Defence`s Feeds

Should the UK bomb IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh in Syria? That is, go above and beyond killing our own citizens in “self defence”. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, says yes, Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour Party and the opposition, says no. The fact that the lethal component to any aerial campaigns in Syria will border on insignificance is, from the looks of things, inconsequential. I think I’m in the “containment” camp (e.g. something like: prevent ISIS from taking more territory, propping up the Iraqi government, but otherwise not committing to extensive military operations in Iraq and Syria) and here’s why.

Problem One: “Defeat ISIS” is an aspiration, not a strategy

On the whole, I think Corbyn (alongside dissident Conservatives) is right: the articulated plan to “degrade and defeat” ISIS is both woolly and ill-conceived. What, if anything, will an increased tempo of airstrikes achieve? How will the UK’s minimal contribution to this effort change the overall character or pace of the campaign? The problem here is that I don’t think anyone has quite worked out what IS is, and how it relates to the UK. In the words of Eli Berman and Jacob Shapiro: “Is it [IS] a tremendously well-resourced terrorist group that controls substantial territory, which it uses to plan attacks, vet operatives and manage a complex financial network? Or is it a fledgling nation-state that sponsors terrorist attacks?” If IS is a fledgling nation-state, then containment works (sortof, in the long run, with the likelihood of international terrorist plots in the meantime), since IS is very bad at actually being a state so there’s good reason to believe it will collapse at some future point in time. Until states can agree on a set of political aims beyond “beat the bad guys” it’s probably best not to tilt headlong into a situation that is already bad, and likely to get worse before it gets better.

More to the point, “defeating” ISIS would require urban warfare, either through proxies (the vaunted 70k non-extreme militia) or through the commitment of western forces (Uh, not gonna happen). We have all the precision-guided munitions in the world, but while that might disrupt and degrade ISIS’s ability to act, that is quite different from defeating or destroying the organisation. The west lacks the political will to commit large scale forces to the defeat of ISIS (for some reason, the public got fed up after Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) and it’s probable that ground forces would fan the flames of the Syrian conflict, if anything. One doesn’t have to read far into academic literature on strategy to figure that a divisive conflict, far away, with lofty goals but an unclear aim (and decisive means foreclosed), is unsustainable.

Problem Two: There is no neutral option

I am signed up to the Colin Powell school of thought: you broke it, you own it. I’m also fully signed up to the fact that if the UK contributes ISR assets to a military campaign, then it doesn’t matter who pulls the trigger, we’re still on the hook for whatever happens. From this perspective, the fact that the UK is conducting strikes in Iraq and helping out in Syria means that we are already responsible for acts of violence on both sides of the border. At the same time, there is no violence-free option available to the UK. If we do nothing (as in, pack up our planes and go home) then violence still exists in the region – packing up and going home shunts responsibility for doing something about it to our erstwhile allies, or worse, gives the worst perpetrators of violence in the region license to go about their business of brutally suppressing populations and dissent. I think that it’s at least arguable that nothing we can do now will save us from an unfavourable judgement by generations to come. After all, we stood by and watched while IS erased substantial elements of the common heritage of humankind with high explosives. Whatever happens, therefore, we’re still involved, somehow, even if that means packing up all our kit and taking it home with us. The “act/don’t act” binary (pushed on both sides, I might add) is therefore a sham. Moreover, the UK might be a target of IS, but it’s always going to be a target of IS (and like groups). Free will means that we don’t get to pick who is allowed to dislike us. All the above pushes towards some form of engagement for the UK – we lose more by walking away than staying involved in the US coalition, but this doesn’t necessitate committing ourselves to trying to eradicate ISIS beyond what we’re already doing. The symbolic value of overturning the commons vote against action in Syria would send a message, but the action that follows from it wouldn’t change a thing. Better, in my view, to re-assert our existing commitment with America, and if necessary throw more resources in, rather than committing to a lofty goal that appears impossible with current (or projected) means.

At the end of the day: someone has to pull the trigger

My ultimate unease at widening attacks on IS into Syria relates to my equal unease at British strikes within Iraq. All the high-minded arguments about the ins and outs of international politics and grand strategy boil down to someone, somewhere, being asked to kill human beings, and bear that experience with them for the rest of their life. This doesn’t change if they’re sitting at the controls of a UAV back here in blighty, soaring over the deserts of Iraq, or if they happen to be holding a rifle and face to face with their target. I think that’s a lot to ask of a person. Thankfully, we have an all-volunteer force so some of the moral questions relating to compelling people to kill are at least ameliorated. Still, the political impulse to “do something” in the face of a Gordian knot tends to ignore the fact that service personnel aren’t toys. For all the talk of drones reducing war to a “video game mentality” (which is disproved in most serious takes on the subject), the political reduction of the armed forces to an intercontinental screwdriver is worse. I think there is a clear role for violence in both Iraq and Syria, but the goal of pushing IS out of Iraq, and attempting to prop up and strengthen that state (and perhaps cajole the Iraqi government into rapprochement with its Sunni population) is achievable. Is there a role for expanding strikes in Syria to achieve this? Definitely. But this should be predicated on the political aim of protecting and stabilising Iraq, not on taking us into an indefinite war against a proto-state that we haven’t figured out how to deal with. Articulating this (limited) goal is far more preferable in my mind to lofty goals with total aims.

Anything that looks like a joint campaign with Russia is a really bad idea

The polite way of putting this is that “proportionality” is a subjective concept that has no precise basis in international law, and is therefore an expression of national military cultures and their interpretations of international humanitarian law treaties. The impolite way of putting this is that Russia doesn’t give a toss about killing civilians in the pursuit of military objectives. At the time of writing, Air Wars has tracked just over 8500 US coalition strikes, killing a claimed 20,000 IS fighters, while also killing between 682 and 2057 civilians in the process. At the same time:

Airwars presently assesses 44 Russian incidents as having likely killed civilians in Syria to October 30th – which between them reportedly killed 255 to 375 non-combatants. This is roughly ten times the level of credible allegations against US-led Coalition operations in Syria.

Whatever disagreements campaigners may have with the US or UK government over the conduct of aerial warfare, targeting and precaution, I think both would agree that no-one wants a Russian-style air campaign. The problem is, if the US-led coalition escalates a large scale aerial campaign against IS in Syria, and Russia also strikes IS in Syria, the two campaigns will not only become functionally indistinguishable to those on the ground, but also to audiences worldwide. It really won’t matter if we take every precaution possible under the sun, wait 72 hours for someone to drive a Toyota into an abandoned road before killing them with a bomb, or conduct battlefield assessments to make sure that no-one else got hurt, if at the same time the Russian air force piles in and bombs an urban area without guided munitions. The US (and potentially, the UK) could say “It wasn’t me” until they’re blue in the face, but all the world is really going to care about is the headline civilian casualty count, which isn’t going to distinguish between us and the Russians (or, for that matter, the Syrian government). With this in mind, restricting the use of lethal force to areas that the Russians don’t operate in is a good way of maintaining some sort of distinction between us and them. Even if we part “own” strikes by the US, the UK could still maintain a semblance of narrative distance from Russian attacks.

Conclusion: Whoever wins, the UK loses

This is pretty much a foregone conclusion. We will spend money, effort and time killing people in an attempt to achieve a more-just state of affairs than the one that preceded it, in the midst of a region dominated by religious governments that are completely illiberal and, on the whole, antithetical to the core values of western democracies. Walking away doesn’t work because Russia and China would probably be there to take our place, which leaves long term engagement, which is messy. Note here that I am talking about governments, not people. If we could treat populations as indivisible from those that rule them, then the choices on offer would be a lot simpler. We know, however, that the societies living under theocracy and autocracy contain many people who, like us, just want to get along with their lives, rather than export their own brand of religion across the region. Those people tend to face persecution or execution (hi Saudi Arabia!), calling into question every single element of ongoing engagement. Nonetheless, we must engage, somehow. The extent to which we engage may be a reflection of circumstance, but it always remains a choice. The question is whether we double-down for no apparent reason and nail ourself to a cross of “Defeat ISIS” or whether we continue muddling along, trying to do our best with what is available to us. I’m for the latter, until a better option presents itself.

