Diplomacy & Crisis News

Kyle Mizokami

U.S. Military, Americas

Let's look at the overarching structure of U.S. special forces, and the diverse special operations units fielded by the U.S. Army.

Here's What You Need to Know: Members of special operations undergo extreme tests of physical and mental endurance.

The United State’s Special Operation Command (SOCOM) counts over 70,000 personnel drawn from elite units in the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps and Navy. At times it virtually resembles a fifth service of the U.S. military with its own aircraft, boats and support services.

Special operations forces are employed for high-risk missions where use of blunt conventional firepower is constrained by political or tactical factors, and where finesse and discretion are required. That includes ‘direct action’ missions such as hostage rescue and capture or assassination of critical enemy personnel, as well as communicating with and training regional allies, and performing reconnaissance deep inside hostile territory.

Members of special operations undergo extreme tests of physical and mental endurance as part of their training. Culturally, special ops units place greater emphasis on smarts and individual initiative, and eschew being labeled ‘soldiers’, instead calling themselves ‘operators’ or unit-specific titles like Raider, Ranger or SEAL.

In this first part of a two-part series, we’ll look at the overarching structure of U.S. special forces, and the diverse special operations units fielded by the U.S. Army.

The Elite within the Elite

U.S. special ops units fall broadly into two categories. Tier 2 and 3 units are usually assigned to service- or region-specific commands, operating only under the auspices of SOCOM when coordinating with other special forces units.

Meanwhile, Tier 1 units, also known as Special Missions Units, are directly commanded by the national-level Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which undertakes critical, classified missions approved at the highest level. For example, JSOC has organized task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to hunt down senior leaders of Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban.

Known Tier 1 units include the U.S. Army’s Delta Force, Ranger Regimental Reconnaissance Company, and Intelligence Support Activity; the Navy’s DEVGRU (SEAL Team 6); and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron. JSOC occasionally also integrates lower-tier units when necessary to fulfill operational requirements.

Special ops units also often work closely with U.S. civilian intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA’s shadowy Special Activities Division, which draws many of its personnel from the Special Ops community.

75th Ranger Regiment

The U.S. Army Rangers date back to six battalions formed during World War II. The Fifth Ranger battalion famously scaled a ninety-foot high cliff at Point du Hoc on D-Day to attack Nazi gun batteries, while the First, Third and Fourth were wiped out in the Battle of Anzio.

Today’s Rangers wear a tan beret and are grouped under the 75th Regiment, which itself traces its lineage to Merill’s Marauders, a unit known for its exploits fighting Japanese forces in China.

The regiment’s three Ranger Battalions are organized similarly to a conventional airborne infantry formation, However Rangers undergo a two-month intensive Ranger School where they wilderness fighting skills, with units focusing on desert, mountain and swamp terrain.

The Rangers specialize in combat missions that involve insertion of relatively large units into hostile territory—particularly seizing airports and other key installations, as well as killing or capturing enemy leaders. One Ranger battalion is always on standby for deployment overseas within eighteen hours.

The Ranger Special Troops Battalion includes the elite Regimental Reconnaissance Company with training in underwater as well as airborne insertion. This Tier 1 unit fields six-person teams that can direct air strikes at key targets, or serve as pathfinders that land ahead of an airborne force to locate and illuminate safe landing zones.

The Green Berets

First formed in the 1950s, standard Army Special Forces units are popularly known as the Green Berets. Though trained in a wide range of skills, the Green Berets particularly specialize recruiting, organizing and training local forces; and accompanying or leading them in combat operations supporting U.S. objectives. Such local allies could be members of a regular military unit like the Afghan or Iraqi Army, a tribal militia, or even an underground resistance force. 

Green Berets famously inserted into Afghanistan in 2001 road on horseback alongside local anti-Taliban fighters, coordinating their ground offensive with U.S. forces, and calling down airstrikes on points of resistance. In the anti-ISIS campaign, Green Berets worked closely with Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria.

While conventional military units depend on support units for fire support, transportation, medical care and resupply, Green Berets training emphasizes ability to operate independently of such structures for long periods of time as reflected by the sobriquet “Snake Eaters.”

Their training also emphasizes studying local cultures and their language and communication styles. For that reason, it’s sometimes styled a “thinking-man’s special forces”—though the term may need revision, given the branch admitted its first female operator in 2018.

The Green Berets operate in five regular and two National Guard Special Forces Groups tied to different regional commands, each fielding three or four battalions.

The basic Green Beret unit is the twelve-operator “A-Team,” led by a captain. Six A-Teams are assigned to each Special Forces Company, and seven companies in each battalion.

Delta Force

 Special Forces Operational Detachment D (SFOD-D) was founded in 1977, and remains the most elite and secretive of the Army’s special forces units. It focuses on direction action counter-terrorist missions such as hostage rescue and capture or killing of high value targets, as well as protection of high-ranking individuals

Delta operatives train on marksmanship, espionage, tactical driving, demolitions and infiltration skills. You can read more about the unit’s extreme training regimen in this earlier article. 

Delta Force is estimated to count roughly a thousand personnel, and has four operational “Saber Squadrons,” each with two assault troops and one reconnaissance troop. Support units include E Squadron, which flies light planes and helicopters on spy missions, G Squadron which performs advanced reconnaissance operations, and a Combat Support Squadron harboring technical specialists in demolitions, signals intelligence and so forth.

160th “Night Stalker” Special Operation Aviation Regiment

 In 1980, Delta Force’s first operation, a complicated attempt to rescue hostages in Iran, came crashing down in flames when a Marine helicopter collided with an Air Force refueling plane.

