Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Increased policy coherence and integrated implementation are necessary to address pressing development problems that cut across different sectors. Meeting these demands, as called for by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, requires institutional innovation. Based on the comparative analysis of 137 countries, this paper investigates how governments have responded to this call and which contextual factors shape their institutional responses. We propose a four-dimensional typology to analyse the institutional set-ups for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), focusing on political leadership, horizontal integration across policy sectors, vertical integration across levels of government, and integration of societal stakeholders. We apply this framework to the descriptions of national SDG-implementation bodies provided by governments in their Voluntary National Review (VNRs) and use qualitative directed content analysis and regression modelling to investigate different driving factors of institutional design choices, including socio-economic development and political regime. Besides a strong commitment from the Centre of Government in most cases, our results show that ministries of the exterior and the environment have a dominant role, indicating that sustainability is not yet perceived holistically. Further, we find that the integration of subnational governments and societal actors is often under-institutionalised: while countries with higher levels of socio-economic development appear more likely to set up mechanisms suited to achieving cross-sectoral integration, political regime type seems to have little impact on institutional design choices for SDG implementation. Conceptually, this study offers a theory-led investigation of the institutional mechanisms for integrated SDG-implementation and the factors that drive institutional innovation or inertia. Empirically, by compiling the information in an original dataset, our study paves the way for future cross-national analysis on effective integrated SDG implementation and identifies entry points for inter- and transnational support of integrated SDG implementation in the context of development cooperation.

Increased policy coherence and integrated implementation are necessary to address pressing development problems that cut across different sectors. Meeting these demands, as called for by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, requires institutional innovation. Based on the comparative analysis of 137 countries, this paper investigates how governments have responded to this call and which contextual factors shape their institutional responses. We propose a four-dimensional typology to analyse the institutional set-ups for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), focusing on political leadership, horizontal integration across policy sectors, vertical integration across levels of government, and integration of societal stakeholders. We apply this framework to the descriptions of national SDG-implementation bodies provided by governments in their Voluntary National Review (VNRs) and use qualitative directed content analysis and regression modelling to investigate different driving factors of institutional design choices, including socio-economic development and political regime. Besides a strong commitment from the Centre of Government in most cases, our results show that ministries of the exterior and the environment have a dominant role, indicating that sustainability is not yet perceived holistically. Further, we find that the integration of subnational governments and societal actors is often under-institutionalised: while countries with higher levels of socio-economic development appear more likely to set up mechanisms suited to achieving cross-sectoral integration, political regime type seems to have little impact on institutional design choices for SDG implementation. Conceptually, this study offers a theory-led investigation of the institutional mechanisms for integrated SDG-implementation and the factors that drive institutional innovation or inertia. Empirically, by compiling the information in an original dataset, our study paves the way for future cross-national analysis on effective integrated SDG implementation and identifies entry points for inter- and transnational support of integrated SDG implementation in the context of development cooperation.

The context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has changed quite dramatically since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Interdependence now often means vulnerability, and new systemic conflicts call for a policy of European sovereignty and open strategic autonomy. Strategies of “de-risking” against revisionist countries and an economic security strategy that reduces vulnerability have become important.

Improving the efficiency of foreign policy-making

The German government is currently working together with the governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia and Spain within a Group of Friends on an initiative to extend qualified majority voting in the CFSP. It examines how the CFSP can be made more efficient within the framework of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

CFSP decisions are taken unanimously in the Council of the EU, with few exceptions. A single member state has a veto right and can block decisions. Yet unanimity allows third countries to prevent the EU from adopting common positions by instrumentalising the economic dependencies of individual countries for their own interests. With a qualified majority, 15 of 27 member states – representing 65 per cent of the EU population – would have to agree. Qualified majority voting blocks the gateway for third countries to overrule and divide the EU.

Against this background, the “Group of Friends” suggests the use of constructive abstentions in the Council (Article 31(1) TEU); the use of qualified majority voting for the implementation of decisions on civilian EU missions that were previously adopted unanimously in the Council (Article 31(2) TEU); the use of qualified majority voting for the implementation of declarations by the High Representative on behalf of the EU; and/or the use of the passerelle clause under Article 31(3) TEU for individual subject areas to define them as policy fields where qualified majority voting applies. Similar to the CSFP, emergency brakes should safeguard “vital and stated” national interests.

