Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In February, the Islamic Republic announced its first confirmed cases of the coronavirus. Within weeks, Iran became the epicenter of Covid-19 in the Middle East, prompting a serious health emergency. However, the current crisis is posing more than just medical and economic challenges that Iran has to cope with while under external pressure from sanctions. It also holds long-term socio-political ramifications for the Iranian state.

Religion takes a back seat

The corona outbreak took root in the city of Qom, home to significant religious seminaries and sites. It is not surprising that the virus spread particularly fast in pilgrimage cities such as Qom and Mashhad. The Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad alone attracts around 20 million visitors every year. Yet, nearly four weeks passed before spiritual centers in the country were closed down. Although the decision was made out of medical necessity, it was by no means self-evident. It was the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic that the government had to close mosques, cancel Friday sermons, and prohibit pilgrimages. The fact that a state which self-identifies as an Islamic republic is denying access to religious sites in times of a crisis has caused major grievances among its social base. Protesters gathered in front of holy shrines in Qom and Mashhad, where they were supported by local clerics. Some of them forcibly tried to gain access to the sites, clashing with the police. The corona crisis puts the theocratic state in an unfamiliar and rather uneasy position. It is forced to suspend religious rituals that are an essential part of its political identity and, what is more, it has to actively prevent people from performing those rituals. Due to corona, religion has been put into the back seat for the time being with the approval of the highest religious authority of the state, the Supreme leader himself.

Secularism on the rise

The current crisis is having an impact on the status of religion in Iran, but it is also affecting faith. Closing down shrines that, for centuries, were considered places of immunity and healing, is tantamount to demystifying long-held Shiite beliefs. Amid the crisis, the trend toward alternative medicine, such as “Islamic remedies” that have been largely promoted by the state in recent years, had to give way to reality as well. The corona crisis has publicly exposed the clear-cut limits of faith and superstition. Some clerics already fear a theological crisis and are warning of an Iranian renaissance that would go hand in hand with people turning their backs on religion altogether. Supporters of a secular state, on the other hand, see the current situation as a chance for a gradual cultural transformation in Iran. This perspective is based on the notion that in Europe, too, a pandemic had once contributed to the disenchantment of religion, thus ultimately paving the way for the emergence of the Renaissance. Given the current conditions, the idea of secularism in particular is gaining new traction. A separation of the political and religious spheres would fundamentally contradict the ideational concept of the Islamic Republic, which categorically rejects secularist thought. Still, the current crisis gives rise to the question of what the relationship between religion and the state should look like – a topic that has preoccupied many Iranian philosophers, sociologists, and clerics alike, even before the Islamic Republic was founded.

Rising doubts about the state

Lastly, the current crisis has further exacerbated the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy problem. In light of the celebrations for the anniversary of the revolution and the parliamentary elections in February, corona cases were not made public for quite some time. But even in the aftermath of official reports about corona-related deaths, the Iranian state acted hesitantly. Domestic power struggles hampered effective coordination efforts and made crisis management much more difficult. At the same time, the level of public trust in authorities was low. This became evident when, after the outbreak of the virus, a large segment of the population was unwilling to comply with governmental instructions. The high level of distrust toward the state was not only based on the fact that Iranian authorities had withheld information and initially not taken the situation seriously themselves. The Iranian leadership had already lost a lot of credibility after a massive crackdown on protests in November 2019 and when the Revolutionary Guards shot down a passenger plane by accident only a few months afterwards. The initial handling of the corona crisis reinforced the perception among many that the state was not up to the challenges of the day. Opponents of the Islamic Republic, who reject the idea that the state had any legitimacy to begin with, see the corona crisis as yet another confirmation of clerical incompetence. At the same time, the cluster of crises in recent months and the ways in which they have been handled have also sown doubts among supporters of the system. As a result, the question of legitimacy has now reached the social base of the Islamic Republic itself.

Corona leaves its marks

The fact that the Iranian leadership has temporarily put religion into the background is not a new phenomenon. The Islamic Republic has always given priority to political requirements when deemed expedient for the system as a whole. Still, in the current crisis, religion has taken an unprecedented back seat. For the first time since 1979, religion in its institutionalized form has been largely removed from the everyday lives of the Iranian people. Although there will be access to religious sites again before long, faith has lost part of its social relevance. Moreover, many will remember significant Shiite shrines not as places of salvation but rather as symbols of the spread of a grave pandemic. As of now, infection rates are decreasing across the country, but in the aftermath of the corona crisis, the Iranian state will face a whole new set of socio-political challenges.

Le Covid-19 touche tout le monde, y compris les médias. Vagues de désinformation, baisse de revenus, nécessité de continuer à opérer… "Comment les médias de votre pays se sont-ils organisés pour assurer la diffusion d’informations fiables autour de l’épidémie ?" : voici la question que nous avons posée à Anais Ginori, journaliste au sein du journal italien La Republicca, Victor Mallet, chef du bureau de Paris du journal britannique …

La propagation du Covid-19 révèle les profondes faiblesses de la politique sociale américaine et de son filet de sécurité sociale : vulnérabilité du système de santé, manque de congés maladie payés et structure fédérée du système de politique sociale.