Afterwards, the Army decided it needed an elite helicopter unit to support its commandos and formed the 160th “Night Stalkers” regiment. The 160th has been involved in virtually every U.S. military conflict since, whether inserting Delta force commandos in Grenada, hunting down Iranian minelayers, dropping elite operatives into the war torn streets of Mogadishu, or flying under Pakistani radars carrying Navy SEALS on a mission to kill Bin Laden.

The first battalion of the 160th operates several types of scout/attack choppers. The MH-60 DAP gunships hefts a 30-millimeter chain gun and Stinger air-to-air and Hellfire anti-tank missiles. There are also diminutive AH-6 and MH-6 “Little Bird” choppers that can mount infrared sensors, minigun and rocket pods, and even external seating for up to four commandos.

The Second through Fourth battalions fly MH-60M Blackhawks and heavy MH-47G Chinook transport helicopters. These are specially modified with inflight-refueling capacity, low-altitude terrain-following radars for skimming close to the ground, and fast-rappelling ropes and hoists.

The 160th is also fields a “stealth” Blackhawk model incorporating radar-absorbent materials and other defensive upgrades.

The regiment’s nearly 200 aircraft are rounded out by two companies equipped with MQ-1C Predator surveillance drones.

Whenever the Pentagon need elite helicopter pilots for dangerous and/or clandestine missions, the 160th’s is likely involved.

Intelligence Support Activity

 The Army’s most obscure special-ops unit is the roughly 300-strong Intelligence Support Activity, formed in 1981, which has gone by various codenames over the years. The unit’s bland title is belied by its Tier-1 status.

ISA focuses on gathering human intelligence based on contact with field agents, and signals intelligence (intercepted communications) to support Delta Force and DEVGRU operations. 

ISA agents often are proficient in multiple relevant languages, and other skills traditionally associated with civilian intelligence-gathering activities. ISA operatives have scaled mountains in Afghanistan to listen in on Taliban radio communications and assisted with recon prior to the Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden.

A companion article will look at Special Operations units of the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, as well as recent challenges facing the Special Forces community.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Steven Lewis

David Axe

Great Power Competition, Americas

It's a possibility the U.S. military must prepare for.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In the event of war with the United States over disputed Pacific territories, Chinese forces likely would attempt to neutralize forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan and Guam and at sea, Goldsmith explained.

The U.S. military must find ways of defeating any attempt by China to launch surprise strikes using non-nuclear weapons, analyst Sam Goldsmith argued in a new article for Naval War College Review.

“China likely would aim to confine itself to the use of conventional weapons during any potential high-intensity conflict with the United States—particularly given that China already possesses a lethal array of long-range, conventional, theater-strike options,” Goldsmith wrote in “U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability.”

“Such a strategic, conventional, first-strike option is one that the United States should seek to deny China by developing an effective conventional access strategy.”

In the event of war with the United States over disputed Pacific territories, Chinese forces likely would attempt to neutralize forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan and Guam and at sea, Goldsmith explained.

Next, the People’s Liberation Army would attack U.S. reinforcements heading west to the Pacific theater, Goldsmith added.

In carrying out this strategy, the PLA will employ each of its four subordinate service branches: the PLA Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLAN submarines would execute undersea attacks against U.S. ships and submarines in port or at sea and strike at land targets with cruise missiles.

The PLAAF would execute air strikes against U.S. aircraft on the ground or in the air, as well as U.S. ships and submarines in port or at sea. Strikes against U.S. bases would occur with extended-range missiles launched from PLAAF combat aircraft or conventional ballistic missiles launched from the Chinese mainland.

“The U.S. military should consider introducing a conventional access strategy, designed specifically to balance the PLA’s counterintervention strategy,” Goldsmith proposed. “The purpose would be to provide the U.S. military with an improved capacity to deter a PLA conventional first strike, and, if necessary, degrade PLA capabilities with long-range conventional strike forces, to facilitate access for follow-on U.S. forces.”

A U.S. conventional access strategy would require four distinct capabilities. A theater-wide passive-defense capability would enhance the ability of forward-deployed U.S. forces to survive initial PLA conventional strikes.

A conventional theater-strike capability would enable the U.S. military to begin degrading PLA capabilities immediately at the outset of a conflict, without access to in-flight refueling tankers or usable runways.

A theater-recovery capability would restore basic runway access in the aftermath of PLA conventional strikes.

A rapid-response capability would allow long-range [U.S. Air Force] bombers and fighter escorts to deploy rapidly to U.S. bases in the western Pacific, capitalizing on freshly repaired runways as well as prepositioned stocks of aviation fuel and conventional earth-penetrating ordnance.

Consider Goldsmith’s proposal in light of a related plan that the Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments published in May 2019.

To blunt China’s advantage, CSBA analysts recommended the Pentagon pursue “a military strategy of maritime pressure, which includes a new inside-out defense operational concept.”

“The strategy of maritime pressure aims to persuade Chinese leaders that attempting military aggression in the Western Pacific will fail, thus discouraging them from trying it,” CSBA explained.

Some troops -- in particular, U.S. Army and Marine forces with mobile rocket launchers, supported by a few U.S. Navy ships and small contingents of U.S. Air Force warplanes -- would hunker down on and around islands near China, preparing to hit Chinese troops from inside China’s own expanding lines.

These “inside” forces would help poke holes in Chinese defenses that could help follow-on forces reach the combat zone.

It would be risky. “Implementing this inside-out defense concept will require some U.S. forces to operate and survive within range of Chinese missiles,” the analysts noted.

Goldsmith’s own proposal posits one approach to ensuring those inside forces can blunt and survive the initial Chinese onslaught and then receive reinforcements. Land-based rockets, rapid-repair capabilities and concepts for quickly deploying aerial reinforcements could help U.S. forces to recover from, and reverse, surprise Chinese advances.

