Ideas on Europe Blog

As the climate continues to change at alarming rates, many have lost faith in traditional international approaches to address the issue. As a result, climate policy innovation and associated experimentation are en vogue.[1] The thinking goes that if old approaches are perceived to be failing, we need new and innovative ones. The hope is that successful innovations will spread as policy-makers, civil society and businesses learn from one another. But what do we know about climate change governance experimentation, and are these hopes justified?

On the face of it nobody directly opposes the idea of experimenting. After all, experimentation drives tremendous progress in the natural sciences, so why should we not apply the approach more widely to governance? The idea also fits well with the evidence-based policy-making agenda, another fashionable idea, holding that experiments may be a key source of evidence for policy-makers. However, there is more to experimentation than readily meets the eye. A recent workshop on “Climate Change Policy and Governance: Initiation, Experimentation, Evaluation” organised by the Innovations in Climate Governance (INOGOV) research network including 26 European countries, focused on how experiments materialise and challenge existing policies, practices and regulatory systems. Thirty scholars from Europe, the US and Australia discussed new empirical and theoretical analyses, showing how diverse the topic of experimentation is. The emerging discussions highlighted that conducting, interpreting and using experiments may not be as straightforward as one may think.

First of all: what are experiments? There were numerous partly conflicting ideas among the workshop participants. Some broadly viewed all policies as potentially failing experiments in the sense that no one can ever exactly foresee policy outcomes in complex socio-ecological systems. Others took more narrow definitions as a starting point with specific criteria that echo statistical experimental designs. Such experiments can, for example, explore a novel policy instrument that is applied and evaluated in restricted regions before being adopted nationally. Our understanding of experiments will affect how we approach and use them. Crucially, experimenting also raises tricky issues of risks, duties and wider social implications. For example, who is to blame if a governance experiment goes wrong and who will bear the consequences? Leaving a legacy, experiments are never fully reversible. They will, at the very least, provide a new perspective on what is doable, and after that the world is never completely the same.

In many cases the purpose of experimenting is nothing short of learning how to change the world. But a single experiment will not suffice – multiple and repeated experiments in different places may be necessary. Crucial issues thus relate to learning and transferability. How can the experiences gained in one experiment be transferred to another? Some will argue that the context is so decisive that possibilities for duplication are limited,[2] but we know from practical experience that policy solutions are copied and multiplied within and across sectors and countries. Thus ‘upscaling’ happens. The mechanisms of these ‘upscaling’ processes and transitions are an area of considerable theoretical and practical interest.

On the whole, the workshop highlighted that there are many outstanding questions to answer before we may experiment our way out of climate change. This is of course not stopping politicians from touting experimentation as a potential solution to various societal issues: for example, following a recent national election, Finland’s Prime Minister-elect Juha Sipilä has declared that Finland should become an “experimental society”. But what it takes for an experimental society to ‘come true’ and whether this is even desirable cries out for in-depth research and an informed public debate.

With this year’s climate summit in Paris rapidly approaching, the INOGOV network is a good place to nurture this debate. Focusing on where climate governance innovations originate, how they diffuse and what effects they have, it seeks to bring together communities of scholars, as well as civil society and businesses, in order to accelerate humanity’s search for solutions to address climate change. Whether experimentation is among these solutions is one of the critical questions the network will discuss.

[1] See also Castán Broto, V. &  Bulkeley 2013. A survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities. Global Environmental Change 23: 92–102

[2] This has been a lively debate in for example development studies. Thus D.K. Forbes in ‘The geography of underdevelopment’ (Croom Helm 1984) refers to the impossibility to replicate development success stories.

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This is the second of two blogposts on Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
The first one is available here.

Only 6 cents the word!

Ten years after the premature death of his constitutional treaty, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, now aged 89, is still an undiscouraged believer in the European project. Concerned by the current crisis of the European Union, he proposes in a recent book a project names ‘Europa’, which an inspired plume – himself or the publisher? – felt the need to subtitle ‘Europe’s last chance’.

