics as well as our economy, and remain attractive to our negotiating partners.

The British public has lost confidence in how governments have managed immigration. Successive governments failed to predict, prepare or plan for the largest migration wave in British history, after the EU expanded eastwards in 2004. They then broke, and broke again, a pledge to cut the net migration numbers dramatically.

Most people, however, are clear that they blame the politicians, not the migrants themselves. British Future’s post-referendum research shows that the public combines scepticism about the current system with moderate, nuanced views on the right migration policy to replace it after Brexit.

“Most people, however, are clear that they blame the politicians, not the migrants themselves”

Two-thirds of those surveyed would like fewer unskilled workers in future, but only one-in-four would cut the number of those who come to work in care homes. Only a fifth of people want to cut skilled or student migration – rather more people would prefer the numbers of migrant nurses, doctors and scientists to increase. 84% believe European nationals currently living in Britain must be told they remain welcome in the UK.

There is no public support for an indiscriminate anti-immigration crackdown. Broad majorities are open to arguments about how both to manage the pressures and secure the gains of immigration.

Three-quarters of people – including a striking 80% of Leave and Ukip voters – now see Brexit as offering an opportunity to get the balance right: to have more choice and control over who comes to Britain while keeping the immigration that is good for our economy and society, and maintaining our tradition of offering sanctuary to refugees.

These attitudes present an opportunity for a deal based on pragmatic consensus, even on this most noisily polarised of all public policy issues. Seizing this opportunity would help to rebuild public confidence that immigration and integration make a positive contribution to Britain.

That chance will be lost if the Article 50 negotiating clock were to run out with no agreement. In that scenario the UK would logically fall back on treating EU and non-EU migration similarly. This would probably lead to loosening the current non-EU regime to secure the inflow of migrant skills the economy needs. This would be a political failure, not just for Theresa May but for German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other EU leaders too.

However, this is not the only alternative to full freedom of movement.

A new UK immigration system for EEA nationals – offering preferential European access to the UK labour market as part of a UK deal on trade with the EU – would be a constructive offer as the UK seeks to negotiate a positive post-EU partnership.

“A new UK immigration system for EEA nationals would be a constructive offer”

A version of free movement could continue, reciprocally, for those with a job above a particular salary or qualification threshold. This would be supplemented by quotas for low-skilled migration, set annually by Parliament after public hearings with employers and local communities. This kind of solution would offer the UK control over the immigration that voters care most about.

The first option to fill the low-skilled migrant quotas would be to make a preferential offer to Britain’s trade partners. While this model could work for future UK trade negotiations with countries like Australia, India and Canada, it would make sense to offer such a preferential trade and migration deal to our European neighbours first.

Such a proposal could secure broad political and public support in Britain. It would bring unskilled migration under UK’s own control while still accepting, under the new rules, some of the low-skilled workers from Europe that businesses need.

It would reflect popular support for skilled and student migration and move us away from a net migration target that has only served to undermine public confidence in the immigration system. It could help to rebuild that trust, showing how a controlled migration policy could keep Britain open to the skills that we need and want.

This is obviously not freedom of movement as it stands, so it would not secure unaltered single market access for the UK. But it would give the EU-27 considerably more access to the UK labour market than if the negotiations were to end in failure.

And, importantly, it would be a positive, constructive offer to put on the negotiating table when the UK sits down with the EU to thrash out a deal.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr.com – John O’Nolan

The post What are Britain’s post-Brexit migration options? appeared first on Europe’s World.

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
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The substantial progress made in the Cyprus peace negotiations over the past 20 months risks falling short of success, as politics and grievances resurface, writes Fadıl Ersözer. He argues that true political leadership is required from both sides to achieve a lasting solution, and that the European Union as a framework can still be an incentive in facilitating a workable federated Cyprus.

The Green Line in Nicosia, CC-BY-NC-2.0

Cyprus is home to one of the longest-running unresolved conflicts in the world. The conflict has been ‘frozen’ by a ceasefire since the division of the island in 1974, but without resolution of the political and territorial contestations. The UN-supported peace talks aimed at establishing a two-state federation since late 1970s have repeatedly failed, as Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides have interpreted concepts such as ‘federalism’ and ‘political equality’ very differently.

With the efforts of consecutive Secretaries-General and countless diplomats down the drain, George Mikes once famously stated that ‘The Cypriots know that they cannot become a World Power; but they have succeeded in becoming a World Problem, which is almost as good’.

A potential game-changer could be the European Union. The Greek Cypriot-run Republic of Cyprus applied for membership in 1990 and got the answer ‘conflict resolution before membership’. However, after a decade, this approach changed from a condition of EU accession to mere rhetoric, principally over the risk that Greece might have vetoed the entire eastern enlargement.

Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot side, whose Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognised by any county except Turkey, was attracted to the prospect of EU membership. The talks gained noteworthy momentum in early 2000s. However, the Greek Cypriot government’s reassurances that it would do everything possible to support the UN-sponsored reunification plan before EU accession did not materialise.

Having secured EU membership without the need to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots were not inclined to share power. Instead they played for time, waiting for a future deal on more beneficial terms. As a result, while Greek Cypriots celebrated EU accession in the South a week after the overwhelming ‘No’ vote (76 per cent) in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum on a peace deal, Turkish Cypriots, who voted in favour of the plan (65 per cent) were plunged into disappointment and continuing uncertainty.