David Axe served as defense editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared in 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

Caleb Larson

Drones,

The United States Air Force successfully conducted an unmanned test flight of a General Atomics Avenger drone—controlled not by a pilot on the ground, but rather by the Skyborg autonomy core system.

Here's What You Need to Remember: While the Air Force Skyborg autonomy core system is still in its infancy, the artificial intelligence piloting program is rapidly gaining experience, and could fly alongside manned pilots in the not-so-distant future.

The artificial intelligence pilot is steadily gaining experience and expanding the number of drones it can fly.

The United States Air Force successfully conducted an unmanned test flight of a General Atomics Avenger drone—controlled not by a pilot on the ground, but rather by the Skyborg autonomy core system. The flight came several months after the Skyborg technology flew a Kratos UTAP-22 Mako drone, and marked the second kind of aircraft that the autonomous piloting program is able to fly.

“This type of operational experimentation enables the Air Force to raise the bar on new capabilities, made possible by emerging technologies,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Dale White explained in an Air Force press release about the recent flight. “And this flight is a key milestone in achieving that goal.”

The Air Force Skyborg effort is in essence a complex artificial intelligence system that hopes to eventually allow low-cost, unmanned aerial platforms to fly in tandem with manned fighters. Having an autonomous, intelligent plane in the air alongside other Air Force platforms is of obvious benefit: by flying ahead of manned airplanes, unmanned and expendable airframes can be placed in high-risk airspace to fly scout and reconnaissance sorties to evaluate potential threats—or even, in theory, to pull the trigger on enemy aircraft or ground installations.

The Skyborg program however would like to take unmanned flight a step further. Rather than flying just one or several autonomous airplanes, the Air Force hopes that Skyborg could enable larger swarms of unmanned aircraft to fly in coordinated teams rather than just solo multiplying their combat effectiveness.

The General Atomics Avenger drone is one  of the company’s most advanced—and though company material on the drone does not state it explicitly—is thought to incorporate some radar-mitigating stealth features into its airframe. The Avenger utilizes a serpentine air intake duct intended to hide the engine's compressor blades from enemy radar and reduce potential radar return. In addition, the Avenger’s fuselage appears to be contoured in a stealthy fashion, and incorporates rectangular exhaust nozzles which are useful for preserving rearward stealth.

Air Force material on Skyborg is careful to state that Skyborg-flown unmanned systems would compliment rather than replace manned pilots, but will “provide them [pilots] with key data to support rapid, informed decisions.” In this way, Skyborg could “provide manned teammates with greater situational awareness and survivability during combat missions.”

“Flying the Skyborg ACS on platforms from two different manufacturers demonstrates the portability of the Government-owned autonomy core, unlocking future multi-mission capabilities for the Joint Force,” Maj. Gen. Heather Pringle, Commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory as the Skyborg Technology Executive Officer explained.

So while the Air Force Skyborg autonomy core system is still in its infancy, the artificial intelligence piloting program is rapidly gaining experience, and could fly alongside manned pilots in the not-so-distant future.

Caleb Larson is a defense writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

This article was first published earlier this year and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters 

Dan Goure

Defense Contracting,

How is antitrust legislation connected to national security?

Here's what you need to know: There is a real danger in allowing the FTC to set the kinds of limits on vertical mergers that it is seeking in the case of Illumina and Grail. Not only could this impair the ability of the medical system to detect cancers more easily, but it could also set a dangerous precedent for vertical mergers in the defense, aerospace, and other sectors.

The defense and aerospace sector is in the midst of overlapping structural and technological revolutions. The Department of Defense (DoD), with strong Congressional support, is pushing defense companies to be more innovative. The military services have also taken up the mantra of calling for faster change and greater innovation. Emblematic of this drive was the first strategic message to his service by the Air Force Chief of Staff General C.Q. Brown titled “Accelerate Change or Lose.”

The change to which he is referring will be comprehensive: organizational, operational, and technological. The DoD is supporting this effort to move faster and be more innovative by adopting new ways of contracting with the private sector, and by creating special funds to help small, innovative companies enter the defense market.

An important tool that contributes to the private sector being more innovative and accelerating change is mergers and acquisitions. In response to the trend of reduced defense spending, as well as reductions in the number of major programs, the defense and aerospace sector has been in a continuous state of consolidation since the end of the Cold War.

In addition, until the recent drive toward shortening acquisition timelines, major programs often took fifteen years or more to go from initial design to full-rate production. Scale and financial resources were also important for the ability of defense companies to survive changes in national security priorities or decisions to cancel major acquisition programs. Therefore, small and mid-sized firms often found it extremely difficult to thrive in the defense and aerospace sector. As a result of these factors, the number of major prime contractors has shrunk to, at best, two or three companies in each defense subsector.

Mergers and acquisitions will continue to be an important tool for defense and aerospace companies in accelerating change, improving their performance, reducing costs, and providing the rapid innovation demanded by the Pentagon. Recent examples include the merger of L3 and Harris; the merger between Raytheon and United Technologies; the acquisition of Sanders Electronics from Lockheed Martin by BAE Systems; the acquisition of OrbitalATK by Northrop Grumman; and finally, the proposed acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne by Lockheed Martin.

But where mergers and acquisitions may be particularly significant is in bringing unique products to bear on critical defense problems. The acquisition of small and mid-sized companies (particularly those without a foothold in the defense sector) by larger firms is an important way of providing them with the access to customers, financial and human resources, and management support required to enter and survive in the defense market.

Over the past several years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has pursued several misguided antitrust investigations and suits. One of these was against Qualcomm, despite senior DoD officials warning that this would harm national security. The recurring theme in these actions is the need to reign in corporations based on size or market presence. This reflects a growing sentiment at the FTC that corporate success as reflected in size or dominant performance is suspect. As a recent Wall Street Journal editorial observed, the premise of the new approach is that “big is bad.”