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U.S. Navy Growlers jam High Value Targets/Individuals’ cell phones. The image in this post shows the nose of a VAQ-137 EA-18G Growler aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, supporting Operation Inherent Resolve against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Interestingly, the aircraft sports a quite unique kill marking, showing a person “hit” by a lightning bolt. According […]

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Area 51 airline is hiring. Janet airline is the name of a small fleet of passenger aircraft that serve the famous Area 51, the U.S. Air Force top-secret base in the Nevada desert, along with some key military airbases used for research and development, including the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, Air Force Plant […]

Belgian FN MAG General Purpose Machine Gun

Today in CCLKOW we are reorienting you to the homeland and the problems of interoperability between police and the armed forces. Even without the Paris Attacks earlier this month, the subject of mastering the ‘JIIM’ environment is critical, both in military operations at home and abroad. To discuss this, I am very happy to bring to you a special guest writer, Ian Wiggett, recently retired as an Assistant Chief Constable from Greater Manchester Police. It should be understood, then, that this piece is written from the British perspective, which includes a significant difference with respect to the use of force by the police, particularly as concerns the generally disarmed stance. Nevertheless, the issue of integrating a military response to an attack to the homeland matters even to the US. Although the matter of Posse Comitatus would seem to forestall the use of the regular forces domestically, this matter has never been tested against any significant threat. And in fact, even as it was ultimately tabled, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks the military role in homeland defence was put on the table for serious debate. It is also worth noting that the American disdain for soldiers operating in the homeland is a legacy of our British heritage, and so to a similar degree the use of the armed forces in domestic circumstances is discomfiting on this side of the Atlantic. Furthermore, although they come under the control of the Governors, the National Guard formations of the individual states are trained as military, not police, forces. Thus, even in the American setting, how the armed forces will act in support of local, state, or even federal law enforcement remains a challenge. Alternatively, should the terrorist threat upon the European Continent reach sufficient proportions, it is not out of the realm of the possibility for recourse to NATO forces to be contemplated. Finally, as the importance of security and stabilization campaigns rise, the ability to work with civilian authorities will become more important. If the problems have not been hashed out for homeland defence, it is very unlikely they will succeed in foreign contingencies. Thus, the locus of operations of the armed forces has shifted and it is time to give serious thought to the issues. Read the piece, consider the implications and questions posed, and join the conversation on Twitter, at #CCLKOW and, it is hoped, the newly launched hashtag for policing discussion, #WeCops. — Jill S. Russell

 

First, some history…

Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) – also known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) – has existed for centuries.  In the days before a regular civilian police force existed, it was only the military that had the numbers, organisation and capability to restore order and maintain control.  That was, indeed, the role of the militia: a body of soldiers that could be raised at short notice to provide homeland defence.  It was the militia in North America that provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Army, and after independence, the United States retained the militia as the National Guard.

The original concept of “MACP” was therefore built around the military, either militia or regulars, being the force of last resort to restore and maintain the Peace.  Use of force (or at least, show of force) was central to that.  Armed soldiers putting down the insurrection – and casualties and collateral damage were expected.

 

The Peterloo Massacre, Manchester, 1819.
Contemporary cartoon, Cruikshank

The folk memory does not easily or quickly forget the intervention of armed forces.  The Peterloo Massacre of 1819 is still invoked to inspire radicalism in Manchester, and the impact of that violent suppression is generally acknowledged as leading to further radicalism and ultimately to wider reform.  The Easter Rising in Dublin involved only a relatively small number of republican combatants, but the violence of the military response arguably pushed many towards the cause of independence.  In South Wales mining communities Churchill is known not as a wartime Prime Minister, but as the Home Secretary who had sent troops against striking miners in 1911.

 

Troops deployed in support of local police to suppress striking miners, Rhondda Valley, 1910-11

History therefore suggests that the relationship between the people and the military has to be managed carefully.  Too much force, applied clumsily, may achieve its immediate objective of quelling a riot – but the lasting impact may be far more damaging to the established order.  The ‘silent majority’ are very grateful that the forces of law and order (whether dressed in blue or green) have made it safe for them to walk the streets and sleep soundly at night.  But if too many skulls are cracked, that ‘silent majority’ can quickly change sides.

 

How does MACP/MACA work today?

Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) falls into three main types.  The first is simply about extra manpower and equipment to help deal with emergencies such as flooding, heavy snow, evacuations, etc.  The military can bring in large numbers people and specialist equipment or skills at short notice.  Filling sandbags to protect critical sites from flooding.  Moving people away from flooded homes.  Helicopters transporting vital supplies.  Building temporary bridges. This is also known as Military Assistance to the Civil Community.   The military also step in when critical services are threatened by industrial action.  Recent examples include fuel deliveries, firefighting, and ambulances.  This is also referred to as Military Assistance to Government Departments.

A second category, closely linked to the first, is the provision of additional or specialist support which may not be available to the civilian authority.  Installing communications equipment in remote areas, deploying radar or aerial photography, for example.  Both the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games used military staff to provide searching and access control.  There are long standing arrangements for handling of explosives and munitions, and until recently the military air sea rescue service worked frequently with local police forces and mountain rescue.

This all has to be paid for, of course.  Whilst the military may be very willing to offer their help, the MoD will want to know which authority to recover their costs from.  This has caused delays in the past, with civilian authorities sometimes being reluctant to call in military because of the costs, and/or arguing over which authority would be responsible for paying. Somewhat of a challenge if the emergency was due to an act of God!

Things have moved on considerably in recent years, with a much wider understanding that protecting life and property is far more important than petty turf wars or arguments over bills.  However, there has a growing tendency over the past decade for political leaders to want to do ‘something’ when faced with a crisis.  This has led to the Army being ‘ordered in’ to ‘sort out’ emergencies such as the foot and mouth outbreak, or the Somerset Levels flooding.  The mission may be loosely defined, and the intervention options may be limited – but it’s ok, the army’s here!   In these situations it’s important that the military recognise local sensitivities.  The civilian authorities will have been working hard for some time, and will feel that military intervention represents a criticism of their efforts.  The Army will also feel uncomfortable about being drawn into incidents that inevitably have political ramifications.

The third category is the use of force – Military Assistance to the Civil Power.  This is the most difficult aspect of MACA.  The military are trained to fight wars, not to be police officers.  It is many decades since the military was deployed to restore order on the streets of the mainland UK, although of course they spend several decades supporting the RUC in Northern Ireland. That deployment still has a painful legacy.

In more recent years, the capability, training and tactics of police and special forces have transformed in response to the changing terrorist threat. For obvious reasons, little of that is seen outside of the counter-terrorist functions.  There is a lot of catching up to be done by politicians, communities and those police and military leaders not directly involved in this specialist area of policing in relation to how the police and military will work together – and what this means for constitutional arrangements, and the longer term impact on the police-military-public relationships.  The maintenance of the Queen’s Peace remains a policing mission, even if it is carried out by the military on the police’s behalf.

 

How MACA/MACP works

In simple terms, the civil power requests the assistance of the military.  The advice to the civil authority is to ask for the ‘effect’ desired, not to specify the resource required.  The military cannot deploy without the authority of the minister of defence.  This is an important constitutional check which we perhaps fail to recognise the significance of in the UK.  In countries where there have been instances of military coups, civil war, or military government, the deployment of the military into the civil space can be highly politically charged and in some cases even outlawed.

