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Au XIXe siècle déjà, libre-échangistes et protectionnistes s'écharpent dans la presse. Avocats de la « liberté » commerciale ou du « produire français », tous défendent cependant les possédants. / France, Royaume-Uni, Agriculture, Alimentation, Capitalisme, Commerce international, Économie, Histoire, (...) / France, Royaume-Uni, Agriculture, Alimentation, Capitalisme, Commerce international, Économie, Histoire, Industrie, Libéralisme, Mondialisation, Politique, Travail, Socialisme, Protectionnisme - 2014/06

/ Christianisme, Démographie, Islam, Minorité nationale, Religion, Sri Lanka, Bouddhisme, Hindouisme, Tamouls, Sous-continent indien - Asie / Christianisme, Démographie, Islam, Minorité nationale, Religion, Sri Lanka, Bouddhisme, Hindouisme, Tamouls, Sous-continent indien - Asie

Donald J. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign asked serious questions in unserious ways. His administration never answered them

In 2016, the United States faced a wide range of serious foreign policy questions. The United States had not readjusted key frameworks for ten or twenty years or more. Candidate Trump used populist rhetoric, pledging to “build a wall” to restrict immigration and to “drain the swamp” of Washington’s elite, globalist ecosystem. Claiming to be a peerless negotiator, he promised to protect Americans from corruption, free trade, China, immigrants, ISIS and “radical Islam,” to move its Israel embassy to Jerusalem, to restore an era of coal- and steel-based economic growth, and to “Make America Great Again.” Enough swing-state voters were willing to take a chance on the outsider to defeat Hillary Clinton.

The questions Trump raised – however inarticulately – were real. Trade and technology created massive wealth for some Americans but had cost the U.S. millions of manufacturing jobs. Economic inequality rose from the 1970s to mid-1990s: twenty years later the Gini coefficient in the U.S. remained higher than in Germany, France, and the UK. President Trump demanded replacing NAFTA with a new agreement and engaged in an on-again, off-again trade dispute with China.

By 2016, Congress had failed for a decade to fashion comprehensive immigration reform to update the 1986 law. Trump promised to limit migration from Mexico and Central America. He added a “Muslim ban,” suspending the U.S. refugee program and nearly all immigration from seven Muslim-majority counties.

By 2016, China and Russia were formidable diplomatic opponents. China’s economic growth over four decades empowered it to make expanding maritime claims and transcontinental “Belt and Road” plans. Russia had transformed from a defeated, de-industrializing weak democracy to an increasingly confident, assertive, autocratic power. It was active in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and menacing elsewhere, including in the U.S. elections via social media. Trump seemed to admire strongmen like Putin and Xi even as he armed Ukraine and contested China’s trade policies. Putin’s 2018 re-election and Xi’s claim to office for life indicate continuing challenges to the U.S. instead of new cooperation.

Nuclear proliferation, especially in Iran and North Korea, remained key concerns. Trump took the U.S. out of President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal as promised, but also held high-profile summit meetings with Kim Jong-un. Iran’s economy remains under economic pressure, and in January 2020, the U.S. killed a leading Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani. Meanwhile, no landmark agreements were reached with the DPRK.

Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Paris climate accord. He had campaigned on restoring jobs in coal and steel industries. He promoted fracking, as Obama had, but without the concerns for advancing new energy technologies to reduce climate change.

Despite pledges to end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the core issues remain unsolved. Afghanistan and Iraq continue to have unstable political, economic, social, and security environments. Each still suffers from its own brands of corruption, violence, and limits on freedom. After nearly 20 years, neither government is fully in control of its territory and neither seems on a path to steady improvement. More than 7,000 U.S. military forces have been killed in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with terrible numbers of Afghanis and Iraqis. Thousands of U.S. troops are still stationed in these countries, though with plans to continue to reduce their number.

In 2015 and 2016, refugee flows from Syria and elsewhere surged into Europe. EU democracies came under economic and political pressure, with right-wing (and some left-wing) populist parties gaining in popularity. The UK voted for “Brexit” to leave the EU. Trump’s NATO policy seemed rooted in other members “paying their fair share.” NATO members in the east were concerned about Russia intentions while some members, but not NATO as an organization, assisted Turkey in Syria.

More broadly, democracy was increasingly challenged around the world. Freedom House warned that “In every region of the world, democracy is under attack by populist leaders and groups that reject pluralism and demand unchecked power.”

Problems at home continue. The President presided over three years of economic growth from 2017 through 2019, with solid performance in GDP, income, and especially unemployment rates. U.S. public debt as a percentage of GDP remained relatively stable, totaling just over 100% of GDP, even after the 2017 tax cuts.

But other worries remained. Congressional Republicans failed to repeal or replace Obama’s Affordable Care Act, as they had promised/threatened for years. About 28 million Americans remain uninsured, while many more face the rising costs of insurance premiums and prescription drugs. The dramatic video of a white police officer killing of a handcuffed black man in Minnesota, in the context of a national economic crisis and global pandemic, sparked peaceful and violent protests around the country. The President promised law and order but failed to lead a credible and effective government response to the calls for reform or to the economy and pandemic. The Covid-19 death toll climbed throughout 2020, while millions of children were kept out of school, unemployment rates skyrocketed, and usual medical care like coronary and cancer screenings were missed.

“Threat to democracy.” Trump was seen as respecting autocratic and populist rulers like Xi, Putin, Kim, Brazil’s Jair Bolsinaro and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, while criticizing the U.S.’s democratic allies and their leaders. Trump’s statements and policy proposals were seen as a genuine threat to American democracy by scholars, pundits, and political opponents – and by some in his own party, enkindling groups like the Lincoln Project and Republican Voters Against Trump. Trump’s tweets and speeches were characterized as misogynist, racist, xenophobic, and more. Promoting suspicion of electoral integrity and the peaceful transfer of power was seen by some as anti-American, unconstitutional, and un-democratic. Trump was impeached for embedding campaign politics into a foreign policy negotiation.

