Diplomacy & Crisis News

“A child being hurt is a child too many”, said the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Representative in Iraq on Friday, following a rocket attack against a school in Baghdad the previous night, which left a child and woman injured.

Leon Aron

Kazakhstan, Central Asia

Will Kazakhstan be the setting for the second edition of the Crimea-Donbass script?

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Putin’s preference is almost certain to wait and see if President Tokayev can quell the unrest with the assistance of the “peacekeepers” from the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The unrest in Kazakhstan spells trouble for Moscow. Until now a reliable authoritarian ally, it provided Moscow with a safety barrier against the perennially unstable Central Asia — all the more needed now with the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan. Still more disturbing for the Kremlin is the specter of a pro-democracy “color revolution” on its borders.

With 18 million citizens and a territory of a million square miles, Kazakhstan is too big for an outright takeover, but a plausible target for a limited annexation. Kazakhs had never had their own state, Putin averred. Instead, he continued, the country was “created” by President Nursultan Nazarbayev (who ruled the Central Asian nation between 1991 and 2019) “on the territory where no state ever existed.” Besides, Putin said in June 2020, if this or that former Soviet republic had “entered” the Soviet Union and had been given “a huge quantity of historically Russian lands,” it should have exited the USSR with its original lands instead of “dragging with it the presents from the Russian people.” Putin did not name the offenders but, alongside Ukraine, Kazakhstan could be Exhibit A. Its six northern provinces, where most of the country’s three-and-half million ethnic Russians live, border Russia and could be considered part of the “historical” Russian south-east, southern Urals, and south-west Siberia.

But the immediate “official” pretext for a limited invasion is most likely to be a claim that the ethnic Russian minority was endangered by the turmoil: a Crimea-Donbass scenario, with Islamic “religious extremists” in Almaty replacing the “Russophobic Nazis” in Kiev as an imminent danger to the lives of Russia’s compatriots.

Busy at the moment with the martial drama he is enacting on the Ukrainian border, Putin’s preference is almost certain to wait and see if President Tokayev can quell the unrest with the assistance of the “peacekeepers” from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Yet the temptation to boost his much advertised image as protector of all Russians no matter where they live and, even more so, of an in-gatherer of “historic Russian lands,” lost in the Soviet collapse, may prompt a second edition of the Crimea-Donbass script. Stay tuned!

Leon Aron is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

This article was first published by AEI.

Image: Reuters

Warrior Maven

Mobile Battery Packs, United States

Lithium-ion batteries, well known for their widespread use in commercial items such as laptops, are virtually indispensable to the military.

Here's What You Need to Know: Desert heat, incoming enemy fire or hot flames emerging from an IED explosion or weapons attack could cause Lithium-ion batteries to malfunction, burst into flames...or even explode.

Soldiers are taking enemy fire in 120-degree desert heat, carrying up to 100-pounds of gear and conducting attack operations at night are totally reliant upon battery-powered weapons, sensors and computers -- a potential scenario inspiring current Army Research Laboratory work to engineer longer-lasting, more-stable and, of critical live-saving significance, less flammable Lithium-ion batteries.

Current Lithium-ion batteries, well known for their widespread use in commercial items such as laptops, are virtually indispensable to the military; they are used for a wide range of combat essential technologies, including computers, night vision, laptops, laser illuminators, radios, gun sights, night versions of gun sights, GPS units and navigational systems. However, despite their utility and crucial role supporting warfare, existing Lithium-Ion batteries are extremely heat-sensitive and subject to explosion in certain combat circumstances.

Simple desert heat, incoming enemy fire or hot flames emerging from an IED explosion or weapons attack could cause Lithium-ion batteries to malfunction, burst into flames...or even explode.

For this reason, the Army Research Office and Georgia Tech are now experimenting with new materials with which to power batteries, which can both hold more Lithium and also vastly increase safety for soldiers at war. This is because new materials, such as polymer substances now being experimented with by the ARL, can not only increase battery density for power longevity, but also reduce the possibilities that battery components, such as its electrolytes, will vaporize and explode in flames.

Mobile battery power emerges from the flow of electrons from one electrode, or solid electric conductor, to another within the battery. This includes one negatively charged electrode - the anode -- and one positive electrode called the cathode. Materials called electrolytes are placed in between the anode and cathode electrodes, helping to facilitate the chemical reaction necessary for the cathode to receive the flow of electrons -- generating electricity.

"We are looking at polymeric flexible electrolytes, which could replace more dangerous liquid electrolytes. A polymer is a solid which, if you were to puncture... water and air will go in. You do have an ignition source but you do not have a readily flammable solvent," Dr. Robert Mantz, division chief, electrochemistry, Army Research Office, an element of U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s Army Research Laboratory, told Warrior in an interview.

The current ARL work, given this, is focused upon identifying materials and electrolytes able to produce more energy per unit, function as a better performing battery and, as Mantz put it, be “inherently more safe.”

"In most systems, carbonates are used as electrolytes. Their low viscosity and transport are faster as a liquid, but once you generate heat carbonates want to boil and generate gas. Carbonate starts coming out, which is gaseous and very flammable. Water and material react and serve as an ignition source," Mantz explained.

A wire running through the battery facilitates the flow of electrons between the cathode and anode where, Mantz added, two types of chemical reactions occur - reduction and oxidation. These reactions, as explained in an interesting essay by the Australian Academy of Science, includes the flow of electrons between the anode the cathode. Oxidation is the loss of electrons created by a chemical reaction at the anode, resulting in the generation and release of negatively charged electrons and positively charged Lithium ions.. (molecules or atoms).

“Oxidation happens at the anode, and the cathode is where reduction occurs and where the lithium would be reduced. LI\ithium starts as cation (positively charged ion) and is reduced at the Cathode,” Mantz said.

At the cathode, another chemical reaction occurs simultaneously that enables the electrode to pull positive Lithium ions from the electrolyte.

An essay by the U.S. Department of Energy explains this process by stating ...“the movement of the lithium ions creates free electrons in the anode which creates a charge at the positive current collector (cathode). While the battery is discharging and providing an electric current, the anode releases lithium ions to the cathode, generating a flow of electrons from one side to the other. When plugging in the device, the opposite happens: Lithium ions are released by the cathode and received by the anode.” (U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy)

The flow of electrons takes place between electrodes, (anode and cathode) which can be various kind of metals or materials with conductive properties. Some batteries have used Zinc as an anode and silver as a cathode, according to the Australian essay. Some common cathode materials include Lithium Manganate, Lithium Nickel Colbalt Aluminum Oxide and Lithium Colbaltate, according to an essay from Battery University.

The electrodes are stacked up in pairs throughout the battery, called cells, which are separated by the electrolytes. The anode, called the negative electrode, and the cathode, or positive electrode, are successively stacked together throughout the battery.

“The difference in standard potential between the electrodes kind of equates to the force with which electrons will travel between the two electrodes. This is known as the cell’s overall electrochemical potential, and it determines the cell’s voltage,” the Australian essay states.

From the anode, an electron flow travels through an external wire, while positively charged Lithium ions are generated to travel through the electrolyte solution. At the anode, negatively charged electrons and positively charged ions are generated by a chemical reaction, driving a flow of negatively charged electrons through a wire in the battery. These negatively charged electrons need to be neutralized, or reduced in a capacity, by the positive ions in the electrolyte materials, enabling the cathode electrode to receive the electrons -- and generate electricity.

Electrolyte possibilities, now being worked on by ARL scientists, can be liquid, gel or solid substances, inspiring the current experimentation with polymer materials.

What all of this amounts to is a chemical process, involving two simultaneous chemical reactions, through which batteries generate and store electricity. Simply put, the ARL is experimenting with how different kinds of electrolytes, including solid materials such as polymers, can extend, improve and further protect soldier missions.

"Polymer electrolytes are solid at room temperature and are a unique class of electrolytes. They have pores, so they are conductive,” Mantz told Warrior.

An interesting essay from Battery University further explains how temperature rises in Lithium-ion battery cells can “approach the melting point of Lithium, causing thermal runaway, also known as ‘venting with flame.’” An overheated anode can generate needle-like structures call dendrites which can “short out” a battery by puncturing the electrolytes.

This technical advancement, should it come to fruition, introduces new strategic advantages. Naturally, longer lasting electronics, weapons and sensors not only increase forward-operating attack missions but also safeguard soldiers from enemy attack. It goes without saying that soldiers under enemy fire would instantly be extremely vulnerable should they lose electrical power, especially when carrying potentially flammable batteries.

Lithium-ions have been the preferred materials for years, in part because “Lithium is the lightest of all metals, has the greatest electromechanical potential and provides the largest specific energy per weight,” the Battery University essay states.

There is not a specific timeframe regarding when this emerging battery technology will be operational, yet ARL scientists do explain the program is making rapid progress.

This article by Kris Osborn originally appeared in WarriorMaven in 2020.

Kris Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics& Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

United Nations,

Eight countries in total lost their right to vote in the UN General Assembly. 

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced on Tuesday that the Islamic Republic of Iran and seven other countries have lost their right to vote in the UN General Assembly because of their failure to pay annual dues to the intergovernmental organization.

The secretary-general claimed that eleven of the UN’s member states were behind on their payments. Of the eleven, eight were stripped of their voting rights, including Sudan, which has been rocked by protests following a military coup in October, and Venezuela, which has faced an ongoing political crisis over the past decade. The five other countries stripped of their ability to vote were Antigua and Barbuda, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu.

UN members that fail to pay their obligations for two consecutive years lose their voting rights unless it can be shown that the failure to pay is “due to conditions beyond the control of the member.” The latter clause allowed the remaining three countries on the list—Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia—to retain their votes.

The sums owed are not substantial for any of the countries. Venezuela owes the UN roughly $40 million, Iran is $18 million behind on payments, and Sudan only owes $300,000. The remaining countries owe $75,000 or less.

Iran lost its voting rights for the first time in January 2021. After lodging a protest and engaging in negotiations, the country’s voting rights were temporarily restored in June under the condition that Tehran would make a minimum payment on its dues.

The Iranian government has attributed its inability to pay to “the oppressive and illegal U.S. sanctions” that have prevented it from accessing billions of dollars in foreign accounts. Iranian officials have claimed that the country intends to resume “full and timely payment of membership dues” when its economic situation improves.

The UN’s annual operating budget is roughly $3 billion, with a separate peacekeeping budget of $6.5 billion. The dues collected from member states provide the funds for these modest budgets. Each country’s dues are calculated by considering factors such as population, gross domestic product, and size.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Peter Jennings

Russia Ukraine, Eastern Europe

Yes, it’s great that ‘America is back,’ but what exactly are we all going to do about these pushy dictators?

Here’s What You Need to Remember: We need a confident America operating with a sense of its own power and purpose.

This week US President Joe Biden faces the first big test of his administration’s global authority. America’s credibility as an ally is on the line, as is Biden’s ability to shape a shared NATO approach to Russia and to back up diplomacy with believable military options.

The challenge to American power comes from Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, a ruthless exponent of brinkmanship. The immediate focus is on Putin’s build-up of about 100,000 troops on the Ukraine border, poised for a potential invasion to counter Russia’s invention of a ‘threat’ from Kyiv.

The stakes are, in fact, bigger for Putin. He is reasserting a Russian claim to a sphere of influence over former states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If Biden concedes to Putin’s claim, American credibility and power fade, but nothing yet in Washington’s approach shows a resolute plan of action.

This should matter profoundly to Australia because, to be blunt, we are as reliant on American power as the Europeans are. And Chinese leader Xi Jinping is learning from Russian risk-taking. The strategies Putin uses to threaten Europe could well be used by Xi to threaten Taiwan, coerce Southeast Asia and weaken Australia, Japan and America’s Pacific allies.

It might be claimed that Biden’s first big international test was withdrawing from Afghanistan, but that was a self-inflicted wound. Biden himself determined when and how quickly it would happen. America’s actions were not shaped or constrained by allies, the Afghan government or the Taliban, or informed by concerns about what would happen in Kabul once the troops had left.

Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine, reassertion of Soviet-style dominance in Belarus and Kazakhstan, and attempts to weaken NATO’s position provide altogether a different challenge to Biden’s authority. Putin is challenging America’s capacity to lead an ever more fractured Europe in the defense of its own security interests.

Russia’s assertion of a role for itself as a global power is based on Putin’s allegation that the US broke a commitment made in 1990 at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall not to expand NATO eastward, closer to the Soviet Union. The US secretary of state at the time, James Baker, told the New York Times this week, ‘I may have been a little bit forward on my skis on that’, but negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a unified Germany would be in NATO. A ban on states joining NATO was never agreed. Russia does, indeed, have legitimate security interests, but that doesn’t mean the interests of bordering countries are dispensable.

NATO now includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); Montenegro (2017); and North Macedonia (2020). This has drawn NATO closer to Russia’s borders, but was the result of countries seeking security with the democratic West against an aggressive Moscow.

Putin’s contemporary claims that NATO missiles and military exercises threaten Russian security and that Moscow must control its ‘near abroad’ neighbors to ensure its own security simply divert attention from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and proxy conflict in Ukraine’s eastern provinces.

So to the current military standoff on the Russia–Ukraine border. Maintaining 100,000 personnel on a war footing over winter is costly and can’t be sustained for long. I argued recently that Putin may have no intent to mount a full-scale invasion of western Ukraine. A hard-fought military occupation would rapidly bankrupt Russia and, over time, damage Putin’s domestic political standing. He has many options short of war including using cyberattacks to shut down Ukraine’s electricity grid. What’s clear is that the threat of Russian military action has spooked Biden, whose initial reaction was to tell Putin in their virtual summit in December, ‘If Russia further invades Ukraine, the United States and our European allies would respond with strong economic measures.’

Removing the threat of a US military response to Russian aggression gives Putin an option to press for further concessions. Even before negotiators arrived in Geneva for the first of three separate meetings with the Russians this week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken was foreshadowing possible US concessions including ‘arms control, where we have successfully engaged with Russia …; various confidence-building measures; greater transparency; risk reduction’.

Possible measures for negotiation include reducing NATO exercises and withdrawing US missiles from Poland. The American demand, Blinken stressed, was Russian reciprocity, in particular de-escalation of the Ukrainian situation. ‘It’ll be very difficult to make actual progress if Russia continues to escalate its military build-up and its inflammatory rhetoric.’

The possibility of reducing NATO exercises echoes former president Donald Trump’s unilateral concession to North Korea in 2018 to end key US – South Korean defensive exercises on the Korean peninsula. The North was delighted and offered nothing in return.

Rather than focusing on concessions, the US should look to make Putin’s goal of intimidation more difficult. Why not locate some US special forces trainers in Ukraine, as the US has done with Taiwan?

The Biden administration’s response to developments in Kazakhstan is even more puzzling. Let’s be clear: deploying thousands of Russian special forces to Almaty is not necessary for crowd control. This is a reassertion of Russian power over a ‘near abroad’ client state.

Yet the response of a senior Biden official at a White House press briefing was to say: ‘What is happening in Kazakhstan is not in any meaningful way about us.’ Once again Putin gets a pass from the White House for his bad behavior.