In the UK, the civil authorities are used to operating on their own initiative, without ministerial or political involvement.  Consequently, the MACA/MACP approval can be seen as a bureaucratic process, mainly to allow the costs to be recharged.  For more sensitive deployments, the request to deploy military assets will require approval from both the minister overseeing the requesting civil power, and the minister of defence.  This ministerial approval process still applies in critical, fast moving incidents.  There are arrangements to ensure the decisions are made quickly, but the process of contacting ministers and completing paperwork will inevitably introduce some degree of delay.

 

Use of military force in support of police

Churchill directing troops at the Sidney Street Siege, 1911.

 The dividing line between police and military used to be clear.  Police forces simply did not have the capability to take on a well armed terrorist cell.  That was the job of Special Forces. Once the civil police could no longer cope, the incident was handed over to the military and special forces neutralised the threat. The most famous example is the Iranian Embassy Siege. Civilian police surrounded the embassy, but at the point when it was decided a forced conclusion was required, a handwritten note on a scrap of paper allowed the police commander to hand the incident over to the military commander. Once concluded, control was handed back to the police.

Planning for a long time since was based on that premise. The incident would be defined and contained.  When the point was reached that an intervention was decided, this would be conducted by special forces. Police handed control to the military until the incident was resolved. The scene would then be handed back to police.  But the world has changed.

 

So what’s changed?

Alongside the changing nature of terrorism, from 9/11 to lone actors and suicide bombers, the attacks that prompted the most rethinking have been Mumbai and Westgate in Nairobi.  Marauding terrorists, well armed, attacking crowded places pose real challenges for the conventional police armed response.  Police firearms officers are trained to contain the threat and make considered decisions whether to open fire. They should use the minimum force necessary – and indeed, rarely open fire, looking to use less lethal options whenever possible.  Once contained, they negotiate a resolution, again avoiding the use of lethal force as far as possible.  Each decision has to be individually justified and will always be subject to intense scrutiny afterwards, particularly if there has been a fatal discharge.

Terrorists intent on killing as many people as possible require very different concept of operations in response.  Armed officers need to respond quickly and take on the terrorists in order to minimise the loss of life. Negotiation is likely to be pointless (but cannot be discounted, regardless of what has happened).  Police forces will need to bring as many armed officers together as quickly as possible.  They will work as ad hoc teams, put together as they arrive.  This has led to common training, tactics, and weaponry.  The fast response also includes Special Forces, mobilised quickly by air.  As the military component will be arriving alongside the civilian police response, the training includes shared and flexible command models. The priority is to save life, and they will need to get in quickly and resolve the incident, using whatever resources are available.

Depending where and when the incident occurs, command structures and ministerial involvement may be ‘in flux’. MACP/MACA will still be needed.  But the situation on the ground will be developing rapidly and is likely to be confused.  There are a number of possible scenarios, ranging from police dealing with the situation themselves through to a full handover to SF.  The priority will always be saving life.

 

But the threat continues to change? What about other scenarios?

In the last few years we have seen: the two Paris attacks; a shooter on a train in France; an attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen; incidents in Belgium; the attack by Anders Breivik in Norway; car bombs in Glasgow and London; lone actors attacking Parliament and the military in Canada; the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby; several attacks and plots in Australia; the downing of civilian jets over Egypt and Ukraine; the attack on tourists in Tunisia.  In the meantime, counter terrorist police and the Security Service have continued to disrupt attack plots in the UK.  The threats range from multiple and coordinated attacks with automatic weapons and explosives, unsophisticated attacks by individuals or groups with knives, to bombing plots with homemade explosives.  The targets could be military personnel, police, crowded spaces, sensitive religious locations or communities, high profile individuals, or representatives of particular countries and communities.

The range of possible attack scenarios is endless. The greatest unknown, however, is the number of threats/incidents that have to be confronted at the same time.  One attack is bad enough, but several happening simultaneously and/or lasting over a long period will stretch the available specialist capacity.   The threat level in the UK is already at severe, the second highest level.  If the threat increases, we are entering unprecedented territory for the UK in peacetime.

The recent Paris attacks could have conceivably happened in the UK.  The response in France and Belgium was a massive armed military presence on the streets.  An incident in the UK or overseas could lead to our government deciding to deploy armed soldiers (other than SF) across the UK.  There may or may not be intelligence to inform the specific response required.  Whilst planning has already envisaged this sort of event, the questions remain – what are they going to do?  What is their role? What are they expected to deal with?

An incident (or incidents) in the UK may require extra numbers to be drawn in beyond the current planning assumptions.

For police forces, there have been further changes in planning assumptions and responses brought about by the 7/7 and 15/7 bombings, the riots of 2011, the 2012 Olympics, and Austerity.  In short, even the largest forces cannot deal with major incidents without support from other forces.  If there are multiple major incidents happening simultaneously and/or for extended periods, police forces may struggle to cope without assistance.  The most likely, if not only source of assistance is the military.

The progressive increase in the threat level in the UK has also brought into question whether police in the UK can remain unarmed for much longer.  There are only a few countries in the world where the police are unarmed.  Whilst a lone officer with a handgun may have limited impact against a group of terrorists armed with automatic weapons, routinely armed police have options which are not available in the UK.  There are between 5,000 and 6,000 armed officers available in the UK, many being committed to protection of vulnerable sites or high profile individuals.  Multiple and protracted incidents could require additional armed resources, which could only come from the military.  But the way police operate with firearms is very different to the way soldiers are trained for combat.

 

What are the likely scenarios?

The various terrorist attacks around the world show the range of possible scenarios.  The unknowns as ever are the where and when.  But the issue for planning are the assumptions about the scale of the attacks and the number of simultaneous attacks (or other incidents).  For the purpose of this paper, the assumption has to be that additional military support has been requested because events are beyond the capability of police and SF capacity.

Without examining each possible scenario, there are are some key considerations that the military need to prepare for:

• Command and Control. It is likely that the incident will remain under civil police command.  Are these arrangements understood?  Does the military understand the police organisational structure?
• Can the military operate effectively within civil police communication systems? What if those systems break down?
• Concept of Operations. Is it clear what the role of the military is? Is this understood by all agencies? Is there a mutual understanding of each other’s roles, constraints, and ‘red lines’?
• Use of Force. What authority is required? What are the rules of engagement? What options are available, including less lethal? What risks and contingencies are envisaged?  What guidance and instructions have been given to the those deployed?  Is the guidance fit for purpose?  Who carries the responsibility if soldiers end up in a situation where they have to defend themselves?
• Locality and Community. How does the local context affect decision making and the options available? What information is needed, and how does that get relayed?

 

Beware of linear assumptions

Planning in the past has been based on a phased, incremental escalation of a single incident.  As the incident escalates, military assistance is engaged.  The mission is relatively clear, and the military resources required are self-selecting.

Planning and preparation are no longer so easy.  It is not inconceivable that the military is deployed for a general security and reassurance presence.  Presumably, though, they will need to react or respond if something happens.

The support requested may be for a specific purpose or role. Perhaps the civil police need additional explosives officers, or logistics, or certain technical skills to deal with the incident, but the military will not be engaged in tackling the threat directly.

There may be a general emergency which requires additional security presence, perhaps for guarding and searching, or to support and work alongside civil police, or even to replace civil police if they are not available or not able to deal with the threat.

And there may be a need for additional armed resources to be deployed quickly to tackle an armed threat, and the current police armed capability may not be available or sufficient.

 

National Security Strategy 2015

The new Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the need to strengthen domestic resilience, and the need to tackle the terrorist threat at home and abroad using the ‘full spectrum of capabilities’.  Ten thousand military personnel will ‘be available on standby to support the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military experts’.

MACA is now a central part of domestic security policy and planning.

