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As anyone with a smartphone knows, the Justice Department indicted former President Donald J. Trump yesterday.  While the US Government has yet to release information about the indictment, Trump’s lawyers have told media outlets that he will be tried for his mishandling of national security documents and for his subsequent obstruction of attempts by the National Archives and the FBI to repossess those files.  The move makes Trump the first former US president to be formally charged with a federal crime.

The indictment comes at a perilous time for American democracy.  Trump himself apparently considers the charges a sign that the American democratic experiment is failing, as his post-indictment communication on social media suggests.  The Justice Department move, he said, is part of a “Continuing attack on our once free and fair elections.  The USA is now a Third World nation, a nation in decline.”  More neutral observers worry that democratic norms are under pressure in the post-Trump era and that the trend lines are not promising for American democracy.  Freedom House, which ranks democracy around the world, still rates the United States as “free,” but the “city on a hill” now falls behind many other countries, including almost all of the European Union, in rankings of global freedom.  Freedom House notes that “in recent years its democratic institutions have suffered erosion, as reflected in rising political polarization and extremism, partisan pressure on the electoral process, bias and dysfunction in the criminal justice system, harmful policies on immigration and asylum seekers, and growing disparities in wealth, economic opportunity, and political influence.”

Just what does the Trump indictment tell us about the state of American democracy?  Do the charges, as Trump suggests, represent a hijacking of American democracy by the “Thugs and Radical Left Monsters” who maliciously indicted the 45th president and presumptive candidate of the republican party in the 2024 elections?  Alternatively, do the charges demonstrate a remarkable resiliency in America’s institutions, even during a period of political stress?  The indictment is a mirror to American democracy.  What do we see?

Rule of law still prevails.  In many parts of the world, of course, rulers are never called into account for their misdeeds.  Here, a former president, until January 2021 arguably the most powerful man in the world, will answer for his alleged failure to respect laws concerning national security information.  President Trump has and will seek to portray the action as a “witch-hunt,” a politically motivated prosecution designed by the Biden Administration to eliminate a formidable political rival.  He will point to the fact that Biden himself was found to have improperly kept classified documents.  But the facts suggest that the judicial system is working as it should, no matter how challenging the political environment.  The Biden Administration has scrupulously avoided engagement in this case, going so far as to appoint a special prosecutor to conduct the investigation.  It is Trump’s apparently willful disregard for the law and deliberate obstruction of legal attempts to retrieve national security information, as opposed to a simple carelessness as in the case of Biden (or former Vice President Pence, or former Secretary of State Clinton), that is the basis for the prosecution.  The Justice Department appears to be treating Trump no better, and no worse, than other, non-presidential American citizens who have been charged with similar crimes.

Nevertheless, norms of behavior on the part of American leaders have been eroded.  Trump is not the first US president to find himself in legal jeopardy.  President Nixon avoided any potential criminal action related to Watergate with a pardon granted by his successor, and President Clinton settled with a special prosecutor rather than face charges over potential perjury in the Monica Lewinsky affair.  However, criminal activity, or the suggestion of it, has generally been seen in the past as disqualifying for political figures.  The traditional response of a national politician facing similar charges would have been to withdraw immediately from the presidential campaign to “prove my innocence and spend time with my family.”  Trump, though, is unrepentant, and in classic Trump style he has attempted to turn the charges into a political strength rather than a weakness.  In fact, Trump’s “victimization” by the “deep state” is a major pillar in his fundraising efforts.  As his campaign website urges supporters, “As the never-ending witch hunts heat up, please make a contribution to defend our movement and SAVE America…”

The republican party is largely failing to choose rule of law over narrow partisan interests.  Much of the republican party, and in particular the right wing of the party, has rallied to the former president’s support without taking the time to consider the merits of the case.  Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, for example, responded to the indictment thus: “Today is indeed a dark day for the United States of America. It is unconscionable for a president to indict the leading candidate opposing him.”  Most prominent republicans speak in terms of “weaponization” of the judicial system, even though they have not seen the actual indictment and much of the information we have seen suggests at least the possibility that Trump may have committed the crimes of which he is accused.  Even Trump’s main rivals for the republican nomination, whose interests are presumably served by the charges, largely dismiss the possibility that the charges are legitimate.  One candidate, Vivek Ramaswamy, has even promised to pardon Trump on the first day of his administration.  In a democratic, two-party system, the fact that one party refuses to allow the judicial process to run its course before seeking to undermine its legitimacy is worrisome.

The American electorate is so polarized that Trump’s supporters are actually energized by their candidate’s legal challenges.  Yesterday’s indictment is not Trump’s first.  In April, Trump was charged in New York with falsifying business records in relation to his alleged coverup of the Stormy Daniels affair.  His polling numbers with republican primary voters went up, considerably, after he was charged.  Immediately after the indictment, Trump’s support over main republican rival Ron DeSantis jumped to 57% to 31% (they had been neck and neck in some polling in February).  In a nutshell, Trump’s hard core of support within the republican base is unimpacted by the suggestion that the candidate might be a criminal.  In fact, May polling found that more republican voters felt more positively about Trump after charges were filed (27%) than less (22%). Essentially, MAGA republicans see charges not as a sign that the former president might be a law breaker but rather that the justness of his cause is so great that his political opponents will stop at nothing to bring him down.

The 2024 elections are yet another turning point in the American democratic process, and this indictment raises the stakes.  Trump may well win the republican nomination, and current polling has Trump and Biden essentially even in a rematch of the 2020 election.  Presumably, Trump’s case will go to trial before the general elections more than a year from now, and a conviction before the elections is a possibility.  Were Trump to continue his campaign as a convicted felon, or to win election, the challenges to American democracy could well be existential.

In August the SOEP organizes another online SOEPcampus workshop "Learn to use SOEP over lunch". On four Wednesdays in August (2nd, 9th, 16th, 23rd, 2023) this online workshop series offers a short online introduction to the data of the Socio-economic panel study. Participants will be introduced to the content of the study, its data-structure, sample selection and weighting strategy and they will be provided with an overview over the study documentation.
To join the workshop, please register by name and institution with contact person Janina Britzke and you will receive the login data the week from July 17 to 21, 2023 before the event. The workshop will be held in English and participation is free of charge. For further information read here.

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

This policy brief addresses the tensions between international and domestic interests on issues relating to partnerships on migration governance. It specifically discusses the Senegal–EU partnership on migration, highlighting the unequal relationship between the two partners and the implications of this relationship for the outcomes of migration policy.
The authors highlight how the EU’s use of funding to shape migration governance in Senegal creates ownership and accountability challenges for policies that are formulated at the initiative of external actors without much, if any, input by the government of Senegal and its people. The Senegalese government’s quest to attract funding from the EU through the partnership on migration results in it being more accountable to its external partners, and less accountable to the Senegalese people and local civil society organisations. The latter argue that the government needs to formulate a policy that addresses migration in Senegal in a comprehensive manner. Senegal’s financially weaker position vis-á-vis the EU does not, however, constrain the Senegalese government from exercising agency in pursuit of its own interests within the EU agenda. It seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the EU and its domestic priorities on migration. It pursues this goal by conflating rent-seeking behaviour with domestic interests that are at variance with the EU agenda – a strategy facilitated by the government’s reluctance to adopt and commit to an official document providing the framework for migration governance. The partnership between Senegal and the EU has the hallmarks of an interface characterised more by mutual co-option than by meaningful co-operation on international migration governance norms. This state of affairs is detrimental to the formulation of a comprehensive migration policy addressing various aspects of Senegal’s complex migration matrix. In order for the Senegal–EU partnership to go beyond the pursuit of narrow interests and address migration governance issues in a comprehensive manner, several changes are required.

- Donor states, especially in the EU, need to acknowledge the variety of migration challenges Sene¬gal is facing, and not limit their action to their own border externalisation interests. Instead of only engaging with the government, and a few “token” civil society organisations, funders need to take on board the views of significant civil society and local government actors who are more in touch with local realities.
- A holistic migration policy is urgently needed, which goes beyond the current focus, required by external actors, on emigration from Senegal. Such a migration policy has become even more indispensable to Senegal because of the Senegalese diaspora’s economic and political role in the country, its contribution to Senegal’s development, and the need for the Senegalese government to provide adequate responses to the diaspora’s needs. Such a policy is also needed because of the position of Senegal as a destination country for migrants from the West African subregion.
- The EU needs to transform its current approach to “partnerships” on the governance of migration to a model that is mutually beneficial. The current partnership functions as a vehicle through which the EU and its Member States pursue their own agenda. A more feasible partnership would entail identification of the partners’ respective priorities and co-operation on areas of mutual

This policy brief addresses the tensions between international and domestic interests on issues relating to partnerships on migration governance. It specifically discusses the Senegal–EU partnership on migration, highlighting the unequal relationship between the two partners and the implications of this relationship for the outcomes of migration policy.
The authors highlight how the EU’s use of funding to shape migration governance in Senegal creates ownership and accountability challenges for policies that are formulated at the initiative of external actors without much, if any, input by the government of Senegal and its people. The Senegalese government’s quest to attract funding from the EU through the partnership on migration results in it being more accountable to its external partners, and less accountable to the Senegalese people and local civil society organisations. The latter argue that the government needs to formulate a policy that addresses migration in Senegal in a comprehensive manner. Senegal’s financially weaker position vis-á-vis the EU does not, however, constrain the Senegalese government from exercising agency in pursuit of its own interests within the EU agenda. It seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the EU and its domestic priorities on migration. It pursues this goal by conflating rent-seeking behaviour with domestic interests that are at variance with the EU agenda – a strategy facilitated by the government’s reluctance to adopt and commit to an official document providing the framework for migration governance. The partnership between Senegal and the EU has the hallmarks of an interface characterised more by mutual co-option than by meaningful co-operation on international migration governance norms. This state of affairs is detrimental to the formulation of a comprehensive migration policy addressing various aspects of Senegal’s complex migration matrix. In order for the Senegal–EU partnership to go beyond the pursuit of narrow interests and address migration governance issues in a comprehensive manner, several changes are required.

- Donor states, especially in the EU, need to acknowledge the variety of migration challenges Sene¬gal is facing, and not limit their action to their own border externalisation interests. Instead of only engaging with the government, and a few “token” civil society organisations, funders need to take on board the views of significant civil society and local government actors who are more in touch with local realities.
- A holistic migration policy is urgently needed, which goes beyond the current focus, required by external actors, on emigration from Senegal. Such a migration policy has become even more indispensable to Senegal because of the Senegalese diaspora’s economic and political role in the country, its contribution to Senegal’s development, and the need for the Senegalese government to provide adequate responses to the diaspora’s needs. Such a policy is also needed because of the position of Senegal as a destination country for migrants from the West African subregion.
- The EU needs to transform its current approach to “partnerships” on the governance of migration to a model that is mutually beneficial. The current partnership functions as a vehicle through which the EU and its Member States pursue their own agenda. A more feasible partnership would entail identification of the partners’ respective priorities and co-operation on areas of mutual

This policy brief addresses the tensions between international and domestic interests on issues relating to partnerships on migration governance. It specifically discusses the Senegal–EU partnership on migration, highlighting the unequal relationship between the two partners and the implications of this relationship for the outcomes of migration policy.
The authors highlight how the EU’s use of funding to shape migration governance in Senegal creates ownership and accountability challenges for policies that are formulated at the initiative of external actors without much, if any, input by the government of Senegal and its people. The Senegalese government’s quest to attract funding from the EU through the partnership on migration results in it being more accountable to its external partners, and less accountable to the Senegalese people and local civil society organisations. The latter argue that the government needs to formulate a policy that addresses migration in Senegal in a comprehensive manner. Senegal’s financially weaker position vis-á-vis the EU does not, however, constrain the Senegalese government from exercising agency in pursuit of its own interests within the EU agenda. It seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the EU and its domestic priorities on migration. It pursues this goal by conflating rent-seeking behaviour with domestic interests that are at variance with the EU agenda – a strategy facilitated by the government’s reluctance to adopt and commit to an official document providing the framework for migration governance. The partnership between Senegal and the EU has the hallmarks of an interface characterised more by mutual co-option than by meaningful co-operation on international migration governance norms. This state of affairs is detrimental to the formulation of a comprehensive migration policy addressing various aspects of Senegal’s complex migration matrix. In order for the Senegal–EU partnership to go beyond the pursuit of narrow interests and address migration governance issues in a comprehensive manner, several changes are required.

- Donor states, especially in the EU, need to acknowledge the variety of migration challenges Sene¬gal is facing, and not limit their action to their own border externalisation interests. Instead of only engaging with the government, and a few “token” civil society organisations, funders need to take on board the views of significant civil society and local government actors who are more in touch with local realities.
- A holistic migration policy is urgently needed, which goes beyond the current focus, required by external actors, on emigration from Senegal. Such a migration policy has become even more indispensable to Senegal because of the Senegalese diaspora’s economic and political role in the country, its contribution to Senegal’s development, and the need for the Senegalese government to provide adequate responses to the diaspora’s needs. Such a policy is also needed because of the position of Senegal as a destination country for migrants from the West African subregion.
- The EU needs to transform its current approach to “partnerships” on the governance of migration to a model that is mutually beneficial. The current partnership functions as a vehicle through which the EU and its Member States pursue their own agenda. A more feasible partnership would entail identification of the partners’ respective priorities and co-operation on areas of mutual

So far, the US administration of Joe Biden has mainly formulated goals when it comes to nuclear arms control. Now, the US government has laid out how it plans to contain the growing risks of nuclear conflict and an arms race with Russia and China. In a much-anticipated speech, Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, offered arms control talks “without preconditions”. America’s nuclear modernisation and conventional weapons would bring Moscow and Beijing to the negotiating table, Sullivan said.

These plans raise too many questions for them to be considered a definitive strategy. But if they are merely the cornerstone of a broader approach to gradually increase pressure on Moscow and Beijing, it would make perfect sense for Washington to reaffirm its willingness to talk now.

Competitive arms control becomes official policy

The US arms control policy under Biden follows a competitive logic: Deterrence and arms control are seen as two sides of the same coin. Gone are the days when maintaining one’s own nuclear arsenal was perceived merely as a necessary temporary evil, until more auspicious times allowed for further reductions on the road to nuclear disarmament.

Under Biden, enhancing deterrence is meant to allow the United States to pursue nuclear arms control from a position of strength. The current government makes it clear that it does not view arms control as a means to overcome nuclear deterrence, but as a means to limit the capabilities of its rivals Russia and China so that the United States can leverage military dominance within the geopolitical great power struggle.

No clear incentives for China and Russia

While it was a good idea to reveal this logic in order to gain support internally and from allies and partners, the question is how Biden’s team plans to win over Russia and China to its competitive approach to nuclear arms control. If agreement really means that the United States retains many of the technological and military advantages, it makes little sense for China and Russia to engage in arms control. Yet Sullivan’s solutions were hardly convincing.

Moreover, it is not clear why the offer to engage in arms control talks “without preconditions” would be sufficiently tempting to induce Moscow and Beijing to change course. The unconditional American willingness to negotiate has rarely been questioned under Biden. Russia, on the other hand, has further curbed its already limited interest in arms control in recent years. Moscow welcomed Sullivan’s “no preconditions” offer, but demanded that Washington abandon its “fundamentally hostile stance towards Russia” – meaning its support for Ukraine. China, in turn, has consistently refused to even participate in arms control discussions.

Between slim chances and long-term goals

As for the Biden administration’s plans to increase pressure on Russia and China to engage in arms control, Sullivan had surprisingly little to offer. He emphasised the ongoing modernisation of the US nuclear arsenal, but pushed back against the consensus emerging among Republicans that the United States needs to increase its nuclear arsenal to keep pace with the combined arsenals of Russia and China. The United States also does not need any new nuclear weapons, and the Biden administration will continue to abide by the limits of the New START treaty as long as Russia does the same, Sullivan said. In addition to the existing nuclear options, the administration would rely more heavily on conventional precision strike weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, to keep its nuclear rivals at bay. Space and cyber capabilities would also allow the US to retain its lead in every domain.

Whether the already priced-in US nuclear arsenal and better conventional capabilities will suffice as leverage to nudge Russia and China to the nuclear negotiating table and force them to make concessions is questionable. The Biden administration itself does not seem to believe this. According to Sullivan’s own speech, Washington expects China to emerge as a near-peer nuclear competitor in the 2030s – despite America’s vaunted advantages in the nuclear, space, and cyber domains.

Nonetheless, strategic arms control policy has rarely been characterised by transparency. It is therefore possible that Sullivan’s vagueness is a sign that the US government is pursuing a much more complex and longer-term diplomatic approach. If this is the case, the goal is not to persuade Moscow and Beijing to change course, but to lay the groundwork for a subsequent pressure strategy. Today, the administration has openly declared its willingness to negotiate “without preconditions”, thereby earning the goodwill of allies, partners, and the international community and positioning itself as a responsible actor.

This would give Washington a more solid basis for saying in a few years that it had tried everything and now had to start exerting effective pressure on Russia and China. The United States could then credibly threaten to expand its conventional and nuclear arsenals while deploying missile defences. Such a strategy would entail, for example, increased funding for the US nuclear infrastructure, a fundamental rethinking of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles, and enhanced military ties with allies in Europe and Asia.

It is too early to say whether Sullivan’s speech is based solely on optimism and hope or whether it is the tip of a strategic iceberg. From a European perspective, the latter would be the better option.

Die religionspolitischen Neuerungen, die Usbekistans Präsident Mirziyoyev im Namen von Liberalisierung und Reform angestoßen hat, setzen in zentralen Aspekten die Politik seines Vorgängers fort. Unter dem Motto »Aufklärung gegen Unwissenheit« wurde der staatliche Zugriff auf das in Bildungs- und Forschungseinrichtungen vermittelte reli­giöse Wissen verstärkt. Das islamische Erbe wird offensiv für staatliche Repräsentation genutzt und als integraler Bestandteil der Nationalkultur aufgewertet. Die religionspolitischen Maßnahmen, die auf eine »Säkularisierung« des Islams durch Verwissenschaftlichung und Musealisierung hinauslaufen, erreichen weite Teile der Gesellschaft nicht. Für diese ist der Islam keine Wissenschaft, sondern geglaubtes Wissen, ein System von Regeln und Über­zeugungen, das ihnen dabei hilft, ein gottgefälliges Leben zu führen. Entsprechende Beratungsangebote stehen mit der Liberalisierung der Medienlandschaft massenhaft zur Verfügung. Dabei werden offensiv auch illiberale Überzeugungen propagiert. Um das religiöse Feld im Blick zu behalten, schreitet der Staat jedoch nur selektiv dagegen ein. Die religionspolitische Liberalisierung hat eine wachsende Islamisierung der Bevölkerung zur Folge. Der autoritäre Staat mit Präsident Mirziyoyev an der Spitze wird dadurch gefestigt. Repression bleibt das Mittel der Wahl, sollten islamische Milieus den säkularen Staat ernstlich herausfordern.

Der »One Health«-Ansatz hat auf verschiedenen Ebenen Eingang in politische Pro­zesse gefunden. Grund dafür ist das vermehrte Auftreten von Zoonosen, also Infek­tionskrankheiten, die wechselseitig zwischen Tier und Mensch übertragen werden können. One Health liegt an der Schnittstelle der Gesundheit von Menschen, Tieren und Ökosystemen und fordert transsektorale Lösungen. Geht es um die praktische Ausgestaltung und Umsetzung des Ansatzes durch WHO, Regionalorganisationen und Staaten, ergeben sich zahlreiche inhaltliche Fragen. Besonders in drei Kontexten wird One Health derzeit thematisiert: in den Verhandlungen zum geplanten Pandemie­ver­trag, in der Global Health Strategy der EU und in der Strategie der Bundesregie­rung zur globalen Gesundheit.

Mit diesem Policy Brief beleuchten wir den geopolitischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklungspolitik im indopazifischen Raum. Zunächst geht es um die Entstehung von Strategien zum Umgang mit dem Indopazifik und deren Überschneidungen mit geo- und entwicklungspolitischen Ansätzen traditioneller Entwicklungsakteure wie den Vereinigten Staaten und der Europäischen Union. Dann untersuchen wir, wie diese Narrative die entwicklungspolitischen Ansätze von China und Indien prägen. Im Anschluss erörtern wir, wie sich diese Dynamik in Schlüsselregionen des Indopazifiks, insbesondere in Südostasien, Südasien und auf den pazifischen Inseln, auswirkt. Wir erklären, warum der Wettbewerb zwar Chancen für diese Regionen bietet, positive Entwicklungsergebnisse sich aber nur dann erzielen lassen, wenn diese Chancen strategisch genutzt werden. Traditionell hat die Geopolitik immer Einfluss auf Entwicklungsdebatten und die Entwicklungspolitik gehabt, ein Fakt, der auch künftig Bestand haben dürfte (Power, 2019; Liao & Lee, 2022). Mit Chinas globalem Aufstieg im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich der geopolitische Wettbewerb auf wirtschaftlicher, strategischer und geopolitischer Ebene verstärkt. China wird zunehmend als Konkurrent traditioneller globaler und regionaler Mächte – etwa der Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union, Japans oder Australiens – wahrgenommen. In Reaktion darauf entstanden neue Strategien, um diesen Aufstieg zu lenken, ihn zu neutralisieren oder ihm entgegenzuwirken. Eine der Folgen dieser Entwicklung ist, dass die entstehenden Rahmenbedingungen und Strategien rund um den Indopazifik mittlerweile den Diskurs über die globale Geopolitik, einschließlich der Entwicklungspolitik, stark beein-flussen oder sogar dominieren. Der starke geopolitische Wettbewerb hat dazu geführt, dass Entwicklungspolitik zu einem umkämpften Thema geworden ist. Die Triebkräfte dieser Dynamik sind der rasante Aufstieg Chinas sowie die darauffolgende Entwicklung von Strategien für den Indopazifik, die diesem Aufstieg entgegenwirken sollen. Während dieser Wettbewerb zwischen und innerhalb von Ländern und Regionen zu Spaltungen führen kann, kann er auch zu mehr Multipolarität, mehr Eigenverantwortung der Part-nerländer und zu einem positiven Wettbewerb um Ergebnisse im Entwicklungsbereich führen. Der Wettbewerb und die zahlreichen damit verbundenen neuen Strategien, Ressourcen und Initiativen können Partnerländern die Möglichkeit bieten, sich Ressourcen und Zusagen für ihre eigene Entwicklungsagenda zu sichern. Anstatt „gezwungen“ zu sein, sich für eine Seite zu entscheiden, können Länder und Regionen versuchen, den geostrategischen Wettbewerb zu ihrem Vorteil zu nutzen – und tun dies bereits. Der Wettbewerb bietet Optionen und die Chance, an Entscheidungen teilzuhaben. Die Übernahme von Verantwortung für diese Strategien und Ressourcen sowie deren Steuerung können für die Partnerländer und -regionen jedoch eine große Herausforderung darstellen. Eine mögliche Lösung sind Absicherungsstrategien (Hedging), die aber auch Risiken bergen, vor allem, wenn politische Entscheidungen plötzlich alles verändern und Entwicklungserfolge in der Folge gefährdet werden. Zwar gibt es eine Fülle von Strategien für den indopazifischen Raum, die Visionen und Wege aufzeigen, wie internationale und regionale Mächte die wirtschaftlichen, diplomatischen, sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Beziehungen zu den Ländern des indopazifischen Raums stärken sollten. Allerdings ist es an den indopazifischen Ländern selbst, eigene Strategien zu entwickeln, die Visionen und Ziele für die Zusammenarbeit mit Großmächten und anderen Akteuren enthalten, die sich um ihre Partnerschaft bemühen.

Mit diesem Policy Brief beleuchten wir den geopolitischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklungspolitik im indopazifischen Raum. Zunächst geht es um die Entstehung von Strategien zum Umgang mit dem Indopazifik und deren Überschneidungen mit geo- und entwicklungspolitischen Ansätzen traditioneller Entwicklungsakteure wie den Vereinigten Staaten und der Europäischen Union. Dann untersuchen wir, wie diese Narrative die entwicklungspolitischen Ansätze von China und Indien prägen. Im Anschluss erörtern wir, wie sich diese Dynamik in Schlüsselregionen des Indopazifiks, insbesondere in Südostasien, Südasien und auf den pazifischen Inseln, auswirkt. Wir erklären, warum der Wettbewerb zwar Chancen für diese Regionen bietet, positive Entwicklungsergebnisse sich aber nur dann erzielen lassen, wenn diese Chancen strategisch genutzt werden. Traditionell hat die Geopolitik immer Einfluss auf Entwicklungsdebatten und die Entwicklungspolitik gehabt, ein Fakt, der auch künftig Bestand haben dürfte (Power, 2019; Liao & Lee, 2022). Mit Chinas globalem Aufstieg im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich der geopolitische Wettbewerb auf wirtschaftlicher, strategischer und geopolitischer Ebene verstärkt. China wird zunehmend als Konkurrent traditioneller globaler und regionaler Mächte – etwa der Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union, Japans oder Australiens – wahrgenommen. In Reaktion darauf entstanden neue Strategien, um diesen Aufstieg zu lenken, ihn zu neutralisieren oder ihm entgegenzuwirken. Eine der Folgen dieser Entwicklung ist, dass die entstehenden Rahmenbedingungen und Strategien rund um den Indopazifik mittlerweile den Diskurs über die globale Geopolitik, einschließlich der Entwicklungspolitik, stark beein-flussen oder sogar dominieren. Der starke geopolitische Wettbewerb hat dazu geführt, dass Entwicklungspolitik zu einem umkämpften Thema geworden ist. Die Triebkräfte dieser Dynamik sind der rasante Aufstieg Chinas sowie die darauffolgende Entwicklung von Strategien für den Indopazifik, die diesem Aufstieg entgegenwirken sollen. Während dieser Wettbewerb zwischen und innerhalb von Ländern und Regionen zu Spaltungen führen kann, kann er auch zu mehr Multipolarität, mehr Eigenverantwortung der Part-nerländer und zu einem positiven Wettbewerb um Ergebnisse im Entwicklungsbereich führen. Der Wettbewerb und die zahlreichen damit verbundenen neuen Strategien, Ressourcen und Initiativen können Partnerländern die Möglichkeit bieten, sich Ressourcen und Zusagen für ihre eigene Entwicklungsagenda zu sichern. Anstatt „gezwungen“ zu sein, sich für eine Seite zu entscheiden, können Länder und Regionen versuchen, den geostrategischen Wettbewerb zu ihrem Vorteil zu nutzen – und tun dies bereits. Der Wettbewerb bietet Optionen und die Chance, an Entscheidungen teilzuhaben. Die Übernahme von Verantwortung für diese Strategien und Ressourcen sowie deren Steuerung können für die Partnerländer und -regionen jedoch eine große Herausforderung darstellen. Eine mögliche Lösung sind Absicherungsstrategien (Hedging), die aber auch Risiken bergen, vor allem, wenn politische Entscheidungen plötzlich alles verändern und Entwicklungserfolge in der Folge gefährdet werden. Zwar gibt es eine Fülle von Strategien für den indopazifischen Raum, die Visionen und Wege aufzeigen, wie internationale und regionale Mächte die wirtschaftlichen, diplomatischen, sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Beziehungen zu den Ländern des indopazifischen Raums stärken sollten. Allerdings ist es an den indopazifischen Ländern selbst, eigene Strategien zu entwickeln, die Visionen und Ziele für die Zusammenarbeit mit Großmächten und anderen Akteuren enthalten, die sich um ihre Partnerschaft bemühen.

Mit diesem Policy Brief beleuchten wir den geopolitischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklungspolitik im indopazifischen Raum. Zunächst geht es um die Entstehung von Strategien zum Umgang mit dem Indopazifik und deren Überschneidungen mit geo- und entwicklungspolitischen Ansätzen traditioneller Entwicklungsakteure wie den Vereinigten Staaten und der Europäischen Union. Dann untersuchen wir, wie diese Narrative die entwicklungspolitischen Ansätze von China und Indien prägen. Im Anschluss erörtern wir, wie sich diese Dynamik in Schlüsselregionen des Indopazifiks, insbesondere in Südostasien, Südasien und auf den pazifischen Inseln, auswirkt. Wir erklären, warum der Wettbewerb zwar Chancen für diese Regionen bietet, positive Entwicklungsergebnisse sich aber nur dann erzielen lassen, wenn diese Chancen strategisch genutzt werden. Traditionell hat die Geopolitik immer Einfluss auf Entwicklungsdebatten und die Entwicklungspolitik gehabt, ein Fakt, der auch künftig Bestand haben dürfte (Power, 2019; Liao & Lee, 2022). Mit Chinas globalem Aufstieg im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich der geopolitische Wettbewerb auf wirtschaftlicher, strategischer und geopolitischer Ebene verstärkt. China wird zunehmend als Konkurrent traditioneller globaler und regionaler Mächte – etwa der Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union, Japans oder Australiens – wahrgenommen. In Reaktion darauf entstanden neue Strategien, um diesen Aufstieg zu lenken, ihn zu neutralisieren oder ihm entgegenzuwirken. Eine der Folgen dieser Entwicklung ist, dass die entstehenden Rahmenbedingungen und Strategien rund um den Indopazifik mittlerweile den Diskurs über die globale Geopolitik, einschließlich der Entwicklungspolitik, stark beein-flussen oder sogar dominieren. Der starke geopolitische Wettbewerb hat dazu geführt, dass Entwicklungspolitik zu einem umkämpften Thema geworden ist. Die Triebkräfte dieser Dynamik sind der rasante Aufstieg Chinas sowie die darauffolgende Entwicklung von Strategien für den Indopazifik, die diesem Aufstieg entgegenwirken sollen. Während dieser Wettbewerb zwischen und innerhalb von Ländern und Regionen zu Spaltungen führen kann, kann er auch zu mehr Multipolarität, mehr Eigenverantwortung der Part-nerländer und zu einem positiven Wettbewerb um Ergebnisse im Entwicklungsbereich führen. Der Wettbewerb und die zahlreichen damit verbundenen neuen Strategien, Ressourcen und Initiativen können Partnerländern die Möglichkeit bieten, sich Ressourcen und Zusagen für ihre eigene Entwicklungsagenda zu sichern. Anstatt „gezwungen“ zu sein, sich für eine Seite zu entscheiden, können Länder und Regionen versuchen, den geostrategischen Wettbewerb zu ihrem Vorteil zu nutzen – und tun dies bereits. Der Wettbewerb bietet Optionen und die Chance, an Entscheidungen teilzuhaben. Die Übernahme von Verantwortung für diese Strategien und Ressourcen sowie deren Steuerung können für die Partnerländer und -regionen jedoch eine große Herausforderung darstellen. Eine mögliche Lösung sind Absicherungsstrategien (Hedging), die aber auch Risiken bergen, vor allem, wenn politische Entscheidungen plötzlich alles verändern und Entwicklungserfolge in der Folge gefährdet werden. Zwar gibt es eine Fülle von Strategien für den indopazifischen Raum, die Visionen und Wege aufzeigen, wie internationale und regionale Mächte die wirtschaftlichen, diplomatischen, sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Beziehungen zu den Ländern des indopazifischen Raums stärken sollten. Allerdings ist es an den indopazifischen Ländern selbst, eigene Strategien zu entwickeln, die Visionen und Ziele für die Zusammenarbeit mit Großmächten und anderen Akteuren enthalten, die sich um ihre Partnerschaft bemühen.