The utter cliché of this subtitle notwithstanding – after all, even Jean-Claude Juncker thought it was necessary to dramatize his mandate at the helm of the Commission with the same words – an essay by Giscard always deserves a look. He certainly has a record of European leadership that spans from the 1970s, when he was a driver of both enlargement – paving the way for Greece, Spain, and Portugal – and deepening of the community, through the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS).

It turns out that only one third of this already very thin book (184 pages printed in very large font, hardly more than 30,000 words sold at € 16.90, which makes roughly 6 cents the word) is actually dedicated to the ‘Europa’ project that gave the publication its title. The rest is a kind of recapitulative short-cut of how the EU got where it is today. Apart from some nice anecdotes – like the moment in Bremen in 1978 when he invented an English name for the forthcoming ‘European currency unit’ with the aim of producing an acronym that would recall a French medieval currency – there is strictly speaking no added value in these fireside souvenirs.

The ‘Europa’ project’ itself is, in a nutshell, yet another draft for a two-speed Europe, with a core of 12 in a Union of 28. The core would naturally work towards fiscal harmonisation by 2030, backed up by a European treasury (issuing Eurobonds) and based on a principle of redistributive solidarity. Note that Giscard does not anticipate any major popular resistance to fiscal union – on the contrary, he expects it to be very well received by the European people – and he foresees harmonisation of retirement age in the long run.

‘Europa’ would be run by a ‘directoire’ (in parallel to the EU and Eurozone institutions). For reasons of democratic legitimacy it would also convene a ‘Congress of the people’ composed of MEPs and national MPs. The tone of the proposal is itself very ‘directoire’-like, especially when it comes to identify the eligible members of the future core-Europa: ‘The participation of Ireland and Finland may also be envisaged’. Good to know! Envisaged by whom? Under what conditions? Would they even be asked?

The book is rife with self-congratulation: oh, the days when Helmut Schmidt and himself created and managed the European Council! Of course, their successors at the heads of today’s European governments entirely lack the necessary leadership qualities and the indispensible vision (he does not mention that his friend Helmut, who wrote the preface to the book, used to advise each politician with ‘visions’ to go and consult an ophthalmologist).

The author also has a strong tendency to over-simplify things (despite, obviously, better knowledge). Three examples: 1) Needless to say that Chirac and only Chirac is to blame for the French ‘no’ vote to the constitutional treaty in May 2005. 2) The resurgence of national identities is mainly due to the scapegoating of Brussels by the current generation of European politicians. 3) if Europe is perceived as ‘the sick man of the planet’, the main reason is ‘permanent Euro-bashing by the Anglo-Saxon press’.

It saddens me to write this, but reading this project is an experience that comes close to marking an undergraduate term paper while not being able to suppress some deep sighs. Had I to mark this text, what would I be supposed to put in the margin of sentences like: ‘Thus the project of Robert Schuman was approved by six states, more or less from the Holy Roman Empire. These were the founding countries. They have remained so until today.’

Unlike the average undergraduate student, however, Giscard is touring schools and media with his term paper, as if there was any serious chance of seeing his project only even discussed by any current European leader. He has also set up a website, as thin as the book itself, which even in the core-Europa of twelve, only Francophone readers will be able to consult (perhaps that’s because he is, as he proudly recalls on the front page, a member of the Académie Française). If you do happen to be among these, you can consult or download the book for free (click here).

This post should by no means be understood as cheap scorn or mockery. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing has great merits both for European integration and for modernising the French Republic without being prisoner to ideological dogma (some of his reforms were more leftist and lasting than Mitterrand’s!). And his advocacy in favour of European integration is sincere and wholehearted. One untimely, uninspired, and unnecessary book will not change this record.

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Changing working conditions at European universities are studied in a recent book ‘Academic Work and Careers in Europe – Trends, Challenges, Perspectives’, edited by Tatiana Fumasoli, Gaële Goastellec and Barbara Kehm. Tatiana Fumasoli tells about the main findings presented in the book.

