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In September 2021, UN Secretary-General Guterres set out reform proposals for an inclusive and networked multilateralism. The German Council for sustainable development recemmends to actively implement the proposals in Germany and lead the way internationally.

In September 2021, UN Secretary-General Guterres set out reform proposals for an inclusive and networked multilateralism. The German Council for sustainable development recemmends to actively implement the proposals in Germany and lead the way internationally.

»Fortschritt für eine gerechte Welt« – so lautet das Motto des Programms der deutschen G7-Präsidentschaft. In ihm schreiben sich die G7-Staaten als »führende Industriestaaten und wertegebundene Partner« eine besondere Verantwortung für die nachhaltige »Gestaltung einer lebenswerten Zukunft« zu. Clubs wie die G7 selbst, aber auch der von der deutschen Präsidentschaft angedachte globale Klimaclub, können oft schneller entscheiden und agieren als inklusivere multilaterale Organisationen wie die Vereinten Nationen (UN). Aber ein Speedboot, so schnell und wendig es auch sein mag, kann nicht allein den Ozean überqueren, und die G7 können allein keine globalen Herausforderungen stemmen. Entsprechend kündigt die deutsche G7-Präsidentschaft im Programm an, enge Bezüge insbesondere zur UN und zur G20 herstellen zu wollen, mit dem Ziel eines »fairen und regelbasierten Multilateralismus«. Auch UN-Generalsekretär António Guterres betont die Bedeutung von Vorreiterinitiativen und Partnerschaften im Rahmen eines »inklusiven und vernetzten Multilateralismus«. In seinem Bericht Our Common Agenda entwickelt er zahlreiche Ideen, wie die Beschlüsse, die die Mitgliedsstaaten anlässlich des 75. Jubiläums der UN getroffen hatten, umzusetzen sind und die internationale Zusammenarbeit gestärkt werden kann. Er ruft dazu auf, dort voranzuschreiten, wo gemeinsame Interessen bestehen. Wächst hier also zusammen, was zusammen gehört? Leider (noch) nicht, denn im G7-Programm bleiben die Verweise auf die UN abstrakt, wirken eher pflichtschuldig. Die deutsche G7-Präsidentschaft hätte aber die Chance, das zu ändern und geteilte Prioritäten gemeinsam umzusetzen:

»Starke Allianzen für einen nachhaltigen Planeten« – bei den UN anbinden

Sowohl die G7 als auch die UN setzen auf Pionierprojekte und auf Partnerschaften mit nichtstaatlichen Akteuren, etwa im Rahmen der Impfallianz Covax oder der G7-Initiative für Infrastrukturprojekte in ärmeren Ländern. Es ist positiv, dass der Bericht des UN-Generalsekretärs sich der Realität dieser Formate stellt und sie in den Dienst der Umsetzung global vereinbarter Ziele – vor allem die der 2030 Agenda für nachhaltige Entwicklung und des Pariser Klimaabkommens – stellen möchte. Auch wenn viele UN-Mitgliedstaaten solche Partnerschaften unterstützen, besteht keine Einigkeit über diese Art von Multilateralismus jenseits rein intergouvernementaler Beziehungen. Um größtmögliche Wirkung zu erzielen, ist es für die G7 wichtig, dass möglichst viele Staaten ihre Initiativen als sinnvoll und legitim wahrnehmen. Dafür wäre eine institutionelle Anbindung an das UN-System wertvoll, die sicherstellt, dass Partnerschaften menschenrechtliche Standards erfüllen, dass sie transparent gestaltet und kontinuierlich nachgehalten und entlang von Bedürfnissen der Zielgruppen weiterentwickelt werden. Der UN-Generalsekretär schlägt vor, das existierende UN-Büro für Partnerschaften zu stärken. Bislang ist dieses nicht in der Lage, die oben genannten Aufgaben zu erfüllen. Frühere Reformversuche scheiterten unter anderem an Finanzierungsproblemen. Jetzt sollen digitale Lösungen weiterhelfen. Die G7 sollte die Entwicklung eines effektiven UN-Hubs unterstützen und dort auch ihre eigenen Initiativen anbinden. Das könnte der G7 helfen, sowohl Akzeptanz zu erzeugen als auch weitere Partner zu mobilisieren. Durch eine solche »Qualitätskontrolle« von Partnerschaften könnte die UN ihre zentrale Rolle in der Global Governance stärken.

