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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

AMENDMENTS 601 - 866 - Draft report on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2015 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Today's Tripartite Social Summit could not have been better timed. We needed this meeting to hear from the social partners on major political issues including Brexit, trade policy and our work-plan for the months ahead reflected in the Bratislava Roadmap.

This was the first time the social partners met formally since the British referendum. There was whole-hearted agreement around the table as regards our approach to Brexit. I really appreciate social partners' strong and impartial position, especially when it comes to the support for our common rules and principles, namely the Single market and four freedoms. Today I saw that people who gathered here feel responsible not only for the interests of their organisations but also for Europe as a whole.

When it comes to the trade deal with Canada I would like to thank the social partners for their engagement and our rich discussion, during which I felt quite a wide support for CETA. On the other hand, it is clear for me and our social partners that in the age of globalisation, people expect trade agreements like TTIP or CETA to be safe for workers, consumers and companies. We have to understand all the doubts and reasons behind them in order to build public support for trade. Because, in the first place, these are the interests of our people that must be protected and respected, and I want to make it very clear.

As you know the challenge now is to find consensus to move forward with the CETA agreement, while addressing the concerns of Belgium. Negotiations are ongoing as we speak, because they have turned out to be politically more difficult than many expected. We know that some work is still needed and we fully respect that. Personally I hope that we will find a way forward on CETA during the European Council.

This week leaders will also discuss trade defence instruments. For trade to be free, it needs to be fair. And this is why making progress on our trade policy also means having the right tools to defend Europe from unfair trading practices. We will do our best to make it happen.  

Tomorrow we will also discuss migration. I am glad to say we are slowly turning the corner. Our actions are best seen on the Eastern Mediterranean route, where we observed a 98% drop in the influx of irregular migrants between September of last year and this year. Now we must reduce the flows across the Central Mediterranean route. To that end, we need to do more on returns of irregular economic migrants. Leaders will discuss this issue in more depth, while the High Representative will update us on the progress with the African countries. Concrete results are expected already in December.

Tomorrow we will also have a strategic discussion about Russia. The objective is to address our overall, long-term relations with this important neighbour. Looking ahead to the decisions we will need to take in December, our main asset in dealing with Russia remains our unity. To date, regardless of our differences, we have always managed to remain united. And we must continue to do so. This will also be crucial when it comes to Russia's role in Syria.  Thank you.

The workshop was organized on June 15, 2016 with the aim of assessing the quantitative and qualitative parameters of Russian military presence in the Eastern Partnership Countries, and its implications for European security. Dr. Anna Maria Dyner, Analyst with the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) covered Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Dr. Gaidz Minassian, Senior Lecturer at Sciences Po Paris and Associate Research Fellow at the FRS, covered Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Further information
Workshop Summary
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On behalf of the European Council, I would like to convey my warm congratulations on your nomination as Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia.

I am confident that through your commitment and professionalism, Croatia will continue to build on its position as a reliable partner in tackling the many challenges that face Europe today. I have no doubt that your knowledge and understanding of the European Union from your previous roles will help you in this process, producing positive outcomes for your country, for Europe and beyond.

I would like to take this opportunity to wish you every success in your term as Prime Minister, and I look forward to welcoming you at the European Council tomorrow.

The Autumn Social summit held a discussion on "Addressing Europe's common challenges: generating growth, creating jobs and ensuring fairness". More particularly, participants at the Summit expressed their views on the following sub-themes: 

• the main challenges in view of the annual growth survey 2017;
• putting the New Skills agenda for Europe into practice: the key role of the social partners;
• the integration of refugees into the labour market and society: lessons learnt so far. 

In his opening statement, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, underlined that: " The Brexit referendum had some characteristics unique to Britain. But we would be foolish to dismiss what the vote told us about the popular view  of globalisation. It is a very negative assessment also widely shared across Europe. Responding to this is the key motivation behind the Bratislava declaration. Bratislava means a necessary shift of emphasis away from lecturing citizens about the benefits of European integration and taking far more seriously their genuine fears about security. Both in the hard sense of securing borders and public order, but also in a soft sense, of securing people's prosperity and way of life. We need a Europe that protects its citizens, a Europe which they can look to as a place of shelter. The summit was also clear that the European Union has a shared responsibility to create a promising economic future for all."