This week of negotiations may strengthen a US position as the reality hits that Russia is looking for opportunistic advantage. NATO can’t agree to rules about military exercising and positioning that weaken America’s ability to defend Europe. Nor will France and Germany step into that gap.

We need a confident America operating with a sense of its own power and purpose. Putin plays his weaker hand much more decisively. After one year in office, Biden needs a national security approach with less windy talk about the importance of allies. Yes, it’s great that ‘America is back’, but what exactly are we all going to do about these pushy dictators? The answer involves a harder focus on the sources of American strength and a greater willingness for collective military action, not to go to war but to deter risky adventurism by reminding authoritarian countries that there are necessary limits to their international bullying.

Peter Jennings is the executive director of ASPI and a former deputy secretary for strategy in the Defence Department.

This article was first published by The Australian and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters

Daniel L. Davis

Korean War, North Korea, South Korea, United States

The Battle of Taejon had been a tactical loss for the United States, but it had been a strategic victory that prevented the North to win the war in July 1950.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: The cost to the Americans had been considerable. After having already been mauled in the series of withdrawals from Osan to the Kum River, the 24th Infantry lost almost 1,000 more men killed, nearly 230 wounded and another 2,400 missing. One of the missing had been the division commander.

Barely two weeks after their June 25, 1950 surprise attack against South Korea and their American allies, the North Korean Army, under its commander Kim Il-Sung, had achieved stunning success. They had blown past all the South Korean frontier defenses, captured the capital of Seoul, and most alarming, had routed the American Army in a series of battles from Osan to the Kum River. If the city of Taejon were to fall as rapidly as the previous towns and cities, Kim might drive the U.S. troops into the sea at Pusan and win the war.

The North Koreans realized what was at stake and sought to move on Pusan with haste before too many U.S. troops arrived. They attacked the Kum river with two full divisions, the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions. After three days of relentless attacks, 24th Infantry Division commander Maj. Gen. General William Dean and his outnumbered American defenders were pushed back from the Kum river and into Taejon—and again surrounded.

Dean was a veteran of World War II and knew Taejon’s urban terrain did not favor the defense, but he had no choice. Unlike previous rounds of the fighting, the Americans would not be able to attempt an immediate breakout of the encirclement as they had done previously, because doing so would have strengthened the communist troops’ position and risked losing Pusan as well.

More to the point, Dean’s boss, Eighth Army Commander Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, ordered Dean to hold Taejon until at least 20 July: the 1st Cavalry Division and 25th Infantry Divisions were madly trying to establish strong defensive positions north of Pusan along the Nakdong river, where the terrain was more favorable for the defender. But they needed time to prepare fortifications before the North Korean armor arrived.

On 19 July, Kim’s lead troops penetrated into the city itself and began attacking American gun emplacements, destroying all food, water and ammunition storage sites they could find, and setting fire to many of the city’s old wooden structures. The battlefield was turning into an inferno. Dean had been ordered to hold the city at all costs until the next day, and he took the charge seriously: he refused to move his headquarters out of the city where it would be safer, choosing instead to endure the same hardships he was asking of his men. That decision would bolster his troops—but cost him dearly.

The situation for the Americans went from bad to worse, as elements of a third North Korean division soon joined the fight on the 19: the 105th Armored Division. Not only were the U.S. soldiers at a disadvantage owing to their unpreparedness to fight, they also suffered because many of the Korean residents of Taejon were sympathetic to the North Koreans and informed them where many of the U.S. fighting positions were.

The loss of men, equipment, and ammunition began to take a fatal toll on the Americans. Much of the 19 and 20 of July, Dean’s men had to fight bloody, vicious house-to-house battles with the North Koreans, often without radios to coordinate actions. The defense began to break down in any coherent fashion and North Korean troops continued the relentless onslaught into the city, unopposed from the North, East, and West. Dean tried to personally rally his men to establish new lines of defenses at subsequent neighborhoods, but each was pushed back.

Late on the 20, Dean finally ordered the remnants of his beleaguered force to withdraw to friendly lines further to the south of Taejon. 1st U.S. Cavalry Division tanks moved forward to help cover their withdrawal. They were too late, however, for the survivors of the 34th RCT, as their fifty vehicle convoy out of the city was ambushed by Kim’s troops and almost all were destroyed. The battle of Taejon was over and the North Koreans had won.

The cost to the Americans had been considerable. After having already been mauled in the series of withdrawals from Osan to the Kum River, the 24th Infantry lost almost 1,000 more men killed, nearly 230 wounded and another 2,400 missing. One of the missing had been the division commander.

In the confusion and chaos of the final withdrawal, Dean’s jeep got separated from the rest of his command vehicles, and he was lost behind enemy lines. For a while he fought on, destroying an enemy tank with a hand grenade with a small band of soldiers he had gathered (he would later be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism). After thirty-five days, however, he was captured, spending the rest of the war in a prisoner of war camp.

Though the Americans had lost the battle at extreme cost, the struggle had not been without value. Owing to Maj. Gen. Dean’s tenacious leadership and the willingness of his soldiers to fight on even under the most horrifying conditions, the remainder of Lt. Gen. Walker’s Eighth Army troops were able to land at Pusan and move inland far enough to establish a solid line of defense.

As it turned out, that defense—and the casualties the 24th ID had been able to inflict on the North Koreans in the process—proved to be decisive. The Americans had a perpetual logistics lifeline at Pusan and a virtual limitless ability to continue to pour more troops and material to overwhelm Kim’s forces, who now had to sustain resupply lines hundreds of miles long. American and allied airpower began crushing those lines, depriving the North of resupply in men and material. Kim’s chance of winning the war was now permanently defeated.

The Battle of Taejon had been a tactical loss for the United States, but it had been a strategic victory that prevented the North to win the war in July 1950.

Daniel L. Davis is a widely published analyst on national security and foreign policy. He retired as a Lt. Col. after twenty-one years in the U.S. Army, including four combat deployments, and is a Foreign Policy Fellow for Defense Priorities and a member of the Center for Defense Information's Military Advisory Board. Follow him on Twitter @DanielLDavis1.​

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Minxin Pei

Pivot to Asia,

The greatest security impact of the US strategic shift to East Asia will be felt in the Middle East, the region that relies most heavily on America for its security needs.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: In the age of the US–China cold war, America may be the indispensable power for East Asia, but not for other regions.

During the Cold War, Europe was America’s strategic priority. East Asia was largely a sideshow, even though the United States fought bloody wars in Korea and Vietnam, and also provided security for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

But in the unfolding new cold war between the US and China, America’s strategic priorities have flipped. Today, US security strategy is dominated by the China threat, and East Asia has replaced Europe as the principal theatre of the world’s defining geopolitical contest. And the security consequences of this shift in America’s focus are becoming increasingly visible.

Most notably, America’s adversaries are taking advantage of its preoccupation with China to test US resolve. Iran, for example, has hardened its position in the stalemated negotiations on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 2015 nuclear deal from which US President Donald Trump’s administration withdrew in 2018. Iranian leaders appear to be betting that President Joe Biden will be extremely reluctant to resort to military force and get bogged down in a new Middle Eastern war when the US is planning for a potential conflict with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military threats against Ukraine are apparently based on similar calculations. Putin believes that he now has a far freer hand to restore Russia’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood, because the US can ill afford to be distracted from its strategic focus on China.

The recent actions by Iran and Russia vividly illustrate America’s strategic dilemma. To increase the likelihood of a favourable outcome in its cold war with China, the US must maintain its strategic discipline and steer clear of secondary conflicts that could divert its attention and resources. Biden’s abrupt—and botched—withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 underscores his administration’s determination in that regard.

How America’s standoffs with Iran and Russia play out remains to be seen, but it’s a safe bet that the US will sooner or later encounter similar tests elsewhere. Some regional powers will be tempted to bully weaker neighbours because they think that the US pivot to East Asia will make American military intervention much less likely.

To be sure, America’s focus on China will affect different regions differently, with much less impact on regional security in Latin America and Africa than in the Middle East. In Latin America and Africa, US policy in the coming years will likely emphasise economic, technological and diplomatic competition with China. The losers will be countries where China has negligible influence or interests.

The greatest security impact of the US strategic shift to East Asia will be felt in the Middle East, the region that relies most heavily on America for its security needs. In all likelihood, focusing on China will dramatically curtail America’s role as the region’s policeman. While the US will continue to provide arms and aid to its most important allies and partners, the Middle East as a whole will have to live without the US as its security provider.

More generally, if the US maintains its strategic emphasis on China, it will unavoidably lose considerable geopolitical influence. Countries that lose American largesse will understandably feel less beholden to the US.

But the diminution of America’s global stature could also bring significant benefits—for both the US and the rest of the world. Strategic discipline would make the US less likely to wage unnecessary wars. The dark side of US unipolarity during much of the post–Cold War era has been America’s recklessness in resorting to military force. According to the US Congressional Research Service, in the three decades since the Cold War ended, the US has used its armed forces abroad every year. In particular, it has squandered an immense amount of blood and treasure in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Elsewhere, America’s new geopolitical orientation will force countries that have until now counted on US protection and support to learn to fend for themselves. For example, some Middle Eastern countries have sought to rebuild ties and foster peace in preparation for American disengagement: relations between some Gulf states and Israel have improved dramatically in recent years.

In Europe, ‘strategic autonomy’ may be mostly rhetoric for now. But as the US makes it increasingly clear to its European allies that the region is a secondary priority, they will have to turn their rhetoric into action.

Former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright once claimed that the US is the world’s ‘indispensable nation’. That description has arguably been true for most of the post–Cold War era. In the age of the US–China cold war, America may be the indispensable power for East Asia, but not for other regions. As this new reality takes hold, the rest of the world will have no choice but to adapt. That could lead to more military conflict, but it could also lead to more peace.

Minxin Pei is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in partnership with Project Syndicate.

Image: Reuters

Aid and food distribution operations in northern Ethiopia are about “to grind to a halt” amid ongoing fighting, bloodshed and a lack of funding that is making humanitarian access impossible, the UN World Food Programme, WFP, said on Friday.

Peter Suciu

T-72B3M,

Russian personnel have been undergoing training to operate the improved T-72B3M tanks, which offer a variety of improved combat properties.

The Russian military currently maintains a small force of T-72 tanks that have been upgraded to the T-72B3M version—also known as the T-72B4. The tanks were first exhibited during the 2014 Tank Biathlon World Championships, and the initial batch of twenty upgraded tanks entered service with the Western Military District of the Russian Army in February 2017.

This week, Tass reported that a batch of thirty T-72B3M tanks arrived at the Russian Army’s 201st military base in Tajikistan as part of its rearmament with advanced weaponry in December 2021. The battalion of the advanced tanks was to boost the capabilities of a motorized infantry unit through improved maneuverability while enhancing the survivability of the tank crews.

Russian personnel have been undergoing training to operate the improved T-72B3M tanks, which offer a variety of improved combat properties.

“In the course of their training, the crews studied the combat capabilities and technical characteristics of the tank, the preparation of its armaments, sighting systems, and ranging equipment. At the Lyaur mountainous proving ground, the tank gunners and commanders conducted fire on the move against the targets located at a distance of up to 2,000 meters from the 125mm guns outfitted with the Sosna-U multichannel sight that cuts the time of detecting and striking targets,” the press office of the 201st military base said in a statement.

In addition, the driver mechanics took part in a variety of exercises including speedy maneuvers, surmounting natural and artificial obstacles, and moving backward using rear-view cameras.

Russia’s Central Military District Commander Colonel-General Alexander Lapin had previously told reporters that a set of measures was underway to further enhance the combat potential of the 201st Russian military base in Tajikistan, including its rearmament with advanced weapon systems.

The Russian Army’s 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, is Russia’s largest military facility outside of its national borders. It comprises motor rifle, armored, artillery, and reconnaissance units, air defense forces; radiation, chemical, and biological protection and signal troops. Under an agreement signed in October 2012, Russia’s military base in Tajikistan will remain operational until at least 2042.

New Lease on Life

The Soviet-designed T-72 main battle tank (MBT) initially entered production in 1971 to replace the T-54/T-55 tank series that had been the workhorse of the Soviet tank forces in the latter half of the Cold War. More than 25,000 T-72s were produced including for export.

Moscow has made significant efforts to modernize its aging tanks even as it has developed more modern armored combat platforms, including the T-14 Armata. The T-72B3M is the latest iteration of the ubiquitous T-72, and it features a nearly identical layout with driver’s cab at forward hull, fighting compartment in the center, and the power-pack at the rear. The T-72B3M MBT is still manned by a crew of three, which include a driver/mechanic, a commander, and a gunner.

The middle section of the forward hull of the MBT houses the driver, while the turret accommodates the other two crew members. The T-72B3M is equipped with an advanced fire control system and a new thermal sight. In addition, the mobility and combat characteristics of the tank have also been improved to compete with the most advanced tanks worldwide. The tank is even equipped with radio systems for encrypted digital voice and data transfer, snorkels for deep fording, and a built-in blade for self-entrenching.

Despite the age of the platform, the T-72B3M is capable of engaging and destroying targets with missiles from the halt and on the move, day and night, at ranges of up to 5,000 meters with fire accuracy close to 100 percent. In addition, the tank’s automatic target tracker increases the accuracy of fire against moving targets and substantially cuts the time of preparing for fire.

It is armed with a 2A46M5 125mm smoothbore gun, an advanced version of the 2A46M cannon. It is capable of firing a range of ammunition, including armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS), high-explosive fragmentation (HEF), and high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT), as well as 9M119 Refleks (NATO codename: AT-11 Sniper) guided anti-tank missiles. The projectiles and missiles are loaded by an auto-loader.

The upgraded T-72B3M has also received an effective protection system that boosts its efficiency both in combined arms warfare and in a variety of combat environments.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

A new bill being debated by lawmakers in the United Kingdom increases the risk of discrimination and “serious human rights violations” and breaches the country's obligations under international law, five independent UN human rights experts said on Friday.

Warrior Maven

West Point, United States

Fast-changing combat scenarios require strength, maneuverability and crucial judgement regarding when and how to move.

Here's What You Need to Know: While various kinds of hand-to-hand combat training have been part of West Point cadet training since the early 1900s and before, Larsen was first to introduce the integrated Combatives concept to West Point in the mid-1990s.

Weapons, firearms and lethal hand-to-hand combat are often blended together in high-risk military combat confrontations, a circumstance which many military and law enforcement entities believe now requires an emerging and distinct “close-in” fight training known as “Combatives.”

Combatives, now being taught to every cadet at West Point, is built upon the reality that large percentages of casualties in warfare take place within an immediate sphere of five feet, Matt Larsen, Director of the Combative Program at West Point, told Warrior Maven Global Security in an interview.

“Lots of people are teaching how to shoot, and lots of people are teaching mixed martial arts. Combatives is the area between those where they meet. You can’t just be trained in both…..you need to put them together. They are part of a continuum,” Larsen said.

Larsen runs the West Point program and operates a long-standing consulting practice which brings Combatives training to a range of entities including the US military, friendly foreign forces and law enforcement organizations.

While various kinds of hand-to-hand combat training have been part of West Point cadet training since the early 1900s and before, Larsen was first to introduce the integrated Combatives concept to West Point in the mid-1990s.

The training prepares for fights wherein an enemy quickly reaches for a gun or knife or attempts to take a weapon from a person they are attacking. Confrontations of this kind require an integrated approach - blending physical strength, hand-to-hand attack and close-in weapons use.

Fast-changing combat scenarios require strength, maneuverability and crucial judgement regarding when and how to move. An ability to anticipate enemy moves and counter weapons, firearms and hand-combat attacks is fundamental to the training. Learning how to learn, Larsen says, is a key to making progress.

“Fights are all about range and angle,” he added. 

Previously the West Point combatives program was run by US-based global security firm Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions LLC (Torres AES here} from Virginia, The program was so successful that the academy hired Matt Larsen as a full time Director of Combatives training.

Larsen was an employee of Torres which in addition to combatives supports the US State Dept., DoD, DoJ and other elite US agencies offering a range of security and training services. Torres guards numerous US Embassies and DoD Forward Operating Bases around the world, works with friendly foreign governments and trains clients in a range of areas - to include cybersecurity, cyber and digital forensics, law enforcement, prison operations, government transformation, combatives, linguistics and other areas.​

Working for Torres, Larson taught Combatives and Close Quarter Battle (CQB) to US Forces in Iraq. CQB, as one might expect, took on a new urgency following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Small ground units were routinely called upon to “clear areas,” attack and engage small groups of insurgents and engage in high-stakes combat in close-quarter buildings and urban environments.

"We were glad to have Matt's expertise in bringing a unique blend of combat skill to our soldiers in Iraq. This kind of integrated "close-in" training seems to address an often unrecognized need to prepare for how fights happen," Torres CEO Jerry Torres told Maven.

The training, described by Larsen as a process rather than a particular event or tactic, operates on the assumption that many close-in fights typically involve a combination of knives, guns and a need for physical combat.

“When was the last time a group of soldiers went into a building where they could shoot everybody in there? You cannot be proficient at clearing a room unless you are proficient in hand-to-hand combat,” Larsen explained.

Grounded in what Larsen points to as a “warrior ethos,” Combatives training explores the full range of dynamics associated with close-in combat. This includes assessments of pre-combat cues, ways to quickly access a weapon, block a sudden attack and maintain the requisite level of readiness for moments when fights might erupt.

Combatives skill can not only lead to more successful attacks or warzone engagements but can also at times prevent violence from escalating to a lethal level. For instance, what are someone’s options at a security checkpoint when an intruder causes problems? Larsen asked.

“If you do not have hand-to-hand combat skills, your only option is lethal,” he said.

Having trained police forces and US allies such as Kuwaiti special forces, Canadian special forces and British infantry, Larsen says global urbanization is creating a growing need for “close-in” combat skills.

There are also, quite naturally, many key applications of Combatives for police forces and other law enforcement entities.

“31-percent of police are killed from within five feet. 38-percent of the fatalities do not involve marksmanship,” Larsen said.

This article first appeared on Warrior Maven in 2018 and is being republished here due to reader interest.

Image: U.S. Army Flickr.

Authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in neighbouring Serbia, must condemn and refrain from any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, the UN human rights office, OHCHR, said on Friday. 

Trevor Filseth

Nord Stream 2, Europe

The pipeline may provide Russia with significant leverage over America's NATO allies. 

In a floor vote on Thursday, the U.S. Senate failed to adopt Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-TX) bill to impose sanctions against Russia’s Nord Stream 2 undersea natural gas pipeline.

Fifty-five senators voted in favor of the proposal, including all but one Senate Republican and six Democrats, while forty-three Democrats and Republican Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) opposed it. Although it secured a majority, the legislation fell five votes short of the sixty votes required to pass.

While Senate Democrats expressed their disapproval of the Russian government’s activities, the opponents of Cruz’s bill justified their votes by citing the existence of similar legislation proposed by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ). Menendez’s bill would not immediately act against the pipeline but would sanction it and other Russian entities if the Kremlin launched a military intervention in Ukraine.

Opponents of the bill also cited the potential for divisions with America’s NATO allies, who largely share Washington’s foreign policy priorities but would benefit economically from cheap Russian gas.

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) argued that the legislation could “drive a wedge” between the United States and Europe. Shaheen claimed that sanctions could be particularly damaging to the United States’ relationship with Germany, where the pipeline is located.

Although the Biden administration has not opted to sanction the pipeline, it has vocally opposed it, arguing that it may provide Moscow with leverage over Europe’s foreign policy. U.S. allies in Eastern Europe have also opposed the pipeline, in part because its construction excludes them from transit fees for shipping gas through their territory in existing pipelines.

In advocating for his bill, Cruz claimed that Ukraine would “risk … getting wiped off the map altogether” if the pipeline went into effect.

The undersea pipeline was constructed between terminals in the Russian city of Vyborg and the German city of Greifswald via the Baltic Sea. The pipeline was built at a cost of roughly $11 billion and was completed in late 2021. However, it has not yet gone into operation due to delays in regulatory approval. If no sanctions are forthcoming from the United States, it is predicted that the first gas shipments will begin in mid-2022.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) called on Friday for concerted international action to end armed conflict in Africa’s central Sahel region, which has forced more than 2.5 million people to flee their homes in the last decade.

Vanessa Geidel

Security, East Asia

While Scholz has not been an outspoken critic of Beijing, Germany’s new foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, has made strong statements critical of China.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: If Scholz’s SPD could govern alone, we would likely witness a continuity of Merkel’s policy in the region.

After 16 years of Angela Merkel’s leadership, a tight race on election night and almost two months of coalition negotiations in Germany, the Social Democratic Party, or SPD, returned to power with Olaf Scholz the new chancellor. With the Greens and the Free Democratic Party, they’ve formed the Ampelkoalition (traffic light coalition)—the federal republic’s first ever three-party governing arrangement.

The new chancellor is widely expected to largely continue Merkel’s legacy, but the coalition agreement outlining policy plans for the next four years signals changes in German’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Since the September election, two important announcements were made regarding future German activity in the region. In November, the chief of the German Navy, Vice-Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, said he would send vessels into the Indo-Pacific every two years with the intention of increasing cooperation with Japan, Australia and the US, and to advocate for peace, free navigation and maintenance of the rules-based international order in the South China Sea. The announcement came during a visit to Tokyo by the German frigate Bayern on its seven-month voyage through the region.

In September, the German Air Force will participate in Pitch Black, a multinational exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force and scheduled to take place over northern Australia. Germany plans to send six Eurofighters, three refuelling tankers and three transport aircraft, a significant step up in its Indo-Pacific participation.

While the navy and air force plans were put in place under Merkel, the new coalition has signalled its wish to increase Germany’s presence in the Indo-Pacific.

If the Scholz government stays true to that promise, then we’re likely to see Germany engage with more confidence, bluntness and interest to intensify cooperation with regional nations.

The coalition agreement aims to strengthen cooperation on multilateralism, democracy, climate protection, trade and digitalisation, and to expand cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. The agreement specifically seeks increased cooperation on multiple levels with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea as values-based partners.

The agreement also seeks a stronger strategic partnership with India and says Germany wishes to address the impacts of climate change and to ‘stand up for those affected by rising sea levels’.

If the coalition contract is to be taken at face value, German engagement with Beijing may be blunter than that of past administrations.

The agreement sets out a China policy driven by values and not afraid to criticise Beijing’s internal affairs and geopolitics. The agreement opposes Beijing’s ‘one-China’ policy and strongly supports democratic Taiwan’s inclusion in international organisations. It takes the position strongly that all changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must happen peacefully and with mutual agreement. The new government wants China to return to the ‘one country, two systems’ principle for Hong Kong and it has undertaken to address human rights violations in Xinjiang against the Uyghur and Kazakh minorities.

