Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Clélie Nallet propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-Michel Severino et Jérémy Hajdenberg, Entreprenante Afrique (Odile Jacob, 2016, 288 pages).
Cet ouvrage explore une dynamique entrepreneuriale africaine peu connue, celle des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) formelles. Jean-Michel Severino et Jérémy Hajdenberg – à la direction d’un fonds d’investissement dédié aux PME africaines – offrent un regard de praticiens expérimentés, nourri d’une riche connaissance des terrains africains. L’approche est empirique, et le sujet novateur.
Si l’entreprenariat africain n’est en rien un phénomène nouveau, le premier tissu de PME africaines apparaît pour sa part tardivement dans les années 1980. Les premières parties de l’ouvrage s’attachent à décrire ces entreprises et leurs entrepreneurs. Des secteurs de l’agro-alimentaire, du bâtiment, du tourisme, à ceux de l’énergie, des nouvelles technologies, de l’éducation et de la santé, le lecteur est invité à suivre différentes aventures entrepreneuriales. Fait appréciable, les difficultés de parcours ne sont pas dissimulées (accès au capital complexe, problèmes liés à la corruption ou au manque d’infrastructures, etc.). On suivra par exemple une PME de produits laitiers, qui fait le pari d’utiliser du lait produit sur place (au lieu d’importer de la poudre de lait), et qui, non sans peine, réussit à structurer toute une filière locale.
Les auteurs se confrontent ensuite à des problématiques plus globales sur les modèles de développement africain et leur avenir. Ils documentent ce qu’ils considèrent comme le tournant africain du siècle dernier : une croissance tirée par une consommation intérieure de plus en plus importante, portée par l’émergence d’une classe moyenne significative. L’entrepreneur est érigé en « héros » de la « croissance autonome », par sa capacité à l’alimenter en fournissant des biens et services adaptés à une demande locale croissante. Il est aussi « le héros de la transformation sociale africaine », de par sa « mission sociale », décrite comme inhérente à la PME africaine. Cette héroïsation de l’entrepreneur est parfois peu convaincante : une PME qui fait preuve d’une « bonne gestion du personnel » étant ici déjà considérée comme « sociale »…
L’ouvrage se clôt sur un plaidoyer en faveur d’un modèle de croissance centré sur un « secteur privé proprement africain ». On sort de sa lecture persuadé que la multiplication des PME telles qu’elles sont décrites serait une bonne nouvelle. Toutefois, le passage du micro au macro est moins convaincant. Si des transformations socio-économiques sont indéniablement en cours, l’ampleur donnée à la dynamique entrepreneuriale et à son rôle dans les économies africaines laisse songeur. Les auteurs sont confrontés à une difficulté très répandue dès qu’il s’agit du continent africain : celle du chiffrage du phénomène – leur certitude quant à son amplification à venir ressemble à un pari.
Ce livre, bien documenté et illustré, n’échappe pourtant pas à certaines généralisations. Le cercle vertueux de la classe moyenne, « à la fois vivier et marché d’entrepreneurs », provoquant automatiquement développement social et démocratie, relève d’une croyance certes répandue mais inexacte empiriquement. Ce cercle vertueux n’a rien d’automatique, et son enclenchement dépend largement des politiques mises en place par la puissance publique, mobilisée (trop) ponctuellement dans ces pages. Le parallèle entre le dictateur et le consommateur, respectivement héros des années 1960 et « nouveau héros africain », peut apparaître quant à lui fâcheux. Il n’en demeure pas moins que cet ouvrage constitue une contribution fouillée et importante sur les transformations socio-économiques en cours sur le continent.
Clélie Nallet
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Non seulement la citoyenneté en démocratie représentative se réduit à une délégation en forme de dépossession, mais il faudrait en plus, à chaque scrutin, voter « utile » au nom d'un front républicain plus mythologique qu'il n'y paraît. C'est hors de toute stratégie électoraliste qu'Armand Gatti, qui s'est éteint le 6 avril dernier, cherchait à « insuffler l'énergie de trouver l'ouverture vers de nouveaux horizons » à tous ses « loulous ». Une sélection d'archives en rapport avec le numéro du mois.