 The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker stressed: "The EU has a clear roadmap and a strong commitment to deliver jobs, growth and social fairness in Europe. Many actions have been undertaken over the last two years - from the Investment Plan for Europe, the deepening of the Single Market based on clear and fair rules, the roll-out of the Youth Guarantee, the launch of a new Skills Agenda, to the ongoing consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights. Unemployment is decreasing but there is still a long way to go. Social partners have a key role to play and the recent agreement on a "new start for social dialogue" should pave the way for further actions at EU and national level. We look forward to discussing EU priorities at this important point in time."   

From the side of the rotating presidency, Slovakia's Prime Minister, Robert Fico, said that "We need to improve the communication with each other - among Member States, with EU institutions, but most importantly with our citizens. We should inject more clarity into our decisions. Use clear and honest language. Focus on citizens' expectations, with strong courage to challenge simplistic solutions of extreme or populist political opposition in our countries. Social dialogue can contribute to social harmony and to implementation of the commitments which we set ourselves at the Bratislava Summit. We offer to our citizens in these months a vision of an attractive EU they can trust and support. Today's tripartite social summit will allow us to become familiar with the opinions of the social partners on this important subject. The social partners in particular are in direct contact with working people, employees, and they know the situation on the labour market as well as the business environment, which can help to address today's challenges". 

BusinessEurope's President, Emma Marcegaglia, representing employers, said " Europe is at a crossroad. We need strong and efficient EU institutions pulling in the same direction to strengthen the EU three key economic pillars:  the single market, the common international trade policy and the euro. Delivering trade agreements negotiated in compliance with the mandates given to the EU is essential for the credibility of the EU and for job creation. Productive private and public investment must increase. We therefore support the extension of the Juncker investment plan and urge the EU and all its member states to remove obstacles to investment. The EU social partners also underlined that companies and workers must not pay the price for Brexit. Our aim is to maintain as close as possible economic relations between the European Union and the United-Kingdom, while preserving the integrity of the Single Market. Cherry-picking between free movement of goods, services, capital and people is not an option". 

For the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) General Secretary, Luca Visentini, said “Trade unions and employers agree that European solutions are needed to the many crises facing Europe. We call for more public and private investment across Europe to drive growth and quality jobs. Such investment requires a golden rule to exclude it from EU deficit  and debt targets, and call on the European Commission to develop an ambitious industrial policy for Europe. We support the closest possible economic relations between the EU and the UK without compromising the single market and the free movement of people. We want to engage with the negotiators to find solutions that minimise the damage to companies and workers, and workers' rights. The EU needs to strengthen social protection, and give social Europe the same importance as the EU's economic governance.”     

The views cited in this text are those of the individual / organization concerned and do not collectively constitute the point of view of the Council or the European Council.

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The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment is held on 19 October 2016 before the October European Council, to focus on "Addressing Europe's common challenges: generating growth, creating jobs and ensuring fairness".

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On 19 October 2016, the Slovak Presidency of the Council called on the European Parliament to take the most recent implementation figures for 2016 into consideration when adopting its amendments to the 2017 EU budget. 

"We have to face reality: the 2016 EU budget is way in excess of actual needs. We must learn from this and align the 2017 EU budget as closely as possible to the most realistic forecasts for expenditure next year", said Ivan Lesay, state secretary for finance of Slovakia and President of the Council after a trilogue-meeting with representatives of the Parliament and the Commission. 

On 30 September the Commission proposed to reduce payments in the 2016 EU budget by €7.27 billion to align it more closely to the latest estimates of needs. 

Outlook for 2017 

The lower than expected needs in 2016 are mainly due to the fact that some of the programmes of the 2014-2020 period are not yet fully up and running. This concerns in particular the area of economic, social and territorial cohesion, where the programmes are unlikely to reach cruising speed even in 2017. That is why in its draft 2017 EU budget the Commission estimated the payment needs  for this policy area to be more than 23% lower than in the 2016 EU budget as adopted. Even after bringing this year's budget in line with actual needs, the amounts proposed by the Commission for 2017 are still more than 10% lower than in 2016. 

With regard to the 2017 EU budget the presidency is concerned that the amendments currently being discussed by the Parliament go completely into the opposite direction. The Parliament is in particular considering to increase payments and commitments for almost all policy areas way beyond the expenditure ceilings of the EU's multiannual financial framework (MFF). This neither reflects current needs nor respects the MFF agreement. 

Focus on top priorities 

The presidency called on the Parliament to direct the available resources towards the EU's current two top priorities. These are measures to address the migration crisis and its root causes, such as strengthening  border controls, providing food, health and education to refugees stranded in Greece and Bulgaria and supporting countries of transit and origin. The other top priority is to help the EU economy to become more competitive and to create new jobs. 