An important source of the political deadlock can be found in the fear that qualified majority voting would overstretch the readiness of member states to agree on highly sensitive issues. Some worry that its introduction would expand the already existing cleavages between Eastern (new) and Western (old) member states. These concerns must be taken seriously. An EU that is deeply divided over issues of war and peace will face hard times in maintaining its internal cohesiveness under conditions of external threat. Qualified majority voting should thus be pursued in resilience policies, apply a variable geometry among a coalition of willing states and proceed by implementing a roadmap that is open to all member states.

A roadmap for qualified majority voting

The EU must reframe the idea of the EU as a normative power in the CFSP, based on principles such as the rule of law, human rights and democracy, and the objectives set out in Article 21 TEU. Instead, it would be better to reframe the EU’s actions as a resilience power that is based on these principles and able to withstand crises, uphold international law and adapt to new challenges. The concept would help to broaden our perception of pressing challenges and extend the limits of a technical or legal understanding of the CFSP. It is open to the inclusion of the new tasks mentioned, that is, the strategic compass of the EU, such as countering hybrid threats, combating disinformation and defending against cyber attacks.

The EU should learn from past successes with variable geometry as it was first introduced with the Schengen Agreement in the 1980s. Schengen allowed for free movement among a few states and has shown that a coalition of willing states can act as an avant-garde, inviting other states to join. They would meet before formal Council meetings and use qualified majority voting to adopt a common position. The European Parliament would be invited to all meetings and would have different rights of participation, depending on the subject (e.g. consultation, co-decision or even veto). The Gymnich – an informal foreign affairs council meeting – already exists and can be further developed as a flexible format. Formalisation of the Gymnich proceeds by integrating qualified majority voting and the European Parliament’s consultation rights.

The success story of the EU market could be replicated by focusing on technical issues first and moving on to politically controversial issues. The new European foreign and security policy should distinguish between technical and politically sensitive issues. It should start with a phase that combines the least controversial instruments and includes preventive, cooperative and stabilising policies. Having successfully cooperated in this first phase, member states could then move on to the second phase and expand their ambitions to include restrictive measures. In the final stage, coercive measures would be added to complete the range of powers. The timing of the transition from one phase to the next would be decided by the member states and the European Parliament.

The harmonisation of European foreign and security policy is the ultimate goal. It helps to think about the unthinkable: the Europeanisation of European foreign and security policy, including the full parliamentarisation of this policy. The more far-reaching the decisions, the greater the demand for parliamentary control should be. The inter-parliamentary assembly for the CFSP, which consists of the national parliamentarians and the president of the European Parliament, only has an advisory role. The Bundestag is often not sufficiently informed about policy implementation. The European Parliament and the national parliaments have no powerful oversight mechanisms in place to follow these informal arrangements in European foreign policy-making. But if the European Parliament actually had a say in the CFSP, it would strengthen the acceptance of a transfer of sovereignty to the EU level.

 

The author is a member of the Group of Friends initiative’s Academic Sounding Board.

Le président du gouvernement espagnol (premier ministre) sortant Pedro Sanchez (Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol, PSOE) a annoncé le 29 mai la dissolution des Cortes generales, nom du Parlement qui comprend le Congrès des députés et le Sénat, et la convocation d'élections parlementaires anticipées ...

Suite à l'invasion russe en Ukraine, vous avez été à l'initiative d'une chaîne de solidarité. En quoi consiste-t-elle ? La nuit du 24 février 2022 m'a bouleversé car elle a montré à quel point la paix était fragile. J'ai ressenti le besoin de faire quelque chose et décidé, avec le Centre Européen...

Alors que jamais l'accumulation de différends entre les deux pays n'a été aussi publique, la France et l'Allemagne doivent retrouver la confiance et un dialogue approfondi, écrit Jean-Dominique Giuliani.

