Diplomacy & Crisis News

A desperate regime might go after soft targets.

Can state-based administrations forge a federalism that will keep the country together?

The agreement was one of several energy-related deals that were signed on the first day of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh's official visit to Moscow.

Les autorités chypriotes devraient intensifier leurs campagnes de promotion au cours des prochains mois afin de limiter les pertes financières

The post « Pas une zone de guerre » : le tourisme chypriote passe à l’offensive appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine, la Russie n'est plus largement considérée comme un « Eldorado » économique

The post Migrants d’Asie centrale : l’Europe séduit alors que la Russie perd de son attrait appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

La Terre absorbe la chaleur à un rythme jamais atteint depuis le début des relevés

The post La Terre en surchauffe : jamais autant de chaleur absorbée, alerte l’OMM appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le Premier ministre polonais a affirmé que les soupçons l'avaient depuis longtemps poussé à garder le silence lors des discussions au Conseil européen

The post Tusk n’est pas surpris par les fuites hongroises présumées vers Moscou appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La course pour intégrer l'un des programmes européens visant à développer un avion de combat de sixième génération bat son plein

The post L’Inde pourrait rejoindre le FCAS en difficulté ou un projet rival pour le futur avion de chasse européen appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La Commission a insisté sur la mise en place de conditions et de garanties afin d'éviter un scénario similaire à celui du Mercosur

The post Bruxelles marche sur des œufs avec les agriculteurs alors que von der Leyen se rend en Australie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Face à la baisse des approvisionnements mondiaux liée à la guerre au Moyen-Orient, le commissaire à l’énergie met en garde contre un risque de « ruée de fin d’été »

The post Lentement mais sûrement : Jørgensen invite l’UE à commencer à constituer des stocks de gaz appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La polémique autour des images générées par l’IA à caractère sexuellement explicite pourrait avoir été un stratagème visant à « gonfler artificiellement la valeur des entreprises » en vue d’une fusion

The post Musk soupçonné par les procureurs français d’avoir encouragé la diffusion de deepfakes pour gonfler la valeur de X appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Ces mesures permettront de « mobiliser » 5 milliards d'euros grâce à des allègements fiscaux et des subventions, a déclaré le Premier ministre espagnol Pedro Sánchez

The post L’Espagne annonce des baisses d’impôts sur les carburants et l’électricité en réponse à la crise énergétique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Des tensions sont apparues après la gestion par Londres d’une attaque au drone du Hezbollah sur la base d’Akrotiri

The post Chypre veut renforcer la coordination avec les bases militaires britanniques « coloniales » appeared first on Euractiv FR.

/ France, Transports, Région, Ville, Urbanisme - Espace et territoire / France, Transports, Région, Ville, Urbanisme

The new American National Defense Strategy speaks the language of sovereignty with unusual clarity. It invokes “key terrain” in the Western Hemisphere, reframes hemispheric doctrine, reduces security guarantees to Europe, and signals a shift toward selective engagement. It is a strategy centered not on universal liberal order, but on national autonomy, strategic control, and power projection. Yet beneath this rhetorical clarity lies a structural weakness: Washington still lacks a coherent system for measuring sovereignty itself.

Traditional metrics—GDP, defense budgets, force size—capture scale, but not autonomy. A state may command the world’s largest military yet remain dependent on foreign supply chains. It may dominate technology markets yet suffer educational decline that undermines long-term innovation. It may enjoy global cultural influence while experiencing domestic fragmentation that weakens political decision-making capacity. Sovereignty in 2026 is multidimensional. Without measuring those dimensions simultaneously, strategy becomes aspirational rather than operational.

The Burke Sovereignty Index, developed by the International Burke Institute, addresses precisely this measurement gap. It evaluates national autonomy across seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military sovereignty. Each dimension is scored from 0 to 100 using official international data (UN, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, SIPRI, PISA and others) combined with calibrated expert assessments from more than 100 specialists across 50+ countries per component. The final score—maximum 700—represents the arithmetic mean of statistical indicators and expert evaluation.

The 2024–2025 results are strategically sobering. The United States scores 650.9 out of 700. China scores 649.1. The gap: 1.8 points — less than 0.3% variance within the total scoring framework. For two states widely assumed to operate in different strategic leagues, this statistical proximity should fundamentally reshape the debate in Washington.

America retains clear advantages. Military sovereignty stands at 96.0, reflecting a $962 billion defense budget, approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads, and unmatched global deployment capacity. Technological sovereignty scores 95.4, supported by 3.4–3.6% of GDP in R&D spending and leadership in AI, biotech, and microelectronics. Yet structural vulnerabilities appear in other dimensions.

Political sovereignty registers 87.8, reflecting polarization, recurring government shutdowns, and declining public trust. Cognitive sovereignty—despite a strong overall score of 95.4—contains warning signals: adult functional literacy fluctuates between 79–81%, and U.S. PISA mathematics performance sits at 469, below the OECD average. Industrial autonomy remains partially exposed: approximately 30% of advanced microelectronics components are imported.

China’s profile differs structurally. Military sovereignty scores 94.5, technological sovereignty 91.6—slightly below the U.S. But political sovereignty stands at 90.8, reflecting centralized decision-making and high institutional cohesion. Informational sovereignty scores 93.2, sustained by a closed national digital ecosystem serving 1.1 billion users without Western platform penetration. Cultural sovereignty reaches 95.1, supported by 60 UNESCO heritage sites and over 6,800 museums.

Most significant is economic efficiency. China approaches near parity while operating at roughly one-third to one-half of U.S. per-capita wealth. Chinese GDP per capita (PPP) stands between $25,000–30,500, compared to the American $76,800–89,100 range. The convergence reflects coordinated cross-dimensional investment: education expansion to 60.8% higher education enrollment, R&D spending at 2.68% of GDP (approximately $506 billion in absolute terms), and long-term industrial strategy under “Made in China 2025.” Sovereignty parity was not achieved through dominance in a single field, but through synchronized development across all seven.

This multidimensional perspective reframes several assumptions embedded in the new Defense Strategy. First, rebuilding the American defense industrial base cannot succeed through military appropriations alone. Industrial sovereignty requires alignment of economic capital, educational capacity, technological independence, and political stability. The United States currently operates with public debt between 119–124% of GDP, national debt exceeding $36–41 trillion, widening educational inequality, and deep partisan fragmentation. Factories can be funded; comprehensive national mobilization demands social coherence.

Second, allied burden-sharing produces strategic paradoxes. European NATO states collectively possess GDP thirteen times larger than Russia’s, yet equipment localization remains limited. Lithuania spends 4–6% of GDP on defense, but approximately 85% of its equipment is imported. By contrast, Turkey—despite lower spending ratios—achieves roughly 70% localization in defense production, including indigenous UAV systems. Genuine sovereignty increases strategic autonomy. Autonomy reduces predictability.

Third, Middle Eastern partners are quietly shifting from dependency toward capability. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 includes domestic industrialization, cybersecurity infrastructure, and technology transfer. Sovereignty once built tends to alter alignment behavior. Allies with capability act independently by definition.

The uncomfortable implication is clear: Washington’s strategy demands sovereignty—at home and among allies—without possessing a comprehensive dashboard to measure whether sovereignty is actually being built or eroded.

The Burke framework does not predict conflict or collapse. It measures capability, not intention. But it reveals structural dynamics invisible to traditional power metrics. It forces strategic evaluation across education, technology, cohesion, information control, industrial resilience, and governance simultaneously.

The United States remains marginally ahead. But a 1.8-point lead in a 700-point system is not structural dominance. It is competitive equilibrium. Sovereignty in 2026 is not defined by possessing the largest military or the most alliances. It is defined by the ability to sustain independent action across multiple domains under stress. That requires educational renewal, industrial autonomy, political stabilization, and technological independence operating in coordination—not isolation.

The new Defense Strategy identifies the correct priority: sovereignty. What it lacks is a systematic mechanism to measure progress toward that goal. Without measurement, sovereignty becomes rhetoric. With measurement, it becomes strategy.

 