The presidency also invited the other EU institutions to use EU taxpayers' money in the most responsible way, which includes reducing their staff by 5% by 2017 as committed in 2013. 

The presidency also recalled that the 2017 EU budget negotiations and the mid-term review of the MFF for 2014-2020 are two different exercises which should be dealt with separately. 

Next steps 

The Parliament is expected to vote on 26 October on its amendments to the Council's position for the 2017 EU budget. On 28 October a three-week conciliation period will start which is aimed at bridging the gap between the positions of the Council and Parliament by 17 November. 

Background 

The €7.27 billion reduction in the 2016 EU budget results in a payment level of €136.61 billion. This is significantly below the €146.46 billion that the Parliament asked for in last year's negotiations on the 2016 EU budget and also well below the €142.12 billion proposed by the Council at that time. 

 

In recent years, the UK government has not been particularly adept at negotiating in the EU (see the Fiscal Compact) or navigating the politics of Brussels (see the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission president). Satisfaction with David Cameron’s EU renegotiation was also relatively low on both sides of the referendum debate.

Prime Minister Visit to Germany – Jul 2016, Tom Evans (Crown Copyright), CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

EU politics has its own rhythm – long-term engagement, multi-year bargains and clever compromise are essential to achieving a government’s objectives. Parachuting in for one-off occasions or paying attention once in a while does not contribute to a winning strategy.

The EU referendum campaign and its aftermath have produced a number of expectations on how Brexit will unfold. As the UK prepares for what is the largest diplomatic exercise in its modern history, there are some strategically unrealistic expectations the UK government should take great care to avoid, if it is to avert repeating past mistakes.

1. The UK can get a superior deal on good/services without free movement of people

The EU27 have individually and collectively articulated a resoundingly clear message since the referendum: the Single Market is a package deal. The Single Market is comprised of the free movement of goods, services, people and capital. The free movement of people is not, as some in the UK have suggested, an accompaniment to the Single Market – it is part of the Single Market.

Should the UK not want to accept the free movement of people, as is evidently the direction of travel at the moment, it will of course likely be able to negotiate a trade agreement with the EU. However, the EU will not allow such an agreement to give as-good-as terms to a country which is not part of the European Economic Area (EEA), either as an EU member or an EFTA member.

It is remotely possible that there could be some sort of compromise allowing for high-quality Single Market access with modest limitations on free movement. However, it seems exceedingly unlikely that Theresa May could get a ‘better’ deal with the UK leaving the EU than David Cameron could, with his renegotiation and emergency break, when the UK was still an EU member.

2. The EU will negotiate with the UK before the Article 50 notification

One of the strategic disadvantages for the UK in its EU withdrawal is timing. Once Article 50 is activated, the two-year negotiating window will begin. While it could be extended by unanimity in the European Council plus the UK, EU leaders are growing fond of having the UK out in time for the 2019 European Parliament elections.

While it would be convenient, and potentially quite helpful, the EU will continue to resist early negotiations before the Article 50 process is begun by the UK. With similar determination to the Single Market mantra, the ‘no negotiations with notification’ refrain is common both from the EU institutions and Member States.

This approach is advantageous to the EU, as it restricts the amount of time the UK has to negotiate and therefore favours the EU27. More broadly, though, it reflects a principled position that the UK will be considered a full member (strictly speaking – not in terms of influence) until the legal process is followed. It will then be a departing member and eventually a third country. Beyond basic technical discussions, the EU will not enable a full member to gain advantage by pre-negotiating its terms of departure.

3. The EU27 are not paying attention to debates within the UK

It has long been a tradition of EU politics that national leaders deliver separate messages to their home audience than they do with their European counterparts and in Brussels. In this case, though, the stakes are much higher and the game is different. The tables are reversed – for the negotiations themselves, at least, it will be much less a ‘from Brussels’ justification to the UK public, and more a ‘to Brussels’ negotiation on the part of the UK.

This situation is novel for the EU in that the UK will be increasingly on its own. In normal circumstances, the UK government would be framing its EU policy for its home audience, at the same time as all other governments were doing the same. Here, however, the UK is on one side and the 27 are on the other – they will all continue to frame, but their objectives will not be the same.

Instead of all governments engaged in the same game (explaining their collective action in Brussels in different ways to suit their populations), the EU27 are closely observing the discussions ongoing in the UK. These debates could therefore have an impact on the negotiations. In the short term, at least, they have the attention of the EU27, since they have relatively little idea what the UK actually wants from its EU exit.

4. European integration is driven more by economics than politics

The EU has long been a political enterprise powered by economic means. The values and principles of the Union are important to the EU institutions and (most of) its members. For better or worse, political purpose often trumps economic reality. The history of European integration, from the admission of new states to the design and membership of the euro, shows that the politics of the EU often comes first.

The UK government cannot assume that the EU27 will be driven solely by economic interests in the exit negotiations. While important, these will only be one factor in what matters to the EU. As referenced above, preserving the integrity of the Single Market will be paramount for the 27. To some extent, the desire will also be to demonstrate that the best access and privileges to the EU come from being a member. Consequently, the EU27 might well be willing to sacrifice some measure of their own economic wellbeing to maintain the foundations of the European project.

5. The UK can leverage relationships with individual EU members

In a negotiation of one versus 27, it would only be natural that the one should seek to maximise its position. The UK has natural allies in other EU members that have shared many views with the UK on the shape of the Single Market, the EU budget, the scope of integration and other issues. Even though it had those partnerships as a member, the UK will not be able to rely on them in the forthcoming negotiations.

For now, at least, the EU27 have been (surprisingly) consistent in presenting a united front. The UK’s traditional allies – such as Denmark, the Netherlands, even Malta – have all reiterated that, in the negotiations, they are looking for a deal that is good for the EU (and for themselves as well). The only country that might at times appear an ‘advocate’ for the UK is Ireland – primarily in respect of its imperative need to assure the future of Northern Ireland relations and the border, and connected with that the Common Travel Area and EU free movement.

Separately, focusing exclusively on Germany for support is not a winning strategy (as David Cameron discovered in his EU renegotiation – and in previous negotiations). The Article 50 withdrawal agreement may only need a qualified majority in the Council of the EU, but the European Parliament will also have a say. Moreover, the separate new relationship agreement(s) will require the support of every EU member.

6. Brexit is the EU27’s number one priority

The EU faces no shortage of major challenges – the aftermath of economic/financial crisis, migration in the Mediterranean, relations with Russia, security and terrorism, even its own legitimacy and future. The UK’s departure from the EU is only one of numerous issues that the Union will confront in the years ahead.

That is not to say that Brexit is not important to the EU – or that the EU27 would not want the negotiations and eventual exit to get under way as soon as possible. It is a reflection, however, that the UK is not the centre of the EU’s world. The EU (in its predecessor forms) existed before the UK’s membership and it will continue after it. In geopolitical and constitutional terms, if not economic ones as well, Brexit is existential for the UK. For the EU, it is but one of many pressing concerns.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/24

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘Six Unrealistic Brexit Expectations the UK Government Should Avoid’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 19 October 2016, britainseurope.uk/24

The post Six Unrealistic Brexit Expectations the UK Government Should Avoid appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Dutch voters opposed the deal with Ukraine by a margin of nearly two-to-one in a referendum in April, leaving diplomats in both Brussels and the Hague despairing over fate of the agreement. Things have not improved since.

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Mongolia, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Helmut Scholz

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The Cooperation Council under the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Union (EU) and the Republic of Iraq met for the second time in Brussels on 18 October 2016. The meeting was opened by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, who headed the EU delegation. The Iraq delegation was led by the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and also included the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's Head of Foreign Relations, Falah Mustafa Bakir. The European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Christos Stylianides, and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis took part in thematic discussions. 

With the campaign to liberate Mosul from Da'esh under way, ministers' discussions were initially focused on Iraq's immediate humanitarian and stabilisation challenges. Further into the meeting they also reflected on Iraq's longer term needs. 

During the meeting the EU commended the government of Iraq for its efforts to address the current crisis. It outlined the support it is providing for Iraq's immediate needs through humanitarian aid and assistance for displaced people, covering both short and longer term needs, including education for displaced children. It also discussed with the Iraqi representatives the priority areas of support for the stabilisation of liberated areas in Iraq, including the removal of "booby traps", so called improvised explosive device (IEDs), which is a precondition for the return of displaced people. 

Looking further ahead, the process of peacebuilding and reconciliation in a unified and inclusive Iraqi state are central and unavoidable themes to any discussion on Iraq. At the same time, in recognition of the fact that Iraq's present crisis and the country's longer term prospects for stability and prosperity are intricately interwoven, ministers gave considerable thought to Iraq's long-term prosperity and how EU-Iraq relations can help to unlock the country's full potential. The Cooperation Council thus reflected not just on the need for political, but also for economic and social inclusiveness. It discussed in particular the need to build up on parallel strands of effort by the EU and Iraq to strengthen  democracy and human rights, boost the economy and trade, and ensure that  Iraq makes the most of its energy potential. 

As well as reviewing existing cooperation, the meeting discussed further steps, including agreement to launch a working group to explore cooperation on energy issues, and the possibility of an informal dialogue on migration. 

Finally, the EU-Iraq Cooperation Council also addressed Iraq's regional relations with its neighbours. The EU reiterated that it fully supports Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its right to preserve these. It also stressed the importance of fostering dialogue between Iraq and the countries in the region.

General : More than 20 million people living today around the world have been trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour and other activities across the world, generating a profit of €117 billion a year. It is also a very lucrative crime in Europe. On the occasion of the EU's Anti-Trafficking Day on 18 October, check out the facts in our infographic and discover what the EU and Parliament have been doing to tackle human trafficking.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

General : More than 20 million people living today around the world have been trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour and other activities across the world, generating a profit of €117 billion a year. It is also a very lucrative crime in Europe. On the occasion of the EU's Anti-Trafficking Day on 18 October, check out the facts in our infographic and discover what the EU and Parliament have been doing to tackle human trafficking.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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The EU is moving steadily towards enhancement of its relationship with Iraq and is committed to a long term, mutually beneficial relationship. The general focus of EU support is on helping Iraq to better use its own resources, through capacity building activities in the areas of good governance; socio-economic recovery through education and strengthening institutional capacity; water management and agriculture.

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EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Luxembourg on 18 October 2016 to take note of the state of play on the mid-term review of the EU's multiannual budgetary framework for 2014-2020. The Council is also preparing the European Council of 20-21 October 2016.

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A finais do pasado mes de setembro finou Shimon Peres (Premio Nobel da Paz, Ex Presidente de Israel e Ex Primeiro Ministro por tres ocasións). Dito motivo provocou, entre outros feitos, un gran número de artigos xornalísticos falando da súa relevancia histórica[1].

Mais analizando ditos artigos ponse o acento especialmente nalgúns elementos da súa vida, resaltado a “súa contribución á Paz”[2]. Pola contra, moito menos era mencionado o seu pasado en Haganá[3].

É interesante observar como ao longo do tempo aqueles grupos, como Haganá, que eran considerados terroristas maioritariamente, na actualidade son considerados “organización defensiva hebrea, que operaba bajo las órdenes de la Agencia Judía para Israel, entre 1920 y 1948, predecesora, junto con otras organizaciones paramilitares, del actual ejército israelí conocido como las IDF o Tzahal” (Fuentes y Pellicer, 2016)[4] [5].

¿Cal pode ser a razón deste cambio? Benjamin Walter (2007) dinos “con quién se compenetra el historiador universal nacionalista. La respuesta suena inevitable: con el vencedor. Pero los amos eventuales son los herederos de todos aquellos que han vencido […] Quien quiera que haya conducido la victoria hasta el día de hoy, participa en el cortejo triunfal en el cual los dominadores de hoy pasan sobre aquellos que hoy yacen en la tierra”.

En definitiva, algúns grupos ou Estados que en determinada época foran considerados terroristas, co paso do tempo deixan de selo por diversas razóns e son aceptados como membros efectivos do escenario internacional en pé de igualdade cos demais Estados[6] [7].

No caso español as cousas sucederon doutro xeito. Primeiramente, cómpre destacar que a inclusión de diferentes nacións dentro dun Estado normalmente da lugar ó predominio dunha nación sobre as demais. O conflito é que o que podería ser unha alternativa teórica admisible (o Estado plurinacional), na práctica normalmente conduce a situacións no que o Estado beneficia a unha das súas parte e discrimina a outras. Mentres que todos os individuos son considerados cidadáns, existe unha discriminación á vez derivada do feito de que o Estado intenta inculcar unha cultura e valores comúns co obxectivo de acabar creando unha soa nación[8].

Ante esta falta de coexistencia entre nación e Estado, hai dúas saídas posibles. O Estado pode ter éxito e acabar absorbendo as diferentes nacións, o que supón a eliminación das culturas minoritarias e rematar sendo un perfecto Estado-nación (véxase Francia). Ou ben, non acabar conseguindo acadar o seu obxectivo e activándose un sentimento de ataque por parte das minorías ante un Estado alleo, o que provocaría que “no son las naciones las que crearon los Estados modernos, sino los Estados modernos los que crearon las naciones, tal como las conocemos” (Palti, 2002). Neste contexto, as minorías nacionais elaboran estratexias de rexeitamento, que pasan pola resistencia cultural e/ou a loita armada.

España é un bo exemplo de dificultade de homoxeneización nacional e que conta cunha resistencia tanto cultural como armada. No caso de Euskadi a resistencia foi dobre debido as accións de ETA. Nos casos de Galicia e Cataluña a resistencia foi e é principalmente cultural. Mais durante os anos 70 e comezo dos 90 foran activas en Cataluña as organizacións Terra Lliure, o Exèrcit Popular Català, o Front d’Alliberament de Catalunya  e o Arxiu. En Galicia, o Exercito Guerrilheiro do Pobo Galego a pesar de pequenas accións esporádicas ou de pouco alcance, demostra como en Cataluña que existía espazo para accións violentas. Recentemente, cabe aínda mencionar que a Audiencia Nacional acusou a outro pequeno grupo galego de terrorista, Resistencia Galega.

¿Que pasa entón para que estas organizacións non se consoliden e entren en decadencia? A resposta é complexa, pero poderiamos afirmar que as novas iniciativas destes grupos para prolongar as súas dinámicas de protesta conducen a unha espiral de violencia-represión-desalento. O pesimismo abre unha fase de apatía tanto sobre o contido das acción como sobre a súa lexitimidade. Deste xeito, os menos que van quedando vanse radicalizando e illando, e a súa utopía decae. Así, comezan a primar formas de protesta máis convencionais integradas no novo contexto político-social (Tarrow, 1991). Prodúcese pois o esgotamento dos movementos polo fracaso da súa estratexia, pola presión do Estado, ou porque obteñen un éxito parcial ou total das súas reclamacións que se institucionalizaron, ou poden converterse nun movemento diferente (Raschke, 1994).

Xente como Shimon Peres non cometeu ditos erros e por iso non son terroristas, senón liberadores nacionais…

 

 

 

“La nación como problema. Los historiadores y la cuestión nacional”, Elías Palti, Bos Aires: FCE, 2002, p.15

“Sobre el Concepto de la Historia. Conceptos de la Filosofía de la Historia”, Walter Benjamín,  La Plata: Derramar Ediciones, 2007, pp. 68-69

“Sobre el concepto de movimiento social”, J Raschke, Zona Abierta, 69, 1994, pp. 121-134

“Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest”, Cornell Studies in International Affairs/Western Societies Program, Occasional Paper, S Tarrow, Cornell University, Ithaca: Center for International Studies, 21, 1991, pp. 41-56

 

[1] Ó día 01/10/2016 ascendían en Google News a 2.580.000 (procura “Shimon Peres”)

[2] Ascendía (“Shimon Peres + Peace”) a 351.000

[3] (“Shimon Peres + Haganah”) 2.620

[4] A modo de indicador, pódese observar que na biblioteca da Universidade de Georgetown as publicacións de “Haganah + terrorist” aumentan no período 1921-1960 de 625 a 2924 no que vai de 1990 á actualidade, isto é un multiplicador de 4,67. Contra isto “Haganah liberation movement” ascende de 27 a 783, ou sexa, un multiplicador de 29,00.

[5]http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/setenta-a%C3%B1os-del-atentado-del-hotel-rey-david-de-jerusal%C3%A9n#_ftn6

[6] “En 1993, la mayoría de estos artículos [periodísticos] asocian [el terrorismo] con los musulmanes […] (especialmente Libia[non posteriormente á morte de Gadafi], Irak [non trala execución de Hussein] […] Virtualmente ningún artículo en el NYT o en el WP asocia tal acto con otros actores o lugares de la violencia política en el mundo (por ejemplo, El Salvador), como una forma de exclusividad tópica y léxica que en sí misma expresa una posición ideológica” http://segundaslenguaseinmigracion.com/L2ycomptext/Anlisisideolgico.pdf

[7] Fatah, anteriormente considerado terrorista, é agora visto como un actor relevante nos procesos de negociación.

[8] “Nationalisms”, M Guibernau, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996

The post ¿Shimon Peres, terrorista ou liberador?: leccións para Galeusca appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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