En temps de crise, une nation se tourne vers ses dirigeants afin d’en obtenir honnêteté, détermination et réconfort. Mais au détriment de ces vertus, le président…

Chronologie

• 27 janvier : premier cas de Covid-19 détecté en Allemagne dans le Land de Bavière. 
• 24 février : le ministre de la Santé Jens Spahn annonce que l’épidémie a atteint l’Allemagne. 
• 4 mars : l’Allemagne interdit l’exportation de matériel de protection médical hors de ses frontières. …

L’épidémie de Covid-19 a vu une baisse drastique de l’activité mondiale, entraînant à son tour une baisse de la consommation énergétique. Quelles en sont les implications, à la fois pour la France et pour le monde ? Réponse de notre Senior Fellow Énergie & Climat, Benjamin Fremaux.

La pandémie mondiale et son impact sur le marché de l’énergie et la consommation énergétique mondiale…

The Corona pandemic underlines the continued importance of improving foresight capabilities. Over the past decade, we have been confronted with an abundance of unexpected situations: the global refugee and migration crisis, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the election of Donald Trump, and Brexit – all of which caught states and societies off guard. It is therefore no surprise that uneasiness about the volatility of global affairs is growing, particularly in politics. No policy-maker will feel comfortable making decisions that affect the security of the population and the welfare of the nation – especially under time pressure and with a high degree of uncertainty about the effects of the decisions.

How to improve forecasting

Fortunately, research about how effective people are at anticipating future events demonstrates that it does not have to be this way. But first a caveat: Representative statistical studies show that experts do not fare much better at making predictions than can be expected on the basis of a mere random distribution. About half of their expectations are correct, whereas the other half are not. Consulting experts is therefore not enough to obtain better predictions about the future.

However, it is still possible to increase the number of accurate predictions – the so-called forecasts – of concrete events. The current pandemic would be one such event. A carefully designed and methodically controlled forecasting tournament has demonstrated how forecast accuracy can effectively be increased. More than 20,000 participants took part in the Good Judgment Project, including both laymen and experts. They responded to questions about conceivable events in the future. At present, hypothetical questions could include, for example: Will Donald Trump win the US presidential election in November? Will the Dow Jones close above 20,000 points at the end of this year? Will North Korea conduct a nuclear test in 2020? Or simply: Will there be another global pandemic within the next 12 months?

At the end of the period to which the question refers, it is checked whether the forecasts of the participants were accurate. Analysing the results highlights differences: Some participants are correct more often than others. This is not due to clairvoyant powers. Rather, good forecasters proceed methodically. They actively look for information that could be important for answering the question at hand. They also take into account information contradicting their opinions. And if newly available facts require it, they adjust their assessments. Apparently, the most important prerequisite for accurate forecasting is to learn systematically from mistakes. Forecasters with above-average performance levels like to exchange information with their peers – about success factors, but also about failures and misjudgements. In practice, this means rigorous analysis of one’s own forecasts and continuous monitoring of successes as well as failures.

If above-average forecasters are combined in teams, the accuracy levels of their aggregate forecasts increase even more. Of course, this is no guarantee that all nasty surprises can be anticipated in the future, even if forecasting tournaments are continued and developed further. But as the Good Judgment Project shows, a significant increase in accurate forecasting can be achieved: The goal of the project, which was initially set up for four years, was to increase the average accuracy levels of forecasts given by a control group by 50 per cent – which was achieved after only two years. The number of unforeseen events can thus be reduced.

Better forecasts do not automatically improve policy

But improving forecast accuracy, and thus reducing the number of unexpected events, is only one side of the coin. For even if future events can be predicted more often, it is not automatically guaranteed that the appropriate preparations will be made. This is due to the process of policy-making. Political as well as electoral majorities are needed to decide on and implement far-reaching and costly measures. In crises situations such as the current pandemic, this is much easier, as we are experiencing in real time. Conversely, with a view to less visible events in the future, it is notoriously difficult to mobilise the necessary majorities for far-reaching precautionary measures. Even scientifically well-founded demands for drastic measures are difficult to implement, as has been observed in recent years with regard to health studies and climate research.

However, it would be wrong to blame political leaders alone for the lack of preparation. For it should not be forgotten that predictions can be wrong – there are plenty of examples for this as well. Time-consuming and costly preparations to ward off an anticipated pandemic could possibly prove redundant, as it might only occur in 10, 20, or 30 years. Of course, decision-makers would have to take the blame for this as well. Deciding about which measures to take in preparation of a forecasted nasty surprise – for which the impact is hardly knowable in advance – requires balancing conflicting interests. The outcome depends very much on expectations about public support for these measures – or opposition against them.

Conflicts about what priorities for political action should be taken in the future will be unavoidable, even after the Corona pandemic. Often at the heart of these conflicts are different assumptions about the future. Even if there is no automatism between good predictions and political action, the standards of rigorous analysis and the continuous monitoring of successes as well as failures can help in the making of informed decisions during such conflicts, thus contributing to more targeted preparation.

Turkey’s prison population has been rising steadily for two decades. Official capacity has reached 234,000, but the actual number of prisoners in March was 300,000. Of these, 43,000 people are on remand awaiting trial.