All this worsened the enduring difficulties of the two parties working together. They were unable to find common ground, or even to seek it. Obama signed the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal without offering either to the Republican Senate for ratification. Trump promptly led the U.S. out of each deal on his own. Obama authored immigration leniency in DACA instead of forging bipartisan immigration legislation with the Congress. Trump followed with a “Muslim ban” and increased family separations. Federal failures during the Covid-19 pandemic – between Democrats and Republicans in Congress and within in the executive branch itself – harmed the nation’s public health and economy and lowered global esteem for the United States.

What’s Next?  As a hotelier, television star, presidential candidate, president, and Covid survivor, Trump has always exuded extreme confidence. His 1987 bestselling autobiography, The Art of the Deal, offered this insight:

“You can’t con people, at least not for long. You can create excitement, you can do wonderful promotion and get all kinds of press, and you can throw in a little hyperbole. But if you don’t deliver the goods, people will eventually catch on.”

Trump faces former Vice President Joe Biden in the presidential election November 3. Early voting is already underway, with record turnout so far. The serious foreign policy questions the U.S. faced in 2016 remain.

 

Photo: Donald J. Trump at the 2016 Republican National Convention  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trump_accepts_nomination.jpg (public domain) from VOAnews.com

 

This article is the English version of : Joao Augusto de Castro Neves and Bruno Reis, « Brésil : plus dure sera la chute », published in Politique étrangère, Vol. 81, Issue 3, 2016.

Brazil is experiencing one of the worst political and economic crises in its recent history – and certainly the worst since the return of democracy in the mid-1980s. Darling of the new global economic order for much of the last decade, Brazil has fallen off the pedestal of punditry in the past few years. Broadly speaking, this bout of pessimism is partly due to the recurrent habit among international relations pundits and market commentators of viewing the world in terms of an inexorable – and even faster – power transition among major powers (or major markets). Until recently the BRICS were construed as the building block of a new global order and a good place to put your money. Now, following the ebb and flow of the financial markets, it appears it is time for other acronyms to have their fifteen minutes in the spotlight.

On the economic side, Brazil is facing the deepest recession in many decades (the country’s GDP has decreased nearly 10% in the last four years), a sky-rocketing unemployment rate and a significant fiscal deficit, among other macroeconomic imbalances. From a political perspective, the country is dealing with a presidential impeachment process, a massive corruption scandal reaching the entire political class, and recently faced an unexpected wave of protests on the streets of Brazil’s largest cities, with millions of citizens decrying the unresponsive – and occasionally irresponsible – political class.

Those events have led the political system to a state of near-paralysis, and emphasize the political class’ incapacity to respond effectively to the many challenges that the country currently faces.

Paradoxically, and therefore making this scenario even more challenging, just a few years ago Brazil was experiencing one of its most “dynamic” periods of its history – a “Chinese” rate of GDP growth (7.5% in 2007); massive social development with millions of citizens rising from poverty and joining the consumer market; and the most popular president in the country’s history (former President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva reached a 73% approval rating in 2010).

So, what happened to Brazil? What went wrong and how and why has the country’s political and economic situation deteriorated so quickly? Where is Brazil heading? Beneath the ever-changing and tenuous layers of tea leaves used to foretell geostrategic scenarios or suggest promising investment opportunities lies a much more complex story of a country that has had its share of boom-and-bust cycles. Whether Brazil is undergoing yet another one this time around demands a more insightful examination of recent political and economic events. Uncovering some of the factors behind these events may allow us to have a clearer view of the country’s trajectory. To try answering these questions, we will contextualize what is happening in Brazil within a broader scenario, in what we call the rise and fall of Latin America’s political supercycle.

The end of the commodities boom

Some of Brazil’s recent woes – and slightly less recent successes – are not unique to the country. Such issues stem from a broader economic and political process that affected many natural-resource-rich nations in the so-called emerging world, particularly in Latin America, in the last decade or so. […]

Read the rest of the article here.

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on Cairn International <<<

In an exclusive interview, Shipan Kumer Basu, who heads the World Hindu Struggle Committee and is now an honorary member of the International Police Commission alongside being an International People’s Alliance of the World Peace Ambassador, claimed that the coronavirus has led to more violence against women in Bangladesh: “The World Population Review survey found that there were 11,682 cases of violence against women in Bangladesh in 2020, which is really worrying. In 2019, 517 minor girls were raped, of whom 60 were killed after being raped and 6 committed suicide after the rape. Due to the shamelessness and indifference of the Awami League government, in the first 4 months of 2020, 164 girls were raped. In the next 3 months, the rape rate of minor girls went up 102% and increased to 332.”

Of course, Bangladesh is not alone in this.  The Sustainable Social Development Organization, an Islamabad-based charity, noted a 400% spike in child rapes, sexual assaults, and the abduction of minors in Pakistan during the coronavirus lockdown.  Sisters-for-Sisters, another charity, found that the fact that nearly a quarter of Nepalese workers lost their jobs during the pandemic has led to a rapid increase in child marriages in the Asian country.    And in Tennessee in the United States, marital rape and homicides have skyrocketed.  According to the Pulitzer Center, “In the COVID era, offenders are likely spending more time with victims because of social distancing, working from home or unemployment.”  

However, Basu noted that the rapid spike in rapes, gang-rapes, murder after rapes, incidents of physical torture, etc. is deeply concerning and that the Bangladeshi government should be held accountable for it: “The local media has reported the involvement of the ruling Awami League Party in many of the incidents.   The police and the administration have collaborated with the criminals.  Since the Awami league came to power in 2009, the crime rate has risen dramatically, especially regarding murder, rape, torture of Hindus, corruption, theft, robbery, and terrorist activities.  Yet, the pandemic made these already existing trends even worse.”

Basu noted that Bangladeshi anti-rape protesters have chanted, “The police are the watchmen of the rapists.”  He claimed this is because the police take virtually no actions in defense of Bangladeshi women who are sexually abused: “In recent times, the whole country has been consumed by a horrific rape culture.   The judiciary of the state has been corrupted against the woman to such a level that even women working prominent positions in the government are unlikely to get justice.”

According to Basu, towards the end of September, a Hindu girl was murdered for refusing to marry a Muslim.  So far, he claims that the police have failed to arrest the perpetrator.  Around the same period of time, Basu claimed that an Awami League official raped a seventh grade school girl and social media posts have emerged of mobs torturing a Hindu woman: “Due to this and many other cases, the Hindu community doubts that the police will ever give them justice.”   In conclusion, Basu called upon the international community to come up with a global plan of action to assist women and girls that are gravely getting persecuted in the Third World amid the pandemic.  As the late Elie Wiesel once stated, “For evil to flourish, it only requires that good men do nothing.”  

 

 

And Not To Provoke China
Image from scmp.com

The unusual news that Taiwan’s legislature passed a bipartisan bill asking the foreign ministry to seek formal relations with the US puts a clear point on the latest round of China-Taiwan tensions.  It also puts a distinct strain on the old US approach of “strategic ambiguity” around Taiwan.  Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. election, the next administration will need to craft a new approach.

The “we agree that it’s your territory but reject forcible reunification” stance begs the question of America’s interest in Taiwan’s status.  The U.S. could defend Taiwan as a matter of non-violence, to avoid economic disruption, to keep geopolitical stability – or to stand up for democracy.  At a time of deep-current shifts in world affairs, it is crucial that America’s stance carries our deepest values.

Ambiguity has shaped Taiwan policy and overall China policy alike.  One justification is that giving up ambiguity means risking some major interest.  In the wide range of interests at stake, policy makers have not wanted to hazard that risk.  But as a result, even we don’t know why we do what we do, or don’t do, vis a vis Taiwan, or China generally.   The problem is that China, the rest of the world, and we ourselves, don’t know what America’s first priority is.  The problem in that is that everyone is left to interpret our motives, and assess our character, on their own terms.

The Trump administration has confronted China on a range of issues, from trade to technology, security policy and human rights.  But undifferentiated confrontation with China leaves open the idea that “China bashing” is simply a Realpolitik move to contest global dominance.  It is not only the Chinese who might take this view.  In a way it carries the same problem as ambiguity, only in unfriendly terms.

America was founded in the name of unalienable rights, and government existing to secure them with consent of the governed.  We must display that as our baseline motivation, not merely as another tool to oppose China.  If our intentions, however bent by circumstance, do not carry that conviction at bottom, then the nation founded in 1776 is absent and the institutional edifice built in its name has no foundation.  On the other hand, if we follow our foundation, Americans see our own common purpose, and the world hears us voicing our own core convictions.

There is a concern that supporting Taiwan for the sake of our principles, opposing China’s forays for the same reason, could lead to a zero-sum Cold War.  The risk is that the loser ends up as a version of the Soviet Union in 1992.  Of course America can always choose to stake its existence on the power of its founding ethos.  We do every day, in one sense.  But we can also look for ways to avoid provoking a desperate existential resistance from China.

First, we must be crystal clear that we oppose China for its transgressions against freedom, for principle rather than for vested interest.  An Indo-Pacific coalition that includes Viet Nam would signal strategic interest taking priority over principle.  We also cannot “trade Taiwan” for trade or technology concessions, in any form.  On the other hand we should try to avoid irreconcilable fundamental hostility.  At least a long term possibility of some philosophical commonality must, and can be found.

What could that be?  Perhaps, as one very low-level compatibility, U.S. policy can note that the Chinese Communist Party is organized for the public interest, in contrast to clan or factional dictatorships.  The U.S. stance might then hope for the two sides to grow into further commonality in standards for government – from this very low level.  Perhaps Chinese doctrines could evolve: Chinese philosopher TongDong Bai, in his “Against Political Equality,” imagines a neo-Confucian governing scheme with a popularly elected lower legislative house.  If U.S. policy signals a relaxation of opposition as such forms might evolve, it defuses the zero-sum nature of the rivalry.  Even as far off as any such developments might be, they mark a path toward convergence and away from intransigent hostility.

Meanwhile we retain a rationale for defending Taiwan.  Of course we already do, and if we see a way, however remote, for some eventual conceptual compatibility with China, we can assert that that defense of freedom does not aim at subverting China.  Our aid to Taiwan essentially aims to make a Chinese invasion prohibitively costly rather than to attack China.  And against any pacifist’s citation  of John Quincy Adams’ injunction against going abroad seeking monsters to destroy, we are already defending Taiwan, and Adams in that same speech declared American would always be a friend to anyone pursuing liberty.  Abandoning an existing commitment would compromise that ethos.

In short, we are already committed to protect Taiwan, we can do it without professing existential hostility to China, and America’s own existential tenets demand our defense of that democracy.

« La fin de règne annoncée pourrait bien n’être qu’une parenthèse. C’est, en tout cas, le voeu le plus cher de Netanyahou, convaincu d’être seul maître après Dieu à pouvoir guider la barque d’Israël au coeur des tempêtes pour la conduire au rang des puissances redoutées et respectées. Certes, un sérieux obstacle se dresse devant lui avant l’échéance de 2024 : le verdict des trois juges de la cour de district de Jérusalem, devant laquelle « l’accusé Netanyahou » a comparu le 24 mai 2020, a de fortes chances d’être rendu avant cette date butoir. »

Accéder à l’article de Denis Charbit, « La démocratie israélienne à l’épreuve de Netanyahou » ici.

Retrouvez le sommaire complet du numéro 3/2020 de Politique étrangère ici.

The new administration will have space to craft a COVID-19 relief package that addresses underlying economic problems.

Most countries in the world right now are trying to find a balance between having their citizens trust their Covid responses, manage the inevitable debt and deficits that arose and continue to rise with mass shutdowns of the economy, and responsibly manage that debt and deficit level so that when a time for a recovery commences, that the level of debt and manner in which it was taken does not drag down any future recovery. It has been difficult to achieve all three, but all three are necessary in order not to cause permanent damage to their economies.

There is a debate on the best method to reduce Covid transmissions, but much of the harm has come from putting politics before the approach. Political fights over Covid has dominated local politics, especially in the US where a united approach has be challenged between different levels of government while fighting a Covid era election. Whether or not reduced rates could have been achieved if it was not in an election year is indeterminable, but the trust in Federal or State governments have taken a hit while political rivals attempt to use the pandemic to their personal benefit in some cases. The reduced trust in their approach has developed a lack of trust in officials managing the pandemic, a problem that has occurred in many countries, albeit without the same political structure as the United States in an election year.

Some countries like Argentina and Canada have not fared well in managing their debt, and it could be the case that short term infusions of cash based on restricting currency exchange rates or outright printing too much money will harm their eventual recovery. Argentina has taken to making it more difficult and expensive to purchase US Dollars, a currency often used when there are signs of economic trouble brewing in Buenos Aires. This is done to prevent a run on the Argentine Peso by local investors, a rush by many holding their savings on Pesos made in the economic collapse in 2001. Canada has taken to not only printing money, and excusing cheap borrowing as an economic model (a model that has torn apart Argentina’s economy pre-2000), but also turned the support for existing profitable businesses towards new experimental industries. With formerly job rich healthy companies now suffering during the pandemic, Canada will focus on a “green” industries, while leaving those companies that paid taxes to them expecting help in an emergency to essentially stave out economically.

Trust in a country’s Covid response must be paramount, and any actions that give even the impression of taking advantage of people during this time will permanently hurt a country’s reputation. In one case, the same government also raised taxes among massive job losses while giving themselves a raise, was caught funneling money to family and friends via a children’s charity in the middle of the pandemic. Actions such as these when many governments have received excess powers during the Covid era does nothing but hurt citizens while enshrining corruption during the pandemic. Transparency and honest approaches can forgive mistakes in policy decisions in a difficult time, but ensuring some at the top benefit while the rest of us suffer should be dealt with promptly and assertively by all meaningful democratic actors and agencies within a society. This is the case because corruption hurts everyone in the long run, especially those who are further weakened because of Covid.

By Anatoliy Amelin, Andrian Prokip and Andreas Umland

Over the last several years, the future of the European energy supply has become an increasingly geopolitical topic. It has become more and more linked to the questions of security, competing gas transportation routes, and continuously tense Ukrainian-Russian relations. In late 2019, Kyiv concluded a new and beneficial transit agreement with Moscow for the transfer of Siberian gas to the EU, in part due to fresh US sanctions against Russia’s off-shore pipeline projects. This 5-year deal is currently securing the continued use of a part of Ukraine’s large gas transportation system, and as long as Gazprom’s Nord Stream II pipeline through the Baltic Sea does not go forward, the Ukrainian gas transportation system will have some prospect, use, and income.

These well-known confrontations and negotiations concerning different routes of Russian gas supply to the EU, however, diverted attention from the potential of Ukraine’s own gas and oil reserves, as well as the associated storage facilities. The considerable natural resources in Ukraine’s energy sphere remain underexplored and underused today despite the fact that their use could spur economic growth not only in the energy sector, but also in other industries of the country.

Untapped Potential

Excluding Russia’s gas reserves in Asia, Ukraine today holds the second biggest known gas reserves in Europe. As of late 2019, known Ukrainian reserves amounted to 1.09 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, second only to Norway’s known resources of 1.53 trillion cubic meters. Yet, these enormous reserves of energy remain largely untapped. Today, Ukraine has a low annual reserve usage rate of about 2 percent. Moreover, more active exploration may yield previously undiscovered gas fields, which would further increase the overall volume of Ukraine’s deposits.

In spite of this hopeful situation, Ukraine still depends substantially on gas imports. When the USSR started large-scale gas extraction in Western Siberia in the 1970s, much of the relevant expertise and capacity in the sector of Soviet gas exploration and production were transferred from the Ukrainian to the Russian Soviet republic and some other East European states. As a result of this outflow of expertise, Ukraine’s remaining gas resources have remained insufficiently developed, largely underused, and partly unexplored.

Until recently, Ukraine’s total average annual consumption amounted to approximately 29.8 billion cubic meters (bcm). Of this entire yearly need, approximately 14.3 bcm consists of imports. Thus, unlocking its unused reserves would provide for a revolutionary future for Ukraine’s gas sector and energy consumption.