Efforts by the FTC to impose outdated antitrust standards on companies involved in multi-year defense procurement contracts could pose a direct threat to national security. Only companies that are uniquely capable of designing, developing, and producing sophisticated stealth fighters, such as the F-35, or secure cloud environments that operate from headquarters in the U.S., such as the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) system, can ever meet DoD’s strict requirements to do so.

These companies need experience, scale, a breadth of talented personnel, and deep pockets. When it comes to bringing commercial products to the defense marketplace, it is also important to have experience in navigating the labyrinth of defense acquisition regulations, accounting standards, and approaches to funding.

It is common for innovative start-ups to focus intensely on developing and proving their technologies. They may expend all their resources to get one prototype developed. Smaller or newer companies may lack the personnel and resources to move their business from the laboratory to manufacturing and distribution. In addition, when it comes to entering the defense marketplace, such companies face additional headwinds if they must wait the eighteen months to two years it often takes to get money for their specific technology included in the defense budget.

This is one example of how innovative smaller companies can be set up to succeed through being acquired by a larger prime contractor. When the merger involves vertical, rather than horizontal, integration, the result is not a reduction in competition but rather an increase in efficiency and lower costs to the customer. The standard approach in a vertical merger is to address any potential competitive issues with behavioral remedies, such as contracts to guarantee pricing or access. These remedies have been proposed by Lockheed Martin in response to criticisms of its proposed acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne

This is where the FTC’s tendency to presume harm even where none can be proven goes beyond constituting a national security threat. It can also harm the nation’s health. For example, the FTC is opposing the effort by biotech corporation Illumina to reacquire another biotech company it had spun off some years earlier, Grail, which has developed a biopsy screening test capable of identifying more than fifty different cancers.

Illumina had branched off from Grail some years back. As in the cases of larger defense firms acquiring smaller companies that lack the resources to fully support their own innovations, Illumina can provide the support needed for Grail’s new technology to reach a global market. Any concerns about the impact of the acquisition competition can be addressed through corrective measures, which Illumina has already proposed.

There is a real danger in allowing the FTC to set the kinds of limits on vertical mergers that it is seeking in the case of Illumina and Grail. Not only could this impair the ability of the medical system to detect cancers more easily, but it could also set a dangerous precedent for vertical mergers in the defense, aerospace, and other sectors.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a Vice President of the Lexington Institute. He served in the Pentagon during the George H.W. Administration and has taught at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities and the National War College. You can follow him on Twitter @dgoure and you can follow the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC

This article first appeared earlier in 2021 and is being reprinted due to reader interest. 

Image:  Reuters

David Axe

F-14 Tomcat, Middle East

The AIM-54 Phoenix is one of the most powerful air-to-air missiles ever.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The only country successfully to wield the AIM-54 in combat has been Iran, which in the early 1970s acquired 79 F-14s and hundreds of Phoenixes from the United States.

The U.S. Navy’s AIM-54 Phoenix, the exclusive long-range weapon of the F-14 Tomcat fighter, is one of the most powerful air-to-air missiles ever to exist.

Thirteen feet long and weighing 1,000 pounds, the rocket-propelled, radar-guided AIM-54 flew at Mach five as high as 80,000 feet while carrying a devastating, 135-pound warhead over a range of more than 100 miles.

Former Navy F-14 pilot Francesco Chierici called the Phoenix “a lethal sledgehammer of a missile.”

But in more than 30 years of U.S. service ending with the type’s retirement from Navy service in the mid-2000s, American Tomcats fired just three AIM-54s in anger. All in 1999 while targeting Iraqi aircraft violating a U.N. no-fly zone.

None of those Phoenixes struck their targets.

The only country successfully to wield the AIM-54 in combat has been Iran, which in the early 1970s acquired 79 F-14s and hundreds of Phoenixes from the United States.

Iranian Tomcats fired many AIM-54s at Iraqi planes during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that began on Sept. 22, 1980. But it’s possible the first Iranian Phoenix kill actually took place before full-scale fighting broke out.

In the fall of 1980, as tensions escalated, Iranian jets flew limited strikes on Iraqi forces just across the border opposite Iran. F-14s flew top cover.

According to aviation historian Tom Cooper, on Sept. 9, 1980, Iranian Tomcat pilot Mohammed-Reza Ataayee and a wingman were protecting a formation of F-4Es bombing Iraqi positions near the border. “My back-seater was 1st Lt. Sultan Pasha-Pour,” Ataayee told Cooper.

Back then, I was a major and the second Tomcat was piloted by Maj. Shahram Rostami … The ground radar announced to us one target that was approaching the border and closing fast, and asked us if it is possible for us to engage it.

At the time the government had given us strict orders to never stray over the border or engage in cross-border combats, in order to give Saddam Hussein no excuse for an invasion. We were to engage only if they violated our airspace. Then we had the right to engage and destroy them.

I told the radar I will head toward TFB.4 [Tactical Fighter Base 4, near Dezful] to land and refuel. After refueling, we took off from Dezful and I was immediately alerted that there was an aircraft roughly 50 or so miles away, in a northern direction.

I saw that this target was coming from direction of Hamedan, meaning from north to south. I asked the radar are you sure it is a foe and not a friend. They said stand by so they could check the status of the target, but after a short delay the radar said, ‘No, this is definitely an enemy.’ For us it was hard to imagine an Iraqi pilot would be as brazen as to enter our airspace. Until then, the Iraqis never had the guts to do so.

I told my [back-seat radar-intercept officer] Pasha-Pour to launch a missile at this target. After a quick pause I repeated my order. He told me to do it. I told him to do it. Finally, he pushed the button.

Because I flew F-5s earlier, I was used to seeing the missile going off the wingtip rails and accelerate really fast. I never fired an AIM-54 before and did not know what a Phoenix launch actually felt like. Once Pasha-Pour pushed the button, I could see nothing. I only heard the sound of something detaching from the belly of my aircraft. I told Pasha-Pour that I think that, unfortunately, the missile malfunctioned and fell to the earth.

Thus I inverted my aircraft to see what was going on below and saw the missile falling away. But then I saw it releasing a smoke trail … only then did I recall that the launch sequence took several seconds.

I rolled out and got back to checking the radar, and saw the countdown until the missile would hit. This was counting down — five, four, three, two, one then zero. And then I saw the target disappear from my radar. The ground radar called to congratulate — that poor guy nearly fainted in excitement!’

The Iranian air force officially credited Ataayee with a kill of an Iraqi Sukhoi Su-20M flown by pilot named Faysal Abdul-Fattah Abdul Rahman, Cooper explained.

But Iraq never actually operated any Su-20Ms. In 1980 it did however operate Su-20s -- not M-models -- that Iraq bought from the Soviet Union in 1973.

According to one Iraqi government study that Cooper cited, the first Iraqi loss in the conflict with Iran was an Su-22 flown by No. 44 squadron commander Maj. Noubar Abdel-Hamid Al Hamadani, shot down on Sept. 14, 1980.

“While the [Iranian] F-14 crew certainly had good reason to claim its first kill on Sept. 9, 1980, currently it remains unknown if Ataayee and Pasha-Pour really scored the first-ever kill by an AIM-54,” Cooper wrote.

“It’s possible that this honor belongs to 1st Lt. Fereydoon-Ali Mazandarani and 1st Lt. Qassem Soltani, who claimed to have shot down a MiG-23 with an AIM-54 on Sept. 17, 1980.”

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared in 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

Defiant X, Americas

Here's what we know about the program.

Here's What You Need to Know: The Army is looking for a new helicopter.

Most Army and industry weapons experts, engineers and innovators may not use the word “stealth” when describing the service’s emerging Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (helicopter) program, yet developers are clear to discuss the merits of thermal signature management and finding ways to lower the aircraft’s radar signature.

The Director of Army Futures Command Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional team described this in an interesting and impactful way when referring to the kinds of innovative engineering methods employed in the construction of new, less-detectable helicopters now developing for the 2030s.

“We know how to hide in the radar clutter and we understand how that generates standoff and overmatch,” Rugen told The National Interest last year.

An essay by Lockheed-Sikorsky-Boeing on its new DEFIANT X cites airframe enhancements to “improve aerodynamics and reduce the thermal signature.”

“We optimized the design based upon the Army’s requirements. We have done quite a bit to the design and made enhancements to reduce the thermal signature and make changes to the exhaust system,” Jay Macklin, Sikorsky business development director, Future Vertical Lift, told The National Interest in an interview.

Certainly, a cursory look at the airframe of a DEFIANT X appears to reveal a smooth and gradually curved or rounded radar evading external configuration.

The absence of hard edges, protruding structures or sharply angular structures minimize the fidelity of any kind of radar return signal. This is because electromagnetic “pings” need to generate return signals from such hard, angular surfaces to offer renderings of an aircraft’s size, shape, speed and angle of approach.

Multiple pings from different sharp or detectable shapes give radar commanders a much clearer picture of the “dimensions” to a given aircraft. The DEFIANT X also has very thin wing-like structures and, interestingly, central rotor blade structures melded directly into the aircraft.

Essentially, there is no easily detectable “pole” or protruding vertical structure leading from the body up to the rotor blades, something which could generate a more specific or recognizable radar return “shape” rendering.

Thermal management is also of great value, as the more the temperature of an aircraft and the surrounding air blend in with or align with that of the surrounding atmosphere, the more difficult it will be for thermal imaging, heat-seeking sensors to locate it. This means the lower and less detectable the heat emissions or exhaust coming from the helicopter are, the stealthier it can be.

Low radar observability can also be thought of in terms of tactical maneuver as well, given that utility helicopters such as a Black Hawk often fly lower to the ground along a specific, less detectable trajectory. The higher a helicopter is above the ground, the more exposed it might be to longer-range radar “pings” traveling through the air as being at greater altitude increases the aperture or field of view available to radar systems.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article first appeared in March 2021.

Image: Lockheed Martin

Peter Suciu

Aircraft Carriers, World

The entire concept isn't flawed though.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Aircraft carriers on the water are protected by destroyers and submarines, and unless similar craft could be built to fly alongside this "mother ship" it couldn't be properly protected. Even with such screening aircraft, it isn't too hard to see how a missile or just a "kamikaze" could all too easily take out such a craft.

In theory, it probably seems like a perfect solution, a carrier that can fly over land and water and become a floating base in the sky. It is unlikely however that such a weapon platform would, or even could be constructed. Forgetting the fact that the scale of such a craft would likely bankrupt a small nation, it would require a construction facility to be purpose-built just to handle the project, and much of the technology to keep it afloat remains well beyond reality.

However, the concept of an aircraft carrier in the sky has been something military thinkers have considered but in far less high-tech ways than movie magic allows.

The U.S. Navy was actually the first to pioneer the concept of a flying carrier, and it began construction of two rigid airships, the USS Macon and the USS Akron, in the late 1920s. Neither of these airships had a runway, but instead, each carried five lightweight Curtiss F9C Sparrowhawk biplane fighters that could be launched and recovered through a hook system that lowered them into the airstream.

The airships had some advantages. They were twice as fast as surface ships of the era, could fly over land and could see much further over the horizon than any surface ship. But each also had some serious disadvantages, the biggest being that bad weather made the airships difficult to control and essentially grounded them. Tragically both airships suffered notable accidents—in April 1933, USS Akron crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New Jersey killing seventy-three out of seventy-six personnel on board; while two years later USS Macon suffered a less serious crash, which killed two of its eighty-three crew and passengers.

The United States Air Force considered a flying carrier concept during the Cold War, but it was far less ambitious and involved a Republic F-84 "parasite" fighter that could be launched from the belly of a B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bomber for reconnaissance operations. This was followed by a slightly more ambitious plan that would transform the interior of a Boeing 747-200 into a hanger in the sky for a dozen or so small jet fighters that could be launched and recovered. This one never went further than the planning stage. While the Flight Dynamics Laboratory claimed it was possible –how possible or practical remains the issue.

All of these concepts were seriously flawed and were really attempts to find a solution for a problem that didn't exist. To put it bluntly, there is no reason to develop a flying aircraft carrier because there simply is no need for a flying aircraft carrier. Long-range bombers can reach any point on the globe already, and a flying aircraft carrier would be a flying target.

Aircraft carriers on the water are protected by destroyers and submarines, and unless similar craft could be built to fly alongside this "mother ship" it couldn't be properly protected. Even with such screening aircraft, it isn't too hard to see how a missile or just a "kamikaze" could all too easily take out such a craft.

This doesn't mean the entire concept is flawed though.

A more realistic solution might be one conceived by defense contractor Dynetics, with support from DARPA. It involved launching an X-61A Gremlin Air Vehicle—an unmanned drone—from a C-130 Hercules that could be used in a variety of missions including reconnaissance but it isn't too hard to see how it could be utilized in a combat role as well.

The ability to launch and recover a drone at least offers the very practical ability to send a drone to regions not otherwise readily accessible. But for now, the flying aircraft carrier is best left in comic books and the movies.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article first appeared in 2020 and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Flickr

Charlie Gao

T-80,

But how do Korean tankers think the T-80U stacks up against the Korean tanks, which were designed with a more Western philosophy?

Here's What You Need to Remember: The lack of modernization due to the foreign nature of the parts for the tank and lack of will to “domesticize” a foreign design impeded the T-80U from being fully embraced by the South Korean military. As a result, nowadays Korean tankers don’t find the T-80U to be favorable, as it’s still a relic. But it is one that served admirably, and even contributed to the K2 Black Panther project when it was in its infancy.

One of the great ironies of the military balance in the Koreas is the fact that South Korea operates more advanced Russian tanks than North Korea. This situation came about in the 1990s after Russia inherited a $1.5 billion debt to South Korea. A deal was made: Russia would give many items of then top-of-the-line military equipment, in exchange for South Korea canceling 50 percent of Russia’s debt. Interestingly, this included the T-80U Main Battle Tank. Nowadays, South Korea fields three “modern” main battle tanks, the T-80U and the indigenous K1 and K2. But how do Korean tankers think the T-80U stacks up against the Korean tanks, which were designed with a more Western philosophy?

In a pure technical comparison, the T-80U lags behind the K1A1 and K1A2. The T-80U has been kept in a relatively stock configuration, while the K1A1 and K2 have been receiving upgrades from the Korean defense industry. While the T-80U has a Day/Night panoramic commander’s sight in the PNK-4S, the K1A1 and K2 both have thermal commander sights. The Korean defense industry puts out the modern M279 APFSDS round for the 120-millimeter cannons of the K1A1 and the K2, but the T-80U is still using imported Russian ammunition. The K2 also has many features that the T-80U doesn’t have, being one of the newest MBTs in the world.

The reliability of the T-80U also doesn’t gain it favors in South Korean service. Reports state that the T-80U’s reliability isn’t the best, although it is better than the BMP-3. Although some T-80U parts, such as the tracks, are produced in South Korea, the majority of parts must be ordered from abroad. The cost of ordering replacement parts from Russia has been steadily increasing over the years (with the cost of some parts doubling or tripling from 1996 to 2006), so many in the South Korean government are considering getting rid of the T-80U to cut maintenance costs.

Not all is bad, though. Koreans do report some advantages over the K1A1 and K2 domestic tanks. The T-80U’s engine has better acceleration performance and is lighter than the domestic tanks due to its turbine nature. Unfortunately, this also makes it consume more fuel. The reduced weight compared to domestic also allows it to be more nimble in the mountains of Korea.

Soldiers who crewed the T-80U generally didn’t have nice things to say about it. The more cramped internal design compared to the K1A1 and K2 could seem claustrophobic, and in gunnery, the T-80U was found to underperform the domestic tanks, both in accuracy and in reload speed.

However, one must take into account the time period in which these criticisms were made. Most soldiers who made these comments compared the T-80U to the K1A1, which only started seeing service in 2001. Compared to the original K1 tank which was Korea’s most advanced tank at the time, the T-80U possessed far more advantages, packing a 125-millimeter gun to the K1’s 105-millimeter, as well as better advanced armor technology. The T-80U was the most advanced tank on the Korean Peninsula when they first arrived. The lack of modernization due to the foreign nature of the parts for the tank and lack of will to “domesticize” a foreign design impeded the T-80U from being fully embraced by the South Korean military. As a result, nowadays Korean tankers don’t find the T-80U to be favorable, as it’s still a relic. But it is one that served admirably, and even contributed to the K2 Black Panther project when it was in its infancy.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in 2019 and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Great Power Competition, Asia

It would be funny if it wasn't such a dangerous idea.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Cancian ignores the possibility that China might retaliate against American privateering by issuing letters of marque to its own seafarers. 