»Investitionen in eine bessere Zukunft« – mit der UN

Wie die deutsche G7-Präsidentschaft legt auch der UN-Generalsekretär in seinem Bericht einen besonderen Fokus auf Zukunftsfragen in Zusammenschau mit Gerechtigkeitsfragen. Die Weltorganisation soll viel besser darin werden, Schiffbruch zu vermeiden – also auf akute und künftige transnationale Krisen zu antworten und dabei ihre Antworten inklusiver und gerechter zu gestalten. Strategischer vorausschauen, Interessen junger Menschen und zukünftiger Generationen stärker berücksichtigen sowie beim Ausbruch neuer Krisen rasch wichtige Player zusammenrufen können – so lauten die ehrgeizigen Vorschläge, um die UN stärker ins Zentrum globaler Problembewältigung zu rücken. Auch hier gilt: Die Mitgliedstaaten sind gespalten, was den damit verbundenen Autoritäts- und Wissenszuwachs der UN angeht. Innerhalb der G7 ist eine Aufwertung der UN ebenfalls umstritten – aufgrund von Effektivitäts- und Souveränitätsbedenken, aber auch angesichts des Einflusses von Staaten wie China und Russland. In Anbetracht der Interessenkonvergenz im Hinblick auf die großen Zukunftsthemen sollte die G7 dennoch darauf dringen, bestehende Fähigkeiten des UN-Systems besser zu bündeln und gleichzeitig den gezielten Ausbau strategischer Kapazitäten der UN politisch wie finanziell unterstützen, ob über freiwillige Beiträge oder teils auch sinnvollerweise über einen Aufwuchs des regulären Budgets. Die G7 hat sich 2021 im Cornwall Consensus verpflichtet, Krisenbearbeitung künftig effektiver, aber auch gerechter zu gestalten. Dieses Jahr sollte sie die Rolle der UN hierbei diskutieren.

Aktuell tauschen sich die Staaten in der UN-Generalversammlung darüber aus, welche der Vorschläge des Generalsekretärs sie unterstützen wollen. Parallel laufen die Vorbereitungsprozesse zum G7-Gipfel. Zeit, die Prozesse für einen zukunftsfähigen Multilateralismus zusammen zu denken.

Dr. Marianne Beisheim arbeitet in der Forschungsgruppe Globale Fragen der SWP. Dr. Silke Weinlich ist Mitarbeiterin des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) im Forschungsprogramm Inter- und Transnationale Zusammenarbeit. Dieser Beitrag erscheint zeitgleich auf der Website des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) unter der Rubrik »Die aktuelle Kolumne«.

Sans surprise, Frank-Walter Steinmeier a été réélu à la présidence de la République fédérale d'Allemagne le 13 février dès le premier tour de scrutin. Le chef de l'Etat sortant a recueilli 1045 suffrages, soit 78,04% des votes (soit 308 voix de plus que la majorité absolue obligatoire lors des deux ...

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus has emerged over the past decade as a useful concept to reduce trade-offs and increase synergies in promoting goals of water, energy and food securities. While WEF scholarship substantiates the biophysical interlinkages and calls for increased and effective coordination across sectors and levels, knowledge on conditions for effective coordination is still lacking. Analysing WEF nexus governance from a polycentricity perspective may contribute to better understanding coordination. In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for analysing WEF nexus governance based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS). The interdependence among transactions for pursuing WEF securities by actors in different action situations generates the need for coordination for changing or sustaining institutions, policy goals and policy instruments that guide actions leading to sustainable outcomes. Coordination is attained through arrangements based on cooperation, coercion or competition. Coordination in complex social-ecological systems is unlikely to be achieved by a single governance mode but rather by synergistic combinations of governance modes. Particular coordination arrangements that emerge in a context depend on the distribution of authority, information and resources within and across interlinked decision-making centres. Further, integrating the political ecology based conceptualisations of power into the analytical framework extends the governance analysis to include the influence of power relations on coordination. Methodological innovation in delineating action situations and identifying the unit of analysis as well as integrating different sources and types of data is required to operationalise the conceptual framework.

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus has emerged over the past decade as a useful concept to reduce trade-offs and increase synergies in promoting goals of water, energy and food securities. While WEF scholarship substantiates the biophysical interlinkages and calls for increased and effective coordination across sectors and levels, knowledge on conditions for effective coordination is still lacking. Analysing WEF nexus governance from a polycentricity perspective may contribute to better understanding coordination. In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for analysing WEF nexus governance based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS). The interdependence among transactions for pursuing WEF securities by actors in different action situations generates the need for coordination for changing or sustaining institutions, policy goals and policy instruments that guide actions leading to sustainable outcomes. Coordination is attained through arrangements based on cooperation, coercion or competition. Coordination in complex social-ecological systems is unlikely to be achieved by a single governance mode but rather by synergistic combinations of governance modes. Particular coordination arrangements that emerge in a context depend on the distribution of authority, information and resources within and across interlinked decision-making centres. Further, integrating the political ecology based conceptualisations of power into the analytical framework extends the governance analysis to include the influence of power relations on coordination. Methodological innovation in delineating action situations and identifying the unit of analysis as well as integrating different sources and types of data is required to operationalise the conceptual framework.