 

There is much in the piece to contemplate, and so rather than limiting the discussion to answering a few questions, what I prefer to do is merely set the big issues up as areas of primary concern for debate. To my mind these are very broadly in two categories:

first, the Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement for the armed forces upon the civilian streets; and,

second, the differences between police/law enforcement and the armed forces across the universe of tactics, doctrine, language, etc., for as certainly as ‘secure the house’ means something different between the services (we all know the joke, right?), so too does the same issue apply in this case.

Specifically for the Americans, I would be interested to hear your thoughts as to what level of threat or incident would alter the political calculus on Posse Comitatus.

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW and #WeCops.

 

———-

Ian Wiggett is a former police officer who retired in 2015 after 30 years service. Ian served in the Metropolitan Police, Cheshire Constabulary, and Greater Manchester Police, reaching the rank of Assistant Chief Constable. During his service, Ian worked in both detective and uniformed specialist roles, gaining particular expertise in serious crime and counter terrorism investigations, public order, specialist firearms command, and intelligence. He was the chair of the Cheshire Local Resilience Forum and deputy chair of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, and has been Gold commander for numerous major operations and events. He was the North West regional lead for counter-terrorism, firearms, and air support. He was the national lead for Casualty Bureau, a member of the national boards for Prevent, and for Protect and Prepare, and a member of the national civil contingencies committee. Ian has led a number of major change programmes and as national lead for systems thinking and continuous thinking helped lead work on demand and new performance measurement approaches nationally.

Here’s why Wild Weasel missions were among the most dangerous sorties flown in Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam War the main threat to the strike packages was the V-750 (S-75) Dvina, the first effective Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM). Better known by the NATO designation SA-2 Guideline, the missile was developed in the mid 1950s and it was used […]

Climate change is already having a severe impact on Afghans’ daily lives – but this challenge is often over-shadowed by what seem to be more-urgent problems: war and the economic crisis. Therefore, the reports submitted by the Afghan government for the Paris climate conference starting today, 30 November 2015 (and President Ashraf Ghani speaking in the early afternoon) provide a concentrated picture of the challenges arising from this phenomenon. At the same time, there are doubts that Afghanistan’s institutional strength and capacities are sufficient to cope with the evolving impact of climate change. Furthermore, the mid-term growth-based development aims of the government, at least in part, run contrary to the needs for long-term environment protection and climate change adaptation. A primer by AAN’s co-director and senior analyst Thomas Ruttig and guest author Ryskeldi Satke. (*)

“Afghanistan is ranked among the most vulnerable countries in the world to the adverse impacts of climate change. . . . As a result of climate change, it is anticipated that the incidence of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods, and droughts will likely increase. . . . Between 1990 and 2000, Afghanistan lost an average of 29,400 hectares of forest per year, at an average annual deforestation rate of 2.25 per cent, which further increased to 2.92% per annum between 2000 to 2005. . . . With these climatic changes the foundation of the country’s economy, stability, and food security is under threat.”

These striking statements are taken from major documents the Afghan government has submitted for the United Nations conference on climate change that will open in Paris today, 30 November 2015 – the twenty-first annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With its 195 signatories, the UNFCCC is the only existing widely legitimate international convention on how to tackle global warming. (1) Every participating country must submit two documents – a so-called Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC, a kind of status report about the national climate situation (Afghanistan’s is here), and the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (Afghanistan’s position paper is here) – in the run-up to the conference.

The gravity of Afghanistan’s situation is made strikingly clear by a short glance at the maps (p 41) in the 2014 synthesis report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – ­the most important report on the subject. These maps show that Afghanistan is part of a region that stands out for having the second-highest rate of rising temperatures and is expected to have a net loss of annual precipitation. According to these models, and cited in Afghanistan’s Initial National Communication for Paris, the country’s “mean annual temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 4.0°C by the 2060s, and 2.0 to 6.2 degrees by the 2090s.” As a result, the Afghan reports for Paris warn, by 2060 “large parts of the [country’s] agricultural economy will become marginal without significant investment in water management and irrigation.”

While the Paris conference’s focus on greenhouse gas emissions is rather narrow, the documents submitted by the Afghan government provide valuable insights into the gigantic challenge that the country is facing, but which are usually crowded out by the attention to the war with the Taleban, the political deadlock in the National Unity Government (NUG), the economic crisis and its fallout, and the mass exodus of young Afghans. This challenge is the changing climate that already has started to affect the lives of many Afghans and will continue to do so increasingly drastically in the decades to come, if no measures are taken.

Briefly put, even if Afghanistan had peace and a highly effective government tomorrow, it would still face a daunting task: to adapt to the effects of the worldwide climate change.

Afghan climate change: Lacking data, striking indications

The empirical data on how exactly the climate is changing in Afghanistan is rather scarce, though. The systematic gathering of data and on-the-ground research in the country that boasted of having “the most advanced meteorological monitoring in the region” before 1979 had been disrupted by decades-long wars. Nonetheless, the effects of climate change are clearly visible, both in Afghanistan and in the region.

The strong earthquake in May 2014 that caused a massive landslide burying a newly-built part of the village of Ab-e Barik in Badakhshan’s Argo district and many of its inhabitants clearly showed how a combination of climate change, conflict and weak governance exacerbate the vulnerability of local populations to natural disasters. The landslide was not the first one in the area but official warnings came too late (pointing to weak government oversight and lack of disaster risk reduction); the destroyed part of the village was built on visibly vulnerable hill slopes (a result of the lack of land for construction and of local government neglect); the slopes were additionally prone to landslides because of the destruction of the top soil by ploughing lalmi (rain-fed) land for cultivation (as a result of overall lack of agricultural land, an effect of unchecked population growth and settlement). Lastly, the main road over which relief should have come had been destroyed by previous flooding (lack of government capability to respond and conflict-related underdevelopment of the infrastructure).

The flooding that destroyed the road to Argo was what people called a “100-year-flood.” In its course, over April and May 2014, flash floods that hit 123 districts in 27 of the 34 provinces, washed away roads and crops, killed over 160 people, destroyed 6,800 homes, displaced 16,000 and affected altogether 125,000 people, according to UNOCHA. The rainfalls that caused the devastating floods were two to three times higher than normal annual averages for the area.

Despite the lack of a final assessment of the damage of the two earthquakes of October and November 2015 in Badakhshan (the first one alone affected more than one quarter of all districts in country, killed more than 300 people in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan and destroyed about 7,000 homes), it can be assumed that climate- and conflict-related degradation of the environment exacerbated the damage.

“So far we do know that the climate change impact is observable in the tributaries of the Amu Darya river in the Wakhan corridor,” Professor Benjamin Orlove from the University of California, also a member of the working group advising the University of Central Asia’s Mountain Societies Research Institute, based in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, told one of the authors in an interview. He is referring an observable decreased water flow in the Amu Darya and its tributaries, which form much of the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. A 2011 study found that 76 per cent of the sampled alpine glaciers in the Hindu Raj, a mountain range in Northern Pakistan, and the Wakhan of Afghanistan “have retreated since 1976”; the speed of this retreat was characterised as “rapid.” The melting of Afghan and Pakistani glaciers combined with the heavy rains during the 2014 spring and summer seasons translated into that year’s heavy flooding in Afghanistan.

Orlove also interpreted heat waves in southern Pakistan and India during spring and summer 2015, which together claimed close to 5,000 lives, as a sign of changing climate in the region.

According to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), “more than 6.7 million Afghans have been affected by disasters and extreme weather events such as drought, earthquakes, disease epidemics, sandstorms, and harsh winters” since 1998. The latest poverty status update for Afghanistan, compiled by the government and the World Bank and published in October 2015 (based on the latest available data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of 2007/08 and 2011/12), reports that

In 2007-08, 36 percent of the population in Afghanistan was poor, that is more than one in every three Afghan person was living on levels of expenditure insufficient to satisfy basic food and non-food needs. Four years later, in 2011-12, the poverty rate in Afghanistan remained substantially unchanged despite massive increase in international spending on military and civilian assistance, and overall strong economic growth and labor market performance. . . .

Another government report stated that a “high proportion of Afghanistan’s 27 million people face chronic and transitory food insecurity.”

A new start for research after 2001

Climate-related research and environment-related institution building in Afghanistan have started to catch up again over the past one and a half decades, both to its former capacity and international standards. Afghanistan joined the UNFCCC in 1992, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2013 and became a party to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1995 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) in 2002. These commitments to address environmental and climate-related issues have also given Afghanistan access to UN funding and technical support.

In 2003, UNEP in cooperation with the then Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment of the Afghanistan Transitional Authority and a broad array of international and Afghan governmental and non-governmental organisations, produced the first “post-conflict environmental assessment” for Afghanistan. With support of the UN and bilateral donors, Afghanistan’s National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was established in 2005. In the same year, Afghanistan’s first environmental law came into force; its current version is from early 2007. In 2008, under a NEPA lead, the assessment of Afghanistan’s environment was updated in a new report.

Britain’s DFID (Department for International Development) and the government of Estonia funded the Afghanistan Environmental Data Centre (AEDC) operating in beta mode, with support from Kabul University’s Department of Geography and NEPA. Afghanistan’s Environment Strategy is covered under Afghanistan National Development Strategy for the period of 2009 to 2014.

NEFA also is involved in awareness raising and education on environmental issues. On its website, it has an almost 100 page-long document on “Environmental Education in light [sic] of Holy Quran” (in Dari: here). Among its successes is its declaration of a number of protection areas and national parks (see AAN reporting here) and its reported compilation of the first list of protected species in Afghanistan which, however, cannot be found on its own website.

In 2012, NEPA and UNEP launched a climate change initiative – the first of its kind in the country – in four particularly vulnerable provinces, Badakhshan, Balkh, Bamyan and Daikundi. This six million US dollar program was mainly financed by the Global Environment Facility “improved water management and use efficiency; community-based watershed management; improved terracing, agroforestry and agro-silvo pastoral system [ASPS]; climate-related research and early warning systems; improved food security; and rangeland management.” (2)

The hydro-meteorological database is also growing again. Today, the Ministry of Transportation that had set up Afghanistan’s pre-war weather stations – the first ones were installed in selected locations around the country in 1953 (3) – again oversees data collection and monitoring through its Department of Meteorology (maps p 92 here). According to UNEP, in 2014 under Afghan Meteorological Authority (AMA) at least 140 weather stations were operating countrywide. Additionally, a number of Afghan ministries and projects gather climate-related observations.

Furthermore, several international foundations and international and national NGOs, individually or within consortiums, are addressing the issue of climate change, or ecology and environmental protection more broadly, as part of their work plans. Five international and national development agencies – Afghanaid, ActionAid, Concern Worldwide, Save the Children and UNEP – have come together as the Afghanistan Resilience Consortium “to provide a coherent and coordinated response to Afghanistan’s urgent needs and vulnerabilities to natural disasters and climate.” This consortium collaborates with the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, NEPA, the ministries of rural rehabilitation and development and of education as well as provincial, district and community development councils in Badakhshan, Bamyan, Balkh, Ghor, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Takhar provinces. The German Heinrich Boell Foundation and Madera, a French NGO operating in Afghanistan since 1988, are working with communities and other stakeholders on natural resource management and in other fields. The Boell foundation  states on its website: “there are already conflicts about the distribution of resources, about fertile lands, grazing grounds and water today. These are likely to increase the more affected Afghanistan will become by the effects of climate change.” Furthermore, the above-mentioned Mountain Societies Research Institute provides research fellowships for Afghans to conduct on-the-ground research on sustainable development in mountain areas.

Large donors like DFID and World Bank are also increasingly incorporating environmental protection as a criterion for their projects and dedicate funding to environmental protection and conservation activities. As Afghanistan has limited funds, it is important that donors mainstream environmental protection as part of their projects.

These examples show that efforts are being undertaken in Afghanistan to start the debate and action on climate change in the country. But environmental awareness is still lacking, both among the population and the authorities. The destruction of the country’s remaining forests continues unabated, because of multiple factors, from the lack of alternative fuels to profit interests of the wood smuggling and land mafias (read examples from the Afghan media from Helmand here and from Badghis here). The government states in its Paris documents:

Between 1990 and 2000, Afghanistan lost an average of 29,400 hectares of forest per year, to an average annual deforestation rate of 2.25%, which further increased to 2.92% per annum between 2000 and 2005. Forest now occupies less than 2% of county’s total area.

Forestry Cover Change Over 30 Years in Afghanistan (Source: Afghanistan Initial National Communication to UNFCCC, p.16)

In another example, Hasht-e Sobh, a Kabul-based independent daily, reported about a recent seminar that brought together non-governmental activists and government officials on the subject of protected species. Both sides complained that Afghans would “mercilessly” hunt all birds, including protected ones, during their migration period, and that police reacted with incomprehension when asked to intervene.

The number 1 problem: drought – from frequent to permanent

In its “initial national communication” to the UNFCCC, the Afghan government identified seven sectors that are particularly vulnerable: “water resources is the most vulnerable sector followed by forestry and rangeland, agriculture, health, biodiversity, energy and waste.” In the same document, it cites an EU report according to which, in general, “regular cycles of around 15 years are observed, during which one would expect 2-3 years of drought conditions. In recent years, however, there has been a marked tendency for this drought cycle to occur more frequently than the model predicts, and since 1960, the country has experienced drought in 1963-64, 1966-67, 1970-72 and 1998-2006.” The period from 1998 to 2005/6, the Afghan report further states, “marked the longest and most severe drought in Afghanistan’s known climatic history” but the country “currently [is] in the grips of the most severe drought in living memory” again.

Such a pattern had already been predicted in 2009, by the Stockholm Environmental Institute. In a report also quoted in Afghanistan’s statement to the UNFCCC 2012 meeting  it stated:

The climate models suggest that Afghanistan will be confronted by a range of new and increased climatic hazards. The most likely adverse impacts of climate change in Afghanistan are drought related, including associated dynamics of desertification and land degradation. Drought is likely to be regarded as the norm by 2030, rather than as a temporary or cyclical event.

According to a 2007 environment assessment by the Asian Development Bank, effects of desertification and drought were particularly observable in the country’s arid north, west and south. This includes the Harirud valley in the western Herat province, the most fertile one in Central Asia, as Daud Saba, Afghanistan’s mining minister and a former governor of that province, told AAN. Similarly, Orlove has already found that climate change will be a cause for internal mass migration in the Central Asian Ferghana valley and may aggravate social tensions within the densely populated area.

Already by late 2000, the penultimate year of the Taleban, Herat had become home to 68,000 IDPs, distributed over six camps, as one of the authors observed then. Most were nomads fleeing a combination of fighting and drought in Badghis (one of the most backward and vulnerable provinces in the country), which had cost them 75 per cent of their harvest and half of their flocks.

In those years, the term Afghan “hunger belt” was coined. It comprised parts of western and large parts of northern Afghanistan, where more than three million people (more than half the population in that region) were dependent on food aid and stretched through the central Hazarajat to parts of southern Afghanistan. During a visit by one of the authors to Kandahar during that period, sheep killed by heat stroke were found along the main road linking the airport with the city. Most of the population of Reg and Shorabak districts, in the very south of the province, was displaced into camps, including to Zhari and Maywand districts of Kandahar, as their herds of camels and other animals had perished due to lack of water. Some were reportedly airlifted out by the Taleban with helicopters after all the animals had died and they were stranded in the middle of the desert (see a contemporary assessment here). The majority of these drought-induced IDPs were never able to return to Reg or Shorabak, because drought conditions there did not improve for more than seven years. Although some IDPs continued to request assistance to facilitate a return, a UNHCR assessment deemed this as unsustainable.