While overcrowding had long been criticized, the coronavirus crisis completely changed the parameters of the discussion. Social distancing and personal hygiene are key elements of the fight against the virus, but neither are possible in the current Turkish prison environment. Cells are overcrowded, with very limited access to water. A shortage of beds sees prisoners even sleeping on the floor next to the toilets. After living for years under such conditions, many prisoners are in poor health and particularly vulnerable. Once the virus enters the prisons many deaths can be expected.

The Turkish government initially responded by banning visits, but complete isolation is not feasible. For one thing, the 67,000 prison staff are possible vectors – and themselves potential victims.

Early Release

To step up its response, the government is accelerating reforms to the Law on the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures (Law 5275). Under the proposed changes, prisoners will be eligible for parole after serving half their sentence (currently two thirds), with probation increased from one to three years. Inmates over the age of 60 with chronic illnesses, and women with children younger than three will be released immediately and serve the rest of their term under house arrest. It is expected that these changes will lead to the release of almost 100,000 prisoners.

There is controversy, however, over the question of who will not benefit. There is broad public consensus that those convicted of serious crimes such as murder and sexual offences should be excluded. But the bill also excludes prisoners held under anti-terrorism laws. Under Turkey’s very broad definition of terrorism, this category also covers political activists, journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders. Most prisoners even remotely linked to the Gülen movement or Kurdish political organizations have also been convicted under anti-terrorism legislation. As a result, there are estimated to be about 40,000 political prisoners, including such prominent figures as the journalist and author Ahmet Altan, the businessman and philanthropist Osman Kavala, and the former leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş. Civil rights organizations are calling for political prisoners to be included in the early release initiative.

While the release of up to 100,000 prisoners will certainly provide relief for those who remain, excluding political prisoners will further undermine trust in the justice system. It will also sharpen existing cultural and political polarization.

The issue has multiple aspects. In humanitarian terms it is crucial to release inmates, particularly those most vulnerable to the virus. Legally the basic principle of equality is at stake. And in the political sphere the issue draws attention to Turkey’s extremely arbitrary use of anti-terrorism charges.

Even the release of 100,000 prisoners is unlikely to be sufficient. Most of the increase in capacity from 111,000 to 234,000 was accomplished by adding beds to existing spaces (bunk beds, floor). So the prisons will still not be spacious enough to meet the standards required to address the pandemic. Further measures to decrease prison numbers are under therefore discussion, including immediate release of remand prisoners and transfer of certain inmates to house arrest with electronic tagging (including all those with documented health issues).

These immediate changes could also form the starting point for long-term improvements in the justice system. The crisis provides an opportunity to correct Turkey’s extremely arbitrary use of anti-terrorism charges. Criticisms particularly focus on two topics: the practice of lengthy pre-trial detention and more significantly, the very broad definition of terrorism, which includes non-violent political activity and threatens freedom of speech. Without a new approach, technical changes such as the current early releases, or even amnesties, will have only temporary effects. Turkey released petty criminals in 2016 to make space for the post-coup purges. Only three years later, the prisons are once again overcrowded. European policy-makers should urge Turkey to take the necessary emergency steps.

But the long-term solution is to reform the anti-terror legislation. The preparations for emergency early release have triggered a public debate on the abuse of anti-terrorism charges. European policy-makers should capitalize on this discussion and continue to press Ankara for reforms in line with the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union that Turkey, at least formally, aims to meet.

À l’apparition en Chine, puis en Asie de l’épidémie, une réaction occidentale a été de privilégier la liberté individuelle, et en particulier celle d’aller et venir, par rapport à la crise sanitaire. C’était peut-être envisageable avec une panoplie de mesures préventives – dont certaines sont déjà vues comme un début d’atteinte aux libertés. Ainsi du port du masque, qui serait une sorte de manifestation inutile de soumission collective "à l’…

Die Bundeswehr besinnt sich mit der Refokussierung auf Landes- und Bündnis­vertei­digung seit 2014 wieder mehr auf ihre Kernaufgaben. Das wirkt sich auch auf die Struk­turen der Streitkräfte aus. Gegenwärtig sind diese vor allem auf Einsätze des Internationalen Krisenmanagements (IKM) ausgerichtet. Deshalb hat die Bundeswehr aktuell keine Führungsorganisation, die sowohl im Grundbetrieb, also dem normalen Dienst in Deutschland, als auch in den Einsätzen unverändert gültig ist. Diese soge­nannte prozessuale Trennung ist für die gewandelten sicherheitspolitischen An­for­derungen nicht mehr zielführend – eine Anpassung ist notwendig.

Im Februar wurde erstmals bekannt, dass das Coronavirus auch die Islamische Republik erfasst hat. Nur wenige Wochen später galt Iran bereits als Epizentrum von COVID-19 im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Dabei stellt die Coronakrise mehr als nur eine medizinische und wirtschaftliche Herausforderung dar, die Iran unter externem Sanktionsdruck bewältigen muss. Sie hat auch langfristige gesellschaftspolitische Folgen für den iranischen Staat.