In the 21st century, sovereignty is no longer an absolute condition but a measurable configuration of strengths and vulnerabilities. According to the methodology developed by the International Burke Institute and operationalized through the Burke Sovereignty Index, sovereignty must be assessed across seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military. When examined through the Burke framework, Greece and the United Kingdom illustrate a central paradox of modern statehood: neither deep integration nor dramatic withdrawal guarantees genuine independence.   Greece represents the first model of the Burke paradox — sovereignty constrained within integration. By adopting the euro, Athens transferred control over monetary policy to the European Central Bank. It relinquished the ability to devalue its currency, independently set interest rates, or issue money to stabilize its economy. The Maastricht criteria — limiting deficits to 3% of GDP and public debt to 60% — institutionalized fiscal discipline. Structurally, the eurozone is a monetary union without a fiscal union: a shared currency but no unified taxation or pension system. In Burke terms, this creates asymmetry within economic sovereignty.   The 2009–2015 debt crisis exposed that asymmetry. Greece’s reported deficit of 3% was revised to 15.6% of GDP, and public debt reached 129.7%. Between 2008 and 2014, GDP contracted from €242 billion to €179 billion — a 26% decline, the longest recession in the developed world. In April 2010, Greece requested international assistance. Three bailout programs in 2010, 2012, and 2015 totaled roughly €290 billion from the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF. By 2015, public debt had climbed to approximately 180% of GDP.   Within the Burke framework, Greece entered a zone of critical economic leverage. Sovereignty remained formally intact, but fiscal decisions became conditional. Between 2010 and 2016, twelve rounds of austerity — salary cuts, pension reductions, privatizations, and tax increases — were implemented under creditor supervision. Political sovereignty existed in constitutional terms, yet economic sovereignty was structurally constrained.   The 2015 referendum highlighted this contradiction. On July 5, 61.31% of Greek voters rejected the creditors’ proposed conditions. Days later, the government accepted an even stricter agreement to avoid financial collapse and eurozone exit. In Burke analytical terms, democratic will could not override economic dependence. Sovereignty as authority collided with sovereignty as capacity.   The United Kingdom followed the opposite path. The 2016 Brexit referendum promised to “Take Back Control” over laws, borders, and trade. Parliamentary supremacy — a core element of British political identity — framed the campaign. The UK formally left the European Union on January 31, 2020, restoring legislative autonomy.   According to the Burke Sovereignty Index, Britain’s political sovereignty stands at approximately 77/100 — a strong indicator of constitutional independence. However, the Burke methodology stresses that sovereignty is multidimensional. Gains in political autonomy can be offset by vulnerabilities elsewhere.   Economically, Brexit imposed measurable costs. Estimates suggest that by 2025 the UK economy was 6–8% smaller than it would have been without Brexit. The EU remains Britain’s largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 47% of goods exports. Post-Brexit trade adjustments contributed to a 23.7% reduction in imports from the EU and an 18.6% decline in exports during the early implementation period. The Office for Budget Responsibility projects a long-term trade reduction of around 15%, translating into a 4% decrease in national income.   In Burke terms, Britain strengthened political sovereignty but absorbed economic vulnerability. The 2025 revisions to the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement — including compromises on fisheries and regulatory alignment — demonstrate that exit did not eliminate obligations. Instead, it transformed integration into negotiated interdependence.   Greece and England therefore embody two faces of partial sovereignty. Greece maintained integration and sacrificed crisis autonomy. Britain rejected integration and encountered the structural limits of economic decoupling. The Burke model clarifies that sovereignty cannot be understood as indivisible. High performance in one dimension does not neutralize weakness in another.   Modern states operate within dense networks of financial markets, supply chains, security alliances, and regulatory regimes. Monetary unions limit currency flexibility. Trade exits reduce market access. Strategic alliances shape military capability. Technological dependence constrains industrial autonomy. The Burke framework treats these constraints not as failures but as structural realities.   The Greek case demonstrates how integration can convert economic vulnerability into external policy influence during crisis. The British case shows how formal independence can generate new economic trade-offs. Both confirm that absolute sovereignty is unattainable in an interdependent system.   Ultimately, the Burke analysis leads to a balanced conclusion. Sovereignty today is not a binary status but a strategic equilibrium across dimensions. Greece and the United Kingdom chose different paths, yet both remain partially dependent. Integration creates conditional governance; exit creates negotiated constraints. The difference lies not in the presence of limits but in their distribution and cost. In the contemporary world, sovereignty is less about isolation or control and more about managing asymmetry within unavoidable interdependence.

Crimes et châtiments Contravention La contravention est la moins grave des infractions. Elle comprend cinq catégories, allant de la contravention de première classe (par exemple le fait de refuser de présenter son permis lors d'un contrôle routier) à la contravention de cinquième classe (par (…) / Justice pénale, Justice, France, Droit

/ Justice pénale, Justice, Droit, France - Droits humains / Justice pénale, Justice, Droit, France

Written by Sasa Butorac and Agnieszka Widuto.

Europe’s key instrument to achieving energy independence and increasing competitiveness lies in the energy transition and, specifically, in boosting the generation capacity of renewable sources of energy. Following the European Green Deal and ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the EU legislative framework for achieving this is largely in place. Significant progress has been made, in particular since the launch of the REPowerEU initiative in May 2022 in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Member States have increased the share of renewables in their energy mix, and the EU is consistently progressing towards its target of a 42.5 % share of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030. The share of renewables in sectors such as electricity (47.5 % of final energy consumption in this sector), heating and cooling (26.7 %) and transport (11.2 %) is also increasing, although progress has been fastest in terms of electricity. The main challenges to an accelerated deployment of renewables can be identified as the cost of capital, timely development of the grids, and the complex and lengthy permitting procedures both at European and national level.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.