Diplomacy & Crisis News

It is increasingly obvious that China can no longer be patient over the North Korean issue. (South China Morning Post)

It is always surreal to watch the televised images of the heir of the Kim family dynasty, Kim Jong-un, strutting around his senior subjects with a cigarette between the fingers.

What is even more surreal is the oddity of the heir’s relentlessly pursued agenda—‘Byungjin Line’ (meaning ‘Guns and Butter’ but more like ‘Guns over Butter’ in actual implementation). At the 7th Party Congress held last May, one of Dennis Rodman’s best friends obstinately manifested that he will unflinchingly invest in the completion of his ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons portfolio, whatever the cost is to its people. Kim’s such dogged ‘Songun’ (Military-first) position clearly demonstrates that he will not follow the Chinese path of moving towards economic reform with a degree of openness.

Kim Jong-un’s diplomatic craftsmanship is disastrous. Since he came into power in 2011 he has not yet made a single official visit to China. Meanwhile China, the G2-aspiring major power, has unwittingly earned an international obloquy as the Kim regime’s one and only godfather; largely because the major power accounts for more than 70% of the regime’s foreign trade, and most of its food and energy supplies.

Instead of reviving its regime’s effete comradeship with China, in 2013 Kim executed his own uncle, Jang Sung-taek. Jang was then the second most powerful person in the Kim regime and China’s most trusted power broker, who dominated the development of trade cooperation and border economy (‘Shinuiju’ meaning special administrative district) with China.

In an official response to Jang’s execution, China hoped to ‘continue’ maintaining a ‘healthy’ relationship with the Kim regime, but the consequences of spoiling little Kim are harmful. Internally, Kim’s support base has been engulfed by his father’s hawkish loyalists who compete for the boss’ trust, notwithstanding the fact that the boss is too survival-conscious (or hyper-rationally ‘mad’) to have faith in anyone but his ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons portfolio.

Externally, the Kim regime keeps flaunting its nuclear missile capabilities in defiance of the international community’s sanctions. The latest UN resolution 2270 was signed in March 2016 to call upon member-states to ban their support for the Kim regime’s WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction) related activities, like transportation of WMDs, and to embargo coal and other mineral exports from the regime.

Scoffing at the fifth UN Security Council (UNSC) sanction that it received, on August 24th the regime lofted at a high angle a long range KN-11 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (using ‘cold-launch’ technology). This landed in the water of Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). And on September 9th (North Korea’s National Foundation Holiday), the regime further conducted its fifth and biggest underground nuclear warhead test yet (the alleged impacts round up to 10kt), dismissive of the G20 summit hosted in China.

Is There a Rosy Future for China and the Kim Regime?

The credibility of Kim’s threats has become existential to the extent that, if the regime really possessed miniaturized nuclear warheads as it claims, its long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and SLBM could nuke the west coast of the U.S. mainland. Such existential threats gives the U.S.-led trilateral alliance in Northeast Asia legitimate reasons to resort to preemptive strikes, in case the Kim regime shows any signs of a nuclear attack.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong-il, who at least kept the de-nuclearization card under the negotiation table of the six party talk, Kim Jong-un is not as dexterous in finding the fulcrum point on the dovish-to-hawkish scale. The danger with little Kim is that his threats swing back and forth in a pendulum between the two polarities of “artilleries and nuclear weapons”.

China must understand that Kim Jong-un’s behavioral incorrigibility concurs with the collapsibility of the regime, not because of exogenous pressures, but from internal malfunctions. The dilemma for the Kim regime is that maintaining political stability through reinforcing a frayed Juche ideology is always more important than promoting a degree of openness in the informal Jangmadang economy.

Thus, the regime will be more repressive in putting an end to the North Korean people’s increasing market demands and simultaneously over obsession with its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons portfolio. For the foreseeable future this can only be exacerbated, especially when the North Koreans (those who surreptitiously access outside information) confirm the own economic reality―namely of being relatively deprived, at a 1:40 per capita income gap, in comparison to their kindred South Korean people,.