Resolute development of the already explored and accessible Ukrainian resources could result in a substantial increase of Ukrainian gas production. The boost would not only enable the country to fully cover its domestic gas needs, but also make Ukraine largely self-sufficient from an energy perspective. In a best-case scenario, increased production could even allow Ukraine to start exporting gas to or via neighboring European states. This would be feasible because Ukraine’s substantial gas transportation system means that the necessary infrastructure is already in place to bring large amounts of gas to the EU.

According to some estimates, the EU will import around 90 percent of the gas it consumes by 2030. Thus, during the next decade, Brussels will be increasingly eager to diversify the origins and routes of the European gas supply. In this context, smaller or even prospective gas exporters like Ukraine become more attractive to policymakers in Brussels: such new participants in the European market would lower EU dependency on the large players in the field, thus strengthening the European negotiating position.

Despite the enormous potential of Ukraine’s energy reserves, there are non-trivial costs to developing Ukraine’s capabilities. According to an assessment study by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, a transformation of Ukraine into a self-sufficient energy consumer and potential exporter would require a number of investments amounting to approximately US$19.5 billion. Of this amount, about US$3.5 billion are needed for developing gas fields and building pipelines, US$14 billion would have to be invested into oil extraction, and US$2 billion would go toward oil refining.

The overall size of the investment needed to achieve the goal of full energy independence constitutes a considerable amount compared to Ukraine’s relatively small state budget and GDP. Nevertheless, the sum only equals the approximate costs for current Ukrainian energy imports over the span of two to three years. Thus, the relatively high absolute cost would amortize itself quickly.

Moreover, financial investment in Ukraine’s energy sector is increasingly attractive. Over the last few years, Ukraine has (often under IMF pressure) gradually reduced distortive governmental interventions into the gas market. Kyiv has introduced market prices for households and no longer provides subsidies for all consumers indiscriminately. This relatively new domestic market should make financial engagement in Ukrainian gas production and exploration more attractive than it had been in the past, and the investment climate will improve once European energy markets recover in the aftermath of a likely global containment of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021.

The Road Ahead

Ukraine’s gas transportation system will continue to play a key role for the future of Ukraine’s energy sector. Ukraine has one of the most well-developed and all-encompassing gas transportation infrastructures of any country in the world, in terms of both domestic deliveries and export facilities. The Ukrainian gas transit system constitutes a heritage of the Soviet energy expansion to Europe, as a partial result of the German Neue Ostpolitik (New Eastern Policy) of the 1970s. For a long time, Ukraine served as the main corridor for the transfer of Soviet and later Russian as well as Central Asian gas to numerous European states. The current usage of this capacity is much lower than a decade earlier due to the completion of the first Nord Stream pipeline in 2012, the growing introduction of renewable energy resources, and the current economic downturn; however, Ukraine’s pipelines and compressor stations are still ready to be used, and have significant capacity beyond merely delivering Russian or Turkmen gas to the EU.

A significant part of the multidimensional Ukrainian gas infrastructure is the huge underground gas storage facilities that the country controls. Only partially used, Ukrainian capacities to store natural gas amount to more than 31 bcm. If fully exploited, Ukraine could hypothetically add almost one third to the approximately 100 bcm of storage space that EU member states currently hold as a whole. Thus, it is no surprise that the energy consultancy Wood Mackenzie recently suggested that Ukraine holds the key to Europe’s gas current storage crunch. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, world gas prices plummeted, but the EU’s storage facilities do not have enough space to take full advantage of the situation. To ease foreign concerns about investing in Ukraine, the country adopted some amendments to relevant laws and directives in late 2019—regulatory modifications that should make it easier for foreign firms to use available storage capacity. In response, during the first nine months of 2020, foreign energy firms pumped 7.9 bcm of gas to Ukraine for storage, an amount several times higher than the volume of foreign gas stored in Ukraine during the entire year of 2019.

Hydrogen is another new horizon for Ukraine’s underdeveloped energy industry. Today, various gas distribution companies are examining Ukraine’s pipeline capacities with the hope of converting some of the existing infrastructure to deliver hydrogen to their customers in the future. The EU has identified Ukraine as a priority partner for future collaboration in the use of hydrogen to enhance the Union’s energy supply and security.

Yet another energy form of high potential in Ukraine is biogas. Currently, the country has sufficient capacity to produce circa 10 bcm of biogas annually, a volume that is roughly equivalent to the amount of natural gas that Ukraine imports every year. In view of Ukraine’s currently growing agricultural sector, its capacity to produce biogas may grow further. This capacity is quite future-proof: mixing biogas with hydrogen generates biomethane, an environmentally friendly form of energy that does not contain carbon dioxide.

Boosting Ukraine’s domestic production of natural gas, biogas, hydrogen and biomethane would not only lower or even abolish Ukrainian dependence on energy imports. It would also create a new and potent export-oriented branch in Ukraine’s economy, while also providing impulses for stronger growth in other sectors. At the same time, the EU would benefit from a diversification of its gas supply sources, and from obtaining a new major energy partner in its immediate vicinity. Moreover, such cooperation would strengthen Brussels’ economic ties with Kyiv, and lower the need for Western support for the Ukrainian state. A resolute development of Ukraine’s untapped reserves in the production, export and storage of energy would be in the interest of all sides involved.

Anatoliy Amelin is one of the co-founders of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv, and its Director of Economic Programs.

Andrian Prokip is an Energy Expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv, and Senior Associate of the Kennan Institute in Washington, DC.

Andreas Umland is a Senior Expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv, and Researcher with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm.

https://hir.harvard.edu/ukraine-energy-reserves/

Big Tech threatens democracy. Few have considered a practical solution: taking away the platforms’ role as gatekeepers of content.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020). Julien Nocetti propose une analyse de l’ouvrage d’Edward Snowden, Mémoires vives (Seuil, 2019, 384 pages).

Les Mémoires vives du jeune Snowden – inconnu avant ses premières leaks de juin 2013 – ne sont pas une collection de secrets d’État, mais le récit d’une trajectoire individuelle, de l’enfance en Caroline du Nord jusqu’à l’exil forcé à Moscou.

Le premier quart de l’ouvrage, consacré à la vie personnelle du jeune Snowden, né au début des années 1980, a surtout le mérite de dresser un parallèle entre l’enfance d’un rejeton de famille conservatrice et l’essor de l’informatique domestique. Au milieu des années 1990, la découverte de l’internet devient la principale occupation de Snowden qui, de geek en herbe, se mue en pirate informatique imprégné d’idéologie libertaire, voire libertarienne : « Je considère que les années 1990 ont engendré l’anarchie la plus agréable et la plus réussie que j’ai connue. »

Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 traumatisent le jeune homme, qui soutient sans ambages la « guerre contre le terrorisme » décrétée par George W. Bush. Ce sera là « le plus grand regret de [sa] vie ». Sa carrière militaire brisée par une blessure lors d’un exercice, Snowden s’oriente vers le renseignement, où il travaille comme employé de la Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), puis comme sous-traitant de la National Security Agency (NSA), occupant des postes d’administrateur système et d’ingénieur système. À la NSA, ce sont ces fonctions au cœur des réseaux qui lui autoriseront un accès très large à des documents internes.

Le récit, qui narre sa prise de conscience, passe par Genève, Tokyo, puis Hawaï, où il est affecté début 2012, et prend la décision qui va changer sa vie : « Une exposition totale de l’intégralité de l’appareil de surveillance de masse. » Ce sont là les pages les plus intéressantes du livre : l’auteur y expose ses ressorts, heurté qu’il est par les pratiques de l’État qu’il souhaitait servir, ainsi que les procédés de surveillance numérique globale mis en place par Washington. StellarWinds, CowBells, Turbulence, XKeyScore, etc. : les noms des opérations de surveillance sont connus depuis les révélations de documents secrets à la presse dès juin 2013. Leur description permet surtout de prendre la mesure du concentré de puissance que confère aux États-Unis l’hégémonie sur l’internet.

Le propos de Snowden sur ces programmes ne vise pas tant à effrayer le lecteur, qu’à faire œuvre de pédagogie sur des sujets en apparence arides. On y apprend, notamment, les techniques employées par les services américains pour collecter les données personnelles de presque n’importe quel individu dans le monde.

Dans la dernière partie, l’histoire s’accélère, rocambolesque : il y a Hong Kong, d’où Snowden se révèle au monde après les premiers articles du Guardian et du Washington Post, puis la fuite, l’atterrissage à Moscou, censé n’être qu’une étape sur la route de Quito, en compagnie de la journaliste Sarah Harrison, figure de WikiLeaks. Snowden, qui n’a jamais caché avoir été approché par le renseignement intérieur russe, raconte l’« offre d’engagement » qui lui est alors faite, à laquelle il coupe court. Il a d’ailleurs assuré ne jamais avoir transmis aux Russes la moindre information. Il découvre alors que les États-Unis ont annulé son passeport, le bloquant en Russie, où il se trouve toujours. À Moscou, il assure vivre des cachets de conférences qu’il donne à distance et dans lesquelles il milite contre les pratiques de surveillance et de censure des États.

Julien Nocetti

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Le monde des bandes resurgit régulièrement dans les débats politiques et médiatiques. Mais, au-delà des discours alarmistes des experts et des martiales déclarations des ministres de l'intérieur, que sait-on de ces formes de sociabilité des milieux populaires et de leurs évolutions ? / France, (...) / France, Criminalité, Exclusion sociale, Inégalités, Sécurité, Jeunes, Pauvreté, Travail, Violence, Chômage, Banlieue, Drogue - 2011/05

Il y a trente ans, un président de la République rappelait que « la peine, c'est la détention ; ce n'est pas plus que la détention ». Désormais, les conditions d'incarcération infligent à des prisonniers sans cesse plus nombreux bien davantage que la détention. C'est le recours fréquent au passage à (...) / France, Droits humains, Justice, Prison, Société, Travail, Violence - 2005/06

La rédaction de Politique étrangère vous offre à (re)lire des textes qui ont marqué l’histoire de la revue. Nous vous proposons aujourd’hui un article de Maurice Couve de Murville, intitulé « La crise libanaise et l’évolution du Proche-Orient », et publié dans le numéro 2/1976 de Politique étrangère.

L’affaire libanaise est liée à la crise du Proche-Orient, que l’on pourrait appeler aussi la crise israélo-arabe. Les risques qu’elle fait courir à cette région se répercutent à l’ensemble du monde. Pour ce qui est de la France, elle est directement concernée.

Nous partons d’un fait évident qu’il faut souligner, c’est la présence au Liban d’un très grand nombre de réfugiés palestiniens, dont on n’a pas le compte exact, mais qui est de l’ordre de 400 000 pour une population normale de 2 millions et demi d’habitants. En proportion, cela signifierait pour la France quelque chose comme 8 millions de réfugiés sur son territoire, dont pas loin de la moitié autour de la capitale.

D’où, évidemment, une situation anormale, qui se prolonge indéfiniment et s’ajoute aux difficultés propres que le Liban connaît et qui tiennent à sa physionomie particulière.

Il faut, en effet, remonter un peu dans le passé pour expliquer les causes de la guerre civile actuelle, remonter à la création du Liban qui, on le sait, date de 1943. La France n’a pas voulu, à l’époque, de la Grande Syrie, qui aurait uni le Liban et la Syrie actuels, pour des raisons historiques, liées au rôle que notre pays avait joué comme « puissance protectrice des chrétiens du Levant » au temps de l’Empire ottoman dont nous étions devenus les héritiers lorsque le mandat sur la Syrie nous avait été confié.