Die Religion gerät in den Hintergrund

Die religiöse Hochburg Ghom gilt als Ausgangsort der Coronakrise in Iran. Dass sich das Virus in Pilgerstädten wie Ghom und Maschhad schnell ausbreiten konnte, ist wenig überraschend. Allein der Imam Reza Schrein in Maschhad wird von schätzungsweise 20 Millionen Menschen pro Jahr besucht. Dennoch vergingen vier Wochen, bevor spirituelle Zentren des Landes geschlossen wurden. Die Entscheidung war medizinisch notwendig, aber keineswegs selbstverständlich. Es ist das erste Mal in der Geschichte der Islamischen Republik, dass die Regierung Moscheen schließt, Freitagspredigten absagt und Pilgerfahrten unterbindet. Dass ausgerechnet eine islamische Republik in Zeiten der Krise den Zutritt zu religiösen Stätten verwehrt, sorgt in Teilen ihrer sozialen Basis für Unmut. In Ghom und Maschhad kam es zu Protesten, die von lokalen Geistlichen unterstützt wurden. Sicherheitskräfte mussten Gläubige davon abhalten, sich gewaltsam Zutritt zu bedeutenden schiitischen Schreinen zu verschaffen. Die Coronakrise versetzt den theokratischen Staat in eine ungewohnte und missliche Lage. Er muss nicht nur religiöse Rituale aussetzen, die wesentlich für sein politisches Selbstverständnis sind, sondern Gläubige aktiv davon abhalten, diese Rituale auszuüben. In der Krise stellt die Regierung die Religion vorerst zurück, und das mit Zuspruch des Revolutionsführers, der höchsten religiösen Instanz im Staat.

Der Säkularismus erhält Auftrieb

Die Coronakrise wirkt sich nicht nur auf die Stellung der Religion aus, sondern auch auf den Glauben. Die Schließung von Schreinen, die über Jahrhunderte als Orte der Immunität und Heilung galten, kommt einer Entmystifizierung schiitischer Glaubensauffassungen gleich. Auch der in den vergangenen Jahren von Staatsseite beförderte Trend zu alternativer Medizin wie »islamischen Heilmitteln« musste der Realität weichen. Corona zeigt für alle sichtbar auf, wo Glaube und Aberglaube unweigerlich an ihre Grenzen stoßen. Einige Kleriker befürchten bereits eine theologische Krise und warnen vor einer iranischen Renaissance, die eine Abkehr von der Religion zur Folge hätte. Anhänger eines säkularen Staates sehen in Corona dagegen eine Chance für eine graduelle kulturelle Transformation in Iran. Der Gedanke speist sich aus der Vorstellung, dass auch in Europa einst eine Epidemie – die Pest – zur Entzauberung der Religion beigetragen und damit der Renaissance den Weg geebnet habe. Vor dem Hintergrund der Coronakrise gewinnt insbesondere die Idee des Säkularismus neuen Auftrieb. Eine Trennung von politischer und religiöser Sphäre steht im fundamentalen Widerspruch mit dem Ordnungskonzept der Islamischen Republik, die säkulare Bestrebungen kategorisch zurückweist. Doch mit der aktuellen Krise wird auch die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Religion und Staat unweigerlich neu aufgeworfen, mit der sich iranische Philosophen, Soziologen und Geistliche nicht erst seit Gründung der Islamischen Republik beschäftigen.

Der Zweifel am Staat wächst

Schließlich hat die aktuelle Krise das Legitimitätsproblem der Islamischen Republik verschärft. Mit Blick auf die Feierlichkeiten zum Jahrestag der Revolution und die Parlamentswahlen im Februar hatte die iranische Führung Coronafälle im eigenen Land lange Zeit nicht öffentlich gemacht. Doch auch nachdem Iran die ersten Toten zu vermelden hatte, reagierte der Staat nur zögerlich. Innenpolitische Machtkämpfe führten zu Abstimmungsproblemen und erschwerten das Krisenmanagement zusätzlich. Das mangelnde Vertrauen in den Staatsapparat zeigte sich deutlich, als ein wesentlicher Teil der Bevölkerung nach Ausbruch der Krise den Anweisungen der Regierung nicht nachkam. Zu groß war das Misstrauen gegenüber einem Staat, der Informationen zurückgehalten und die Situation lange selbst nicht ernstgenommen hatte. Seit der gewaltsamen Niederschlagung von Protesten im November 2019 und dem Abschuss eines Passagierflugzeugs durch die eigenen Revolutionsgarden hat die iranische Führung merklich an Glaubwürdigkeit in der Bevölkerung eingebüßt. Der anfängliche Umgang mit der Coronakrise hat die Wahrnehmung verstärkt, dass der Staat den Herausforderungen der Zeit nicht gewachsen ist. Kritiker des Systems, die der Islamischen Republik per se die Legitimität absprechen, sehen in der Coronakrise eine weitere Bestätigung klerikaler Inkompetenz. Die Krisendichte der letzten Monate und die Art ihrer Bewältigung hat aber auch unter Anhängern des Systems Zweifel gesät. Damit hat die Legitimitätsfrage nun auch die soziale Basis der Islamischen Republik erreicht.