It is expected that the United States might soon apply the Iran Model to the Kim regime, in order to strengthen sanctions against the regime’s incorrigible behavior. Pundits warn that China will be offended by the United States’ initiation of a secondary boycott on Chinese companies transacting with North Korea, foreboding possible ruptures in cooperation between the United States and China on the Korean peninsula.

Despite the gloomy picture, whenever Kim Jong-un poses another new non-negotiable threat, it becomes ever more obvious that China can no longer be patient over its buffer zone; it is turning into a rambunctious nightmare to regional security. A number of Chinese experts have recently recognized that Kim Jong-un is a worn-out nuisance. Perhaps now is the ripe time for China to recalibrate it policies towards North Korea.

The post China should Recalibrate its Policies towards North Korea appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

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Tsai Ing-wen waves to supporters at her party’s headquarters in Taipei on Saturday after her victory in Taiwan’s presidential election.

Diplomatic ties between Taiwan and mainland China have been experiencing multiple hurdles since the new Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen won the election this past January, after eight years of gradual restoration of trade and cultural exchanges under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency.

A Message Through Political and Economic “Cold Peace”

This June, mainland officials unilaterally suspended all major communication mechanisms with their Taiwanese counterparts. A spokesperson for mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) announced it would  cut off the official exchanges channel between them and mainland Affairs Council (MAC), as well as between mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). His decision leaves both sides with no outlets for direct government communication in case of a crisis.

In the meantime, Beijing is consciously reducing its cross-Strait tourist numbers and trade volumes. The numbers of tourist groups visiting Taiwan from mainland dropped by 30% since this past May, and Beijing plans to further cut down the total tourist number even further from 3.85 million in 2015 to 2 million by the end of this year.

Like-minded soft trade sanctions, such as canceling cross-Strait trade deals, also created stress on Taiwan’s economy. From January to July this year, the total cross-Strait trade volume dropped by 9.8%, with exports from mainland to Taiwan dropping by 12.7%, according to mainland’s Ministry of Commerce.

Meanwhile, Beijing sent Tsai a clear message of dissatisfaction by “further squeezing [Taiwan’s] international space”. The Gambia, an African nation formally connected with Taiwan, resumed diplomatic ties with Beijing in early March.

In addition to poaching Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, Beijing has successfully persuaded Cambodia, Malaysia, and Kenya to send Taiwanese suspects residing in those countries back to China for trial this year. Comparing this to China’s past history of non-interference in Taiwanese citizens’ legal affairs overseas under President Ma, Beijing is clearly flexing its muscles since Tsai Ing-wen’s election

A historic Ma-Xi meeting focused on the “1992 consensus”.

A Historical Document

Most cross-Strait policy changes were made by mainland officials directed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, with the clear political objective to apply pressure on the new Taiwanese President Tsai. Why has Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan shifted so dramatically from Ma to Tsai?

The key to understanding this deterioration on cross-Strait relations goes back to the 1992 Consensus—a mutual agreement between Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1992. In it, both sides agreed on the “One-China principle”, that Taiwan is a province of China, with “different interpretations” of which party is the legitimate governing body of China.

As the current leader of DPP, to endorse the 1992 consensus would be considered political suicide for Tsai Ing-wen. Consequently, she failed to endorse the 1992 Consensus after she won the Taiwanese presidential election this January. In her interview with Liberty Times (Tzu-yu Shih Pa) shortly after the election, she addressed the “discussion of the 1992 Consensus” as “a historical fact and both sides had a common acknowledgement to set aside differences and seek common ground” yet did not support the actual substance of the document.

The Challenges Ahead for Tsai

Unlike Tsai, her predecessor President Ma Ying-jeou was never asked to clarify his stance of the “One-China Principle” during his presidency. Despite Tsai’s multiple attempts to extend olive branches to Beijing, Xi Jinping has never recognized her as a credible partner of Beijing. Although Tsai clearly outlined her cross-Strait policies on a “no surprises, no provocations” policy stance, she is facing much more systematic obstacles than her predecessor.