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus has emerged over the past decade as a useful concept to reduce trade-offs and increase synergies in promoting goals of water, energy and food securities. While WEF scholarship substantiates the biophysical interlinkages and calls for increased and effective coordination across sectors and levels, knowledge on conditions for effective coordination is still lacking. Analysing WEF nexus governance from a polycentricity perspective may contribute to better understanding coordination. In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for analysing WEF nexus governance based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS). The interdependence among transactions for pursuing WEF securities by actors in different action situations generates the need for coordination for changing or sustaining institutions, policy goals and policy instruments that guide actions leading to sustainable outcomes. Coordination is attained through arrangements based on cooperation, coercion or competition. Coordination in complex social-ecological systems is unlikely to be achieved by a single governance mode but rather by synergistic combinations of governance modes. Particular coordination arrangements that emerge in a context depend on the distribution of authority, information and resources within and across interlinked decision-making centres. Further, integrating the political ecology based conceptualisations of power into the analytical framework extends the governance analysis to include the influence of power relations on coordination. Methodological innovation in delineating action situations and identifying the unit of analysis as well as integrating different sources and types of data is required to operationalise the conceptual framework.

Die Instrumentalisierung von Flucht und Migration, digitale Attacken auf Wahlen und Infrastrukturen, Hyperschallwaffen, vollautomatisierte bewaffnete Drohnen und gläserne Gefechtsfelder weltweit: Die Vorstellungen über die Formen künftiger Kon­flikte bestimmen schon heute darüber, wie Staaten ihre Sicherheitsvorsorge gestalten und ihre Sicherheitskräfte ausrüsten. Mutmaßlich greifen rein militärische Konzeptionen dabei angesichts des verstärkt hybriden Charakters von Auseinandersetzungen zu kurz. Daher sollten der angekündigten Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie komplexe Konfliktbilder zugrunde gelegt werden, die unterschiedliche Aspekte nationaler wie auch internationaler Sicherheit umfassen. Weil solche Konfliktbilder langfristig bin­dende Beschaffungs- und Organisationsentscheidungen mitbestimmen, ist es notwendig, sich frühzeitig und strukturiert damit auseinanderzusetzen, wie sie ent­stehen. Kriterien für Konfliktbilder möglichst hoher Güte sind eine wissenschafts­basierte Vorausschau, parlamentarische und öffentliche Beteiligung sowie ressort­gemeinsame Strategieentwicklung.

Mit grenznahen Manövern demonstriert Moskau seine Fähigkeit, im Donbas offen militärisch zu intervenieren. Es beschuldigt Kiew, die Lage dort zu eskalieren, und den Westen, die Ukraine durch einseitige Parteinahme darin zu bestärken. Doch im Westen wird geargwöhnt, Russland plane eine großangelegte Invasion der Ukraine. Dies hat der Kreml dementiert. Mitte Dezember 2021 hat er mit zwei Vertragsentwürfen verdeutlicht, worum es ihm geht, nämlich eine weitere Ausdehnung der Nato nach Osten zu verhindern und dafür eine verbindliche Zusicherung zu erhalten. Dabei be­ruft er sich auf die Nato-Russland-Vereinbarungen der 1990er Jahre. Moskau befürchtet, dass vor allem ein Nato-Beitritt der Ukraine das strategische Gleichgewicht mit den USA gefährden würde. Die USA und die Nato signalisieren Dialogbereitschaft in Fragen der Rüstungskontrolle, sind aber nicht bereit, die Prinzipien der europäischen Sicherheitsordnung zu revidieren. Ob Moskau dies akzeptiert, bleibt abzuwarten. Jeden­falls sollte der neue Dialog als Chance aufgegrif­fen werden, um die Lage zu deeskalieren und die mili­tärische Berechenbarkeit durch Rüstungskontrolle wiederherzustellen, ohne Prin­zipien preiszugeben.