While the EU’s influence in pushing for a resolution was severely limited after accession, the Union still has a useful role in play in achieving a united Cyprus. In particular, the EU’s supranational level adds a third level of governance to the two levels of a potential federation (federal and state). Such a multilayered architecture would offer institutional flexibilities in striking a balance between the competing needs for unity and autonomy.

For example, a federal Cyprus would be a sovereign state, but it component sub-states could represent themselves at the EU level on matters on which they have competence, such as regional issues. Additionally, the EU provides a promising environment to consolidate peace after reunification, where notions of sovereignty and power-sharing can be redefined.

Sociological institutionalism suggests that that identity politics and interests are subject to change in the long run through social learning and norm diffusion. This might be the answer to an unexpected crisis in the current phase of the peace talks. The Greek Cypriot parliament recently passed a law that an unofficial Greek Cypriot plebiscite from 1950 seeking union with Greece (called enosis) will be commemorated in schools. Turkish Cypriots were extremely critical, as they see enosis idea as an ‘existential threat’ and as the ‘root cause’ of the conflict.

Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı, who has said that honouring such old ideals is entirely against the ‘mentality of peace-making’, has refused to negotiate until the decision is overturned. Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, who initially said that Turkish Cypriots were ‘exaggerating’ a ten-minute commemoration, later admitted the decision was wrong but has not sought to repeal it.

Both insist that the talks should continue, but neither is willing to step back. The current climate is not ideal, but nobody sees the process as over, yet. Perhaps the UN can find a formula to resume dialogue, as it did in December 2016 during another crisis point during the talks.

I share Akıncı’s criticisms on the commemoration law. The mentality behind the commemoration vote is against peace-making and the decision is entirely wrong. It has only fed Turkish Cypriots’ insecurities. After all, the law was proposed by ELAM, a far-right neo-Nazi party, which got enough support to pass it. It is also discouraging that Anastasiades has not tried to make up for opening wounds with Turkish Cypriots.

However, Akıncı’s response – refusal to negotiate – is also unacceptable. This matter is neither directly related to the talks, nor the chances of agreement in the short run. If the concern is on the longer-term peace, again, I share the concern, but things get more puzzling there. It was in fact Akıncı who earlier abandoned the peace-promoting mechanisms for preparing Cypriots to live together that he championed during his electoral campaign. Instead, he focused on quickly achieving a ‘(comprehensive) solution in months, not in years’. The contradiction is not too different from the ‘mentality’ that he criticises.

Perhaps Anastasiades and his party have changed tack, with an eye to the next Greek Cypriot presidential elections set for early 2018, by – not objecting to the commemoration vote. Similarly, Akıncı might be playing for time. A breakthrough on the Cyprus issue now is against the interests of Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who wants to secure nationalist votes for Turkey’s upcoming referendum on a new constitution.

It is saddening that what started as ‘the best chance for reunification’ (and is said to be the last) has nearly come to an end. It was only in January that UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that ‘We are very close to an arrangement’. The leaders seemed not only willing to achieve a solution, but determined to do so. Progress over the 20 months of negotiations has been remarkable, and described as ‘unprecedented’ by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide.

In Geneva, the two sides presented their respective maps for territorial readjustment within a united Cyprus. The international dimension of the Cyprus problem, particularly security and guarantees, has also been under discussion between Cyprus’ guarantor powers – the UK, Turkey, and Greece – and the two Cypriot sides. While these big advances have reached a new high, currently that optimism now bogged down by toxic blame-games.

Currently, we are not sleepwalking to collapse of the talks, but running towards it. There is still a chance that the leaders will resume and carry the talks the last mile. However, a ‘business-as-usual’ optimism will not be enough. Many contentious issues remain in the talks, among them Turkey’s future military presence on the island, the possibility of a rotating presidency and final territorial readjustments.

Additionally, Greek Cypriots will conduct further hydrocarbon exploration studies this year. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are expected to follow suit. In 2014, this issue brought peace talks to a standstill.

In view of these challenges, we need a big leap forward with truly responsible and willing leaders working for a united Cyprus. If they fail, we will need to wait for ‘true leaders’ who are able to make peace. Perhaps the peace talks will shift away from the ‘undoable’ objective of a two-state federation. However, success would not only mean resolution of a decades-old frozen conflict, but also that Cyprus would become a true example of peace-making and power-sharing in a problem-ridden part of the world.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Fadıl Ersözer | @FadilErsozer
University of Manchester

Fadıl Ersözer is a doctoral researcher in politics at the University of Manchester. His main research focus is the limits of Europeanisation and liberal peace in conflict resolution focusing on the EU’s post-accession involvement in Cyprus

The post Cyprus Peace Talks at a Stalemate: What Hope For Reconciliation? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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EU Heads of State or Government meet informally on 10 March 2017 to prepare for the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties.

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Plenary sessions : MEPs vote Tuesday 14 March on four directives concerning waste management, mainly waste from households and small firms, representing 8% of total waste. These plans are a first step towards creating a circular economy where products are designed in order to facilitate reuse. One of the key issues is how ambitious targets should be for recycling rates and limiting landfilling, which is probably the most harmful way of getting rid of waste.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs vote Tuesday 14 March on four directives concerning waste management, mainly waste from households and small firms, representing 8% of total waste. These plans are a first step towards creating a circular economy where products are designed in order to facilitate reuse. One of the key issues is how ambitious targets should be for recycling rates and limiting landfilling, which is probably the most harmful way of getting rid of waste.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP