Diplomacy & Crisis News

Russia’s threat on the Ukrainian border is not a bluff, but forceful U.S. financial sanctions could stop Putin from another land grab.

Biden wants the summit to push back against authoritarianism. It could also backfire.

Robert Farley

Sino-American War, Asia

Chinese and American leaders should remember the costs of the first Sino-American conflict. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The most important legacy of the first Sino-American War is the enduring division of the Korean Peninsula.

In November 1950, China and the United States went to war. Thirty-six thousand Americans died, along with upwards of a quarter million Chinese, and half a million or more Koreans. If the United States was deeply surprised to find itself at war with the People’s Republic of China, a country that hadn’t even existed the year before, it was even more surprised to find itself losing that war. The opening Chinese offensive, launched from deep within North Korea, took U.S. forces by complete operational surprise. The U.S.-led United Nations offensive into North Korea was thrown back, with the U.S. Army handed its worst defeat since the American Civil War.

The legacies of this war remain deep, complex and underexamined. Memory of the Korean War in the United States is obscured by the looming shadows of World War II and Vietnam. China remembers the conflict differently, but China’s position in the world has changed in deep and fundamental ways since the 1950s. Still, as we consider the potential for future conflict between China and the United States, we should try to wring what lessons we can from the first Sino-American war.

Initiation

In early 1950, the politics of the Cold War had not yet solidified around a pair of mutually hostile blocks. Nevertheless, the contours were visible; the Soviets had spent several years consolidating control of Eastern Europe, and the Chinese Communist Party had ridden the victories of the People’s Liberation Army to power in Beijing. The stage was set for a zero-sum interpretation of the global struggle between Communist and non-Communist powers. It was just such an interpretation that dominated Washington’s thinking as North Korean forces escalated the Korean civil war with a massive invasion across the 38th parallel.

Inside the United States, tension over the collapse of Nationalist China remained high. The Nationalist government possessed an extremely effective public-relations machine in the United States, built around the Soong family’s relationship with Henry Luce. This influential domestic lobby helped push the United States towards both intervention and escalation, while at the same time undercutting the advice of experts who offered words of caution about Beijing’s capabilities and interests.

The initial Chinese victories in late fall of 1950 resulted from a colossal intelligence failure on the part of the United States. These failures ran the gamut from political, to strategic, to operational, to tactical. The politicization of American expertise on China following the establishment of the PRC meant that U.S. policy makers struggled to understand Chinese messages. The United States also misunderstood the complex relationship between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang, treating the group as unitary actor without appreciating the serious political differences between the countries.

On an operational level, advancing U.S. forces paid little heed to warnings of Chinese intervention. The United States failed to understand the importance of the North Korean buffer to Beijing, failed to detect Chinese preparations for intervention, failed to detect Chinese soldiers operating in North Korea and failed to understand the overall strength of the Chinese forces. This lack of caution stemmed from several sources. The U.S. military, having had experience with Chinese Nationalist forces during World War II, had little respect for the capabilities of the PLA, especially outside of Chinese borders. Americans overrated the importance of air superiority at the tactical and operational level, not to mention the relevance of nuclear weapons at the strategic level.

Conduct

The People’s Liberation Army appreciated the significance of U.S. air superiority over the battlefield, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. armor and artillery. The PLA (or PVA, as the expeditionary force in North Korea was dubbed) attempted to fight with the hybrid insurgent tactics that it had used to prevail in the Chinese Civil War. This involved using light infantry formations, designed to move and attack at night, in order to avoid U.S. airpower and concentrated American firepower. These tactics allowed the PLA to surprise U.S. forces, which were uncertain of the magnitude of Chinese intervention until it was too late to do anything but retreat.

Similarly, the United States fought with the tactics (and often the weapons) that it had used in World War II. Although North Korean armor and artillery had outmatched unprepared U.S. ground forces in the opening weeks of the war, by the time of the Chinese counteroffensive, the United States was fielding mobile, armored forces and employing combined arms tactics. These weapons and tactics allowed the United States to inflict severe losses on Chinese forces, even as it gave up wide swaths of territory.

The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy expected to conduct sea and air operations in what we now refer to as a permissive environment, without significant interference from Communist forces. The Navy was right; the Air Force was wrong. Expecting overwhelming advantages in training and material, the U.S. air forces found cagey Communist forces equipped with the MiG-15 interceptors, which could outfight American piston-engined aircraft and most early jets. Formations of B-29s attempted to conduct daylight precision bombing raids of North Korea, finding that MiG-15s could cut them to pieces. U.S. forces, fresh from the bloody organizational fights that had birthed the U.S. Air Force, also struggled to develop a compatible, cooperative ground-air doctrine. Still, despite the problems, the United States managed to establish and hold air superiority for most of the war, using that freedom to inflict severe damage on Chinese and North Korean forces, infrastructure and logistics.

Lessons and Legacies

The most important legacy of the first Sino-American War is the enduring division of the Korean Peninsula. Following the exhaustion of the Chinese counteroffensive, neither side really threatened to throw the other off the peninsula. The relationships between Seoul, Washington, Beijing and Pyongyang have changed mightily over the years, but the conflict remains frozen along the geography established in 1953.

Many of the problems have stayed the same, despite the fundamental transformations that have overtaken global politics. Beijing has grown tired of the antics of its North Korean client, just as South Korea has grown significantly in wealth and power. But North Korea can still threaten the security and prosperity of the Republic of Korea, and threats to the DPRK are still felt in Beijing.

China and the United States remember this conflict much differently. For the United States, the Korean War represents an odd aberration; a war fought for justice, but without satisfactory resolution. Americans’ most enduring memory of the conflict came through the television show M.A.S.H., which used the war as a proxy for talking about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Even this memory has begun to fade, however.

For China, the war represents a remarkable victory over imperialism in the face of overwhelming odds. It introduced the People’s Republic of China to the international system with a (literal) bang. At the same time, the legacy of the war complicated China’s international situation. In part because of the memory of Chinese intervention, but also in combination with China’s domestic politics, the United States managed to keep the PRC isolated from the international system into the 1970s. Today, the PRC poses a quasi-imperial threat to neighbors all along its vast periphery, while at the same time representing one of the three major tent-poles of the growing global economy.

Militarily, the political, social and technological conditions that produced mass infantry warfare in Korea in the 1950s no longer hold. The United States has grown accustomed to fighting opponents who excel in hybrid warfare, but the People’s Liberation Army has been out of that business for decades. The ground forces of the PLA are now transitioning between mechanized and postmechanized warfare, while the air and sea forces are in the process of perfecting the world’s most extensive anti-access/area denial system. If conflict were to happen again, China would challenge U.S. control of the air and seas in a way that it never did during the Korean conflict.

The most interesting, useful lessons may involve botched war termination. The Korean War dragged on for nearly two years after the settlement of the key strategic issues became clear. Nevertheless, poor communication between Washington and Beijing, combined with reputational concerns on both sides, inflated minor issues—such as POW repatriation—and extended the war well beyond its productive limits. That the United States viewed its conflict with China as a proxy war complicated the problem, as American policy makers became obsessed with the message that every action sent to the Soviet Union. In any future conflict, even as political questions associated with escalation and reputation loom large, Beijing can likely count on having Washington’s full, focused attention.      

Conclusion

There was nothing good about the last Sino-American War, not even the “peace” that resulted from it. The experience of this war, now nearly forgotten on both sides, should serve as a grim lesson for policy makers in both Washington and Beijing. The Korean War was anything but accidental, but miscalculation and miscommunication both extended and broadened the war beyond its necessary boundaries.'

Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls.

This first appeared several years ago and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

MiG-25,

It intercepted bombers, did reconnaissance, and served as a fighter-bomber.

Here's What You Need to Remember: However, the true inheritor of the Foxbat are the MiG-31 Foxhound, which continues, in Russian service, to perform its original patrol and interception missions, and the F-15 Eagle, which has played as dominant of a role since its development as any fighter in the history of flight.

The MiG-25 (NATO reporting name: Foxbat) was one of the most awesome, yet most misunderstood, fighters of the Cold War. Envisioned as an interceptor designed to destroy U.S. supersonic bombers and high-flying spy planes, the Foxbat also put its high speed to good use as a reconnaissance aircraft and, to less good effect, as a fighter-bomber. The Foxbat also became a mainstay on the global export market, eventually serving in the air forces of over a dozen countries, and seeing combat in Lebanon, in the Syrian Civil War, over Egypt, in the Kargil War, in the Iran-Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War and the Libyan Civil War.

But what if the Foxbat had failed?

The Plane

The MiG-25 was a magnificent aircraft in many ways, capable of flying in excess of Mach 3 and at altitudes few aircraft could reach. The formidable performance parameters of the Foxbat were soon apparent, and as early as 1965 prototype models were claiming world records in speed, climb, and altitude.

But notwithstanding its extraordinary performance, the Foxbat had major problems. It lacked maneuverability, especially at low altitudes. It was exceedingly heavy, as the USSR lacked the materials technology to produce airframes with the required tolerances and therefore used nickel-steel alloy for most of the plane. Its engines could reach Mach 3.2, but flying at this speed tended to permanently damage them, resulting in a lower practical speed of Mach 2.8. The earliest models lacked a look-down/shoot-down radar, a major handicap for an interceptor designed to hunt and kill American bombers

The downsides of the Foxbat became clear when a Soviet pilot defected to Japan with one in September 1976. The Japanese turned the aircraft over to the Americans, who disassembled and inspected it at length. The investigation confirmed that the Foxbat was an interceptor and not intended as an air superiority fighter, and that its capabilities were not as impressive as many had assumed.

Had the Soviet Union enjoyed better intelligence on the development of U.S. bombing doctrine, it might have decided to eschew the expense of building large numbers of MiG-25s, instead focusing on less expensive multi-role fighters. This would have set in play a series of dominoes that could have had a major impact on the history of world combat aviation.

The Alternatives

The Soviet Union built over 1,000 Foxbats, some 80 to 90 percent of which served in the Soviet air forces in various roles. Had these planes not existed, the USSR would have had to look elsewhere for fighter, fighter-bomber, recon and interceptor roles. The first two could have been accomplished just as effectively by additional MiG-21s, MiG-23s and Su-17s. The Foxbat shared the interceptor role with the Tu-28, an enormous, long-ranged aircraft that wasn’t as fast as the MiG-25, but did the job well enough under the circumstances. The Foxbat’s main practical contribution came in its recon configuration, where high speed and high altitude performance made it virtually invulnerable to defense.

