Diplomacy & Crisis News

In today’s fraught international environment, technological innovations such as artificial intelligence, automation, robotics, quantum technology, and space technology generally provide exceptional advantages to states and shape global power competition. China, which has attracted attention with its investments and policies in these areas, has started to emerge as a significant opponent of the United States.

China aims to take advantage of the political, economic, military, and commercial opportunities offered by innovative technologies to become the world leader in technology. China’s strategy, in which all Chinese state mechanisms act together, intends to increase support for state-owned enterprises, prioritize research and development activities, ensure high-tech industrialization, and boost innovation programs. But what does this approach, which has recently worried Western countries, mean?

China’s technological pragmatism

In early 2006, China’s cabinet declared that it sees innovative technology as a strategic choice within the National Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020). In this context, China, which focuses on reinforcing its capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles and space, has started to popularize using digital technologies and automation in line with its five-year development plans. Under the 973 Program, which started in 2009 under the coordination of the Ministry of Science and Technology, China has increased its support for many scientific programs, including quantum technology, space and satellite technologies, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, automation systems, and robotics.

China, which codified its technology goals in 2015 when it announced its “Made in China 2025” and Internet Plus plans, has particularly focused on investments in artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and big data. Technological development also provides large-scale economic opportunities to China, though challenges remain in developing high-tech industry and increasing market share. Against an actor with big technology companies like the United States, Chinese policymakers are trying to increase China’s capacity and to become an actor that can compete in the global market with companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Huawei, and Xiaomi.

Another purpose of China’s investments in innovative technology is to integrate these capabilities and other dual-use technologies into the military area. China under President Xi Jinping began reforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2015 as a part of its civil-military integration policy, and has since improved the PLA Strategic Support Forces’ capabilities in areas, including space, cyber war, and electronic warfare. Thus, while modernizing its army, China also is aiming to implement a new military doctrine based on competition in space and future wars.

In line with this doctrine and the goal of restructuring the armed forces, state-owned companies, private technology companies, universities, and research centers are in partnership with the Chinese military. At this point, quantum technology, cyber capabilities, space programs, automation, robots, and artificial intelligence stand out as the basic components of China’s civil-military integration strategy. China, which established the Integrated Military and Civil Development Central Commission in 2017 to coordinate civil-military integration policies, has given this commission broad powers to determine and supply needs.

China, which sent a quantum satellite into space in 2016 to raise its military capabilities, has sought opportunities to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and gain an advantage over global rivals. Similarly, China’s 360 Enterprise Security Group, the country’s first civil-military cyber security innovation center, has started to create cyber defense systems for military needs.

Global competition in the shadow of innovative technology

For Washington, China’s rising technological capacity has become one of the main issues in bilateral relations with Beijing. Given American decisionmakers’ desire to maintain Washington’s global leadership in economic, military, and technological spaces, Beijing’s civil-military integration and development of dual-use technologies have become crucial challenges for the United States. Therefore, as early as the 2010s, Washington under the Obama administration adopted a strategy to limit China’s rapid economic rise. After President Donald Trump was elected, he adopted a more aggressive policy involving economic and technological sanctions. The sanctions-based policy has inflicted significant losses on Chinese companies such as Huawei. Washington’s policy of combating China continues under President Joe Biden, although the methods are different.

Despite this, it can be said that Washington’s China policy is not clear yet. However, four crucial parameters can be discerned: maintaining its technological, economic, and military leadership; limiting China’s influence in the technology market by deepening cooperation with its allies; producing alternative technologies; and building a techno-political structure against its rivals.

For instance, NATO’s close focus on China’s technological rise is a significant indicator of the West’s concern. Western companies have been encouraged to limit cooperation with China and, in some cases, restrictions have been legislated. Efforts have also been made to limit Beijing’s acquisition of Western companies.

However, the conditions and areas of competition in today’s world are not solely based on the security paradigm. The current global order’s institutions and actors closely interact with China. In other words, in today’s competitive environment, there is no bipolar structure. Many actors, including the United States and its allies, must interact with China in diverse fields. This situation complicates the scope and future of the anti-China campaign.