Q1: What have been the rationales and origins of this book?

The book explores the impact of changes in governance, work and careers in European higher education. It observes empirically how and to what extent a European higher education profession is emerging through convergence, standardization and formalization of academic careers.  The book is an output of the project EuroAC – The Academic Profession in Europe: Responses to Societal Challenges, funded by the European Science Foundations and national research councils coordinated by University of Kassel (Germany). It originates from the qualitative data gathered in 8 European countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Croatia, Ireland, Poland, Romania and Switzerland) by the 8 national partners. Around 500 interviews were conducted with university leaders, administrators and academics.

Q2: What are the main common trends in academic work and careers in Europe?

Standardization and formalization of recruitment, promotion and evaluation, as well as of PhD supervision is everywhere apparent and an international dimension is nowadays – at least ideally – integrated in European universities, for instance in hiring, conducting research, teaching.

Competition for academic positions, research grants, publications is increasing at all levels and takes place within and across universities and countries. Such competitive pressures shape increasing differences between global players (countries, universities, academics) and regional players. Thus elite universities, research groups and academics are connecting more among themselves and less within their institutional and national settings.

Q3: What are the main differences between the eight European countries you analyze in the book?

In general the increasing institutional autonomy of universities across Europe has shaped complex dynamics that are not completely under the control of states. The stagnating or shrinking public funding has created unequal distribution of resources among universities, which hold different adaptive capacities.

Concretely, national and local practices are still important in the organization of academic careers. In this sense, the landscape of a European academic profession is still rather fragmented. The recent financial crisis has affected European countries quite differently.

Q4: Are the main policies on academic careers made at national and institutional levels or does the European Union also play a role?

There is no doubt that the EU is influencing the restructuring of academic careers and work. First, the standards of research for participating in the Framework Programs (on-going Horizon 2020) have diffused across EU members and ERA associate members. Second, the Commission has been involved in the Bologna process quite early. Third, the EU has contributed to enhance an understanding (and a legitimating role) of higher education institutions in the construction of Europe of Knowledge. This has focused the public debate also on the role of academics and their contribution to societies. Finally, the idea of a free market of knowledge is met with a certain criticism by most academics, who have to balance personal and family life with long years of uncertainty before achieving a permanent position.

Q5: What are the main messages for policy-makers and practitioners?

Europe has excellent academics in all scientific fields, however their careers and trajectories are prone to chance and to sometimes idiosyncratic choices. There is a waste of resources in forming academics, having them compete for positions, publications, research funding, that is arguably not efficient. If the knowledge society is key to socio-economic development, the role and organization of academic careers should be addressed more structurally at European and national levels.

Professional organizations like universities rely on individuals (that is academics) for producing knowledge and not on technologies, structures, routines, which can be designed. From this point of view it is astonishing how few universities and higher education systems have addressed thoroughly academic careers in order to improve their performance. There is a tension between the traditional professional control on careers and the demands for more effective use of resources that should be addressed.

Q6: What would be interesting avenues for future research? 

Academics are professionals with multiple affiliations and loyalties, as they are embedded in higher education institutions and discipline-based communities; as such they strive to protect their academic freedom and control of their teaching and research activities.

The European dimension has become an arena where academic professional interests can be advocated and promoted. It is thus relevant to investigate how academics engage in European policy processes, how they link across Europe to other actors and arenas, and which factors empower and constrain them in protecting their professional interests. Given the increasing number of European academic associations, academies, scientific journals we should scrutinize how the integration of higher education and research at national and European level is affected.

Academics’ engagement in European policy processes will be the topic of the panel “Transnational actors in the multi-level governance of knowledge policies” in the section “The Global Governance of Knowledge Policies: Europe of Knowledge in Context” at the ECPR General Conference in Montreal, August 2015.

Dr. Tatiana Fumasoli is a Post-doctoral fellow at the ARENA Centre for European Studies, and an assistant professor at the Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Oslo. Previously she was a researcher at the Institute of Management of University of Lugano (Switzerland), where she received her PhD with a thesis on strategy of higher education institutions. Tatiana presently works in the Flagship Project, funded by the Research Council of Norway, and investigating institutional change dynamics in European universities. Her interest lies on strategic agency of political and social actors and on its implications for policy and governance of higher education and research. Her work has appeared, among others, in Higher Education, Minerva, Higher Education Policy, International Journal of Public Administration, and with Springer and Palgrave.

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Giscard between two ESSCA students (14 April 2005).

Ten years ago, in mid-April 2005, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing came to Angers in order to exchange with ESSCA students. Just six weeks before the French referendum on the constitutional treaty his visit was part of a campaign for an increasingly uncertain ‘yes’ vote. Given his role in chairing – with diplomatic skills and political know-how - the European Convention between March 2002 and June 2003, his defense of the treaty was more than legitimate and the amphitheatre was crowded.

The former president of the Republic was visible delighted to find himself with a handful of young students who, in turn, were visibly very impressed with the charism of the 79-years-old elder statesman. After a bit of coquetry on his age, he staunchly defended his text,hiding his disappointment with the manner in which the substance of the original treaty had been watered down by the European Councils in 2003 and 2004. Rather helplessly, he had witnessed how the ‘big’ member-states wanted to modify the voting rights, how the ‘small’ member-states were all up in arms about ‘their’ commissioner, how the catholic member-states insisted on a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe, and how Poland, Spain and the UK went each on a major ego-trip. All that remained of the rather audacious ‘Constitution’ of the summer of 2003 was a much diluted and quite indigestible treaty, unreadable for every citizen who did not have the good luck to have doctorate in international law.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, Giscard d’Estaing played the true believer and defended the virtues of his ‘child’, as he called it, with conviction. He even went so far as to find this pseudo-constitution ‘as perfect as the French constitution’. A comparison, which in retrospect sounds like a Freudian slip of the tongue, given that both texts are at the origin of numerous and lasting deadlocks in France and Europe.

Moreover, this attitude of assimilating any criticism of the treaty, however well-founded and differentiated it may have been, to the old anti-European reflexes of the political extremes, could only be perceived, in the already tense atmosphere of the referendum campaign, as yet another evidence of élitist condescension. And, thus, contribute to strengthen the ‘no’ camp.

Needless to say, Giscard had no trouble convincing ESSCA’s students of the merits of both the constitutional treaty and European integration in general. Smart, young, multilingual individuals, with high-level academic training and an international mindset, are part of those Europeans for whom Europe (just like globalisation) does not stand for economic threat and identity angst, but for professional opportunity and cultural diversity.

On the same day, Jacques Chirac, French president for ten years already, convened a panel of 83 young citizens between 18 and 30 years old to the Elysée Palace in order to debate on Europe. It was a disaster. Far from preaching to an already convinced audience, the president had to resort to papal phrases like ‘Don’t be afraid!’. The sentence that more than any other gave evidence to his flagrant inability to understand the prevailing scepticism was his avowal of total lack of understanding of the young people’s ‘pessimism’ with regard to France and Europe: ‘Je ne le comprends pas!’, he sighed, incredulously and helplessly messing up a communication exercise that had seemed so simple and had turned so sour.

Could there have been a better illustration of the socio-economic and generational rift between the French élites and the people they were supposed to represent? Six weeks later, the constitutional treaty was voted into the dustbin of history with almost 55% of the votes.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute, ESSCA School of Management.

This is the first of two blogposts on Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.

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Since 2010, the European responses to the global financial and economic crises have been dominated by a narrative of austerity. European governments have sought to bolster confidence in their economies by rolling back public spending. Austerity may pose an existential crisis for the European Union (EU), both regarding austerity-hit states being forced to leave the single currency (think Greece), and the EU’s willingness to be a global leader on key issues outside economic growth (think climate change). The extent to which austerity is necessarily a barrier to climate ambition is a crucial component of our research, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit in the French capital, Paris, has been identified as a crucial opportunity to foster ambitious climate goals. Will the EU be a leader during the negotiations, or fade into the background?

The Barroso Commissions

While US leadership in environmental policy declined during the 1990s, the EU moved to position itself as a global pioneer of climate policy, particularly following the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997.[1] International climate policy provided the EU with a niche into which it could forge its global identity. The European Commission is the ‘commissioner’, or source, of all EU legislation. Under the guidance of José Manuel Barroso (2004-2014), the win-win objective of ‘green growth’ dominated Commission thinking around climate change. Here, the Porter hypothesis[2] underlined the belief that by stimulating innovation, environmental policy can be economically beneficial. The EU Climate and Energy Package, with its ‘20-20-20’ targets, was a notable centrepiece. In 2008, Barroso claimed confidently that the 20-20-20 targets were the most ambitious in the world; indeed, compared against other developed states, the EU’s targets remain world-leading. Moreover, the separation of the Commission’s Environment and Climate Change briefs in 2010 enabled Janez Potočnik and Connie Hedegaard, respectively, to push their remits onto the global political agenda. Thus, under Barroso, climate change leadership was a key signifier of the EU’s global identity.

The Juncker Commission

However, since the financial crisis of 2008, newer European states (such as Poland) have played an active role in blocking new proposals, while previously ambitious states (such as Germany) have shied away from leadership. (Moreover, officials within the Commission have also been known to block new legislation.) The narrative of climate change being a ‘win-win’ opportunity appears to have been replaced by a zero-sum framing of economy first, everything else second. Crucial to this new context were the changes of 2014, seeing the formation of both a new European Parliament and a new European Commission. Jean-Claude Juncker touted climate change leadership amongst his key messages during his successful election as the new Commission President during the summer of 2014. However, his pro-austerity leadership as President of the EuroGroup between 2011 and 2014 suggests that he will continue to favour austerity measures. As such, a reduction in ambition regarding climate change may not solely be a reflection of member state preferences, but also an indication of the new Commission expressing its own agency.

The new Commission and Paris 2015

The new structure of the Commission under Juncker appears to give a lower priority to climate change than under Barroso. So how will this reduced ambition manifest itself in the run up to the Paris climate talks? Let’s identify the internal and external impacts. Internally, the EU may formulate fewer and less ambitious climate policies, preferring instead to focus on facilitating economic growth. The Circular Economy bill, for example, was dropped in December 2014, shortly after the new Commission took office. By restricting new climate legislation, the EU may hold a less credible leadership position with which to participate in international negotiations. Moreover, under the auspices of austerity, the EU may reduce spending on its own climate projects, hindering the capacity of the EU to encourage other states to follow its lead. For instance, the EU will not ring fence funds to pay for projects that boost energy efficiency in buildings, instead encouraging the private sector to decide where funding should be allocated. The EU member states have committed, however, to a minimum 40% reduction of emissions by 2030, based on 1990 levels.  Although this 40% target is the overall percentage reduction to be met by the EU rather than an obligation for every state to achieve individually, it provides a relatively ambitious starting point for negotiations with states outside the EU.

Externally, the new structure of the Commission will allow less time for the Commissioner responsible for climate change, Manuel Arias Cañete, to build ambitious coalitions in the run up to the Paris talks. Also responsible for energy policy – a significant portfolio in its own right – Cañete is tasked with responding to fluctuating oil and gas prices, opposition across Europe to the construction of new nuclear reactors and energy security challenges. Overseeing these developments is likely to limit Cañete’s ability to prioritise climate change effectively. Second, with budgets squeezed within EU member states, the EU may feel unable to offer significant funding to developing states for climate change mitigation and adaptation. With the UN’s Green Climate Fund struggling to reach its $100 billion target, having been designed to release funds from developed to developing states for climate mitigation and adaptation, a lack of leadership from developed states could hinder significant policy action. As such, regardless of how much the Commission would wish to prioritise climate change, its hands are likely to be tied by its member states’ unwillingness to spend.

Next steps

2015 is a critical year for climate change mitigation. For the past 15 years, the EU has been at the forefront of climate negotiations. But with a new European Commission and austerity measures being implemented in EU member states, the EU may not assume its traditional leadership position at this year’s international negotiations. Will the EU be willing and able to lead in Paris? If not, which states will press for ambitious targets? And how will the EU define its international reputation going forward, if not through climate change? The answers to these questions will not only shape the future of the EU, but the future of the planet as well.

[1] Kelemen, R. D. (2010). Globalizing European Union environmental policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(3), 335-349.

[2] Porter, M. E., & Van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 97-118.

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So we now have most of the major manifestos for the General Election. None of them – possibly bar the LibDems -  give me much cause to change my mind about the continuing failure of British politicians to talk about the detail of European integration.

UKIP’s effort - released today - is a case in point. On one hand, it’s very clear that it thinks the UK should leave the EU, but on the other – as noted by FleetStreetFox - they want to retain a whole pile of policy areas that they think are beneficial. Such a position is very much that of Boris Johnson on cake.

But the more interesting point that I’ve taken from the manifesto is the continuing evolution of UKIP as a party.

I’ve been interested in the party almost as long as it’s been in existence: I seem to recall writing about them for my Masters dissertation back in the mid-1990s. As such, I’ve witnessed quite closely how things have changed. And change they have.

My interest comes from their euroscepticism: in the early days that meant I was interesting in everything that the party did, since it did nothing but oppose the EU. It’s one original policy was to contest European elections, then not take those seats, but instead to provoke a constitutional crisis that would in turn cause the UK to leave. Not a sensible plan, but a simple one.

This only lasted until the departure/ejection of the party’s founder, Alan Sked – a man you’ll be hearing from over the next few weeks as he tells you why you shouldn’t vote UKIP – whereupon the policy switched to taking up EP seats, and using them to secure funds, gain inside information and use it to forment further euroscepticism (I paraphrase slightly).

It was only in the early 2000s that the party really began to develop other policies. Immigration – which has become the central policy plank – started as an issue in the wake of the 2004 EU enlargement.

But even five years ago, the party wasn’t really about policies, but about disgruntlement: recall the Nigel Farage disowned the 2010 manifesto last year as ‘drivel’. It was indeed a poorly conceived and articulated document, with stuff thrown in willy-nilly (I paraphrase even more slightly than before) and no-one really cared about it.

Today we have a real contrast. A much more profession document - pace some photoshopping - with independent costings and a lot more focus on constructive policies. Strikingly, UKIP policy on the EU is withdrawal after a referendum, i.e. even the election of a UKIP government wouldn’t necessarily secure exit from the EU. This reads very much as a gambit for a party that it looking to join a coalition (hence also the softening of Farage’s line on Cameron as Tory party leader).

In short, UKIP now looks much more like a normal political party.

And that’s a problem, for two reasons.

Firstly, a key part of the party’s appeal has been its heterodox approach: ‘common sense politics’, ‘not like the others’, etc. Farage is the consummate non-politician, despite being a classic politician in so many ways. Becoming more normal thus comes with a clear potential of costing the party some of its vote, especially those who are disaffected with politics.

Secondly, it further exposes the lack of ideological consistency within the party. Common sense is all well and good, but what basis does the party decide its policies? Again, the tension between the libertarians (essentially Carswell and Reckless, with Farage and a few others leaning that way) and the non-libertarians (coming from across the political spectrum) remains. Regardless of whether Farage is able to retain the leadership, this will be a critical debate post-election for the party. That Reckless has been almost invisible in the party campaign to date suggests that the personality politics also remain a problem/challenge.

Some commentators have talked about the election as a staging post for UKIP: using a strong showing to build for 2020. However, for that to work, the party will have to continue to evolve, in rather significant ways. A year ago, I doubted if that was possible. UKIP has struggled with leadership challenges before, but never under quite the spotlight that it has been so successful in courting.

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