The big problem facing the Foxbat was that its mission disappeared almost as soon as it entered service. Concerned mostly about Soviet SAM systems, the United States abandoned its B-70 Valkyrie strategic bomber project, and retired its supersonic B-58 Hustler bombers at an early age. Instead of fast and high, U.S. bombers would now enter the Soviet Union low and slow, an approach that the Foxbat was almost uniquely ill-suited to counter. But as it turned out the USSR never needed to defeat a massive incursion of U.S. bombers, so the merits and demerits of the Foxbat in this mission were never tested.

The Impact

The Foxbat rarely served in a combat capacity while in Soviet service, but it did fly in several conflicts in the Cold War and post-Cold War period. MiG-25s performed relatively well in air superiority missions during the Iran-Iraq War, although they suffered at the hands of Iranian F-14s. In the Persian Gulf War a MiG-25 killed the last U.S. fighter shot down in air-to-air combat, an U.S. Navy F/A-18. Another Foxbat killed a U.S. Predator drone in 2002, on a mission that took advantage of the plane’s unique high-speed characteristics. In its recon role the Foxbat turned in excellent service for the Indian Air Force in its millennial conflicts with Pakistan. But although it made real contributions, as a tactical aircraft the MiG-25 was something less than transformational.

But the Foxbat had an impact beyond the Soviet Union, beyond its combat contributions, and even beyond its awesome capabilities. Concern about the potentially transformational nature of the Foxbat spurred fighter development in the United States. Intelligence about the Foxbat suggested that it easily outclassed existing Western fighters, but acknowledged few of its shortcomings. Consequently, the US re-evaluated its F-X program (designed to replace the F-4 and the Century Series fighters) and revised plans for what would become the F-15 Eagle. The Eagle would eventually become the world’s most formidable air superiority fighter, in large part because it was designed to fight a Soviet plane that only really existed in the minds of Western intelligence. Had the Foxbat never seen the light of day, the F-15 would likely have been built to a more modest, less effective, and probably less enduring design.

Finally, the Foxbat led to the development of the MiG-31 Foxhound, by all account a considerably more effective interceptor. With better radars and better materials, the Foxhound continues to fly in the Russian Aerospace Forces. Had the Foxbat never flown, the Foxhound likely would have been replaced by some variant of the Su-27, an extremely capable fighter but somewhat less effective interceptor.

Wrap

Today, only the Algerian Air Force operates the MiG-25 in any numbers. Foxbats have been pressed into service in Libya and Syria in the past few years, but represent more of a curiosity than a genuine capability. This stands in contrast with the MiG-21 and MiG-23, both of which remain in extensive service around the world.

However, the true inheritor of the Foxbat are the MiG-31 Foxhound, which continues, in Russian service, to perform its original patrol and interception missions, and the F-15 Eagle, which has played as dominant of a role since its development as any fighter in the history of flight. The F-15 was built around a mistake, but it turned out to be a very fortunate mistake indeed.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is the author of The Battleship Book.

The views expressed here are his personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the Army War College, or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

This first appeared in 2018 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia

Robert Farley

IDF, Middle East

Israel's arsenal could get even more impressive with these weapons. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: But in some areas the Israelis could take more advantage of U.S. technology, especially if strategic necessity and financial reality came together in more productive ways.

With only a few notable exceptions, Israel can buy whatever it wants from the United States, generally on very generous terms associated with U.S. aid packages. Notwithstanding the availability of weapons, however, Israel must still make careful decisions regarding how to spend money. Consequently, Israel can’t have quite everything that it would like, despite the continued good relationship with the United States and its arms industry. Here are a few US military systems that the Israelis could use:

Littoral Combat Ship

For a long time, the sea arm of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has examined the potential for warships somewhat larger than the corvettes that have historically dominated the force. As Israel’s maritime security interests increased (the necessity of maintaining the Gaza blockade, and of patrolling offshore energy deposits), this need has become more acute.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Over the last decade, the IDF extensively studied the possibility of acquiring heavily modified versions of the U.S. Littoral Combat Ship design. These would have had significantly different features, mainly making them less modular and more self-sufficient than their American cousins. On paper, the plan made a lot of sense; a high-speed, networked platform would fit in very well with the IDF’s operational concept. However, the necessary modifications drove up the cost of the warship, pricing it out of Israel’s range. Future changes in the market (or in Israel’s perception of need) might well shift the equation, however.

F-22 Raptor

The Obey amendment, which prohibits the export of the F-22 Raptor, was developed with Israel firmly in mind. Concerned about Israel’s transfer of high-technology equipment to Russia or China, the United States decided that domestic considerations meant it could not bar Israel from acquiring the Raptor without a blanket ban.

And so this has meant that only the USAF flies the world’s most advanced fighter aircraft. Historically, Israel has preferred fighter-bombers that can conduct both air superiority and strike missions, and the Raptor doesn’t yet have much in the way of a strike profile. However, the IDF purchased the F-15 when it was still primarily an air-superiority platform, then made the necessary modifications on its own to transform the fighter into a devastating bomber. The F-22, which otherwise serves Israel’s air superiority needs nicely, might have gone through a similar process.

Long Range Strike Bomber

Setting aside the periodic nonsense about Israel acquiring American B-52s, the long-term stand-off with Iran has demonstrated that Israel really could use a plausible long-range strike option. While Israeli F-15s and F-16s can, with refueling, reach targets in Iran, the immense distance would put them at a disadvantage as they tried to penetrate defended airspace. In this context, the Air Force’s B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber might seem attractive.

Of course, Israel hasn’t operated a strategic bomber since it retired a few B-17 Flying Fortresses in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the perceived need for an option that could penetrate Iranian air defenses and deliver heavy payloads might make the IDF reconsider its commitment to fighter-bombers. Whether the United States would ever consider exporting the bomber (which will likely fall under a variety of legal restriction associated with nuclear-delivery systems) is a different question entirely.

Massive Ordnance Penetrator

And what good are planes if they don’t have bombs to drop? Rumors of Israeli interest in the thirty-thousand-pound precision-guided bomb began to emerge at the beginning of this decade, fueling ideas in Congress about transferring the munition and an aircraft capable of delivering it. The MOP interests Israel because of its “bunker busting” capacity, which would give Israel the ability to hit deeply buried weapons facilities in Iran and elsewhere.

The United States has thus far declined to send the bomb to the Israelis, in no small part because the IDF still lacks a plausible delivery system. The Obama administration also worried about giving Israel the tools it needed to strike Iran would upset the regional balance. But geostrategic changes (or domestic political shifts in the US) might alter that calculation.

Ballistic Missile Submarine

Israel’s submarine force teeters on the very edge of presenting a plausible deterrent. The IDF submarine arm has done excellent work with its group of transferred Dolphin-class subs. However, diesel-electric submarines carrying long-range cruise missiles simply cannot match the performance, endurance, or security of nuclear boats.

This is not to say that Israel needs, or could use, something analogous to the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. However, a more modest boat with a smaller number of missiles of limited range could indeed prove very useful to Israel’s efforts to create a robust second-strike capability. A flotilla of four such boats would provide a nearly invulnerable retaliatory capacity.

Israel has most of what it needs from the United States; in several areas, the technical capabilities of the IDF exceed those of the U.S. military. But in some areas the Israelis could take more advantage of U.S. technology, especially if strategic necessity and financial reality came together in more productive ways. Given the dynamism of Israel’s economy, the IDF may have the chance to avail itself of some of these opportunities in the near future.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money, Information Dissemination and the Diplomat. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: DVIDS

Up to $1.7 trillion is estimated to be wagered on illicit betting markets each year, according to a new report released on Thursday by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  

David Axe

Aircraft Carriers, Russia

Russia has a poor track record with aircraft carriers. Its used carriers sold to other nations aren't any better.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Efforts from China, India, and others to purchase aircraft carriers from Russia and other countries have often resulted in long delays and expensive cost overruns.

Imposing, flexible, able to sail fast and launch devastating air strikes at long range, aircraft carriers are the ultimate expression of national power. And many of the world’s best-armed countries are acquiring them. China, Russia, India, Brazil, the U.K., France, America.

But just getting your hands on a flattop is hardly enough. For every example of a country that succeeds in deploying a functional carrier and matching air wing, there’s a counter-example: a flattop hobbled by mechanical problems, stricken by age, sidelined by bad design or stuck with warplanes that simply don’t work.

What follows are not the success stories. They are the case studies in flattop failure … and object lessons for all the countries building aircraft carriers today.

Mother Russia’s tugboat bait

The Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft carrier, was launched in 1985 and joined the fleet in 1991. Since then the 55,000-ton, fossil-fuel-powered flattop has managed just four frontline deployments—all of them to the Mediterranean, and all of them just a few months in duration.

By contrast, American flattops typically deploy for at least six months every two years. The nuclear-powered USS Enterprise, commissioned in 1962, completed 25 deployments before leaving service in 2012.

One of Admiral Kuznetsov’s major problems is her powerplant. The vessel is powered by steam turbines and turbo-pressurized boilers that Defense Industry Daily generously described as “defective.” Anticipating breakdowns, large ocean-going tugs accompany Admiral Kuznetsov whenever she deploys.

Poor maintenance makes life difficult and dangerous for Admiral Kuznetsov’s 1,900 sailors. A short circuit started a fire off Turkey in 2009 that killed one seaman.

Her pipes are bad. “When it’s this cold, water freezes everywhere including pipes which may cause a rupture,” English Russia reported. “To prevent this, they just don’t supply almost 60 percent of the cabins with water (neither in winter nor in summer). The situation with latrines is just as bad. The ship has over 50 latrines but half of them are closed.”

Almost 2,000 men. Twenty-five latrines. Do the math. Training and morale are so poor that in 2009 Admiral Kuznetsov sailors apparently botched an at-sea refueling, spilling hundreds of tons of fuel into the Irish Sea.

And even when the ship functions as intended, her design limits her utility. Admiral Kuzentsov does not have steam catapults like American flatttops do. Instead, her Sukhoi fighters launch into the air off a bow ramp. The fighters must stay light, meaning they can carry only a few air-to-air missiles and a partial fuel load. Their patrol endurance is measured in minutes rather than hours.