Moreover, technological competition is not only limited to physical or geopolitical spaces. The competitive environment reaches beyond states, institutions, companies, and other actors to include information and data-based areas. This competition in the digital space is not an area where states, governments, or other actors—even hegemonic ones—can exercise direct dominance. This situation heightens the importance of discussions about the future of today’s competitive environment.

Mesut Özcan is a Ph.D. student at Sakarya University Middle East Institute studying how innovative technologies will shape security and international competition.

Image: Shutterstock.

Vladislav Surkov, an ex-aide to Vladimir Putin, claims that, under Putin, Russia entered a new historical era—“the long state of Putin,” in which it returned to “its natural and only possible state of a great expanding and land-gathering community of people.” Per Surkov, Russia will exist in this capacity for hundreds of years.

Surkov states that Russia is back to its old imperial self. There is even a new clause in the Russian constitution allowing the inclusion of new territories into the Russian Federation. Numerous public figures, including Putin, claim that gathering lands for Russia is a historically just endeavor. Dmitry Rogozin, the Russian politician who has served in several key positions in the Russian government, even claims that Russia has a right to take back any lands where Russians have shed their blood and sweat. 

Yet Surkov’s prediction regarding the longevity of the “state of Putin” is unlikely to come true. Indeed, under Putin, Russia has entered a new historical era: both the most frightening and the most fragile in its history. It is the most alarming because of the unprecedented nature of the new nationalism of Russia’s political leadership. It is the weakest because of the weakness of Russia’s institutions of power, armed forces, and national unity.

This newly promoted nationalism is belligerent and retrogressive. For the first time in Russian history, the ruling elite praises nearly all of Russia’s past, all its powerful leaders, and all its wars. Moreover, a seemingly unthinkable merge of Czarism and Communism has taken place. The best symbol of this merge is the order of the “Hero of Labor,” a civilian award introduced by Joseph Stalin in 1938 as the “Hero of Socialist Labor.” In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the first Russian president Boris Yeltsin eliminated the order. Yet Putin restored it in 2013 under a slightly different name, “The Hero of Labor.”

In the Soviet Union, the order was in the form of the five-point golden star embossed with the hammer and sickle: the symbols of communist ideology and working-class solidarity. Putin’s new “Hero” order is also in the form of the golden star, yet now it is embossed with the double-headed eagle: the symbol of the Russian Empire. The two initially warring ideologies stand reconciled under the banner of Russian expansionism.

The Russian government now portrays all wars Russia has fought over centuries as both necessary and just. The Russian constitution legalizes this in a new amendment: “The Russian Federation honors the memory of defenders of the Fatherland and safeguards the defense of historical truth. Diminishing the significance of the heroism of the people in defending the Fatherland is not allowed.” Following this logic, Putin now justifies the “Winter War”—an act of brutal aggression by Stalin’s Soviet Union against Finland in 1939–1940. Even in the Soviet Union, especially in the post-Stalin era, this war was not portrayed as necessary or just. 

Most frighteningly, Russia’s new nationalism borrows directly from German Nazism. One of the slogans, posted on billboards throughout Russia and on the occupied territories of Ukraine, reads “One People. One History. One Country.” This a direct reference to the Russian-Ukrainian War, which is almost identical to the Nazi slogan “Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuehrer” (One People, One County, One Leader). The latter was used during the Nazi-led referendum on the annexation of Austria on April 10, 1938.

Similarly, Russia’s ruling elites, with the personal involvement of Putin, lionize the legacy of Ivan Ilyin, a Russian anti-communist philosopher who was expelled from the Soviet Union shortly after the Communist Revolution and who expressed sympathy for fascism. In 1933, Ilyin wrote that Hitler did Europe a huge favor by rescuing it from Bolshevism, declaring “While Mussolini leads Europe and Hitler leads Germany, European culture gets a break.” After World War II, when the crimes of the Nazi regime became widely known, Ilyin still justified fascism, calling it a complex phenomenon within which “one finds elements of health and illness.” In October 2005, the remains of Ilyin were brought back to Russia and reburied in Moscow under the personal patronage of Putin. Putin even cites Ilyin in his speeches.