China has a 9,000-mile coastline and, by one recent count, the world’s second-largest merchant fleet after Greece’s. Thousands of ships in all.

So how could the United States even hope to blockade China and starve its economy during a major war?

One retired U.S. Marine has an idea, and it’s not a good one. Privateers.

“Privateering, authorized by letters of marque, could offer a low-cost tool to enhance deterrence in peacetime and gain an advantage in wartime,” Mark Cancian proposed in an article in Proceedings, the professional journal of the U.S. Naval Institute.

“In wartime, privateers could swarm the oceans and destroy the maritime industry on which China’s economy—and the stability of its regime—depend. The mere threat of such a campaign might strengthen deterrence and thereby prevent a war from happening at all.”

Never mind that, in deploying privateers, the United States might invite privateering along its own shores.

Privateers, in essence, are pirates, albeit pirates with official state sponsorship. In past centuries, governments often authorized, via “letters of marque,” private seafarers to arm themselves and attack rivals’ merchant ships.

The privateers kept the spoils. The sponsoring government benefited from the economic hit its enemy took from each seizure.

Modern privateering “would attack an asymmetric vulnerability of China, which has a much larger merchant fleet than the United States,” Cancian wrote. “Indeed, an attack on Chinese global trade would undermine China’s entire economy and threaten the regime’s stability. Finally, despite pervasive myths to the contrary, U.S. privateering is not prohibited by U.S. or international law.”

Hiring private raiders would be faster than expanding the Navy, Cancian argued. “Letters of marque could be issued quickly, with privateers on the hunt within weeks of the start of a conflict. By contrast, it would take four years to build a single new combatant for the Navy.”

Cancian in his article acknowledged one of the greatest risks privateering could pose to law and order and American credibility in the world. As the Pentagon learned the hard way during the Iraq war, mercenaries can be difficult to regulate and control. And they can be unpredictable.

In 2007, gunmen working for private military company Blackwater murdered 17 civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square. The incident soured U.S.-Iraqi relations and alienated American troops from the very people they were trying to protect.

But Cancian stressed the benefits of recruiting for-profit maritime forces. “The existing private military industry would doubtless jump at the chance to privateer,” he wrote.

“Dozens of companies currently provide security services, from the equivalent of mall guards to armed antipiracy contingents on ships. A large pool of potential recruits has shown willingness to work for private contractors. At the height of the Iraq war, for example, the United States employed 20,000 armed contractors in security jobs.”

Cancian ignores the possibility that China might retaliate against American privateering by issuing letters of marque to its own seafarers. The former Marine seems to think that the United States’s relatively small merchant marine, numbering just 250 U.S.-flagged ships, makes it all but impervious to privateering. “Even if China threatens to dispatch its own privateers, U.S. vulnerability is comparatively small.”

But those 250 U.S.-flagged ships aren’t the only merchant vessels that the United States relies on for trade. Indeed, the U.S. merchant marine is deceptively small because the U.S. tax code and regulations incentivize shippers to flag their vessels under foreign flags.

If China authorized privateering, the raiders could target all shippers serving U.S. ports, not just shippers with U.S.-flagged vessels. The simple truth is that the United States depends on foreign trade nearly as much as China does, and that trade mostly travels in ships.

Privateering would release for-profit killers on the world’s oceans in the same way the so-called “war on terror” released for-profit killers on America’s foreign battlefields. The consequences likely would be ugly.

David Axe served as defense editor of The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters. 

Kris Osborn

Chinese Army, Asia

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is now deploying a new kind of weapon.

Here's What You Need to Know: Beijing may be building new weapons, but America has recently improved its well-known and lethal javelin anti-tank missile.

New Chinese-built, vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles are being engineered to attack U.S. tanks “from above,” meaning at higher altitudes that cause more destruction with a top-down attack.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is now deploying this new kind of weapon reported to be more powerful and more mobile than existing weapons for mounted off-road attack missions against armored vehicles.

Quoting an unnamed “military expert,” the Chinese government-backed Global Times newspaper says the top-down attack is in part intended to exploit the top of a tank where soldiers might be exposed. The new missile can be mounted on China’s Mengshi series off-road assault vehicle or infantry fighting vehicles. The concept of a higher-altitude top-down attack is interesting in that it could be of particular relevance in the mountainous plateau regions of Western China and places where air support is not available.

“China operates a wide selection of anti-tank missiles, including portable ones and those launched by attack helicopters, drones, armored vehicles and assault vehicles, military observers said, noting that the new missile could be mass produced and be widely used by the PLA in the near future,” the Global Times writes.

There are not a lot of details available regarding the weapon available in the report, however its existence brings some interesting parallels to mind, such as the U.S. Army’s TOW missile, Javelin anti-tank weapon or even ground-launched Hellfire missile. But there are several key respects in which the Chinese weapon may not parallel a number of more recent U.S. anti-tank weapons innovations.

The Army’s ongoing upgrades to the Javelin anti-tank missile offer an interesting point of reference, as a new Raytheon-built Lightweight Command Launch Unit for the weapon actually doubles the attack range from 2.5km to 4.5km. The more recent innovations, slated to enter production in 2022, also incorporate improved sensor fidelity and a “fast lock” for improving attacks on the move. Army officials told The National Interest last year that the service is also engineering a new warhead for the Javelin as well.

The Javelin’s on-the-move targeting ability is also of great relevance as it seems to rival, if not outmatch the Chinese claim that its new vehicle-mounted weapon can attack while off-road. The Javelin can dismount and operate as a shoulder-fired weapon used by small groups of soldiers on the move or also mount and fire from tactical vehicles as well, such as those that go off road. The concept of a top-down attack certainly makes sense as something of tactical relevance, but apart from being deployable on mobile, off-road vehicles, there is nothing mentioned about what might better enable that kind of attack? Any weapon, if fired from an advantaged point at higher altitudes, should it be able to go off road, can exploit a tactical advantage and strike from the top down.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article first appeared in March 2021.

