Defense Industry Daily

Americas

• After a long wait, the KC-46A tanker has been cleared for production. The Milestone C approval was awarded by US Under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, Frank Kendall, following a series of stringent refueling tests of various USAF and Navy aircraft. Contracts are expected to be awarded to Boeing within the next 30 days for the first two low rate initial production lots, totaling 19 aircraft.

• A B-52H bomber equipped with the new Conventional Rotary Launcher (CRL) has successfully dropped three AGM-158 Joint Attack Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) from its internal weapons bay for the first time. While the bomber is capable of carrying 12 of the cruise missiles on its wing pylons, the inclusion of the Conventional Rotary Launcher now enables it to hold a further eight internally, a payload increase of 60%. Next in store for the launcher is more of the same testing but with the inclusion of live weapons followed by final validation of the CLR system’s full capability.

• The AIM-9X Sidewinder has become the first short range air-to-air missile to be fully integrated on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Testing of the missile so far has lead to a three for three success with a fourth guided test expected by the end of the year alongside final integration work. The F-35 is capable of holding two AIM-9Xs on its wings, and when configured for air superiority missions, can hold four AIM-120s internally.

Middle East North Africa

• Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has showcased their Drone Guard system to a number of armed forces in order to show its operational capabilities. Designed with the threat of small UAVs carrying explosives in mind, the trails saw the system disrupt a number of different UAVs which can be detected from as far as 3kms. Once identified, Drone Guard can then send the UAV back to its launch point, or hold it in a certain space until its battery or fuel runs out.

Europe

• The US State department has cleared a $231 million munition sale to a number of European NATO members. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain are to receive 2,040 joint direct attack munition (JDAM) guidance kits of various iterations, as well as computer control groups, joint programmable fuzes, and bomb fin assembly and airfoil groups. Also included in the deal would be laser sensors, proximity sensors, avionics kit interfaces, electronic bomb fuzes, repair and return services, transportation, engineering services, and other support services.

• Saab has received a number of contracts for munition and development work for the Swedish military. A $14.3 million deal has been awarded for the provision of a variety of ammunition for the Carl-Gustaf recoilless rifle, an anti-armor weapon. The company has also been tapped to undertake a $15.29 million project to design, develop and deliver vehicle electronics to Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Gmbh for use in Leopard 2 tanks used by Sweden.

• The British government has launched a $1 billion defense innovation initiative aimed at fast tracking future defense solutions and changing the MoD’s creative culture. Individuals and companies will be able to avail of the fund over the next ten years, and follows the mentioning in the 2015 Strategic Review for the need to include the cutting edge in departmental culture. Technologies believed to benefit from the extra funding include Birmingham University’s sensors that can survey underground tunnels in minutes, and Animal Dynamics’ work on tiny drones inspired by dragonflies.

Asia Pacific

• Taiwan has agreed to part of a US weapons package that will see delivery of 13 sets of Phalanx close-in weapons systems (CIWS) and other equipment set to the tune of $286.6 million. While not due for delivery until at least 2024, the new CIWS systems will add to one MK 15 Block 1B CIWS system found on one of its Kidd-class destroyers and give an uplift in capabilities to the older Phalanx systems currently in use. The deal is part of a wider $1.83 billion defense package that includes two Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates, 36 AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles, and 250 Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger missiles.

Today’s Video

IAI’s Drone Guard:

Americas

• A long awaited low-rate initial production decision for the KC-46 tanker is to be made by the end of the month. Secretary of the USAF Deborah Lee James informed the media of the upcoming meeting “We believe that the aircraft has met all of the wickets that are required to meet milestone C, but of course that remains to be seen, so I’ll say stay tuned on that.” Flight testing of the aircraft wound up in July following a number of hardware and software fixes to the plane’s boom following aerial refueling problems.

Middle East North Africa

• Russian helicopters seeing action in Syria are to be fitted with composite rotor blades to counter against the rapid wear and tear currently experienced on their metal ones. According to the blade’s manufacturer Mil, the composite blades have already been used in the production of multirole Mi-38 and Mi-35M attack helicopters and have also been included on the newly upgraded Mi-28NM. Russia has been supporting the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad with air support and logistics since September 2015.

• In addition to a $1.1 billion Airbus H225M helicopter deal, France is also trying to sell Kuwait anti-ship missiles to help fill a specific Kuwaiti requirement for airborne missiles for use against fast offshore boats. The Gulf nation had a similar requirement on its recent purchase of Eurofight Typhoons. Airbus is conducting similar work on H225Ms operated by the Brazilian Navy, integrating the MBDA Exocet AM39 anti-ship missile.

• $50 million in weapons has been delivered by the US to Lebanon. Goodies in the shipment include 50 armored Humvees, 40 Howitzer field artillery pieces, 50 MK-19 grenade launchers and 1,000 tons of ammunition, including small, medium and heavy artillery rounds. With Lebanon being the fifth-largest recipient of US military financing, the country has received more than $221 million in funding this year.

Europe

• With just a day to spare, a joint effort by Lockheed Martin UK and Elbit Systems will enter the UK’s Challenger II upgrade program. The duo’s late entry into the $816 million modernization will see them duke it out with a consortium involving General Dynamic and the tank’s original equipment manufacturer BAE Systems as well as bids from Rheinmetall, Swiss defense company Ruag and a CMI Defence-Ricardo UK partnership.

• The Russian Aerospace Forces are to shortly receive next generation bombs with proximity fuzes. According to state-owned manufacturer Tecmarsh, the fuze has recently passed tests and is being prepared for serial production. Improvements in the new munition aim to decrease the amount of energy lost to crater creation and soil displacement and increasing the radius of damage.

Asia Pacific

• Sri Lanka has expressed an interest in replacing its aging Kfir fighters. According to a cabinet spokesperson, the government has approved a new competition and is looking for interested manufacturers to come forward. The service is looking at getting between eight to twelve aircraft which at present is down to only one serviceable fighter.

• South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) has given the second half of 2020 as the date for the first prototype of their indigenous active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Developed in conjunction with Hanwha Thales, DAPA foresees six years of development, with the new radar to be ready for deployment in 2026. The radar will be integrated on the upcoming KF-X indigenous fighter.

Today’s Video

China sends its Gaofen-3 radar imaging satellite into space:

Americas

• A survey of 31 F-35A pilots has given their full confidence in the upcoming fifth generation fighter. According to the report, all asked would choose the F-35A over their former fighters if they were to engage in a beyond-visual-range fight. Furthermore, despite its cost, the F-35 was deemed notably more effective and in many cases cheaper than any other four-plus-generation multirole fighter in the world.

• MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper pilots are to undergo a fifteen-day course in electric warfare missions. The USAF program will see pilots gain training so that they can continue to operate their UAV when under electronic attack such as jamming of their satellite uplinks. Once completed, they will be known as Electronic Combat Officers.

• While Segway hoverboards are the closest most of us currently have to emulating a scene from the movie Back to the Future, a US company specializing in the explosives-trace-detection business is looking to bring the technology to the military. Massachusetts based firm Implant Sciences Corporation is currently in the process of acquiring the French Zapata Industries SAS who reached a proof-of-concept milestone this year by producing a personal flight system it’s calling Flyboard Air. Once completed, Implant hopes to use the technologies gained in order to explore new markets in the defense, security and commercial markets.

• Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $101 million delivery order against a previous agreement for the production of F-35 software data loads. The deal provides for additional non-recurring effort and integration efforts required in support of the F-35 Reprogramming Center West and includes the production of F-35 software data loads for laboratory testing, planning for verification and validation test, conduct technical support of the test, design, build and delivery of verification and validation modification kits and mission data file generation tools for foreign military sales customers.

Middle East North Africa

• Misplaced hysteria or 1930s appeasement? What ever it may be, Israel and the Pentagon are back at loggerheads over the Iranian nuclear deal a week after discussions over the continuation of Washington’s military aid package to the Israeli government. While Israel’s MoD has likened President Obama to a hapless Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemingly softened the criticism by looking to refocus the discussion on ways the two countries must work together to mitigate dangers.

Europe

• While initially docketed to fly in 2019, the Tu-160M2’s maiden flight will now be moved forward to late 2017. The announcement was made by Russia’s Aerospace Force commander Viktor Bondarev last week. Bondarev continued stating that the first serial produced units of the strategic bomber will have been completed by 2021.

Asia Pacific

• In the search to modernize the world’s largest archipelago nation’s military aircraft, Indonesia is looking to Airbus and Antonov. Meetings have taken place between Indonesian officials and Fernando Alonso, Head of the Military Aircraft division of Airbus Defence and Space, over potential sales of the A400M transport plane and Eurofighter jets. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials have claimed that Jakarta is set to order An-70 transport planes as well as securing a license to serial produce Ukrainian radar systems.

• Leonardo has signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Taiwan’s state-owned Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation to supply 66 M-346s to the Republic of China Air Force. According to the document, Italy will provide the first 4-6 aircraft and the rest will be assembled in Taiwan with 50% components made in Italy alongside any relevant technology transfers. The M-346s will replace existing AT-3 jets due for modernization.

Today’s Video

Zapata Industries:

Americas

• Argentina has been cleared by the US State Department for the potential sale of 24 T-6C+ Texan II trainer aircraft. The Foreign Military Sales contract, which includes spare engines and associative support equipment, is estimated to be in the region of $300 million. Under the announcement, new T-6Cs will not only go toward a modernization of the Air Force’s trainer fleet, but will also participate in border control missions.

• The Mexican Navy has debuted its new Arcturus T-20 UAV for surveillance operations. Procurement of the drone came as part of a collaboration between the Navy and the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food, with the system featuring three aircraft equipped with high-resolution cameras, control vehicles, antennas, and a pneumatic launcher. Specific tasks include surveillance for the protection and recovery of the endangered vaquita, a rare porpoise, and to prevent poaching of the totoaba fish found in the Gulf of California.

Middle East North Africa

• The UAE is to receive $785 million in US munitions, sustainment and support. Procurements include 7,700 GBU-10 guidance kits with 7,700 Mk-84/BLU-117 bombs; 5,940 GBU-12 guidance kits with 5,940 Mk-82/BLU-111 bombs; 500 GBU-31V1 guidance kits with 500 Mk-84/BLU- 117 bombs; 500 GBU-31V3 guidance kits with 500 BLU-109 bombs; and 14,640 FMU-152 fuzes. The US State Department stated that the munitions would go toward aiding the participation of the UAE in operations against Islamic State militants.

• Several armor manufacturers are to collaborate on a joint venture based in Turkey. Germany’s Rheinmetall AG, Turkey’s BMC, and the Malaysia-based Etika Strategi have joined to focus on wheeled and tracked armored vehicles with the aim of expanding local and external markets. This could then lead to Rheinmetall and BMC working on the new Turkish Altay tank if the latter wins a serial production contract for the vehicle.

• Contract negotiations are underway to clear a $100 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) for 76mm Super Rapid guns for Israel. Much sought after by Tel Aviv for many years, the sale will see Italian defense contractor Oto Melara, a subsidiary of Leonardo-Finmeccanica, deliver the weapons to Israel via the US Navy. Cash for the guns will come through US military aid.

Asia Pacific

• Military reimbursements to the tune of $300 million will not be paid to Pakistan by the Pentagon. Sourced under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), the program aims to reimburse US allies that have incurred costs in supporting counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations. Since 2002, Pakistan has received $14 billion from the CSF, however US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has not told Congress that Pakistan was taking adequate action against the Haqqani network insurgent group.

• India’s MoD has approved $294 million to go toward a program to upgrade its ten Ka-28 anti-submarine warfare helicopters. A 42 month modernization will see state-of-the-art western weapons and sensors integrated on a fleet that currently suffers from poor serviceability. First purchased in 1980, only four Ka-28s are currently operational.

• The first export order for the Il-76MD-90 cargo plane could very well be Kazakhstan. It’s been reported by Russian media that both defense ministers are in discussions over a number of military-technical issues which not only include the Il-76, but Yak-152 and Yak-130 trainers. Other potential export customers include Algeria, Iran and South Africa.

Today’s Video

Japanese planes searching for remnants of North Korean ballistic missiles:

AH-1F, Cobra Gold 97
(click to view full)

In June 2008, US GAO auditors released a report that documented issues with the USA’s billions of dollars in “coalition support fund” aid to Pakistan. One of the items cited involved Pakistan’s 20-28 AH-1F “TOWCobra” helicopters; despite reimbursements of $55 million to maintain Pakistan’s MI-17 utility and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, the Pakistani army was not in fact maintaining them, causing poor readiness rates for these critical assets.

A recent DSCA announcement indicates that Pakistan may be getting more serious about maintaining its attack helicopters. Whether it becomes more serious about using them in areas under al-Qaeda’s control is another matter…

The Helicopters

The AH-1F was the final Cobra upgrade in the US Army, which phased in out of active army service in 1999 and National Guard service in 2001. They are still in use in number of countries, including Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, et. al. This model improved upon previous Cobra variants by adding a new fire-control system with a laser rangefinder; an improved cockpit layout with a head-up display (HUD) for the pilot; an AN/ALQ-144 IRCM (“disco ball” infra-red counter-measure) unit mounted above the engine; a cable cutter above and below the cockpit to protect the Cobra in NOE (nap-of-the-earth) flight; and a long exhaust pipe to reduce the helicopter’s infrared signature.

Subsequent upgrades to the fleet included improved night-fighting equipment via the C-NITE Cobra Night Attack system that gave the helicopters the ability to target enemies at night, and in bad weather that obscures normal vision.

Contracts and Key Events

August 5/16: Military reimbursements to the tune of $300 million will not be paid to Pakistan by the Pentagon. Sourced under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), the program aims to reimburse US allies that have incurred costs in supporting counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations. Since 2002, Pakistan has received $14 billion from the CSF, however US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has not told Congress that Pakistan was taking adequate action against the Haqqani network insurgent group.

Sept 26/08: The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Pakistan’s official request to refurbish and maintain 8 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters. The Government of Pakistan has also requested warranties, system integration, delivery of spare and repairs parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, and other related elements of logistics support. The prime contractor will be US Helicopter in Ozark, AL (a.k.a. Bell Helicopter Services), and the estimated cost is $115 million.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple U.S. Government and contractor representatives in Pakistan for approximately 3 weeks to ensure delivery and operability of the equipment. This will be followed by a 3-person Field Office that will provide technical assistance and contract administration for the Pakistan Army for 3 years.

Feb 2/07: The USA transfers 8 C-NITE equipped AH-1F Cobras to the Pakistan Army, at the Qasim Airbase near Islamabad.

Sources indicate that Pakistan already had about 20 AH-1F helicopters, which were assigned to the Army’s base at Multan in central Pakistan. American issues with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons prevented further shipments, but systems upgrades were shipped in the mid-1990s. Pakistan’s newly-acknowledged status as a necessary ally against al-Qaeda has relaxed American sanctions, and made advanced weapon sales possible again despite some Congressional concerns. See fuller background in “US Transfers 8 More Attack Helicopters to Pakistan“.

Indian Ka-28
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In September 2008, Flight International reported that India’s defence ministry has issued a tender for “advanced multirole naval helicopters” to several manufacturers around the world, including AgustaWestland, EADS and Sikorsky. The initial RFP reportedly covered 16 helicopters, with a potential expansion to 60 helicopters.

The problem, as usual, is that nothing happened for years, while critical Indian defenses were left rotting. India’s naval sphere of influence is growing, and the country purchased long-range P-8i jets to improve its territorial coverage. Unfortunately, that can’t paper over a glaring hole in India’s defenses. The Navy currently has many high-end ships without serious naval helicopter capability. Few of their Russian Ka-28s are still fit for service, and their small and aged Sea King fleet faces both technological and airframe limitations. It’s a terrible policy for a country that continues to add high-cost, high-value ships to its fleet, in a region with more and better submarines.

Finally, by the end of 2014 India indicated interest in expediting its initial naval multirole helicopter acquisition.

India’s Anti-Submarine Weakness Helicopters: Flying Low, Dying Slow Indian Sea King
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As of 2014, the situation has become grave. India’s Ka-28 fleet has dwindled to just 4 operational helicopters, while a mid-life upgrade that would restore 10 to flying condition and give them modern sensors has been trying to get underway since 2008. The effective Sea King helicopter fleet has dwindled to just 16-17 upgraded machines, and all of them won’t be in flying condition all of the time. India’s Naval Air Arm also has a small number of Dhruv utility helicopters, and a somewhat larger set of very old Chetak helicopters that are only suitable for light supply and search and rescue roles, but neither is much help in sea control roles. The resulting situation is dire:

“For instance, between the six Talwar class frigates, which include the recently inducted frigates Teg, Tarkash and Trikand, only three carry a helicopter. Some other frigates don’t have even one helicopter between them. Coming to larger ships like the destroyers, one Kamov [Ka-28] helicopter is being shared between five Rajput class ships.”

These are key ships that would normally be tasked with anti-submarine duties. Without helicopters, their ability to perform those roles drops sharply. Which means that they are not fit for purpose to protect India’s carriers against Pakistani or Chinese submarines. A July 2014 report in India Today said that just 20% of available slots were filled in the Indian Navy, based on:

• Delhi Class destroyers can carry 2 helicopters
  
• Kolkata Class frigates can carry 2 helicopters
  
• Shivalik, Betwa, and Godavari Class frigates can carry 2 helicopters
  
• Talwar Class frigates can carry 1 helicopter
  
• Offshore Patrol Vessels can carry 1 helicopter
  
• Landing Ship Tank (Large) can carry 2 helicopters
  
• INS Viraat aircraft carrier can carry 8 helicopters
  
• INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier can carry 12 helicopters

Towed Sonar: Rolling in the Deep Talwar Class
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To make things worse, the Indian Navy has been trying to import an Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS) for its ships since the mid-1990s, but the Ministry of Defence has blocked it in favor of DRDO projects that went nowhere. The Nagan project was finally shut down in 2012, but DRDO just turned around and started a new ALTAS project in its place. As a result, 21 destroyers, frigates and corvettes bought since 1997 lack key sonar systems: 3 Delhi Class destroyers, 3 Kolkata Class destroyers, 6 Talwar Class frigates, 3 Brahmaputra Class frigates, 3 Shivalik Class frigates, and 4 Kamorta Class corvettes. They must depend, instead, on an Indian HUMSA passive array towed sonar with limited capabilities.

Indian MoD approval for a limited 6 ATAS buy was finally granted to an exasperated navy in 2009, but baseless complaints of wrongdoing left Atlas Elektronik’s systems in limbo, despite investigations that cleared the procurement.

That leaves India’s navy with a double ASW handicap, just as advanced submarine systems are proliferating in Pakistan and the Southeast Asian region. At the same time, the country is introducing advanced vessels like aircraft carriers and their accompanying multi-role surface ships. It’s a very poor situation, which would quickly turn disastrous if put to a military test.

Helicopters: Acquisition Programs MH-92
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In response, there are 2 acquisition programs underway, and 2 potential upgrade programs.

NMRH: An initial tender for 16 front-line medium naval helicopters. India wants full anti-submarine capability, and anti-surface warfare capability that includes anti-ship missiles. Required secondary roles will include search and rescue (SAR), transport, casualty evacuation, etc. The RFP included options for 44 more, which could bring the total to 60. If an American helicopter is picked, India wants a Direct Commercial Sale that lets them manage the entire procurement themselves.

The final contenders were Sikorsky’s S-70B-x and NH Industries NH90 NFH; and even though trials finished in 2011, Defense Acquisition Council clearance didn’t happen until 2014. NH Industries’ complaints about requirement waivers granted to the S-70B caused most of the delay, which had predictable results within India’s Byzantine bureaucracies. It got to the point that the Navy openly criticized NH Industries, while insisting that both helicopters met naval staff qualitative requirements. Sikorsky was generally considered to have a strong edge, and ended up winning by default after the NH90 was removed.

A follow-on program is expected in the 9 – 12.5 tonne medium to medium-heavy classes, with reported numbers that have varied over time. If the anti-ship missile requirement changes or is dropped, Sikorsky is widely expected to substitute the MH-60R/S Seahawks, whose lack of an anti-ship missile made them ineligible as an NMRH candidate. Meanwhile, NHI’s NH90 isn’t going away, Airbus could push the NH90 or the naval Super Puma, Kamov can expect to keep trying, and AgustaWestland could offer the AW101 naval helicopter – if their position with the Indian government allows them to bid.

Indian Multirole Helicopter (IMRH). A program to build a domestic 12-tonne class helicopter as a joint venture with HAL. They want a maximum speed of 275 kmh, maximum payload of 3.5 tonnes at sea level, 500 km range at sea level, and a service ceiling of 6,500 metres.

India’s pattern of behavior makes the potential for interference with any NMRH follow-on obvious; in standard style, state industry lobbying for an exclusive contract would be followed by long delays before equipment reaches the Navy. One possibility is to bring in the NMRH/follow-on contenders for this partnership. Sikorsky’s S-92, for instance, is a 12-tonne helicopter that’s already partly manufactured in India at Tata, with a strong civil record in the offshore oil & gas industry and a naval helicopter variant that’s being (slowly) developed for Canada. Airbus has the precedent of their license manufacturing agreement with Brazil for EC725s, including an unarmed naval utility variant. The disadvantage? It throttles the development of a viable private competitor to HAL.

AS565 Panther
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NUH: The Naval Utility Helicopter involves machines with a maximum take-off weight of 4.5 tons, as a replacement for existing HAL Cheetah and Chetak designs derived from the ancient Alouette-III. India’s Navy and Coast Guard were poised to benefit, and the 2012 RFP included 56 helicopters, 3 simulators, 28 spare engines, etc., with an option for another 28 helicopters (TL = 84). RFIs were issued in 2010 and 2011, and the RFP was issued in 2012 at an estimate of $900 million, with entry into service expected for 2016. In 2014, however, the Indian government canceled the competition and restarted it under different terms, which will require full manufacturing in India. Service by 2016 is extremely unlikely.

Coast Guard helicopters must include Search and Rescue duties as a matter of course, along with sensors for finding boats and people. Naval NUH helicopters also need to go beyond transport roles, and will be used both on shore and abord ship. India wanted the ability to carry rocket launchers, lightweight torpedoes, and depth charges on “a modern airframe design, proven fuel-efficient engines and fully-integrated advanced avionics.”

Candidates reportedly included Airbus’ popular AS565 Panther light naval helicopter, and a derivative of AgustaWestland’s AW109 LUH. As a wild card, HAL’s locally-designed Dhruv began shore-based naval utility and SAR service in Kochi in November 2013. Navy disappointment with Dhruv was a key factor in pushing NUH’s existence, but since then, HAL has been working on a naval version with some anti-submarine capability, and has already fielded an armed Rudra ALH-WSI version for India’s land forces. The Navy has been very lukewarm about the Dhruv, citing stability issues, concerns about the ability to operate from ships, a lack of naval features like folding rotors, and the helicopter’s accident rate. Still, delays to NUH create time for more advances, fixes, and lobbying. In other words, a new opportunity for HAL.

Modernized S-61
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Upgrade Programs include both of India’s current naval helicopter fleets.

Ka-28s. At present, India has just 4 flyable Kamov Ka-28 ASW helicopters. The other 6 Ka-28s have been mothballed for spares, while a mid-life upgrade that would restore the 10 to flying condition and give them modern sensors has been trying to get underway since 2008. Bids were finally opened in 2012, and a combination of Russia’s Kamov and Italy’s Finmeccanica won the INR 20 billion project. Contracts are set, and both the Cabinet Committee of Security and India’s CBI investigators cleared the deal, but nothing has been done.

Sea Kings. India also wants to upgrade its 17 Sea Kings with new composite main rotor blades to improve lift, and modern avionics to include a glass cockpit and automatic flight control systems. A 2008 proposal to use Israeli equipment as the upgrade package was vehemently opposed by AgustaWestland, which delayed things. That firm’s limited bidding ability in the wake of the AW101 VVIP helicopter dispute could exclude them now, leaving the door open for Israeli firms. If India needs a competition, Sikorsky’s S-61T contract for the US State Department offers another viable model. S-61 is the Sea King’s civilian designation.

NMRH/ IMRH Naval Helicopters: Contenders Italian AW101
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The initial NMRH competition narrowed down to the NH90 NFH vs. the S-70B, then the S-70B alone, but subsequent buys could introduce additional options. Flight International:

“Defence ministry sources say the new aircraft will be equipped with potent anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare equipment including cruise missiles and torpedoes, and also be capable of being refuelled in flight. The type will operate from both naval vessels and land bases, they add.”

As a further wrinkle, India wants anti-ship missiles with a range of 100+ km, which is about 2-3x farther than most helicopter-launched missiles. They’re reportedly interested in Kongsberg’s stealthy Naval Strike Missile, or MBDA’s Marte-ER.

Sikorsky (winner, S-70B). The S-70 is an export designation for Sikorsky’s H-60 family, designed for international markets through options like federated avionics that can more easily accept country-specific items. Depending on the specific configuration ordered, a wide range of technologies can be included, making them anything from a basic ASW choice to a very advanced helicopter. What will an Indian S-70B naval helicopter look like?

For starters, it will carry an anti-ship missile, per Indian missile requirements. Kongsberg’s AGM-119B Penguin is the S-70B’s standard option, but doesn’t have the range India wants; switching to Kongsberg’s NSM or MBDA’s Marte-ER would require testing for aerodynamic compatibility, and additional integration work. On the flip side, the S-70B offers greater versatility, carrying up to 8 AGM-114 Hellfire short-range strike missiles for troop support ashore, or defense against fast boat swarms. DID has confirmed that qualified torpedoes include Raytheon’s MK-46, Eurotorp’s A244 Mod 3 (Singapore), and the new MK-54 torpedo (Turkey). India is already buying MK-54s for their new P-8i sea control aircraft fleet.

MH-60Rs fire Hellfire
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Sikorsky’s most produced naval helicopters are their MH-60R/S Seahawks. Lockheed Martin’s bid for India’s maritime patrol aircraft competition reportedly included 16 MH-60Rs (est. cost: $350-400 million), alongside 8 of its P-3 aircraft. They lost, but this MRH tender offers Sikorsky a way to get their foot in the door again, and subsequent buys may open up a broader market for their MH-60 family.

The MH-60R’s inability to be exported as a Direct Commercial Sale disqualified it from the initial NMRH competition. It also lacks an anti-ship missile of any kind. On the other hand, it carries a number of potent and attractive anti-submarine and surface warfare technologies. Sikorsky is reportedly looking to offer it for India’s follow-on buys, or it could assemble an S-70B offer that draws on some of those technologies. MH-60R submarine detection options include new processing systems for advanced sonobuoys, while the S-70B’s standard HELRAS dipping sonar is replaced by the same FLASH sonar used in the NH90-NFH. The S-70B’s standard is the AN/APS-143 radar family, which will also be used on India’s P-8i sea control jets; in contrast, the MH-60R uses the AN/APS-153, with inverse SAR mode for detecting submarine periscopes. MH-60R/S helicopters carry AGM-114 Hellfires for use against small boats and land targets, and will soon add APKWS 70mm laser-guided rockets, alongside the latest Mk.54 torpedoes. Australia has ordered some MH-60Rs to replace its S-70B-2s, and of course they’re the current and future mainstay of the US Navy’s ASW force, which ensures wide operational compatibility and future upgrades. The MH-60S is more of a naval utility helicopter, though it can also be armed with Hellfire missiles and APKWS rockets, or fitted with a limited Airborne Mine Countermeasures suite. Thailand has ordered a couple of MH-60S.

Sikorsky had a larger option, but they chose not to offer it here. Canada chose Sikorsky’s larger H-92 Superhawk as the basis for its CH-148 Cyclone naval helicopter, and full production of S-92 helicopter cabins is already outsourced to a joint venture with India’s Tata. Unfortunately, Canada’s program remains beset by delays and capability issues, including the lack of an anti-ship missile. Until its issues are fixed and the helicopter is performing in service, the MH-92 isn’t a viable export candidate anywhere. On the other hand, it could be a logical joint venture partnership offering for the proposed IMRH.

NH90: TTH & NFH

AgustaWestland/ Airbus (quasi finalist, NH90). The NH90 NFH medium naval helicopter finally entered full operational capability service in late 2013. AgustaWestland is the NH Industries consortium lead for the naval variant, but Indian politics may force another consortium member to take the lead. Note that a number of European navies have needed to upgrade and modify their ships to support the NH90 NFH, due to its size and fully-loaded weight.

The NH90 NFH can fire MBDA’s Marte Mk.2/S light anti-ship missile, and work is already underway to integrate the Marte-ER as a heavier and longer-range option. The AM39 Exocet used in Indian submarines isn’t an option, because of its effects on turbulence and the NH90’s center of gravity. Qualified torpedoes include Eurotorp’s MU90, Raytheon’s Mk.46, or BAE’s Stingray. NH90-NFH helicopters have been ordered by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Qatar.

NMRH specifications were too heavy for AgustaWestland’s Super Lynx naval helicopter, which fits a very wide range of naval vessels and is in service all around the world. Britain’s AW159 Lynx Wildcat offers even more advanced technologies. At the heavier 12 tonne end, the AW101 medium-heavy helicopter is used in both naval and search-and-rescue roles with Britain’s Royal Navy, Denmark, and Italy.

Airbus. Eurocopter is the top shareholder in the NH90 consortium, so they’re technically a participant in the NH90 bid, and they may need to step to the fore. Their own AS532/ EC725 Super Puma/Cougar also serves with a number of navies, including some customers near India, and there’s an earlier AS332F variant for ASW roles.

AgustaWestland’s entanglement in the AW101 VVIP helicopter’s legal proceedings left Airbus with a decision: push the NH90-NFH as a more popular and proven alternative with partial Airbus workshare, or push an all-Airbus design instead? The NH90’s disqualification from the initial tender seems likely to push Airbus toward a more exclusive path.

Rosoboronexport/ Kamov can play the commonality and standardization cards, because India’s Navy already uses its Ka-28s and Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters. On the other hand, it would appear to have the most limited set of upgrade options. India has delayed modernizing the handful of helicopters they have, and reports don’t indicate that they’re a contender, but Kamov is trying anyway.

Contracts & Key Events 2014 – 2016

AW101 VVIP deal blows up, affecting other competitions; Sikowrsky wins initial NMRH competition. NUH canceled and re-started as “Buy & Make India”; Dhruv ASW? S-70B fires Penguin
(click to view full)

August 5/16: India’s MoD has approved $294 million to go toward a program to upgrade its ten Ka-28 anti-submarine warfare helicopters. A 42 month modernization will see state-of-the-art western weapons and sensors integrated on a fleet that currently suffers from poor serviceability. First purchased in 1980, only four Ka-28s are currently operational.

Jan 26/15: RFP for additional 123-unit NMRH purchase expected. Sikorsky’s win of the NMRH contract, to build 16 helicopters, is just weeks old, but the Indian Navy will again put out to tender the next 123 units. Sikorsky does not appear to have won much of an advantage for the larger competition in its many-years fight for the first 16 helicopters. Making things more interesting, the Indian government, under nativist political pressure, is said to be preparing the RFP as a design and price competition with the manufacturing to be done by Indian firms. A new trade group, the Confederation of India Industry’s National Committee on Aerospace (CIINCA), has been loudly insisting on future contract structures that bring manufacturing to India.

At the heart of the long and somewhat embarrassingly
mismanaged helicopter procurements in recent years has been India’s domestic helicopter manufacturer HAL, whose light, single-engine choppers have served the Indian Army – which, in recent times, has not had much love for the manufacturer. The CEO of HAL is currently the chair of CIINCA.

Dec 5/14: Sikorsky wins NMRH. India’s ministry of defense and Sikorsky both announce that the firm has won a contract for 16 S-70B Seahawk naval multirole helicopters, with an option for another 8 helos. The deal is valued at Rs. 6,000 crore (about $1B), but the two parties still have to negotiate procurement details as well as attached logistics, support, and training. Indian officials use the increasingly popular “fast tracking” qualifier to signify they intend to expedite the conclusion of this acquisition.

The US has been putting renewed energy in its courtship of India, but in this case, Sikorsky had been left competing only against possible Indian inaction for the past month.

NMRH winner

AW101 VVIP

Nov 5/14: NH90 out. Sikorsky’s S-70B is now the sole bidder for India’s initial buy of 15 naval helicopters. The NH90 and S-70B both cleared the technical trials a couple of years ago, but the legal fights around the AW101 buy have resulted in a de facto ban on Finmeccanica outside of existing tenders – even though India lacks the evidence to bring a case (q.v. July 29/14). Despite the Attorney General’s opinion (q.v. Aug 7/14), the NH90-NFH has now been removed from the initial tender, leaving Sikorsky’s offering all alone.

Indian procurement laws generally prohibit contracts if there’s only 1 bidder. It remains to be seen whether the government will argue that there were more bidders (a rationale that hasn’t been effective in many similar cases where blacklisting left just 1 vendor), issue an override the law on the basis of emergency needs, or do nothing and sabotage a critical acquisition. Sources: India’s Economic Times, “Finmeccanica out, US’s Sikorsky joins Navy copter acquisition race”.

Oct 15/14: Helicopters – NUH. India’s new BJP government cancels the INR 90 billion NUH tender, and re-starts it on similar terms to the Army’s canceled RSH light helicopter contract. Instead of buying abroad and requiring industrial offsets locally, the competition would buy a foreign design that would be assembled in India by local partners.

Previous rumors (q.v. Sept 20/14) appear to have picked the wrong competition, though some news reports conflict. Note that despite the navy’s earlier unhappiness (q.v. Aug 20/12), HAL is now supplying Dhruv helicopters to the Navy for shore-based SAR and transport roles (q.v. July 20/14), and appears to be working on an ASW variant with DRDO (q.v. June 16/14). If this quote from Defense World is true, therefore, one might have legitimate cause to wonder about the NUH competition’s future:

The DAC has reportedly approved a proposal to allow HAL to manufacture 440 light utility helicopters to be supplied to the Army, Navy and Air Force. The HAL helicopter has not even been fully developed. According to unconfirmed reports, HAL is rushing to finish development of the prototype which it plans to unveil in time for the Aero India show scheduled to take place in February 2015.”

Note that HAL’s stalled LUH project is a single-engine helicopter like existing Chetaks, rather than the twin-engines demanded by NUH. Then again, the welfare of the people who have to perform night rescues in inclement weather isn’t generally a priority for state-run industry lobbyists. Sources: Defense News, “India Cancels Navy LUH Tender; Issues New Request” | Defense World, “Tender Cancellations Bring International Helicopter Procurements To A Halt In India” | India’s Economic Times, “Tender for 56 naval choppers scrapped”.

NUh canceled and restarted

Sept 20/14: Helicopters – NMRH. Indian media report rumors that the NMRH competition is about to be canceled. It would shift from foreign construction with Indian industrial offsets, to a “Buy & Make India” class of competition that requires foreign vendors to find a local partner and have that partner make the helicopters in India. That seems really odd, given recent (q.v. Aug 29/14) DAC approval for the initial NMRH buy.

A shift of that kind does two things, from the Navy’s perspective. One, it delays the project by pushing it back through the bureaucracy, and forces vendors to find a partner it can trust at that level and then re-calculate its bid. That bid is likely to be more expensive, and a shortage of local Indian capability means that manufacturing will also take longer. If confimed, the delay would certainly be measured in years. Sources: India’s Financial Express, “Anti-submarine choppers to be made in India soon”.

Sept 14/14: Helicopters – NUH. India Strategic explains some of the hurdles faced by HAL’s Dhruv, which seems to be trying to angle its way into the NUH contract, even though NUH was floated due to dissatisfaction with Dhruv (q.v. Aug 20/12):

“IAF has often expressed discomfort – and displeasure – at aircraft made/ serviced by HAL…. Its HPT-32 trainer was a poor product, and the Dhruv helicopter, made with French collaboration and parts, still does not inspire confidence, thanks to the number of crashes. There have been two crashes recently, and many IAF officers openly challenge HAL’s capability to give “perfection.” Former Air Chief NAK Browne had also said that HAL charged three times the cost for something that IAF engineers and technicians would do also more efficiently.”

The rest of the article repeatedly stresses the need for timely delivery, lest basic Indian capabilities crumble. Sources: India Strategic, “Choppers, Aircraft and Submarines: More Delays but Some Smiles”.

Aug 29/14: NMRH & ATAS. The new BJP government’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) makes a number of key moves, beginning with cancellation of the 197-helicopter LUH competition. At the same time, however, DAC’s clearances included the INR 18 billion foreign NMRH tender for 16-60 naval multi-role helicopters.

DAC also approved a INR 17.7 billion purchase of integrated Active Towed Array Sonar anti-submarine suites for 11 frontline warships: 4 destroyers and 7 frigates. There’s some confusion regarding that approval, however, and it’s hard to tell which public interpretation would be worse for Indian ASW capabilities in the medium term.

The ATAS effort had been focused on an advanced solution from Atlas Elektronik, but some reports cite a developmental ATAS from India’s DRDO research institute instead. In an era where major opponents are deploying quiet submarines that include Air-Independent Propulsion, that may not be enough to do the job. On the other hand, Ajai Shulka says that the ATAS will be Atlas Elektronik’s product, but the buy involves future warships, rather than additions to serving vessels: the Project 17A frigates that don’t even have a contract yet, and the Project 15B Bangalore variant of the new Project 15A Kolkata Class multi-role destroyers. The Bangalore Class isn’t expected to enter service before 2018, and Project 17A is in limbo. Sources: Business Standard, “Govt clears defence deals worth Rs 17,000 cr” | Defense News, “India Cancels $1 Billion Light Helicopter Tender” | Financial Express, “Make in India kicks off with defence deals” | Indian Express, “Centre scraps light utility helicopter tender, opens it to Indian players” | NDTV, “Modi Government Drops Rs 6000-Crore Foreign Chopper Plan, Wants ‘Made in India'” | Livefist, “Advantage Sikorsky As Indian MoD To Finally Open MRH Bids”.

Aug 7/14: Finmeccanica. An official legal opinion states that India can’t afford to blacklist Italy’s Finmeccanica, on strategic grounds:

“Attorney general Mukul Rohatgi has given the opinion that blacklisting Finmeccanica with its several subsidiaries, which are supplying a large number of weapon systems, radars and ammunition to the Indian armed forces, is not advisable since the ongoing CBI investigation and the subsequent trial in the VVIP helicopter case could take a decade or so to be completed…. If any Finmeccanica company has already been declared L-1 (lowest bidder) in a finalized tender process, then it should be allowed…. [but] none of the Finmeccanica firms should be allowed to participate in a new defence tender if the equipment in question could be supplied by more than one company outside the group…. There was another category of cases where some Russian defence suppliers to India had a Finmeccanica subsidiary as a sub-contractor. Rohatgi said such cases should be allowed to continue unhindered.”

He’s correct that Finmeccanica is Kamov’s sub-contractor for Ka-28 naval helicopter modernization, and is arguably in a similar position for the NH90, but that will take a formal political decision to affirm. Note also the secondary escape clause that requires more than one competitor before Finmeccanica could be banned from a tender. The NMRH competition could also go ahead under this provision, as long as India’s politicians accept that other options like AW159s, Ka-28s, AW101s, etc. don’t meet Navy requirements, and that HAL’s Dhruv ASW (q.v. July 20/14) isn’t a front-line option.

To put some specifics on Rohtagi’s opinion, a full Finmeccanica ban would cut off sources and spares for many Indian naval guns, a number of radars, the torpedoes needed by India’s new submarines, Ka-28 modernization, and other programs. The real bottom line is that it’s impossible to blacklist any major supplier, if any formal complaints take a decade to resolve. Sources: Times of India, “Finmeccanica ban can hit forces’ battle-readiness, attorney general says”.

Finmeccanica sanctions

Aug 6/14: Kamov. Russia may not be shortlisted for N-MRH, but they haven’t given up. A 2013 proposal to set up a joint venture and assemble Kamov helicopters in India still stands:

“Sources tell RIR that this proposal was discussed as recently as June when high level defence talks held in New Delhi that were led by Indian Defence Secretary R K Mathur and Rostec Chief Executive Sergey Chemezov.”

On the other hand, India’s issues with Russia tend to revolve around reliability and maintenance delays. Sources: Russia & India Report, “Kamov ready to supply seaborne helicopters to Indian Navy”.

July 29/14: Finmeccanica. Finmeccanica announces that the Italian Prosecutor has discontinued its investigations relating to India’s 2010 contract for 12 AW101 VVIP helicopters:

“The Prosecutor specifically acknowledged the non-involvement of Finmeccanica in the alleged wrongdoing, recognizing that that since 2003, Finmeccanica has implemented – and regularly updated – an organizational, management and audit model, sufficient to prevent unlawful conduct…. AgustaWestland S.p.A. and its subsidiary AgustaWestland Ltd., together with the Prosecutor, have agreed to apply for a negligible fine, whilst confirming the appropriateness of their internal control systems and specifically their non-involvement in the misconduct alleged by the Prosecutor. This decision is not in any way an admission of any wrongdoing or liability.”

Finmeccanica says that the fine isn’t an admission of guilt, but it may not be seen that way outside of Italy. On the other hand, without Italian cooperation, India’s CBI has already acknowledged that it doesn’t have enough to bring a case. There’s also an international arbitration case pending, and the firm can try to use the Italian prosecutor’s statements as a finding of fact. Sources: Finmeccanica, “Finmeccanica: Investigations into the Company relating to the AW101 helicopters contract with the Indian Ministry of Defence discontinued”.

July 28/14: Helicopters – NMRH. The investigation into India’s AW101 VVIP helicopter buy, which became a full-blown legal dispute between India and Finmeccanica in 2013, continues to stall India’s maritime helicopter buy. The introduction of a new BJP government doesn’t seem to have changed that yet:

“The Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC), chaired by defence [DID: and finance] minister Arun Jaitley on July 19, deferred the decision on the MRH helicopter project while clearing other military procurement proposals. The two contenders in the competition are the European NH-90 helicopters, which have Finmeccanica as a partner, and the American Sikorsky-70B choppers.

The contract is crucial for the Navy since it was to be followed by a bigger one for 123 helicopters, with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities as well as customized for amphibious assaults and commando operations, at a cost of over $3 billion…. While the Navy is on track to induct four to five warships every year over the next decade, it is fast running out of helicopters meant to detect, track and kill enemy submarines. The force currently has just 11 Kamov-28 [DID: 4 operational] and 17 Sea King ASW helicopters to defend its existing fleet of over 130 warships. While the Sea Kings are over 20 years old, the Kamov-28s are long overdue for a mid-life upgrade.”

The problem with waiting for the CBI investigation to conclude is that the CBI has a practice of keeping investigations going for years, with no result. They recently had to admit that they had no solid evidence in the VVIP case, though they may be hoping that recent charges against new senior officials might shake something loose. Unless they’re given a time limit, however, India’s naval posture will be crippled for years. Sources: The Times, of India, “Scam-wary govt defers decision on naval copters”.

July 20/14: Dhruv. India’s Defence Acquisition Council cleared a set of acquisitions worth Rs 21,000 crore (INR 210 billion / $3.493 billion). The largest share involves up to 56 light transport aircraft, but DAC also includes 32 HAL Dhruv helicopters, split evenly between the Navy and Coast Guard (INR 70 billion).

The Coast Guard in particular will be very happy to replace its Chetaks with Dhruvs, though they will need many more in order to become effective beyond Porbandar (q.v. July 19/14). The Navy has been less enthused about Dhruv. There has been some notion of outfitting it as an ASW helicopter for the Navy (q.v. June 16/14) but its limitations (q.v. Aug 20/12) remain. The November 2013 stand up of INAS 322 at Kochi demonstrates how the Navy is working within those limitations, by assigning Dhruvs to shore-based transport, Search and Rescue, and day/night patrol roles.

DAC project approvals also added 5 new supply vessels (INR 90 billion), 5 OPV ships (INR 20 billion), 5 fast patrol boats (INR 3.6 billion), and Search & Rescue equipment (INR 9 billion) to India’s approved list. Note what isn’t on the list: MRH helicopters. Sources: International Business Times, “What Does Indian Defence Get in Military Projects Worth [Rs] 34,260 Crore?”

Navy, CG buying more Dhruvs

July 19/14: Helicopters. India Today adds some more hard numbers behind the Indian Navy’s helicopter problem – and hence its ASW problem. they’re noted above. The article adds that:

“With a requirement of over 100 helicopters across different categories, and yet going nowhere, the navy’s predicament is clear. Said an MoD official, “The Indian Navy had to get 16 choppers as a direct replacement for Seaking 42A helicopters which came with the INS Viraat in 1987 and were decommissioned by the end of the century. Categorised as ‘Multi Role Helicopter’ acquisition, it is yet to take off even today.” Then there is the Naval Multi Role helicopter deal to replace the Chetaks which were first introduced into the Indian armed forces in the 60s, and the Naval Utility Helicopter deal. It is all hanging in balance.”

The Coast Guard has a similar problem, with under 20 ageing Chetak helicopters and 2 newer Dhruv machines all deployed solely at Porbandar, in order to keep an eye on Pakistan. The service was asked to gift 1 of its few helicopters to the Maldives, and 15 years worth of attempts to get new helicopters have come to nothing. Sources: India Today, “Exclusive: Navy, Coast Guard send SOS to Defence Ministry on helicopter crisis”.

June 16/14: Helicopters – Dhruv ASW? India is reportedly looking to outfit their locally-designed HAL Dhruv helicopter with some anti-submarine equipment from the state’s DRDO research agency:

“The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited-built ALH Dhruv is undergoing trials for carrying out role of detecting hostile submarines using systems developed by the DRDO, Defence officials said…. The system was put under trial at Vishakhapatnam and would be tried further before any final decision is taken on deploying the twin-engine chopper on board the carrier, they said.”

The Dhruv is in the same size and weight class as AgustaWestland’s Lynx, but the final result of this program is likely to fall rather short of capabilities possessed by the AW159 Wildcat, or of larger machines like the NH90 NFH or MH-60R Seahawk. On the one hand, adapting an existing HAL platform circumvents India’s broken procurement system, creating a near-term solution for their astonishing weakness in this area (q.v. March 31/14). It also creates a platform that can be improved over time, which is good for India and its industry.

On the other hand, providing sub-standard protection to the flagship of one’s naval force is a terrible idea if it’s the only proposed solution. The question is whether the long-discussed foreign tender (q.v. Feb 25/14) for helicopters like the AW159 will also go forward, in order to equip platforms like India’s high-end destroyers (q.v. Oct 15/13) and add a higher tier of shipborne ASW protection for key assets. Sources: IBD Live, “Dhruv chopper likely to be deployed on-board INS Vikramaditya”.

May 16/14: ATAS. Ajai Shulka says the reason that operational safety was the reason that India’s new Vikramaditya aircraft carrier was joined by an armada of Indian warships for the last leg of its journey to Karwar. The problem is the lack of an effective towed sonar on Indian surface combatants, due to obstruction by the defense bureaucracy. Coming as it does on top of the MoD derelict performance with respect to anti-submarine helicopters, it creates a huge naval weakness that would doom India’s carriers in a shooting war.

The Indian Navy has been trying to import an Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS) since the mid-1990s, but the Ministry of Defence has blocked it in favor of DRDO projects that went nowhere. The Nagan project was finally shut down in 2012, but DRDO just pulled a switch and started a new ALTAS project in its place. As a result, 21 destroyers, frigates and corvettes bought since 1997 lack key sonar systems: 3 Delhi Class destroyers, 3 Kolkata Class destroyers, 6 Talwar Class frigates, 3 Brahmaputra Class frigates, 3 Shivalik Class frigates, and 4 Kamorta Class corvettes. They must depend, instead, on an Indian HUMSA passive array towed sonar with limited capabilities.

MoD approval for a limited 6 ATAS buy was finally granted to an exasperated navy in 2009, but baseless complaints of wrongdoing left Atlas Elektronik’s systems in limbo, despite investigations that cleared the procurement. It remains to be seen whether changing control of the MoD away from the Congress Party will change anything. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Warships in peril as defence ministry blocks sonar purchase”.

March 31/14: Helicopters – Ka-28. The Ka-28 force is in sad shape:

“The Navy is today being asked to make do with four Ka28 helicopters that have the technology of mid-80s for training pilots, doing ASW roles against modern submarines for the five Rajput Class destroyers as well as the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya,” said a source.”

The other 6 Ka-28s have been mothballed for spares, while a mid-life upgrade that would restore the 10 to flying condition and give them modern sensors has been trying to get underway since 2008. Bids were finally opened in 2012, and a combination of Russia’s Kamov and Italy’s Finmeccanica won the INR 20 billion project. Contracts are set, and both the Cabinet Committee of Security and India’s CBI investigators cleared the deal. Defence Minister Antony’s office has been sitting on that for over a month, however, while playing extreme hardball with AgustaWestland over the VVIP helicopter deal. Meanwhile, the Sea King fleet has problems of its own, and a proposal to buy up to 16 modern naval helicopters from foreign sources remains stalled. Sources: Daily Mail India, “Navy left ‘defenceless’ after being forced to ‘make do’ with outdated Soviet hardware”.

Feb 25/14: No Helicopters. India’s Ministry of Defence clears a whole series of defense projects: upgrades for 37 airbases, modernization of 5 ordnance depots, 4,000 hand-held thermal imagers for soldiers, 5,000 thermal imaging sights for tanks and infantry combat vehicles, 44,000 light-machine guns, 702 light armored multi-purpose vehicles, and 250 RAFAEL Spice IIR/GPS guided smart bombs. The deals not done?

A program to buy M777 howitzers, 56 transport aircraft to replace the ageing Avro fleet, produce 4 amphibious LPDs – and 16 naval multi-role helicopters to restore an effective anti-submarine capability. With elections looming, it will take some time before any of them are restarted. Sources: Times of India, “Decision on four key defence deals put off”.

2008 – 2013

ASW weakness exposed; NUH RFP a vote of non-confidence in Dhruv; Sea King upgrades needed. Merlin & Type 23
(click to view full)

Oct 15/13: ASW weakness. India’s anti-submarine issues continue to surface, which is a serious weakness for a fleet air arm and for a carrier. How serious is it?

“The Navy has given an insight into how it is placed during its ongoing exercise with the Royal Navy off the Goa coast. The Royal Navy’s HMS Westminster – a type-23 frigate known for its advanced anti-submarine capability – is taking part in the exercise Konkan. The frigate is equipped with Merlin helicopters – the maritime version of triple-engine AgustaWestland EH-101 that is used extensively by the Royal Navy… The Indian Navy has pitched a Delhi class destroyer, which is a formidable platform, but it carries only one helicopter although it is capable of operating two. The only helicopter on the destroyer is Chetak, which has a limited role in search, rescue and communication. It cannot carry out advanced anti-submarine or anti-surface operation.”

That isn’t what you want defending your carrier. Sources: Daily Mail India, “Chopper shortage rattles Indian Navy during joint exercise with British fleet”.

Aug 20/12: Helicopters – NUH RFP, etc. India issues its $1 billion NUH RFP for a base of 56 twin-engine light helicopters under 4.5 tonnes, with induction slated for 2016. The helicopters will operate from shore, and aboard ships that range from OPVs to aircraft carriers.

Core NUH utility roles that current Cheetah/ Chetak fleets can’t currently handle include day/night SAR and CASEVAC roles in adverse weather, and transport duties that include underslung cargo. India also wants the NUH to replace some Westland Sea King roles, however, including anti-submarine warfare with a light torpedo or depth charge, and the ability to carry rockets and machine gun pods. Aviation Week adds that:

“A procurement manager with the Indian navy indicates that the NUH has to meld several roles into one modern new platform, after the indigenous naval ALH Dhruv failed to deliver a light, multirole shipborne platform with an ASW capability.”

India Strategic goes farther:

“The rotors have to be foldable so that the machines can be moved to their hangars in the limited space available…. Significantly, the Navy had found the HAL-made Dhruv unsuitable because of excessive vibrations in the rotors as also their large size. The air draft generated by a flying machine and its stability are crucial for landing and takeoffs from moving ships, some of which sail at around 30 knots.”

Other activities are also underway:

“The navy is also finalizing an RFP for a follow-on N-MRH to acquire 75 more helicopters as part of a fresh bid. The N-MRH will progressively replace the navy’s Westland Sea King Mk. 42B fleet…. The navy is also set to solicit bids for a long-delayed upgrade of its Sea King fleet, with original manufacturer AgustaWestland expected to compete against? Israel Aerospace Industries’ Lahav Div. In addition, the navy will shortly begin an effort to upgrade its fleet of Ka-28 Helix ASW helicopters.”

Sources: Aviation Week, “India Floats New Naval Utility Helicopter Requirement” | India Strategic, “Navy floats $ 1 billion RfP for utility Helicopters”.

NUH RFP

Aug 17/12: Sea Kings. India’s Mk.42B Sea King utility/ASW helicopters have readiness issues, which is a problem because India has a shortage of working anti-submarine helicopters. Upgrades have been delayed, and India is considering packages from AgustaWestland and an Israeli consortium. Upgrades to the 20 or so helicopters would include new avionics, electronic warfare suites, new communication kits, and an all-new weapons suite with anti-ship and anti-submarine ordnance. Sources: SP’s Naval Forces, “Indian Navy Sea Kings upgrade process soon”.

Sept 9/08: Tender. Flight International reports on the tender:

“India’s defence ministry has issued a tender for 16 advanced multirole naval helicopters to companies including AgustaWestland, EADS and Sikorsky, with its initial requirement likely to later expand by a further 44 aircraft…. The Indian navy meanwhile plans to acquire five more Kamov Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters [DID: ordered in 2009], and is exploring the possibility of conducting mid-life upgrades to its Ka-28 and Westland Sea King transport helicopters.”

Sources: Flight Global, “India launches tender for up to 60 maritime helicopters.”

ASW Helicopter Tender

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Current Helicopter Force & Issues

• Air Force Technology – Ka-27/28 and Ka-29 Helix Naval Helicopters, Russia.

• Bharat Rakshak – Kamov KA-28 Helix-A.

• Bharat-Rakshak – Westland Sea King.

• Wikipedia – 2013 Indian helicopter bribery scandal.

Finalists

• DID – MH-60R/S: The USA’s New Naval Workhorse Helicopters.

• DID – NH90: Europe’s Medium Helicopter Contender.

News and Views

• DID – Indian Naval Air Defenses: Another Avoidable Crisis. Poor underwater defenses against submarines, and poor aerial defenses against missiles, is not conducive to keeping your navy afloat.

• India Today (July 19/14) – Exclusive: Navy, Coast Guard send SOS to Defence Ministry on helicopter crisis.

• Daily Mail India (March 31/14) – Navy left ‘defenceless’ after being forced to ‘make do’ with outdated Soviet hardware.

• IBN Live (Dec 30/13) – The Indian Navy’s helicopter plans and purchases.

• Sikorsky (Oct 24/13) – TATA Sikorsky JV delivers first fully indigenous S-92 helicopter cabin. “The India operation is not only assembling cabins but also producing all parts needed for the assembly, before shipping the cabins to the U.S. for aircraft completion and customer delivery.”

• Defence Forum India (Oct 6/12) – Sikorsky S-70B – Right choice for Indian Navy Multirole Helicopter program. The illustrated H-60/S-70 variant family tree is very helpful.

Americas

• It’s been a long time coming, but the F-35A has been cleared for service by the US Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC). As a result, the 34th Fighter Squadron of the 388th Fighter Wing has the honor of being the first unit declared operational. This follows the F-35B squadron which was passed for combat back in July 2015.

• The Miniature Hit-to-Kill (MHTK) interceptor missile has successfully completed an engineering demonstration for the US Army’s Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center’s Extended Area Protection and Survivability program. Designed by Lockhhed Martin, the testing was to prove the munition’s agility and aerodynamic capability. At 3 feet in length and 8 pounds in weight, MHTK aims to provide the Army with a cost and logistically effective way to defeat rocket, artillery and mortar threats.

Middle East North Africa

• Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $58 million contract to enhance Qatari and Saudi Patriot missile systems. Work to be undertaken in the deal involves modifications of the Patriot’s segment enhancement software. This will contribute to an entire system’s situational awareness by transmitting precision cueing data to other theater elements while simultaneously protecting against short-range ballistic missile, large-caliber rockets and air-breathing threats.

• Iraqi security forces want to expand their security in Baghdad and counter unmanned aircraft threats from the Islamic State. The recommendations come on the back of a trip to the country by Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) director, Lt. Gen. Michael Shields, who was sent to determine how the Pentagon might be able to help the government in Iraq stabilize and secure Baghdad. Efforts already in place to ease UAV threats in Iraq include the Pentagon requesting an additional $20 million from Congress to address the issue.

Europe

• Poland has expressed an interest in expanding industrial ties with France and Germany. Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz made the statement in relation to increasing local defense work and may include partnership on a new tank build program. While further details of any formal negotiations have not been released, any program would go towards Poland’s shift away from its older Soviet-era hardware towards Western gear.

Asia Pacific

• Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) CEO Ha Sung-young is so confident in their T-50A, that he will resign if the trainer is not selected for the USAF’s ongoing T-X competition. The bold statement was made in front of 39 executives attending an executive strategy meeting held at LIG’s Sacheon Training Institute in Gyeongnam Province. Ha’s bet is said to be backed up by T-X partner Lockheed Martin making a clean sweep of contracts recently in the US.

• The Philippine Air Force is set to beef up their attack helicopter capabilities as the service also bulks up munitions with purchases of South Korean Blue Shark light anti-submarine torpedos. Known as the Flight Plan 2028 initiative, the new procurements will add to 12 MD-50s and eight AW-109s. PAF usually implement attack helicopters for clearing and pursuit operations.

• In the latest salvo of sabre rattling on the Korean Peninsula, a North Korean ballistic missile landed in Japanese territorial waters. The launch saw a Rondong missile travel 1,000km, and marks the furthest a North Korean missile has traveled in a year which has seen a gradual continuation of testing. While natural condemnation came from the usual quarters of Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, Pyongyang hit back at the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.

Today’s Video

The F-35A’s road to USAF IOC:

Americas

• An F-35A has shot down its first aerial target with AIM-9X missiles off the coast of California. The kill test saw the fighter take down a drone, and test data confirmed the F-35 identified and targeted the drone with its mission systems sensors, passed the target “track” information to the missile, enabled the pilot to verify targeting information using the high off-boresight capability of the helmet mounted display (HMD), and launched the AIM-9X from the aircraft to engage the target. F-35s carry two AIM-9X missiles on their wings.

• Boeing is to provide $1 billion in spare parts for US Navy F/A-18 fleets. A total of four contracts were awarded by the US Defense Logistics Agency with the largest amounting to $640 million. All four orders were made against the same five-year base contract with one five-year option period.

• Approval has been granted by the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the production engineering phase of their B61-12 nuclear warhead life extension program (LEP). The first production unit (FPU) of this weapon is planned for 2020, followed by full-scale production. With the modernization projected to cost anywhere between $350-450 million over the next decade, the B61-12 will replace the existing B61-3, -4, -7, and -10 thermonuclear bombs.

Middle East North Africa

• Israel is moving ahead with their $100 million program to procure their own Air Force One. Tricked out with its own special defense systems and advanced communications, it has been reported that the conversion will be carried out on a Boeing 767. Once in service, the aircraft will replace an aircraft leased from flag carrier El Al.

Europe

• Sukhoi Su-34 bombers are to be fitted with new radio surveillance gear that will allow them to spot and destroy enemy headquarters, communications and drone control centers. Dubbed UKR-RT, the system is a scaled-down version of the M-410 radio reconnaissance system that is installed in the Tu-214R. Many foreign military specialists regard the Tu-214R as a unique information gathering platform able to spot targets hundreds of kilometers away.

• Regulations imposed on the testing of the F-35’s on board laser designator will make it almost impossible for Royal Air Force versions to test in the UK. The strict rules prohibit the use of optic devices within 33km of the aircraft, and no observers being allowed within 9km when the laser designator is fired. Approval is now being sought by the MoD to use the device in the UK.

Asia Pacific

• Australia has taken delivery of their last MH-60R Seahawk helicopter from manufacturer Lockheed Martin. Replacing the older S-70B-2 Seahawks, the MH-60Rs now complete a requirement for a fleet of 24 next-generation, multi-role naval combat aircraft. The cost of the replacement is believed to be in excess of $2.2 billion.

• India and France are edging ever closer to closure on a potential $9 billion Rafale fighter deal. According to Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, New Delhi has agreed to sign a long awaited inter-governmental agreement (IGA), a key requirement for a potential sale; however, negotiations on offsets and final pricing are still to be confirmed.

Today’s Video

Induction of AW159 naval helicopters into the South Korean Navy:

MH-60Rs fire Hellfire
(click to view full)

Australia’s AIR 9000, Phase 8 project aimed to buy 24 modern naval helicopters to 16 existing S-70B-2 Seahawks, along with the disastrous A$1.1 billion, 11-helicopter SH-2G “Super Seasprite” acquisition attempt. With a total sales and support value of over A$ 3 billion, it was a highly coveted award.

The finalists were familiar, and both had roots in Australia. Sikorsky’s MH-60R is a modernized descendant of the RAN’s existing S-70B anti-submarine helicopters, and Australia’s army operates the S-70A utility helicopter. On the other hand, a multi-billion dollar 2006 order made the European NH90-TTH (“MRH-90”) the Army’s future helicopter, and some MRH-90s will even serve as Navy utility helicopters. NHI/Eurocopter’s NH90-NFH naval variant builds on that base. So why did the MH-60R make Australia its 1st export win?

Australia’s Winner MH-60R Seahawk
click for video

A combination of problems with its “MRH-90s,” slow NH90 TTH development, MH-60R naval interoperability benefits with Australia’s principal ally, and the MH-60R’s low-risk already-operational status tipped the balance. Australia’s MH-60Rs will be entirely standard US Navy designs; the only differences will be their paint scheme, and the addition of tamper-proofing to 4 avionics boxes that are considered “sensitive.” Australia’s DoD states that the fleet of 24 will:

“…provide at least eight warships with a combat helicopter at the same time, including ANZAC Class frigates [8 bought] and the new Air Warfare Destroyers [3 bought]. The remainder will be based at HMAS Albatross in Nowra, New South Wales, and will be in various stages of the regular maintenance and training cycle.”

There’s a regular cycle of ship maintenance and training, as well as deployments, which means Australia never has all of these ships at sea at one time. The helicopters can rotate among ships as they enter training & service stages, allowing full coverage with some helicopters left over. Unless the 4-ship Improved Adelaide Class is added to this mix, however, the decision as discussed does raise the question of how to equip Australia’s expensively-upgraded FFG-7 frigates with naval helicopters. One option may involve some sort of service-extension program for the existing S-70B-2s, whether through refurbishment, or by rotating a larger pool of S-70Bs among a small set of operational ships.

The RAN currently has 4 MH-60Rs flying as RAN 725 Squadron, alongside 3 full US Navy MH-60R squadrons in Jacksonville, FL. Australian crews and maintenance personnel are trained in operations and tactics there, until they return to Australia with their machines at the end of 2014. They’ll become the training squadron at the air station in Nowra, New South Wales, and Initial Operational Capability for the Royal Australian Navy as a whole is scheduled for August 2015.

Deliveries to Australia will continue until 2016. The larger RAN 816 Squadron will fly the MH-60Rs from Australian ships, while using Nowra, NSW as its home base.

Contracts & Key Events 2014 – 2016

RAN pilot on MH-60R

August 3/16: Australia has taken delivery of their last MH-60R Seahawk helicopter from manufacturer Lockheed Martin. Replacing the older S-70B-2 Seahawks, the MH-60Rs now complete a requirement for a fleet of 24 next-generation, multi-role naval combat aircraft. The cost of the replacement is believed to be in excess of $2.2 billion.

July 30/14: Testing & Deliveries. The Australians fire their 1st Hellfire missile from the new helicopter, and also update their delivery status and plans.

The RAN has 4 MH-60Rs; the first pair were accepted in the United States in December 2013, and the second pair were accepted in February 2014. They’re currently flying as RAN 725 Squadron, alongside 3 full US Navy MH-60R squadrons in Jacksonville, FL. Australian crews and maintenance personnel are trained in operations and tactics there, until they return to Australia with their machines at the end of 2014. They’ll become the training squadron at the air station in Nowra, New South Wales, and deliveries to Australia will continue until 2016. The larger RAN 816 Squadron will fly the MH-60Rs from Australian ships, while using Nowra as its home base. Sources: Australia DoD, “Hellfire missile firing a first for new Navy helicopters”.

May 13/14: Sensors. Australia’s new MH-60Rs of NUSQN 725 “commence dipping operations” with the new AQS-22 ALFS sonar off of Jacksonville, FL, as part of their training. NUSQN 725 will begin a phased return to the Fleet Air Arm’s home base at HMAS Albatross (Nowra Airport, SSW of Sydney) in October 2014, and current plans involve a full return of all members by Christmas. Sources: RAN Navy Daily, “Romeos packing a new punch”.

March 28/14: Sensors. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Owego, NY receives $13.1 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for 19 radar receiver processors, used in support of Australia’s MH-60R buy.

All funds are committed immediately. Work will be performed at Owego NY (56%) and Syracuse NY (44%), and work is expected to be complete by March 2017. This was a non-competitive requirement in accordance with FAR 6.302.1 by US NAVSUP Weapons System Support in Philadelphia PA (SPRPA1-09-G-002Y).

2013

Support contract Phase 2 awarded; MK-54 torpedo request; 1st helicopters delivered. RAN MH-60R
(click to view full)

Dec 17/13: ANAO Report. Australia’s National Audit Office releases their 2012-13 Major Projects Report. Overall, the MH-60R program is seen as stable in its early stages, and its truly off-the-shelf nature is expected to keep it that way. The helicopters are arriving earlier than predicted, but basing and support facilities may not be ready in time. As ANAO puts it, “there is no float in the construction program.” The RAN is looking at temporary or shared hangar and administrative facilities, and may operate the initial MH-60Rs in the US to mitigate risk and consolidate training – whose infrastructure may fall behind its own February 2015 target date.

Meanwhile, how many ships will actually be ready to host MH-60Rs once the whole fleet has arrived, in 2016? It may be just 3-4 ships. While Australia’s ship certification baseline is the existing S-70B-2 Seahawk helicopters, there are differences. As such, the 3 new Hobart Class air defense destroyers will have to be modified for MH-60R use, and that won’t happen until their 1st docked servicing program after they enter the fleet. As things stand now, HMAS Hobart won’t even be declared operationally capable by the end of 2016, and the 3rd ship won’t be delivered until 2019. The 8-ship ANZAC frigate Class will be looking to make any required changes during their extensive Anti-Ship Missile Defense upgrade; 6 ships will be ready by the end of 2017, excepting HMAS Perth (already done), and HMAS Arunta (already in progress).

The final point ANAO makes is that overseas travel restrictions have become a problem for the project. People need to attend key engineering, project management and airworthiness activities in the USA, but can’t go. The RAN’s proposed solutions involve videoconferencing and teleconferencing, which doesn’t work especially well from Australia to Jacksonville, FL, and also using “contracted staff to represent overseas rather then ADF or Australian Public Service (APS) staff.” None of that seems like a useful solution to the actual problem.

Dec 16/13: ALFS. Raytheon IDS in Portsmouth, RI receives a maximum $42.6 million sole source, firm-fixed-price contract from the Royal Australian Navy for “the manufacture and delivery” of AN/AQS-22 ALFS dipping sonar systems. Australia has ordered 25 systems already (q.v. Dec 22/11), which is more than enough for installation in each helicopter. Spares? Upgrades? Additional reserve units? Finalized payment? Raytheon’s Dec 20/13 release is uninformative. If the 2 orders are combined, they total $123.4 million.

Work will be performed in Rhode Island, with a February 2017 performance completion date. The US Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Philadelphia, PA manages this contract, unlike the 2011 contract which was managed by US NAVAIR (SPRPA1-09-G-001Y-5027).

Dec 10/13: Australia accepts the first 2 MH-60R helicopters, at a delivery ceremony in Owego, NY. The expected in-service date remains June 2014. Source: Lockheed Martin, Dec 10/13 release.

Delivery

Nov 5/13: Mods. Lockheed Martin in Owego, NY receives a $10.5 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for electronics modifications, on behalf of Australia. They’ll develop and test system configuration 15 series modifications to the MH-60R’s VHF Omni-directional Range/Instrument Landing System, crash data recorder, and ABS-B Out.

All funds are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and is expected to be complete in February 2016. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract as Australia’s agent(N00019-09-G-0005, #4092).

Nov 4/13: Sub-contractors. Textron’s AAI Test & Training receives a $1.6 million award to provide Advanced Boresight Equipment for Australia’s MH-60Rs. ABE is a gyro-stabilized, electro-optical angular measurement system designed to align systems on any land, sea or air vehicle before a mission begins. The base system is widely used, but adds platform-specific “personality modules” for customization.

The US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division at Lakehurst, NJ manages the contract, and deliveries are expected to take place throughout 2014. Sources: Textron Systems, “AAI Test & Training to Provide Advanced Boresight Equipment (ABE) Systems for Royal Australian Navy MH-60R Seahawk Helicopters”.

Aug 30/13: Support. The Sikorsky/ Lockheed Martin “Maritime Helicopter Support Co.” partnership in Trevose, PA receives a 6+ year, $170.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for the RAN’s MH-60R Through Life Support program (q.v. Feb 2/12), Phase II. They’ll perform depot level Phased Maintenance Interval, and also handle the corresponding back office services of squadron administrative management of aircraft and support equipment, data and aircraft inventory reporting, and supply chain management. All funds are committed immediately.

MHSCo also performs this kind of work for the US Navy. Work on Australia’s behalf will be performed in Yerriyong, New South Wales, Australia (73%); Owego, NY (15%, LMCO); and Stratford, CT (12%, Sikorsky); and is expected to be complete in December 2019. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD acts as Australia’s agent (N00019-13-C-4000).

July 24/13: The 1st RAN MH-60R arrives at Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training in Owego, NY, to have its digital cockpit and integrated mission systems and sensors installed. Sources: US NAVAIR Aug 7/13 release.

July 10/13: Weapons. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces Australia’s formal export request for up to 100 MK-54 All-Up-Round Torpedoes, 13 MK-54 Exercise Sections, 13 MK-54 Exercise Fuel Tanks, 5 Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes, support and test equipment for upgrades to MK 695 Mod 1 capability, plus spare and repair parts, and various forms of US government and contractor support. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Keyport, WA is the contractor, and the DSCA says that:

“Australia will use the MK 54 torpedo on its MH-60R helicopters and intends to use the torpedo on a planned purchase of the P-8A Increment 2 Maritime Patrol and Response aircraft.”

Note that this is Australia’s 2nd request (q.v. Oct 5/10), totaling 300 torpedoes now, which they have begun buying (q.v. Oct 18/12). Australia’s uses Eurotorp’s MU90 as its standard lightweight torpedo, but that weapon isn’t integrated with the MH-60R or the P-8A. Australia decided that they’d rather have 2 separate stocks of lightweight torpedoes, instead of paying to integrate the MU90 on those platforms. The cost implications would require a full study; meanwhile, opponents have their lives complicated by knowing that they need to defeat or avoid 2 different weapon types.

DSCA: 100+ Mk-54s for Australia

June 29/13: The RAN’s 1st MH-60R Seahawk is officially delivered by Sikorsky Aircraft and accepted by the US Navy. At this point, however, it’s just the base airframe. Delivery and flight may have happened 6 months ahead of the original schedule approved by the Australian Government in 2011, but the formal delivery of the helicopter to Australia hasn’t changed, It’s still December 2013. Sources: US NAVAIR Aug 7/13 release.

Officially delivered by Sikorsky Aircraft and accepted by the U.S. Navy on June 29, the Seahawk was flown from Sikorsky’s Stratford, Conn., facility by U.S. Navy pilots to the Lockheed facility to have the digital cockpit and integrated mission systems and sensors installed.

“Delivery and first flight of an Australian MH-60R aircraft in late June occurred only two years after contract signature, some six months ahead of the original schedule approved by the Australian Government in 2011,

May 15/13: Training. The first 2 Australian crew complete NATOPS certification for the MH-60R at NAS Mayport, FL, USA, after extensive experience in the RAN’s S-70B helicopters and a 9-week, 17/7 schedule. The team have a few more weeks to absorb the aircraft’s mission and weapon systems, then they’ll move to USN test squadron HX-21 at NAS Patuxent River, MD to work on testing the Australian configured MH-60R. Initial MH-60R deliveries are still expected by December 2013. RAN.

2012

New umbrella contract for global MH-60R buys; Sub-contracts. Upgraded HMAS Perth
(click to view full)

Dec 19/12: ANAO Report. Australia’s National Audit Office releases their 2011-12 Major Projects Report. Project SEA 9000, Phase 8 has A$ 2.91 billion budgeted. The official In-Service Date (ISD), defined as 2 aircraft in US Navy configuration, is June 2014.

Cited risks include an unapproved Helicopter Aircrew Training System (Project AIR 9000 Phase 7). In addition, staffing and work pressures at Australia’s Defence Support Group have hurt the schedule for the facilities required to house the new helicopters. The schedule has slipped by 12 months vs. its Second Pass baseline, and has become a possible issue for the helicopters’ initial operational capability milestone.

At sea, Australia’s new MH-60R Seahawks won’t achieve full capability until all ANZAC Class frigates are modified for interoperability. Unfortunately, ANAO says that can happen only after each updated ship is accepted into naval service, and a suitable maintenance period for the modifications becomes available. The same issues will be present for Australia’s Hobart Class destroyers. It seems likely that Australia’s S-70B Seahawks will be needed well past their successors’ entry into service.

Oct 18/12: Weapons. Raytheon announces a $45.3 million contract to provide MK 54 lightweight torpedo hardware, test equipment, spares and related services for the US Navy, Australia, and India. It’s exercised as an option under the current umbrella contract, but Raytheon doesn’t release numbers or proportions. Australian buys are almost certainly aimed at their forthcoming MH-60R fleet. Sources: Raytheon Oct 18/12 release.

Aug 3/12: Sensor turrets. Raytheon Co. in McKinney, TX receives a $23.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for 24 Multi-Spectral Targeting systems, which includes purchases for the government of Australia under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Case AT-P-SCF.

Work will be performed in McKinney, TX, and is expected to be complete by December 2013. This non-commercial contract was procured and solicited on a sole source basis by the US Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane, IN, acting as Australia’s FMS agent (N00164-12-G-JQ66).

July 11/12: MH-60Rs under MYP-8 contract? Sikorsky signs an $8.5 billion firm-fixed-price umbrella contract with the US government to buy 653 H-60M, MH-60S, and MH-60R helicopters, with options for up to 263 more that could push the contract as high as $11.7 billion (W58RGZ-12-C-0008). Interestingly, Sikorsky adds that:

“To reach the full baseline value of $8.5 billion, the services are ordering aircraft in the base agreement to be sold via the U.S. Government’s Foreign Military Sales program. These aircraft include Foreign Military Sale (FMS) UH-60M aircraft for several allied countries and MH-60R SEAHAWK anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare helicopters for the Royal Australian Navy… BLACK HAWK and SEAHAWK aircraft deliveries under the new contract will begin this month.”

Read “Sikorsky’s $8.5-11.7B “Multi-Year 8? H-60 Helicopter Contract” for full coverage.

June 28/12: IMDS/HUMS. Simmonds Precision Products (United Technologies’ Goodrich Sensors and Integrated Systems) in Vergennes, VT receives a $9.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 120 various Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic System kits in support of The US Navy and Australia’s MH-60R/S helicopters. As their name implies, these embedded sensors are used to detect mechanical problems in critical areas of the helicopter, allowing maintenance to shift from a regular schedule regardless of need, to a “condition-based” response to problems while they’re still small.

The US Navy gets 11 retrofit kits and one Delta retrofit kit, 18 integrated vehicle health management units and data transfer units, and 18 production kits.

Australia receives 24 Troy kits, 24 integrated vehicle health management units and data transfer units, and 24 production kits for its 24 MH-60Rs.

Work will be performed in Vergennes, VT, and is expected to be complete in March 2014. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. US NAVAIR manages the contract (N00019-12-C-2015).

June 11/12: Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $19.1 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for one-time engineering efforts to support delivery of 24 Australian baseline MH-60R helicopters.

Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and is expected to be complete in September 2017. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-08-G-0010).

April 20/12: Avionics. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego, NY receives a $126.5 million modification to Australia’s previous advance acquisition contract, which turns its preliminary order for 24 MH-60R mission systems and common cockpits into a finalized firm-fixed-price contract. This brings all contracts related to these sub-systems up to $315.1 million, or $13.13 million per helicopter. Note that “mission systems” reach well beyond the cockpit, to include things like the maritime radar, integration of the dipping sonar and sonobuoy systems, weapons capabilities, etc.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (58%); Farmingdale, NY (25%); Woodland Hills, CA (4%); Ciudad Real, Spain (3%); East Syracuse, NY (2%); Victor, NY (2%); Everett, WA (1%); Stratford, CT (1%); St. Charles, MO (1%); Bennington, VT (1%); Lewisville, TX (1%); and various locations throughout the United States (1%), and is expected to be completed in March 2017. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD acts as Australia’s agent to manage the contract (N00019-11-C-0020).

March 13/12: Sikorsky in Stratford, CT received a $27.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for the “advanced procurement funding services in support of the Royal Australia Navy MH-60R program.” Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Dec 13/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-08-C-0003).

2011

MH-60R picked, contracts begin; Australian industry; Rival MRH-90’s problems. MH-60R TOFT
(click to view full)

Dec 29/11: Avionics. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego, NY receives a $103.5 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for Australia. It covers common cockpit and mission electronics to equip 24 MH-60R helicopters for the Royal Australian Navy, including non-recurring engineering, program support, and associated efforts required for the production and delivery. See also Dec 2/11 entry; the combined value is $188.6 million (abut A$ 185 million).

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (95%), Farmingdale, NY (4%), and various locations throughout the United States (1%). Work is expected to be completed in July 2018. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD, is the contracting activity (N00019-09-G-0005).

Dec 22/11: ALFS. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI receives an $80.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy 25 AN/AQS-22 Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS) dipping systems for the Royal Australian Navy’s 24 MH-60R helicopters.

Thales produces the system’s sonar, which is why most work will be performed in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France (68%). Raytheon in Portsmouth, RI (32%) has the rest, and work is expected to be complete in October 2016. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the sale on behalf of its Australian client (N00019-11-C-0077).

Dec 2/11: Avionics. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Owego, NY receives an $85.1 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for work at both ends of the MH-60R Mission Avionics Systems and common cockpit life-cycle. It includes both long-lead materials to begin building cockpits, and “end-of-life components” so the Australians have enough of certain items to support their 24 Royal Australian Navy MH-60Rs.

Work will be performed in Farmingdale, NY (53%); Owego, NY (32%); Ciudad Real, Spain (5%); Victor, NY (4%); St. Charles, MO (3%); Lewisville, TX (1%); Windsor Locks, CT (1%); and various locations throughout the United States (1%). Work is expected to be complete in March 2012. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract, as the agent of their Foreign Military Sale client (N00019-11-C-0020).

June 16/11: MH-60R wins. Sikorsky’s MH-60R beats the NH90-NFH for Australia’s 24-helicopter, A$3+ billion (over $3.16 billion) AIR 9000, Phase 8 helicopter competition. The Commonwealth of Australia has signed the Letter of Acceptance with the US Navy, who will manage the acquisition on behalf of its Australian client under Foreign Military Sales procedures.

A subsequent GE release value the T700-401C engines and associated Total Logistics Support package at approximately $100 million.

“Team Romeo” includes Sikorsky (MH-60R) and Lockheed Martin (sensor/ weapon/ mission systems integration), plus CAE (training simulators), GE (engines), and Raytheon (sonar and sensors). The team has pledged to bring long-term industrial benefits to Australian industry valued at $1.5 billion over 10 years, which was a necessary move to compete with Eurocopter’s established in-country MRH-90 infrastructure. Australia DoD | US NAVAIR | Sikorsky | Lockheed Martin | GE | Team Romeo web site.

MH-60R wins.

MRH90 w. 105mm Hamel
(click to view full)

April 29/11: Competition. Australia completes its “full diagnostic review” of the MRH-90 program, after engine failures, transmission oil cooler fan failures and the poor availability of spares ground the fleet. To date, 13 of 46 MRH-90 helicopters have been accepted by Australia’s DoD and are being used for testing and initial crew training. They aren’t operational yet. So far, the Army helicopters are 12 months behind schedule and the Navy utility helicopters, 18 months.

The review doesn’t consign the program to the infamous “Projects of Concern” list – yet. It does ask for a remediation plan, before a follow-up diagnostic review later in 2011 looks at the project again. With the Australian naval helicopter contract looming, a good follow-on review is important to Eurocopter. Australian DoD.

March 3/11: Sub-contractors. Sikorsky signs a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Trakka Corp. in Melbourne, Australia. Searchlights are Trakka’s specialty, and they are integrated into a highly efficient pan and tilt gymbal, allowing slewing up to 60 degrees per second. Internal filtering allows the searchlight to choose the appropriate light spectrum for the mission, while precision optical elements and a low power light source deliver a more intense and efficient on-target beam than conventional reflector-type searchlights.

This MoU goes beyond just Australia’s naval helicopter competition. Trakka develops and manufactures aviation searchlight products in its AS9100 certified facility in Australia, but it also has operations in Scottsdale, AZ to support its U.S. customers, including U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and the U.S. Coast Guard. The MoU covers H-60 Black Hawk and Seahawk helicopters. Sikorsky.

Feb 25/11: Sub-contractors. Lockheed Martin has issued a Request For Information to Australian firms to supply MH-60R weapons pylons, with selections expected by the end of 2011. The RFI is issued under the auspices of a recently signed Global Supply Chain (GSC) Deed, giving Australian companies new opportunities to compete for subcontracts on a range of Lockheed Martin products and services. Lockheed Martin’s naval helicopter program head, George Barton:

“Growth in orders for the MH-60R has resulted in an urgent need for an expanded supply base, and Australian industry has a depth of capability that would be an ideal supplement to our dedicated supplier base.”

The pylons are just the 1st opportunity, and tie into the billion-dollar naval helicopter competition there, featuring the MH-60R vs. the NH90-NFH. Lockheed Martin.

Feb 2/11: Competition. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Australia’s formal request to buy a 10-year Through-Life-Support (TLS) contract for 24 MH-60R helicopters, including associated equipment & part, at an estimated cost of up to $1.6 billion. With the ADF’s MRH-90 program facing difficulties and receiving increased scrutiny, the support offer caps what amounts to a $3.7 billion maximum (A$ 3.66 billion) offer for 24 MH-60Rs, plus 10 years of support (vid. July 20/10), to set against the NH90 NFH.

The principal contractors will be Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in Stratford, CT; Lockheed Martin of Owego, NY; GE of Lynn, Massachusetts; and the Raytheon Corporation of Portsmouth, RI. Implementation would require temporary assignment of approximately 20 U.S. Government and contractor representatives to Australia on an intermittent basis over the life of this Foreign Military Sale case.

DSCA request: support

Feb 1/11: Competition. The Australian DoD makes an announcement concerning its MRH-90s:

“Mr Smith and Mr Clare also announced that a high-level comprehensive diagnostic review of the MRH-90 helicopter project would occur this month. As reported in both the Defence Annual Report and the ANAO Major Project Report released last year, the project has suffered delays of 12 months for the Navy’s helicopters and 18 months for the Army’s helicopters. Delays are due to a series of key issues, including engine failure, transmission oil cooler fan failures and the poor availability of spares… 13 MRH-90 helicopters have been accepted by Defence to date and are currently being used for testing and initial crew training. Minister Smith said that the full diagnostic review would be supported by external specialists. It will provide recommendations to Government on the actions necessary to fully implement this important project.”

2009 – 2010

Competition announced and underway; US DSCA request. NH90 NFH
(click to view full)

Oct 23/10: Competition. The Australian reports on the Project AIR 9000, Phase 8 helicopter competition. A navy evaluation team reportedly test-flew the MH-60R in early October 2010, and wants to fly the NH90 NFH as well, even though its mission systems software won’t be ready until mid-2011, and the helicopter won’t be operational until late 2011 – well after Australia’s decision deadline.

The paper believes that the Navy will simply declare both helicopters capable of meeting specs, so the buy could simply come down to price in the current budget environment.

Oct 5/10: Weapons. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Australia’s official request to buy up to 200 MK 54 All-Up-Round Torpedoes, 179 MK 54 Flight in Air Material Kits to mount them onto aircraft, 10 MK 54 Exercise Sections, 10 MK 54 Exercise Fuel Tanks, 10 MK 54 Dummy Torpedoes, 6 MK 54 Ground Handling Torpedoes for safe training, plus support and test equipment to upgrade Intermediate Maintenance Activity to full MK 54 capability, spare and repair parts, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of U.S. government and contractor support.

It’s an interesting request, because Australia had picked the Eurotorp MU90 as its lightweight torpedo, but an MH-60R pick would require either a MK-54 purchase or expensive integration work. The estimated cost is up to $169 million, and the prime contractor will be Raytheon Company Integrated Defense Systems in Keyport, WA.

DSCA: 200 MK-54s for Australia

July 9/10: Competition. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Australia’s formal request to buy 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters, along with 60 T-700 GE 401C Engines (48 installed and 12 spares), communication equipment, support equipment, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, and other support services.

The estimated cost is up to $2.1 billion, but that will not be settled until and unless a contract is negotiated. The prime contractors are Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in Stratford, CT (helicopter); Lockheed Martin in Owego, NY (mission systems); General Electric in Lynn, MA (engines); and Raytheon Corporation in Portsmouth, RI (sensors). Implementation of this proposed sale would require the assignment of 10 contractor representatives to Australia to support delivery of the MH-60R helicopters.

DSCA requests are not contracts, and in this case, it doesn’t even indicate intent. The MH-60R is competing against the NH90 NFH in Australia, and it isn’t unusual for countries to submit requests during competitions, in order to ensure that the American equipment has full export clearances.

DSCA request: 24 MH-60Rs

April 28/10: Australia issues its formal solicitation for “AIR 9000, Phase 8” to buy naval helicopters: either the NH90 NFH or the MH-60R, with a decision expected in 2011. Ministerial release.

RFP

Jan 6/10: Competition. Australia’s Daily Telegraph reports that Australia’s Labor Party government has rejected a DoD request to approve a $4 billion “rapid acquisition” of 24 MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, plus related equipment including training weapons, etc. The buy would have been an emergency replacement for the long-running, ill-starred, and canceled SH-2G Super Seasprite program.

Instead, successful lobbying by Eurocopter will force a competition between Sikorsky’s MH-60R, in service with the US Navy, and the European NH90 NFH variant, which is expected to be ready for service some time around 2011-2012.

Sole-source buy rejected

Oct 23/09: Recommendation. The Australian reports that the country’s military chiefs have recommended the MH-60R as Australia’s next anti-submarine helicopter, citing it as a cheaper and lower risk solution compared with the NH90 NFH, with better allied interoperability. Australia would be looking to buy 24 helicopters for service by 2014, per its 2009 Defence White Paper.

Australia currently flies 16 older S-70B Seahawks that lack the full range of capabilities required, and delays to the NH90 program do add risks that aren’t present in the already-operational MH-60R. That’s particularly sensitive in light of the A$ 1+ billion SH-2G Super Seasprite fiasco; the Navy is operating none of the planned 11 SH-2G helicopters, and the Labor government who made a big issue of the Seaprite acquisition is aware that delays or overruns in the follow-on program would put them in a very bad situation.

On the other hand, Australia’s Army is standardizing on the NH90-TTH (MRH-90), and Australia has invested large sums of money in building its Eurocopter affiliations through the MRH-90 and Tiger ARH attack helicopter programs. Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin are talking about A$ 1 billion of investment in local industry if the expected A$ 4 billion deal goes through, and assure the Australians that delivery under the ongoing MH-60R program could be made by late 2011. If the US government wishes to trade some of its MH-60R production slots, that date could even move up. Which leaves Australia’s Labor Party government with a decision to make.

Additional Readings The MH-60R

• Team Romeo Web Site

• DII – MH-60R/S: The USA’s New Naval Workhorse Helicopters. Full coverage of these helicopter programs, in the USA and beyond.

• DII – Fly and Listen: The AN/AQS-22 ALFS Sonar System. This dipping sonar is a critical feature of the new MH-60R. As it happens, it shares key components with the NH90 NFH’s system.

• DII – Sikorsky’s $7.4-11.6B “Multi-Year VII” H-60 Helicopter Contract and Sikorsky’s $8.5-11.7B “Multi-Year 8” H-60 Helicopter Contract. Australia’s base helicopter airframes were actually bought under the volume pricing provided by these American deals.

Other Australian Equipment

• DII – NH90: Europe’s Medium Helicopter Contender. The MH-60R’s opponent. A medium utility “MRH-90” variant will serve as the Australian Army’s main helicopter.

• DII – Aussie Anti-Air Umbrella: The Hobart Class Ships. They’ll carry MH-60Rs.

• DID – Australia and USA Collaborating on New Small-Ship Radars. They’ll be the core of the 8 refitted ANZAC Class frigates, which will also get a helicopter upgrade in the MH-60R.

• DII – Australia’s Canberra Class LHDs. Not slated to host MH-60Rs, but they could certainly do so in a revival of the anti-submarine escort carrier role. The question would be datalinks and other interoperability issues, in order to go beyond mere “lily pad” status.

• DID – Australia’s Hazardous Frigate Upgrade. The project to upgrade its FFG-7 frigates didn’t go well, but it was finished. Left hanging: what helicopters will they carry, now that the Seasprites are gone?

• DID – Australia’s Ill-Starred SH-2G Seasprite Project. Canceled, after an A$ 667 million deal for 11 refitted helicopters turned into over A$ 1.1 billion for 11 helicopters, which were years late and deemed not yet ready for service by the RAN. They were eventually sold to New Zealand, which already operated SH-2Gs.

SU-34: takeoff!
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Sukhoi’s SU-27 Flanker fighter has become one of Russia’s great export successes. It’s also a design success. Its basic airframe applied lessons from all of America’s “teen series fighters,” producing a 4+ generation aircraft that remains the yardstick by which other fighters are measured. What’s even more impressive is that the base design has been so flexible, allowing further refinements and modifications that include SU-30 and SU-35 upgrades, versions that add canard foreplanes (SU-30MKA/I/M), and even carrier-launched capability (SU-33).

Then there’s the SU-32/34 “Fullback.” It was envisaged as a Flanker family successor to the F-111 analogue SU-24 “Fencer,” which was very highly regarded in Chechnya as a battlefield support aircraft. Its closest western comparison is the F-15E Strike Eagle, but the Russian design has evolved since its initial drafts in 1986.

Russia’s SU-34 Program SU-32/34, firing
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The collapse of Russia’s arms industry in the 1990s really hurt the SU-34’s development, but it has recovered. A development journey that began with the aircraft’s maiden flight in 1990, as the T10V/SU-27IB, ended in with 2010 deliveries and fielding under a 5-year production contract, followed by a 2012 full rate production order.

RIA Novosti put the plane’s mission simply: “The Su-34 is meant to deliver a sufficiently large ordnance load to a predetermined area, hit the target accurately and take evasive action against pursuing enemy planes.” Other reports have gone further, stating that the plane is also meant to be able to handle enemy fighters in aerial combat. Given its base platform characteristics, it would likely match up well in the air against many of America’s “teen series” aircraft.

In December 2006, Sukhoi announced a target of 18 SU-34s produced by 2010, and in March 2006, defense minister Sergei Ivanov placed the longer-term schedule at 58 aircraft purchased by 2015. Production has taken a bit longer than that, and that order for 18 ended up capped at 5, but Russia remains serious about the platform. Eventual demand levels of 120-200 aircraft have been floated, in order to replace Russia’s 300 existing SU-24s. More recent reports have featured numbers at the low end of this range, but orders have been placed for up to 138 (8 dev, 5 in 2006, 32 in 2008, 92 in 2012).

The determining factor for final SU-34 numbers is likely to be the SU-34’s priority amidst Russia’s rearmament program. So far, that program has been well-fueled by Russian hydrocarbon exports and Central Asian distribution hammerlocks, amidst a global scenario of rising hydrocarbon demand. Discoveries of shale oil and gas may upset those economic arrangements, and force the VVS to prioritize, but the SU-34 program’s critical power projection role and submitted orders ensure its future place.

To date, Russia remains the plane’s only customer. A jamming variant of the SU-32/34 has reportedly been discussed in the Indian and Russian trade press, using an L175V / KS418 high power jamming pod that’s supposedly under development. There are also reports of export interest from Vietnam, and the plane has been exhibited in China.

The SU-32MF/-34 “Fullback” fighter-bomber SU-34, armed
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The SU-34 is also referred to as the “SU-32” by Sukhoi, and Sukhoi’s web site has long used the 2 designations interchangeably. Other sources use SU-32 to refer to a dedicated naval strike variant, but recent company references seem to be distinguishing SU-32s by reserving that designation for exports. DID will be using “SU-34” throughout, until and unless clear differences emerge. The SU-34’s key characteristics reportedly include:

• Side-by-side cockpit configuration of 2 K-36DM ejector seats, with a small aisle in between, and even a toilet of sorts for long missions. The ejector seats can be activated at any speed and altitude, even when the plane is on the ground.

• A 17mm armored cockpit, like the SU-25 Frogfoot ground-attack jet.

• 45.1 tonne maximum takeoff weight.

• 8 tonne ordnance load. Air Force Technology adds that this is distributed on 10 hardpoints, which can accommodate precision-guided weapons, as well as R-73/AA-11 Archer and R-77/AA-12 ‘AMRAAMSKI’ missiles. An internal 30mm GSh-301 gun with 180 rounds out its weapon array.

• AL-31FM1 turbofan engines built by the Moscow-based Salyut Company generate a thrust of up to 13.5 metric tons (over 29,000 pounds) and have a 1,000-hour service life in between repairs. Subsequent reports indicate that more powerful AL-41 engines may be fitted in future.

• Maximum speed stated as Mach 1.8 at altitude. Believed to be supersonic capable at sea level, but that’s often an academic statistic – most planes can’t sustain it without emptying their fuel tanks.

• 3,000 km range with standard drop tanks, extensible to “over 4,000 km” with the help of additional drop tanks. This makes deployment to locations like Tajikistan much easier, because intermediate airfields in Russia can easily be closed by bad weather. The SU-34 can also refuel in mid-air. Note, however, that typical “ground hugging” attack flight profiles will shorten their range considerably – Air Force Technology lists it as just 600 km on internal fuel, or 1,150 km with external fuel tanks.

• Can fly in TERCOM (Terrain Contour Matching) mode for low-level flight, and relies on software to execute a number of other difficult maneuvers. The front horizontal empennage behind the cockpit is designed to help it handle the air pockets found in high speed flight at low altitudes.

• Leninets B004 phased array multimode X-band radar, which interleaves terrain-following radar and other modes. The US B-1B’s stealth bomber’s AN/APQ-164 phased array radar uses a similar approach, and the Leninets radar’s performance is claimed to be of 200-250 km against large surface targets, with ground mapping capability to 75-150 km, and GMTI(Ground Moving Target Indicator) moving target tracking to 30 km. Detection performance against fighter sized aerial targets is claimed to be 90 km. Those are reasonable figures, but the AESA radars on modern American fighters will outclass it.

Other reports add additional details, and can be found in the “Additional Readings” section below.

Contracts & Key Events 2014-2016

SU-34
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August 3/16: Sukhoi Su-34 bombers are to be fitted with new radio surveillance gear that will allow them to spot and destroy enemy headquarters, communications and drone control centers. Dubbed UKR-RT, the system is a scaled-down version of the M-410 radio reconnaissance system that is installed in the Tu-214R. Many foreign military specialists regard the Tu-214R as a unique information gathering platform able to spot targets hundreds of kilometers away.

April 13/16: Talks have reportedly been started between the governments of Jordan and Russia over Jordan’s potential purchase of a small number of Su-32s. Interest in the export version of the Su-34 bomber as well as other Russian made military hardware has increased following Moscow’s military intervention in Syria. Until late, military and technical cooperation between the two have been fairly small, with contracts last year amounting to a refurbishment deal of two Il-76MF transport aircraft and the supply of components for the assembly of RPG-32 grenade launchers. However, a sale of any number of Su-32s would point to a potential reorientation from Jordan, who until now have happily been purchasing American weaponry with American money.

July 7/15: The Su-24 has become the latest Russian Air Force model to be grounded, with flights suspended following a deadly crash in the Eastern Khabarovsk region on Monday. This follows news that the MiG-29 fighter and Tu-95 heavy bomber fleets have also been grounded, also following recent crashes.

Oct 15/14: Delivery. Sukhoi’s Novosibirsk aviation plant hands another batch of Su-34 fighter-bombers to the Ministry of Defense. The aircraft plant is operating at full capacity, and is currently expected to do so until 2020. Sources: Sukhoi, “Sukhoi handed over a batch of Su-34 frontline bombers to the Ministry of Defense”.

June 10/14: Delivery. Sukhoi begins delivering planes from the full rate production order (q.v. March 1/12). These first 3 jets are reportedly headed to Baltimor military airdrome in Voronezh. Sources: Sukhoi, “New batch of Su-34 front-line bombers was transferred to the Russian Air Force” | IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, “Russia begins receiving Su-34s from third production contract” | Air & Cosmos, “Sukhoi livre un premier lot de Su-34 de série à l’armée de l’air russe”.

2012-2013

Full SU-34 production order; Deliveries; User conference; Crashes ground legacy SU-24 fleet for a while. Fullback in position
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Dec 16/13: Sukhoi finishes delivering the 32 Su-34s ordered under Russia’s 2008 Low Rate Production contract, and holds an official ceremony to mark the occasion. The line will continue producing fighters under the 2012 Full Rate Production contract for 92 planes. Sources, Sukhoi, Dec 16/13 release.

LRIP order delivered

Oct 23/13: Delivery. Another delivery ceremony for SU-34s at the V.P. Chkalov Novosibirsk aircraft plant (NAZ). Sukhoi offers no meaningful details. Sources: Sukhoi Oct 23/13 release.

Oct 12/13: Delivery. A RIA Novosti report says that 29 SU-34s have been delivered to date, that the 2013 target of 14 fighters is on schedule, and that another 16 are slated for delivery in 2014. The official total for present orders is 124. That math works, if the 8 development aircraft and 2006 order for 18 are both excluded. Source: RIA Novosti, “Russian Air Force to Receive 30 New Fighter-Bombers by 2015”.

Aug 19/13: Sub-contractors. Sukhoi signs a sub-contract for 184 IFF transponders (RUB 1.5 billion/ $47 million) with the Ukrainian firm Radiopribor. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Sukhoi Signs $47M Transponder Deal for Su-34” | ZSE Radiopribor, via Ukroboronprom.

July 9/13: Delivery. Another 3 SU-34s are delivered to the VVS, and Sukhoi says that manufacturing is ramping up at the Novosibirsk aircraft plant. Source: Sukhoi release.

May 6/13: Delivery. Sukhoi has a handover ceremony for the 1st in “a batch” of Su-34s to be delivered in 2013 to the Russian Air Force under the State Defense Order for the year. The January 2013 deliveries would have corresponded to earlier orders. Sources: Sukhoi release.

April 2013: Conference. A conference is held at Vorozneh’s “Baltimore” air base about SU-34 operations, attended by the VVS’s 1st Air Force and Air Defense Command, combat units operating the Su-34, UAC and Sukhoi representatives, and top managers and representatives from the manufacturing supply chain.

Sukhoi says that the time period between failures on the ground and in the air met specifications. Even so, a protocol was signed at the end of the conference, providing for the adoption of specific measures to improve SU-34 performance, ergonomics, serviceability, reliability, and durability. Sources: Sukhoi May 6/13 release.

Jan 25/13: Delivery. Another 5 SU-34s are delivered to the Russian air force. They’ll join 5 planes that already fly from Voronezh, in southwest Russia. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Sukhoi Delivers 5 Su-34 Bombers to Russian Air Force” | Sukhoi release.

Nov 12/12: China. Sukhoi announces that it will present its Su-35S fighter, Superjet 100 short-haul airliner, and “Su-32 (Su-34 export version)” at Airshow China 2012 in Zhuhai.

China is still license-producing SU-type aircraft, and Sukhoi continues to supply spare parts for its aircraft in China. Having said that, China’s “indigenous” J-11 copies have been a bone of contention, and a Chinese offer to buy a small number of SU-33 naval fighters was rejected as a transparent ploy to repeat the same theft. China is currently developing its “J-15” naval fighter without help, and similar concerns can be expected to plague potential sales of SU-32 or SU-35 fighters. Sources: Sukhoi release.

Oct 25/12: VVS modernization. Russian Military Reform relays and translates a VPK article about Russian air force procurement plans. The article offers a figure of “129 Su-34 fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2020, with an option for at least another 18.”

Oct 26/12: Vietnam. Phun.vn cites a report from the mysterious site “Periscope 2,” wherein it’s suggested that Vietnam plans to replace its fleet of 50 or so aged SU-22 strike aircraft with SU-34s, and that export approval will be given immediately, once it’s requested. The report also suggests that Saab JAS-39 Gripens will replace the VPAF’s even older fleet of 150 or so MiG-21s, that L-159s may replace existing L-39 trainers alongside Vietnam’s reported Yak-130 options, and that Vietnam may be interested in C295-AEW planes. Read “Vietnam’s Russian Restocking” for a more detailed take.

March 1/12: 92 Ordered. Russia signs a follow-on contract with Sukhoi for 92 SU-34s for delivery by 2020, making this plane the production centerpiece of the VVS’ current rearmament effort. So far, Sukhoi holding’s Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association (NAPO) has delivered 10 of the 2008 contract’s 32 SU-34s.

Depending on how one reads Russian releases and reports, this could bring the SU-34 order history to 150 (8 development + 18 in 2006-2010 + 32 in 2008 + 92 in 2012). Russia’s lack of transparency also raises the possibility that orders to date are just 100: 8 development planes plus a series of contracts that raised the base from 18 to 92. DID asked Sukhoi for clarification, but has received none.

The current contract was given a strong push by the recent series of SU-24 “Fencer” crashes, and by the swing-wing fighter’s costly, maintenance intensive upkeep. As Sukhoi puts it: “Implementation of the program will allow soon largely replacing Su-24 front bombers currently in service.” Sources: Sukhoi release | Interfax, “Sukhoi to sell 92 Su-34 frontline bombers to Russian Air Force – Defense Ministry” | RIA Novosti, “Russian Defense Ministry to Buy 92 Su-34 Fighters”.

Russia: 92

Feb 28/12: SU-24s. Russia has partially resumed SU-24 flights, following the Urals crash. CIHAN.

Feb 14/12: SU-24 Fencer flights suspended. Russia suspends all SU-24 flights indefinitely, after a SU-24 crashes in the woods of the Urals’ Kurgan region during a routine flight. Both pilots ejected safely. The Feb 13/12 crash is the 3rd SU-24 crash in the last 4 months, and a full investigation is underway to establish the cause. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russia Grounds Su-24 Bomber Fleet after Urals Crash”.

Fencer crash, fleet grounded

2010 – 2011

SU-34 deliveries behind, but continuing; Long-range flight tests; SU-24 crashes become a problem. SU-24 Fencer
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Dec 29/12: SU-24 Fencer crash. An Su-24 crashes as it attempts to land at the Marinovka air base in the Volgograd region, south of Moscow. The aircraft was on a routine training mission, and both pilots ejected and survived. The plane, on the other hand, catches fire and burns.

Each crash adds to the urgency of the SU-34 program. Sources: AP, “Russian military jet crashes, both crew survive”.

Fencer crash

Dec 12/11: 2 delivered. Sukhoi announces that the Russian SU-34 fleet continues to grow. They’re behind the original production plans, but:

“…four serial [production] Su-34 frontline bombers went up in the sky from the runway airport of the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association (NAPO) and off to the place of their deployment at the air base in Voronezh. Two more aircraft will arrive there in the next few days. The aircraft delivery is carried out in the framework of the five-year state contract signed in 2008 to supply 32 Su-34 frontline bombers to the Russian Defense Ministry.”

Oct 20/11: SU-24 Fencer crash. An Su-24 crashes at the Ukrainka military airfield in Russia’s Far East Amur region. It was flying in from the Central Russian city of Voronezh for planned maintenance work, but reportedly ran off the landing strip and caught fire after the landing gear collapsed. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Two killed in Su-24 fighter-bomber crash in Russia’s Far East”.

Fencer Crash

Sept 19/11: Russian media report that Russian Commander of the Air Forces Colonel General Aleksandr Zelin has given then go-ahead for SU-34 mass production, following successful tests. Russia Today:

“Earlier, General Zelin said the Air Forces planned to buy a total of 120 Su-34s, which will be formed into five squadrons with 24 aircraft deployed in each one. The aircraft are to be produced by the Novosibirsk branch of the Sukhoi Corporation.”

Full-rate production

Dec 28/10: 4 delivered. The Russian Air Force receives 4 new Su-34 fighter-bombers at the VVS’s Lipetsk Combat Training Center. Sources: Sukhoi release.

July 20/10: Testing. A Sukhoi release confirms that Su-34s used in the East-2010 military exercises used aerial refueling on their non-stop flight from the European part of Russia to the Far East, but makes it clear that this was more than just a ferry flight. The fighter-bombers carried out attacks as part of their routine. Sukhoi Director General Mikhail Pogosyan added that “…it is planned to increase the operational capability of the aircraft by adding new aerial munitions.”

June 23/10: Testing. RIA Novosti reports that a wing of SU-34s successfully accomplished a non-stop 6,000 km ferry flight from Lipetsk south of Moscow, to the Khabarovsk region in the Russian Far East. Even with a full load of wing tanks on a one-way trip, that’s a huge step up from the turbojet-powered SU-24M Fencer/ “Chemodahn

• ”, whose ferry range with wing tanks is listed as 3,055 Km.

The SU-34’s initial reports suggested a 4,000 km range with full drop tanks, which would match the F-15E Strike Eagle’s published ferry range. A 6,000 km ferry range is so far beyond that goal, and beyond similar aircraft, to make one wonder if aerial refueling was involved. That would still make it a non-stop trip, of course, and hence a “true” (but incomplete) report.

March 16/10: VVS Modernization. In “The future of the Russian Air Force: 10 years on“, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik discusses planned buys and pending recapitalization of the Russian Air Force over the next decade:

“According to various media reports, the Ministry wants to buy at least 1,500 aircraft, including 350 new warplanes, by 2020. The fleet would include 70% new equipment at that point, said Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Alexander Zelin… The Defense Ministry has now signed contracts for the purchase of 32 Su-34 Fullback advanced fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2013, 48 Su-35 Flanker-E fighters by 2015, 12 Su-27SM Flanker-B Mod. 1 fighters by 2011, 4 Su-30M2 Flanker-C planes by 2011 and 12 Su-25UBM Frogfoot combat trainers. This year, the Defense Ministry intends to sign a contract for the delivery of 26 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D fighters by 2015. Additional contracts for the delivery of at least 80 Su-34s and 24-48 Su-35s are expected to be signed. In all, the Russian Air Force is to receive 240-260 new aircraft of these types. It is hard to say much about the specifications of another 100-110 aircraft, due to be manufactured primarily after 2015. They will probably include 25-30 MiG-35 fighters, another 12-16 Su-30 combat trainers for Su-35 squadrons and 40-60 Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Advanced Frontline Aviation Aircraft System) fifth-generation fighters…”

2008 – 2009

Full production starts; Contract for 32 more SU-34s; Last SU-24M4 upgrade delivered; Broader VVS procurement plans. SU-34: Going long
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Dec 21/09: 2 delivered. The V.P.Chkalov Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association (NAPO) officially delivers 2 Su-34s produced under the framework of the new manufacturing contract to the Russian Air Force. The planes have already arrived to the Russian AF Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Flight Training.

In accordance with the 5-year state contract with the Ministry of Defense signed in 2008, NAPO will produce 32 Su-34 fighter-bombers till 2013. Sources: Sukhoi release.

Dec 10/09: SU-24. NAPO hands over the final batch of modernized Su-24M2 “Fencer” aircraft to the Russian Air Force, fulfilling its obligations under 3-year state contract, and shifting focus toward SU-34 production. Sukhoi release.

June 5/09: 32 more 34s. Jane’s Defense Review reports that Russia has placed a 5-year contract for SU-34 fighter/bombers. Subsequent quotes by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin place the contract at 32 jets for about RUB 40 billion (about $1.3 billion).

Subsequent Sukhoi releases place the contract date in 2008.

Low-rate production contract: 32

April 24/08: VVS modernization. Moscow News Weekly carries an analysis of the SU-34 and its acquisition plans by Ilya Kramnik of RIA Novosti:

“The Su-34 will replace the Su-24M aircraft (about 400 planes), the Su-24MR surveillance aircraft (over 100 planes), and the MiG-25RB aircraft (about 70). Russia will have to produce between 550 and 600 Su-34s to replace these obsolete aircraft within 10-15 years. However, the Defense Ministry plans to buy only about 58 [SU-34s] by 2015, and a total of 300 by 2022.

Many experts say that if the Su-24 and MiG-25RB aircraft are scrapped by 2020, Russia will be left without fighter-bombers and surveillance aircraft. Others argue that this number will be enough for the Air Force’s new concept.

The concept is focused not so much on the combat characteristics of the Su-34, as on its long range, the ability to refuel in the air (including by other Su-34 aircraft with additional fuel tanks under their wings), and its comfortable cabin… Units armed with such aircraft can be used in the so-called pendulum operations, when an Air Force unit bombs a terrorist base in Central Asia today, delivers a strike at a missile base in Europe the next day, and three days later flies to the Indian Ocean to support a combined group of the Northern, Pacific and Black Sea fleets, with flights from a base in Russia.

…This is not a new concept. Elite units of top-class aircraft manned by superbly trained crews formed the core of the German air force during World War II, and Japan’s Imperial Navy had a similar concept. However, such elite units can be quickly weeded out by swarms of ordinary aircraft in a global war of attrition, such as World War II. From this viewpoint, Russia’s new concept looks vulnerable, but then this country has the nuclear triad for a global war.”

Jan 9/08: Industrial. Sukhoi announces that Russia has started “full-scale production” of the Su-34 Fullback fighter bomber, and a company spokesman said that up to 20 fighters could now be assembled simultaneously at the Novosibirsk Aviation Production Association (NAPO). He did not specify how many would be built each year, and it’s likely that the announcement really means that the industrial infrastructure is ready.

This RIA Novosti report places the price of the plane at $36 million, but real clarity on that front is unlikely until the aircraft wins an export competition. RIA Novosti report | Kommersant report.

2005 – 2007

Contract for 18 SU-34s; Initial deliveries; Phase 2 tests; Don’t drink & courier – it delays the program. Tastes like… Siberia
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Dec 25/07: SU-24. Merry Christmas from NAPO. RIA Novosti reports that the firm has completed the delivery of 4 upgraded swing-wing Su-24M2 Fencer tactical bombers from the Chkalov plant in Novosibirsk to an Air Force regiment based in Russia’s Far East. Another 6 Su-24s are currently being modernized at the same plant, and another 2 modernized aircraft were deployed earlier in December with the Lipetsk pilot combat training center in central Russia.

The Su-24M2 is adds an improved cockpit with multi-function displays, helmet-mounted sights, a new SVP-24 mission computer, and new software that improves navigational accuracy and unguided weapon delivery. The SU-34 is still the VVS’ desired successor, but the pace and success of these modernizations may affect SU-34 Fullback deployment plans, and urgency. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russian Air Force receives 4 modernized tactical bombers”

Dec 18/07: RIA Sibir relays a notice that NAPO will obtain 43 high-performance processing centers for EUR 50 million, in order to help modernize aircraft production.

NAPO makes Su-34 fighter-bombers, overhauls and upgrades Su-24M fighter-bombers, carries out preparations for the manufacture of Russian regional aircraft Sukhoi Superjet-100, and “participates in the program of Sukhoi Holding on the development of a 5th generation fighter.” Source: RIA Sibir.

Dec 27/06: Production update. A Sukhoi release adds clarity to the SU-34’s production schedule:

“The Sukhoi Aircraft Holding Company, in conjunction with the Russian Air Force, has started the second phase of the official tests of the Su-34 attack aircraft.

The three-year phase will include tests of the aircraft armed with new kinds of armament that the domestic defense industry is offering to further enhance the capabilities of the new aircraft. The first phase of the official tests was successfully completed in October [2006]. As a result Sukhoi has received go ahead to launch series production of the Su-34s at the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association (NAPO) and start deliveries of the new aircraft to the Air Force.

The first Su-34s have been handed over to the Russian Air Force this month [December 2006]. By 2010, under a three-year government contract, will build and supply the Russian Air Force with 18 Su-34s. Later, plans to manufacture 8 to 10 Su-34 aircraft a year.”

Subsequent events derail this contract, ending production at 5 planes. Sources: Sukhoi, “Second phase of the Su-34’s official tests has started” | Air & Cosmos, “Sukhoi livre un premier lot de Su-34 de serie a l’armee de l’air russe”.

Russia: 18 (5 produced)

Oct 10/06: Pravda’s tabloid version Fun Reports runs an amusing story that explains a multi-month delay to the program. The saga reportedly began when the Ulianovskoe Designing Bureau of Device Construction received an order from Novosibirsk aviation workers, who needed a control assembly part. The part took 3 months to make, and 2 designers were supposed to deliver the EUR 30,000 shipment to Novosibirsk, in Siberia.

When his colleague fell ill, Pavel Pahomov was sent on the train from Volgograd [DID: once named “Stalingrad”] to Ulan-Ude all alone, with an ordinary looking cardboard box designed to hide the contents. Unfortunately, Pahomov accepted drinks from his comrades on the train. After a missed train in Ufa, a high-speed taxi ride, and more than 24 celebratory hours, he returned to his seat and found the box missing. Pavel called the Russian Federal Security service, and claimed he had been set up American spies. It turned out that a train stewardess decided to clean up, and threw the box of “refuse” (with a false bottom) in the furnace. Yuriy Butov, the director’s assistant for supplying Chkalov’s Aviation Factory in Novosibirsk :

“Without this part the bombardment aircraft SU-34’s serial production cannot be launched. And we have a pending order for 24 planes. That is one billion Euros! Now the Designing Bureau is desperately trying to construct the part but they need another two months to complete it. We are facing serious financial losses.”

Pavel Pahomov’s visit to Siberia may wind up being a bit longer than he had intended. Sources: Pravda, “Russian engineer guzzles away secret Su-34 part”

Don’t Drink & Courier!

Sept 1/06: RIA Novosti reports that Army General Vladimir Mikhailov, commander of the Russian Air Force, has said that they would receive the first batch of Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers by late 2006. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russian Air Force to receive unique bomber soon”

1986 – 2004

From program start to the initial development batch. Hey, what’s 18 years between friends? SU-34 Fullback
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2004: Dev batch. Chkalov Aircraft Production Association in Novosibirsk, which produces the planes, had produced a development batch of 8 Su-32 aeroplanes. Source.

Development batch produced

June 2003: The plane successfully completes the first stage of Russian government testing. Source

1997: Sidelined. GlobalSecurity: “The [SU-34’s] development was decelerated [for Sukhoi] to concentrate itself in the development of the Indian Su-30 and the Su-27 acquired by China.”

June 1995: The aircraft is renamed the Su-32 according to Sukhoi, and the aeroplane is shown abroad at the 1995 Le Bourget air show in Paris. Eventually, even Sukhoi will start referring to it as the “SU-34” again. Source

Dec 18/93: The first pre-production T-10V is built and makes its first flight, piloted by the design bureau’s test pilots I.V. Votintsev and Ye.G. Revunov. [Source] This plane reportedly adopts “the Su-35 wing with additional stations, enlarged internal fuel tanks, enlarged spine and lengthened tail stinger, the production reinforced centre section design, and the representative production configuration of the tandem dual wheel main undercarriage” [Source].

April 13/90: The T10V-1’s test aircraft’s first flight is performed by the design bureau’s test pilot A.A. Ivanov. Source

1st flight

1989-90: The first prototype T10V-1 is built on the platform of the production Su-27UB. Source

May 1988: CDR. the plane’s conceptual design is presented for critical design review. In addition to the conventional Su-27UB-style cockpit configuration, with the pilots seated one behind the other, an alternative option of a “side by side” pilot-seating arrangement is discussed – and later adopted. The cockpit overhead space created behind the side-by-side seats allows the pilot to stand up, with the crew boarding the plane using an inbuilt ladder through the bay in the nosewheel landing gear unit and the service hatch in the back wall of the cockpit. Source

June 19/86: Work to produce a two-seat fighter-bomber version of the SU-27 officially begins, initiated by a decree of the government. The Sukhoi Design Bureau assigns the new plane the manufacturer’s designation T-10V. Source

Additional Readings

For the curious, the Russian TV show video features SU-24M2s, MiG-29SMTs, SU-27 family, and the SU-34 as the prime focus. The refueling aircraft for that aerial sequence is an IL-78.

• Sukhoi – SU-32. The firm has also referred to the aircraft as “Su-34” in its releases.

• Sukhoi – Su-32 Historical background

• Air Force Technology – Su-34 (Su 27IB) Flanker Fighter Bomber Aircraft, Russia

• Australian Air Power – Sukhoi Su-32/Su-34 Fullback: Russia’s New Heavy Strike Fighter “In comparing the basic Su-32/34 airframe against Western types, the design with 12.1 tonnes (26.7 klb) of internal fuel sits in between the Boeing F-15E and F-111 in combat radius and weapon payload capabilities. It will provide at lower gross weights lower agility than the F-15E, but higher agility than the F-111. Its top end supersonic performance is inferior to both US types…”

• GlobalSecurity – Su-34 (Su-27IB)

• Air Force Technology – Su-24M Fencer Front-Line Bomber, Russia. The SU-24’s swing-wing predecessor, which has some similarities to the American F-111. Also called “Chemodahn” by Russian crews. The word means “suitcase,” and refers to the aircraft’s boxy shape and slab sides.

Broader Context

• DID – Russia’s Military Spending Jumping – But Can Its Industry? Restarting an entire defense industry is hard.

• Russian Military Reform, via WayBack (Oct 25/12) – Russian air force procurement plans. Gives a figure of “129 Su-34 fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2020, with an option for at least another 18.”

• RIA Novosti, via WayBack (Jan 9/07) – Russian defense industry still faces problems. Points out, inter alia, that: “The management of the Novosibirsk Aircraft Plant had promised to supply six, rather than two, Su-34 bombers in late 2006.” Other items in the report are also highly relevant to the larger rearmament picture, including production difficulties, paper factories, and insolvency levels within the industry.

Americas

• An MV-22B Osprey has successfully flown with critical components fabricated by 3-D printing. The work was undertaken by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) which involved the creation of a titanium link and fitting assembly for the engine nacelle of the aircraft. This link and fitting assembly is one of four that secure a V-22’s engine nacelle to the primary wing structure. NAVAIR intends to further expand the usage of 3-D printed components, fabricating six additional parts for the V-22, H-1 and CH-53K.

• While it doesn’t seem so at first, an emerging problem for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is that it is almost too stealthy. Pilots flying the aircraft have discovered that they are unable to participate in certain training exercises such as evading surface-to-air threats. The inability on the ground to track the fighters had to be rectified by crews flipping on their transponders in order to be followed.

Middle East North Africa

• Israel has wheeled out its indigenous Eitan armored personnel carrier (APC) demonstrator. Weighing in at 35 tons, the 8×8 APC will cost nearly half that of new Merkava Mk4-based Namer heavy carriers now in production. Field trials will now commence to assess Eitan’s performance in “varied and complex” conditions and the Ministry of Defense hopes to have it in service within the next five years.

Europe

• A missile explosion at a military installation in northern Ukraine has killed three people, including a NATO representative. The incident occurred last Thursday while a missile was being unloaded from a vehicle. According to local media, the NATO representative was there to oversee the disarmament of Soviet-era weapons.

• Delivery of a South Korean made fleet tanker for the British Royal Navy has now been delayed by seven months. Initially due to enter service in September, the vessel is still undergoing trials with manufacturer Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME). A total of four tankers are to be eventually delivered as part of the service’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) program.

Asia Pacific

• South Korea’s Hanwha Techwin is to buy out the Thales SA stake in their joint venture, Hanwha Thales, for $257 million. While the deal has yet to be approved by the South Korean government, the sale would result in Hanwha owning Hanwha Thales outright and integrated into the company. The integration will add expertise in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems to Hanwha Techwin, who primarily deal with land systems.

• AM General has been awarded a $356 million contract to provide Humvees to Afghanistan. The deal will see 1,259 M1151 armament-carrying Humvees and 414 M1152 troop carriers delivered, and is part of an earlier released foreign military sales contract which includes deliveries to Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Ukraine, and Tunisia. Features found in the models include armor protection, including frag kits, all of of which can be installed and removed in the field.

• BAE and Rheinmetall have both been shortlisted by the Australian government to participate in the second phase of their LAND 400 program. The vehicles offered, AMV35 (BAE) and the Boxer 8×8 (RM), will now be assessed on their mounted combat reconnaissance capabilities. Once selected, the winning company will provide replacements for the Australian light armored vehicle and M113 armored personnel carrier fleets.

Today’s Video

Eitan 8×8 APC:

RFA Bayleaf, 1982-2011
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Britain’s Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) program was begun in 2002, and aimed to buy up to 11 supply ships for the Royal Navy’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Unfortunately, all the project could produce was studies, MoD planning delays, and slow progress. In 2007, MARS was broken up into a series of smaller buys, with an initial focus on the critical state of the RFA’s fuel carriers. Even that effort ran into delays, but the last 3 years have seen Britain’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary retire 3 of its 4 Leaf Class replenishment oilers. Another 3 of its remaining 5 oilers were commissioned in 1984 or earlier, and their single-hull design no longer complies with MARPOL regulations for fuel-carrying ships.

Replacements are urgently needed, in order to keep the Royal Navy supplied around the world. In February 2012, Britain finally placed a MARS order for 4 oilers, which will measure over 200m long and around 37,000t apiece. It has been expected for some time that these ships would be built outside of Britain, and that has held true.

Contracts & Key Events

MARS is intended to involve more than 1 block buy. The initial buy involves the 4 Tide Class 37,000t MARS tankers, which will begin entering service in 2016. There are also plans for 3 MARS Fleet Solid Stores ships over the next 10 years, to replace the RFA’s two 23,384t Fort Rosalie Class ships, and the 33,675t RFA Fort Victoria.

2012

MARS Tanker
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August 2/16: Delivery of a South Korean made fleet tanker for the British Royal Navy has now been delayed by seven months. Initially due to enter service in September, the vessel is still undergoing trials with manufacturer Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME). A total of four tankers are to be eventually delivered as part of the service’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) program.

Nov 14/12: Named. The MARS tankers will become the Tide Class, restoring a class that had left the fleet. The new ships will be named Tidespring, Tiderace, Tidesurge, after previous ships; and Tideforce, which is a new name for the RFA. RFA, Commodore Bill Walworth confirms that the ships are on contract, with RFA Tidespring scheduled to enter service in 2016.

The original Tide Class fleet tankers were developed using the lessons of the World War II Pacific Campaign, and were the Royal Fleet Auxillary’s 1st purpose-designed replenishment tankers. They served worldwide from 1954 until 1991. UK MoD.

Class & ships named

Sept 14/12: Sub-contractors. Kelvin Hughes Surveillance in London, UK announces that they’ve been picked to supply the 4 MARS tankers’ integrated bridge systems (IBS) and helicopter control radars.

Each shipset will consist of 3 solid state SharpEye radars, accessed and controlled via multiple console mounted Naval MantaDigital tactical displays. The system will also include a suite of navigation sensors, a command and control system, and the helicopter control radar system. All of these elements will be integrated in the IBS.

Feb 27/12: Controversy. The choice of Daewoo as the MARS ships’ builder draws expected criticism, but it also draws a report that there was, in fact, a British bid for MARS. The Daily Mail reports that Fincantieri was partnered with BAE Shipbuilding, and would have built 1 of the 4 tankers in the UK, with 35% of the overall work taking place in Britain. This compares to just 20% for Daewoo, and no ships built in Britian. On the other hand, the Daily Mail’s report cites sources who say that Fincantieri’s bid was about GBP 675 million, compared to announced total of GBP 542 million for Daewoo + BMT.

The very existence of a bid that would have built a ship in Britain contradicts some key MoD statements, which make the story significant enough that British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond and Equipment Minister Peter Luff are forced to respond. Luff says that the Fincantieri bid “did not meet some fundamental requirements,” adding that even BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK. Hammond doesn’t deny the partnership, and lays out an alternate defense. Based on the leaked letter cited by the Daily Mail, Hammond’s 1st statement is very problematic, but the rest is straightforward:

“No British firm put in a bid and the Italian company never indicated during the two-year bid process that they would build any of the tankers in the UK.

When we are building complex warships or highly sophisticated weapons, of course we must protect Britain’s industrial base. But when it comes to non-military type equipment, I am clear that my responsibility is to get the best deal for the UK taxpayer and plough the savings back into the front line.

In this case, the choice we were faced with was to buy South Korean and save hundreds of millions of pounds for the taxpayer, or let the work to an Italian shipyard.”

Daily Mail | UK MoD

Feb 22/12: Britain’s Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, Peter Luff, announces that South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) is the Government’s preferred bidder for a deal to build 4 new double-hulled oilers, using BMT’s Aegir family design. The 37,000t ships will be just 200.9m long, and 28.6m wide, with a draught of 10m. Onboard tanks will handle Diesel Oil, Aviation Fuel and Fresh Water, with Lube oil stored in drums, and stowage for up to 8 ISO 20′ containers. A set of 3 abeam Replenishment And Supply stations will be coupled with a hangar and flight deck for a medium helicopter, allowing simultaneous fuel and supplies transfers. The ships will be designed to add a stern fuel delivery reel in future, but won’t be built with one.

The Daewoo contract is GBP 452 million (about $711 million), but the overall buy will be around GBP 602 million (about $950 million). That adds around GBP 60 million to British firms for “customisation, trials and specialist engineering support”; and GBP 90 million to the UK’s BMT Defence Services for “key equipment, systems, design and support services.” The UK MoD explains that:

“A number of British companies took part in the competition, but none submitted a final bid for the build contract. In light of this, the best option for Defence, and value for money for taxpayers, is for the tankers to be constructed in South Korea by DSME.”

South Korea’s industrial policy makes shipbuilding a priority, and it has been successful. ROK shipbuilders are currently global leaders in the civil sector, with extremely advanced shipyards. This has translated into a very good record with new ROK Navy vessels as well. UK MoD | BMT Defence.

MARS contract

Additional Readings

• UK MoD – MARS Tankers

• BMT Defence – Aegir. See also the more specific MARS Tanker, a derivative of the Aegir-26 design.

• Beedall Navy Matters – Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS). Note: current only to 2008.

M113A1 & M1A1s, 1AR
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The M113A1 family of vehicles was introduced into service in Australia in the mid 1960s, and arrived in time to see service in Vietnam. Additional vehicle variants were added until 1979, and there are 766 M113A1 vehicles currently in the Australian Army fleet. By February 2005, however, only 520 remained in service.

A number of upgrades have been suggested for Australia’s APCs(Armoured Personnel Carrier) over the years, with a number of different reviews and upgrade proposals submitted. Many of Australia’s M113s remained in the old M113A1 configuration, though some had at least been repaired and overhauled at 25,000 km. Bushmaster wheeled mine-resistant vehicles have replaced some M113s in the ADF, but the M113’s lightweight, tracked, off-road mobility remains important to Australian mechanized formations, and to troops deployed in combat zones. A plan approved in the 1990s involved a “minimum upgrade” of 537 vehicles from 1996-1998, at a cost of about A$ 40 million in 1993 dollars, with a major upgrade to follow. That major upgrade did follow – along with schedule slips, and cost increases from around A$ 594 million to nearly A$ 1 billion.

New-Old Vehicles: The M113-AS4s M113AS4 APC
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There are 7 variants of the upgraded M113AS family being produced under LAND 106. Enhancements are being made to a variety of areas.

Protection: Add-on external armor kits to protect against weapons up to 14.5mm; internal spall liners; hull reinforcement to improve mine protection; fuel tanks moved from inside to outside. The change in configuration also allowed the introduction of stealth characteristics into the design by decreasing the overall turret profile, and reducing the vehicle’s radar cross-section and infra-red signature.

Firepower: A new Australian designed and built electrical turret, with improvements designed to lessen the battering its occupant takes. It will host a new .50 caliber weapon that sports a quick change barrel and day/night sights.

M113AS: new controls
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Mobility: Replacement of the engine, transmission, drive train and driver’s controls. To maximize the benefits of this new driveline, the suspension, track and road wheels are also being replaced.

Internal: Compartment improvements like heat mitigation measures and better stowage of equipment externally where it isn’t so much in the way. New electrical and fuel systems; a land navigation system that combines GPS and INS.

The exact designations refer to the upgraded vehicles’ general characteristics. M113-AS3 variants have 5 road wheel stations per side, and a Recommended Gross Vehicle Mass of 15,000 kg/ 33,069 pounds. AS4 variants are stretched by 666 mm/ 26.2″, with 6 road wheel stations per side, and an RGVM of 18,000 kg/ 39,683 pounds. Variants include:

• Armoured Personnel Carrier (M113-AS4 APC). Most common variant.
  
• Armoured Fitters (M113-AS4 AF). Includes a new Hiab crane with a significantly enhanced 2.4-tonne lift at 4 meters. 38 planned of 350.
  
• Armoured Recovery Vehicle Light (M806-AS4 ARVL). Includes a Sepson winch capable of a 13-tonne single line pull. 12 planned of 350.
  
• Armoured Ambulance (M113-AS4 AA)
  
• Armoured Command Vehicle (M113-AS4 ACV)
  
• Armoured Logistic Vehicle (M113-AS4 ALV)
  
• Armoured Mortar (M125-AS3 AM)

The final vehicles will be transportable in the RAAF’s C-17A heavy-lift aircraft (4 per plane, vs. 3 for larger armored vehicles), though that hasn’t been certified as of March 2012. One M113AS4 may be transportable in an Australian C-130J tactical transport aircraft if enough equipment is removed, but it hasn’t been certified, even though the initial test took place 6 years ago in March 2006. ANAO is correct to cite that gap as possible evidence of a problem.

On land, the upgraded M113s will have to wait for the arrival of its LAND 121 (“Overlander”) Phase 3 heavy trucks to transport them, and the ADF will need to lease commercial vehicles until then.

Australia’s LAND 106 The Program

A plan approved in the late 1990s involved a “minimum upgrade” of 537 vehicles from 1996-1998, at a cost of about A$ 40 million in 1993 dollars, with a major upgrade to follow. That initial plan was derailed mid-stream by an unsolicited contractor proposal to combine the 2 phases. The end result was Australia’s LAND 106 project, which aimed to perform major upgrades to a smaller set of 350 M113 APCs. That program suffered from problems in its early stages, delaying any fielded modernization until 2007.

The operational effect of that switch has been to delay fleet upgrades by about a decade. Final delivery is now expected to take place at the end of 2012.

M113AS4 FV
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The LAND 106 M113 Upgrade was scheduled to be completed in 3 stages, and delivery of the first company group of upgraded M113s was scheduled for 2006.

Stage 1: Development and preliminary testing of 2 Demonstration vehicles. Completed in 2004.

Stage 2: Design, construction and testing of the first 14 of the Initial Production Vehicles (IPV). This stage encountered a number of technical difficulties, resulting in an extensive Test and Evaluation Phase. Delivery of the initial 16 Phase 1 & 2 vehicles (14 APCs, 1 AF and 1 ARVL) to the 1st Brigade in Darwin was completed in December 2007.

Design development of the remaining 4 vehicle variants will continue through to the end of 2009.

Stage 3: Design, construction and testing of the remaining IPVs, and the delivery of 336 production standard vehicles. Began with successful completion of the Production Readiness Review for the base M113 APC variant in November 2007.

When Tenix’s land systems business was acquired by BAE Systems, it was easy for the vehicle’s original manufacturer (United Defense, now the largest part of BAE Land Systems) to assume leadership of the project via its new subsidiary. Tenix had chosen Germany’s FFG as the major technology partner for the program. Other key subcontractors and suppliers include Thales Optronics, Moog GmbH, SKF Australia, Bisalloy and a number of Australian SMEs including Imag Australia Pty. Limited.

The ANAO’s 2012 Report

Australia’s independent audit department, the ANAO, has issued a number of reports covering the LAND 106 program, with the program nearing its end, the 2012 audit offers a solid retrospective of the program, its progress, and the lessons learned from its problems. The core of its conclusions:

“Deficiencies in the [2002] Major Upgrade Contract meant that technical problems with the vehicles’ design and production could not be effectively managed under its provisions. Contrary to the advice tendered to government when the major upgrade was initially approved, critical milestones were not effectively incorporated into the contract, which also failed to properly specify vehicle payloads, prioritise vehicle technical specifications in order of necessity and desirability, or establish clear terms for liquidated damages.”

The project subsequently failed to perform, but the government found that it was in a poor position to collect damages, and so ended up renegotiating the contract in 2 global settlements, in an attempt to fix the contract’s original problems. What the November 2007 and August 2011 settlements could not fix, was the time, effort, and money wasted as a result of those omissions.

Defence considers that the Prime Contractor is currently on course to deliver all 431 vehicles by October 2012, after the delivery date has been revised several times.

According to the ANAO, a range of factors hurt project schedule performance, including:

• Delays in the preparation and stretching of M113 hulls under the CSP Contract, which are needed to feed into the major upgrade production line.
  
• Missing/broken lifting eyes on existing M113, which caused delays in moving hulls through the CSP process).
  
• Poor quality, with more vehicles than expected needing rework after quality inspections. That was an especial problem, because the production facilities at Bandiana had limited room for rework.
  
• The ANAO refers to “facility failures at the Defence-owned facilities in Bandiana.”
  
• Hull de-lamination, resulting in additional preparation work, and laminar cracking, which resulted in hulls being set aside until a suitable repair technique could be developed.
  
• Delays in the technical development of the ALV [cargo variant] and AM [mortar variant]; and
  
• Shortages of VIC 3 vehicle communication harnesses, supplied by Defence as government furnished equipment, and required to finish the vehicle.

M113AS4s, Exercise
Chong Ju 2009
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According the ANAO, the full cost of the M113 upgrades is close to A$ 1 billion for 431 vehicles. A$ 2.32 million per vehicle isn’t small change, though in fairness, it is half or less of the cost of a new, modern tracked IFV like BAE’s M2 Bradley, or its CV90. Australia’s Chief of Army responded to the ANAO by saying that:

“…as the Capability Manager … I am satisfied that the [upgraded M113] provides a significantly enhanced capability to Army and that it is a potent and capable platform. I am also satisfied that the delivery of [the upgrade project] satisfies the original requirement specified by the Capability Manager.”

The question ANAO asks is whether the project’s long delays, and 20-year run, have left those requirements behind. The M113AS4 is much less capable than modern IFVs. It has weaker armor protection, less formidable weaponry, and remains stuck with old communication gear. That last issue will be a problem going forward. ANAO:

“The M113 relies on the VIC 3 model communications harness as its main electronic communication system. There are currently a limited number of these harnesses available, and priority… is given to the ASLAV vehicles, currently deployed to Afghanistan… Army aims to rectify this shortage by December 2012 through fitting the Bushmaster fleet… with updated SOTAS communications systems, which will make an increased number of VIC 3 harnesses available… [Even so,] the electronic systems fitted to the upgraded vehicles do not permit optimal communication and data transfer with heavy tanks and the other force elements, such as artillery and aircraft, with which they are intended to operate… Army originally expected to address the current communications limitations of the M113 by fitting to these vehicles the systems to be developed under projects LAND 75 and LAND 125.64 However, in the context of the 2012-13 Federal Budget, the relevant phases… will not now proceed.”

An even more alarming problem involves the M113s’ reliability. ANAO:

“Maintenance records classify the vehicles as ‘Fully Functional’; ‘Restricted Use’; or ‘Unserviceable’. Over the three years to December 2010, the proportion of vehicles at the School of Armour classified as ‘Fully Functional’ decreased from an average of 62 per cent in 2008 to 38 per cent in 2010. Since 2010, this has not improved: Defence advised that as at 19 March 2012 the proportion of vehicles classed as ‘Fully Functional’ was 39 per cent across Army. The main factors affecting vehicle availability have been a lack of supplies (spare parts) and mechanical failures.”

That reliability level would become a serious problem if the upgraded M113s had to be deployed. It also affects the math of a comparison with more expensive IFVs. Assume that buying a new IFV would be 225% of the final upgrade cost, that the budget to buy them remains the same, and that we use reliability benchmarks met by those modern IFVs:

• 431 M113-AS4s x 39% fully functional = 168 available IFVs.

• 192 modern IFVs x 70% fully functional = 134 available IFVs

At similar availability rates, Australia’s DoD would have a strong argument for its choice. Given the actual number of available machines, however, a good counter-argument can be made that it would have been better to own 134 IFVs that are much more capable. What is certain, is that neglecting this key performance parameter seems to have cost Australia hard.

Contracts and Key Events M113AS4 FV and ARVL
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August 2/16: BAE and Rheinmetall have both been shortlisted by the Australian government to participate in the second phase of their LAND 400 program. The vehicles offered, AMV35 (BAE) and the Boxer 8×8 (RM), will now be assessed on their mounted combat reconnaissance capabilities. Once selected, the winning company will provide replacements for the Australian light armored vehicle and M113 armored personnel carrier fleets.

November 17/15: The Australian Department of Defense have issued a request for information for 450 tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) as part of the Australian Defence Force’s largest ever land systems acquisition program. Project LAND 400, which is now in its third phase, has been a major overhaul of existing aging equipment of the ADF and in total will cost approximately USD $7.1 billion. Phase Three will aim to replace the existing M113AS4 and it is hoped that these will be replaced by 2025 and the M113AS4 LOT by 2030, but the Australian DoD find the machinery decaying given current and emerging threats.

May 24/12: The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) issues “Upgrade of the M113 Fleet of Armoured Vehicles.”

Specific conclusions are covered in the previous section, but its overall tone is that many of the program’s problems and cost increases were avoidable. They also point out that the final product is an APC that’s under the capability standard of modern alternatives, despite its costs. This is true, and was known in advance. Australia accepted that trade, in exchange for what it saw as a lower-cost option, with better transportability. Limited communications compatibility with its companion M1 tanks, and the withdrawal of the M113s from plans for Australia’s new battlefield management C4I systems, is a more serious issue. Most serious of all is the fact that availability rates for the upgraded M113s remain abysmal – under 40%! That will impact training, and unless it’s corrected, it will become a serious problem if the armored vehicles ever get deployed.

Meanwhile, BAE has qualified for the first 3 incentive payments under the August 2011 re-negotiation, and looks to be on target to deliver all M113s by the end of October 2012.

May 10/12: Australia’s budget features a series of reductions. From the Chief of Army’s Budget Message:

“M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carriers. One hundred M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carriers will be placed into temporary storage [along with 15 M1A1 Abrams tanks]. The APCs will be placed into temporary storage in a condition where they can be rapidly returned to service when Army’s fiscal situation improves. Army will need to develop an equipment and training methodology to ensure an adequate number of crews are maintained to meet contingency requirements.”

Lt. Gen. D.L. Morrison later pens a letter to the editor of The West Australian, reiterating his confidence in the M113AS4, and citing the current measures as “informed solely by a need to reduce operating costs in order to focus key resources to operational priorities and linked training support.”

August 2011: 2nd global settlement. Dissatisfaction with BAE’s performance led Australia’s DoD to begun reviewing its legal contractual options in June 2010, but it eventually decided that it was on softer ground than it thought, and decided to negotiate a solution instead. The new agreement involves a number of concessions from Defence, and according to the ANAO, key provisions included:

• BAE withdraws A$ 5 million in postponement claims.
  
• Australia’s DoD won’t exercise contractual rights to liquidated damages of approximately A$ 1 million for late delivery.
  
• Final delivery date for all vehicles moves from April 2012 to Dec 9/12.
  
• Incentive payments totaling A$ 2.8 million are available to BAE if certain production targets are met between August 2011 – October 2012, including delivery of the last vehicle by the end of October. Defence says this was done to avoid having BAE close some of its facilities early, and set LAND 106’s schedule back even further.

Oct 7/10: BAE Systems Land and Armaments LP’s US Combat Systems business announces a $14 million contract to provide T150F double-pin track link assemblies and sprockets, for Australia’s M113 upgrades.

Work on the track shoes will take place at the BAE Systems’ Anniston, AL facility by the existing workforce, and is expected to be complete in July 2011. The contract was awarded by Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation office based in Washington, DC.

M113AS4 night test
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March 27/09: The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) issues “Management of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier Upgrade Project.” The 2009 ANAO report praises progress in a number of problem areas that were highlighted in the 2005 report. The 2007 renegotiation and restructuring has helped the program make significant progress in key areas, from management, to technical development. Having said that:

“The M113 Major Upgrade Project commenced in July 2002 and has suffered a series of delays. Army has so far received 42 of the 350 vehicles to be upgraded [which is behind schedule]… In July 2008, the Prime Contractor informed Defence that the existing production facilities at Bandiana, Victoria, were not adequate to the task and, at December 2008, there was a potential shortfall of around 100 upgraded vehicles by December 2010.

The backlog is caused chiefly by delays in extending the hulls. This is proving to be more complex than anticipated, and is taking longer than expected… would not be able to deliver 350 upgraded vehicles by December 2010. Defence is currently negotiating arrangements with the Prime Contractor…”

Oct 28/08: Australia’s Labor Party government announces an A$ 220 million (currently about $143 million) addition to LAND 106. BAE will upgrade another 81 M113s to equip Darwin’s 5 RAR mechanized infantry and the recently established 7 RAR, raising the total to 431 vehicles.

BAE Systems’ production line at Bandiana in northern Victoria will now remain open until July 2011, and additional facilities will be opened in Williamstown, Victoria and Wingfield, South Australia to ensure that delivery commitments are met.

May 22/08: The LAND 106 project is reported to be back on track. Frontier India:

“The M113 project experienced some well-known technical problems in the development phase, and it was feared these problems would impact on the cost and schedule of the project,” the announcement said. The serious technical risks faced by the project have now been resolved, the schedule pressures have been reduced, and the project does not face cost pressures said the release.”

Nov 15/07: The first 4 M113AS4s built by Tenix Aerospace and Defence are accepted into service with the Australian Army’s 7th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (Mechanised Infantry), during a ceremony in Darwin. Australian DoD | Space Daily.

M113A1, last exercise
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June 11/06: Australia’s DMO contracts with Honeywell Germany to supply the new TALIN 500 Inertial Navigation Unit for the M113 vehicles at a cost of A$ 11 million.

Acquired under Project JP5408, the TALIN 500 is the central component of the new navigation system for the M113s, integrating a global positioning system (GPS) with the inertial navigation functions as a backup if GPS isn’t available. The new system will provide full navigation capability to both the commander and driver of the M113. DMO believes the system has export potential. DoD release | DMO On Target article.

July 28/05: The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report criticizes Australia’s management of its M113 upgrade program, beginning with the 3-year delay between project approval in June 1999 and the July 2002 contract and continuing to the present day. The report add that the November 2006 goal for introduction into service is unlikely to be achievable. ANAO report | Jane’s

July 15/02: Australia’s Liberal Party government announces an A$ 400 million (then about $223.5 million) contract with Tenix Defence Land Division to upgrade 350 M113 tracked armored fighting vehicles to M113-AS4 configuration. Imag Australia Ltd. Pty release.

June 2002: The M113 Major Upgrade Project is approved at a cost of A$ 552 million (ANAO figure).

Additional Readings and Sources

• Australian DMO – LAND 106 – M113 Upgrade Project

• Australia DMO – Large-Scale Projects: Upgrade of M-113 Armoured Vehicles LAND 106

• ANAO (May 24/12) – Upgrade of the M113 Fleet of Armoured Vehicles

• ANAO (March 27/09) – Management of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier Upgrade Project

• ANAO (July 28/05) – Management of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier Upgrade Project

• Digger History – “The Tracks”: A Digger’s Best Heavy Metal. Includes history of the M113 in Australian service.

• Australian DoD, Team Australia – Mackay Defence Technologies: armoured vehicles – vibration and noise isolation (APC floor mats)

• Jane’s – BAE Systems Australia one-man turret for M113 APC upgrades (Australia), AFV turrets and cupola

• Army: The Soldiers Newspaper (#1169, June 28/07) – Now that’s better. Discusses firing trials of the new electric turret.

• Army: The Soldiers Newspaper (Ed. 1151, July 27/06) – A fitting display. Discusses the M113-AS4 FV and ARVL.

• Army: The Soldiers Newspaper (#1135) – New M113 on track

Latest updates: USAF to use RQ-11Bs at bases worldwide. RQ-11B Raven
(click to view full)

The RQ-11 Raven is a 4.2-pound, backpackable, hand-launched UAV that provides day and night, real-time video imagery for “over the hill” and “around the corner” reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.

Each Raven system typically consists of 3 aircraft, 2 ground control stations, system spares, and related services. The digital upgrades are still designated RQ-11Bs, but they enable a given area to include more Ravens, with improved capabilities. The secret? Using L-band spectrum more efficiently.

• Ravin’ bout Ravens: Current Models, and Proposed Upgrades
  
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
  
• Additional Readings
  

Ravin’ bout Ravens Raven in the field

The Raven has received positive reviews from Army units in the field. The basic RQ-11 “Raven B” has a wingspan of 4.5 feet, weighs 4.2 pounds when taken out of its backpack and assembled. The hand-launched UAV includes a color electro-optical camera, or an infrared camera for night operations. The UAV operates just 100-500 feet off the ground, which removes many airspace “deconfliction” and clearance issues. Traveling at 30-60 mph on its quiet electric motor and lithium-ion batteries, it can fly for about 60-90 minutes. Line-of-sight control range is about 6.2 miles.

The man-portable Raven system features 3 UAVs, a ground control unit, a remote video terminal, transit cases and support equipment.

With respect to the digital upgrade, Commenting about the digital upgrades in National Defense magazine, Col. Gregory Gonzalez, project manager of the Army’s unmanned aerial system (UAS) program, said:

“This allows us to have more capable and faster processing for better payloads. By using the frequency spectrum in [the L-band] more efficiently, we will be able to [fly] up to 16 Ravens in a specific geographical area, as opposed to just four.”

The digital upgrade also includes greater communication security through signal encryption. The analog Ravens have come under scrutiny because they send unencrypted video signals that could be intercepted by insurgents equipped with a laptop computer, reports the Associated Press.

The Raven system can be flown manually or autonomously through set way-points with options of either a daylight or infrared camera. Over 3,000 Ravens have already been deployed to US forces for use in light infantry Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) and dismounted warfare.

Full funding for the digital upgrade order was provided by a US Department of Defense supplemental funding bill. Deliveries of the Raven digital systems and kits began in October 2009.

Beyond the “digital Raven” project, Col. Gonzalez’s office is proposing adding 2 new sizes of UAV: 1 that would be smaller than the current 4.5 feet long, 4.2 pound RQ-11B, and 1 that would be larger. All 3 sizes would use the same controller and frequency, and would link into the Army’s “One System” remote video terminal. The proposal still needs to be approved by the Army leadership.

Contracts and Key Events RQ-11: higher, faster…
(click to view full)

Unless otherwise indicated, AeroVironment in Simi Valley, CA is the contractor.

August 1/16: As part of the European Reassurance Initiative package, Ukraine has received 24 RQ-11B Raven UAV systems from the US. The hand-launched reconnaissance and surveillance tool are being given to help increase and modernize Ukrainian security efforts amid ongoing violence in the country’s eastern regions. More than $600 million has been made available by the US for training and equipment to help Kiev better defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Oct 5/11: A $6.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for new USAF Raven systems, and Initial Spares Packages. USAF Security Forces plan to employ Raven systems to enhance situational awareness and security at bases worldwide. This initial order will provide training systems for USAF personnel, as a precursor to broader deployment.

Work will be performed in Simi Valley, CA, with an estimated completion date of Feb 29/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-11-C-0055). See also Aerovironment.

Sept 8/11: Aerovironment announces a $15.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract order to support US Army Raven systems over “the next several months.”

May 25/11: AeroVironment, Inc. in Monrovia, CA receives an $8.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for 67 Army Digital Data Link Raven Systems and 67 Army Raven Digital Data Link spares packages.

Work will be performed in Simi Valley, CA, with an estimated completion date of May 14/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received, by the U.S. Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-11-C-0055). The U.S. Army continues toward its total acquisition objective of 2,358 systems (7,074 UAVs), though that may rise. See also Aerovironment release.

April 20/11: The US Army currently equips each brigade with 15 RQ-11B Raven systems, but the 9 Afghan BCTs want to raise that to 35 each (105 UAVs). They’re also shipping larger Puma-AE UAV systems into theater, with 64 in and another 20 requested. So what’s the problem? Training.

Right now, the US FAA requires Federal Aviation Administration must issue a certificate of authorization, in order to fly UAVs in US air space. There are limits to that requirement, but it takes months to get that certification, and it’s hurting operator training. Commanders are complaining that some operators lack adequate pre-combat preparation, and must learn on the job.

In response, the US Army has instituted a buddy program, a tracking program for operators, and a ground-based technical solution. Under the buddy program, skilled mini-UAV operators will teach other soldiers. The web tracker will make sure that qualified operators don’t get lost in the shuffle when they move from one brigade to another. The technical solution involves a ground-based sense-and-avoid system that may help expedite FAA certification. NDIA’s National Defense Magazine.

April 12/11: A $14.8 million order for 248 US Army digital Raven UAV retrofit kits. Work is scheduled to be completed by December 2011, and will be performed at Simi Valley, CA, with an estimated completion date of Oct 9/12. One bid was solicited with one received. by the US Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-05-0338). See also Aervironment release.

Feb 4/11: Aviation Week reports that the US Army wants to beef up UAV availability down to the platoon level, in an environment where, as Army Operations Office aviation UAS director Lt. Col. James Cutting puts it, “there will never be enough multi-million-dollar systems to cover them.” Where now there are 17 RQ-11 Ravens in a brigade combat team (BCT), the Army plans to increase this to 49 “Small UAS family of systems”, initially made up of AeroVironment’s Puma AE at the high end, RQ-11B Raven as the core, and smaller Wasp III as the true “flying binoculars” micro UAV.

Down the road, this set is expected to be a competition, and the numbers involved make it an attractive target. According to Cutting, the Army will push the new UAVs directly down to engineer, armor and infantry units , rather than forming more aviation units and adding their overhead. Since the UAVs in question are so small, and fly at under 1,000 feet, they can be used without worrying about “deconfliction,” and don’t really require the same planning & support overhead as, for instance, a unit of RQ-7B Shadows, or MQ-1C Gray Eagles. Aviation Week | Aviation Week Ares.

Jan 27/11: A $7.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 919 U.S. Marine Corps Raven Module 2 upgrade sets. The upgrade kits allow digital RQ-11B Ravens to operate using a different frequency band than the stock configuration. Funding was appropriated in the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act.

Work will be performed in Simi Valley, CA, with an estimated completion date of April 30/11. Even though they’re for the Marines, 1 bid was solicited with 1 bid received by the U.S. Army AMCOM Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-05-C-0338). See also Aerovironment.

Dec 28/10: A $46.2 million order for 123 new digital Raven UAV systems and spares, as well as 186 digital retrofit kits for the USMC and 339 digital retrofit kits for the US Army. The order represents the remainder of funds appropriated for the Raven systems procured in the FY 2010 DoD appropriations. Work is expected to be completed within a year. AeroVironment release

May 10/10: An $11.2 million firm-fixed-price contract, exercising and finalizing a not-to-exceed FY 2010 option for up to 113 full rate production Raven systems, 113 Raven initial spare packages, and Raven engineering services. This effort procures 63 Raven systems; 63 Raven initial spare packages plus Raven engineering services, and logistics support for the family of systems proof of principle effort. The latter appears to be Col. Gonzalez’ “3 sizes” approach.

Work will be performed in Simi Valley, CA, with an estimated completion date of Jan 30/11. U.S. Army Contracting Command, CCAM-AR-A at Redstone Arsenal, AL is the contractor (W58RGZ-05-C-0338). See also Aerovironment release.

April 12/10: A $12.3 million order for 216 retrofit kits to upgrade existing analog Ravens to digital data link capabilities. Aerovironment release.

April 6/10: A $6.8 million firm-fixed-price contract exercises a priced option for 51 US Marine Corps RQ-11B systems with digital data links plus 51 initial spares packages and contractor logistics support.

Work is to be performed in Simi Valley, CA, with an estimated completion date of March 29/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command/CCAM-AR-A at Redstone Arsenal, AlL (W58RGZ-05-C-0338).

Feb 23/10: AeroVironment in Monrovia, CA announces that it received firm fixed-price orders valued at $20.7 million for digital Raven UAVs and digital retrofit kits, and $17.1 million for Raven system spare parts, repairs and training services for the US Army and US Marine Corps. The Raven system and retrofit order represents a portion of the $121 million appropriated for RQ-11 Raven system procurement in the FY 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. The items and services provided under these awards are scheduled to be delivered over the next 12 months.

Dec 21/09: AeroVironment in Monrovia, CA announces that it recieved a $23.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to supply digital RQ-11 Raven hand-held UAVs and digital kits to upgrade existing analog RQ-11s being used by the US Army and US Marine Corps. If all options are exercised, the potential value of the contract modification is $66.6 million.

Additional Readings

• Aerovironment – UAS: Raven

• USAF Fact Sheet – RQ-11B Raven

• Army Technology – RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aircraft System, USA

• Designation Systems – AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven

• DID – Handling UAV-Generated Huge Data Volumes

• U.S. Department of Defense (Nov 9/10) – Armed with Science. Describes how Spartans (U.S Army 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team) employed the Raven system to reduce enemy attacks on U.S. forces.

• National Defense Magazine (November 2009) – Army to Expand Raven Family of Unmanned Aircraft

• DID (Feb 24/05) – Raven UAV Draws Raves from the Field

Americas

• Competitors involved in the upcoming T-X program will have the opportunity to score bonus points according to a draft request for proposals (RFP) by the USAF. The inclusion comes as part of an incentive by the service to push manufacturers to exceed the threshold requirements in certain performance areas. For example, the minimum requirement is for the jet to pull 6.5g in a turn. Exceeding the specification by each 0.1g will earn a bonus point, with a cap at 7.5g. This system will, in theory, edge out low cost bids.

• Two contracts are to be awarded by the USAF in 2017 for a new Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) weapons system, or ground-based strategic deterrent. On Friday, the service released a request for proposals for the replacement of the existing Minutemen III ICBMs as part of the military’s costly modernization of its atomic weapons systems. The next ten years will see up to $350 billion spent on the modernization with some analysts suggesting the costs will run in excess of $1 trillion over 30 years.

Europe

• As part of the European Reassurance Initiative package, Ukraine has received 24 RQ-11B Raven UAV systems from the US. The hand-launched reconnaissance and surveillance tool are being given to help increase and modernize Ukrainian security efforts amid ongoing violence in the country’s eastern regions. More than $600 million has been made available by the US for training and equipment to help Kiev better defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

• Two C-23B+ Super Sherpa transport aircraft due to be inducted into the Estonian Air Force have been dropped by the authorities. The two were offered on a free transfer by the US back in 2014, however are no longer deemed necessary to the service’s needs. First used by the USAF in 1985, Estonia along with Djibouti and the Philippines were offered the aircraft as well, along with several being transferred to Alaska.

• The latest version of the Mi-28NM has been spotted at the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, with pictures capturing the attack helicopter on its first hover. In development since 2008, a prototype first flew in 2015 with further tests to continue before delivery to the Russian Defense Ministry later this year. The improved version comes equipped with surveillance radar, an advanced suite of optical-electronic sensors mounted in the new nose turret, and a dual control system which allows the navigator-operator to operate the machine if required.

Asia Pacific

• India has finally inked a deal with Rosoboronexport to modernize ten Ka-28 naval helicopters. Valued at Rs 2,000 crore ($428.8 million), the contract will see the submarine hunting helicopters transported to Russian Helicopters’ facility in Kumertau to be overhauled to extend their life-span over the next five years. Upon return to India, new avionics will be installed.

• Japan is to upgrade their Patriot PAC-3 missile defense system with Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors with upgrades likely to begin next year. With Tokyo set to host the Olympic Games in 2020, the move represents the most significant upgrade to Japan’s missile defense system in a decade. The work will be carried out under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) who are expected to upgrade 12 batteries in the first year, another 12 the following year, with four in the subsequent twelve months.

• Kazakhstan has taken possession of their fifth of eight ordered C-295 transport aircraft from Airbus. Two were originally delivered in 2013 with options to increase to eight if necessary. The C-295 has proved a popular choice, with Airbus supplying the aircraft to over 20 international customers.

Today’s Video

The Mil Mi-28 Night Hunter:

LGM-30G Minuteman III
(click to view full)

For 50 years, land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have been part of the US primary strategic deterrence capability, the nuclear-armed triad that also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long range heavy bombers.

Although the main target for the US deterrent – the Soviet Union – imploded in 1991, other threats – such as nuclear-armed rogue states and non-state actors – have emerged. To address these new threats, the US Air Force undertook a major ICBM modernization program.

To carry out this program, the USAF awarded a 15-year ICBM Prime Integration Contract (F42610-98-C-0001) in 1997 to a team led by Northrop Grumman. Since then, the team, which includes Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and ATK, has been carrying out a major modernization of the ICBM system to ensure its readiness.

ICBM Prime Minuteman III launch

The ICBM Prime Integration Contract covers modernization of thousands of missile propulsion, guidance, re-entry, and ground system components. The goal is to extend the US Minuteman III ICBM’s life to 2030.

Some of the larger programs covered by the contract include:

• ICBM Security Modernization Program, which is implementing steps to keep nuclear-tipped ICBMs securely in their silos;

• Safety Enhanced Re-entry Vehicle (SERV) Program, which is fitting Minuteman III ICBMs with the Mk 21 re-entry vehicle from the decommissioned Peacekeeper missile force – a change that will provide US Strategic Command planners with increased targeting flexibility and enhanced safety;

• Propulsion Replacement Program, which is remanufacturing motors to replace Minuteman III’s aging propellant to maintain booster reliability;

• Guidance Replacement Program, which is substituting the NS-50 missile guidance set for aging 1960s vintage guidance electronics, improving flight reliability, system maintainability, and nuclear safety;

• Propulsion System Rocket Engine Life Extension Program, which is replacing engine components originally produced in the 1970s that had a 10-year design life;

• Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting Service Life Extension Program, which is updating ICBM command and control capability;

• Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network program, which upgraded communications in all Minuteman III launch control centers and also connected these systems to the Milstar satellite communications system; and

• Improvement to the launch control centers, accomplished through the Environmental Control System program, which is upgrading climate controls to ensure that electronics and ground support systems are maintained at specified pre-set temperatures.

Contracts and Key Events Still Ready.

Numerous contract modifications have been issued under the ICBM Prime Integration Contract (F42610-98-C-0001). Below are contract modifications covered by DID over the years. Unless otherwise noted, the contracts are awarded by Hill Air Force Base in northern Utah to Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems in Clearfield, UT.

August 1/16: Two contracts are to be awarded by the USAF in 2017 for a new Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) weapons system, or ground-based strategic deterrent. On Friday, the service released a request for proposals for the replacement of the existing Minutemen III ICBMs as part of the military’s costly modernization of its atomic weapons systems. The next ten years will see up to $350 billion spent on the modernization with some analysts suggesting the costs will run in excess of $1 trillion over 30 years.

June 8/16: The USAF has claimed it is not looking at a road-mobile option for its next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Under the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program the aging Minuteman III ICBM fleet will be replaced. Speaking about the mobile option, a service official said “We want to make sure that as we look at GBSD, we’re building it modular so if changes need to be made in the weapon system you don’t have to open up, let’s say, the software to redo the entire software.”

March 14/11: Lockheed Martin announces it received a $12.5 million contract from Northrop Grumman for refurbishment of re-entry vehicle arming and fuzing assemblies for the Minuteman III. Under the subcontract, Lockheed Martin Space System’s Valley Forge facility in King of Prussia, PA will replace components and refurbish and test the assemblies. The subcontract includes an option for a second year. Under an earlier contract in 2009, Lockheed Martin demonstrated the feasibility of the refurbishment effort. Lockheed Martin is the original equipment manufacturer for the arming and fuzing assembly.

Oct 6/10: Lockheed Martin announces it received a $106 million contract from Northrop Grumman to develop next-generation re-entry field support equipment (RFSE) for the Minuteman III. Under the 58-month contract, Lockheed Martin will design, develop, test, and deliver 2 sets of RFSE, with an additional 10 RFSE sets to be delivered in a follow-on contract. The RFSE will replace the aging Minuteman III Re-entry System Test Set (RSTS). Lockheed Martin will continue to sustain the RSTS, for which it is the original equipment manufacturer, until deployment of the replacement RFSE, which will be used, along with SERV support equipment, to test Mk12A and Mk21 re-entry vehicles.

April 19/10: $33.8 million to provide sustainment support for the Minuteman weapon system. At this time, $31.8 has been obligated.

April 2/10: $15.3 million contract to provide a Minuteman enhancement reliability accelerometer engineering and feasibility study, Phase III, prototype phase. At this time, $10.9 million has been obligated.

Dec 24/09: A $16.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for the exercise of options 12 and 13 for the Propulsion System Rocket Engine Life Extension Program.

Nov 19/09: A $31.1 million contract modification to provide for the Remote Visual Assessment Program in support of the ICBM Security Modernization Program.

Dec 21/06: A $53.1 million fixed-price-incentive-firm and cost-plus-award fee contract modification, exercising option 1 to continue upgrading the Environmental Control System for the Minuteman III ICBM system. Work is expected to be complete October 2008.

Nov 1/06: A $225.2 million cost-plus-fixed fee, cost-plus-incentive fee contract modification to remanufacture Stage 1, 2, and 3 rockets motors and offer product quality assurance test support. The contractor will provide 75 complete booster components sets (one each Stage 1, 2 and 3 motors and an ordnance kit) and 2 product quality assurance test motors.

April 6/06: A $34.8 million cost-plus incentive-fee contract modification to begin to provide for full rate production of Minuteman III Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicles (SERV) on US ICBMs. The scheduled completion date is March 2010.

March 17/06: A $7.7 million fixed price incentive (firm target) award fee, firm-fixed price contract modification for Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) full rate production (FRP) Value Engineering Change Proposal 01-OPIC-030 and 01-IPIC-0009.

March 17/06: A $25 million fixed price incentive firm with award fee contract modification. This contract will provide environmental control system units, deployment activities, and interim contractor support to upgrade the launch facilities and missile alert facilities at the 3 US ICBM missile wings. Work is expected to be complete October 2007.

Jan 19/06: A $225.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-award-fee contract modification for ICBM Propulsion Replacement Program. Full Rate Production (FRP) options FRP5, FRP6, and FRP7 restructure modification for 212 stage 1, 2 and 3 rocket motors, production quality assurance, ordnance production, and contractor cost data reports.

Sept 20/05: A $122.7 million cost plus award fee contract modification to exercise option VIII for the ICBM Prime Integrated Contract to support the Minuteman ICBM. Work on the contract will be complete by September 2006.

June 20/05: A $5.9 million cost-plus award-fee contract modification to ensure that US ICBM Reentry Vehicles (which carry nuclear warheads) remain functional until retirement and that an industrial base exists to support replacement follow-on systems. Work is expected to be complete by June 2007.

May 19/05: A $24 million cost-plus award-fee contract modification to provide for ICBM Security Modernization Program Fast Rising B-Plug Low Rate Initial Production; 15 B-Plug Kits and 6 B-Plug Kit Installations will be produced under this contract modification. Work is expected to be complete by September 2007.

Additional Readings

• DID (Nov 19/09) – No Dr. Strangelove Here: USAF Takes Steps to Beef Up ICBM Security

• DID (Dec 21/06) – $53.1M for Minuteman III ECS Upgrades

• DID (Nov 1/06) – $225.2M to Remanufacture Minuteman III Rocket Motors

• DID (April 6/06) – SERV Program for “Safety Enhanced” Nuclear Warhead RVs Enters Full-Rate Production

• DID (March 17/06) – $32.7M to N-G as Part of US ICBM Refurbishment

• DID (Jan 19/06) – US Spends $225.2M for 212 ICBM Rocket Motors

• DID (Sept 20/05) – MX Missiles Deactivated, Minutemen at the Ready (updated)

• DID (June 20/05) – $5.9M to Keep ICBM Warheads Operational

• DID (May 19/05) – $24M for ICBM Security Doors

• DID (April 11/05) – $7M to Upgrade ICBM Readiness Testing

Mi-28N with MMR
(click to view full)

In August 2012, Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev pledged that the state would buy 60 Mi-28UB attack and training helicopters by 2020. That would be good news for the VVS, as well as the Rosvertol plant at Rostov on Don.

Russia is slowly modernizing its military, and its attack helicopter force is one of the areas being given priority. New Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-28N Night Hunter machines are beginning to replace the VVS’ 240 or so old Mi-24 gunships, but training has been an issue for the nascent Mi-28 fleet.

The Mi-28 Attack Helicopter Aerobatics video

Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 places the VVS’ Mi-28N inventory at 51 machines, with another 19 on order. The new Mi-28UB model, introduced in 2013, includes an enlarged cockpit for the instructor, and a larger canopy for the pilot. It can be flown from either the pilot’s cockpit or the second seat, and it retains full attack helicopter functionality.

Implementation of Bondarev’s promise would give Russia 130 Mi-28s by 2020, alongside 140+ Ka-52s. That would more than replace the current Mi-24 Hind fleet, and Russia has also ordered 60+ modernized Mi-35M Hinds to help fill in the gaps.

The Mi-28N is most often compared to the American AH-64, as it shares the same basic heavily-armed attack helicopter layout. The specifications above illustrate some of the basic differences between the 2 machines, but the bigger differences relate to concept of employment, and are reflected in harder to see areas like onboard electronics.

Russia is the largest Mi-28 operator, with 70 machines delivered or on order. Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 also lists 16 Mi-28s ordered by Kenya, with 5 delivered, and Iraq is reportedly in the process of buying about 30 Mi-28NEs. If a deal is done, the Iraqi helicopters’ configuration may serve as a proxy for assessing the state of the platform’s development.

Rosvertol stated in a June 6/10 investors announcement that Algeria had expressed interest in up to 42 machines, and that became a contract in December 2013. Iraq has also purchased 15, and a Rostvertol report cited serious prospects in Egypt, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

India trialed the Mi-28N against the AH-64D, and chose the American helicopter in 2011. Indian media reported that the AH-64D displayed better maneuverability, more multi-role capability, and better capacity to accept upgrades.

Contracts & Key Events Mi-28UB, 1st flight
(click to view full)

The Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant developed the Mi-28N Night Hunter, and they’ve been produced at the Rosvertol aviation plant since 2005.

August 1/16: The latest version of the Mi-28NM has been spotted at the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, with pictures capturing the attack helicopter on its first hover. In development since 2008, a prototype first flew in 2015 with further tests to continue before delivery to the Russian Defense Ministry later this year. The improved version comes equipped with surveillance radar, an advanced suite of optical-electronic sensors mounted in the new nose turret, and a dual control system which allows the navigator-operator to operate the machine if required.

April 26/16: Russia has placed an order for 24 Mi-28UB attack and two 26 transport helicopters. Contracts were signed between Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Berisov and Director General of Russian Helicopters Alexander Mikheyev. The Mi-28 are to be the first procured to come with dual controls and improved flight crew ergonomics. Improvements to the helicopter come as the Russian military aims to improve combat training speeds for crews alongside increasing the helicopter’s operability, safety and combat capabilities.

June 12/14: Rostvertol report. Rosvertol’s 2013 annual report contains a number of interesting details regarding its orders. Deliveries to Russia are confirmed at 14 Mi-28Ns and 1 Mi-28UB. Evidence is conflicting, but the report also cites a 2013 prototype launch for the of Mi-28UB OP-1, and the helicopter and its and its mast mounted radar enclosure are photographed.

Iraq [foreign customer K-8] has its October 2012 order confirmed at 15 machines, and Algeria [foreign customer 012] is confirmed to have ordered 42 Mi-28NE attack helicopters on Dec 26/13. That Mi-28NE order makes them the type’s 2nd export customer after Iraq (15), but they are the largest. Other serious prospects include Egypt [customer 818], Turkmenistan [customer 795], and Uzbekistan [customer 860].

The report adds that Mi-28s have been having problems with increased vibration in the main gearbox. They decided to continue operations with an upgraded set of main gears in the 1st stage. Sources: Rostvertol PLC, “Annual Report ‘Rosvertol’, ZA2013 Year | LiveJournal bmpd [in Russian, incl. photos].

Dec 25/13: Russian Helicopters JSC announces that:

"The Mi-28N Night Hunter combat helicopter, made by Russian Helicopters a subsidiary of Oboronprom and part of State Corporation Rostec, has officially entered into service with the Russian Defence Ministry under an order signed by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu."

This is a formality. The Russians have of course been flying them for several years now, and the Mi-28N has served as the mount for Russia's Golden Eagles (Berkuty) helicopter aerobatics team since 2012. Sources: Russian Helicopters, "Mi-28N Night Hunter helicopter enters into service with the Russian Defence Ministry".

Aug 10/13: Mi-28UB. Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev says that they intend to buy 60 Mi-28UB helicopters by 2020, with a dual training and attack role. The intent is "4-6 [Mi-28UB] helicopters for each unit that has Mi-28N in service," allowing in-unit training while retaining combat power. Source: RIA Novosti, "Russian Air Force to Get 60 Mi-28UB Helicopters by 2020".

Aug 9/13: 1st flight. The Mi-28UB training and attack helicopter conducts its official maiden demonstration flight at the Rostvertol subsidiary in Rostov-on-Don. That plant manufactures Mi-28NE and Mi-35M attack helicopters, as well as Mi-26T super-heavy transport helicopters. The Mi-28UB model is distinguished from the Mi-28N by its dual pilot controls, in order to allow for training.

The Mi-28UB's next destination will be the Zhukovsky airfield near Moscow, for its public unveiling during MAKS 2013. Source: Russian Helicopters JSC Aug 9/13 release.

Dec 26/12: Mi-28NM. A Russian air force (VVS) official says that draft tactical and technical specifications for a modernized Mi-28NM have passed preliminary approval by VVS General Command. A commission on modernization of the Mi-28N had been set up in 2009.

The question is what might be in that modernization. The VK-2500-02 engine could be switched for the VK-2500-03 used in the Ka-52K, which has slightly higher maximum power. There have been some external questions regarding the operational readiness of the type's Arbalets mast-mounted radar, which is seen very rarely on photos of deployed helicopters, so improvements in that area are another possibility. Another obvious improvement area would involve communications technologies, and there's always room for improving an attack helicopter's weapons array. It will be interesting to see what choices they make. Source: RIA.RU [in Russian].

Nov 15/12: Deliveries. Interfax-AVN reports that Russia's Western Military District received 20 Mi-28N helicopters this year, and expects about 20 more in 2013. Deliveries are clearly picking up. Source: Russian Helicopters JSC.

June 2012: Radar. Take-off magazine reports that the helicopter's Arbalets radar may have appeared in pictures for over 7 years, but it's still a work in progress:

"The mast-mounted radar being developed for the Mi-28N by the Ryazan State Instrument-Making Plant cleared a number of test hurdles this spring. In March, the radar's interdepartmental performance tests were completed... April 2013 saw the completion of the radar-equipped Mi-28N's preliminary trials in the Moscow Region and the release of the acceptance report recommending the radar's employment as part of production-standard helicopters of the type. The last hurdle remaining is the joint special flight tests of the helicopter equipped with the radar. Depending on the outcome of the tests, a decision will be made to launch the radar's production.... Concurrently, the radar's export version, designated as N025E, is being developed to equip the Mi-28NE export model..."

Feb 15/11: Grounded. The VVS reportedly grounds its Mi-28 fleet after a crash near Starvopol kills the pilot. Source: Washington Post [dead link].

Additional Readings Background: Helicopter

• Russian Helicopters JSC - Mi-28N

• Take-off (June 2012) - New Mi-28N versions in the pipeline. Also deals with the state of the Arbalets radar.

• DID (July 20/06) - Russia Commits to Multi-Year Buy of 67 Mi-28 Attack Helicopters

• DID - Baby Come Back: Iraq is Buying Russian Weapons Again. Including Mi-28NEs.

Competitors

• DID - Russia’s Ka-52 Alligator Scout-Attack Helicopters

• DID - AH-64E Apache Block III: The Once and Future Attack Helicopter

• DID - Turkey Finally Lands Its Attack Helicopters. The T129 ATAK, formerly the A129 Mangusta.

• DID - Tiger, Tamed? Eurocopter’s New EC665 HAD Helicopters

Americas

• While Canada’s government continues to flounder on its CF-18 fighter replacement, it still continues to contribute to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Since the Liberal Party’s campaign promise to ditch the F-35 and launch a new replacement competition, they continued paying $33 million into the program. Meanwhile, consultations have taken place with fighter manufacturers which some see as simply giving the Liberals political cover to buy a plane other than the F-35 without holding a competition. If a fair and free competition were to include Lockheed Martin, a fair bet would be on the F-35 winning.

• Officials from South Korea and the US have met in Washington for their first set of talks to discuss the transfer of technologies for the former’s upcoming KF-X indigenous fighter. Approval had been given for the transfer of 21 technologies as part of Seoul’s commitment to purchase 40 F-35s, however Washington refused on four core technologies, saying they would need to be developed domestically by South Korea. The meeting saw further discussion of the core technologies in question as well as technologies related to the development of the medium-altitude UAV.

• A growth in Paveway guided bomb sales has resulted in Raytheon posting better than expected quarterly revenues for 2016. The sales saw the company’s missile division posting a 6% increase in the second quarter. International sales accounted for a third of all guided munitions with half of exports coming from governments in the Middle East and Africa.

Middle East North Africa

• The Israeli Air Force has announced that its first F-35I “Adir” fighter has flown in the USA and the flight of a second jet is expected shortly. A pilot from lead manufacturer Lockheed Martin will conduct a number of further tests prior to the fighters’ delivery to Israel on December 12. As with its existing fleets of F-15 and F-16s, Israeli F-35As will be heavily customized to suit the IAF’s needs.

Europe

• Despite Bexit, a falling Pound Sterling and a whole lot of uncertainty, BAE Systems has claimed recent events have not resulted in a short-term impact on their business. The company’s statement comes as it rolls out first-half results that show a small rise in revenues compared to 2015. Overall company revenues continued to be dominated by the US with 36 percent of revenues in the first half. Britain and Saudi Arabia remain the company’s other major markets.

Asia Pacific

• Plans for October? Mitsubishi’s X-2 stealth demonstrator is to go on public display at Gifu Air Base, Japan, on October 30. This will be one of the first times regular punters can get up close and personal with the new jet following its maiden flight in April. For those rushing to check those dates, authorities have advised to leave the cars at home and come via rail.

• The Indian government has backtracked on a plan to procure six A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) aircraft for the Indian Air Force. This marks the second time that India has scrapped the aircraft’s tender which is estimated at $2 billion. But Airbus, already in the midst of financial hits due to its A400M transporter, seems to be remaining confident with an official saying the company “will engage with the Indian government in finding a way to bring the A330 MRTT’s capabilities to the IAF.”

• Negotiations continued regarding the modernization of 194 Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft operated by the Indian Air Force. A visiting delegation from Russia came to New Delhi to explain their “Super Sukhoi” concept, which if implemented, will give the aircraft near-fifth generation capabilities and effectiveness. With the deal expected to be finalized within four to six months, the project is expected to top $8 billion.

Today’s Video

India’s Super Sukhoi upgrade:

CF-18, 20-year colors
(click to view full)

Canada’s 138 “CF-18s” were delivered between 1982-1988, but accidents and retirements have reduced the fleet to about 103, with only 79 upgraded F/A-18 AM/BM Hornets still operational. The CF-18s are expected to be phased out between 2017 – 2023. Maintenance and upgrades will remain necessary until then, and possibly beyond.

Canada has been an active Tier 3 partner in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, participating in both the Concept Demonstration Phase ($10 million) and the System Development and Demonstration Phase ($150 million). This USD $160 million has included funding from both the Department of National Defence, and from Technology Partnerships Canada (TPC). In the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development Phase of the F-35 program, it is estimated that Canada’s contribution will exceed C$ 550 million (about the same in USD) over 44 years. As of September 2011, the government had disbursed about C$ 335 million toward participation in the JSF Program, and related support to Canadian industry.

Now, 65 new CF-35As are Canada’s official choice to replace its Hornets – and estimates of the cost range from $17 billion to $45.8 billion. This article covers efforts to keep existing CF-18s fit for service, as well as Canada’s replacement fighter buy. As timelines continue to slip, these 2 programs have become more interdependent – and the F-35’s selection less certain.

Canada and the F-35 Timelines: The F-35’s, and Canada’s

Here’s the timeline as it has unfolded so far, along with Canada’s plans out to 2050. The timeline will change, but it’s unlikely to move F-35 fielding up to an earlier date. That’s a problem, because the CF-18s have a limited number of hours for safe flight, and they will reach those limits soon. Any delays to the F-35s will either raise costs again by forcing a major refurbishment of Canada’s CF-18s, or leave Canada with serious gaps in its fighter fleet.

(click to view full) From Canada’s OAG, 2012
(click to view full) F-35: Canadian Industrial Partners

The F-35 has been designed on 3 levels: operational, industrial, and political. The tiered partnership model created initial commitments by member governments, and a sub-contracting model that spread industrial benefits among committed partners was designed to create constituencies that would lobby for the F-35’s selection and production.

That approach has generally worked. It isn’t a coincidence that these industrial benefits have been the main defense used by Canadian governments whenever the F-35 purchase has been questioned, even though any other winner would also have to commit to a similar sort of arrangement. Existing recipients of public money will always fight harder, because the beneficiaries of any switch are only potential winners, who haven’t made big commitments that would be painful to undo. This political engineering approach saved the Dutch F-35 buy in the face of determined political opposition, even though the plane’s cost is forcing them to cut their planned fighter fleet by almost 2/3. Canada seems headed for a similar fate, and their industrial participants include:

According to the government’s Industry Canada, contracts as of summer 2013 totaled C$ 503 million, while total future contracts are estimated at C$ 9.429 billion: C$ 8.261 billion if existing contracts are extended over the scheduled number of fighters, plus another C$ 1.168 billion in identified production & service opportunities.

Given the sharp order cuts we’re seeing in even Tier 2 partners like Britain and the Netherlands, and the USA’s long-term fiscal situation, Lockheed Martin might be lucky to produce half of the expected number of F-35s. Lockheed Martin would argue that one can only publish official figures using official estimates, and they’d have a point, but an honest debate can’t be blind to reality. This is a dilemma for all F-35 partners, and it needs to be kept in mind when reading estimates of the program’s long-term industrial value.

A Word on Stealth The Stealthy Mosquito F-35A & F-22A
(click to view full)

Military discussion in Canada has been almost non-existent, beyond hand-waving and the grossest generalizations. The strategic requirements for new fighters, and whether the choices available can do those jobs at acceptable cost, doesn’t much concern Canada’s governing class. Such references as have been made generally revolve around the need for stealth, without explaining the concept.

The thing to remember is that stealth isn’t invisibility, just a shorter detection distance. To use a very simplified and very Canadian analogy, a mosquito will have to be a lot closer to you before you’ll see it, compared to a sparrow. Hence all those “surprise” bites, as they exploit the gaps in your perception and get in close enough to strike. They aren’t invisible, though you might swear otherwise at times. On the other hand, if you use other parts of the spectrum by employing your ears, even a tiny mosquito can be detected at uncomfortably long distances in a quiet room.

That’s just the beginning of your problem, of course. Awareness must be followed by pinpointing and tracking its location, and then it must come within your killing range.

It’s basically the same sequence for enemy systems. A fighter can survive by defeating any one link in the detection – tracking – reach – kill chain. Stealth complicates all 3 areas, shortening detection ranges, making tracking more difficult, and frustrating or weakening final stage radar guided missile locks.

Other manufacturers are correct when they respond that modern jets without the stealth marketing have much better radar cross sections that Canada’s existing CF-18s. Even so, the CF-35’s stealth will be a step beyond other fighters on offer to Canada, albeit a step below the USAF’s F-22A Raptors and F-35s. The thing is, modern fighters, missiles, and radars have been making their own parallel improvements over the last decade. To the point where even the F-35’s ability to prevail against high-end enemy air defense systems, and against fighters fielded after 2030, is a matter of controversy.

Design Choices: America vs. Europe Eurofighter & Meteor
(click to view full)

The Americans had better hope that stealth continues to work in practice. They’ve placed their entire future fighter bet on stealth, and are paying the accompanying financial and operational costs.

The Europeans, in contrast, looked askance at the added construction and maintenance costs of stealth, and at the huge expense of aerodynamic changes once a stealth design is set. They opted instead for radar cross-section reduction that stopped short of full stealth, plus high kinematic performance. Advanced electronic warfare and defensive systems integrated into the planes, non-standard sensors like Infra-Red Search & Track, and long-reach weapons like the Meteor air-to-air missile and stealthy cruise missiles, would all improve protection in other ways.

Who is right?

The answer to this question is very consequential to Canada, but it’s hard to say at this point, because the respective approaches haven’t been fully tested against top-end enemy systems. American stealth worked very well against Iraq, twice. Modern European fighters were more than sufficient over Libya in 2011, however; and the stealthless Israelis sliced through dense Syrian air defenses in 2007, using planning, jammming, and well-chosen weapons to destroy a nuclear reactor.

If stealth remains fully or mostly relevant, even as a matter of faith rather than proof, Europe’s high-end jets will be unable to compete with American stealth fighters. Worse, the F-35’s full-rate production costs beyond 2020 would make it lethal in export competitions.

On the other hand, if jamming keeps pace, or if stealth’s advantages can be beaten or watered down, the European approach can create cheaper planes with better aerodynamic performance.

Changing the Game? PIRATE IRST:
B-2, ICU
(click to view full)

Right now, modern ground radars are lengthening the ranges at which stealth aircraft can be detected, and AESA fighter radars are getting better. Those trends will continue, but neither will invalidate stealth on its own. With that said, there are at least 2 key technologies that could significantly change stealth design’s cost:benefit ratio.

Infrared Search & Track (IRST) systems on planes like the Eurofighter and Rafale, on the F-35 itself, and on most Russian-designed fighters, already offers a potential alternative to radar in aerial engagements. The B-2 picture above was taken by a Eurofighter’s PIRATE IRST system, and used in a presentation to the Norwegian government. The mechanics of fuel circulation in the F-35 are intended to make heat-based lock-ons harder to achieve, and there are pilot-activated additives that can even frustrate locks from tailpipe exhaust, but processors will continue to improve, and so will infrared detection arrays. IRST will remain a potent and improving solution for detection and location, and the mere friction of an airplane cutting through the atmosphere at high speed is very hard to hide completely.

The greatest long-term threat to stealth is probably a combination of “passive” radars that collect input from wider slices of the spectrum. They’d need to be paired with ever-expanding processing power that can separate anomalies from the clutter by collating multiple input types, and with networked analysis that collates multiple sensor systems. Early research and tests have begun in this area, courtesy of firms like Saab and EADS.

Canada’s Choice Does Canada Have a Plan B? Canadian Parliament
(click to view larger)

At present, it does not. One could even say that it took until 2013 for the government to offer a Plan A.

There’s an argument that Canada has no strategic need for a fighter in the F-35’s class, and might be better off spending the same amount of money on the same number of cheaper 4+ generation fighters, plus assets like MQ-9 UAVs that would deploy abroad with its troops, maritime patrol aircraft to improve surveillance, etc. To date, however, Canada’s military, governments, and media have all diligently avoided a strategic discussion that could separate, evaluate, and prioritize spending options. Instead, the debate has revolved around economic concerns, and the military’s wants.

A rigid and secretive procurement system has only exacerbated these tendencies. In the wake of the 20+ year rolling fiasco of its Maritime Helicopter Program competition, multi-billion dollar, single-source buys have characterized almost all Canadian defense procurements over the last 5-7 years. Canada’s choice of the F-35 has been no different, and the only real debate has taken place in the realm of federal elected politics. Opposition critics have cited significant cost uncertainties for the F-35, the shift toward UAVs, and the availability of cheaper aircraft on the global market as reasons to avoid a sole-source purchase. In its place, they’ve alternated between favoring an open fighter competition with public criteria, and making noises about avoiding a fighter buy altogether.

A 2011 election seemed likely to decide the issue, and the F-35 became a campaign topic. The results were indeed decisive, as the governing Conservative Party finally won its long-sought majority.

F-35A: open doors
(click to view full)

That result left the F-35 with a number of elements in its favor.

One is the structure of the Canadian Parliamentary system, in which a majority government has no meaningful checks and balances. If the current majority Conservative Party government wants a plane, it can force the sale through, easily. The Conservatives in particular will bear little political cost for doing so, because they have become the only party in the country with serious security credentials. The national security constituency largely lives within that party, and will be happy that something is being done after decades of neglect. The rest of the population isn’t overly interested. The Liberal Party found this out to their sorrow when they tried to make the F-35 an election issue in 2011, and watched the attempt fizzle. They had a solid case, but the messenger had no credibility with people who were interested in the issue.

Another point in the F-35’s favor is its industrial program. It’s working as intended, by creating industrial constituencies with a strong interest in keeping the purchase. The power of that constituency is partly offset by the fact that Boeing, Canada’s largest aerospace player, is on the other side of the dispute. But only partly. Organizations billing actual dollars will always fight harder that those who might benefit at some future date. Which is why the F-35’s industrial benefits are the current focus of the government’s F-35 defense.

A third point in the Lightning’s favor is the commitment of senior DND members, who have gone public with a very absolute commitment. Never mind the fact that this commitment seems to mask some shoddy work underneath. In that circumstance, there’s little alternative to a no-compromise stonewall defense, until and unless senior leadership at DND changes.

Average flyaway cost estimates
(click to view full)

Barring a reversal in the next elections, therefore, only a large external shock can change Canada’s commitment to the F-35A. The F-35 program is busy providing that, as costs continue to rise, and major partner countries like the USA, Britain and Italy move to delay or cut their buys. Those moves will keep the plane at lower rates of production for a longer period of time, which makes each plane more expensive.

Unfortunately, Canada wants to begin replacing its CF-18s by 2017 – 2018. Which means that it needs to place an initial order by 2014 – 2015. The net effect is a fighter whose purchase costs are uncertain, but are clearly set to stay very high in the near term. Worse, at the time of purchase, the operating and maintenance outlays that comprise 2/3 of total lifecycle costs will be extremely vague.

The Harper government’s response has been to insist that the procurement budget is C$ 9 billion, period, and higher prices will just mean fewer planes bought. At some point, however, a low enough number of planes bought makes it impossible for them to cover their assigned missions. Canada’s air force is already close to that margin in asking for just 65 aircraft, in order to cover the 2nd largest country in the world and participate in international missions.

Politically, a “wait and see” strategy makes a lot of sense under these circumstances. Which is exactly what we’re seeing. Statements by ministers like Julian Fantino telegraphed that approach, without changing Canada’s underlying commitment. Perhaps some sort of “group buy” approach by the partners will bring purchase costs down, or program news may improve. If so, the purchase goes forward easily.