Bien que demeurent beaucoup d'incertitudes, il ne faut plus désormais exclure la dislocation de la Fédération de Russie, qui résulterait de l'agression ratée de l'Ukraine. Pourtant, l'Europe ne doit pas craindre ces éventuels bouleversements, écrit Jean-Dominique Giuliani. Elle doit seulement s'y préparer avec tous les moyens dont elle dispose.

Le Parti populaire (PP) conduit par Alberto Nunez Feijoo est donné favori des élections parlementaires anticipées le 23 juillet. Il est crédité de 32,1% des intentions de vote devant le Parti socialiste ouvrier (PSOE) du premier ministre sortant Pedro Sanchez (29%). Vox, parti populiste de droite, obtiendrait 13,9% et Sumar (S) (Additionner), coalition de partis de gauche radicale, 13,6%. Le reste des suffrages irait aux partis régionaux, nombreux en Espagne. Ces derniers peuvent priver le PP ou le PSOE de majorité. Lors des deux derniers scrutins parlementaires (2015 et 2019), les Espagnols ont dû retourner aux urnes quelques mois après de premières élections, celles-ci n'ayant pas permis de dégager de majorité. Le scénario sera-t-il le même en 2023 ?

L'Europe a changé... C'est ce que montre le "Rapport Schuman sur l'Europe, l'état de l'Union 2023", qui analyse les profonds changements intervenus en Europe, accélérés par le choc de la guerre en Ukraine. Cette 17e édition parue aux éditions Marie B. comporte 19 contributions de personnalités de haut niveau, dont celle d'Odile Renaud-Basso sur le modèle économique européen à l'épreuve de l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine. Elle comporte aussi 30 cartes originales et un ensemble complet de statistiques commentées. L'ouvrage est disponible en français en version papier et numérique, et en anglais au format numérique. Commandez-le...

Afin de répondre aux conséquences économiques et sociales de la pandémie de Covid-19, l'Union européenne a mis en place un fonds de relance de 672,5 milliards €. Les 26 et 27 juin, la Commission a livré une évaluation positive sur les demandes de Malte, de la France et de la Slovaquie visant à modifier leurs plans pour y ajouter un chapitre REPowerEU. La Commission a donné une évaluation préliminaire positive à la deuxième demande de paiement de la Roumanie pour un montant de 3,22 milliards €. La Fondation vous propose une carte interactive des plans pays par pays, pour en connaître les montants, les calendriers.

Les 27 chefs d'État et de gouvernement, réunis à Bruxelles les 29 et 30 juin, ont réitéré leur soutien à l'Ukraine et ont demandé à la Commission d'étudier la possibilité d'utiliser les biens russes saisis pour financer la reconstruction. Ils ont discuté de la politique économique et industrielle et ont appelé les institutions à adopter rapidement les mesures pour la compétitivité et la résilience . Dans des conclusions sur la migration publiées séparément en raison de l'opposition des dirigeants hongrois et polonais, le Conseil européen réitère sa volonté de casser le modèle économique des passeurs et de parvenir à un accord sur la gestion des demandeurs d'asile.

La Commission a annoncé, le 26 juin, que 41 nouveaux projets communs de recherche et développement bénéficieront d'une enveloppe de 832 millions € dans le cadre du Fonds européen de la défense. On compte notamment le projet E-NACSOS pour la défense aérienne et antimissile dans le domaine naval, le projet REACTII pour la gestion des moyens de guerre électronique dans le secteur aérien et le projet ODIN'S EYE II pour les capacités spatiales européennes.

La Commission a présenté, le 28 juin, son projet d'euro numérique, qui serait utilisé par les citoyens et les entreprises pour leurs paiements tout en présentant des garanties pour que les espèces restent accessibles.

La commission de l'environnement du Parlement européen a rejeté, le 27 juin, le projet de règlement sur la restauration de la nature, qui sera soumis à la prochaine séance plénière. Le même jour, la commission a adopté sa position sur la révision de la directive-cadre sur l'eau, la directive sur les eaux souterraines et la directive sur les normes de qualité environnementale. Elle a adopté un rapport sur la révision des directives sur la qualité de l'air. Les députés souhaitent notamment harmoniser les indices sur la qualité de l'air.