Corona hinterlässt Spuren

Dass die iranische Führung die Religion zeitweise hintanstellte, ist kein neues Phänomen. Sie hat politischen Erfordernissen stets den Vorrang erteilt, wenn sie dem System als zweckdienlich galten. Doch in der aktuellen Krise muss die Religion ungewöhnlich weit in den Hintergrund treten. In ihrer institutionalisierten Form ist sie erstmals weitgehend aus dem Alltag der Bevölkerung entrückt. Schon bald werden religiöse Stätten wieder zugänglich sein, doch der Glaube hat an gesellschaftlicher Relevanz eingebüßt. Bedeutende schiitische Schreine werden vielen nicht als Orte der Erlösung, sondern als Sinnbilder einer Pandemie in Erinnerung bleiben. Derzeit sinken die Infektionsraten landesweit, aber nach der Bewältigung der Coronakrise wird die iranische Führung vor neuen gesellschaftspolitischen Herausforderungen stehen.

Dieser Text ist auch bei Zeit Online erschienen.

∎ Rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the past two years. It shapes both strategic debates and real political, military and economic dynamics.

∎ The dimensions of Sino-American competition over power and status in­clude growing threat perceptions and an increasingly important political/ ideological component.

∎ The US-China trade conflict is politically instrumental and closely bound up with the development of the world order.

∎ The crux of the technological dimension is not who sets the standards, but geopolitical power projection through “technopolitical spheres of influence”. The development and use of technologies thus become part of a systemic competition.

∎ Through their respective leadership styles, Presidents Trump and Xi foment bilateral conflicts and – each in their own way – damage international rules and institutions.

∎ The Sino-American rivalry also undermines multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation. While Washington has withdrawn from a number of multilateral institutions, Beijing is expanding its influence in contexts like the United Nations.

∎ Europe needs to escape the bipolar logic that demands it choose between the American and Chinese economic/technological spheres. The European Union must develop a China policy for its drive towards sovereignty (stra­tegic autonomy). That requires a “supranational geopolitics”.

 

 

The protests in Chile, which began in October 2019, have resulted, among other things, in a constitutional initiative, which citizens had been demanding for a long time. Government and opposition parties have now agreed to it. It is supposed to begin with a referendum on whether a new constitution is desired and which col­lective body should elaborate it. Since 26 February, Chile has officially been engaged in the election campaign for this referendum. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it has been postponed from 26 April to 25 October. The potential election of the constituent body is now scheduled for 11 April 2021. It is still uncertain to what extent a new con­stitution will contribute towards overcoming this social, political, and institutional crisis. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the population believes that it is an indispen­sable cornerstone for a necessary new social contract.

Die Corona-Pandemie unterstreicht, wie wichtig es ist, die Fähigkeiten zur Vorausschau zu verbessern. Von der EU-Schulden- über die Flucht- und Migrationskrise bis zum Brexit: Immer wieder sind Staat und Gesellschaft in der letzten Dekade in unvorhergesehene Situationen geraten. Das Unbehagen darüber wächst, auch in der Politik. Keinem Verantwortlichen dürfte wohl dabei sein, unter Zeitdruck Entscheidungen zu treffen, von denen die Sicherheit der Bevölkerung und die Wohlfahrt des Landes abhängen – und dies bei hoher Ungewissheit über die Auswirkungen der beschlossenen Maßnahmen.

Gutes Vorhersagen lässt sich lernen

Das Unbehagen müsste nicht so groß ausfallen. Das zeigt die Forschung darüber, wie gut wir Menschen darin sind, künftige Ereignisse zu antizipieren. Zwar belegen repräsentative statistische Untersuchungen, dass Experten bei Vorhersagen nicht viel besser abschneiden, als aufgrund einer bloßen Zufallsverteilung zu erwarten ist. Etwa die Hälfte ihrer Annahmen trifft ein, die andere Hälfte jedoch nicht. Experten zu konsultieren reicht also nicht aus, wenn es darum geht, bessere Zukunftsaussagen zu erhalten.

Dass sie besser werden können, verdeutlichen Analysen, die untersuchen, wie die Trefferquote für die korrekte Vorhersage von konkreten Ereignissen, die sogenannten Forecasts, gesteigert werden kann. Die gegenwärtige Pandemie wäre ein solches Ereignis. Die Untersuchungen stützen sich auf die Analyse eines wissenschaftlich konzipierten und kontrollierten Vorhersagewettbewerbs, des Good Judgment Projects. An diesem Wettbewerb beteiligten sich mehr als 20.000 Teilnehmer, darunter Laien ebenso wie Fachleute. Sie beantworteten Fragen, die sich auf denkbare Ereignisse in der Zukunft beziehen. Aktuell könnten solche Fragen etwa lauten: Wird Donald Trump die Präsidentschaftswahlen im November in den USA gewinnen? Wird der Dax zum Jahresende über 10.000 Punkten schließen? Wird Nordkorea im Jahr 2020 einen Nukleartest durchführen? Oder eben: Wird es innerhalb der nächsten zwölf Monate zu einer weiteren globalen Pandemie kommen?