In Badghis, the situation has also not changed fundamentally over the past decade. In 2014, still, a newspaper article put the province in an Afghan “hunger belt” where “grain has become the only currency that matters” in “its fourth year of a drought, which has destroyed the rural economy” and where “people have been reduced to selling their daughters for grain.” And Maslakh, the biggest IDP camp in Herat in 2000 (named after the old slaughterhouse in which it was situated), is also still there, AAN heard from UNHCR Kabul. (The latest figures from 2014 gave 3,648 families, with altogether 17,933 people living there.) The IDPs in Maslakh and those from Reg and Shorabak  likely can be categorised as climate change refugees.

In 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that an estimated three million people have been affected by severe drought in that year throughout 14 provinces of Afghanistan. In 2015, the warmest year ever recorded worldwide, the droughts in Afghanistan remained on the same level as in the previous years, according to UNEP.

How strong are adaptive capacities?

UN conventions on climate change also enable Afghanistan to “identify and communicate urgent and immediate adaptation needs of Afghanistan to the effects of climate change.” Already in 2009, the Afghan authorities calculated that the country’s National Adaptation Plan to climate change would require 10.785 billion US dollars over the next ten years. For the Paris conference, the requirements were increased to 17.405 billion US dollars.

At the same time, Afghanistan’s capacity to adapt to challenges associated with climate change is clearly limited. According to its government’s own assessment, it not only lacks the necessary data basis but also human and institutional capacity and expertise as well as basic environmental awareness, both within its government institutions and among the general population. Under these circumstances, the danger is that funding, such as that being channelled through the UNFCCC, could not be used efficiently or might be diverted into corrupt channels. On the content side, the latest available assessment of the country’s adaptive capacity, published in 2009, concluded that aid for climate-change-related programmes remains marginal due to concentration of “efforts on emergency response together with high-priority development issues that include education, health and basic infrastructure, amongst others” (p 57). Currently, as it does every two years, UNEP is updating its country assessment, due to be released next year.

A strategy dilemma: Development versus environment

NEPA also says in its communication to Paris: “At present, [the Afghan government] does not have a National Strategy on Climate Change including the mitigation strategy.” This was repeated recently by Environment Watch Afghanistan, one of the few local NGOs that focuses on Afghan ecology, in an under-reported press conference – and then promptly denied by a government representative. Indeed, as Afghanistan’s Paris documents state, “the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) with its Vision 2020 aims for environmentally sustainable development” but “does not emphasize ‘climate change.’ . . . [The Afghan government] does not have a national climate change policy or strategy.”

Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s position paper for Paris with its action plan already comes with a price tag of over 17 billion US dollars for the decade between 2020 and 2030 (the period covered by the UNFCCC). It will be presented by President Ashraf Ghani, when he joins almost 150 other world leaders at the Paris conference today (30 November 2015). Since Afghanistan’s contribution to global warming is low, being one of the lowest emitters globally, the expectation is that it may receive pledges against its national position paper, including funds for equipment and required technical resources, the UNEP country director for Afghanistan, Andrew Scanlon, told AAN.

As the energy chapter of the funding-oriented action plan shows, Afghanistan has joined those developing countries and emerging economies (including the so-called BRIC countries Brazil, Russia, India and China) that have pitted their development goals against the struggle to curb greenhouse gas emissions. They argue that industrialised countries’ hydrocarbon-based development over past centuries has given them an advantage and that other countries must be allowed to catch up using the same means. As a result, the Afghan government stated that while, so far, “Afghanistan has very low relative per capita GHG emissions . . . there would be lower costs and a clearer development path for Afghanistan if it pursued development using mainly fossil fuels, as other countries have.” The projections – again in Afghanistan’s Intended National Contribution (p 2) – do not bode well for the country’s environment:

The current growth of transport sector both road and air, will increase demand on diesel and gasoline from 1.2 million tons in 2010 to 12 million tons in 2030, and aviation fuel from 1.0 million tons in 2010 to 22 million tons in 2030. Parallel with the economic development and changing lifestyle of people, waste volume generated in cities is projected to reach 3.1 million tons annually by 2030, compared to 1.4 million tons in 2010. 

But there are ways to at least alleviate the impact of these possible developments on the climate – and both the immense follow-up costs for the Afghan health system and the country’s environment – that could be implemented today. These include a simple change of law, namely an update to the quality standard for car fuel, which is still based on a Soviet standard from the 1970s; a curb on the import of at least the most out-dated second-hand cars; better traffic regulation in Afghanistan’s main cities; or – more long-term – the construction of a stable energy base built on solar and water power and a phase out of diesel generators. Already in 2010, a review of environmental studies had put Kabul among the ten most-polluted cities in the world.

 

(*) Ryskeldi Satke is a contributing writer and researcher with news organisations and research institutions in Central Asia, Turkey, EU and the US. Currently, he is based in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). Contact e-mail: rsatke at gmail.com.

(1) The UNFCCC goes back to the so-called ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This convention set out a framework for action aimed at stabilising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The UNFCCC, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, now has a near-universal membership of 195 parties. Annual Conferences of Parties (COP) review the convention’s implementation. At COP3, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which ran out and was not followed-up at COP15 in Copenhagen. At COP17 in Durban, the Green Climate Fund was created, the basis for the Paris conference, where participants, for the first time in over 20 years of UN negotiations, aim to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate, with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C.

Naomi Klein, meanwhile, one of the most relevant activists worldwide, captured the Paris conference dilemma in one tweet: “response can be ‘historic’, a ‘major step forward’ *and* catastrophically inadequate all at the same time.”

(2) ASPS is a collective name for land-use systems, implying the combination or deliberate association of tree or shrub vegetation with cattle farming in the same site. (See: Ricardo Russo, “Agrosilvopastoral Systems: A Practical Approach toward Sustainable Agriculture”, Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 07/1996.

(3) In a contemporary article of 1969, German researcher Hermann Flohn, says, “until 1940, there were only foreign-installed weather stations,” including by the USSR. He also mentions a hydrological yearbook for the Kabul River valley for 1960 to 1964. He lists 14 stations in Afghanistan (p. 210), criticises however that “the precipitation stations . . . all lie in the valleys and basins, [and therefore] cannot be in any way taken as representative of the higher areas.” (Hermann Flohn, “Zum Klima und Wasserhaushalt des Hindukush und der benachbarten Hochgebirge”, Erdkunde  23 (1969), 205-15).

Russian Igla Man-Portable Air Defense System

European Geostrategy continues its analysis of the United Kingdom's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Daniel Fiott sits down with Julian Lindley-French, Olivier de France and Ben Jones to go over the fine print.

The post The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: a conversation appeared first on European Geostrategy.

Russian REM-KL Repiar and Recovery Vehicle

The commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, has said the deadly air strike on the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz in the early hours of 3 October 2015 was “a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures.” The US military investigation, moreover, found that several personnel closely involved in the attack had not followed US rules of engagement. Given that these rules incorporate key principles of the Geneva Conventions, not following them effectively means the attack breached the laws of war. Several battlefield-level personnel have been suspended. However, the failures in command which led to the attack on the hospital appear to have gone much higher. AAN’s Country Director Kate Clark takes a closer look.

After the attack on MSF hospital on 3 October 2015, which killed at least 30 people and injured at least 37 others, the US military conducted an investigation. The main – vetted – findings were presented during a press conference held in Kabul and relayed live to the Pentagon press corps on 25 November 2015. The US military said a redacted version of the investigation’s report would be released, but did not say when.

During the press conference, General Campbell said the US military had “learned from this terrible incident” and that he had “already directed some immediate changes to ensure we learn and apply the right lessons from this incident.” His spokesman, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, said three times that “we are determined to learn the right lessons” and repeated that they were “committed to ensuring that this does not and cannot happen again.” (For a full transcript of their remarks see the end of this dispatch.) However, a closer look at the findings of the investigation and the US military’s response – as well as what was left unsaid – shows that the ‘mistakes’ were of a far more serious nature than Campbell would have us believe and that the lessons the military now intends to learn, have in fact long been standard operating procedure. The question remains whether the disregard of these procedures was intentional.

What went wrong – on the ground and in the air

Late on 30 September 2015, said Campbell, following the Taleban’s capture of Kunduz city (see AAN reporting here and here), “U.S. SOF [Special Operations Forces] and their Afghan counterparts moved from the airfield into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police, or PCOP, compound.”

On the evening of 2 October 2015, the Afghan SOF commander asked the US SOF commander for close air support for a clearing operation that night, including of the NDS headquarters which they believed was occupied by Taleban. The US SOF commander agreed to have air support on standby. By that time, Campbell said, US SOF and their Afghan allies had been engaged in heavy fighting for “nearly five consecutive days and nights.”

Campbell said the AC-130 aircraft designated to provide close air support actually launched more than an hour before it was due to leave, after receiving an emergency call to protect troops under fire. In the end, this particular aircraft was not needed and it proceeded on to its initial mission. However, the early take-off meant the crew had not received a normal mission brief for the NDS headquarters attack and had not secured “crucial mission essential related materials, including the no-strike designations which would have identified the location of the MSF trauma center [the hospital].”

No explanation was given as to why the aircrew had not already known about the hospital. Kunduz is a small city and the MSF hospital was a highly distinctive building – large, in the shape of a cross, and the only one lit up at night in a city without electricity because of its use of generators to keep the intensive care unit and operating theatres working. The US had used air assets every day since 29 September. Yet, Campbell would have us believe, this particular crew did not know about the hospital from earlier sorties which did have accurate lists of ‘no strike designations’.

Campbell further said the investigation had found the electronic systems on board the aircraft had malfunctioned, preventing the transmission of video, email or other electronic messages. He said this prevented “the operation of an essential command and control capability.”

He also said the aircrew had thought that, in the vicinity of Kunduz, they were being targeted by a missile (he gave no further details) and had moved away from what he called the aircraft’s “normal orbit to an orbit approximately eight miles from the mission area.” He said “this degraded the accuracy of certain targeting systems which later contributed to the misidentification of the MSF trauma center.”

The investigation determined, said Campbell, that the US SOF commander, who was still at the Provincial Police headquarters in the city, had given the “correct coordinates of the NDS headquarters building, the intended target of the Afghan SOF” through his joint Terminal Attack Controller or JTAC (an officer specialised in targeting). However, when the aircrew entered the coordinates into their fire control systems, Campbell said the coordinates produced the wrong location; they correlated instead to “an open field over 300 meters from the NDS headquarters.” This mistake happened, said Campbell, because the aircraft was several miles beyond its normal orbit and its sensors were degraded at that distance.

Alarm bells apparently did not ring for the aircrew when the coordinates led them to an empty field. Instead, according to Campbell, they visually located the “closest, largest building near the open field” whose physical description “roughly matched” that of the NDS HQ. It was the MSF trauma centre. (However, according to the US military’s map produced at the press conference, the NDS headquarters was actually nearer to the empty field – 329 metres away – than the MSF hospital was – 402 metres away.)

The crew also ignored what Campbell called other “contradictory indicators,” for example, “once the aircraft returned to its original orbit, the aircraft’s grid location system correctly aligned with the NDS facility instead of the open field.” Yet the crew remained “fixated on the physical description of the facility, and at that point, did not rely on the grid coordinate.” They also did not “observe hostile activity at the MSF trauma center” which, given they were supposed to be giving close air support, should also have been noticed as strange.

Campbell said the person who authorised the attack, the US SOF commander, had remained at the police headquarters compound and “was beyond the visual range of either the NDS headquarters or the MSF trauma center as he monitored the progress of his Afghan counterparts.” This indicates he was monitoring the progress of partners who had presumably been expecting close air support for their clearing operation on the NDS headquarters. Yet, neither the Afghans nor the US commander seems to have been surprised or alarmed when the air support did not turn up as planned.

Campbell further said:

“The report found that, under the circumstances, the U.S. SOF commander lacked the authority to direct the aircrew to engage the facility. The investigation also found that the U.S. SOF commander relied primarily upon information provided by Afghan partners and was unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building at the MSF Trauma Center.”

And most damningly:

The report also determined that the personnel who requested the strike and those who executed it from the air did not undertake the appropriate measures to verify that the facility was a legitimate military target.

As AAN understands it, standard operating procedure has been for air strikes to be signed off by a one star general. For voluntary strikes like this one, where the strike is not in response to an emergency call to protect troops under attack, the bar for authorising a strike and ensuring civilians will not be harmed, is particularly high. Did the SOF commander on the ground have the seniority to authorise this air strike or had the rules of engagement been relaxed to allow more junior officers to authorise strikes? Also, were the normal checking procedures followed to ensure this was a military target was being attacked and there was not going to be disproportionate harm to civilians? Such procedures are always important, but are vital when launching air strikes in a built up area.

What went wrong – further up in the system

The failures extended beyond those immediately involved in the operation. Campbell said that, one minute before launching the attack, the aircrew transmitted to their operational headquarters at Bagram Airfield that they were about to engage the building and “provided the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center as their target.” The headquarters failed to “realize that the grid coordinates for the target matched a location on the no-strike list or that the aircrew was preparing to fire on the hospital.” In other words, whoever had the task of checking to make sure air strikes do not target a protected site failed to carry out their job. Under the laws of war – the Geneva Conventions and other laws which protect civilians and reduce suffering during conflict – hospitals, medical staff and their patients enjoy special protection (for more detail, see here). It is for this reason that medical facilities give their coordinates and identify themselves to the warring parties in a conflict.

What Campbell called the “confusion” at Bagram was exasperated, he said, by the lack of video and electronic communications between the headquarters and the aircraft, caused by the earlier malfunction and “a [mistaken] belief at the headquarters that the force on the ground required air support as a matter of immediate force protection.” Headquarters staff, it seems, had not remembered/realised/been told that the mission of the AC-130 had changed.

Campbell did not describe the attack itself, but other reporting has showed that it was concerted. Survivors described the plane circled round again and again, making five passes in all. Munitions leveled much of the hospital and killed and injured at least 67 people, staff, patients and caretakers. Survivors described “massive explosions, sufficient to shake the ground”, “coming in concentrated volleys”, with attacks aimed at the main hospital and also at those trying to run away.

The duration of the attack according to the US investigation was 29 minutes. MSF, however, based on its record of mobile phone calls and text messages sent to Resolute Support and the Pentagon, among others, to try to stop the strike, said it lasted closer to an hour. Campbell said MSF had called a SOF officer at Bagram twelve minutes after the strike started, but it took the command 17 minutes to discover the error and by that time, the AC-130 had already ceased firing. It is unclear, and unexplained, why it took so long.

Also left unexplained was why the Afghan authorities have been so adamant and so consistent in their version of events, that this was a correctly targeted strike, intentionally made on the hospital because they said – and MSF has denied – there were active Taleban fighters there and they were coming under fire from them.

What really went wrong

In conclusion, Campbell summarised the blame like this:

… the approximate cause of this tragedy was a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures. In addition, the report found that fatigue and high operation tempo contributed to this tragedy. It also identified failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident.