This approach to China contrasts with the coalition contract at the start of Merkel’s final term in 2018. That deal chose to not address China’s human rights abuses in detail and only briefly mentioned its growing geopolitical importance. The 2018 contract favoured trade and investment for Germany’s economic benefit. Merkel’s stance on China was at times considered too lenient and she appeared reluctant to make concrete statements condemning Beijing.

The 2021 agreement repeatedly uses the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, which was not mentioned in the 2018 agreement, as Germany adopts new terminology championed by India, Australia and the US.

Indications are that the Scholz government will not be shy about stepping on Beijing’s toes. While some media outlets have suggested that the agreement signals a ‘break with China’, Chinese government mouthpiece Global Times has downplayed the potential impact on relations. It says the ‘landscape of China–Germany cooperation will not change’ as ‘Scholz’s party has always advocated for dialogue with China’. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has already warned Germany that issues such as Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are ‘all China’s internal affairs’.

While Scholz has not been an outspoken critic of Beijing, Germany’s new foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, has made strong statements critical of China. Baerbock, who was the Greens’ candidate for chancellor, has described China’s Belt and Road Initiative as ‘hardcore power politics’ and has urged a ban on products from Xinjiang, saying Europe must make sure that ‘products from forced labour do not come onto our market’. Since becoming foreign minister on 8 December, she has spoken out against previous styles of German diplomacy, stating that ‘eloquent silence is not a form of diplomacy in the long run, even if it has been seen that way by some in recent years.’ She aims to establish a values-driven relationship with China based on ‘dialogue and toughness’.

This week, Baerbock made her first official trip to the US, meeting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken. She stressed the importance of the German-American relations, stating that Europe has ‘no partner stronger than the US’.

How much Germany’s Indo-Pacific policies of the next four years end up reflecting those outlined in the coalition agreement remains to be seen. If Scholz’s SPD could govern alone, we would likely witness a continuity of Merkel’s policy in the region. A significant deciding factor will be how much room Scholz will grant Baerbock to implement her own policies. If she is able to develop freely in the role, then Beijing can expect some difficult years ahead with Berlin.

Vanessa Geidel is a coordinator in ASPI’s professional development program. 

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Tu-160M, Europe

The Tu-160M retains many of the design elements of the original aircraft, but features numerous advancements and new hardware.

Russia’s Tupolev Tu-160 “White Swan” (NATO reporting name “Blackjack”) was the last strategic bomber designed for the Soviet Union. The legacy airframe, which first entered service in 1987, remains the largest and heaviest bomber ever built.

As part of the Russian Air Force’s Long Range Aviation branch, efforts have been made to keep the active fleet flying. Upgrades to its electronics system and other modernization efforts have been ongoing since the early 2000s, and in 2015, Moscow announced plans to resume production of an upgraded version of the White Swan.

The first of those new production models has reportedly performed its debut flight.

“On January 12, the first newly-built Tu-160M strategic missile-carrying bomber performed its debut flight from the aerodrome of the Kazan Aviation Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Tupolev Company [part of the United Aircraft Corporation within Rostec],” the press office of the state technology corporation Rostec announced according to a report from Tass.

The newly-built strategic bomber performed its maiden flight, which lasted about thirty minutes, at an altitude of 600 meters. During the flight, the crew was able to inspect the aircraft during various aerial maneuvers.

Significant Improvements

The Tu-160M retains many of the design elements of the original aircraft, but features numerous advancements and new hardware. It remains the largest and heaviest Mach 2+ supersonic military aircraft ever built and is second in overall length to the experimental XB-70 Valkyrie.

“The new aircraft has 80 percent of its systems and equipment modernized,” explained United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) CEO Yury Slyusar.

The upgraded White Swan, which remains outwardly similar to the American Rockwell B-1 Lancer, will reportedly be able to carry new emerging weapons.

“Today we see considerable prospects for the Tu-160 platform: its further development will make it possible to use it for new, including breakthrough weapons,” explained Russian Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov.

The Tu-160M is now designated to strike enemy targets in remote areas with nuclear and conventional weapons. Whereas the U.S. Air Force’s B-1 is a bomber in the classical sense—meaning it flies to targets to deploy its bomb load—the Tu-160 was developed to operate as a stand-off weapons platform, where missiles would be launched from its bomb bay doors.

After deploying its weapons load, the “White Swan” would speed off at Mach 2+. The White Swan was also the only Soviet-designed bomber not to carry any defensive weapons, which is why even today it is routinely escorted in patrol missions by fighter aircraft such as the MiG-31.

Moscow has strived to tout the long-range capabilities of the Tu-160, and in September 2020 two crews onboard one of the bombers broke a record for the longest non-stop flight for the aircraft. It was in the air for more than twenty-five hours, and covered a distance of more than 20,000 kilometers. Perhaps Russia will seek to best its record with a new model Tu-160.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

Wallace C. Gregson

EMALS, Indo-Pacific

The United States must eliminate any worries about revealing EMALS and AAG technologies and share the production and implementation with its allies.

Liberal democratic countries are stirring. On September 15, 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the establishment of AUKUS, “an enhanced trilateral security partnership.” On January 6, 2022, Japan and Australia signed a defense pact, making Australia only the second nation to have such an agreement with Japan. On January 7, Japan time, the United States and Japan convened the 2022 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. Among many other remarkable items is this paragraph:

The Ministers committed to pursue joint investments that accelerate innovation and ensure the Alliance maintains its technological edge in critical and emerging fields, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, directed energy, and quantum computing. The Ministers concurred to conduct a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology. They also welcomed the framework Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation in Testing and Evaluation, based on which the two sides will advance and accelerate collaboration on emerging technologies. [Emphasis added] They stressed collaboration on streamlined procurement and resilient defense supply chains.

The sincerity of this pledge to advance and accelerate collaboration will be tested soon. Japan is interested in the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system. It’s now a proven technology on the U.S. Navy’s newest carrier, CVN 78, the Gerald R Ford. It’s also said to be approved for sale to one U.S. ally in Europe. Japan is keenly interested in railgun and directed energy weapons, and is aware that China is about to commission a new carrier with electromagnetic launch and recovery technology. 

We’re off to a good start on developing operational naval interoperability. The United Kingdom devoted the maiden voyage of its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and its accompanying multinational escorts as Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG-21), to working with allies and partners from Great Britain to the Middle East to East Asia. Its “F-35 Lightning II” air group included a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B squadron and a Royal Air Force F-35B squadron. (The “B” model is the short takeoff and vertical landing version of the F-35). While in the Mediterranean the Queen Elizabeth brought Italian F-35B fighters aboard, proving that multinational operations from one carrier are effective across language barriers. The Queen Elizabeth deployment was not just a global demonstration. While in the Middle East, CSG-21’s air wing participated in combat missions against ISIS.

In Asia, CSG-21 participated in multinational exercises involving six different navies—the U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal New Zealand Navy. 

Two U.S. carrier strike groups drilled with the United Kingdom’s CSG-21 and a Japanese big-deck warship in a major naval exercise in the waters southeast of Okinawa, Japan. A total of seventeen surface ships, including four aircraft carriers, operated together in the exercises. 

The two U.S. carriers employ conventional catapults and arresting gear, while the Queen Elizabeth uses a “ski jump” bow for launch. The Japanese ship, the JS Izumo (DDH-183), a “straight deck” without catapults, ski jump, or arresting gear, was recently modified with a new deck coating to support F-35B operations. U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs embarked on Izumo to assist in verifying the modifications and to participate in the exercises. Japan is buying both the F-35A and F-35B aircraft and returning to the ranks of nations deploying aircraft carriers. 

Naval task forces, especially those that include one or more aircraft carriers, are ideal air, land, and sea power and influence projection formations. Nothing else provides such presence, wide-area engagement, surveillance, and maritime domain awareness. Recent deployments involving Great Britain’s new carrier alongside U.S. and other allied ships provided powerful demonstrations of presence and power. The United States can build on this recent multinational effort through the creation of standing multinational maritime task forces that can accept many allied participants. Joint and combined theater commands, in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, would support these task forces and enhance readiness and influence across all participating forces.

The United States must also look to near-term enhancements to its allied naval capabilities. One such enhancement should be incorporating the Electromagnetic Launch System and its accompanying Advanced Arresting Gear throughout allied forces. Launch and recovery cycles of all types of aircraft, manned and unmanned, tankers, surveillance planes, and stealth fighters are accelerated with less stress on the airframes will realize greater range and a wider assortment of capabilities across all aviation components. These systems, adapted for smaller decks currently thought capable only of rotary-wing or STOVL (short takeoff and vertical landing) aircraft, will enhance capability across the force, adding to allied interoperability and effectiveness. With modernized launch and recovery systems among allied forces, individual aircraft can access any flight deck, an essential capability in any emergency.

Imitation is often part of international competition. So is demonstration and intimidation. This naval competition is no exception. China’s newest carrier under construction is likely to employ electromagnetic systems to support aircraft launch and recovery. It’s a good bet that the People’s Liberation Army Navy will showcase this achievement near Japan and Taiwan to demonstrate its superiority, and as a counter to the USS Ford before it can deploy to the region. That’s no small matter as the United States competes for influence in the Western Pacific. China is already marketing its version of EMALS to clients like Pakistan and others. U.S. allies are watching. Will the United States respond?

If the United States can’t restrain the proliferation of this type of technology, it must move the goalposts, developing and improving common alliance capabilities at unmatched speed. The United States must eliminate any worries about revealing EMALS and AAG technologies and share the production and implementation with its allies. Rapid implementation of these systems across U.S. and allied fleets, and the development of operational concepts to take maximum advantage, are essential.

Wallace C. Gregson served as a former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2009-11) and is currently a senior advisor at Avascent International as well as senior director for China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest. Gregson last served as the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Bases, Pacific, headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. He is a senior advisor to General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems.

Image: Flickr.

Ahmad Hashemi

Democracy, Middle East

Iran needs to choose whether it wants to remain an expansionist Persian-Shiite empire or transform into a multi-ethnic democracy where Persians and Shiites have no claim over other ethnic, racial, and sectarian groups.

Though Iran has attempted to move towards democracy in fits and starts since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, any genuine advance forward has been met with unending opposition, mainly originating from influential landlords, conservative circles, traditional Shiite clerics, and other significant social forces. The uncomfortable reality is that despite being a century into its transformation, there are myriad factions, including a large number of ethnic Persian figures and political parties, that have indicated a willingness to give up on the prospect of democracy in exchange for the preservation of contemporary Iran as the successor to the Persian empire of old.

Iranian officials have time and time again stated that they are the last guardians of the Persian empire, and that Iran’s destiny is intertwined with that of the Islamic Republic. During the anti-regime protests in November 2018, the Iranian regime went as far as cautioning the public that people need not protest, as doing so would bring about the country’s collapse and enable external its enemies to “Syrianize” Iran.

Strange as it may sound, this motivation to preserve traditional social structures transcends contemporary political divides. Various opposition forces also hold similar opinions: when the  2019 protests in Iran reached an unprecedented and worrying level—according to a Reuters report, more than 1,500 protesters were killed—the Persian-dominated Freedom Movement of Iran warned that “the collapse of Iran is imminent,” expressing concern that the fall of the regime would coincide with Iran’s collapse. Some secular Persian ethno-nationalists, such as the dissident politician and former minister of information and tourism under the shah of Iran, Daryoush Homayoun, have clearly indicated that they are willing to bear arms and fight on the side of the current Islamist regime if that is what it takes to hold together the Persian empire. The issue is serious enough that scholar Brenda Shaffer, who has extensively written on Iran and its ethnic groups, has contended that “Iran faces the democracy conundrum: in multi-ethnic states where one non-majority group prevails over others, democratization entails risk of loss of empire.”

A significant number of ethnic Persians, including members of the former regime of the shah, who fled the country after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, support the idea of a unified Persian empire at the cost of denying basic rights to the non-Persian half of the population—even if that means condoning the nuclearization of Iran, supporting Iran’s designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, and glorifying its deceased commander, Qassem Soleimani. According to a report in the Washington Post, Ardeshir Zahedi, the last ambassador of Iran to the United States and the former son-in-law of the shah, “sometimes spoke favorably of the new regime, defending the country’s nuclear program and praising Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.”

The Iranian regime is well aware of both this complex situation and the desire, particularly prevalent among Persians, to preserve “the empire” and rule over non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran and potentially even beyond. This expansionist ideology, commonly referred to as Iranshahr, is often exploited by the regime to justify its military adventurism abroad and suppress domestic dissent voices, especially among non-Persian ethnic groups, who have stronger reasons to push for democracy.

Secular Iranshahri Persians Support the Islamist Regime

Why do many secular Persian ethnonationalists support the current clerical regime in Iran? The honest answer is that they are deeply concerned over the prospect of Iran disintegrating outright due to deep ethnic inequalities within the country. Ironically, however, Persian nationalists hide this fear when sharing their opinions with Western pundits. Take, for example, AEI scholar Michael Rubin, who has repeated the same argument of ethnic Persians in his writings—including in a recent article with a rather clear title: “Iran Will Not Fracture on Ethnic Lines Like Ethiopia.”

Rubin, though, cannot really be blamed: he, like most other U.S. analysts, policymakers, and DC think-tankers, is not familiar enough with the nuances of Iran’s domestic dynamics and gets his “facts” about Iran from the very same Persian ethno-nationalists who have every reason to present a distorted and biased view on the country’s complex ethnic composition and its implications for the future.

Consider this: because of ethnic inequalities within Iran, Persians are generally more affluent, better-educated, and better-organized. Consequently, they are overrepresented in Iranian diaspora, academia, media outlets, and think tanks. For instance, the Iranian-American journalists and think-tankers who conduct research activities related to Iran at major Washington DC think tanks or media outlets are almost exclusively either ethnic Persians or Persianized Iranians. The latter generally have sympathetic views on Persians and usually harbor unfavorable opinions on non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran because they are insecure about any concept of Iranian “nationhood” which is not exclusively based on the Persian identity.

A holistic approach to future developments in Iran should contain a more balanced view on Iran’s ethnic and other complex domestic dynamics. The Persian factor, too, is equally important. If Persians were to gradually come to embrace an inclusive, decentralized democratic structure for the future of Iran, then democratization efforts would gain momentum. If not, then the disintegration of the country would become a likelier possibility.

Contrary to what experts like Rubin argue, it is not outside of the realm of reality to anticipate that Iran could collapse as a result of what some might call a semi-apartheid system—in place since 1925—and split the country into its constituent ethnic units, including Azerbaijanis, Arabs, Kurds, and Baluch. It is important to recognize the diversity within Iran. Yet, instead of recognizing its multi-ethnic composition, the Islamist regime has further tilted towards Persian ethnonationalism over the last two decades, unofficially embracing the Pahlavi-era doctrine of “One Nation, One Language, One Supreme Leader, One God.”

Secularization Further Stokes Ethnic Awareness

Recent developments, such as the rise of global identity politics; an international resurgence of ethnonationalism; and the inception of the internet, social media, and other platforms have all contributed to a revival of ethnic identities in Iran. Moreover, Tehran’s Islamization policies have largely backfired among the youth, and as a result, ethnic nationalism has gained momentum within the country. Contrary to most Muslim-majority nations, enthusiasm for Islamist ideology in Iran has been declining for the last two decades. Ethno-nationalist movements are on the rise, and Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluch groups are demanding equal economic opportunities and cultural and linguistic autonomy.

Iran needs to choose whether it wants to remain an expansionist Persian-Shiite empire (Iranshahr), or transform into a multi-ethnic democracy where Persians and Shiites have no claim over other ethnic, racial, and sectarian groups.

As the regime’s domestic legitimacy is steadily declining and its long-term survivability is in doubt, it remains to be seen what path awaits Iran.

Ahmad Hashemi is a Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @MrAhmadHashemi.

Image: Reuters.

Wes Martin

Azerbaijan-Armenia, South Caucasus

Only through breaking Armenia’s dependency on Russia—through renormalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey—will the region’s true economic potential be unleashed.

On January 14, 2022, Turkey and Armenia will begin talks aimed at reopening Europe’s final Cold War-era closed border. The historic move, supported by the West, promises to fundamentally reconfigure the South Caucasus—and Russia’s sway within it.

Blocked borders, jagged pipelines, and irrational freight routes speak to the region’s limitations, all of which have played to the former imperial power. Russia prefers these countries to be at odds as it hands Moscow economic and political leverage while stifling solidarity against it.

Should the countries remain at odds, a landlocked Armenia will suffer under the weight of regional isolation. To the west lie the closed border with Turkey and the freight lines to Europe. To the east lie the equally sealed border with Azerbaijan and the gateway to central Asia. Yet the primary rationale for keeping both borders closed has disappeared: the occupation of almost one-fifth of Azerbaijan—according to the UN Security Council—since the 1990s.

As the USSR crumbled, the neighbors fell into conflict over the mixed region of Karabakh. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War reversed most of Armenia’s land grab. Since then, Baku has favored open borders and logistics lines. So too has Turkey, who closed its border in solidarity with ally Azerbaijan after the first war. With the status quo altered and some necessary space between the conflict, now there is an opening for change.

Without open borders, the region’s economic potential remains locked. But if open borders and restored rail lines become a reality, Armenia could create the fastest freight line between East Asia and Europe.  An alternative route would also weaken East Asia and Europe’s reliance on Russia. Cooperation in the South Caucasus also fuels greater prosperity and helps the region stand on its own feet.

But there are other barriers to overcome. It is not simply solidarity with Azerbaijan that has structured Turkey’s relations with Armenia, but a contested history. At its core is the killing of 1.5 million ethnic Armenians during World War I. Since then, Armenia has characterized said acts as genocidal but Turkey disputes the label despite recognizing atrocities were committed by the Ottoman empire. It remains a thorny issue between the two nations.

As for Azerbaijan, wounds are still raw in Armenia since the closure of the 2020 war. Being the victor of the 2020 conflict, it may be easy for Baku to talk up renormalization in its wake. Selling a radically different future from the moral puncture of defeat—with former foes establishing trade and diplomatic relations—is another matter.

Given the discontent now playing out within Armenia, the difficulties are clear. Detainees released from Azerbaijan—which the government had lobbied for—were condemned by the speaker of the house as being deserters and traitors, sparking protests from the parents. Many are looking for someone to blame, scapegoats permitted.

Before he became prime ministership, Nikol Pashinyan had championed himself as a reformer following the 2018 protests against a corrupt ruling elite. Those he had toppled led the counter-offense after defeat in the war, staging an unsuccessful coup. They were the militaristic parties that had ruled Armenia for much of its independence and had shunned compromise to resolve the long-frozen conflict. Many were themselves from Karabakh and based their legitimacy—often to deflect from accusations of graft or incompetence—on the struggle for the territory.

Having survived the junta’s unsuccessful coup d’etat, Pashinyan is now talking up cooperation with Armenia’s former enemies. This has again earned him another chorus of traitor. Yet despite the pressure he is experiencing, he must remain steadfast. He won a renewed mandate postwar to chart a different path from the discredited elite of the past: turning away from Russia and toward the West.

If anything, however, Russia’s grip has tightened over Armenia’s sovereignty, with Moscow’s peacekeepers stationed in Karabakh. This growing dependence was neatly delineated by the recent upheaval in Kazakhstan. As part of the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization, Pashinyan sent Armenian troops to quell the protests.

This rankled a domestic population who did not see Russia’s sweep to its aid in a time of need. It was also viewed at odds with the prime minister and his supporters’ politics. The Kazakhstan protests his troops helped quell differed little from the 2018 Velvet Revolution that had swept him to power. But power politics prevailed over values. Pashinyan had little choice but to follow orders. Only through breaking Armenia’s dependency on Moscow—through renormalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey—will that change.

The first president of an independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, spoke of compromise following the first Karabakh war to stabilize the region and entrench national sovereignty. He was toppled by the same forces that now threaten Pashinyan. But the current prime minister must hold out. Economic prosperity not only for Armenia, but for the whole region—and then throwing off the Russian yoke—will be the reward.

Colonel (Ret.) Wes Martin has served in law enforcement positions around the world and holds an MBA in International Politics and Business.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Inflation,

Many Americans haven't seen an annual inflation rate this high in their entire lives. 

Russia is massing troops on the border with Ukraine, China is expanding its presence in the Indo-Pacific Region, North Korea is testing hypersonic weapons, and COVID-19 shows no signs of going away. Yet, for most Americans, the most worrisome threat is the record inflation that is increasing household expenses and eating into wages. The 7 percent increase in the inflation rate over the course of 2021 marked the largest annual increase in inflation in nearly four decades.

Americans saw prices for the basic necessities they rely on rise at a dramatic rate in 2021. While the government's efforts to provide stimulus aid and ultra-low interest rates motivated Americans to spend, supply chain woes resulted in such high demand for goods that prices increased at a record pace.

The U.S. Department of Labor reported on Wednesday that the core inflation rate, which excludes volatile goods such as food and gas, jumped by 5.5 percent in December, the highest in decades. According to the Associated Press, overall inflation rose 0.5 percent from November to December. The only good news was that the increase was down from 0.8 percent in October.

Economists have warned that because inflation pressures show no sign of easing, inflation is unlikely to fall back to pre-pandemic levels in the near future. While Americans are feeling it the most, the nineteen countries that use the euro had the largest increase in the annual inflation rate since the Euro was adopted.

Taxpayers Protection Alliance (TPA), a group that advocates on behalf of taxpayers and consumers, has slammed the Biden administration, calling inflation a hidden tax on the American people.

"Between the energy crisis, supply chain issues, concerns about the economy, and latest job reports, it's time for Washington to wake up," the TPA said in a statement. "They ought to reverse course and stop the reckless government spending packages, like Build Back Better, that are still being discussed in Congress. The Biden Administration should immediately drop tariffs across the board and Congress should rein in the administration's ability to unilaterally hike tariffs in the future."

The White House has argued that Build Back Better would reduce the cost of living, especially for many low-income families, and ease inflation over the long run. However, the key Democratic holdout, Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), has continued to express concern that the bill would only increase inflation.

"Another month of record-breaking inflation. In just one year, there has been a 7 percent increase across the board, with many categories of goods and services well into the double digits," Patrick Hedger, executive director of Taxpayers Protection Alliance, said via an email. "Americans are feeling it each month when they go to buy necessities like groceries and gas. Small businesses are feeling the economic pinch when purchasing supplies. Economists predicted this, and unfortunately for the American people, they were right. Meanwhile, Democrats in Washington are desperate to blame anything else besides their policies for this predictable disaster."

The economy of 2022 is starting to look a lot like 1982’s economy, but it's not certain that Joe Biden can turn things around as President Reagan did. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.