Nach Ablauf des Zeitraums, auf den sich die Frage bezieht, wird geprüft, ob die Vorhersagen der Forecaster eingetroffen sind. Die Auswertung verdeutlicht Unterschiede: Manche Teilnehmer liegen öfter richtig als andere. Das ist nicht etwa auf hellseherische Fähigkeiten zurückzuführen. Vielmehr gehen gute Forecaster methodisch vor. Sie suchen aktiv nach Hinweisen, die für die Beantwortung der Frage wichtig sein könnten, und sind offen für Informationen, die ihren Ansichten widersprechen. Legt die neue Informationslage es nah, passen sie ihre Bewertungen an. Es zeigt sich: Die wichtigste Voraussetzung für zutreffende Forecasts besteht darin, systematisch aus Fehlern zu lernen. So tauschen sich überdurchschnittlich abschneidende Forecaster gern untereinander über Erfolgsfaktoren, aber auch über Fehleinschätzungen aus. In der Praxis bedeutet dies die rigorose Analyse der eigenen Vorhersagen und eine kontinuierliche Erfolgskontrolle.

Werden diese überdurchschnittlich gut abschneidenden Forecaster in Teams zusammengefasst, steigt die Trefferwahrscheinlichkeit ihrer gebündelten Vorhersagen weiter. Das ist zwar keine Garantie dafür, dass künftig alle bösen Überraschungen antizipiert werden können, selbst wenn die Vorhersagewettbewerbe kontinuierlich fortgesetzt und weiterentwickelt werden. Aber wie das Good Judgment Project zeigt, ist eine deutliche Erhöhung der Vorhersagepräzision möglich: Ziel des zunächst auf vier Jahre angelegten Wettbewerbs war es, die Durchschnittsgenauigkeit der Vorhersagen um 50 Prozent zu übertreffen – was bereits nach zwei Jahren gelang. Die Anzahl an unvorhergesehenen Ereignissen lässt sich also reduzieren.

Gute Vorhersagen führen nicht automatisch zu besserer Vorbereitung

Das ist jedoch nur eine Seite der Medaille. Denn selbst wenn sich künftige Ereignisse häufiger voraussehen lassen, ist nicht automatisch gewährleistet, dass auch die angemessenen Vorbereitungen getroffen werden. Das liegt in der Struktur des Politik-Machens begründet. Um weitreichende und kostspielige Maßnahmen zu beschließen und umzusetzen, sind politische und gesellschaftliche Mehrheiten notwendig. In Krisensituationen wie der gegenwärtigen Pandemie fällt dies erheblich leichter, wie wir gerade in Echtzeit erleben. Umgekehrt ist es mit Blick auf weniger sichtbare Ereignisse in der Zukunft notorisch schwierig, die notwendigen Mehrheiten für weitreichende Vorsorgemaßnahmen zu mobilisieren. Auch wissenschaftlich gut begründete Forderungen nach einschneidenden Maßnahmen lassen sich schwerlich umsetzen, wie in den vergangenen Jahren mit Blick auf die Gesundheits- und Klimaforschung zu beobachten gewesen ist.

Es wäre jedoch falsch, den schwarzen Peter für mangelnde Vorbereitung allein den politisch Verantwortlichen zuzuschieben. Denn es sollte nicht vergessen werden, dass Vorhersagen daneben liegen können – auch dafür gibt es hinreichend Beispiele. Aufwendige und kostenintensive Vorbereitungen zur Abwehr einer befürchteten Pandemie könnten sich womöglich als überflüssig erweisen. Das würde ebenfalls den Entscheidungsträgern zur Last gelegt. Und es ist nicht nur eine Güterabwägungsfrage, wofür und wie Vorbereitungsmaßnahmen getroffen werden. Sie hängt vor allem von der politischen und öffentlichen Unterstützung dafür ab.

Konflikte darüber, wo künftig die Prioritäten politischen Handelns gesetzt werden sollen, werden auch nach der Corona-Pandemie unvermeidlich sein. Im Zentrum dieser Konflikte stehen häufig unterschiedliche Annahmen über die Zukunft. Auch wenn es keinen Automatismus zwischen einer guten Vorhersage und politischem Handeln gibt: Die Maßstäbe rigorosen Analysierens und kontinuierlicher Erfolgskontrolle können dabei helfen, in solchen Konflikten fundierte Entscheidungen zu treffen, die zu einer gezielteren Vorbereitung beitragen.

The plight of refugees in the Syrian province of Idlib, on the Greek islands, and on the EU’s external borders has worsened dramatically over the last few months. Once more, the European Union (EU) is split on questions of asylum and migration, and it portrays limited capacity to act in issues of foreign and security policy. What options does the EU have to address the deteriorating situation? This question has become even more pressing due to the spread of Covid-19. The EU-Turkey statement of 2016 has strengthened cooperation with Ankara on humanitarian aid and border controls, but it also has major weaknesses. A comprehensive approach is needed. The EU should prioritise providing new financial resources for Turkey that should be com­plemented by scaling-up assistance to Greece as well as to Syria’s neighbours. In addition, the Europeans should support the creation of a safe zone in northern Idlib.

Adela Raz, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the UN and IPI Vice President Adam Lupel

Event Video: 
Photos:

jQuery(document).ready(function(){jQuery("#isloaderfor-xbnqts").fadeOut(2000, function () { jQuery(".pagwrap-xbnqts").fadeIn(1000);});});

Afghan women have been at the forefront of bringing peace and development to Afghanistan over the past two decades, but despite this, peace talks and political processes have with few exceptions excluded them.