English Russia summed up the Russian aircraft carrier’s fundamental limitations succinctly. “Actual aircrafts visit this ship pretty rarely.”

Moscow appreciates its flattop problem and has vague plans to replace Admiral Kuznetsov sometime in the 2020s, by which time planners can realistically expect to have deployed the decrepit old lady maybe two or three more times.

But the Russians promised us she would work

Admiral Kuznetsov’s ill repute did not deter the Indian and Chinese governments from acquiring second-hand Russian carriers. China’s Liaoning, a rebuilt sister ship of Admiral Kuznetsov, began limited testing in the summer of 2012, serving a mostly educational role while a Chinese shipyard slowly built a new carrier from scratch.

Outfitted with the same faulty powerplant and performance-limiting bow ramp, Liaoning is unlikely to venture far from shore or send her lightly-loaded J-15 fighters—copies of Russian Sukhois—into serious combat. In a rare pique, Chinese state media denounced the J-15s as “flopping fish.”

India’s experience has been even worse. In 2004 New Delhi inked a $1.5-billion deal for the 1982-vintage Russian flattop Admiral Gorshkov. In Russian service, the 45,000-ton vessel had carried a few helicopters and small Yakovlev jump jets; the Indians paid to have the flight deck expanded and a bow ramp fitted to accommodate up to 16 MiG-29 fighters.

Renamed Vikramaditya, the flattop was due to enter service in 2008. But the poorly-managed Russian shipyard was overwhelmed by the scale of the refit. The cost doubled and trials were bumped back to September 2012. And when the crew pushed the conventionally-powered ship to her theoretical top speed of 32 knots, her boilers overheated.

“India didn’t want to use asbestos as heat protection for the boilers,” Defense Industry Daily explained. “Instead, the boilers’ designer had to use firebrick ceramics. Which, as we see, didn’t work so well. Especially on a ship that Russia put up for sale in 1994, after a boiler room explosion.” Our emphasis.

More repairs. More delays. More money. “The problems revealed during sea trials last year have been fixed,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin vowed in late 2013, by which point Vikramaditya was expected to enter active service in India in the spring of 2014.

“Active service” being a relative term. If Russia’s own experience with its crappy carriers is any indication, the Indian ship will spend most of her time in port being repaired between brief forays into near waters. New Delhi is building a new carrier from scratch that should eventually complement the Russian hand-me-down.

The floating museum

Not all bad aircraft carriers are Russian. The U.K. and France have both sold to poorer navies decommissioned flattops that probably should have been permanently retired. In 2000 the Brazilian navy acquired the former Foch from Paris for $12 million.

Commissioned into French service in 1963, the 33,000-ton, non-nuclear Foch carried 40 fighters and helicopters. Unlike Russian flattops, Foch had a steam catapult, allowing her to boost heavily-laden planes off her deck.

The Brazilians renamed her Sao Paulo and, for the first four years, busily sailed the second-hand vessel in a series of regional exercises—practicing with her upgraded A-4 fighters, sailing with the American carrier USS Ronald Reagan and even qualifying Argentinian planes for deck operations. Sao Paulo was, and remains, Latin America’s only aircraft carrier.

But her age began to show, despite Brazil spending an additional $100 million on upkeep. On-board fires in 2005 and 2012 killed two sailors and left the flattop “barely functioning beyond flag-flying and light duties,” according to Warships International Fleet Review. “The Brazilian defense ministry admitted the ship’s effectiveness is extremely limited.” Today the A-4s rarely fly.

Sao Paulo’s replacement is still in the planning stages: a brand-new carrier to enter service some time in the 2020s, around the same time that Russia, China and India all hope to have new and better—that is to say, safe and functional—flattops of their own.

This article by David Axe originally appeared at War is Boring in 2013. It is is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Paul Richard Huard

Aircraft Carriers, Europe

Had she ever sailed, the Soviet supercarrier Ulyanovsk would have been a naval behemoth.

Here's What You Need to Know: For Moscow’s navy, the failure of the Ulyanovsk project is one of the biggest, baddest memories of them all.

Had she ever sailed, the Soviet supercarrier Ulyanovsk would have been a naval behemoth more than 1,000 feet long, with an 85,000-ton displacement and enough storage to carry an air group of up to 70 fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

With a nuclear-powered engine—and working in conjunction with other Soviet surface warfare vessels and submarines—the supercarrier would have steamed through the oceans with a purpose.

Namely, to keep the U.S. Navy away from the Motherland’s shores.

But the Ulyanovsk is a tantalizing “almost” of history. Moscow never finished the project, because it ran out of money. As the Cold War ended, Russia plunged into years of economic hardship that made building new ships impossible.

The Ulyanovsk died in the scrap yards in 1992. But now the Kremlin is spending billions of rubles modernizing its military—and wants a new supercarrier to rival the United States.

Big Goals, Bad Timing:

Builders laid the keel for the Ulyanovsk in 1988, just as the Soviet empire began to break apart. The ship was such a large project that builders wouldn’t have finished her until the mid ’90s.

Construction took place at the Black Sea Shipyard in Ukraine—often called Nikolayev South Shipyard 444. It’s an old facility, dating back to the 18th century when Prince Grigory Potemkin signed orders in 1789 authorizing new docks to repair Russian naval vessels damaged during the Russo-Turkish War.

The famous Russian battleship Potemkin—scene of the famous 1905 naval mutiny and the subject of Sergei Eisenstein’s classic film—launched from the same shipyard.

Early in the Soviet period, the shipyard constructed battleships. During the ’60s and ’70s, workers built Moskva-class helicopter carriers and Kiev-class carriers at South Shipyard 444.

But none of these ships came close to the Ulyanovsk.

Named after Vladimir Lenin’s hometown, everything about the supercarrier was huge, even by Russian standards.

Her propulsion system would have comprised four KN-3 nuclear reactors, a model originally used to power enormous Kirov-class battlecruisers, such as the heavy guided-missile cruiser Frunze. Ulyanovsk could have easily reached 30 knots while under way.

The carrier would have carried at least 44 fighters on board—a combination of Su-33 and MiG-29 attack jets configured for carrier operations. Ulyanovsk’s two steam catapults, ski-jump and four sets of arresting cables would have created a bustling flight deck.

The ship’s designers planned three elevators—each capable of carrying 50 tons—to move aircraft to and from the cavernous hanger deck. Plus, the carrier would have had helicopters for search-and-rescue work and anti-submarine warfare missions.

The Soviets planned a complement of 3,400 sailors—roughly half of the crew aboard an American Nimitz-class carrier, but sizable compared to other Soviet vessels.

Why Build It?:

That the Soviets even wanted a supercarrier was remarkable. The massive ships have never figured significantly in the Soviet or Russian naval inventory.

Currently, Russia has only one carrier—the significantly smaller Admiral Kuznetsov—launched in 1985. Multiple mechanical problems have plagued the ship ever since, and she doesn’t go anywhere without an accompanying tug vessel.

But there was a logic behind the Ulyanovsk. James Holmes, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, explained that the Soviets wanted to create a defensive “blue belt” in their offshore waters.

The “blue belt” was a combination of land, sea and air power that would work together to thwart U.S. carrier and submarine forces. Russia could defend the homeland while providing safe patrol areas for ballistic-missile subs performing nuclear deterrent missions.

“Those ‘boomers’ need to disappear for weeks at a time into safe depths,” Holmes said. “Soviet supercarriers could have helped out with the air- and surface-warfare components of a blue-belt defense, chasing off U.S. Navy task forces that steamed into Eurasian waters.”

But pride and national honor also prompted the decision to build the Ulyanovsk.

“There’s also the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses aspect to carrier development,” Holmes continued. “If the U.S. is the world superpower and the U.S.S.R. wants to keep pace, then Soviet leaders want the same toys to demonstrate that they’re keeping pace. It sounds childish, but there are basic human motives at work here.”

“It’s not all about the roles and missions carriers execute,” he said. “It’s about national destiny and dignity.”

But by the mid ’90s, Russian naval vessels were rusting at their moorings, sailors served without pay and the United States stepped in to help deactivate Soviet-era nuclear submarines and provide security for the Russian nuclear arsenal.

“The Soviets weren’t dumb,” Holmes explained. “They wouldn’t spend themselves into oblivion to keep up with the Joneses, and as a great land power, they obviously had enormous claims on their resources to fund the army and air force. There was only so much to go around for ‘luxury fleet’ projects.”

“Bottom line, if you can’t afford to keep the existing fleet at sea, where are you going to get the money to complete your first nuclear-powered supercarrier, a vessel that will demand even more manpower that you can’t afford?”

Moscow’s Military Rises Again…or Not?:

But Russia now seems willing to revive its supercarrier dream. “The navy will have an aircraft carrier,” Russian navy chief Adm. Viktor Chirkov recently said. “The research companies are working on it.”

Other Russian media reports indicate that designers are in the early phases of planning a new carrier class that would be slightly larger than the Nimitz class—and capable of holding an air wing of 100 planes.

But economic problems — including a looming recession — and the expense of maintaining and modernizing the rest of the nation’s aging fleet makes it doubtful whether Russia can build such an expensive ship.

Holmes estimates the cost of a new Russian carrier could be as much as $8.5 billion and take up to seven years to complete. But the professor also said the Russian quest for a carrier is serious.

Great nations have carriers, Russia considers itself a great nation, and therefore the ship would be a symbol of national revival and destiny. In other words, a new carrier would be one more reason to forget the bad old days when the Soviet Union disintegrated.

“We think of the Soviet Union as a dreary place, but Russians also remember that it wielded great power,” Holmes continued. “That’s a potent memory.”

For Moscow’s navy, the failure of the Ulyanovsk project is one of the biggest, baddest memories of them all.

This piece first appeared in WarIsBoring here. 

Image: Reuters / TASS

David Axe

Iranian Navy, Persian Gulf

Iran’s fleet has a long history of waging losing fights with the United States and other Western powers.

Here's What You Need to Remember: On Oct. 16, 1987, an Iranian missile struck a Kuwaiti tanker, injuring 19 people. In response, a U.S. task force targeted two inoperable oil platforms that IRGC forces were using as bases for armed speedboats.

Tensions have escalated in the Persian Gulf region in the aftermath of U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision unilaterally to withdraw the United States from the agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program.

The U.S. military has implicated Iranian agents in several summer 2019 attacks on civilian ships sailing near Iran. The U.S. Navy sent the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and her strike group to the region. The U.S. Air Force deployed B-52 bombers and F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters.

If war breaks out, American forces could target Iran’s small navy as well as the vessels belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps militia.

The battle could be brief. Iran’s fleet has a long history of waging losing fights with the United States and other Western powers.

During World War II, the Allied powers worried that Iran, while technically neutral, might sympathize with and aid the Nazis, potentially depriving the Allies of the country’s oil. On Aug. 25, 1941, Commonwealth and Soviet forces invaded.

British and Australian warships steamed into Abadan Harbor as part of a surprise attack. HMS Shoreham opened fire first, striking the Iranian warship Palang. Soon virtually the entire Iranian fleet was in ruins and commander-in-chief Adm. Gholamali Bayandor lay dead.

The British and Soviets divided up Iran and deposed its shah. In the two decades following the war, the new regime rebuilt the navy with mostly British-made ships, some of which remain in service today.

The new Iranian navy fought hard during the bloody Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. Iran’s attacks on tanker ships—some strictly neutral, others admittedly supplying Iraq—incited international rage.

In 1987, Washington approved Kuwait’s request to “reflag” its tankers as American vessels, in order to allow the U.S. Navy to escort the ships through the Persian Gulf. The Americans’ Operation Earnest Will, lasting from July 1987 to September 1988, included several smaller efforts that resulted in the destruction of Iranian forces.

The Navy converted two oil-service barges into “sea bases” for Special Operations Forces and armed helicopters, and the U.S. Army placed attack copters aboard Navy ships. On Sept. 21, 1987 Little Bird helicopters from the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment attacked the Iranian vessel Ajr as she laid mines, forcing the crew to abandon ship.

A few days later, Little Birds sank three Iranian patrol boats.

On Oct. 16, 1987, an Iranian missile struck a Kuwaiti tanker, injuring 19 people. In response, a U.S. task force targeted two inoperable oil platforms that IRGC forces were using as bases for armed speedboats.

American warships surrounded the platforms, compelling the Iranian crews to evacuate. U.S. commandos climbed aboard one platform to gather up any documents the Iranians had left behind. Four U.S. destroyers opened fire, setting the platforms ablaze.

On April 14, 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine while escorting tanker ships through the Persian Gulf. The carrier USS Enterprise led a retaliatory raid.

Two U.S. destroyers and an amphibious assault ship carrying a battalion of U.S. Marines assaulted an oil platform the Iranians were using as a staging base. The Iranians fired back, drawing heavy return fire from the destroyers and Marine Cobra helicopters. Marines stormed the platform, capturing one surviving Iranian gunner.

Iranian speedboats raided three civilian cargo ships. As the Iranians withdrew, Enterprise’s A-6 bombers zeroed in, sinking one speedboat with cluster bombs.

The Iranian missile boat Joshan fired a Harpoon anti-ship missile at a group of American warships—and missed. The Americans fired back with Harpoon and Standard missiles then sank the damaged Joshan with their guns.

While the U.S. ships fought off Iranian air attacks, Tehran’s 1960s-vintage destroyers joined the battle. Sahand and Sabalan both fired without effect at A-6s overhead. The A-6s shot back with Harpoons and laser-guided bombs, sinking Sahand and badly damaging Sabalan.

At least 56 Iranians died in the fighting. Two U.S. Marines perished when their helicopter crashed. Battered, the Iranian fleet pulled back, and since then has been hesitant to make good on its periodic threats against Iran’s neighbors and the United States.

David Axe was Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

David Axe

NATO, Bulgaria

The Bulgarian air force had worked hard to maintain around 100 old Soviet-era aircraft with a struggling economy.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Bulgaria's government approved a $1.2-billion deal with the United States to acquire eight new F-16 Block 70s plus spares and support equipment in 2019. The F-16s are due to arrive in Bulgaria before the end of 2022.

In the summer of 2016, the cash-strapped Bulgarian air force nearly collapsed amid political squabbling in the capital Sofia. With a yawning air-defense gap forming on its southeastern frontier, NATO intervened — and assigned an F-15 squadron from the California Air National Guard to fill in for the Bulgarians’ own dysfunctional air arm.

A former Soviet satellite, Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004. Overburdened with old Soviet hardware and doctrine, the tiny European state — with just seven million people and a $55-billion economy — has struggled to meet NATO standards.

The Bulgarian air force had worked hard to maintain around 100 old Soviet-era aircraft, including nine MiG-29 fighters — of which only four were flyable— and a dozen Su-25 attack planes. Money was tight. Training and operational flights were few and far between.

The government repeatedly pledged to boost the air force’s funding — and, according to critics, repeatedly broke that promise. Realizing its own air force could not effectively patrol its air space, in February 2016 the Bulgarian parliament approved a measure requesting NATO assistance.

The transatlantic military alliance routinely deploys fighter squadrons to patrol over Iceland and the Baltic states, which lack their own fighter planes. The arrangement with Bulgaria extends NATO’s “air-policing” duties to a country that does, in fact, have its own fighters — but which can’t seem to sustain them.

Incensed at what he claimed was a lack of support, on Aug. 1, 2016 Maj. Gen. Rumen Radev — then the Bulgarian air force’s commander and an active MiG-29 pilot — resigned in protest. The vocally pro-Russia Radev promptly went into politics and, in November 2016, won the election to become the country’s next president.

In the meantime, the U.S. Air Force had deployed the 194th Fighter Squadron — part of the California Air National Guard — to Europe starting in April 2016. The deployment fell under the umbrella of the Pentagon’s Theater Support Package scheme, which rotates U.S.-based forces to Europe to deter Russian aggression.

The 194th sent four F-15s to Iceland for air-policing and eight of the venerable, twin-engine jets to Romania for training. With Radev’s resignation only deepening the Bulgarian air force’s woes, in August 2016 NATO asked the Americans to help out. The 194th quickly sent four of the F-15s then in Romania to Graf Ignatievo in Bulgaria, from where they could patrol Bulgaria’s Black Sea border.

NATO and the Pentagon put a happy face on the rushed deployment. “It’s important that we are standing side-by-side with our NATO allies,” Lt. Col. Cesar Gonzalez, the 194th Fighter Squadron aircraft maintenance commander, said in a statement. “We are committed to the security of Europe and helping Bulgaria and countries who ask for our help.”

In fact, the F-15s’ mission to Bulgaria both exacerbated — and helped to put a salve on — deep political division in the country … and in NATO. Radev’s election as president dovetailed with the rise of pro-Russia, and nominally anti-NATO, leaders across the alliance. Most notably, Donald Trump in the United States.

The California fighters returned to the United States in October 2016. Facing a new and uncertain era with Radev’s election, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense scrambled to acquire 10 spare engines worth $20 million for the air force’s MiG-29s. In an apparent passive swipe at Radev, the ministry claimed the fresh engines were proof that “propaganda claims that the air force will be grounded” were untrue.

Sofia put out a tender for new fighters to eventually replace the MiG-29s. The government in the summer of 2019 approved a $1.2-billion deal with the United States to acquire eight new F-16 Block 70s plus spares and support equipment. The F-16s are due to arrive in Bulgaria before the end of 2022. Sofia signaled it might add another eight jets to its order

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This article first appeared in April 2020 and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

David Axe

F-14, Persian Gulf

The killing blow came when the F-14s guided Air Force F-15Es as they dropped 5,000-pound bunker-buster bombs to wipe out the underground bunker.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Shortly before the invasion of Iraq kicked off, a special detachment composed of five F-14As, five two-person crews and 30 maintainers from Navy Fighter Squadron 154 left the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and set up shop ashore at Al Udeid air base in Qatar, where U.S. Special Operations Forces were also located.

Early in the morning on March 19, 2003, U.S. Special Operations Forces infiltrated western Iraq to neutralize strategic radar and command installations. It was one of the first attacks of the American-led invasion — and it played out under the watchful gaze of a secretive detachment of aging but still very capable U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat fighters.

Tony Holmes tells the whole amazing story in the September 2015 issue of Combat Aircraft magazine.

The twin-engine, two-seat, swing-wing F-14 was an old airplane in 2003. The Navy would finally retire the 1970s-vintage fighters just three years later. But in its final days, the F-14 was at its peak. The Navy had added sensor pods and GPS- and laser-guided bombs, transforming the Tomcat into the ground-attack Bombcat.

Fast, powerful and flexible with huge fuel capacity, the Bombcat also turned out to be an excellent command platform. In the forward-air-control-airborne — or FAC(A) — role, an F-14 could orbit over the battlefield, its front-seat pilot focusing on flying the plane while the backseat flight officer worked the radar and camera pod.

Radio — and secure datalink in the case of the most advanced F-14D model — allowed the FAC(A) Bombcat to steer other warplanes toward targets on the ground. “Long, dangerous and incredibly important, these FAC(A) sorties required exceptional situational awareness,” Holmes writes.

Shortly before the invasion of Iraq kicked off, a special detachment composed of five F-14As, five two-person crews and 30 maintainers from Navy Fighter Squadron 154 left the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and set up shop ashore at Al Udeid air base in Qatar, where U.S. Special Operations Forces were also located. The Bombcats’ mission, details of which remain secret 12 years later, was to support these specialized troops.

F-14s almost always flew from carriers, but the commandos demanded to be able to speak face-to-face to the aircrews covering them, so the Bombcats had to operate from land. When the commandos flew into western Iraq under the cover of darkness on March 19, two of the VF-154 F-14s and other jets were overhead.

The Special Operations Forces’ targets were Pluto and Flat Face early-warning radars and a command bunker near Iraq’s border with Jordan. The radars cued air defenses that stood in the way of Jordan-based U.S. warplanes poised to strike Iraq.

The attack was a success. The killing blow came when the F-14s guided Air Force F-15Es as they dropped 5,000-pound bunker-buster bombs to wipe out the underground bunker. Today, VF-154 flies F/A-18F Super Hornets.

David Axe was the Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring, and Machete Squad.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring here in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

David Axe

Pakistani Air Force, Pakistan

The Pakistani defense ministry revealed that it purchased 60 CM-400AKGs at a total cost of $100 million.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In 2018 photos circulated apparently depicting a JF-17 firing a CM-400AKG in a test that perhaps took place a few years earlier.

Pakistan’s newest fighter jet could launch a powerful, but strange, new anti-ship missile.

The Pakistani air force is acquiring more than a hundred JF-17s from China in order to complement older F-16s, Mirages and J-7s.

To help the single-engine JF-17s target enemy warships such as India’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers, Islamabad’s air arm in 2017 and 2018 bought 60 CM-400AKG anti-ship missiles.

The CM-400AKG, a product of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, is an unusual weapon. Unlike many other anti-ship missiles, it follows a high ballistic flight path.

The supersonic standoff missile first appeared in public at an air show in Zhuhai, China in 2012. The missile appeared in a display with the JF-17, a highly-evolved derivative of the MiG-21 that China has sold to Pakistan, Myanmar and Nigeria at a cost of around $30 million per plane.

Six years later, the Pakistani defense ministry revealed that it purchased 60 CM-400AKGs at a total cost of $100 million. The acquisition transformed the country’s JF-17s into potent ship-killers.

In 2018 photos circulated apparently depicting a JF-17 firing a CM-400AKG in a test that perhaps took place a few years earlier.

The CM-400AKG reportedly weighs around 2,000 pounds and carries either a 300-pound fragmentation warhead or a 400-pound penetrating warhead. It reportedly can fly as far as 150 miles.

The missile boasts an internal navigation system that guides it near its target, at which point a combination infrared- and radar-seeker takes over. Sources claim the weapon’s circular-error probability is as small as 15 feet, meaning it has a 50-50 chance of striking within 15 feet of its aimpoint.

The CM-400AKG reportedly can maneuver in its final seconds of flight, helping it to dodge enemy defenses. It tops out at five times the speed of sound, sources claim.

Some observers have pointed to the CM-400AKG’s high speed in order to draw comparisons with the Indian armed forces’ own Brahmos cruise missile. Itself a derivative of the Soviet Oniks cruise missile, the air-, sea-, undersea- and land-launched Brahmos can fly as fast as Mach three and strike targets as far away as 370 miles.

The CM-400AKG’s size, range and accuracy are consistent with the capabilities of other anti-ship weapons. What’s odd is the weapon’s flight profile.

Most anti-ship missiles launch from low altitude in order to avoid detection. The CM-400AKG, by contrast, is designed to launch from high altitude.

According to the manufacturers’ figures, a fighter such as a JF-17 would launch the CM-400AKG at an altitude between 26,200 and 39,400 feet while traveling as fast as Mach .9.

The weapon’s apparent origin as a development of the SY-400 short-range ballistic missile could explain this odd profile. The CM-400AKG like other high-flying ballistic missiles consumes solid fuel and does not require an air inlet. Lower-flying weapons often combine liquid fuel and an air-breathing motor.

David Axe was the defense editor of The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This first appeared earlier in 2020 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

David Axe

U.S. Navy, United States

The Flight III is cheaper than the Large Surface Combatant might have been, but it’s still too expensive for the Navy to afford in large numbers.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The last time the Navy designed a new surface combatant from the hull up, the result was the Zumwalt class of stealth destroyers. The Navy bought just three Zumwalts for more than $7 billion apiece before canceling production.

The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding plan is a disaster. So it should come as no surprise that the fleet’s plan for a new destroyer also is a mess. The two problems are related.

The Navy in mid-2019 indefinitely delayed production of the new Large Surface Combatant, a ship class that eventually could replace today’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers.

A few months later, the sailing branch announced it no longer could afford to spend $20 billion or more annually buying the new ships it would need to grow from today’s 295 front-line vessels to 355, the service’s goal since 2016.

The Navy subsequently suspended long-term ship-construction planning and submitted a budget proposal for 2021 that buys just eight new warships, down from 12 or 13 in previous years.

Planning for the Large Surface Combatant essentially has disappeared in this bureaucratic chaos. And one key Navy leader isn’t sad to see it happen.

Vice Adm. Tom Moore, the Navy’s chief ship-buyer, told USNI News he’s been watching closely as the fleet designs the Large Surface Combatant. Moore praised the design process but admitted that deferring the ship was the right decision.

“I’ve watched the Large Surface Combatant with great interest over the last four years, and frankly I think we’ve pushed it to the right for good reasons,” Moore said.

Namely, cost. “Clearly as we work through that process, the first go-around was a platform that was going to be pretty expensive,” Moore said.

The last time the Navy designed a new surface combatant from the hull up, the result was the Zumwalt class of stealth destroyers. The Navy bought just three Zumwalts for more than $7 billion apiece before canceling production.

The fleet is eager not to repeat that experience. So in lieu of the Large Surface Combatant, the Navy is buying for around $2 billion per copy a new variant of the Arleigh Burke called the Flight III.

The Flight III is slightly bigger than earlier Burkes are and features a new radar and more power generation. A Burke-class destroyer is around 500 feet long and displaces around 9,000 tons of water. Armament includes nearly 100 missile cells plus guns.

“We think Flight III meets the needs, we think the threat’s evolving, we’re looking at unmanned, so we don’t want to rush into this,” Moore said. By “unmanned,” Moore is referring to a new class of small, crew-optional missile corvettes that the fleet wants to develop.

But there’s a twist in the Navy’s default to the Flight III as its main new surface combatant. Sure, the Flight III is cheaper than the Large Surface Combatant might have been, but it’s still too expensive for the Navy to afford in large numbers.

The sailing branch as recently as late 2019 planned to buy, through 2024, at least 13 Flight III Burkes to join 74 Burkes of earlier variants.

Then in a December 2019 memo, the Navy proposed to reduce the construction of Flight IIIs to just nine over the next five years. Over the same five-year span, the fleet would decommission early 13 of its 22 Ticonderoga-class cruisers.

The moves would save more than $10 billion from an overall $100-billion, five-year shipbuilding scheme, but would mean a smaller fleet than the Navy and lawmakers wanted. Instead of 355 front-line ships, the fleet might top out at just 310.

And it’s unclear whether that smaller fleet might ever include the Large Surface Combatant.

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This first appeared in May 2019 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Indian Military, Asia

India’s carrier force has developed a three-pronged rationale for its purpose.

Here's What You Need to Remember: India has committed to carrier aviation, and has the resources and experience to develop a successful force. 

With one large carrier in service and another on the way, India has become one of the world’s pre-eminent naval aviation powers. How did the program come about? Where is it going? And what is the strategic rationale for India’s massive investment in aircraft carriers?

The Origins of India’s Carriers

Despite considerable economic challenges, India took carrier aviation very seriously in the years after independence. Unlike China (or even the Soviet Union), India focused on carriers instead of submarines. INS Vikrant, a Majestic-class light carrier, served from 1961 until 1997, fighting effectively in the 1971 war. INS Viraat, formerly the Centaur-class carrier HMS Hermes, joined the Indian Navy in 1987 and served until 2016. These carriers gave the Indian Navy long-term experience in carrier ops, as well as a compelling organizational logic for maintaining a carrier capability.

The Current Situation

By the early 2000s, Viraat was showing her age. The supply of second-hand carriers, long dominated by the Royal Navy’s World War II relics, had narrowed considerably. Instead of building a new ship itself, India determined to acquire an older Soviet carrier, the former Kiev-class warship Admiral Gorshkov, which had been out of service since the 1990s. India paid in excess of $2 billion for a massive reconstruction that left the ship nearly unrecognizable, with a ski-jump deck and transformed weapon systems. When accepted into service in 2014, the new 45,000-ton INS Vikramaditya could operate around twenty MiG-29K fighters, along with utility helicopters. Despite cost-overruns and serviceability problems, the ship offered the Indian Navy the chance to redevelop its aviation muscles after years of operating only VSTOL (vertical and/or short take-off and landing) aircraft from Viraat.

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Vikramaditya was only the first step towards recapitalizing the aviation wing of the Indian Navy. The second step was the new INS Vikrant, a 40,000-ton ski-jump carrier built in India’s Cochin Shipyard. Laid down in 2009, Vikrant is expected to finally enter service around 2020, with an air wing similar to that of Vikramaditya. The construction process has witnessed a number of setbacks, many of which are to be expected from a first effort at carrier construction.

For the time being, India has decided to stick with the MiG-29K as its primary naval combat aircraft, rather than the Su-33, the F/A-18 or the Dassault Rafale. Both Boeing and Dassault remain at least somewhat hopeful of exporting carrier-borne fighters to India. Even Saab expressed an interest in converting the Gripen for naval service. The Indian Navy also contemplated developing a navalized version of the HAL Tejas, but (for now) has wisely rejected the complicated effort to convert the troubled fighter.

Strategic Rationale

India’s carrier force has developed a three-pronged rationale for its purpose. The first prong is support of a conventional war against Pakistan, which would involve strikes against Pakistani naval assets and land bases. Unfortunately, Vikrant and Vikramaditya would struggle in strike operations because of limitations on aircraft weight, although they certainly would attract Pakistani attention. Second, the carriers make the Indian Navy the preeminent force in the Indian Ocean, better able to command the area than any foreign competitor. Indian carriers will always have better access to bases and support facilities in the Indian Ocean than China, the United Kingdom, or even the United States, and the presence of the carriers facilitates the projection of Indian power and the management of trade protection.

The third prong involves geopolitical competition with China. With the anticipated commissioning of its second large carrier, China has managed to leapfrog Indian naval aviation development in a relatively short period of time. Although China lacks India’s experience with carriers, it boasts a remarkably efficient shipbuilding industry and an increasingly sophisticated aviation sector, making it less dependent on foreign technology. Although India may struggle to keep up with Chinese construction, it can leverage geography (proximity to bases) to its advantage in the most likely areas of any conflict.

What to Expect from the Indian Navy

The next step in India’s naval aviation project will be INS Vishaal, a 65,000-ton conventionally propelled, domestically produced CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier. With experience gleaned from the experience with Vikrant, the design and construction of the carrier will hopefully go more smoothly. It appears as if India will have unprecedented access to U.S. technology for the construction of Vishaal, including the EMALS electromagnetic catapult system used on the Gerald R. Ford class. Unlike Vikrant or Vikramaditya, Vishaal will be able to launch and recover heavy strike aircraft, as well as early warning planes such as the E-2 Hawkeye. Vishaal is supposed to enter service by 2030, although that timeline may be optimistic.

More recently, a spate of rumors has suggested that India might try to acquire one of the variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Deciding to buy the F-35 (and then going through with it) would deeply tax India’s military procurement bureaucracy, however, and would require a great deal of forbearance from U.S. export control officials. Still, the F-35C is the world’s most modern carrier fighter, and INS Vishaal could surely operate the plane.

Next Steps

By the early 2030s, India plans to have three active carriers. At that point, the next presumed step will be to replace INS Vikramaditya; although lightly used, her hull is already thirty years old, and she will be less capable than the other two ships. If Vishaal is at all acceptable, India’s best bet would be simply to build more of that design, which would allow the capture of construction efficiencies will also enabling incremental improvements. Although the Indian Navy has toyed with the idea of nuclear propulsion, it really doesn’t need a nuclear carrier; the strategic tasks of the navy should keep it relatively close to home, and building nuclear propulsion into the design would result in three different carriers with three different designs, limiting efficiency and co-operability.

Conclusion

India has committed to carrier aviation, and has the resources and experience to develop a successful force. However, India still faces some big decisions, including the choice of a new carrier fighter and the design characteristics of its flagship class of fleet carriers. Much will depend on how successfully India masters the difficulties of large-scale shipbuilding, and how well it integrates new technologies into the design and construction process.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money, Information Dissemination and the Diplomat.

This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

Bombers,

These five bombers stand above the pack. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Current air forces have, with some exceptions, effectively done away with the distinctions between fighters and bombers, instead relying on multi-role fighter-bombers for both missions.

Bombers are the essence of strategic airpower. While fighters have often been important to air forces, it was the promise of the heavy bomber than won and kept independence for the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force. At different points in time, air forces in the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Italy have treated bomber design and construction as a virtually all-consuming obsession, setting fighter and attack aviation aside.

However, even the best bombers are effective over only limited timespans. The unlucky state-of-the-art bombers of the early 1930s met disaster when put into service against the pursuit aircraft of the late 1930s. The B-29s that ruled the skies over Japan in 1945 were cut to pieces above North Korea in 1950. The B-36 Peacemaker, obsolete before it was even built, left service in a decade. Most of the early Cold War bombers were expensive failures, eventually to be superseded by ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

States procure bombers, like all weapons, to serve strategic purposes. This list employs the following metrics of evaluation:

· Did the bomber serve the strategic purpose envisioned by its developers?

· Was the bomber a sufficiently flexible platform to perform other missions, and to persist in service?

· How did the bomber compare with its contemporaries in terms of price, capability, and effectiveness?

And with that, the five best bombers of all time:

Handley Page Type O 400

The first strategic bombing raids of World War I were carried out by German zeppelins, enormous lighter than aircraft that could travel at higher altitudes than the interceptors of the day, and deliver payloads against London and other targets. Over time, the capabilities of interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery grew, driving the Zeppelins to other missions. Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and others began working on bombers capable of delivering heavy loads over long distance, a trail blazed (oddly enough) by the Russian Sikorsky Ilya Muromets.

Even the modest capabilities of the early bombers excited the airpower theorists of the day, who imagined the idea of fleets of bombers striking enemy cities and enemy industry. The Italians developed the Caproni family of bombers, which operated in the service of most Allied countries at one time or another. German Gotha bombers would eventually terrorize London again, catalyzing the Smuts Report and the creation of the world’s first air force.

Faster and capable of carrying more bombs than either the Gotha IVs or the Caproni Ca.3, the Type O 400 had a wingspan nearly as large as the Avro Lancaster. With a maximum speed of 97 miles per hour with a payload of up to 2000 lbs, O 400s were the mainstay of Hugh Trenchard’s Independent Air Force near the end of the war, a unit which struck German airfields and logistics concentration well behind German lines. These raids helped lay the foundation of interwar airpower theory, which (at least in the US and the UK) envisioned self-protecting bombers striking enemy targets en masse.

Roughly 600 Type O bombers were produced during World War I, with the last retiring in 1922. Small numbers served in the Chinese, Australian, and American armed forces.

Junkers Ju 88

The Junkers Ju-88 was one of the most versatile aircraft of World War II. Although it spent most of its career as a medium bomber, it moonlighted as a close attack aircraft, a naval attack aircraft, a reconnaissance plane, and a night fighter. Effective and relatively cheap, the Luftwaffe used the Ju 88 to good effect in most theaters of war, but especially on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean.

Designed with dive bomber capability, the Ju 88 served in relatively small numbers in the invasion of Poland, the invasion of Norway, and the Battle of France. The Ju-88 was not well suited to the strategic bombing role into which it was forced during the Battle of Britain, especially in its early variants. It lacked the armament to sufficiently defend itself, and the payload to cause much destruction to British industry and infrastructure. The measure of an excellent bomber, however, goes well beyond its effectiveness at any particular mission. Ju 88s were devastating in Operation Barbarossa, tearing apart Soviet tank formations and destroying much of the Soviet Air Forces on the ground. Later variants were built as or converted into night fighters, attacking Royal Air Force bomber formations on the way to their targets.

In spite of heavy Allied bombing of the German aviation industry, Germany built over 15,000 Ju 88s between 1939 and 1945. They operated in several Axis air forces.

De Havilland Mosquito

The de Havilland Mosquito was a remarkable little aircraft, capable of a wide variety of different missions. Not unlike the Ju 88, the Mosquito operated in bomber, fighter, night fighter, attack, and reconnaissance roles. The RAF was better positioned than the Luftwaffe to utilized the specific qualities of the Mosquito, and avoid forcing it into missions in could not perform.

Relatively lightly armed and constructed entirely of wood, the Mosquito was quite unlike the rest of the RAF bomber fleet. Barely escaping design committee, the Mosquito was regarded as easy to fly, and featured a pressurized cockpit with a high service ceiling. Most of all, however, the Mosquito was fast. With advanced Merlin engines, a Mosquito could outpace the German Bf109 and most other Axis fighters.

Although the bomb load of the Mosquito was limited, its great speed, combined with sophisticated instrumentation, allowed it to deliver ordnance with more precision than most other bombers. During the war, the RAF used Mosquitoes for various precision attacks against high value targets, including German government installations and V weapon launching sites. As pathfinders, Mosquitoes flew point on bomber formations, leading night time bombing raids that might otherwise have missed their targets. Mosquitos also served in a diversionary role, distracting German night fighters from the streams of Halifaxes and Lancasters striking urban areas.

De Havilland produced over 7000 Mosquitoes for the RAF and other allied air forces. Examples persisted in post-war service with countries as varied as Israel, the Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and the Dominican Republic

Avro Lancaster

The workhorse of the RAF in World War II, the Lancaster carried out the greater part of the British portion of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). Led by Arthur Harris, Bomber Command believed that area bombing raids, targeted against German civilians, conducted at night, would destroy German morale and economic capacity and bring the war to a close. Accordingly, the Lancaster was less heavily armed than its American contemporaries, as it depended less on self-defense in order to carry out its mission.

The first Lancasters entered service in 1942. The Lancaster could carry a much heavier bomb load than the B-17 or the B-24, while operating at similar speeds and at a slightly longer range. The Lancaster also enjoyed a payload advantage over the Handley Page Halifax. From 1942 until 1945, the Lancaster would anchor the British half of the CBO, eventually resulting in the destruction of most of urban Germany and the death of several hundred thousand German civilians.

There are reasons to be skeptical of the inclusion of the Lancaster. The Combined Bomber Offensive was a strategic dead-end, serving up expensive four-engine bombers as a feast for smaller, cheaper German fighters. Battles were fought under conditions deeply advantageous to the Germans, as damaged German planes could land, and shot down German pilots rescued and returned to service. Overall, the enormous Western investment in strategic bombing was probably one of the greatest grand strategic miscalculations of the Second World War. Nevertheless, this list needs a bomber from the most identifiable bomber offensive in history, and the Lancaster was the best of the bunch.

Over 7000 Lancasters were built, with the last retiring in the early 1960s after Canadian service as recon and maritime patrol aircraft.

Boeing B-52 Stratofortress

The disastrous experience of B-29 Superfortresses over North Korea in 1950 demonstrated that the United States would require a new strategic bomber, and soon. Unfortunately, the first two generations of bombers chosen by the USAF were almost uniformly duds; the hopeless B-36, the short-legged B-47, the dangerous-to-its-own-pilots B-58, and the obsolete-before-it-flew XB-70. The vast bulk of these bombers quickly went from wastes of taxpayer money to wastes of space at the Boneyard. None of the over 2500 early Cold War bombers ever dropped a bomb in anger.

The exception was the B-52. The BUFF was originally intended for high altitude penetration bombing into the Soviet Union. It replaced the B-36 and the B-47, the former too slow and vulnerable to continue in the nuclear strike mission, and the latter too short-legged to reach the USSR from U.S. bases. Slated for replacement by the B-58 and the B-70, the B-52 survived because it was versatile enough to shift to low altitude penetration after the increasing sophistication of Soviet SAMs made the high altitude mission suicidal.

And this versatility has been the real story of the B-52. The BUFF was first committed to conventional strike missions in service of Operation Arc Light during the Vietnam War. In Operation Linebacker II, the vulnerability of the B-52 to air defenses was made manifest when nine Stratofortresses were lost in the first days of the campaign. But the B-52 persisted. In the Gulf War, B-52s carried out saturation bombing campaigns against the forward positions of the Iraqi Army, softening and demoralizing the Iraqis for the eventual ground campaign. In the War on Terror, the B-52 has acted in a close air support role, delivering precision-guided ordnance against small concentrations of Iraqi and Taliban insurgents.

Most recently, the B-52 showed its diplomatic chops when two BUFFs were dispatched to violate China’s newly declared Air Defense Zone. The BUFF was perfect for this mission; the Chinese could not pretend not to notice two enormous bombers travelling at slow speed through the ADIZ.

742 B-52s were delivered between 1954 and 1963. Seventy-eight remain in service, having undergone multiple upgrades over the decades that promise to extend their lives into the 2030s, or potentially beyond. In a family of short-lived airframes, the B-52 has demonstrated remarkable endurance and longevity.

Conclusion

Over the last century, nations have invested tremendous resources in bomber aircraft. More often than not, this investment has failed to bear strategic fruit. The very best aircraft have been those that could not only conduct their primary mission effectively, but that were also sufficiently flexible to perform other tasks that might be asked of them. Current air forces have, with some exceptions, effectively done away with the distinctions between fighters and bombers, instead relying on multi-role fighter-bombers for both missions. The last big, manned bomber may be the American LRS-B, assuming that project ever gets off the ground.

Honorable Mention

Grumman A-6 Intruder, MQ-1 Predator, Caproni Ca.3, Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear,” Avro Vulcan, Tupolev Tu-22M “Backfire.”

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

People's Liberation Army, China

China's few veterans with combat experience are expected to retire in the next few years, leaving it without any firsthand experience at war.

Here's What You Need to Know: Today the U.S. military possesses arguably more combat experience than any other armed forces, owing to the long-term American-led operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But it's debatable whether this experience in low-intensity warfare would matter in what would probably be a high-tech war with China.

The Chinese military has almost no combat experience, analyst Timothy Heath wrote for the California think-tank RAND. But that inexperience might not matter very much, Heath explained.

“Today, China's military has an increasingly impressive high-tech arsenal, but its ability to use these weapons and equipment remains unclear. There are reasons to be skeptical.”

The last time the People's Liberation Army fought a major conflict was in 1979, when "a seasoned Vietnamese military demolished a bungled Chinese invasion," according to Heath.

At the time, the Vietnamese military was still fresh from its defeat of the U.S. and allied forces in the early 1970s. The Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, had gutted its own armed forces through politically-motivated purges.

"The deleterious consequences are evident in the PLA's reversion to discredited, but low-skill, tactics like the human-wave assault, as well as in the inability of infantrymen to navigate or read maps and the inaccuracy of artillerymen due to unfamiliarity with procedures for measuring distances and calculating firing distances," Heath wrote.

"The ghost of that defeat still hovers over the PLA," he continued. "In China, authorities have largely chosen to ignore an embarrassing conflict that fits awkwardly with Beijing's narrative of a peaceful rise, but the official silence has left many PLA veterans disillusioned about their participation in the war."

"The few combat veterans who remain in service will all retire within the next few years, which means the military will soon have no personnel with firsthand combat experience."

But that doesn't mean Beijing can't "win" a major war. Although it's debatable whether any party truly would "win" in such a conflict, given the potentially profound loss of life and the economic, ecological, and political chaos that surely would result from the war.

"Win" in this case can only mean: one side achieves its own immediate strategic goals while preventing its opponent from doing the same. Heath looked to history to explain the role combat experience plays in a war's outcome.

The U.S. military early in World War II lacked experience but possessed the resources, will-to-fight and institutional foundation -- training, education and capacity for official self-correction -- to quickly recover from battlefield defeats such as the German army's rout of American troops at Kasserine Pass in North Africa in 1943.

By contrast, the Iraqi military in 1991 was experienced, having fought Iran for eight years starting in 1980. But its equipment, doctrine and institutions were inadequate. A less-experienced U.S.-led coalition prevailed over the Iraqis, owing in part to the Americans' excellent equipment, training and readiness, all holdovers from the Cold War -- a conflict that involved very little shooting between the major rivals but ample preparation on both sides.

Today the U.S. military possesses arguably more combat experience than any other armed forces, owing to the long-term American-led operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But it's debatable whether this experience in low-intensity warfare would matter in what would probably be a high-tech war with China.

"At the strategic level, a war between Chinese and U.S. forces would likely involve high-intensity combat that neither side has experienced," Heath wrote. "The outcome of an initial clash could go either way. With adequate preparation and planning and under ideal circumstances, it is possible that China could prevail in a first battle."

"But since the initial clash probably would not end the war," he continued, "U.S. forces could be expected to use their formidable advantages to adapt and improve their performance in subsequent engagements, just as they rallied following their initial rout at Kasserine Pass to defeat Germany."

"Whether China had made sufficient efforts to overcome the sizable gaps in the quality of its command, training rigor, integration, and other factors could prove important if the conflict drags on. But even then, the ultimate outcome of a long war between the two global powers will likely be decided by factors beyond the control of generals and admirals, such as economic strength, political cohesion and national resolve."

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

This article first appeared in December 2018 and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Caleb Larson

F-35 Jet, Europe

With help from the United States and Italy, the Royal Navy raised a sunken warplane.

A British F-35B stealth jet that plunged off the side of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier and into the sea has reportedly been found and raised to the surface. 

The warplane plunged into the sea off the deck of the HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the British Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers, in November. 

A startling video surfaced after the crash. The video’s grainy images show a British F-35B jet slowly flying upward on the ski jump ramp on the HMS Queen Elizabeth, then rapidly losing speed and tip over the bow. The pilot bails from the aircraft as the airplane descends, and his parachute reportedly snagged on the edge of the aircraft carrier, forcing him to cut loose into the water. 

The British military authorities reportedly arrested the sailor who took the video, as yet unnamed, on suspicion of learning the video.   

Underwater Espionage 

Following the incident, the Royal Navy scrambled to locate the fifth-generation fighter, fearing the aspects of its advanced stealth technology could be compromised if a foreign country located and salvaged the airplane first. 

Russia topped the list of countries with both the interest and the means to recover sensitive military technology deep underwater. 

British National Security Adviser Sir Stephen Lovegrove spoke to the Commons Defence Committee, highlighting the risk and explaining that “the recovery of the flight data recorder and the wreckage are really vital for an accurate investigation to determine the causes of the crash,” and to prevent unwanted, clandestine technology transfer.   

Recovery Operations 

Although where the airplane entered the water was known, where the F-35B jet ultimately came to rest was not, as the plane may have glided through the water significantly before hitting bottom. It was located, however, about a mile from the ocean surface. As a result, the Royal Navy asked the United States Navy and Italian Navy for assistance in raising the F-35 fighter jet, a process that was somewhat hampered by adverse weather on the surface.  

What exactly caused the crash is not known for sure. However, some reports suggest that the airplane’s engine may have ingested an air intake cover, limiting the amount of air available for the engine to breathe and consequently the lift it could generate. 

Though indeed not good news for the Royal Navy’s air arm, an operations or maintenance error rather than faulty equipment onboard the F-35B jet would be a more manageable issue. Still, what exactly caused the airplane to crash—pilot error, foreign object ingestion, improper maintenance—might not be made public in national security interests. 

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest. A graduate of UCLA, he also holds a Master of Public Policy and lives in Berlin. He covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society for both print and radio. @calebmlarson 

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

U.S.-Canada Relations, North America

Japan would have backed Canada. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The British Army and the Royal Navy could, possibly, have erected a credible defense of Nova Scotia, preventing the United States from completely rolling up Canada.

The end of a war only rarely settles the central questions that started the conflict. Indeed, many wars do not “end” in the traditional sense; World War II, for example, stretched on for years in parts of Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

Even as the guns fell silent along the Western Front in 1918, the United States and the United Kingdom began jockeying for position. Washington and London bitterly disagreed on the nature of the settlements in Europe and Asia, as well as the shape of the postwar naval balance. In late 1920 and early 1921, these tensions reached panic levels in Washington, London and especially Ottawa.

The general exhaustion of war, combined with the Washington Naval Treaty, succeeded in quelling these questions and setting the foundation for the great Anglo-American partnership of the twentieth century. But what if that hadn’t happened? What if the United States and United Kingdom had instead gone to war in the spring of 1921?

The Liberation of Canada

The U.S.-Canadian border would have constituted the central front of the War of 1921. Although Washington maintained good relations with Ottawa, war plans in both the United States and the United Kingdom expected a multipronged invasion into America’s northern neighbor, designed to quickly occupy the country before British (or Japanese) reinforcement could arrive. Canadian declarations of neutrality would have had minimal impact on this process. Plans for initial attacks included the seizure of Vancouver, Winnipeg, the Niagara Falls area and most of Ontario.

Given the overwhelming disparity between available U.S. and Canadian military forces, most of these offensives would probably have succeeded in short order. The major battle would have revolved around British and Canadian efforts to hold Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and especially the port of Halifax, which would have served both as the primary portal for British troops and as the main local base for the Royal Navy. U.S. military planners understood that Halifax was the key to winning the war quickly, and investigated several options (including poison gas and an amphibious assault) for taking the port.

Assuming they held the line, could British and Canadian forces have prevented the severing of supply lines between Halifax and the main cities of Quebec and the Great Lakes region? Unlikely. The U.S. Army would have had major advantages in numbers, logistics, and mobility. Ottawa and Toronto might each have proven too big to swallow and digest quickly, but severing their connection to the Atlantic would have made the question of their eventual surrender only a matter of time.

And what about Quebec? The nationalism of the early twentieth century did not look kindly on large enclaves of ethno-linguistic minorities. Moreover, the United States had no constitutional mechanisms through which it could offer unique concessions to the French speaking majority of the province. In this context, Quebecois leaders might have sought an accord with Washington that resulted in Quebec’s independence in exchange for support for the American war effort, and Washington might plausibly have accepted such an offer. An accord of this nature might also have forestalled French support from their erstwhile British allies. If not, the U.S. Army planned to seize Quebec City through an overland offensive through Vermont.

Operations in the Atlantic

British war planning considered the prospect of simply abandoning Canada in favor of operations in the Caribbean. However, public pressure might have forced the Royal Navy to establish and maintain transatlantic supply lines against a committed U.S. Navy. While it might have struggled to do this over the long term, the RN still had a sufficient margin of superiority over the USN to make a game of it.

The eight “standard-type” super-dreadnought battleships of the USN flatly outclassed any British warship on any metric other than speed. The USN also possessed ten older dreadnoughts, plus a substantial fleet of pre-dreadnoughts that would have undertaken coastal defense duties. The United States did not operate a submarine arm comparable to that of Imperial Germany, and what boats it had lacked experience in either fleet actions or commerce raiding.

For its part, the Royal Navy had at its disposal nine dreadnoughts, twenty-three super-dreadnoughts and nine battle cruisers. The British ships were generally older, less well armored and less heavily armed than their American counterparts. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy had the benefit of years of experience in both war and peace that the USN lacked. Moreover, the RN had a huge advantage in cruisers and destroyers, as well as a smaller advantage in naval aviation.

But how would the RN have deployed its ships? Blockading the U.S. East Coast is a far more difficult task than blockading Germany, and the USN (like the High Seas Fleet) would only have offered battle in advantageous circumstances. While the RN might have considered a sortie against Boston, Long Island or other northern coastal regions, most of its operations would have concentrated on supporting British and Canadian ground forces in the Maritimes.

Operations in the Pacific

Both the United States and the United Kingdom expected Japan to join any conflict on the British side. The connections between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy ran back to the Meiji Restoration, and Tokyo remained hungry for territory in the Pacific. In the First World War, Japan had opportunistically gobbled up most of the German Pacific possessions, before deploying a portion of its navy in support of Entente operations in the Mediterranean. In the case of a U.S.-UK war, the IJN would likely have undertaken similar efforts against American territories. These included many of the islands that Japan invaded in 1941 and 1942, although the invasions would have moved forward without the benefit of years of careful preparation.

Given the strength of the IJN (four battle cruisers, five super-dreadnoughts, two dreadnoughts) and the necessary commitment to an “Atlantic first” strategy, the United States probably could not have held the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Midway or most of the other Pacific islands. Hawaii might have proven a bit too far and too big, and it is deeply unlikely that the Japanese would have risked a land deployment to western Canada (although U.S. planners feared such an eventuality), but the war would have overturned the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Would It Work?

The British Army and the Royal Navy could, possibly, have erected a credible defense of Nova Scotia, preventing the United States from completely rolling up Canada. London could also have offered support for resistance forces in the Canadian wilderness, although even supplying guerilla operations in the far north would have tested British logistics and resolve.

In the end, however, the United States would have occupied the vast bulk of Canada, at the cost of most of its Pacific possessions. And the Canadians, having finally been “liberated” by their brothers to the south? Eventually, the conquest and occupation of Canada would have resulted in statehood for some configuration of provinces, although not likely along the same lines as existed in 1920 (offering five full states likely would have resulted in an undesirable amount of formerly Canadian representation in the U.S. Senate). The process of political rehabilitation might have resembled the Reconstruction of the American South, without the racial element.

The new map, then, might have included a United States that extended to the Arctic, an independent Quebec, a rump Canada consisting mostly of the Maritimes and Japanese control of the entirety of the Western Pacific. Tokyo, rather than London or Washington, would have stood as the biggest winner, hegemonic in its own sphere of influence and fully capable of managing international access to China.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and the Diplomat.

This first appeared in 2017 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Chinese Navy,

However, it is not clear just how effective these new anti-submarine technologies would be against upgraded, high-tech, Virginia-class attack submarines equipped with new quieting technologies and stealth coating materials. 

China’s first quasi-stealthy new Type 055 destroyer is preparing for aggressive submarine-hunting missions near Taiwan and the South China Sea. How? By testing helicopter-dropped sonar and built-in anti-submarine technologies. 

Part of the exercise included cross-domain networking initiatives wherein the surface destroyer networked with helicopters and other aircraft to track threats and transmit target data in real-time, according to the Chinese Communist Party-backed Global Times newspaper. The four-day exercises included what the paper called “realistic scenario-oriented anti-submarine training courses.” 

In a manner apparently quite similar to how Arleigh Burke-class destroyers interoperate with Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, the new Chinese Nanchang destroyer dispatched a Z-9 search helicopter to deploy sonar equipment. The newspaper praised the Nanchang’s ability to discern submarine signals from other sources of undersea noise. 

“Despite fishing boat activities in the vicinity of the exercise zone, which disrupted the sonar equipment's detection of submarines, the Nanchang was able to use its acoustic data analysis and application system to accurately distinguish the noises of the submarine,” the Global Times writes. 

The extent of secure or hardened connectivity between the Nanchang and its sub-hunting helicopters would be crucial, as it may not parallel the U.S. Navy’s ability to quickly exchange threat data from undersea to helicopter and drones before reaching a host ship destroyer able to perform command and control. 

The Nanchang also fires rocket-propelled, submarine-killing torpedoes and has an ability to conduct “joint fire strikes,” according to the Chinese paper. 

The Chinese paper did say part of the intent of the anti-submarine drills was to ensure U.S. attack submarines could not operate near Chinese shores. However, it is not clear just how effective these new anti-submarine technologies would be against upgraded, high-tech, Virginia-class attack submarines equipped with new quieting technologies and stealth coating materials. 

Virginia-class attack submarines are increasingly being thought of as platforms capable of conducting undersea reconnaissance missions, due to navigational, acoustic, and sensing upgrades. 

Interestingly, it seems significant that the Chinese paper made no mention of undersea drones as being part of the Nanchang’s networked sub-hunting network. Many U.S. Navy surface ships, such as its Littoral Combat Ships, are able to launch and recover submarine-hunting drones and mine-hunting platforms. Any kind of effective submarine-hunting mission would benefit greatly from an ability to gather time-sensitive intelligence information from beneath the surface.  

Ultimately, the success of the Nanchang’s ability to truly find submarines would not only rest on the range and fidelity of its sonar and acoustic-data collection and analysis but also upon an ability to securely network that data across domains in real-time. Submarines can of course quickly change position, so an anti-submarine mission would need to find a day to move information quickly or develop an extended “continuous track” because an attack submarine on a clandestine surveillance mission is not likely to stay in one place for long.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

F-22 Raptor,

It might be impressive, but the F-22 is no F-35. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The F-22 has enjoyed the unusual distinction of holding an almost universally acknowledged dominance in the core air superiority mission for over a decade, and yet has not participated in a consequential way in any military conflict.

The F-22 has been the world’s most formidable air superiority fighter since it first entered service in 2005. Although the Raptor has yet to kill a target in anger, aviation specialists almost unanimously agree that it can outclass any opponent, foreign or domestic. The only hard limitation on its ability to kill appears to be the number of missiles that it can carry.

But what if the F-22 had never been? Like all advanced technological systems, the Raptor has suffered from hiccups; in 2009 these hiccups were severe enough to excuse the ending of the production line. What if those hiccups had been more severe, or if the United States had decided earlier that the Raptor simply wasn’t in its strategic interest?

The Plane

The Air Force appreciated that the Soviet Union could catch up with the F-15 and F-16, the formidable air superiority pairing developed in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, it began to pursue the Advanced Tactical Fighter program, geared towards producing a revolutionary air superiority platform that would include stealth, as well as a wealth of blooming technological advances. Two teams made it to the prototype stage, producing the YF-22 and the YF-23. The YF-22 won the competition, and went into production and testing in 1997. The Raptor first entering service in late 2005, and immediately began dominating warfighting exercises.

The Problems

But the problems faced by the F-22 were immense. Any innovative new aircraft faces delays and cost overruns associated with managing new technologies. The F-22, however, ran into one of the most comprehensive military technological shifts since the dawn of the jet age; the digitization of warfare that ensued in the 1980s and the 1990s. This was over and above the “normal” problems associated with creating the world’s first supersonic stealth airframe.

The strategic situation complicated matters further. The end of the Cold War reduced the need for advanced air superiority aircraft, leading DoD to reduce the expected buy. The 750 became 648, which became 339, which became 277, which became 183. This represented a classic death spiral, in which development costs were divided between a smaller and smaller number of aircraft. This made the Raptor seem more expensive, even as the production process matured.

The U.S. response to September 11 further clouded the F-22’s prospects. Instead of facing off against peer competitors, the US military engaged itself in conflicts against significantly technologically inferior opponents, including insurgents who had no air forces to speak of. This made the spiraling expense of the F-22 unpalatable, even to many defense hawks, who could not identify any meaningful contribution that the Raptor could make to the current conflict. Moreover, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter seemed to offer a cheaper, more modern alternative. In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates capped the overall production line at 187 (plus eight test aircraft) for all of these reasons.

The decision could have come sooner. The Joint Strike Fighter project began in 1992, and offered a more contemporary option for the US Department of Defense. The Wars of Yugoslav Disintegration demonstrated that the United States had presumptive air dominance over most foes, even without the F-22. And no peer competitor appeared, in the late 1990s, capable of challenging this dominance in the near term.

The Alternatives

The immediate, obvious alternative to the F-22 Raptor was its competitor aircraft, the Northrop YF-23. In some ways a more innovative design, the F-23 was faster and stealthier than the Raptor, and many have argued that the USAF made the wrong choice. At the time, though, the Air Force believed the F-23 was too risky, and that the Raptor represented the safe choice. The competition was not foreordained, however, and if the F-22 had not won then the F-23 probably would have; competitions of this sort very, very rarely result in the dismissal of both choices. Of course, the F-23 would have run into its own development problems along the way, just as the United States became embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan, and might have been cancelled for the same reasons.

 

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Alternatively, the Air Force could have simply waited for the F-35 to arrive. Although the F-35 was always understood to be a less formidable air superiority platform to the Raptor, it was also expected to be cheaper, in some sense was the aviation equivalent of a “digital native,” a person who grew up during the internet age and who incorporated the basic structures of the digital age into their day-to-day existence. Sensor fusion, networked communications, and a modular software build are intrinsic to the F-35 in a way that are not to the F-22, and it’s hardly impossible to imagine DoD simply giving up on the latter to await the former. Indeed, this was part of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reasoning for capping the F-22 buy at 187 units.

Finally, the Air Force could have continued to pursue improvements to its legacy fleet. Boeing has demonstrated that the F-15 design still has some life in it, having proposed both a stealthy version and a “missile truck” version. The IDF Air Force has doubled down on the F-15, supplemented but not replaced by F-35s, and it is hard to argue that the Israelis don’t value air superiority. Similarly, even before Russia gave up on the Su-57, it invested heavily in improving legacy platforms, especially the Su-27 family of fighters.

Wrap

The most difficult question associated with the Raptor may be this: Would anyone ever really have missed the F-22 if it had not existed? In an important sense the answer is “no,” at least thus far. The F-22 has enjoyed the unusual distinction of holding an almost universally acknowledged dominance in the core air superiority mission for over a decade, and yet has not participated in a consequential way in any military conflict. It is the world’s best boxer, and yet can find no one to fight. This may change, of course; the international system is unpredictable, and the window of the Raptor’s dominance does not appear to be closing. And indeed, as the United States increasingly shifts its attention to peer competitor conflicts, voices emerge calling for a restart of the Raptor line. Though there is undoubtedly something sad about such a dominant aircraft never finding a way to make a contribution.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.