Primordialism, or the desire to have one long continuous history, is another facet of Russia’s new nationalism. The Russian elites want to be heirs of all its purported predecessors: Kyivan Rus, the Mongols, the Byzantine Empire, and, most unbelievably, the Aryans. Viacheslav Nikonov, one’s of Russian most prominent political and media personages, who happens to be a grandson of Stalin’s foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov, called Russians the Aryans in a statement posted at some point on the website of the Russian parliament.

Primordialism leads to the idea of a civilization-state: the belief that Russia is a unique civilization with its own political, social, and cultural norms. Per Putin, “it is precisely the state-civilization model that has shaped” Russia’s state polity. This model is discriminatory both in practice and by the letter of the law. The Russian constitution now labels the Russians a “state-forming people.” Whether being a Russian is determined by one’s physical appearance, culture, language, or religion is not discussed. Neither is it clear who decides whether a person is Russian.

This horrid nationalism notwithstanding, Russia today is fragile as never before. Putin and his cronies are aware of this. Therefore, they introduce draconian amendments and laws banning any kind of dissent and, “God forbid,” separatism.

Several key factors explain why the current political regime is unlikely to survive after Putin. 

First, Putin now rules as a petty and capricious tyrant, resulting in unwise decisions. It was his sole choice to launch a full-scale war against Ukraine in February of 2022. Even Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, was reportedly unaware of Putin’s plans. And just two days before the war, Putin publicly chastised Russia’s otherwise hawkish spymaster Sergei Naryshkin for appearing indecisive on invading Ukraine. This is exceptional even in Russian history. The Russian Czars and Soviet Leaders consulted their inner circle on key issues. For example, the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan in December of 1979 resulted from long and collegial discussions at the Politburo, the highest Soviet governing authority. 

Second, there are frictions between the three elements of the Russian invasion—the regular military, the Wagner Group, and the various Chechen battalions. The Wagner Group is a mercenary army and criminal organization owned by Putin’s notorious pal Evgeny Prigozhin. It is known for its brutal war tactics, including recruiting convicts from prisons and executing those who refuse to fight on the battlefield. The Chechen battalions are semi-autonomous, as they are allegiant to the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, and Chechnya itself rather than to Putin or Russia. Prigozhin and Kadyrov have publicly criticized Russia’s military command, claiming that it has been their forces that have realized Russia’s recent territorial grabs.

Third, Putin wages this war with a colonial-style army. Russians from affluent families dodge the draft and flee Russia en masse, forcing the Russian military and the Wagner Group to recruit from ethnic minorities—Lezgins, Avars, Buryats, Tatars, Chuvash, etc. However, since Russia has historically oppressed its national minorities, it is implausible to imagine that they have a genuine allegiance to the Russian state. If the situation permits, they may cease fighting or even turn against Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the great Russian writer and humanist Leo Tolstoy called Russia “a combination” and predicted that it would eventually collapse. “The circumstance that all these nationalities are regarded as parts of Russia is an accidental and temporary one,” he wrote.

Lastly, and perhaps most disturbingly, Russian propaganda has never been so aggressive and simultaneously absurd. For example, TV presenter Olga Skabeeva has claimed that the entire West is now at war with Russia, just like allegedly during World War II. Surely, Skabeeva knows that the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain were allies after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Another TV presenter, Vladimir Soloviev, scorns German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, saying that a Nazi uniform would fit her the best. The political commentator Igor Korotchenko says that Russia should treat Germany’s Chancellor Scholtz as Adolf Hitler and repeatedly calls for nuclear strikes on the United States.