Image: REUTERS/David Gray

Dan Goure

Air Defense, Asia

The Japanese government needs to rethink its decision to halt work on the Aegis Ashore program.

Here's what you need to know: In light of the growing missile threats posed by China and North Korea, Japan needs to field a multi-layer missile defense.

This week, Japan’s Defense Minister, Taro Kono, surprised the world by announcing the decision to suspend construction in his country of two missile defense sites. This decision could not have come at a worse time for both the security of Japan and its strategic relationship with the United States. Both China and North Korea continue to build up their inventories of theater ballistic missiles. The suspension decision came right on the heels of Pyongyang, ramping up its bellicose rhetoric and even blowing up a building that housed a liaison office for North-South talks. Japan needs to reconsider its decision to suspend the Aegis Ashore program. Instead, in consultation with the United States, the Japanese government should devise a new plan that will address any concerns while ensuring that its people are protected by the best missile defense capability currently available.

Today, U.S. allies, facilities, and forces in the Western Pacific face a missile threat that is expanding quantitatively and becoming ever-more sophisticated and capable. In the event of a conflict with China, Japan can expect to face an intensive barrage of Chinese theater-range ballistic and cruise missiles intended to devastate military facilities, mobile forces, critical infrastructure, and command and control nodes both along the so-called First Island Chain and in the Home Islands.

Although the Japanese government now rates China as its number one security challenge, it cannot dismiss the North Korean ballistic missile threat. According to Japan’s 2019 annual Defense White Paper, North Korea has achieved the ability to put a nuclear warhead atop a ballistic missile. In addition, its ballistic missiles are becoming more sophisticated with improved guidance systems and greater reliability.

To counter the growing worldwide threat from ballistic missiles, the United States and its allies are deploying ballistic missile defenses. The U.S. is building a layered missile defense system to protect the homeland as well as forward-deployed forces and allies. A key pillar of U.S. and allied missile defenses is the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. The Aegis BMD currently consists of the AN/SPY radar, the Standard Missile (SM), and the Aegis Combat System. Both the U.S. Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) operate Aegis-equipped ships.

The Aegis Ashore system is a land-based variant of the extremely mature and proven sea-based Aegis BMD system. In essence, the Aegis Ashore is the three elements of the Aegis BMD system placed on land. The AN/SPY radar is located in a deckhouse that also supports the system’s command and control capabilities. Co-located with the deckhouse are fixed launchers for the current version of the SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor, the Block IB, as well as SM-6 air defense missiles. Aegis Ashore was initially conceived as the central part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach designed to protect Europe from missiles launched from the Middle East. The first Aegis Ashore site in Romania was declared operational in 2016. A second site, being constructed in Poland, is expected to become operational in 2022.

The Japanese government decided in December 2017 to purchase two Aegis Ashore systems. In addition, the U.S. and Japan are partnered in the SM-3 Cooperative Development Program to build a larger, 21-inch diameter variant of the SM-3 missile, the SM-3 Block IIA. This variant will be able to reach out farther, providing a defense against longer-range ballistic missiles. The new missile is expected to be deployed with the U.S. Navy and Japanese MSDF, as well as all Aegis Ashore sites.

One reason Japan decided to acquire the Aegis Ashore was to reduce the burden on its destroyer fleet associated with serving as that country’s primary missile defense capability. A missile defense based entirely on sea-based capabilities is not always optimally located to protect land areas. In addition, destroyers assigned the missile defense mission for the Japanese homeland are generally restricted to a small ocean area, close to land. As a result, ships on missile defense patrols are unavailable for other critical missions.

Given the growing ballistic missile threat to Japan, the decision to suspend its Aegis Ashore program came as something of a surprise. According to Minister Kono, the suspension decision was based on both technical and cost issues with the program. The principal technical concern is the danger that from the currently planned sites, the SM-3 Block IIA booster might fall into populated areas. Modifications will be required to the missile’s software and, possibly, hardware to solve this problem. There was also local opposition to the placement of the AN/SPY radar near populated areas. There are reports that the Japanese Government had decided to halt the planned deployment at the Akita Prefecture site in the northwest of Honshu, Japan's main island, and to explore alternative locations.

With respect to cost, it is true that the price for completing each of the two sites had increased by some 25 percent to around $900 million. However, it should be pointed out that the cost of a single Japanese missile defense-capable destroyer is now approximately $1.5 billion, exclusive of expendables such as the SM-3 Block II missiles. For defense of the Japanese homeland, Aegis Ashore is the cost-effective solution.

To be clear, the suspension does not suggest that Japan has lost confidence in the effectiveness of missile defenses, in general, or the Aegis system and the Standard Missile, in particular. Today, the Japanese MSDF operates seven Aegis destroyers with another one under construction. These ships, as well as U.S. Aegis-capable cruisers and destroyers, will eventually carry the SM-3 Block IIA. In addition, Japan has deployed four batteries of the advanced version Patriot missile defense system to provide a terminal layer.

The Japanese government needs to rethink its decision to halt work on the Aegis Ashore program. In light of the growing missile threats posed by China and North Korea, Japan needs to field a multi-layer missile defense. Such a defense is essential to maintaining a credible deterrent. In addition, in the case of North Korea, it is a hedge against a potential accidental or unauthorized launch. Seven or eight Aegis-capable destroyers are not sufficient to manage the threat. The most sensible and cost-effective solution is to move forward with Aegis Ashore deployments, modified as necessary to meet credible concerns.

Dan Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Reuters

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