Agrégateur de flux

Today, in a signing ceremony held as part of the EDA Steering Board, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Defence Agency brought into force an agreement to work together to deliver the European Helicopter Tactics Instructor Course (HTIC).  This course is designed to give selected European helicopter crews an enhanced awareness of helicopter tactics, operational employment and multi-national integration. 

At the end of the course, which is divided into three phases (ground-school, simulator and live flying), graduates will be qualified to delivering tactical instruction during home-based training; multinational courses and exercises; and on operations. They will also be capable of providing helicopter tactical advice at 1 Star level, as well as leading multi-platform complex Composite Air Operations (COMAOs).  

A proven concept

The concept of creating the HTIC was approved by the EDA Steering Board on 9 March 2011. The EDA in partnership with the UK Joint Helicopter Command and the Armed Forces of Sweden developed the concept during 2011/12 and the first course, jointly funded by Sweden and the UK was delivered at RAF Linton-on-Ouse and FMV Test Range, Vidsel in Northern Sweden in April-May 2013. The course consisted of 14 Students from Germany and Sweden and 14 instructors from the UK and received unanimous praise from all participants. 

Consequently, a year later, a second course was delivered.  Enlarged and with additional financial support from the Multinational Helicopter Initiative, the 2nd course graduated students from Austria, Czech Republic, German, Sweden and the UK.  Swedish graduates for the first course became staff instructors on the second – beginning the process of creating a self-sustaining cadre.  Nineteen students graduated from six helicopter types: Kiowa, Mi-171, CH-53, UH-1, AS330, and NH90. The course also involved eight fast-jets (Alca 159, Hawk, Gripen) from the Czech Republic, Sweden and the UK. These were used as “red air” both in the academic sorties teaching fighter evasion and also in a free role, trying to prevent the helicopters completing their “mission”.

Upcoming events

The next course, No3 HTIC, will be the first organised under the new arrangements. It will take place in August-September 2015. Once again, the simulator phase will be delivered at the EDA simulator facility at Royal Air Force Linton-on-Ouse and the flying phase will be hosted by Sweden at Vidsel.  The graduate instructors will go on to teach on future HTIC and also become mentors on the EDA Helicopter Exercise Programme.

More information

• Learn more about the EDA’s helicopter initiatives

Sommaire :
Actualité :Libye : la partie se joue à quatre
Dossier : L'Afrique ne démarre pas
- Il est urgent de dire la vérité à l'Afrique- Nicolas Baverez ou l'archétypique exemple de contre-sens en matière de développement- La classe moyenne africaine n'existe pas- Les Africains sont de plus en plus pauvres
Histoire : Le premier conflit mondial en Afrique : le Sud-Ouest africain

Editorial de Bernard Lugan :
La chute des cours des matières premières a fait éclater la bulle afro-optimiste artificiellement gonflée par les médias. Après les emballements de l'année 2014, le retour à la réalité est donc cruel.Aujourd'hui, les compagnies minières réduisent leurs investissements pour se concentrer sur les parties du monde dans lesquelles les coûts de production sont les moins élevés, l'Australie par exemple. Pour toutes l'objectif est désormais de ne conserver que les projets les plus rentables ; or, et il faut bien être conscient de cela, l'Afrique est mal placée pour quatre grandes raisons qui sont le manque d'infrastructures, la corruption, l'insécurité et l'absence d'industries de transformation.
La désaffection pour l'Afrique, réalité prenant l'exact contre-pied des discours afro-optimistes ressassés par les médias, est actuellement amplifiée par une erreur économique majeure : pour compenser les pertes, la plupart des pays producteurs augmentent les taxes ou souhaitent le faire, ce qui entraîne automatiquement l'accélération du mouvement de retrait.La Zambie a ainsi multiplié par trois les taxes sur l'extraction du cuivre, avec pour résultat, la fuite des investisseurs. La société multinationale Vedanda Resources a ainsi annoncé une révision profonde de son implication dans le pays. Or, le cuivre représente 70% des recettes à l'exportation de la Zambie.En Afrique du Sud, à la suite des mouvements de grève qui, en 2014, ont paralysé la production durant de longs mois, le géant Anglo-American a fermé trois de ses sept mines de platine pour investir ailleurs que dans la « nation arc-en-ciel ».Dans le domaine des hydrocarbures, l'effondrement des cours a fait que plusieurs projets de recherche ont été purement et simplement abandonnés. Quant aux gisements devenus non rentables avec un baril aux environs de 50 dollars, leur maintien en exploitation est l'objet de bien des interrogations, ce qui place une « épée de Damoclès » sur plusieurs pays africains.
La baisse des cours décourage en effet les prospections, notamment les plus prometteuses, mais également les plus coûteuses, à savoir celles à très grande profondeur maritime. Les conséquences pourraient être dramatiques pour les anciens pays producteurs dont les champs arrivent à épuisement et qui comptaient sur de nouvelles découvertes pour relancer leur production. Trois pays sont particulièrement concernés, le Congo Brazzaville, le Gabon et la Guinée équatoriale. Au Congo-Brazzaville le pétrole représente 67,2% du PIB, plus de 90% des exportations et 79% des recettes publiques ; au Gabon, le pétrole représente 45% du PIB, plus de 90% des exportations et environ 60% des recettes budgétaires cependant qu'en Guinée équatoriale, il assure 76% du PIB et 99% des exportations. Or, dans les trois pays, des découvertes pétrolières ou gazières ont été faites en offshore profond. Leur mise en production nécessitant de gros investissements, le problème est une fois de plus de savoir où se situe leur seuil de rentabilité.

While many in the media will generously report about 'an agreement to keep trying to agree,' -- let's face it: this is where the West and Iran were a year ago.

The past 7 days particularly have not been kind to Obama's attempt at a Middle East legacy, as we have been bombarded with 3 major setbacks to an effective deal with Iran:

• Last Wednesday, the US conceded on PMD's ("Possible Military Dimensions"): the administration is now willing to let Iran put off fully disclosing its nuclear program until after sanctions relief had been granted, a concession which significantly undermines any attempt to verify whether Iran is keeping its agreement this time around.
  
  
• Then on Thursday, the AP revealed that the Obama administration will let Iran continue spinning centrifuges in its underground military enrichment bunker at Fordow, ensuring that Iran continues to maintain nuclear infrastructure completely impervious to Western intervention if they decided to break out.
  
  
• Just yesterday, The New York Times revealed that the Iranians would not agree to ship their enriched uranium to Russia, a scenario Iran had used for months to secure concessions on the number of centrifuges they'd be allowed to run.

Congress is currently out of session and returns on April 13.

Can't wait.

Hat tip: The Israel Project

-----
If you found this post interesting or informative, please it below. Thanks!

Technorati Tag: Iran and Obama and Nuclar Weapons.

Bonn, 31.03.2015. Syriens Machthaber Assad hat sich kürzlich in einem CBS-Fernsehinterview erneut dem Westen als politischer Partner angeboten. In den Wochen zuvor hatten der amerikanische und der deutsche Außenminister bereits angedeutet, dass das Regime wieder stärker in die Lösungsversuche einbezogen werden müsste. Doch kann das Assad-Regime deshalb wieder Partner des Westens sein? Alle politischen Verhandlungen mit dem Assad-Regime im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen scheiterten bislang. An bereits erreichte Vereinbarungen (‚Genf I‘) sah Assad sich in der Folge nicht mehr gebunden. Weitere internationale Lösungsversuche (‚Genf II‘, Moskau I‘) scheiterten, weil minimale Erfolgsaussichten für eine politische Lösung nicht gegeben waren. Die jetzt in die politische Öffentlichkeit lancierte Aufwertung des Regimes zum zwar unartigen, aber vielleicht durchsetzungsfähigen ‚Ordnungshüter‘ würde indes nicht einmal die fortwährende Brutalisierung des Konflikts oder auch nur die Ausbreitung des selbst ernannten ‚Islamischen Staates‘ (IS) stoppen. Leider geschähe das Gegenteil: Der militärisch schon überraschend starke ’IS‘ würde erst durch die westliche Wiederannäherung an Assad zusätzlich zur politischen Großmacht aufgewertet. Mehr Reputation und weitere Gefolgschaft kann ‚IS‘ sich gar nicht selbst verschaffen: Nämlich die Position seiner faktischen Unabhängigkeit von politischer Patronage und Unabhängigkeit von massiver finanzieller Zuwendung von außen demonstrieren zu können. Darüber verfügen in der Region gerade einmal noch die Ordnungsmächte Saudi-Arabien, Türkei, Katar und Iran. Die ‚islamisch‘ als ‚Kalifat‘ behauptete Souveränität von ‚IS‘ kommt vor der Abhängigkeit des Assad-Regimes von äußerer Anerkennung noch besser zum Tragen. Schon jetzt ist das politisch gescheiterte Regime in Damaskus abhängig von der Waffenhilfe Russlands sowie von direkter paramilitärischer Unterstützung aus dem Iran und durch die libanesischen Hisbollah-Milizen. Dabei ist Souveränität das politische Alleinstellungsmerkmal in der Region – nicht nur in den Augen der Kämpfer für den vermeintlichen ‚Heiligen Krieg/Jihad‘. Aus Sicht der Jihadisten tritt dagegen in den Hintergrund, dass ‚IS‘ der Aufstieg nur aufgrund der vorherigen Schwächung der Gesellschaften wegen des Bürgerkriegs in Syrien und der US-Intervention im Irak gelang. Und, nicht zu vergessen: Weil Assad die späteren Anführer des ‚IS‘ aus seinen eigenen Kerkern entlassen hatte. Kaum abschreckend, und offenbar eher attraktiv, wirkt im Kreis der ‚IS‘-Sympathisanten dessen gewaltökonomisches Geschäftsmodell: von politischer Repression und Verfolgung von Minderheiten, Raub, Schutz- und Lösegelderpressung sowie Ressourcendiebstahl und Verkauf antiker Kulturgüter. Die Politik in Europa und den USA sollte nicht mehr bereit sein, sich von Machthabern und einzelnen Gewaltunternehmern erneut das bekannte nahöstliche Theaterstück aufführen zu lassen. Das Stück von der ‚islami(st)ischen Gefahr‘ oder gar der vermeintlichen ‚Demokratie-Unfähigkeit der Araber/Muslime‘. Der arabische Frühling 2011 hat das Stück als hohle Kulissenschieberei entlarvt. Tunesien ist ein zwar sehr gefährdetes, aber politisch eindrucksvolles Gegenbeispiel – trotz des jüngsten Anschlages auf das Nationalmuseum von Bardo. Unbestreitbar geht eine reale Gefahr von Akteuren wie ‚IS‘, diversen al-Qa’eda-Ablegern, Jihadisten – vielleicht sogar von Muslimbrüdern selbst aus. Im gleichen Maß aber auch davon, dass ihre Existenz den Autokraten in der Region im Westen zu politischem Ansehen und gar wirtschaftlicher Unterstützung verhilft. Das wäre verhängnisvoll. Denn diese Strategie verdeckt abermals, wie seinerzeit vor dem arabischen Frühling, die Ursachen der Konflikte und mögliche Lösungswege aufzeigen zu können. Auch werden die Kosten kurzsichtiger Politik zuerst von Menschen in der Region getragen. Von denen, die trotz politischer Repression, terroristischer Bedrohung durch das eigene Regime, durch Gewaltunternehmer und durch ausländische Kämpfer den Mut aufbringen, für eine Vision des friedlichen Wandels und des Zusammenlebens aller einzutreten. Westliche Sicherheits-, Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik muss an der Seite dieser Menschen stehen. Die Konflikte selbst kann der Westen nicht lösen. Im Kleinen müssen wir (Über-)leben und Perspektiven sichern für die Flüchtlinge, für die aufnehmenden Gemeinden und die Nachbarländer. Die heutige Ankündigung von Bundesminister Gerd Müller, 155 Mio. € für die syrische Flüchtlingskrise zur Verfügung zu stellen, ist hierzu ein wichtiger Beitrag. Im Großen heißt das, auch den widerstreitenden Interessen von Großmächten in der Region den Weg zum Verhandlungstisch zu bahnen. Längst ist keine der syrischen Konfliktparteien mehr souverän genug, auch nur, den Kernkonflikt um den Wiederaufbau der Gesellschaft und die Neudefinition von Politik zu lösen. Es geht dabei besonders um die Verwobenheit von innergesellschaftlichen mit zwischenstaatlichen Interessengegensätzen und Konflikten. Das gilt auch für die aktuellen Krisen im Irak, im Jemen und in Israel/Palästina. Jetzt ist die Zeit gekommen, die alte und doch aktuelle Vision einer Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit im gesamten Nahen und Mittleren Osten wieder aufzunehmen und fortzuentwickeln.

Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU trade commissioner, during a press conference last week

Meet the Miculas: two twin brothers, Ioan and Viorel, whose battle with EU law will be of interest to anyone following Europe’s fitful trade negotiations.

The duo’s battle to save their beer-to-biscuits food empire in northern Romania may not seem an obvious proxy for an increasingly bitter fight over the EU’s trade deals with the US and Canada. But it cuts to the heart of one of the most politically contentious issues surrounding both trade accords: the status of international investment tribunals.

The brothers, who also hold Swedish citizenship, have had a terrible start to the week.

On Monday, the EU said they would have to repay all the subsidies they received to build up their business in the poor northern Romanian county of Bihor, on the Hungarian border. Their factories, which produce brands such as Servus beer and Rony biscuits, depended on what Brussels ruled was illegal state aid. According to their lawyers, the pair had decided to invest in a region as impoverished as Bihor on the understanding that Romania would subsidise them. On that pledge hang some 9,000 jobs.

Their business model, which predated Romania’s accession to the EU, came unstuck when Bucharest decided to join the European club. Competition authorities no longer allowed this kind of state largesse. In 2005, Bucharest cut the funds to the brothers in Bihor. (Romania finally joined in 2007).

This is where things get interesting legally, and the trade aficionados will start to realise something is afoot.

As Swedish citizens, the Miculas took their case to an international tribunal and won. At the end of 2013, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes awarded a settlement of $250m from the Romanian government because of its suspension of the subsidies. It was one of the largest sums ever awarded by an international investment tribunal. To Brussels, the award of damages meant state aid was now effectively being paid “through the back door”.

Read more

Pourquoi donc une médaille russe célèbre-t-elle le début des opérations militaires de Moscou en Crimée, une semaine avant leur début effectif ?

A helyi választási bizottság adatai szerint Üzbegisztán eddigi államfőjét, a 77 éves Iszlam Karimovot a voksok 90,4 százalékával választották újra, így további öt esztendőre kezében tarthatja a hatalmat. A résztvételi arány 91 százalék volt.

Karimov több mint két és fél évtizede, 1989-től tölti be hivatalát, először a kommunista párt vezetőjeként, majd elnökként irányította a 30 milliós államot.

Új alapok, új Tízparancsolat kell az új Európa felépítéséhez – véli az elmagányosodott volt államfő.

Pour remplir les nouvelles missions de sécurité intérieure, la non-réduction pourrait atteindre 13000 à 18000 postes. Décisions avant juin.

Under the conditions of low oil prices, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union face serious economic problems. The population of the Eurasian Economic Union will increase by 50 percent as compared to the population of Russia. The dollar should not exist for us when we live within our own country

The European Defence Agency (EDA) today published the aggregated defence data for 2013 of the 27 EDA participating Member States. 

2013 was no exception to the recent years’ trend across EDA Member States to cut defence spending. Despite the fact that EDA increased from 26 to 271 Member States in 2013, the total defence expenditure of its Member States decreased by EUR 1.7 billion or 0.9%, compared to 2012, to EUR 186 billion. In real terms², the total defence expenditure has been declining since 2006, dropping by over EUR 32 billion or about 15% from 2006 to 2013.

Both as a share of GDP and as a share of the total government spending, defence expenditure has decreased for the seventh year in a row to its lowest value since 2006, 1.45% and 2.97%, respectively.

Defence expenditure breakdown (billion EUR and % change on previous year)

Operation and maintenance and R&D/R&T expenditure increase slightly

In terms of the distribution of defence expenditure, there were some shifts in 2013. Personnel-related expenditure decreased by over 4%, from EUR 95.7 billion in 2012 to EUR 91.8 billion in 2013, and for the first time since 2006, its share in the total defence expenditure dropped below 50%, to 49.3%. Personnel expenditure expressed per person employed in defence (military and civilian) has been increasing since 2006 to reach its highest value of EUR 51,475 in 2011, and started to decrease the year after. It decreased further from 2012 to 2013 (-2.6%), to EUR 49,836.

With a share of 25.1% - the biggest since 2006 - operation and maintenance expenditure remained the second largest component of the total defence spending in 2013, and, despite minor annual fluctuations, it appears to be on an upward trajectory. From 2012 to 2013, it increased by EUR 2 billion or 4.4%, to EUR 46.8 billion, and almost reached its highest level of EUR 46.9 billion recorded in 2007. By contrast, defence investment, comprising equipment procurement and R&D (including R&T) expenditure, following a sharp decrease in 2011 (-10.5%), increased slightly in 2012, but decreased again in 2013 below the level it was in 2006, to EUR 37.5 billion or 20.1% of the total defence expenditure. This resulted from a decrease in one of its components - equipment procurement - which reduced by EUR 1.5 billion or 4.9%, to EUR 30 billion (16.1% of the total expenditure).

The second component - defence R&D expenditure - increased slightly to EUR 7.5 billion (4% of the total expenditure), breaking a downward trend observed since 2006 (with the exception of 2010, when it marginally increased). R&T expenditure - a subset of R&D - followed a similar path. Being on a decline since 2006 (except 2011), it increased by just over 3% from 2012 to 2013, to reach EUR 2.1 billion. In real terms, defence investment decreased by EUR 4.8 billion or 11.3% from 2006 to 2013, whereas its components – equipment procurement and R&D - decreased by EUR 1.7 billion (-5.3%) and EUR 3.1 billion (-29.1%), respectively.

Defence expenditure in current and constant1 prices (billion EUR)

Collaboration3: a sharp decrease in procurement and a marginal increase in R&T

Since 2012, it has not been possible to have a comprehensive picture of the total EDA Member States’ expenditure on collaborative (including European collaboration) defence equipment procurement and R&T projects or programmes, as several Member States were not able to provide this data. A glimpse into the partial 2012-2013 data reveals a worrisome trend, particularly for defence equipment procurement. Between 2012 and 2013, reported collaborative equipment procurement expenditure decreased by 20.7% to the lowest level since 2006 of EUR 4.75 billion. In relation to the total defence equipment procurement, collaborative expenditure accounted for 15.9%, suggesting that over 84% was spent nationally. European collaborative equipment procurement experienced an even sharper decrease of 21.6%, and in 2013, amounted to EUR 4.5 billion, accounting for 94.6% of the total collaborative equipment procurement.

The total collaborative defence R&T expenditure of the EDA Member States that provided the data also shrank, though less dramatically (-0.9%), to EUR 203 million. Its share in the total defence R&T was 9.7%, the remaining 90.3% being regarded as national expenditure. Although the reported European collaborative defence R&T expenditure increased by 21.4% between 2012 and 2013, with a total of EUR 168 million, accounting for 82.5% of the total collaborative defence R&T, it nevertheless remained record-low.

 

Defence expenditure and investment per military decrease despite reduced personnel numbers

2013 saw the seventh consecutive reduction in the number of personnel working in defence (both military and civilian), caused mainly by internal restructuring processes. The total personnel decreased by almost 600,000 or 24% between 2006 and 2013, while the number of military and civilian personnel decreased by over 500,000 (-26%) and almost 80,000 (-16%), respectively, during the same period.

In 2013, there was a total of 1,435,693 military and 407,245 civilian personnel in EDA Member States - a decrease of 0.9% and 3.6%, compared to 2012. A share of military in the total personnel has also been decreasing from the highest of 80.6% in 2008 and 2010 to the lowest of 77.4% in 2012. In 2013, it was 77.9%. For the first time since 2006, defence expenditure expressed per military decreased by 0.05%, from EUR 129,878 in 2012 to EUR 129,814 in 2013.

So did defence investment per military, which has been on an overall increasing trend since 2006 due to declining military personnel, rather than increasing Member States’ investment. In 2013, defence investment per military was EUR 26,122 - a 2.9% reduction on the 2012 figure of EUR 26,906.

 

Increasing numbers of troops available for deployment and actual deployments

Between 2012 and 2013, the average number of troops deployed outside the EU territory increased for the first time since 2008, both in absolute terms (+17.2%) and as a share of military personnel (from 3.4% to 4%). EDA Member States together deployed on average 58,086 troops on a continuous basis throughout 2013, which constituted 4% of the overall strength of their military personnel. In 2013, there was also an increase in the total number of deployable (land) forces (+7%) and that of sustainable (land) forces (+1.5%). The 27 EDA Member States had in total 481,001 deployable (the highest number since 2006) and 110,433 sustainable (land) forces. The ratio between sustainable and a pool of deployable (land) forces remained stable at 1:4.4.

Meanwhile, after a five-year-long upward trend, the costs related to deployed operations4 decreased for the second time in a row, both in absolute terms - from EUR 9 billion to EUR 7.4 billion (-17.1%) – and as a share of the total expenditure - from 4.8% to 4% - between 2012 and 2013. Operations costs per military deployed decreased by 29.3% and stood at EUR 127,989 in 2013.

 

Background

The European Defence Agency (EDA) collects defence data on an annual basis. The Ministries of Defence of the Agency’s 27 Member States (MS) provide the data. EDA acts as the custodian of the data and publishes the aggregated figures in a yearly defence data booklet.

 

Defence investment breakdown (billion EUR and % change on previous year)

More information

• The booklet is available for download here. 
• A summary article is published in the latest issue of the EDA magazine, European Defence Matters

 

---------------------------------

1 Data does not include Denmark which is not an EDA Member State. 2006-2012 data does not include Croatia which became the 27th EDA Member State on 1 July 2013.
2 In order to measure real growth and ensure a “real” comparison between years, inflation needs to be taken into account. Thus, data from 2006 to 2012 has been inflated to 2013 economic conditions (Source of deflator: European Commission ECFIN - based on weight of EU-28).
3 All 2012 and 2013 figures on collaboration are partial, as several Member States were not able to provide data.
4 2013 figure is an estimate, as several Member States were not able to provide accurate data, therefore sound comparisons with the previous years are limited.

Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Lockheed Martin have been selected by the Defense Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) for the design and development of 120 indigenous fighter jets. The team beat out competition from Korean Air (KAL) and Airbus. The 8.6

A Klebelsberg Intézményfenntartó Központ 17 millió forint európai uniós támogatással valósította meg az "Adj teret, nyiss utat! - Szociális kompetenciákkal a hátrányok ellen" elnevezésű projektet.

A testvériskolai kapcsolatokat segítő programban két békés megyei általános iskola diákjai és tanárai vettek részt.

A projektet megvalósító intézmények a dévaványai Ványai Ambrus Általános Iskola és Alapfokú Művészeti Iskola, valamint a kunágotai Bereczki Máté Általános Iskola volt. A programban 11 fő megvalósító pedagógus és 60 fő bevont tanuló vett részt, közülük 20 fő halmozottan hátrányos helyzetűként. A program fő célja a diákok szociális (együttélési, érdekérvényesítő, proszociális, kommunikációs) kompetenciáinak élethelyzetekben történő fejlesztése, valamint a két intézmény tanulói és pedagógusai közötti személyes, baráti és jó munkakapcsolatok kialakítása volt.

A tanulók két csoportban tevékenykedtek a két félév, illetve a fizikai megvalósítás 14 hónapja során heti rendszerességű szakmai programot megvalósító foglalkozások keretében. A program megvalósulását segítette mindegyik csoportban a heti egy – matematika, anyanyelvi kommunikáció, informatika – szaktárgyi felzárkóztatás, fejlesztés is.

Az iskolán kívüli tanulmányi, kulturális és szabadidős programok alapvetően a tudatos értékeken és társas kapcsolatokon alapuló életviteli ismereteket voltak hivatottak elmélyíteni. Ennek során a két intézmény bevont tanulóinak és megvalósító pedagógusainak személyes találkozójára került sor mindkét érintett településen. Továbbá két közös kirándulást szerveztek Békés megyében: Gyulára, valamint Gyopárosfürdőre, mely programok egyaránt segítették a személyes, a szociális és a kognitív kompetenciák fejlesztését.

Hat napos, közös nyári tábort tartottak a Balaton partján, a Zánkai - Új Nemzedék Központban, ahol naponta szervezett foglalkozásokat, kulturális, sport és egyéb szabadidős programokat biztosítottak a gyerekeknek. Végül a három előadásból álló sorozat témái között a partner iskolák megismerése, az alkohol és drogprevenció, illetve a társadalmi egyenlőség kérdésének fontossága szerepelt.

A „Hazai és nemzetközi testvériskolai kapcsolatok kialakítása” című pályázati kiíráson 17 000 000 forint vissza nem térítendő támogatást elnyert projekt 2014. február 1-jén indult és 2015. május 31-én zárul.

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras at a cabinet meeting Sunday night in the Greek parliament

There has been lots of analysis on a new list of economic reforms that the Greek government sent to its bailout monitors over the weekend, including this incredibly comprehensive report from the Athens-based analytical website Macropolis.

But before everyone goes concluding that this is the final list that eurozone creditors will rule on, remember: nothing has been submitted yet to the eurogroup – the committee of 19 eurozone finance ministers that will ultimately rule on whether the reforms are sufficient to unlock the remaining €7.2bn in bailout funds Athens desperately needs.

And tonight’s “deadline” for bailout monitors to approve a submission, and then forward it onto the eurogroup, is nothing more than a self-imposed one; in reality, there is no deadline other than the date when Athens eventually runs out of cash.

People on both sides of the negotiations say that despite three days of talks, the list is not comprehensive as yet. “There was no such thing as an original list,” insists an official from one of the bailout monitoring institutions. “There were contributions, tables, pieces of paper.”

Indeed, on the Greek side, some involved in the discussions say a fuller, longer, and more detailed document is in the works. They argue the issue is not, as many among the bailout monitors claim, a lack of detail. The issue is getting all the details – some 72 reforms, according to one person in the Athens camp – into a well-organised document, in English, without mistakes in substance or politics.

Read more