Historiens et sociologues ont abondamment démontré que les Tutsis et les Hutus ne constituent pas des tribus ou des ethnies : ils ne sont pas issus de terroirs distincts ; ils partagent une même langue, une même culture, les mêmes références religieuses. Il ne s'agit pas non plus de castes, car les mariages mixtes ont de tout temps été fréquents.
Le vocable le plus adapté est donc celui d'« ordres », au sens où ils existaient dans la France d'avant 1789. Or, si l'on pense à l'Europe prérévolutionnaire, on voit bien que les ordres y organisaient une très grande variété de rapports, à la fois entre leurs membres et les uns avec les autres. Au Rwanda, le contrat informel patron-client, l'ubuhake, était extrêmement dur, puisqu'il assignait la masse des paysans hutus à un statut proche du servage. Au Burundi, le contrat d'ubugabire instaurait des rapports plus tolérables : le travail était ponctuel et rémunéré en nature (par l'usage du bétail, par exemple).
Autre différence de taille : le royaume rwandais recourait largement à la guerre. Il se trouvait ainsi constamment en conflit avec ses voisins des royaumes du Nkore (dans l'Ouganda d'aujourd'hui), du Karagwe (dans le nord-ouest de l'actuelle Tanzanie) et des Kivus (au Congo). Le Rwanda était la Prusse de la région, pas sa Bavière. Le Burundi se montrait beaucoup plus paisible et devait parfois se défendre face au Rwanda. En outre, alors qu'au Rwanda la dynastie royale était clairement identifiée aux Tutsis, au Burundi la lignée monarchique Ganwa n'était considérée ni comme tutsie ni comme hutue, mais comme un groupe séparé qui incarnait l'identité nationale.
Demonstrators in Hanoi last May, demanding cleaner waters in the central regions after mass fish deaths along the coast of Vietnam. (REUTERS/Kham)
Vietnam took another small step toward inclusive political institutions this month, announcing the creation of a website where Vietnamese can air their grievances. At a regular press conference, Minister and Chairman of the Government Office, Mai Tien Dung, formally declared the website nguoidan.chinhphu.vn, which would allow authorities at all levels to receive, answer, and respond to citizens’ questions and complaints, and collect proposals on how to improve the country’s administrative system.
The initiative is timely, coming just days before the one-year anniversary of the start of the Formosa protests, sparked by mass fish deaths along a 200-kilometer coastline of central Vietnam, which some called Vietnam’s largest environmental disaster. The deaths of some 100 metric tons of fish in four central provinces were first recorded on April 6, 2016, and protesters soon gathered to accuse a steel mill in Ha Tinh. The steel mill, being developed by Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics Group, was widely suspected of discharging untreated waste into nearby waters.
The accusations led to organized protests breaking out in several major cities, and resulted in the arrests and detainment of dozens of Vietnamese protesters. Those actions drew the attention of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), who called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly. Formosa finally admitted responsibility in June, pledging $500 million in compensation to some 186,000 fishermen and fish farmers.
To date, there is some confusion over exactly how much compensation has been paid out. Minister Dung, at last week’s press conference, announced local authorities disbursed 76.8% of the total as of March 6. Afterwards, one newspaper reported just 32%, or VND3.7 trillion ($162 million) of VNĐ11.5 trillion ($500 million) had been paid to support local fishermen and help clean up the polluted marine environment as of April 1.
Minister Dung also sought to reassure the Vietnamese public, announcing an inspection team from the environment ministry would begin a three-day examination of the plant, checking whether a blast furnace could be put into use, “If they cannot ensure the safety for the facility’s operation, the mill will never be allowed to go into production.”
Here in Vietnam, findings from the 2016 Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) were also published last week, revealing a dramatic increase in concern by citizens for the environment. More than 12% of those surveyed expressed the environment as their most important concern, increasing 10% from last year. And the party secretary of Ha Tinh province, Vo Kim Cu, was reportedly fired last week for his role in the Formosa fish kill.
Through these timely actions, Hanoi appears to taking positive steps toward acknowledging their citizens’ newfound environmental activism, hoping to avoid any widespread social unrest given the extent of pollution. But they are also taking punitive measures to quell protests. This past week, Nguyễn Văn Hóa, a 22-year-old resident of Kỳ Anh District, was arrested by Hà Tĩnh police for “abusing his civil rights, freedom and democracy to infringe upon the interests of the State.” He stands accused of using a Flycam device to shoot videos of the protests at the Formosa steel plant that posted on social networks.
The anniversary of Vietnam’s largest environmental disaster has seemingly motivated government officials to pay heed to citizens’ concerns and take actions to address the pollution and potential unrest. Yet there are some fears the new website will be used against the agitated populace much like Mao Zedong used the “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign in China.
Hopefully restraints on waste discharge will displace restraints on peaceful assembly – lest another environmental disaster crashes the new website after a flood of complaints, and the increasingly environmentally-paranoid Vietnamese return to the streets. On Sunday, the favorite day for Vietnamese to protest last year, the streets of Saigon were quiet, and locals were back to eating fish again.
The post Vietnam Seeks to Calm Waters One Year After Environmental Disaster appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Following the recent decision of the South Korea’s Constitutional Court to remove President Park Guen-hye in the wake of the massive scandal that has deeply shaken South Korean’s political and economic landscape, former President Park was arrested last Friday and is currently detained at the Seoul Detention Center while awaiting trail. If convicted, she will be facing more than 10 years in prison.
Indeed, hundred of thousands have railed in the street demanding President Park’s resignation since October 2016. The scandal has unveiled a large network of bribery, corruption and influence peddling that has led to the arrest of important political members such as Moon Hyung-pyo, Chairman of the National Pension Service (NPS), but also Samsung Vice President Lee Jae-young and several prominent members of the Chaebol financial clique face trial and severe charges.
While South Korea’s political history has been characterized by a deep turmoil during the turbulent years that have marked the democratic transition from the authoritarian rule period, President Park has become the first president to be forced from the office and later arrested after being involved in a large-scale corruption scandal since the military era.
South Korea will be electing a new president on May and the attention remains focused on Park’s successor and on his or her ability to define a new critical strategy to address the North Korean issue. President Park relied on strong measures to force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program, marking a significant shift from a trustpolitik strategy championed during the first years of her Administration.
Following the escalation of tense relations with Pyongyang, culminated with a series of missiles and nuclear tests, Park Administration was characterized by an increasingly open and harsh confrontation with Pyongyang. In less than a year, Park Administration closed the jointly operated Kaesong Industrial Facility, denounced the violation of human rights in North Korea while encouraging additional sanctions targeting North Korea, stressed Seoul’s level of preparedness in the event of an imminent collapse of the North Korea’s regime and also openly disclosed the existence of a plan to kill Kim Jong-un and his close entourage in order to decapitate the command-chain in the event of a war.
The sudden end of Park Administration is expected to affect the delicate balance in the region. In the attempt to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Park’s Administration reinforced the security ties with Washington and has also promoted a new entente with Tokyo, considered a valuable asset in containing North Korea’s nuclear threat despite decades of tensions caused by the historical legacy of Imperial Japan’s occupation of the Korea.
Last November, under the auspices of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement, allowing the two countries to share classified information including North Korea’s missile and nuclear activities. The agreement was strongly opposed by the Minjoo Party, concerned about the involvement of Seoul into a larger missile defense pact with Japan that could endanger the unsteady balance in the Korean peninsula while alimenting additional tensions with Beijing.
Besides the evident turmoil within South Korea’s political landscape, the new scenario characterized by the sudden end of the Park Administration will be a determining element in outlining a new direction in South Korea’s security priorities, while Pyongyang continues to cast a dreadful nuclear shadow across the region.
In the wake of President Park’s dismissal, the attention on the recalibration of the relations with Beijing and the growing tensions with Pyongyang aliment the debate. Relations with China have been strained by the acceleration of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system strongly supported by Washington, alarmed about the resurgence of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program.
Under the rising leadership of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s notorious provocations and sinister nuclear ambitions have reached an unprecedented level of threats, jeopardizing not only the unsteady military balance in the region but accelerating the dangerous confrontation with Washington and its allies. Pyongyang has conducted an increasing number of ballistic tests, creating concern about its fast-paced ability to develop ballistic missile capabilities to reach the continental U.S. with a nuclear-tipped warhead.
The end of the strategic patience advocated by Obama Administration toward North Korea has led to a critical outcome, as stressed by Secretary of State Tillerson during his recent visit to South Korea. While the United States have reiterated their commitment in defending its critical ally from Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, the chance of a military option remains on the table. Trump Administration’s concerns about the volatility of the regional scenario, constantly exposed to a consistent number of strategic shifts jeopardizing Washington’s presence, have certainly contributed to the renovated close entente between South Korea and Japan.
South Korea’s emerging security challenges and opportunitiesIn the last few weeks, the future of the US-ROK Alliance, relations with China and the nature of the strategic approach in the Korean peninsula that will be determined by South Korea’s new president have further fueled the debate.
President Park’s dramatic downfall has already galvanized the opposition and opened the doors for a return to power of the Minjoo Party led by its front runner candidate Moon Jae-in. The impeachment has exposed the Saenuri Party to a large scandal, putting in disarray its core leadership and also creating a strong fracture within its party members and supporters. More important, it has almost certainly determined a marked change in the South Korea political leadership, opening the door for a return of the Minjoo Party as leading forces after many years of the unchallenged prominence of the Seanuri Party.
The expected return of Minjoo party to the power after almost ten years represents an additional shock in defining the new contours of South Korea’s tense relations with China and also in dealing with the emerging threat represented by North Korea. Minjoo Presidential candidate, Moon Jae-in, former Chief of Staff during Roh Administration and former Chairman of the Minjoo is considered as a front runner in the upcoming election after the sudden announcement of Former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon to not run as a candidate for the South Korea’s presidency.
Moon Jae-in is a former human right lawyer and also a well-known political figure in the South Korea ran as a presidential candidate in 2012 and he was eventually defeated by President Park. Moon Jae-in has several times expressed his wish to foster a wide recalibration of South Korea’s foreign policy and security. During the years of Park Administration, Minjoo Party called several times for a reduction of military engagement with Washington and the promotion of a greater level of diplomatic and economic engagement with North Korea, as the ultimate tool to promote peace and foster a path toward the stability of the inter-Korean relations.
Minjoo Party has also often criticized when not openly opposed the deployment of the THAAD, considered an ineffective measure, but also expressed concern about the deterioration of the relations with China. Last January, in the attempt to reduce the frictions with China, Minjoo lawmakers traveled to Beijing to promote a positive framework to enhance the level of dialogue between the two countries after the decision of Seoul to participate to Washington-led anti-missile system. Beijing’s relations with South Korea have reached a tense peak after China has banned Chinese tour groups from travelling to South Korea. Mending ties with China represents an important goal for Minjoo leaders since Beijing is not only an important trade partner but certainly remains a critical actor in bolstering any diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang.
On the other hand, Minjoo Party leaders have expressed their desire to mend relations with Beijing while fostering a different approach to defuse an incoming crisis in the Korean peninsula. With the front runner presidential candidate Moon Jae-in likely to be elected as a president, a new direction in foreign policy is extremely plausible. It is also expected that the new priorities in Seoul’s agenda will be not to antagonize North Korea, trying to encourage dialogue and foster engagement rather than maintaining a hard line position.
For instance, this might coincide with Moon’s decision to reopen Kaesong and even remove some economic sanctions in the attempt to reduce the level of economic and diplomatic isolation that has alimented Pyongyang’s rampant bellicose posture and that could ultimately ignite a larger crisis. Yet, it is unlikely that this could induce North Korea’s leadership to suspend its nuclear and military activities, especially after the recent declaration of Pyongyang in the wake of Washington’s airstrike in Syria.
It remains difficult to predict whatever Seoul will remain strongly committed in upholding any strategic initiatives promoted by Washington in the region, while the new forthcoming South Korean Administration might choose to determine a different direction from the path originally marked by Obama’s Pivot to Asia. There is no doubt that the alliance will remain, yet the new Administration might be inclined to foster a deep recalibration of the level of cooperation between Seoul and Washington while fostering a renovated entente with Beijing in order to defuse an imminent crisis in the Korean peninsula.
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