It is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin can keep Russia in this state of national psychosis for a prolonged period of time, especially after Putin goes. The United States, the European Union, and NATO are currently strategizing how to enable Ukraine to end Russian aggression. This is a noble cause. Yet it is also time to prepare for the potential collapse of Putin’s or post-Putin’s Russia. Given Russia’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, it may not be beneficial for everyone involved, including Ukraine. If Russia disintegrates along the borders of its national autonomous republics—Dagestan, Chechnya, Tatarstan, etc.—this could very well turn into a nuclear Armageddon. The United States, the European Union, and NATO need to have a long-term strategy to avoid this.

Peter Eltsov is professor of international security studies at the College of International Security Affairs at National Defense University and the author of the recent book, The Long Telegram 2: A Neo-Kennanite Approach to Russia.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U. S. government.

Image: Shutterstock.

En décembre dernier, quand il devint évident que le film « Titanic » remporterait un énorme succès, l'appréciation du spectacle et de son producteur-réalisateur bascula en un tournemain. Après avoir moqué l'extravagant coût de fabrication du film, la communauté des critiques salua le génie de James (...) / Cinéma, Inégalités - 1998/08

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Russia has always been and remains committed to strict compliance with its obligations in combating criminal proceeds. For twenty years as a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), we have managed to develop one of the world’s most advanced anti-money laundering regimes. The FATF mutual evaluation proved that in 2019.

Additionally, over recent years, the Russian Financial Intelligence Unit has accumulated unique experiences that it has willingly shared with all interested countries. In order to boost the capacity of law enforcement agencies, a number of educational programs are being actively fulfilled for experts from Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

The past year turned out to be unprecedented in terms of the politicization of international institutions combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Blindly following the directive to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia in retaliation for our desire to put an end to multi-year flagrant injustice in Ukraine, there is a wish to settle scores with us on different dialogue platforms.

No exceptions are made, even for purely expert and technical bodies designed to promote international cooperation in combating various kinds of financial crimes—the FATF, the Egmont Group, and Interpol. It appears that authors of anti-Russian initiatives, in a bid to “expel” Russia from everywhere, have completely lost touch with reality and forgotten about the dangerous consequences of dismantling the global AML/CFT system.

Despite measures taken by the international community, the threat of terrorism does not subside. It is naive to believe that terrorists and their facilitators have abandoned their plans to carry out attacks against humanity. They skillfully adapt to current realities and adjust emerging technologies to suit their needs.

The issues of transnational crime and the increasing involvement of terrorist organizations with drug trafficking are acute. In this context, it is important to remember that the majority (86 percent) of global illicit opium production takes place in Afghanistan. The potential increase in drug flows from there could destabilize any region of the world.

For this reason, the Russian Federation is putting considerable energy within the FATF-style Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, featuring countries that border the former Islamic Republic.

Russian authorities traditionally make a significant contribution to the security of both regional and international financial systems. The statistics speak for themselves: at our request, the funds of about two thousand persons involved in terrorism were “frozen” in foreign countries. However, with the introduction of unilateral restrictions against Russia, the global financial security situation began to objectively worsen.

The attention of special governmental structures—initially called upon to fight crime with taxpayers' money—has been diverted to the search for Russian assets for their subsequent illegal blocking. As a consequence, serious cross-border offenses remain uninvestigated.

What can attempts to limit Russia’s role in the multilateral anti-money laundering efforts result in? The answer is obvious: at the very least, it results in a weakening of the global financial system security. Any restrictions on interaction and exchange of information related to terrorism, drugs, fraud, cybercrime, money laundering, and other serious offenses make it difficult to trace illegal assets. The pursuit of dangerous criminal groups risks practically stopping.

As a result, the benefit of such ill-conceived actions is obtained directly by criminals, including by those who committed economic offenses in the countries that “frozen” useful and mutually beneficial enforcement contacts with Russia. There is no doubt that they will certainly take advantage of the emerging vulnerabilities in their own vested interests.

States that refuse to cooperate with the Russian government agencies on special issues of combating crime are, in fact, “shooting themselves in the foot”—exposing their own citizens and their national security to unreasonable risks.

The credibility of the FATF, well-known for its professionalism and high-quality expertise, is also suffering. It is sad that statements regularly made during its meetings about the need of establishing international cooperation in combating the financing of terrorism without politicization and double standards are nothing more than empty rhetoric. Our former Western partners are clearly not rushing to put these declarations into practice.

It would seem that in the history of Russia’s relations with Western countries, including the United States, there are many examples of successful cooperation in countering terrorism and crime. Our joint efforts saved people's lives and brought criminals to justice. Facilitated strengthening of mutual financial security. Why destroy what has been built over the years?

Yury Chikhanchin is the Director of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation.

Image: mojahata/Shutterstock.

An increasing media galore is witnessing the discussion of the role of Wagner Group, a Russian quasi-private military company (PMC), in the Ukrainian conflict.

The Wagner Groups’smercenaries are popping up all over Ukraine, allegedly committing blatant war crimes and providing the necessary combat skill lacking among young, untrained Russian conscripts. While the focus is on Ukraine, the actual value of Wagner is in Africa. Russian paramilitary groups and mercenaries are increasing their footprint in Africa, from Mali to the Central African Republic. While the Russian army is bogged down in a war of attrition with Ukraine, the Wagner Group is a placeholder for Moscow’s geopolitical interests in natural resource-rich African countries. Several reasons are related to the increasing footprint of the Wagner Group in the continent, starting with Russia’s long history of involvement in Africa and the support of strong ties with several African countries. Since Putin’s rise to power, Russia has increased its economic and military presence in Africa.

The Wagner Group is an efficient tool to further Russian objectives on the continent without attracting the same level of scrutiny as regular Russian military units. Besides offering plausible deniability, Wagner is a source of income for oligarchs tied to Putin. For example, in Africa, Wagner’s training services and supply of Russian military hardware are a source of hard currency and precious metals that help the Kremlin to mitigate international sanctions.

To b clear, the Wagner Group more often refers to the Kremlin’s commitment to using paramilitary groups and mercenaries as the sharp end of the stick of its foreign policy from the Middle East to Africa. The Kremlin’s strategy is straightforward: mercenaries provide plausible deniability and achieve precise strategic objectives with limited resources. Russia’s proxy warfare doctrine has changed since Soviet times. Today, it cannot count on former Soviet satellite states to provide the proxy forces required to conduct expeditionary warfare, such as the Cubans in Angola. The use of mercenaries is related to efficiency and the fact that Moscow’s options are limited. Tor Bukkvall, a specialist on Russia’s military strategy, defines the Wagner Group as Moscow’s “power projection on the cheap.”

The Syrian conflict demonstrated how agile and well-trained combat units motivated by money can be a gamechanger. Small units fighting against untrained armed militia and guerrilla forces enabled Moscow to establish influence at a low cost and maintain public deniability in case of failure or blatant human rights violations. Having proved its value in support of the Assad regime and in Libya—where it orchestrated Khalifa Haftar’s successful defense of the oil crescent after he was routed in Tripoli—the Wagner Group expanded its franchise to Africa.

In the continent, however, the Wagner Group is not used only to further the Kremlin’s geopolitical aims but to line the pockets of the Russian elite by establishing a presence in resource-rich countries, where they ally with militias in return for payments in cash or mining concessions. In this regard, Russian PMCs are helping the country work around crippling sanctions.

Moscow’s paramilitary groups are increasing their footprint in Africa. In Sudan, the Wagner Group provided security and logistical support to save former president Omar al-Bashir in exchange for diamond mining concessions. The group supported the Central African Republic government’s struggle against rebel groups. While in Mozambique, the Wagner Group could not provide decisive support to government forces fighting insurgency in the northern part of the country.

Today, Russia relies on distinct armed groups to do its bidding: regular military, mercenaries, special forces operators in disguise, and paramilitaries. Depending on Moscow's needs, a single Russian operator could play each of these roles.

The host government requested the Wagner group’s presence in several African states, while Moscow denies any government involvement. As soon as the boots are on the ground, the Russian disinformation campaign is then ramped up a notch on social media and even with movies supporting Moscow’s presence in Russian and local languages. The propaganda message is straightforward: Russian quasi-PMCs are the last bastions against Islamic terrorists supported by Western mercenaries. Two recent movies distributed in Russia and Africa, Granite and Tourist, which were filmed in the Central African Republic and paid for by a Russian company owned by Wagners’ founder are a case in point.

The case of Mali, where the government officially asked the Wagner Group to support its struggle against terrorist groups, represents this trend. Even Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed reports that Mali contracted the group to fight extremism in the Sahel, asserting that it is a business agreement between a state and a private company without Moscow’s involvement.

Is it not by chance that shortly after an increased Russian presence in Mali, the government of neighboring Burkina Faso was ousted in a January 2022 military coup—the fifth in a year in West and Central Africa, a region known as the continent’s “coup belt.”

Mali is just a tiny piece of a broader geopolitical puzzle Russia is acquiring in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. The Syrian playbook, previously tested by the Kremlin during the support of the Assad regime, works like a charm in Africa: moving into a region of interest with a small number of boots on the ground and in a cost-efficient manner while all the attention is centered on Ukraine.

Therefore, the presence of Wagner and similar groups is an early warning indicator that Russia is going to try and alter the political and regional status quo in the short term, months and not years, with any indirect means ranging from deception, active propaganda, and violent actions including political decapitation and supporting military’s coup.

Dr. Alessandro Arduino is an associate at Lau China Institute, King’s College London. His most recent book is China’s Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road (Palgrave, 2018).

Image: fotoandy/Shutterstock.com.

Since becoming independent in 1991, Georgia has been striving for closer ties with the West and membership in organizations such as the European Union. However, in recent times, particularly in the past eighteen months, the ruling coalition led by oligarch and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream party has made decisions that seem to push Georgia away from the West and toward Russia’s sphere of influence. The government continues to claim support for integration with the EU and NATO, but it has opted for a policy of non-confrontation with Moscow. This significant change in direction has sparked controversy and debate within the nation.

The Georgian government’s policies have put it at odds with the Georgian population, which prefers closer ties with the West. A 2022 survey by the Center for Insights in Survey Research found that 89 percent of Georgians consider Russia a “political threat,” while 79 percent of Georgians want their country to have a “pro-Western” foreign policy. Likewise, 85 percent of Georgians also “fully” (70 percent) or “somewhat” (15 percent) support their country joining the EU, while 70 percent want their country to join NATO. As Georgia navigates its delicate position between Russia and the European Union, Georgian Dream’s actions are understandable. After all, who could forget Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, an act of aggression that former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev later admitted was motivated by a desire to prevent NATO’s expansion into former Soviet territories.

Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the relationship between Georgia and Ukraine, both former Soviet republics, has significantly deteriorated despite their traditional solidarity. Georgian authorities formally condemned Russia’s “unacceptable“ invasion of Ukraine and provided humanitarian assistance and diplomatic support through organizations such as the United Nations. However, the Georgian government’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia sparked widespread discontent among the population, as demonstrated by the anti-government protests calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili.

According to a survey conducted by Caucasus Research Resource Centers last spring, 66 percent of Georgians believe that their government should take a stand against Moscow and implement some form of action. In addition, a majority of respondents, 61 percent, stated that the government should show greater support for Ukraine. These views contrast the ruling party’s stance, which has refused to impose any sanctions on Russia.

Much like Ukraine, Georgia has been dealing with its own territorial issues with Russia. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and declared the independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For over ten years, Russia has been constructing fences along the line of separation between South Ossetia, which is almost completely surrounded by Georgian-controlled territory, and Georgia, in an effort to turn this line into a fully recognized border between the two countries. This process, known as “borderization,” has been a dire problem for Georgia, as it challenges the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Georgia’s strategic neutrality in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia may be a calculated move to avoid angering Moscow and potentially facing consequences such as economic sanctions and the further “borderization” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Kornely Kakachia, the head of the Georgian Institute of Politics, suggests that Tbilisi is adopting a cautious “wait and see“ approach in dealing with the volatile and unpredictable nature of Russia’s actions.