If the math continues to look grim, on the other hand, the difficult decisions can always be made later. The government’s shift of program leadership to the Public Works ministry, following a scathing 2012 auditor’s report, makes backtracking easier. The 1st real indication of cracks in the facade didn’t come until November 2012, when the government backed away from DND’s original tailored-for-F-35 fighter requirements. Would it matter?

What If… Potential Competitors EA-18G & F/A-18F
(click to view full)

The F-35 offers Canada the best stealth, the most advanced array of on-board sensors, and the best “user interface” for presenting all that information to its pilots. Strategy has been absent from all Canadian discussions, so if Canada is forced away from its commitment to the F-35, it’s going to be a decision driven by costs. Handicapping for any prospective replacement needs to reflect that.

The strongest competitor would be Boeing, with its twin-engine F/A-18E/F Super Hornet family. Its F-15E Strike Eagle family is arguably a far better fit for Canada’s military needs, but the Super Hornet is significantly cheaper at about USD$ 60 million flyaway cost, and offers perceived continuity with the existing CF-18 fleet. A Super Hornet buy also offers long-term commonality with the US Navy, ensuring that upgrades and improvements will be financed outside of Canada.

Australia also flies the Super Hornet, and a 3rd option would be for Canada to take a leaf from their playbook, buying a mix of Super Hornets and F-35As. Australia is about to take the next step in their approach, and fit out 12 RAAF Super Hornets as EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. That capability is unique to the Super Hornet platform, and it will always be in demand among international coalition partners. Fortunately, Canada is one of just 3-4 countries that could get EA-18G export clearance from the USA.

Eurofighter
(click to view full)

Canada’s large and remote territories have traditionally pushed their air force toward twin-engine fighters, and the Europeans offer a pair of advanced options. Of the two, EADS/BAE’s Eurofighter Typhoon has far better odds, because it’s compatible with the American weapons that Canada’s air force currently stockpiles, and is used by a number of NATO countries who will help to modernize it over time. The cockpit’s sensor fusion and voice commands got high marks from Canadian evaluators, and Libyan operations demonstrated their ability to Mach 1.2 supercruise at 40,000 feet with air-to-air weapons mounted. On the industrial front, Eurofighter’s connections with firms like Airbus and Thales offer it a good starting point to fulfill industrial offset requirements.

The Eurofighter’s flip side includes a cost that’s at or above current totals for the F-35A. It also has a very limited set of integrated weapons, with significant gaps in key areas like suppression of enemy air defenses and naval attack. Fortunately for Eurofighter, Canada’s arsenal is pretty basic, but the cost issue won’t go away as easily. Based on sales to date, Eurofighter costs are comfortably above USD$ 100 million. That will make it difficult for them to position themselves as a better deal than Canada’s existing F-35 commitment.

Rafale with MICA
missiles, Reco-NG pod
(click to view full)

Dassault’s Rafale is a capable, combat-proven multi-role plane, but it comes with a number of problems from Canada’s point of view. Industrial presence and offsets may prove to be a challenge for Dassault, and the plane has no confirmed export sales yet, despite promising signals from India and the Middle East. Unless that promise turns into orders by the time Canada needs to make a decision, long-term modernization costs must also be a serious concern for the Rafale.

Then, there’s the question of absolute purchase cost. The Rafale was judged to be slightly cheaper than the Eurofighter by India’s evaluators, but it’s still a high-end fighter in the $100 million range. Worse, weapon incompatibilities mean that Canada would need either new stocks of missiles, or an expensive integration program. The combined purchase cost would be unlikely to beat the Eurofighter, let alone the F-35.

JAS-39 Gripen Demo
(click to view full)

Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen could certainly beat the F-35 on price. It’s compatible with Canada’s existing weapons, has the requisite cold-weather pedigree, can be bought for around $60 million, and is built for very low maintenance costs compared to competitors like Eurofighter. It’s a single-engine fighter, like the F-35, but offsets that slightly with an exceptional reliability record in service. Saab’s undeveloped industrial presence in Canada will be a challenge, but using the same GE F414 engine as the Super Hornet helps, and their international record for industrial offset programs is good. The plane is fully NATO-compatible, and earlier model JAS-39C/D Gripens already serve with NATO countries Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The Gripen’s problem is that its JAS-39E/F models won’t be available in numbers until 2023 or so, which is too late for Canada. The Swiss and Brazilians are solving a similar problem by getting leased JAS-39C/D aircraft on very attractive terms, until their more advanced JAS-39Es arrive. Sweden has cut its own active fleet size quite sharply, so there may be enough Gripens in storage to meet Canada’s needs. If not, a life extension program similar to the US Navy’s Hornet SLEP plans could keep 65 CF-18s flying for another 5 years, at a cost of about $1 billion. If the F-35’s schedule continues to slip, that may be necessary anyway.

There are reports that Saab pulled out of the competition in June 2013. Saab’s issue, if it gets an opening, is how to compete with a Super Hornet option whose production volume gives it a similar price, plus twin engines, long-term modernization assurance, local allied and expeditionary commonality, and lobbying from Canada’s biggest aerospace firm?

Contracts and Key Events 2014 – 2016

CF-18 & VVS MiG-29
(click to view full)

July 29/16: While Canada’s government continues to flounder on its CF-18 fighter replacement, it still continues to contribute to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Since the Liberal Party’s campaign promise to ditch the F-35 and launch a new replacement competition, they continued paying $33 million into the program. Meanwhile, consultations have taken place with fighter manufacturers which some see as simply giving the Liberals political cover to buy a plane other than the F-35 without holding a competition. If a fair and free competition were to include Lockheed Martin, a fair bet would be on the F-35 winning.

July 12/16: A total of five defense manufacturers have expressed an interest in supplying the replacement to Canada’s CF-18 fighters. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Eurofighter and Saab all took part in a conference call with Canadian officials last week, with Dassault planning to meet and discuss the matter at the Farnborough International Airshow this week. Lockheed, whose F-35 was dropped by the Canadian government, welcomed the meetings as a first step towards a new competition.

July 8/16: Canadian Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan has called for a return to the drawing board on Canada’s CF-18 replacement by reaching out to fighter manufacturers for consultations this summer. The news comes amid reports that Canada was going to purchase Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornets as a stop gap (or kicking the can down the road) without the new competition promised by the Liberals during the election campaign. However Sajjan refused to commit to a new competition or independent oversight raising concerns that the bold promises made to ditch the F-35 is causing a capability crisis.

May 31/16: A new sense of urgency has been injected into Canada’s CF-18 fighter replacement by Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan, saying that the issue “needs to be dealt with quickly.” Speaking at the CANSEC defence and military trade show in Ottawa last week, Sajjan didn’t forget to remind reporters that the issue was inherited from the previous government while seemingly forgetting that it was the current Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau’s promise to ditch its participation in F-35 procurement in favor of a more affordable aircraft.

June 5/14: Decision, under wraps. Reuters reports from 3 unnamed sources that Canada’s NFPS report recommended sole-sourcing the F-35, but adds that the Conservative Party government is waiting until Parliament is dismissed for the summer before announcing the decision. That’s one way to try and avoid criticism.

The next question becomes how quickly the government signs a contract. If the government buys the jets before the 2015 elections after all (q.v. April 6/14), the F-35 will become an election issue again, and this time it could hurt the Conservatives. That’s Lockheed Martin’s best situation, because high cancellation costs would likely force the next government to keep the contract in place. If the Conservative Party government doesn’t sign a contract, on the other hand, the election issue loses its bite, but the F-35 buy would be at very grave risk if the Liberal and/or NDP parties win. Sources: Reuters, “Exclusive: Canadian review will recommend buying Lockheed F-35 fighter jet – sources”.

April 13/14: NFPS done. The Harper government has accepted the “options analysis” report from its National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS) panel, after more than 18 months. As noted earlier (q.v. April 6/14), Canada won’t be able to order F-35s until 2015, and probably won’t do so until after the 2015 elections, if they place any orders at all. Sources: Postmedia News, “F-35 decision back in government’s court as air force completes major study”.

April 11/14: Stealth risks. The December 2012 report concerning Canada’s F-35 buy had a lot of cuts, including passages that highlighted ongoing problems with the program.

“But the Citizen has obtained more than a dozen earlier drafts of the report showing defence officials had originally laid out many of the issues surrounding the F-35’s development, and their potential impact on Canada [only to have them removed later].”

Issues that were removed from the Canadian report included fuel consumption that’s 26% higher than the CF-18s, problems with the Helmet-Mounted Display that have been cited in multiple US GAO and US DOT&E publications, and serious software delays involving the fighter’s 8+ million lines of code. That last item was the subject of a March 2014 report from the US GAO. Canada.com, “Final report on F-35 dropped references to fuel, IT problems”.

April 7/14: CF-18 Engines. Magellan Aerospace has been responsible for F404 engine maintenance & repairs for over 30 years, and that isn’t changing. Their latest contract is a C$ 55 million, 1-year award with an option for an additional year. Sources: Magellan Aerospace, “Magellan Aerospace Awarded Engine Maintenance Contract for CF-188 F404”.

April 6/14: Stall. Canada’s “buy profile” for the F-35 has been moved from 2017 to 2018, which means there won’t be a decision before the 2015 elections. That’s a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives the Conservative Party plausible deniability to say that it hasn’t made any decisions, which will keep the F-35 from becoming an issue again. On the other hand, the process itself has so alienated the other parties that unless the Conservatives win a majority, the F-35 buy will probably be canceled. Sources: Defense News, “Canada: No F-35 Buys Before 2018”.

Jan 22/14: Rafale. Dassault SVP of NATO affairs Yves Robins is quoted as saying that they’re offering Canada unrestricted transfers of technology if it picks the Rafale, including software source codes for servicing the planes. That’s something Canada won’t get with the F-35, and it’s being touted as a long-term cost savings that will let Canadian firms do more of the required maintenance. They’re also pushing the government to declare a competition.

CBC goes on to show that they don’t really grasp the issues, asking about the Rafale’s ability to operate alongside the USAF. France replies that this worked over Libya, but that isn’t the real question. The question is whether Canada could use its American weapons with the Rafale, without having to buy new weapons or conduct expensive integration and testing programs. In most cases, the answer is no. Sources: CBC News, “Dassault Aviation ramps up CF-18 replacement pitch”.

Jan 15/14: DND’s former assistant deputy minister for procurement, Alan Williams, explains why he thinks the entire review is a sham. The government hasn’t released its requirements for the fighter buy, and hasn’t solicited the full cost and performance data that would be required for an informed comparison. Williams is probably correct in his conclusion, but full price data would only come about as a result of an RFP – which is to say, after a competition is declared. Sources: Embassy magazine, “Feds haven’t changed perspective on F-35: Williams”.

Jan 2/14: Paperwork in. According to documents posted on a federal website on Thursday, the Canadian Forces have already prepared draft reports to the “National Fighter Procurement secretariat” on the price, the technical capabilities and the strategic advantages of the 4 fighter jets considered (F-35A, Eurofighter, Rafale, Super Hornets). Actually, the price isn’t included, except as a rough order of magnitude. That information wasn’t forthcoming from all manufacturers, and even Boeing would likely be quoting an Advanced Super Hornet model that isn’t being bought under its current multi-year Navy contract. A competition would be necessary in order to really know, and the key question from the start has been whether the Conservative government has ever had any genuine interest in a competition.

The RCAF is also reportedly finishing up its “Integrated Mission Risk Assessment,” though the quality of their work has been less than stellar in the past. Source: The Globe and Mail, “Military’s fighter-jet reports to put ball in Ottawa’s court on F-35s”.

2013

EA-18G: key systems
(click to view full)

Dec 10/13: Industrial. The federal government’s Industry Canada department releases a report detailing Canadian contracts to date from the F-35 program, explaining their calculation approach, and estimating future opportunities.

Contracts to date as of summer 2013 amount to C$ 503 million, while total future contracts are estimated at C$ 9.429 billion: 8.261 billion if existing contracts are extended over the scheduled number of fighters (a very dubious proposition, based on order cuts to date), plus another 1.168 billion in identified production & service opportunities. Sources: Canada IC, “Canadian Industrial Participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program”.

Nov 7/13: Sub-contractors. One modification shared by Canada and Norway’s F-35As will be drag chutes, which help with landings on short and/or ice-covered runways. Airborner Systems, “Airborne Systems Canada Supports Development of F-35 Drag Chute Program”:

“Airborne Systems is currently providing technical assistance to Lockheed Martin during the F-35 drag chute development. Their experience and expertise have contributed to the drag chute concept development which has led to the baseline design currently being finalized for the F-35A. Airborne Systems plans to continue supporting the drag chute development, flight test, certification and eventual production for the F-35 fleet.”

June 4/13: This headline from the [Parliament] Hill Times sums it all up, which is good, because the rest is subscription-only: “Prime Minister Harper, Cabinet to decide on F-35 fighter jets without advice from Public Works Procurement Secretariat, say Public Works officials.”

Saab’s decision looks very rational if this is true. Hill Times.

May 31/13: No Saab. “Senior government officials” confirm to Quebecor’s QMI news agency that Saab has decided not to participate in Public Works Canada’s market analysis phase.

That doesn’t keep Saab from entering a competitive process later, if there is one. Saab has told QMI that they will re-evaluate the decision once there’s a clear way forward in Canada. QMI, via Sun News.

April 28/13: Expected losses. Canada’s Postmedia News reports:

“In December 2011, the Defence Department’s research arm, Defence Research and Development Canada, published a report in which it said “that the probability of having 63 or more (F-35s) remaining at this time (when the last one is delivered) is approximately 54 per cent.”

Canada plans to order 65 F-35As, for delivery from 2017-2022. Their expectation is 7-11 destroyed aircraft over the fleet’s expected 42-year lifespan, with losses fitting the standard fighter pattern and being heavier in the early years. So they’re claculating a 46% chance that 2 or more F-35As are crashed or lost in the first 6 years. Not unusual, or unreasonable.

Where the math becomes more questionable is the expectation that Canada can order 65 F-35As plus accompanying spares, training equipment, etc. with its budgeted funds, while placing orders in the program’s early production years from 2014-2020.

March 3/13: RFI. Canada’s issues its official RFI/ “Industry Engagement Request”:

“Five identified companies with aircraft in production—The Boeing Company, Dassault Aviation, EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin and Saab Group—were previously sent a draft of the questionnaire on January 25, 2013, for comment. The National Fighter Procurement Secretariat received input from all five companies and their feedback is reflected in the final questionnaire, which the companies are being asked to complete within six weeks. A second questionnaire to obtain information on costs will be sent in draft form to the five companies for comment at a later date.”

See: Release | Final Industry Engagement Request: Capability, Production and Supportability Information Questionnaire.

Feb 27/13: Lifetime costs. Media traction for the Super Hornet, as Boeing has an opportunity to publicly tout their Super Hornet in a CBC TV report, which feature Boeing’s (Canadian) lead Super Hornet test pilot. The report also brings sustainment costs into Canada’s public debate for the first time, claiming $23 billion in lifetime savings from a Super Hornet buy:

“[Half] sounded too good to be true – so CBC News dug into Boeing’s figures to see how credible they are. According to the GAO, the Super Hornet actually costs the U.S. Navy $15,346 an hour to fly. It sounds like a lot – until you see that the U.S. Air Force’s official “target” for operating the F-35 is $31,900 an hour. The GAO says it’s a little more – closer to $32,500. CBC also asked Lockheed Martin to say if it had any quarrel with these numbers – and it did not…. Super Hornets, which Boeing says are 25 per cent cheaper to run than Canada’s “legacy” CF-18s.”

At this late point in the CF-18’s life, that’s certainly possible. At Lockheed Martin, they won’t publicly argue with the GAO, but they’re hopeful that its estimate will drop as the jet gains experience. At the same time, F-35 program manager Lt. Gen Bogdan has publicly pegged F-35 support projections as “just too high”, and vowed to bring them down.

With that said, the math using KPMG’s F-35 estimate as a starting point, and the GAO’s figures as the relative baselines, is that a Super Hornet buy might save Canada around $19.53 billion in ownership costs to 2042 ($37 – 17.47 billion operations). It will actually be less than that, because upgrades should be assumed to factor in at the same cost. So let’s say $15 billion. CBC also mistakenly assumes that an F/A-18E/F purchase price of around $60 million would also save half of the F-35 program’s $9 billion maximum purchase price, but it wouldn’t. Rather, it would allow Canada to buy all 65 fighters that the RCAF says are the minimum required, including 12 EA-18G electronic attack aircraft, instead of buying fewer than 65 F-35As. Of course, even $15 billion is a large enough figure to make a dent in the public debate. CBC article | CBC video: The Super Hornet.

Feb 14/13: More estimates. Canada’s government orders another cost estimate connected to their fighter replacement program:

“In December 2012, KPMG presented the Next Generation Fighter Capability: Life Cycle Cost Framework to the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat—a life-cycle cost framework for the F-35 program. The purpose of this new review is to ensure that the framework is appropriately applied by National Defence and that the cost estimates in the upcoming 2013 Annual Update are sound…. The notice of proposed procurement about the review is posted on the Government of Canada’s tendering system hosted on MERX. The contract is expected to be awarded in the coming weeks.”

Feb 13/13: Library of Parliament Report. Canada’s Library of Parliament issues “Estimating the Cost of Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets,” which chronicles the various cost estimates submitted to Parliament and in major published reports. One interesting change is noted by The Globe and Mail:

“The amount National Defence has set aside for weapons has been cut to just $52-million for the estimated 30-year operational life of the jets, compared with estimates in two previous reports of $270-million and $300-million.”

The key driver is a December 2012 Public Works report that said existing weapons in Canadian stocks wouldn’t be adequate over the fighter’s full 40-year life cycle. Which is reasonable. Compatibility with American weapons saves money in the near-term, but doesn’t change the need to buy items over the long term. Paveway laser-guided bombs last a long time, but existing AIM-120 missiles will need upgrades at the very least, and new weapons will become necessary over the next 40 years. Hence the statement that “over the life cycle of the replacement fleet, the acquisition of newer weapons will be considered and funded as separate projects.”

So, on the one hand it’s reasonable. On the other hand, weapons are a reasonable part of a fighter fleet’s cost, and the sudden change in terms is an obvious way to lower the published cost by a quarter billion dollars. Sources: Library of Parliament, Estimating the Cost of Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets”, Globe and Mail, “National Defence to buy fewer bombs if F-35 selected as new air force fighter”.

Feb 12/13: Whitewashed report? Comparing a Nov 1/12 copy of the draft Parliamentary Public Accounts committee report with the final November 2013 product shows the removal of important information that was shared during Spring 2011 hearings. Opposition members are incensed.

CP chronicles omissions including references to the F-35’s selection without competition, a caveat that the price tag per aircraft could almost double from the claimed USD $75 million to $138 million, and passages critical of the F-35’s industrial benefits program. More explosively, it dropped Auditor General Michael Ferguson’s testimony that the Conservative Party government had seen the full cost of the plan, as opposed to the final report that blamed DND for omissions. Ferguson’s stated concern that F-35 ownership costs could create problems for future defense budgets was also edited out, along with a passage of cost-related testimony from Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page, who has an unfriendly relationship with the current government. Sources: CBC News, “F-35 committee report strategically edited, draft suggests”.

Feb 11/13: Postmedia obtains documents from Canada’s 2005-2006 look at its fighter options, and discovers what DND thought of each option.

Eurofighter: “Remarkable” sensor fusion and fine cockpit, a powerful aircraft with effective air-to-air capabilities and reduced RCS, though it isn’t a full stealth aircraft. Might even be considered a borderline “5th generation” plane. The report worried about interoperability, and it also talked more bluntly about buying aircraft from anyone other than the USA. Relayed contents don’t mention Eurofighter’s low variety of integrated weapons and sensors, which is still an issue in 2013.

F/A-18 Super Hornet: Credible option with a lot of integrated weapons and bolt-on sensors, seen as a smaller shift for Canadian CF-18 maintainers. It seems to be the default backup for many nations that were considering the F-35 – and since then, the USN and Australia have proven them right. On the other hand, “It makes several compromises between approach speed, weight and structure.” The EA-18G electronic warfare option pursued by Australia is not reported, and seems not to have been mentioned.

JAS-39 Gripen: A “fairly stealthy” platform due to its small size, design, and use of radar-absorbing materials, but not a full stealth aircraft. They also liked its low maintenance costs. Its system for emergency landings and landings on short airfields is different from Canada’s, which would require changes. Doesn’t seem to have discussed the new JAS-39E/F, but then, the design was unclear at that time. It’s a lot clearer now.

Rafale: Seen a fast and maneuverable, with above-average range that’s a plus for Canada. Weren’t so impressed with the cockpit, and wondered about the Snecma M88 engine’s cold-weather performance. Relayed report contents didn’t focus on Rafale’s unique weapon incompatibilities with the American gear that fills Canada’s existing stores, and which can be diverted from US stocks for emergencies and joint efforts. That’s a big omission, but the relayed contents also missed Rafale’s strong SPECTRA electronic protection system, which proved itself over Libya 5 years later.

F-35: Saw its stealth features as unique. Flip side of this is that security at Canadian bases would become more elaborate and expensive. Worried that “many of the capabilities and performance features (of the F-35) such as signature, payload, speed, range and manoeuvrability, could change due to the U.S. focus on keeping the costs down.” Which is indeed happening. On the other side of the coin, F-35 sensors and sensor fusion are uniquely excellent, but that isn’t in the relayed report contents.

Canada’s competitor conclusions

Jan 29/13: Bridge buy? Canada’s Hill Times reports that Canada is considering a short-term bridging fighter buy. The key piece of information comes from the letter announcing the Industry Engagement Request, which also asked respondents to talk about options in to the 2020-2030 frame, and then options beyond 2030:

“The evaluation of options will review and assess all available fighter aircraft and will result in a comprehensive report with the best available information on the capabilities, costs, and risks of each option, including bridging and fleet options…”

That would put them in the same boat as Australia’s RAAF, which also flies upgraded F/A-18 Hornets. They’ve already received 12 F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters as a bridge, plus 12 more that will be converted to EA-18G electronic warfare and air defense suppression planes. Australia is finding that F-35 delays are creating the need for a longer bridge, and the RAAF could end up with a 50/50 long term split between the Super Hornet family and the F-35. In practice, a similar logic is likely for Canada: every “bridging” fighter bought is 1 fighter subtracted from their eventual F-35 order. Hill Times | CDFAI.

2012

F-35A, eh?
(click to view full)

Dec 16-17/12: Trust busted? An article in the Hill Times magazine quotes former DND assistant deputy minister for procurement Alan Williams, who says that “We know that the fiasco certainly started by the bureaucrats hijacking the process,” while ministers simply went along and didn’t ask questions.

The British TV hit “Yes, Minister” was based on that very premise, but this instance doesn’t seem to have the same comic value. Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page has had a publicly hostile relationship with the Conservative Party government, and he has been very critical of the CF-35 decision process (q.v. May 3/12), but it still matters when he says things like:

“Trust is broken. I don’t think you get, in terms of a reset, that trust back until you have that debate in front of Parliament…. From my view, the (F-35) process that we had up to date, certainly our experience in 2010-11, was a complete failure, and, I think, a lack of leadership both politically and I think by public servants as well…. There were numbers that existed at DND (Department of National Defence) that were much higher than what was presented to Parliament. Canadians saw the lower set of numbers… So in that sense, they were misled”

Dec 7/12: KPMG’s cost estimate. The precise figure for KPMG’s cost estimate is reported to be C$ 45.802 billion, based on an in-service life of 42 years. Current F-35 industrial participants are becoming worried, and a soon-to-be released companion study will take a second look at real figures for industrial benefits. Those estimates have already been quietly scaled back from C$ 12 billion to C$ 9.85 billion, and may drop further. The government defends their 20-year cost estimates, and they do have a point. Former treasury board official Michelle d’Auray:

“Going beyond 20 years is considered too high-risk to ensure that the value in contracting with industry would be sustained, or the costs would be going beyond the 20-year mark… So that, for us, is considered to be reasonable, and as the deputy minister of National Defence indicated, all of the submissions to date have been presented to the Treasury Board have used a 20-year cost estimate.”

Periods over 20 years are chancy for contracts, and wide potential variations in core inputs like fuel prices makes those estimates little better than guesses. Even guesses can still be of value, but only if they’re comparing components like fuel costs with other alternatives, using the same baseline pricing assumptions. See: Canadian Press | CTV | The Globe and Mail | National Post.

KPMG’s F-35A lifetime cost estimate

Dec 6/12: Not cancelled. Postmedia, which usually has good sources within the government, says Canada will pull out of the Joint Strike Fighter program. It turns out not to be true. Canada is about to analyze its options, and as noted earlier, Public Works has thrown out the specifications straightjacket. Early reports indicate that Boeing (Super Hornet) and Eurofighter have been approached for detailed information, with the possibility of broadening the invitation.

The other revelation in their article is that KPMG is done with their audit, which exceeds even the $29 billion maximum estimate from previous studies. Reports are pegging the potential 36-year lifecycle cost at C$ 40+ billion, though that involves a longer service life than previous estimates, and includes fuel costs. CBC | The Globe and Mail | National Post | Flight International.

Nov 30/12: Stealth. Gen. Tom Lawson, a former fighter pilot and Canada’s new chief of defence staff, tells a Parliamentary committee that the F-35 isn’t the only aircraft able to meet stealth requirements. The F-35 is better, he says, but when asked by Liberal defence critic John McKay whether there is only 1 airplane that can meet the Canadian military’s requirements in this area, Lawson said “no.” He later added, correctly, that “Fourth and fifth generation is not a very helpful way of looking at that aircraft.”

Canada’s exact “low observability” requirements, such as they are, have never been made public. It is true that even 4+ generation fighters like the Eurofighter, Gripen, Rafale, and Super Hornet will all have significantly smaller radar cross-sections that the current CF-18 fleet, even though several of them are bigger aircraft. The F-35 will be smaller again. See above for a more detailed discussion of “stealth.” CBC.

Nov 22/12: 1st cracks. Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose tells Canada’s House of Commons that Canada’s “review of options will not be constrained by the previous statement of requirements.” That seems minor, but it isn’t. DND’s requirements had been crafted to make the F-35 the only available choice, per the department’s standard pattern over the last 7-8 years. Breaking that lock opens up other options for consideration.

A serious analysis hasn’t been performed yet, but this statement is a sign that it could start. Much will depend on the exact people chosen to do the analyzing. CBC | CDFAI | iPolitics.ca.

Oct 22/12: New RCAF chief Lt.-Gen. Yvan Blondin tells the Canadian Press that DND hasn’t really begun looking at other fighter options beyond the F-35. A thorough examination of other possible aircraft would require a more detailed study by military planners, and he said that the order hasn’t been given. Blondin was asked twice during the interview whether other aircraft had been considered, and he replied: “No.”

That examination was central to the government’s promises after the negative 2011 Auditor General Report, so the government replied by saying that “work continues on the evaluation of options… The options analysis is a full evaluation of choices, not simply a refresh of the work that was done before.” None of which actually means that a serious evaluation is underway.

DID’s verdict: Lt-Gen. Blondin told the truth, and the government is being dishonest. There isn’t a serious analysis taking place. To date, any analysis has been a hasty and less-than-professional justification for a decision that’s already made. There is no sign yet that this pattern is changing. Canadian Press | Canada DND.

Sept 28/12. Requirements. Canada’s CBC obtains a redacted copy of Canada’s official Statement of Requirements for its next-generation fighter, and makes it available for download. As they explain:

“The Statement of Operational Requirements for Canada’s next jet fighter was produced by the Royal Canadian Air Force Directorate of Air Requirements in June, 2010. It wasn’t submitted to Canada’s Public Works department until after the government announced its decision to purchase 65 F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft in July, 2010. Normally Public Works is responsible for procuring hardware for the military after they have submitted their statement of requirements. [CBC Program} The Fifth Estate obtained this highly redacted copy through an Access to Information request.”

Sept 7/12: Auditor hired. KPMG has been given a $643,535 to review/audit projections for the CF-35. Their offer was 1 of 2 bids reviewed by Treasury Board and Public Works and Government Services Canada. CBC.

Aug 9/12: Delayed audit. Almost 2 months after its self-imposed deadline, Public Works quietly re-issued a tender, asking for an audit firm to come forward and take on the politically explosive task of verifying the F-35 figures provided by DND. The minister’s office tells Postmedia that the original tender was the problem, as it didn’t give accounting firms enough flexibility to sub-contract portions of the project. This might be important, in order to gain in-depth expertise in defense procurement.

The new tender doesn’t close until the end of August, which means the review might not even arrive in 2012. Postmedia.

May 24/12: Industrial. Lockheed Martin vice-president Steve O’Bryan talks to Canada’s Postmedia News about the F-35. They’re working on the understanding that Canada will place a production order in FY 2014

“Right now we will honour all existing contracts that we have. After that, all F-35 work will be directed into countries that are buying the airplane… What we have is the official statement out of the government and we’re working with the government. They’re committed to the F-35, they’ve selected it, and we haven’t had any change in that official position.”

That commitment has underpinned the JSF program’s work with Canadian firms, which the National Post reports as C$ 435 million to 66 Canadian companies since 1997. Even if those partnerships stop, however, Canadian procurement policies will require industrial offsets from the winner worth 100% of purchase value. The industrial question for the F-35 involves the perceived long term technical and financial value of their work to Canada’s aerospace industry, vs. the offsets their competitors might offer. That makes for a complex evaluation, but it’s often a component of big-ticket defense competitions around the world. Postmedia.

May 15/12: Gone Rogue? Following a round of Parliamentary hearings, in which senior DND bureaucrats are grilled about their CF-35 program estimates and conduct, NDP MP Malcolm Allen goes so far as to say that:

“This is a department that’s really gone rogue… [the minister] has totally lost control of that department… There’s no faith in this department anymore. None whatsoever.”

Allen is the Official Opposition party’s shadow minister for Agriculture, but he’s involved in the F-35 issue through his role on Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee. It’s expected that opposition members will oppose the government of the day, and the NDP’s socialism has always been coupled with an aversion to the military. With that said, for an MP in his position to level that kind of criticism at a government department, and use words like “no faith” and “out of control,” is a very rare thing. No political party rules forever, and if DND is seen as institutionally untrustworthy and dishonest by Canada’s other major parties, they will have created very dire future for themselves. Postmedia.

May 3/12: Was DND honest? Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page tells its Public Accounts Committee that the government withheld key information about the full costs of the F-35 in 2011, against explicit requests, in an effort to present a lower price tag to Canadians.

“Over the past few weeks, it has become clear that the Department of National Defence provided the PBO with figures that did not include all operating costs… The PBO understood that it had been provided with full life-cycle costs from DND as required… It seems difficult to understand how there could have been any confusion as to whether or not the PBO included operating costs within its estimate.”

DND officials say they understood that operations and maintenance costs should be excluded, but Page drew attention to the November 2010 committee motion that prompted PBO’s report. It specifically called for the release of all documents that outline life-cycle costs. Postmedia.

April 3/12: Auditor General report. The office of the Auditor General of Canada delivers its 2012 Spring report, including a chapter covering Canada’s process for selecting and then budgeting for the F-35. Based on previous stories concerning leaked drafts, the report has been softened and made more vague.

On the one hand, it describes how the F-35 program itself was built to circumvent normal procedures in participating governments, and make any subsequent competitions difficult to execute fairly. This is true, and beyond Canada’s influence. On the other hand, the report describes a number of instances where Canada’s DND has deliberately misled Parliament, a situation that past OAG reports have now detailed in almost every major Canadian defense procurement program over the last 5 years. Beyond deliberate deceptions, DND also made repeated assertions about both the F-35’s costs and its air needs that were not backed by any substantive analysis. Public Works Canada, which is supposed to serve in an independent oversight role, utterly failed in this duty, and was often hampered by DND’s refusal to provide information when it did attempt to act.