La création du Liban a été rendue possible par la conclusion d’un compromis entre les Chrétiens et les Musulmans, auquel on a, par la suite, donné le nom de « Pacte National ». Ce compromis accordait aux Musulmans qui ne voulaient pas d’un Liban séparé de la Syrie, la satisfaction de la fin du mandat français et de l’évacuation définitive de notre armée, autrement dit, l’indépendance. Pour les Chrétiens, qui voyaient partir avec beaucoup de craintes l’armée française dont ils considéraient qu’elle était leur défenseur, il y avait un certain nombre de garanties qui remplaçaient cette garantie de l’armée française : essentiellement la répartition des postes au sein du gouvernement, du parlement et de l’administration, ce qui donnait en fait, il faut bien le dire, aux Chrétiens et plus particulièrement aux Maronites, la prédominance dans la direction du pays. Prédominance qui, d’ailleurs, était en pratique à l’époque justifiée par le fait que les Chrétiens étaient de loin la partie de la population la plus évoluée, celle qui avait reçu le plus d’instruction, en particulier qui avait le plus bénéficié de l’enseignement supérieur. A l’époque, le personnel politique et les fonctionnaires se recrutaient facilement chez les Chrétiens, beaucoup plus difficilement chez les Musulmans.

Ce compromis qui a permis la création du Liban, en tant qu’Etat indépendant séparé de la Syrie, a longtemps fonctionné de façon satisfaisante. Il a si bien fonctionné que tout le monde s’en félicitait, au dedans et au dehors, et l’on considérait le Liban comme une sorte de miracle de coexistence pacifique et de coopération étroite entre les communautés religieuses différentes qui, jusqu’alors, avaient été séparées ou opposées les unes aux autres.

C’était une sorte d’opinion reçue qui, cependant, à mesure que le temps passait, ne tenait pas compte et de moins en moins, de l’évolution naturelle, une évolution qui s’est traduite de deux manières :

D’abord sur le plan démographique. En 1943, à l’époque du Pacte National, on était parti de l’idée — c’était une convention mais qui, dans une certaine mesure et même dans une large mesure correspondait à la réalité — que les Chrétiens étaient plus nombreux que les Musulmans. D’où leur prédominance dans le domaine politique et administratif.

La situation, progressivement, a changé, pour deux raisons. D’abord la démographie proprement dite, car les Musulmans ont plus d’enfants que les Chrétiens. Puis l’émigration, parce que les

Chrétiens, et en particulier les Maronites, ont énormément émigré au cours de ces 30 ans, et très loin puisque leurs colonies les plus nombreuses se trouvent en Amérique du Nord et du Sud et en Australie.

Voilà un premier fait qui a changé beaucoup la situation.

Le second a été l’évolution des populations elles-mêmes. Je disais qu’au début, les Chrétiens étaient beaucoup plus évolués que les Musulmans. Peu à peu les Musulmans se sont éduqués, ils sont allés à l’école, à l’Université ; ils sont entrés dans les affaires. Ayant réussi, ils sont devenus riches, et finalement une grande partie d’entre eux, non pas la majorité, mais surtout la communauté sunnite, qui s’oppose à la communauté chiite, est largement aujourd’hui à égalité avec les Chrétiens de tous ces points de vue. Dès lors ces Musulmans n’ont plus de complexe d’infériorité et d’autre part, ils ont un personnel capable, à l’instar des Chrétiens, de participer à la politique et à l’administration.

Voilà un second fait qui a, en quelque sorte, remis en cause les fondements mêmes du Pacte National conclu en 1943 et dont j’ai rappelé les grandes lignes.

A cela s’ajoutait un facteur qui n’est pas moins important, c’est que les deux communautés, ou plutôt les deux ensembles de communautés, instinctivement, avaient et ont tendance à réagir de façon différente devant l’événement.

Le Liban se caractérise par deux traits essentiels qui font son originalité dans la région où il se trouve situé. Le premier est que, malgré sa diversité confessionnelle, il fait partie du monde arabe, et cela d’une manière évidente, puisque la langue maternelle de tout le monde, sauf peut-être des Arméniens, est la langue arabe. L’autre caractéristique est l’ouverture sur le monde extérieur, laquelle est beaucoup plus grande que chez les autres pays arabes. Et quand on dit « ouverture sur le monde extérieur », c’est d’ouverture sur l’Occident qu’il s’agit. D’où des liens étroits avec celui-ci sur le plan économique et sur le plan culturel.

Pour les Musulmans, l’élément appartenance au Monde arabe est le plus important des deux facteurs. Pour les Chrétiens, c’est l’ouverture sur l’extérieur qui compte d’abord.

Tout cela a créé peu à peu, sans qu’on s’en aperçoive beaucoup, une situation où se préparaient, à l’arrière-plan, des conflits. Je ne veux pas dire une guerre civile, mais des conflits, même si, en même temps, la réussite du pays paraissait éclatante, même si la prospérité était fantastique et si tout le monde s’enrichissait. A telle enseigne que les Musulmans nouvellement enrichis, qui en 1943 n’étaient pas partisans de l’existence du Liban, en sont aujourd’hui les plus fermes adeptes.

Les difficultés apparaissent quand il y a crise. On l’a vu pour la première fois en 1958, lors de la première grande crise nationale, du temps où M. Chamoun était Président de la République libanaise. C’était un peu la conséquence de la révolution égyptienne de Nasser, qui avait été à la fois une révolution nationale et une révolution sociale, mettant fin à un régime très largement venu de l’étranger, parce que très largement héritier de l’Empire ottoman, et encore féodal. Ce bouleversement avait eu des conséquences profondes dans le monde arabe, au Liban en particulier, et bien sûr, dans la population musulmane, beaucoup plus sensible à l’attrait du régime nassérien que la population chrétienne.

A cette époque, la crise avait été réglée de manière expéditive,. à l’initiative de M. Chamoun, par le débarquement de l’armée américaine. Ainsi les troubles, qui avaient commencé mais étaient loin d’une vraie guerre civile, avaient été bloqués et le calme s’était rétabli. Au point de permettre le rembarquement rapide de l’armée américaine. D’autant plus que le Président Chamoun avait été très vite remplacé par le général Chehab qui, à la différence de son prédécesseur, était un homme d’esprit ouvert et libéral, qui a essayé d’engager son pays sur la voie des réformes.

Cela n’a duré que le temps du mandat du Président Chehab. Puis les choses sont reparties comme avant, c’est-à-dire d’un côté, l’immobilisme, de l’autre des événements extérieurs très graves, péripéties successives du conflit israélo-arabe. D’abord la guerre de 1967, dont la conséquence très importante pour le Liban a été de doubler le nombre des réfugiés palestiniens, puisqu’à ceux venus en 1947 de la Galilée et des rivages de Saint- Jean d’Acre, se sont ajoutés 200 000 réfugiés venant de la zone de Gaza et de la Cisjordanie. […]

>> Lisez la suite de l’article sur Persée <<

Rien ne relie, a priori, Che Guevara, Lady Diana et Mère Teresa, sinon le fait que ces trois figures emblématiques se sont transformées en icônes pour des millions de personnes, d'un bout à l'autre de la planète. Si le révolutionnaire argentin restera dans l'histoire, rien n'est moins sûr en ce qui (...) / Personnalités, Société - 1998/08

This article is the English version of : John McLaughlin, « Moyen-Orient : en attendant la nouvelle administration américaine », published in Politique étrangère, Vol. 81, Issue 2, 2016.

Not since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I has the Middle East been wracked with so much change, violence, and uncertainty. When long building pressures erupted with the so-called “ Arab Spring” in 2011, Henry Kissinger presciently said that it was only “scene one of act one of a five act play”. Before we can venture even a guess about the next scene or act and how American policymakers might approach it, it’s necessary to step back and examine the region in its broader setting.

Strategic context

Contemporary events are so riveting that it is easy to forget how much the Middle East has been shaped by external forces. In this century, this has been the case ever since Mr. Picot and Mr. Sykes drew their lines on the map delineating some of the new Middle Eastern boundaries exactly a century ago this year.

Indeed, the United States (US) and other great powers have long seen influence in the region as tightly related to their security and viewed its resources as essential to their economic health – convictions demonstrated repeatedly since the end of WW II and the onset of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, direct great power competition in the region was a kind of zero-sum game as the United States and the Soviet Union vied for influence and access. Even as hot wars flared in Asia – thinking of Korea and Vietnam – the US, Russia, and many European nations still saw the Middle East as an arena for competition. It played out in relations with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, in weapons sales, and in the Arab-Israeli conflicts.

But when the Cold War ended, the major powers’ approaches to the Middle East became more individualistic and fluid, either by necessity or choice. During the early post-Cold War years, Russia and China were mindful of the Middle East but thoroughly absorbed with internal transformations – Russia moving from a command economy to private enterprise and China digesting Deng Xiaoping’s market economic reforms and purging sympathizers of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Without the overlay of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, Europe focused on rebuilding traditional relationships in the Middle East, while elsewhere deepening integration within the European Union, and laying the groundwork for bringing in former Soviet satellite countries as new members. For its part, the US was absorbed in consolidating its post-Cold War position in Europe (the uniting of Germany within NATO, for example), building a new relationship with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s newly-independent states, and dampening ethnic conflict in the Balkans. America’s focus on the Middle East sharpened dramatically of course as terrorism escalated and particularly after the 9/11 attacks and in the chaotic aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Meanwhile, the global financial crisis of 2008 weakened confidence in the US, including among Middle Eastern partners. At the same time, Russia was becoming more assertive, as evidenced by its occupation of parts of Georgia in 2008 and parts of Ukraine in 2013. And the perception grew that China was “rising” in a way bound to challenge American international dominance.

As the major powers were adjusting to these new dynamics, the Middle East was rocked by three phenomena that changed the character of the region and the terms on which outsiders must engage it. First, the Iraq war polarized the countries of the region and roiled relations among the major outside powers. Second, Islamic extremism sunk deeper roots and sparked divisions among outside powers about how to respond to it. And third, the region experienced the Arab Spring, which upset not only the domestic norms of many countries but also changed many of the personalities and institutions that served for years as conduits to the outside powers.

In short, the end of the Cold War meant that Middle Eastern competition among the great powers was separated for the first time in decades from a global struggle. The Middle East has thus become the world’s principal laboratory for practicing the new balance of power politics likely to characterize the coming decades. It is the arena where the first rounds of a new “Great Game” are playing out. The game has begun, whether the great powers are ready or not. […]

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On a comparé l'événement à l'assassinat de John Kennedy, aux funérailles de Winston Churchill, ou même aux indescriptibles scènes de deuil survenues en Iran, entourées d'hystérie, à la suite de la mort de l'ayatollah Khomeiny... Quand Lady Di a trouvé la mort brutalement dans un accident d'automobile à (...) / Europe, Royaume-Uni, Femmes, Société, Monarchie - 1997/10