And despite claims from members of Georgian Dream, it is clear that Ivanishvili still wields significant power in Georgian politics. With a history of business in Russia and close connections to the Kremlin, Ivanishvili has maintained a tight grip on Georgia’s leading institutions for the past decade. Interestingly, there have been no criticisms of Ivanishvili from Moscow, possibly due to his promise to improve relations between the two countries when his Georgian Dream party came to power in 2012. Ivanishvili’s influence and connections continue to shape the political landscape in Georgia.

Since its inception in 2012, Georgia’s ruling party has faced criticism for its handling of democracy, human and minority rights, media freedoms, and the fight against corruption and political polarization. In 2019, thousands of people took to the streets in protest after a Russian lawmaker was allowed to sit in the parliamentary speaker’s chair during a meeting, an event known as “Gavrilov night“ and viewed as a national indignity given Russia’s ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

But the protests go beyond this single incident. They also stem from discontent with Georgian Dream’s overall performance, including a struggling economy, perceptions of rigged elections, restrictions on freedom of the press, and selective justice. The European Parliament even passed a resolution calling for the EU to impose sanctions on Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream’s founder, for his “destructive role” in Georgia’s politics and economy, including risks posed to free media and journalists’ safety.

The Georgian government’s deviation from Western-backed democratic reforms has jeopardized the country’s relations with the EU and United States. In September 2021, Georgian Dream declined the EU’s macro-financial assistance package, which included requirements for judicial reforms recommended by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. Instead, the government sought funding from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which did not have such conditionality. In June 2022, the European Council further decided to postpone Georgia’s potential EU membership until it implemented reforms and met twelve specific conditions reforms.

As Georgia edges closer to Russia, tensions may escalate if the Georgian people seek to replace their country’s pro-Russian leaders. Russia and President Vladimir Putin have a history of advocating for regime change in Georgia and Ukraine. For example, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov demanded the removal of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in 2008, much like when Putin himself called on the Ukrainian military to overthrow their government in 2022 as a precondition for peace negotiations. It’s possible that Moscow could become more aggressive in the face of any attempts by Georgia to loosen its ties with Russia.

The 2013 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine was sparked by President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to abandon the EU in favor of closer ties with Russia. However, the underlying factors that fueled the revolution went much deeper and included widespread corruption, economic hardships, undemocratic politics, media censorship, and police brutality that left the Ukrainian people feeling silenced and oppressed. In the face of these challenges, Ukrainians took to the streets to demand change and fight for a better future.

As Georgia struggles with corruption, undemocratic elections, economic challenges, and media censorship, the government’s attempts to move closer to Russia and distance itself from the West have faced strong resistance from the majority of citizens. Ivanishvili’s leadership and actions are reminiscent of those of Yanukovych in Ukraine, which sparked the Euromaidan Revolution. As discontent and frustration among Georgians reach a boiling point, it seems that the country may be headed for a Maidan-style revolution of its own, similar to what Ukraine experienced before it.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe and an editor at Euromaidan Press. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Image: Shutterstock.

Aydar Rashidovich Aganin is one of Russia’s best Arabists. He has served in Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, and the United States. From 2007 to 2011, he ran Russia Today’s Arabic edition, which is today one of the most influential news outlets in the entire Arab world. He was one of Vladimir Putin’s close advisors on the Middle East in the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Department. As of last month, he is the Russian ambassador to Libya.

Putin’s man in Tripoli is there for good reason. At a time when Russia needs all hands on deck as it wages its war in Ukraine, the decision to dispatch one of Russia’s best and brightest regional experts to Libya—a country that the West evidently considers to be a backwater—is telling. While Western diplomats continue to chatter kalam fadi, or empty talk, about “elections” or a “constitutional settlement” or other vague promises, Russia has an opportunity. Aganin’s appointment is a sign that Russia plans to take it, and the West had better watch out.

As the world watches the war in Ukraine, Russia is probing the rest of the world for weak spots. While it is true that Russia is somewhat drawing down its presence in Syria, it has not lost its influence in the Middle East. The influence of Russia over OPEC was made clear just one year ago, when Saudi Arabia refused to increase oil production to support the rest of the global economy. Russia’s influence in Syria has sufficed to stop Israel from helping Ukraine with even defensive systems. Russia’s influence over Iran destroyed the resurrection of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in March. And in Libya, too many Libyan politicians owe their lives and careers to Russian weapons and Russian mercenaries for Moscow to be excluded—not that there is any incentive. Now is the perfect time to call in those debts, and Putin knows it.

Today, Libya occasionally appears in Western news. Nine times out of ten, Libyan oil flows need to be disrupted for the West to recall its existence. When NATO intervened in Libya, it baked half a regime change cake but did not succeed in finishing the job. The batter has long turned sour. The myth of Arab dictators—that, in their absence, only chaos can reign—got a new lease on life when Libya’s brief experiment with democracy failed in the absence of support from a non-committal NATO, which was scarred from the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan and clueless about how to handle a country it had long ignored. After a half-hearted attempt at creating a democracy, Libya had a second civil war. The West could not decide on what approach to take. Following another failed attempt to impose a new dictator, Khalifa Haftar, on Libya, the West pushed pause. It has tried to preserve that status quo ever since. But Russia has no interest in calm.

Putin’s only way out of his Ukrainian Vietnam is to force the West into stopping Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy from trying to achieve a total victory. To do that, he can use the West’s greatest advantage against it: democracy. Just as Russian bombs fall on Ukrainian houses, Russia sought to freeze Europeans in their homes this winter and will try to squeeze their pockets throughout 2023, at the gas pump, at the electricity meter, and wherever else they can. In addition to that, Russia has a Trojan Horse in NATO. Turkey’s half-hearted support for Ukraine has helped Russia prolong its bloody campaign while the West’s economic blockade on Russia has created economic opportunities for the Erdoğan government. Furthermore, Turkey’s reluctance to accept Sweden into NATO has been an obvious favor to Putin. Libya is another low-hanging fruit to do this. Without a government, without a constitution, without rule of law, and full of hired-gun militias, Libya can quickly become a headache. While Libya’s warlords are content with their bribes today, a skilled diplomat, with no competition from his Western counterparts, could change that very quickly.

For a political operative looking to make Europe’s life a little more miserable, Libya is a land of opportunity. In Aganin, Putin has sent a skilled pair of hands to pluck ripe fruit. Aganin can easily ask any militia to blockade or sabotage an oil pump, taking hundreds of thousands of barrels away from the West. He could have gas pipelines sabotaged. He could use his obvious flair for the Arabic language and deep familiarity with Arab culture, which his Western counterparts also lack, to charm Libya’s tribes into thinking that they would be better served by Russia. He could work with any number of thugs to try and force migrants from across the Middle East and Africa to Europe en masse. In a more extreme case, he could work with one of Libya’s many political strongmen to try and force the country back into civil war. It also works in Russia’s favor in the rest of Africa, giving Russia an outlet of influence in the Sahel as well as even more leverage over Egypt.

How can the West respond? The truth is, it cannot. To do so would require putting serious thought into how to end Libya’s decade of political misery and sending skilled diplomats of its own who can engage with tribal leaders and build a Libyan consensus. To do so would require a willingness to use just part of its vast economic and political power to threaten Libya’s strongmen. The very least the West could do is threaten no more shopping trips to London, no more holidays in the South of France, no more pizza in Rome unless you can provide a decent life for your own people. But they have not done this for a decade. Why would they start now? When the oil stops flowing again, and it will, they should not blame Aganin. They can blame only themselves.

Burak Bilgehan Özpek is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara. Özpek is also one of the founders of Daktilo1984 Movement in Turkey.

Image: Shutterstock.

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