In response, the government “accepts the Auditor General’s recommendation and conclusions,” and commits to a number of steps. None of them imperil the F-35 program yet, or punish past misconduct, but the government is leaving themselves an official out.

The biggest apparent commitment is a freezing of funding at C$ 9 billion procurement and C$ 7 billion for support, followed by a statement from Associate Minister of National Defence Fantino that they “will acquire the F-35 only if and when we can operate within that budget.” This is less of a concession than it seems. First, it reiterates stated policy. Second, it freezes only the purchase cost. Support costs are even more likely to see serious cost inflation, but are the easiest to falsely assume away in advance. If they double to C$ 14 billion in real costs, Canada would have no option but to pay. Finally, it offers no other fighter options, or even preparation to make another fighter option feasible. Canada’s DND will “continue to evaluate options,” but the C$ 16 billion is still described as an F-35 acquisition budget, not a fighter acquisition budget. Likewise, the program’s new coordinating Secretariat in Public Works Canada is the F-35 Secretariat, though the effect clearly shifts authority out of the Department of National Defence, and away from Minister for National Defence Peter Mackay.

Annual updates to Parliament have now been promised, to be delivered within 60 days of receiving revised costing forecasts from the USA’s F-35 program. The question is whether these Parliamentary reports will continue to omit pertinent information that is not mentioned by the US office, or will otherwise improve the past record of incomplete and misleading reports. It’s more encouraging that Canada’s Treasury Board Secretariat will have to commission an independent review of DND’s acquisition and sustainment project assumptions and potential F-35 costs, and make that public, before a purchase contract is signed. OAG 2012 Spring Report. | Canada PWGSC/DND response | Canada’s CBC: video of OAG presentation.

OAG criticizes the program

April 3/12: F-35 schedule & costs. Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman takes a deep look into the Pentagon’s latest Selected Acquisition Reports, which was released on March 30/12. Some of the conclusions are very relevant to Canada’s choices:

“Another three-year slip to initial operational test and evaluation, the culmination of system development and demonstration, which now is due to be complete in 2019 – the target date is February but the threshold date is October… it appears that the main culprit is software and hardware, mainly in terms of… sensor fusion and emission control – that take place in the fighter’s main processor banks… In what follows, I’m going to use average procurement unit cost (APUC)… recurring flyaway is the lowest cost, but neither the US nor anyone else can put an aircraft on the ramp for that money. And all numbers are base-2012… The APUC for the F-35A in 2013-14 is $184-$188 million, versus $177m (2009 dollars) for the last F-22s. And that is at a much higher production rate.”

Most ominously for the F-35’s future cost structure:

“Although the basis of the numbers has been changed, the SAR still compares the F-35A with the F-16, and shows that the estimated CPFH [DID: Cost Per Flight Hour] for the F-35A has gone from 1.22 F-16s in the 2010 SAR to 1.42 today – versus 0.8 F-16s, which was being claimed a few years ago. Where is that operations and support money going to come from?”

March 20/12: Plan B? As Canada’s government gives conflicting signals about its F-35A commitment, and braces for a scathing Auditor General report about their pledged buy, other planes may get an opening:

” The likeliest contenders, should there be a competition, are U.S.-based Boeing, maker of the F-18 Super Hornet, and Dassault of France, maker of the Rafale… “In our world we’re already in a competition,” one industry insider said. “(Associate Defence Minister) Fantino himself said we’re basically looking at our options. There’s a team at (Department of National Defence) looking at the market. So it’s already on.”

Despite this report, Canada’s considerable stockpile of American-made air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons adds huge additional switching costs to an already-expensive Rafale aircraft, and makes it a very unlikely challenger. Post Media.

March 15/12: Auditor General. Canada’s Auditor General is carving out a respected niche in Canadian politics, and that may be bad news for the F-35. The office is due to deliver a report on Canada’s F-35 plans by April 3rd, and a draft copy has been circulating. It reportedly says that the air force relied more or less exclusively on Lockheed Martin for all key pricing and performance assertions, even as government officials failed to follow procurement rules. Globe and Mail | Macleans magazine | National Post | Post Media | UPI.

March 13/12: If? Deputy defense minister Julian Fantino tells the House of Common Defence Committee that Canada has made no commitment to the F-35A, and uses the word “if” with respect to any proposed buy. While he maintains Canada’s interest in the aircraft, the comments are seen as a marked change in tone. A later release by Canada’s DND highlights Fantino’s March 16/12 CADSI speech, in which he affirms the industrial benefits of the F-35 program. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. | Globe and Mail | iPolitics.ca | Toronto Star | Reuters || Canada’s DND.

March 2/12: Canada hosts a meeting of international F-35 program partners in its Washington Embassy, to discuss the future of the program. Canada’s DND | Canadian Press | Post Media | Reuters.

F-35 summit

2011

CF-18 ACES sim
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Nov 24/11: Norway’s costs. Norwegian MP Roger Ingebrigtsen [Troms, Labour Party], and Rear Admiral Arne Røksund, head of their Department of Defence Policy and Long-Term Planning, visit Canada. They respond to Canadian MP Christine Moore [Abitibi-Temiscamingue, NDP], who asks about Norway’s planned F-35 purchase:

“Mr. Roger Ingebrigtsen: It’s about $10 billion U.S. That’s for 51 or 52 air fighters. That’s $10 billion today…

RAdm Arne Røksund: …The life cycle costs will be, I think, about–this is not public yet, so I have to be careful – $40 billion U.S. over 30 years. So that’s life cycle costs over 30 years, all included.

Ms. Christine Moore: …So the $10 billion is simply to purchase the aircraft themselves.

RAdm Arne Røksund: That is for the planes, initial logistics included, repair kits, and so on, for the first few years.”

The purchase figures are consistent with accounts of NOK 61 – 72 billion, but the 30-year sustainment costs are new. Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch.

Oct 28/11: Canada’s National Post reports that Canada’s F-35A purchase may not be a sure thing, even though the majority government could easily force the sale through. Excerpts:

“This minister has a knack for projecting blithe confidence. But in this instance he is increasingly offside with other members of the cabinet and with the Prime Minister’s Office, sources familiar with the situation say… Indeed in defence circles, it is believed that Julian Fantino was installed as under-minister in charge of procurement partly to offset MacKay’s tendency to defer to the senior military brass… “The reaction is, where’s the competition, where’s the bidding, and what do you mean you don’t know the price?” acknowledges Senator Colin Kenny, former chair of the Senate defence committee and a strong proponent of the F-35… there are three elephants in the room…”

One is Canada’s 20-year, C$ 33 billion national military shipbuilding strategy, which is politically untouchable. The 2nd and 3rd issues refer to the effect of a possible slowdown and/or cut of F-35 buys in America and in Europe, which would raise the price for Canada’s planes. Our analysis: it’s too early to call Canada’s F-35 deal into serious question. On the other hand, if these reports are true, it’s no longer the sure thing that it seemed to be when Prime Minister Harper won his majority government.

Oct 23/11: Communications frozen? A Global TV News article reveals that the F-35 will have issues communicating during arctic patrols, because its satellite communications capability will be worse than the current CF-18 fleet’s when it’s delivered:

“Military aircraft operating in the high Arctic rely almost exclusively on satellite communications… The F-35 Lightning will eventually have the ability to communicate with satellites, but the software will not be available in the initial production run, said a senior Lockheed Martin official, who spoke on background… It is expected to be added to the aircraft when production reaches its fourth phase in 2019, but that is not guaranteed because research is still underway.”

Sept 6/11: CF-18 Sims. L-3 Link Simulation & Training announces a foreign military sale contract through US NAVAIR’s Training Systems Division, to upgrade Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CF-18 flight simulators located at Cold Lake, AB; Bagotville, PQ; and Ottawa, ON. The contract’s value was not disclosed.

L-3 Link is the original supplier for Canada’s 6 existing CF-18 Air Combat Emulators (ACEs), and 10 CF-18 Part Task Trainers, plus instructor/operator stations and brief/debrief systems. They will be upgraded with the latest F/A-18 training system capabilities, creating a common F/A-18 training solution with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps’ Tactical Operational Flight Trainers. Key upgrades to the trainers will include a new photo-texture visual system database, and enabling the Mission Operation Center to conduct multi-plane training. The CF-18 training systems will also include Canada-specific modifications.

Aug 31/11: CF-18 support. Canada adds up to C$ 111 million (currently around $112 million) to its CF-18 Primary Air Vehicle contract with L-3 Military Aviation Services (L-3 MAS), converting the previous arrangement to a full Optimized Weapon System Support program.

The contract breaks down as another C$ 80 million to 2017 in the base contract (now C$ 547 million), plus a set of extension options that could extend the additional work out to 2020 and raise the total by C$ 111 million, taking the overall contract to C$664 million (currently $676 million). OWSS adds new items to the previous contract’s list of maintained components (vid. Sept 1/10), consolidating them under this 1 contract, but doesn’t change contract length or other particulars. Public Works Canada | L-3 MAS [PDF].

CF-18 support extensions

May 2/11: Election. Canada’s Conservative Party wins an election forced by the opposition parties, and ends a string of minority Parliaments by taking 167 seats and gaining a Parliamentary majority.

The structure of the Canadian system ensures nearly complete party discipline. The Prime Minister can refuse to sign the nomination papers for any party candidate, forcing them to run as an independent or quit. Canada also requires whole-party leadership conventions to remove a party leader or Prime Minister, as opposed to the British tradition where it can be done by a majority of party MPs. In other words, Canada will buy any jet the Prime Minister approves. That means the F-35A. CBC Election Day coverage.

Majority government

DND shoots back
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March 10-21/11: As Canada’s upgraded CF-18s join allied operations over Libya, Canada’s government and Department of National Defence exchanges fire with the Parliamentary Budget Officer over the F-35 report, in the media and via detailed statements. Bottom line? Both parties are standing firmly by their figures. The Canadian DND’s F-35 mini-site includes release and comparison of figures table, among others. See also PBO’s detailed rebuttal [PDF] | Macleans magazine | Ottawa Citizen’s “Let’s be honest about the price tag on those planes“, written by the person who signed the F-35 Phase 2 MoU on Canada’s behalf.

March 10/11: PBO F-35 report. Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer releases its independent report on the F-35 buy. Its conclusion: that the government’s figures for buying and maintaining the plane were based on essentially no research, and that instead of costing $16 billion ($9 billion to buy 65, and $7 billion for 20 years of operations and maintenance at $350M/year), the total will be more like $29.3 billion. They forecast $9.7 billion or more for 65 fighters, plus $19.6 billion in operations and maintenance over 30 years ($1.7 billion initial logistics and setup, $14 billion O&M, plus $3.9 billion upgrades & overhaul over 30 years, or about $650M/year). That works out to a total package cost of about $450.75 million per fighter over 30 years, exclusive of weapons and other ancillaries. This passage was especially interesting, with implications well beyond the F-35, or Canada:

“There has been an exponential increase in the cost to manufacture one kilogram of fighter jet over the last six decades. This cost has risen from under US$ 1,000/kg in 1950 to approximately US$ 10,000/kg today (both in 2009 dollars). This represents a real [DID: inflation-adjusted] annual rate of increase of approximately 3.5%.

During the same period, the average weight of jet fighter aircraft has increased by about 0.5% per year. Given this, the cost of fighter aircraft has increased 4% per year in real terms since 1950 – doubling roughly every 18 years.”

The report’s impact is magnified in 3 ways. One is that it states that its own purchase and maintenance figures are likely to be revised upward if its 75% confidence level fails, based on program trends and official reports from the USA, as well as elimination of the competitive dual-engine program. The 2nd is that an election is now imminent in Canada, and the F-35 purchase is a key source of differences between the minority Conservative Party government and its opposition parties. On the flip side, Parliament’s dissolution will end opposition attempts to see the program’s statement of operational requirements justifying the F-35’s sole-source choice, which was classified by the DND in 2010, around the time the F-35 became a major political controversy. The 3rd factor is that the report was peer reviewed by a panel of experts that included the US Congressional Budget Office and Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The unintended result of that peer review has been wider publicity and impact around the world. “An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter” | Liberal Party release and pre-election ad | CTV News | Globe & Mail | Postmedia’s Canada.com | SunMedia’s Canoe | Aviation Week.

C$ 29.3 billion?

Jan 6/11: As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates states that he is placing the Marine Corps’ F-35B on the equivalent of a 2-year probation, extends the program’s development phase again to 2016, and cuts production of all models over the 2012-2016 time period, including 47 fewer F-35As. During the low-rate initial production phase, cuts in the number bought mean that the price for each plane doesn’t drop as quickly, making purchases more expensive. Canada’s DND responds directly to these changes, saying:

“Canada is not purchasing the STOVL variant. Canada will order the conventional take off and landing (CTOL) variant, which is the lowest-cost option that the majority of JSF partners will also acquire. The CTOL variant is progressing very well. Canada does not anticipate the announcement by the US Government regarding the STOVL variant will affect the schedule or cost of Canada’s Joint Strike Fighter Program.”

See also: Pentagon release re: overall plan | Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | F-35 briefing hand-out [PDF] || Aviation Week | Fort Worth Star-Telegram’s Sky Talk blog.

2010

F-35A
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Oct 14/10: CF-18 support. The Canadian government has contracted Calgary-based Harris Canada Inc. to continue avionics and electronics maintenance of its CF-18 fighter jets, until their replacements are ready to fly. The contract is worth up to C$ 273.8 million (currently at rough parity with American dollar) until 2020, and covers nearly 2,300 components.

It is more focused than the larger L-3 MAS contract (q.v. Sept 1/10), which covers the entire aircraft, but it’s a similar sort of extension. Public Works Canada | Canadian Press | The Globe and Mail.

Sept 20/10: According to 2009 Defence Department documents obtained by the Ottawa Citizen, Canadian officers working on the Next Generation Fighter Capability project called for a “competitive process” for both the aircraft and the long-term maintenance contract. The aircraft competition was to be run in 2010, with a contract to be awarded by 2012, aircraft delivery in 2015-16, and operational fighters between 2018 – 2023. The revelations will place further pressure on the Conservative government to justify their sole-sourcing decision, which has become the crux of a political controversy. Postmedia News via Montreal Gazette.

Sept 15/10: Hearings begin in Parliament, as the Standing Committee on National Defence calls witnesses to discuss the F-35. SCND/NDDN page | Canadian Press, via Winnipeg Free Press | CBC | CTV News (incl. video) | The Globe and Mail | Postmedia interview with Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose | Toronto Sun.

Sept 12/10: Sitting MP Laurie Hawn [Cons – AB – Edmonton Centre] will be an important voice in the upcoming Parliamentary fighter debate. He’s a former CF-18 pilot. Postmedia, via Montreal Gazette.

Sept 1/10: CF-18 Support. Canada needs to keep its existing fleet flying, and that cost money, too. A late F-35 means a longer set of support contracts, and so the Prime Minister’s Office announces the extension of its CF-18 Systems Engineering Support Contract to L-3 Communications MAS of Mirabel, Quebec, until at least 2017. This 7-year contract extension is valued at C$ 467 million, and 3 additional 1-year extension optionscould add another C$ 86 million (C$ 553 million total). the options would also stretch the contract until the end of the fleet’s estimated service life in 2020.

The contractor’s primary responsibility for the CF-18 Hornet fleet is development and maintenance work that includes mission software, structural testing, depot-level inspections and repairs, technical support teams, and other engineering services. In addition to their Canadian maintenance work, they’ve also been involved in Australia’s HUG [PDF] Hornet upgrade and life-extension program. Canadian PMO | L-3 MAS [PDF] | CBC | National Post.

CF-18 support

July 16/10: Sole-source F-35, eh? Canada’s Conservative Party government declares that it will buy the F-35A, without a competitive process. The jets would begin to enter service around 2016, and the initial budget is C$ 9 billion for 65 F-35 aircraft and associated weapons, supporting infrastructure, initial spares, training simulators, contingency funds and project operating costs. That budget has not been confirmed by an actual contract, however, something that reportedly led to unpleasant surprises when Canada bought C-130Js from Lockheed Martin. DND statements indicate that an F-35 contract would not be negotiated until about 2014-2015.

The government’s defense of its decision revolves around economic and industrial benefits:

“To date, Canada has invested approximately CAD$168 million in the JSF program. Since 2002, the Government’s participation in the JSF program has led to more than CAD$350 million in contracts for more than 85 Canadian companies, research laboratories, and universities – meaning that Canada has already seen a two-to-one return on its investment.

Now that Canada has committed to purchasing the F-35, Canadian industrial opportunities could exceed CAD$12 billion for the production of the aircraft. Sustainment and follow-on opportunities for Canadian industry are emerging and will be available over the 40-year life of the program. For instance, in accordance with the industrial participation agreements, all 19 Canadian companies manufacturing items for the F-35 will also repair and overhaul those components for the entire global fleet.”

The government needs that defense. They’re a minority government, and the opposition Liberal Party objects to the lack of competition and the cost. The Liberals are promising to freeze the agreement if they take power, and an election will be due by 2013 at the latest. This sort of thing has happened before, when an incoming Liberal government froze Canada’s EH101 helicopter contract, leading to a 20 year delay in fielding Sea King replacements. See: DND backgrounder | DND release | Lockheed Martin | Magellan Aerospace | Canadian Press (CP) | CTV TV | Toronto Star | Winnipeg Free Press re: local industry | BBC | NY Times | Reuters || Political angle: CBC | National Post | Toronto Star.

F-53A, yes. Competition, no.

June 11/10: The Globe & Mail newspaper reports the contents of secret documents it has acquired related to Canada’s F-35 purchase. For starters, the purchase price is expected to reach C$ 16 billion once 20 years of maintenance are factored in. The report adds:

“According to secret cabinet documents obtained by The Globe and Mail, officials are well aware that any move to open up the process to a competition could push the manufacturers of rival jets, such as the Boeing Super Hornet and the Eurofighter Typhoon, to lower their prices. In addition, the government is expecting a “negative reaction” to the fact that the contract is set to be awarded without a competition… One of the government’s major arguments is that a competition could hurt Canada’s reputation among the other countries that have been involved in Lockheed-Martin’s massive Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program since the 1990s…”

June 7-8/10: Canadian media reports indicate that the government is about to launch single-source negotiations to buy up to 65 F-35A fighters, at a cost of about C$ 9 billion. The government says that its rationale is to “lock up the cost,” but the jet’s maintenance costs would be a moving target. Canada had a similar experience with Lockheed Martin and maintenance costs when it sole-sourced its C-130J buy.

The move is politically controversial, to the point that the topic was removed from the cabinet committee on economic growth’s June 9 agenda, then reinstated. CP | The Globe and Mail | The Globe and Mail re: controversy | Winnipeg Free Press | UPI.

Jan 4/10: Reporter David Pugliese’s sources say that Canada’s Harper government, which is currently running a $55 billion deficit, is not moving to start the CF-18 replacement program, or to make a sole-source commitment to Lockheed Martin’s F-35. Boeing, which has a substantial industrial presence in Canada, continues to lobby for a competition.

According to Canadian Air Force documents, any competition needs to start no later than 2010. That allows a contract with the winning aircraft manufacturer to be signed by 2012, in order to receive initial deliveries in 2015-2016, and reach initial operating capability in 2018. That would be 38 years after the F/A-18 Hornet won Canada’s last fighter competition, and 36 years after initial Hornet deliveries. Under this timeline, full operating capability for the Hornet’s successor would be achieved by 2023.

2009 and Earlier

Sniper pod on CF-18
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Oct 8/09: Canada’s Ottawa Citizen newspaper reports that Boeing has stepped up its lobbying to create a competition:

“Some DND officials are concerned that a competition would drag on for too long and because of that Canada would not have new fighter aircraft in place when the current fleet of CF-18s is ready to be retired starting in 2017.

But representatives with U.S. aerospace firm Boeing are arguing that it makes more sense to hold a competition and let the best aircraft win. It has been involved in meetings with defence officials.

In addition, Canadian industry representatives who support Boeing have approached government officials to question the idea of a sole-source deal.”

Aug 22/09: Canada’s Ottawa Citizen newspaper reports that the government is preparing a presentation to cabinet for approval of a sole-source, multibillion deal to to buy 65 F-35s, even though military leaders had earlier claimed that a competitive process would be followed in any replacement of Canada’s F/A-18A/B Hornets.

The Ottawa Citizen cites Lockheed Martin officials who say they expect Canada to make its decision over the next 12 months. Canada is currently a JSF Tier 3 member, who has committed $150 million to the project thus far. Meanwhile, officials from Boeing (F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet) and Gripen International (JAS-39NG) are interested in competing for Canada’s follow-on order.

Dec 11/06: F-35 Production MoU. In a ceremony at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, Canada’s Department of National Defence formalizes their continued partnership in the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program. Canada was the 2nd of 8 partner nations to sign the MoU for the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development phase. The Department of Industry also signed MoUs with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Pratt & Whitney and the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team.

The Canadian Department of National Defense had this to say regarding the F-35’s status as the follow-on to its current CF-18 (F/A-18A) fighter fleet:

“While participation in this next phase does not commit the Department to purchasing the multi-role aircraft, it is helping to define and evaluate DND’s future requirements for the next generation of fighter aircraft to replace the CF-18 and its capabilities. It is also contributing to improved interoperability between Canadian, American and allied forces and is enhancing the competitiveness and technological capability of Canada’s aerospace sector.”

See: DID coverage | Pentagon DefenseLINK | Canada’s DND: release | Canada’s DND: Backgrounder.

F-35 Production MoU

Additional Readings The Program

• JSF Program Office – JSF Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development MoU [PDF], update 4. From 2010.

• Canada Public Works – Evaluation of Options to Sustain a Fighter Capability. Includes the 4 people appointed to the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS) panel in 2013. Just 1 has military experience.

• Canada NFPS (March 3/13) – Final Industry Engagement Request: Capability, Production and Supportability Information Questionnaire.

• Canada DND – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Next Generation Fighter Capability

• Canada DND – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Next Generation Fighter Capability Mandatory Capabilities / Requirements. Vague to the point of making the title misleading. “Flying long distances” is not a requirement. “Unrefueled range of at least 1,500km at full load” would be.

The Fighters

• Canadian DND – CF-18 Hornet

• Wikipedia – CF-18 Hornet

• DID – Boeing Leads Phase 2 Upgrade of 79 CF-18 Fighters. Referred to as CF-18AM or CF-18BM. The last one was delivered in March 2010.

• Canada DND – Joint Strike Fighter: Technical Briefing. See slide 23: “F-35-The only option that met all CF Mandatory Requirements…” Presented March 17/10.

• F-35.ca – Official lobbying site

• DID FOCUS – F-35 Lightning: The Joint Strike Fighter Program, 2012-2013

• DID FOCUS – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: 2009-2010

Competitive Possibilities

• DID – Eurofighter’s Future: Tranche 3, and Beyond

• DID – Super Hornet Fighter Family MYP-III. The F/A-18E/F, Advanced Super Hornet, and EA-18G.

• DID – EA-18G Program: The USA’s Electronic Growler. A very specialized variant that performs high-power jamming and air defense suppression.

• DID – Lightning Rod: F-35 Fighter Family Capabilities and Controversies. Free-to-view article covers the base F-35 platform, with links to related coverage.

• DID – The JAS-39 Gripen: Sweden’s 4+ Generation Wild Card

• DID – France’s Rafale Fighters

Official Reports/ Presentations

• US GAO (March 24/14, #GAO-14-322) – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Problems Completing Software Testing May Hinder Delivery of Expected Warfighting Capabilities. Something known for some time, but left out of Canada’s official reports.

• Industry Canada Dept. (Dec 10/13) – Canadian Industrial Participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. Includes current totals and an estimate of future opportunities.

• CBC (Sept 28/12) – More on the SOR Report. Redacted copy of Canada’s official Statement of Requirements for its next-generation fighter. “The Statement of Operational Requirements for Canada’s next jet fighter was produced by the Royal Canadian Air Force Directorate of Air Requirements in June, 2010. It wasn’t submitted to Canada’s Public Works department until after the government announced its decision to purchase 65 F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft in July, 2010. Normally Public Works is responsible for procuring hardware for the military after they have submitted their statement of requirements. [CBC Program} The Fifth Estate obtained this highly redacted copy through an Access to Information request.”

• Canada DND (August 2013) – Next Generation Fighter Capability Annual Update.

• Canada DND (Aug 5/13) – 2013 Department of National Defence Annual Update on Next Generation Fighter Capability Life Cycle Costs. No major changes. Conducted by Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton Consulting Inc.

• Auditor General of Canada (April 3/12) – 2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 2 – Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets

• Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (March 10/11) – An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter [PDF]. Followed by a detailed March 23/11 statement, in response to DND’s public disagreement with their study: Comparing PBO and DND Cost Estimates on Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Some Preliminary Questions and Answers on Key Issues [PDF].

• Canada DND (March 17/11) – Next Generation Fighter Capability: Comparison of Costing. With the PBO. See also the accompanying Narrative document.

News & Views

• Airbus Defence and Space – Passive Radar: to see without being seen [PDF]. In frequencies that may not be stealth friendly.

• Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch (March 8/14) – Just Face It – The F-35 Is A “Bomb Truck”

• James Hasik (Oct 1/13) – Less stealth, more agility, and more certainty: what the Super Hornet has, and whether that will matter in Canada

• Canadian Skies (May 12/13) – Fighter Focus: Eurofighter and Gripen

• Canada.com (Dec 6/12) – Canada’s involvement in the F-35. A timeline.

• Aviation Week (April 3/12) – JSF – SAR Discloses Another Three-Year Slip. Not to mention some costs.

• Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch (Sept 19/11) – Canadian Forces Never Did Full Examination of the Super Hornet, the F-35 Competitor

• Aviation Week (March 23/11) – JSF Cost Predictions Rattle Foreign Customers [dead link]. “Canada’s report – “An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter” – came out March 10. The report predicts that average unit production cost for its F-35s will be $148 million with an additional $15 million for the engine, which brings the total to $163 million per aircraft. Cost estimates given to Congress last week say the fourth low-rate initial production batch, with engines, will cost $127 million per aircraft for the F-35A, $141 million for the F-35B and $158 million for the F-35C…. [Lockheed] officials contend their estimates… predict that each Canadian aircraft will cost $70 to 75 million when deliveries begin in 2016. “It is not immediately obvious, given the available evidence, how the cost can be reduced to estimates predicted by Lockheed Martin over 10 years ago,” the Canadian report says…. Unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to see prices reducing to their original estimated level,” it concludes…. The Canadian study also lists a number of additional opportunities for cost escalation that could inflate Ottawa’s F-35 bill.”

• Ottawa Citizen’s (March 23/11) – Let’s be honest about the price tag on those planes.” Written by Alan Williams, who signed the F-35 Phase 2 MoU on Canada’s behalf.

• The Dominion (Feb 28/11) – Under the Radar: Diplomatic cables raise concerns of US influence in F-35 jet campaign

• Embassy Magazine (Feb 23/11) – DND Claims key F-35 Document is ‘classified’. Which is odd because, as the article points out, at least 4 other documents of that type have been released via DND’s own web site.

• US CDI (Jan 21/11) – F-35 Testimony to Canada’s House of Commons. CDI.org no longer resolves; alternate link to a transcript.

• Ottawa Citizen’s 3-part Series on Canada’s F-35 Buy (Dec 11-13/10) – Maintenance tab may send cost of new fighter soaring to $21B | The untold story of Canada’s JSF deal | Selling Canada on the need for fighters

• Ottawa Citizen (Dec 13/10) – Can the F-35 win a charm offensive?

• Aviation Week Ares (Nov 1/10) – Uh-O Canada

• Vancouver Sun (Oct 13/10) – Scrap F-35s for cheaper drones, defence analyst argues. Additional context: the defense analyst in question works for the left-wing Rideau Institute, and the study is publicized by the socialist CCPA (q.v. release).

• Wikileaks (Dec 16/08) – cable 08OSLO670, LESSON LEARNED FROM NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BUY JSF. May have a lot of relevance for Canada.

• DID (Sept 7/08) – Canada Investing in F-35 Related R&D

• DID (June 23/08) – Canada Lays Out Future Defense Plans

• Wings Magazine – The F-35 and Canada’s Aviation Future

Americas

• The US Navy has cleared Lockheed Martin’s VH-92A program Critical Design Review (CDR). Tasked with transporting the president and vice president of the United States and other officials, the VH-92 will see initial fielding in 2020, and production continuing until 2023. First flight is expected next year.

Middle East North Africa

• Two years since the commencement of deliveries, Israel has received the last of its M-346 Lavi jets from manufacturer Leonardo-Finmeccanica. The $1 billion deal sees the 30 jet trainers delivered to replace the 1960s-era Douglas TA-4 Skyhawk. Equipped with the Elbit Systems Targo helmet, the Israeli Air Force can provide synthetic on-board training for pilots transitioning onto the full range of the IAF’s frontline combat aircraft fleets which will soon include the F-35.

• As US and Israeli officials move to finalize talks over the upcoming military aid package, a former IDF general has warned against his government looking to increase the amount sent. Maj. Gen. (Res) Gershon Hacohen called the increased dependence on US financing as suiting and expanding US interests and a reduction in such dependence would be better for all over time. Lamenting what he sees to be an addiction to advanced US platforms, US aid merely institutionalizes IDF reliance on air power, at the expense of innovative and daring ground maneuver warfare.

Europe

• French aerospace laboratory Onera has released details on their test of the A400M transporter. The company had been contacted by manufacturer Airbus to conduct the studies of a new hose and drogue configuration designed to permit helicopter refueling from the airlifter. Customers involved in the A400 program’s development have experienced frustration over the lack of helicopter refueling capabilities, with France having already bought two Lockheed Martin KC-130J tankers to perform the task, and Germany considering a similar acquisition.

• Greece’s P-3B Orion aircraft are to undergo a $142 million mid-life modernization program. Work to be carried out as highlighted in the deal include the reactivation of one of the navy’s P-3Bs and the procurement of software and hardware kits for the upgrade and modernization of a total of four aircraft. Greece operates six of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) P-3Bs.

• Leonardo-Finmeccanica is expecting to deliver the first of its ATR-72 maritime patrol aircraft to the Italian Navy within the next few weeks. A total of four will be delivered and are to conduct missions including aiding navel vessels searching for migrants crossing the Mediterranean. The $397 million deal does not give the Navy any ASW capabilities, with budget shortfalls after the 2008 economic crash causing Rome to ditch plans to look at Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon.

Asia Pacific

• China has hailed the US deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) batteries to South Korea as harming the “foundation of their trust.” THAAD’s presence on the Korean peninsula as a counter to North Korean nuclear missile testing also caused Chinese officials to warn that the government in South Korea “should think twice about the deployment and value the good momentum of ties between Beijing and Seoul.” Meanwhile, the North moves ahead with the construction of fortified submarine pens for its ballistic missile submarines.

• Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is to partner with South Korean giant Samsung to produce 100 tracked 155mm howitzer guns at Indian facilities. The contract, at $700 million, constitutes India’s largest ever order for the domestic private sector, and could lead to further orders of wheeled guns for the Indian Army. Offering the K-9 Vajra-T gun, the winning team beat out Rosoboronexport’s MSTA howitzer.

Today’s Video

• Coming soon the the Indian Army, the K-9 Vajra-T: