Diplomacy & Crisis News

Tuesday’s ruling by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea has bought a little clarity to the problems in the South China Sea, but it has not made solving the underlying problems significantly simpler.

(Own report) - Whereas the Brexit has been met with wholesale rejection by the German and other EU member states' establishments, it was positively assessed in the little noticed countries of Northwest Europe, growing in strategic importance. Iceland's president recently invited Great Britain to enhance its cooperation with the "triangle of non-EU countries," meaning Iceland, and the autonomous regions Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which are part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland left the European Community (EC) in 1982; the Faroe Islands have never been members and Iceland officially withdrew its application for EU membership in 2015. All three countries refuse nuclear weapons and NATO's missile defense shield on their territories, while showing a greater openness towards Russia than most other western countries. Iceland and particularly Greenland have been growing in their strategic importance with the impending opening of Arctic sea routes and exploitation of Arctic natural resources. German experts have already suggested inciting Greenland to secede from Denmark. This would offer Germany greater influence on Greenland and consequently on the Arctic's political, economic and military affairs.

Réunis à Paris le 3 octobre 2014, les responsables africains de la zone franc ont confirmé leur attachement à ce lien monétaire. Pourtant, l'écart grandit avec les pays disposant de leur propre devise. / Afrique, France, Aide au développement, Commerce international, Développement, Économie, Finance, (...) / Afrique, France, Aide au développement, Commerce international, Développement, Économie, Finance, Libéralisme, Mondialisation, Monnaie, Francophonie, Afrique de l'Ouest - 2014/11

A partir des années 1980, la Turquie, portée par une impétueuse croissance économique, s'est déployée dans toutes les directions : vers l'Union européenne ; vers le monde turcophone, notamment en Asie centrale et au Caucase ; vers le monde arabe et vers l'Afrique. Mais son rôle est fragilisé par les (...) / Afrique, Asie centrale, Caucase, Europe, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Turquie, Conflit, Énergie, Kurdes, Gaz naturel - Europe

No doubt that the recent NATO Summit in Warsaw was partly overshadowed by the uncertainty of the historic Brexit vote. During the week in the lead up to the Summit the political discourse landmark transatlantic arena was much more focused on what a Brexit would mean for Europe than on NATO’s future. Nevertheless the Summit delivered important if not milestone results for NATO.

The decisions for a new persistent rotational presence of Western European and American military units in Poland and the Baltics is a major achievement for Eastern European members threatened by a re-emergent Russia. Although the size and capabilities of the deployed forces, altogether about 4000 troops, are largely symbolic in light of Russia’s overwhelming military advantage in the region, however, the persistent presence of other NATO troops in the region obviously has a significant political value in terms of demonstrating Alliance solidarity. As for the grounding of the decision, it is telling that Germany, long known to be the most reluctant member to take any military steps which might antagonize relationship with Russia, felt obliged to be one of the framework nations of the units first to be deployed in the East. Nevertheless, keeping NATO’s relations with Russia on dual tracks, adding the possibility of dialogue next to deterrence is essential for European security. The first NATO-Russia Council meeting held just days after the Summit was an important first step in this direction.

The decisions pointing to greater NATO involvement in tackling soft security challenges, including terrorism and illegal migration - stemming from the Southern flank are also significant. The relevant activities and missions, especially NATO’s maritime mission in the Aegean Sea in tackling human trafficking could be highly visible examples of the value of NATO towards the citizens of the member states, who are increasingly concerned of the security threats related to uncontrolled migration and terrorist networks with ties to the Middle East. Of course close partnership with the EU in this as well as in other security domains are critical. One can hope that the new arrangements signed between the two Brussels based organizations will prove to bring valuable practical benefits for the member states, and long standing political obstacles will not shallow out the agreement.
Nevertheless, the possible effects of Brexit looms over all the above mentioned issues. As the UK is set to lose its place in the EU’s CSDP, there will be high ambitions in London to remain a leading actor in the European security arena through NATO. Hence we can expect robust commitments towards Allied operations in and outside of Europe, including streaming UK capacities towards NATO previously tied down in CSDP activities. NATO will remain the most important organization through which the UK will be able to institutionally influence political and strategic developments in Europe. One must note that the Brexit did not alter the age old British strategic objective of fostering a balance of power in continental Europe, that is restraining Germany’s power. However, the possible negative economic effects of the Brexit will likely not evade London’s defense budget, which will obviously put a restraint the UK’s ability to invest robustly in defense. Furthermore, the possible brake up of the UK if Scotland or Northern Ireland succeeds would be a significant blow to Britain’s status as a considerable European power.

Brexit has created new conditions for the EU and its common security and defense policy. With the UK leaving the EU CSDP has lost its most potent military power. As a result CSDP will likely focus even more on low end crisis management operations, not as if during the past ten years there would have been robust EU military missions. But the UK’s departure will further weaken Europe’s potential to be a global actor, whether we speak of actual military capabilities or strategic ambitions. With France alone in the EU with a global strategic outlook but with increasing economic and social challenges, Germany’s influence will grow on the future shape of CSDP as well. This would probably mean a more risk averse approach towards possible crisis management operations and a softer approach towards Russia by the EU. Nevertheless, the chances of greater integration within European security and defense have also grown with the UK exit. However, deeper security and defense cooperation are closely tied with the question of the whole future direction of the European Union, which is rather uncertain at the moment.

A sudden disorderly disintegration of the EU could be fatal for NATO as well. The total loss of solidarity and the will to compromise between EU member states would surely spill over on to the security and defense realm. However, this does not mean that further integration is the only viable path, as the democratic will of the vast majority of European citizens cannot be overlooked. It’s not the question of more or less integration as some European leaders have already suggested but where and how – and even more importantly, with what kind of policy objectives. NATO will only have a strong and capable CSDP by its side if the EU has the firm support of its citizens.

Language Undefined Tag: NATOVarga GergelyCSDPUKBREXIT

(Own report) - With his introductory visit to Berlin on Monday, the French presidential candidate Alain Juppé has begun preparing his candidature for the 2017 elections. Whereas his rival, Nicolas Sarkozy, had not left a particularly good impression during his talks in the German capital, Alain Juppé, following his meeting with Chancellor Angela Merkel und his talk with business representatives, is being highly praised in Germany. Juppé, who has announced budget cuts of from 80 to 100 billion Euros and a drastic reduction of public service jobs, "is one of the few politicians, who has a plan and takes a stand," according to the Director General of the Federation of German Industries (BDI). Another business manager is quoted with his condescending statement, "Juppé could even be a minister in Germany." Already in the last presidential election campaign, President Sarkozy's party had formulated its election platform in coordination with Germany's CDU. Sarkozy was ostentatiously seeking information on the "Agenda 2010" from the German Chancellor at the time, Gerhard Schröder. In bowing to Germany's austerity dictate, Paris was hoping to play a leading role in the EU's foreign and military policy. Those hopes, however, are deceptive. As one can read in the German media, "Paris' traditional spheres of influence, for example in West Africa, should no longer be left up to France."

S’il est nécessaire de rester prudent et d’analyser objectivement les éléments disponibles, ni les errements médiatiques ni la récupération du drame par la classe politique ne suffisent à rejeter la possibilité d’un attentat. Les éléments allant en ce sens sont … Lire la suite →

Au début des années 1990, la fin de la guerre froide devait vider les arsenaux et mettre fin à la plupart des conflits. Loin de régresser, les dépenses militaires dans le monde ont augmenté d'un tiers en dix ans, atteignant 1 520 milliards d'euros en 2014, année qui a connu plus de guerres que toute (...) / Arabie saoudite, États-Unis, France, Armée, Armement, Commerce des armes, Commerce international, Conflit, Défense, Droits humains, Économie, Géopolitique, Industrie de l'armement, Violence - 2016/04

China has taken a leap towards clarifying its claims in the South China Sea, but in a direction that could intensify frictions.

Cette recension est issue de Politique étrangère (2/2016). Yaël Hirsch propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Didier Epelbaum, Des hommes vraiment ordinaires ? Les bourreaux génocidaires (Paris, Stock, 2015, 304 pages).

Journaliste, ancien directeur de France 2 et ancien correspondant de la chaîne en Israël, Didier Epelbaum est également historien, docteur de l’EHESS et maître de conférences à Sciences Po. Spécialiste de la Solution finale (il a écrit sur l’adjoint d’Adolf Eichmann, Brunner, et sur les juifs polonais immigrés en France), avec son nouvel essai il élargit le champ de ses recherches et choisit pour terrain quatre génocides : arménien, juif, khmer et rwandais.

Il s’inscrit donc dans un champ polémique, à la suite des historiens Christopher Browning et Daniel Goldhagen. Il le fait avec humanité, connaissance et élégance. Sa question est celle de savoir si, réellement, les bourreaux sont des hommes ordinaires, et si les historiens ont pu prouver que, une fois soumis à des conditions politiques très particulières, tout un chacun peut se mettre à massacrer en masse des êtres humains. À cette question, l’historien répond par une thèse qu’il va démontrer méthodiquement : la nature humaine ne verse pas nécessairement vers un mal si « banal », et les bourreaux sont une minorité très spécifique. Forgeant le terme de « cidocratie » pour définir les régimes politiques où, à un moment donné, les bourreaux prennent le pouvoir, il avance l’idée que les meurtres de masse sont préparés par une lente idéologie et inspirés par un climat de peur. Si l’historien a du mal à déterminer quel pourcentage de la population se transforme en bourreaux (cela oscillerait entre 2 et 8 %), il avance que nombreux sont ceux qui se contentent de laisser faire et de piller, tandis qu’une autre minorité est constituée de sauveurs. Se concentrant sur les bourreaux, Epelbaum décrit leur action comme un mélange d’obéissance bureaucratique et de « capacités d’improvisation convaincue ». Il nous démontre alors que ces derniers sont recrutés par des idéologues selon des critères précis : « Des hommes qui adhèrent à l’idéologie, volontaires, jeunes, vigoureux et endurants, loyaux et obéissants, ne reculant pas devant la violence extrême.»

Le but de l’essai n’est pas de dévoiler de nouvelles sources mais de s’appuyer sur de nombreux textes existants pour faire un point. À l’heure où les témoignages « précieux et infiniment respectables » des survivants s’accumulent, Epelbaum termine les remerciements de son livre là où il aurait pu le commencer, en soulignant que « les synthèses deviennent de plus en plus nécessaires ».

La deuxième qualité du livre est de donner autant de place à chacun des quatre génocides. Venu de l’étude des bourreaux nazis, Epelbaum fait une place aussi grande à l’Arménie, au Cambodge et au Rwanda. Il maîtrise l’art de la comparaison, dessinant des modes opératoires sans jamais oublier de préciser les différences.

Enfin, Des hommes vraiment ordinaires est un magnifique plaidoyer pour l’histoire. Si Epelbaum n’hésite pas à dialoguer avec d’autres disciplines – notamment avec le sociologue Zygmunt Bauman sur la question de la « modernité » des génocides –, il évacue assez rapidement la psychologie et la philosophie pour rendre hommage aux historiens « qui font consciencieusement leur travail ». Ainsi, si le livre est une réponse à Christopher Browning, Epelbaum souligne que son étude du bataillon 307 a nuancé les propos des Hommes ordinaires du bataillon 101, trouvant « consternant » que « sa révision partielle ultérieure n’ait trouvé aucun écho dans la presse ».

Yaël Hirsch

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

 

At a United Nations intergovernmental forum opening in Nairobi, Kenya, today, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged participants to focus on strong collaboration, equality and inclusion in trade, finance and investment in order to better align action with agreed-upon sustainable development targets and help restore trust in the global economy.

From a national park to a fossil site and a naval dockyard, the United Nations cultural agency today inscribed 12 new sites of special cultural or physical significance on its World Heritage List.

Paradoxes have always abounded in the relationship between the Turkish military and the country’s politicians. Turkey’s armed forces — or factions within them — have justified their repeated interventions in politics with claims that they are saving the state from corrupt, populist politicians. The political class, for its part, frustrated as its leaders turn rotten, blames its degradation on over-dominant army interventions that keep wrecking the country’s democratic progress.