The Taliban and the United States reached a deal in February arranging for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and setting the stage for talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Though women’s rights were not mentioned in the text of the Taliban-US agreement and no female civil society representatives from Afghanistan participated in the talks leading up to it, Afghan women are determined that the upcoming intra-Afghan negotiations protect and enhance the equal rights assured them under the Afghan constitution, including their role in the peace process itself.

On Thursday, March 12th, IPI, together with the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations, hosted an online, live-streamed discussion with four prominent Afghan women leaders in Kabul on the subject of Women’s Inclusion in the Afghan Peace Talks.

Participating in the discussion from Kabul were Hasina Safi, Minister for Information and Culture; Nadima Sahar, Head of the Technical Vocational Education and Training Authority; Onaba Payab, Adviser to Rula Ghani, the First Lady of Afghanistan; and Aisha Khurram, Afghanistan’s Youth Representative to the UN.

Adela Raz, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the UN, opened the discussion from IPI’s office in New York by stressing the progress that women have made in Afghanistan.

“Women empowerment in Afghanistan is real, it’s genuine, it truly has happened, and I always say that it’s an investment by the international community that really paid off in terms of where we started 19 years ago and where we are now,” she said. “Nineteen years may seem too long ago to worry about, but for a lot of us, it is not too long because we still remember the dark days of the Taliban.”

She asserted that a key principle that women are fighting for now is “inclusivity, and that inclusivity for us means the inclusion of women and also the voice of youth and different ethnic groups.” She said that women are also demanding that the teams of negotiators and facilitators of the talks reflect this inclusivity.

Though those memories of the restrictive Taliban practices are still fresh, she said women will not be revisiting them in the negotiations but rather exercising their hard won present authority and making sure none of it is relinquished. “We’re always able to compromise the past to enable us to coexist with a group of people that we have known for their having committed a lot of crime, but it’s too hard for us to compromise the future.”

Onaba Payab said that women had emerged as leaders in all walks of life in Afghanistan, with 25 percent of the seats in the parliament occupied by women and 5,000 businesses owned by women. Some 15,000 women from 34 provinces had been consulted on what would be acceptable to them in a peace agreement, she said. “We have protective legal frameworks for women’s public and private institutions and a long term plan designed to empower women in rural as well as urban areas.” She described the attitude of women in advance of the intra-Afghan talks as “we know that peace is achievable, and we are moving towards it guided by the principles of inclusivity, dignity and sustainability.”

Hasina Safi said that Afghan women had achieved much on their own at home and would insist on their ideas being treated seriously in the talks, but an element that was crucial now was the active support of Afghanistan’s friends abroad. “We have all the strategies and policies and know what is needed to implement them, and what we need from the international community is for them to back us up. Afghanistan is not the Afghanistan of 1995 where a woman could not introduce herself in front of a foreigner. Today, that woman speaks up, and she analyses, and she reasons, and she fights for her role for her existence for her very meaningful participation in the process, and protecting that is one of the requirements we would like the international community to recognize.”

Nadima Sahar illustrated the new confidence of Afghan women by noting that while she had had to struggle to ensure her right to an education, “now we have kids like my 8-year-old girl who aspires to be the first female president of Afghanistan.”

She argued that the stakes are much higher for women than for men. “For a man, this entire process boils down to growing a beard or shaving a beard. For us women, there is a lot more at stake, our right to an education, our right to live basically, our right to everything is at stake.” For that reason, she said, women had to be present at the negotiating table. “If there is a compromise that needs to be made for their future, they must have a say in what is that decision and what price they have to pay.”

Another asset that women bring to the talks, she said, is their impartiality and bent for seeking non-violent solutions. “Whenever men encounter a peace process, their discussions revolve around military action and power-sharing arrangements and territorial gains, but women’s involvement in the peace process would make sure that issues such as political and legal reforms, social and economic recovery and transitional justice are priorities.”

Elaborating on that point, Aisha Khurram argued that any agreement reached that did not include the active participation of women would be neither durable nor sustainable. “And women should not be included just in the formal negotiation, but they also must be part of the design and implementation of whatever agreement emerges.”

Two thirds of the Afghan population is under the age of 25, and Ms. Khurram said that young women consider themselves “active partners” in forging a peace for Afghanistan’s future rather than “passive beneficiaries” of the process. Similarly, she said, “the new generation of Afghan men really believe in women’s rights, and they really stand for their sisters’ rights.”

Stressing that this is a “pivotal moment” for young women in Afghanistan, she concluded, “Right now the future of Afghanistan is going to be decided so it’s more important for us than just the elites who are sitting there at the negotiating table and talking about our future. We expect more, and we deserve to be heard, and we deserve to be included.”

IPI Program Administrator Masooma Rahmaty reported on a tweet chat about women’s inclusion that she had conducted, some of it in Farsi, with 40 respondents from Kabul and the diaspora.

IPI Vice President Adam Lupel moderated the discussion.

Retrait américain, mouvements populaires en Algérie, au Liban et en Irak… Comment expliquer ces évolutions qui ont cours actuellement au Moyen-Orient ? Quelles conséquences revêtent-elles pour la région ? Pour l’Europe ? À l’occasion de la publication de la nouvelle édition de son ouvrage Le monde arabe en morceaux : des printemps arabes au recul américain (Éditions Armand Colin), Charles Thépaut, chercheur invité au Washington Institute for Near East…

Il est naturel que les débats autour de la 5G gravitent autour de la Chine, des États-Unis et du positionnement stratégique de l'Europe dans un ordre international à la bipolarité croissante. L’année 2020 est, pour l’Europe, celle des choix -  et ceux-ci sont difficiles. Comment protéger les infrastructures critiques du continent contre les fournisseurs à haut risque, tout…

jQuery(document).ready(function(){jQuery("#isloaderfor-ldbmrb").fadeOut(2000, function () { jQuery(".pagwrap-ldbmrb").fadeIn(1000);});});

On March 10th, IPI Vice President Adam Lupel took part in a panel discussion held by the UN Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan, led by Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, titled: “A Critical Moment for Afghan Women: The Intra-Afghan Peace Process.” The event was co-sponsored by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security.

The event included extraordinary remarks from Afghan women, including Ambassador Adela Raz of Afghanistan; Nargis Nehan, Former Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Industries of Afghanistan; and Dr. Orzala Nemat, Director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. The First Lady of Afghanistan, Rula Ghani, delivered a video message from Kabul.

Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, a longtime champion of women’s rights in Afghanistan, was the keynote speaker. An equal champion on the panel was United Kingdom Ambassador to the UN Karen Pierce, who was the UK Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan June 2010-June 2011.

The discussion focused on protecting and enhancing the equal rights of women granted under the Afghan constitution, including their central role in peace negotiations and ensuring that any prospective outcomes in the peace process recognize, protect, and promote the role of women in all spheres of life.

The event was moderated by Ambassador Melanne Verveer, Director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. Over 40 UN ambassadors were in attendance.

In his remarks, Dr. Lupel said, “Women’s substantive involvement in peace processes increases their potential for success and durability, because if women meaningfully participate, peace processes are less likely to be simply a negotiation about power among men with guns, and more likely to include broader issues about how to build a sustainable peaceful society.

“So going forward the question becomes how to ensure women play a central role in the Intra-Afghan peace process and how can the international community help?” he said.

Drawing on the expertise of IPI’s Women, Peace and Security program, Dr. Lupel recommended an “ecosystem” approach. This means supporting not just women’s access to the negotiating table, but also including them in the design of the whole peace process and the environment surrounding it. He offered these two points:

1) Focus on what works: There has been a tremendous amount of progress on women’s inclusion in Afghanistan over the last twenty years. As is evident on this panel and the Afghan diplomatic corps this has produced a wealth of human capital and already active networks that will provide important resources in the coming period. I think we all know this, but suffice it to say we don’t have to start from scratch.

2) Be creative and persistent. This will be a long, complicated process with many ups and downs. And a creative, persistent approach to ensuring that women’s voices are heard will be necessary.

Dr. Lupel closed his remarks by quoting a tweet from a representative of Afghan youth in Kabul, Aisha Khurram, the Afghan Youth Rep to the UN.

She writes, “Afghan youth and women’s priorities are the priorities of all Afghans. These priorities must be included in the peace process not because they will benefit women, but because they will benefit everyone.”

Related Content

Full remarks from IPI Vice President Adam Lupel

Full event video from the UN

Press Release: A Critical Moment for Afghan Women: The Intra-Afghan Peace Process, the UN Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan

 

 

Le 24 février, une escadrille de chasseurs russes et syriens frappait une position occupée par l’armée turque dans la région d’Idlib, faisant 33 morts parmi les soldats turcs. Les Russes allaient par la suite expliquer que les Turcs, venus en renfort pour s’opposer à l’offensive du régime d’Assad contre la dernière enclave tenue par les rebelles, n’avaient pas signalé leur présence. Leur localisation aurait été en outre indiscernable de positions…

10 mar. Image principale

Lundi 9 mars 2020, le directeur de l’IHEDN, le général de corps d’armée Patrick DESTREMAU a ouvert la première des quatre semaines de la 32e session européenne des responsables d’armement (#SERA) qui se déroule cette année en France, en Belgique et en République Tchèque.

Pendant près de 5 journées, à l’Ecole militaire ou lors des visites de sites industriels situés en région parisienne, la nouvelle promotion est invitée à réfléchir et à échanger Au sujet la base industrielle et technologique de défense européenne (BITDE).

Originaires de l’ensemble des pays de l’UE, du Royaume-Uni, de la Suisse, de la Norvège et de l’OCCAr, les auditeurs de la SERA 32 exercent des fonctions à responsabilités dans le domaine de l’armement, tant dans l’industrie de défense et de sécurité, qu’au sein du ministère de la défense de leur pays.

Lors de la première journée, les auditeurs ont assisté à la conférence inaugurale d'Olivier LANDOUR de la Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS), puis à la table ronde qui à reunit Léonie MARTIN (DGRIS) et du capitaine de vaisseau Fabrice COHELEACH (EMA) pour discuter de la vision française de la défense européenne.

Les travaux des auditeurs sur la BITDE permettront de nourrir une réflexion commune et européenne répondant au vœu du Président de la République de voir émerger une vision stratégique commune en Europe.