Coherence and coordination among interdependent policy sectors are considered key for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Literature on policy coherence argues that a lack of coordination may lead to policy incoherence; however, literature on coordination also sometimes points to the reversed causality that incoherencies in policies or in governance functions (functional incoherence) may hinder coordinated policy outcomes; in fact, these assumptions have rarely been further theorized or tested empirically. In this paper, we hypothesize the higher functional or policy coherence, the higher coordination at process level and the higher the likelihood that coordination at process level is translated into coordination at outcome level. We test this hypothesis for cross-sectoral coordination challenges among different water using sectors in six different basins located in Germany, Iran, Mongolia, Spain, and South Africa. At first glance, four cases seem to confirm the first part of the hypothesis for functional coherence and three for policy coherence. It remains difficult to establish causality. Whether functional and policy coherence translate into coordination at process level seems to depend on a functioning coordination body. We further find that functional and policy incoherencies may either lead to coordination problems (in view of conflicts of interest) or even go along with a high level of coordination at the process level, possibly to compensate for incoherencies. Neither functional nor policy coherence change the relationship of coordination at process and outcome level. To explain coordination at the outcome level, other factors need to be considered.

Coherence and coordination among interdependent policy sectors are considered key for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Literature on policy coherence argues that a lack of coordination may lead to policy incoherence; however, literature on coordination also sometimes points to the reversed causality that incoherencies in policies or in governance functions (functional incoherence) may hinder coordinated policy outcomes; in fact, these assumptions have rarely been further theorized or tested empirically. In this paper, we hypothesize the higher functional or policy coherence, the higher coordination at process level and the higher the likelihood that coordination at process level is translated into coordination at outcome level. We test this hypothesis for cross-sectoral coordination challenges among different water using sectors in six different basins located in Germany, Iran, Mongolia, Spain, and South Africa. At first glance, four cases seem to confirm the first part of the hypothesis for functional coherence and three for policy coherence. It remains difficult to establish causality. Whether functional and policy coherence translate into coordination at process level seems to depend on a functioning coordination body. We further find that functional and policy incoherencies may either lead to coordination problems (in view of conflicts of interest) or even go along with a high level of coordination at the process level, possibly to compensate for incoherencies. Neither functional nor policy coherence change the relationship of coordination at process and outcome level. To explain coordination at the outcome level, other factors need to be considered.

Coherence and coordination among interdependent policy sectors are considered key for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Literature on policy coherence argues that a lack of coordination may lead to policy incoherence; however, literature on coordination also sometimes points to the reversed causality that incoherencies in policies or in governance functions (functional incoherence) may hinder coordinated policy outcomes; in fact, these assumptions have rarely been further theorized or tested empirically. In this paper, we hypothesize the higher functional or policy coherence, the higher coordination at process level and the higher the likelihood that coordination at process level is translated into coordination at outcome level. We test this hypothesis for cross-sectoral coordination challenges among different water using sectors in six different basins located in Germany, Iran, Mongolia, Spain, and South Africa. At first glance, four cases seem to confirm the first part of the hypothesis for functional coherence and three for policy coherence. It remains difficult to establish causality. Whether functional and policy coherence translate into coordination at process level seems to depend on a functioning coordination body. We further find that functional and policy incoherencies may either lead to coordination problems (in view of conflicts of interest) or even go along with a high level of coordination at the process level, possibly to compensate for incoherencies. Neither functional nor policy coherence change the relationship of coordination at process and outcome level. To explain coordination at the outcome level, other factors need to be considered.

Die Türkei beansprucht im östlichen Mittelmeer einen Festlandsockel, der unmittelbar an das Küstenmeer der Republik Zypern und an das der griechischen Inseln heranreicht. Griechenland und Zypern machen dort jedoch ebenfalls Festlandsockelrechte geltend. Die daraus erwachsenden Spannungen destabilisieren die Region. Eine verbindliche Festlegung der maritimen Grenzen zwischen den drei Staaten würde Rechtssicherheit bringen. Gegenüber Griechenland hat die Türkei signalisiert, dass sie nicht ausschließe, unter gewissen Bedingungen den Internationalen Gerichtshof hiermit zu betrauen. Eine Abgrenzung im Gebiet westlich der Insel Zypern kommt für Ankara jedoch erst dann in Betracht, wenn die Zypernfrage vollständig geklärt ist. Solange keine Abgrenzung durch Übereinkunft oder durch ein inter­nationales Gericht erfolgt ist, müssen die drei Staaten gemäß dem Völkerrecht Zurückhaltung in Bezug auf die umstrittenen Seegebiete üben. Bohrungen auf dem Festlandsockel, die der Förderung von Erdgas dienen, sind in einem umstrittenen Gebiet nur zulässig, wenn hierüber Ein­vernehmen zwischen den betreffenden Staaten herrscht. Vorläufige Vereinbarungen, die eine gemeinsame Erschließung um­stritte­ner Seegebiete vorsehen, können zu einer Annäherung der Parteien bei­tragen und gegebenenfalls sogar den Weg für längerfristige Lösungen ebnen. Gerade mit der wachsenden Bedeutung des östlichen Mittelmeers als energiewirtschaftlicher Transit- und Verbindungsraum könnten sich neue Chancen für eine Zusammenarbeit eröffnen.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