One of the challenges for President Tsai is the long history of mistrust between Beijing and DPP, the party she currently chairs. Mainland politicians are prone to associate DPP with “pro-independence”, “separation”, and other labels of the like. The infamous separatist “Two-state Theory” put forward by the former President, DPP leader, Lee Teng-hui is still fresh in the memory of mainland politicians. On the other hand, Beijing shares a mutual trust with Ma Ying Jeoy and the KMT he led, built on years of reconciliation and cooperation. Without trust, calculated ambiguity won’t lubricate the cross-Strait relations for President Tsai like it did for Ma.

Tsai has also had to face obstacles as the first female president of Taiwan. She has dealt with sexist criticism directed at her gender and marital status. Maj. Gen. Wang Wenxing, a Chinese military official at China’s Academy of Military and an acting member of ARATS, described Tsai in the International Herald Leader as “extreme” and “emotional” because “she was never married, and therefore lack of the burden of love, family, and children”. Though his article was taken down shortly after due to broad criticism from the public, the fact that it was approved by a CCP-affiliated publication exposed some mainland officials’ hostility against this “single woman politician”.

Calculated ambiguity was sufficient to maintain a healthy cross-Strait relationship during Ma’s Presidency. But if Tsai wishes to keep vital diplomatic ties from deteriorating, she needs to find more creative ways to maneuver between Taiwan’s domestic calls for independence and Beijing’s pressures to endorse the 1992 Consensus.

The post Tsai Ing-wen and the Need to Balance Cross-Strait Relations appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Partenaire du Club Med depuis plusieurs années, le conglomérat shanghaïen Fosun a fini par l'absorber. Il cherche dans la foulée à acquérir la Compagnie des Alpes et ses concessions sur les plus grandes stations de ski (Les Arcs, La Plagne, Serre-Chevalier…). Son objectif ? Attirer la clientèle chinoise. Dans son propre pays, où le tourisme a explosé et où un Club devrait ouvrir prochainement ; à l'étranger, où cent vingt millions de Chinois ont passé leurs vacances en 2015, singulièrement en France, première destination occidentale.

On s'étonnera à peine que le territoire national ressemble à un champ de bataille pour les opérateurs chinois. Outre Fosun, le groupe hôtelier Jin Jiang a racheté Louvre Hôtels (Kyriad, Campanile, Première Classe) et pris, à la surprise générale, 15 % d'Accor (Mercure, Ibis, Novotel…) sans cacher son envie d'aller plus loin ; Kai Yuan s'est offert l'hôtel cinq étoiles Marriott sur les Champs-Élysées, à Paris ; la compagnie Hainan Airlines a croqué une part de Pierre et Vacances et pris 10 % du capital de Center Parcs — elle a également racheté la compagnie à bas coût Aigle Azur puis Servair, la filiale restauration d'Air France.

Plus spectaculaire encore, le groupe chinois Symbiose allié au canadien SNC-Lavalin s'est approprié l'aéroport de Toulouse-Blagnac, à proximité des pistes d'essai d'Airbus. Non seulement il a profité de la privatisation de cet aéroport pour en prendre 49,9 % du capital, mais MM. Manuel Valls et Emmanuel Macron lui ont octroyé un pacte d'actionnaires hors normes permettant aux propriétaires chinois, minoritaires, de diriger (1). Sûrs d'eux-mêmes, ces derniers ont d'ailleurs voulu faire main basse sur une partie de la cagnotte de l'aéroport (70 millions d'euros) en réclamant, moins d'un an après leur arrivée, le versement de 20 millions d'euros de dividendes…

(1) Révélations de Laurent Mauduit, « La scandaleuse privatisation de l'aéroport de Toulouse-Blagnac », Mediapart, 28 novembre 2014.

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