With its unique multilateral assets, the United Nations Development System (UNDS) should be playing a key role in assisting governments and other stakeholders with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. But this requires change. Despite improvements in recent decades, too often the UNDS has continued to act as a loose assemblage of competing entities, undermining its effective support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation. It is against that backdrop that the UNDS has been undergoing an extensive reform – that was decided on in 2018 and has been implemented since 2019 – to provide more coherent, integrated support in line with requirements of the 2030 Agenda to United Nations (UN) programme countries. What effects have the reforms yielded at the country level? This paper presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations from our research on UNDS reform implementation. It does so with a focus on reform-induced changes towards what we call a strengthened, collective offer at the country level. Overall, our research shows that reform implementation is moving the needle on the quality of the collective offer. In particular, with regard to its institutional element, we observed that the reform has fostered change in how UN country teams work together that is in line with what the 2030 Agenda demands. Institutional changes allow for increased cross-organisational and cross-sectoral coordination, which could potentially lead to increased policy coherence. But while we see substantial progress, it remains incomplete, fragile and subject to structural limitations. A more critical picture emerges with regard to change in the substantive component of the collective offer in the areas of SDG integration, cross-border work and normative approaches. While there were positive examples, we found little evidence of a systematic repositioning in these areas. The adjustment of the UNDS to the 2030 Agenda does not (yet) meet the expectations derived from the UN’s own reform ambition.

With its unique multilateral assets, the United Nations Development System (UNDS) should be playing a key role in assisting governments and other stakeholders with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. But this requires change. Despite improvements in recent decades, too often the UNDS has continued to act as a loose assemblage of competing entities, undermining its effective support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation. It is against that backdrop that the UNDS has been undergoing an extensive reform – that was decided on in 2018 and has been implemented since 2019 – to provide more coherent, integrated support in line with requirements of the 2030 Agenda to United Nations (UN) programme countries. What effects have the reforms yielded at the country level? This paper presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations from our research on UNDS reform implementation. It does so with a focus on reform-induced changes towards what we call a strengthened, collective offer at the country level. Overall, our research shows that reform implementation is moving the needle on the quality of the collective offer. In particular, with regard to its institutional element, we observed that the reform has fostered change in how UN country teams work together that is in line with what the 2030 Agenda demands. Institutional changes allow for increased cross-organisational and cross-sectoral coordination, which could potentially lead to increased policy coherence. But while we see substantial progress, it remains incomplete, fragile and subject to structural limitations. A more critical picture emerges with regard to change in the substantive component of the collective offer in the areas of SDG integration, cross-border work and normative approaches. While there were positive examples, we found little evidence of a systematic repositioning in these areas. The adjustment of the UNDS to the 2030 Agenda does not (yet) meet the expectations derived from the UN’s own reform ambition.

With its unique multilateral assets, the United Nations Development System (UNDS) should be playing a key role in assisting governments and other stakeholders with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. But this requires change. Despite improvements in recent decades, too often the UNDS has continued to act as a loose assemblage of competing entities, undermining its effective support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation. It is against that backdrop that the UNDS has been undergoing an extensive reform – that was decided on in 2018 and has been implemented since 2019 – to provide more coherent, integrated support in line with requirements of the 2030 Agenda to United Nations (UN) programme countries. What effects have the reforms yielded at the country level? This paper presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations from our research on UNDS reform implementation. It does so with a focus on reform-induced changes towards what we call a strengthened, collective offer at the country level. Overall, our research shows that reform implementation is moving the needle on the quality of the collective offer. In particular, with regard to its institutional element, we observed that the reform has fostered change in how UN country teams work together that is in line with what the 2030 Agenda demands. Institutional changes allow for increased cross-organisational and cross-sectoral coordination, which could potentially lead to increased policy coherence. But while we see substantial progress, it remains incomplete, fragile and subject to structural limitations. A more critical picture emerges with regard to change in the substantive component of the collective offer in the areas of SDG integration, cross-border work and normative approaches. While there were positive examples, we found little evidence of a systematic repositioning in these areas. The adjustment of the UNDS to the 2030 Agenda does not (yet) meet the expectations derived from the UN’s own reform ambition.