However, rather than a simple string of human errors, this seems to have been a string of reckless decisions, within a larger system that failed to provide the legally proscribed safeguards when using such firepower. There were also equipment failures that compounded the problem but, again, if the forces on the ground and in the air had followed their own rules of engagement, the attack would have been averted.

The US SOF commander, according to Campbell, had relied primarily upon information from Afghan partners and, Campbell said, had been “unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building and the MSF Trauma Center.” The word ‘distinguish’ is key, as under the laws of war, the commander had a duty to distinguish between civilian and military targets. If he was unable to do so, he should not have ordered the strike. The aircrew had also recklessly assumed they were homing in on a legitimate military target, while choosing what was in essence a random building that happened to be near the coordinates they had received and one, moreover, from which there was no hostile activity. These are not errors, but rather reckless decisions which failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets and failed – again a legal obligation – to take “all feasible precautions” to protect civilians. 

There are also questions surrounding whether the SOF commander’s use of airpower was justified by US mission parameters. (1) When asked about this, the US military spokesman, General Shoffner said, “Under these circumstances, US assets can be used to support Afghan forces if they request air support. Ultimately that decision is in the hands of a [sic] U.S commander.” He was pressed again:

Q: Do I understand your answer to mean that no, this is not the proper circumstance under which to use combat power? Is that what you’re saying?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

This was one of several times Shoffner answered by saying some US individuals had not followed the rules of engagement. He made the same reply when asked whether the aircrew had ever expressed “any concern or question the validity or legality of the target they were about to strike” and “whether, given “there were so many problems with systems and with comms and with identifying targets… that attack [was] allowed to proceed?” He also gave the same answer to a question asking whether the attack had been ‘proportional’, given, the journalist said, “every U.S. servicemen from basic training all the way through and prior to deploying must … review the basic laws of war, including proportionality and distinction.”

When asked about taking precautions to protect civilians, Shoffner said:

The investigation found that — that the actions of the aircrew and the special operations commander were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officers’ recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition and I won’t comment on that further.

The legal duty on parties to a conflict to take precautions to protect civilians is, however, systemic, not just at the individual level. Campbell admitted that “failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident” included “the nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations at Kunduz City and the lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list.”

This means that, after all these years, precautions – on the ground, in the air, and within the higher command – were still not adequate to ensure civilian and military targets were distinguished. Procedures to ensure that protected sites were not attacked were not followed. The chain of command and communication did not function when MSF’s designated point of contact in the US military tried to urgently stop an illegal and deadly operation.

Campbell promised to learn lessons from the ‘tragedy’ of 3 October 2015. However, the US military had already learned such lessons from many ‘mistakes’ over many years of catastrophic air strikes, which killed hundreds of Afghan civilians in the years after 2001. Starting from around 2008-2009, the US command realised those deaths were undermining America’s military and political mission in Afghanistan, after which, successive commanders of ISAF and US forces repeatedly tightened the rules of engagement, especially with regard to air strikes.

Over the years, the US learned not to rely on Afghan intelligence, because it was often mistaken or mischievous. It learned to take special care when strikes were voluntary, ie not launched to protect troops in imminent danger on the ground. Even when air power was used to protect ‘troops in contact’, it was increasingly used judiciously with the aim of not harming civilians disproportionately. Those rules of engagement succeeded in massively bringing down the number of civilians killed in airstrikes . Many would argue (2) they also actually brought US forces into line with the laws of war.

It appears that what happened on the night of 3 October amounted to a throwing away of the rule book.

In general, says the US “Department of Defence Law of War Manual” rules of engagement “reflect legal, policy, and operational considerations” but are always “consistent with the international law obligations of the United States, including the law of war.” States use them, says the Manual, to implement “their law of war obligations during military operations.” The failure of US forces to follow their own rules on 3 October is, then, more serious than General Campbell made it sound. The attack on the MSF hospital involved not only violations of the US military’s rules of engagement but breaches of the laws of war: US forces failed to distinguish between civilians and military targets, failed to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and launched an indiscriminate attack. (3)

According to General Campbell “those individuals most closely associated with the incident have been suspended from their duties, pending consideration and disposition of administrative and disciplinary matters.” But the problems went higher than that – to those planning, vetting targets and to Campbell himself who has command responsibility for ensuring that both the rules of engagement and the laws of war are respected.

Have the rules of engagement been ‘liberalised’?

During the late ISAF years, keeping civilian casualties down had become a central part of the military command, particularly under General John Allen (see AAN reporting here who was both commander of ISAF and Enduring Freedom, the separate US counter-terrorism mission which also answered to the same rules. This was during the surge years when the US and ISAF was actively battling the insurgency with offensive strikes and kill/capture operations. However, not only had the rules of engagement become very strict, (4) but General Allen had also made it a personal priority that they were implemented effectively. A senior officer whose sole responsibility was mitigating civilian casualties sat in the command centre and answered directly to Allen who had also ordered that he be notified, day or night, of any incident. All incidents and ‘near misses’ were investigated by a team which carried clout, and lessons learned were actively fed back into procedures to improve them. Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan were given ‘scenario training’ on applying the rules of engagement and officers were sacked for breaching them. During this period, ISAF and the US military were more open to discussions, allegations and feedback from NGOs, the United Nations and civil society: transparency, the military held, would help reduce the numbers of civilians needlessly being killed. Those working in this field have noticed a new secrecy surrounding such matters.

In addition, when it comes to US forces in Afghanistan, the dividing line between the two military missions currently operating has been blurred: US forces are interchangeably used for the NATO Resolute Support non-combat mission and the US military counter-terrorism, partially combat, Freedom’s Sentinel mission. Campbell is the commander of both missions. As AAN has reported, this blurring has led to confusion as to who answers for what and what may be permissible for particular forces, depending on what mandate they might be under that day.

The ‘unlearning’ of lessons of the past has appeared to coincide with a possible “liberalisation” of the rules of engagement during the battle to retake Kunduz (according to a senior US military officer speaking to AAN). The hospital strike was not the only legally questionable strike that night, according to Washington Post reporting. Two other strikes on 2/3 October that thankfully only hit a house and a factory, both empty, were also reportedly requested by Afghan forces to locations where they said they were under pressure from Taleban. According to residents in the area interviewed by the Post, there was, however, no longer an insurgent presence. These strikes seem to have been ordered with the same recklessness and disregard for the obligation to distinguish civilian from military targets.

What happens next?

Campbell told the Kabul and Pentagon press corps, “Matters regarding individual accountability will be managed in accordance with standard military justice and administrative practices for joint commands. I have decided to refer some of the recommendations to the command of U.S. Special Operations Command for his review and action, as appropriate.” So far, only those “closely involved in the strike” appear to have been singled out for suspension.

It is a familiar pattern in the US military, and other organisations, to let junior staff carry the blame. However, from what Campbell told the press, the failures went far higher than just those on the ground and in the air, and went to those in the highest command who were responsible for the planning, vetting and setting the parameters of the campaign.

Campbell claimed that the investigation was independent because it had been carried out by US officers not under his command. However, he is both commanding and adjudicating officer and this is an internal investigation from an organisation with an abysmal record on holding its own accountable, particularly senior officers. It is not surprising that the calls for an independent investigations continue. Human Rights Watch has said a criminal investigation is necessary, while MSF continues to call for an independent international investigation mandated by the UN. Its director, Christopher Stokes, said:

“The US version of events presented today leaves MSF with more questions than answers…

The frightening catalogue of errors outlined today illustrates gross negligence on the part of US forces and violations of the rules of war.”

It is clear that the Afghan government will not press for greater accountability. Unlike President Karzai, who was outraged when Afghan civilians were killed, President Ghani and CEO Abdullah would like more US military involvement and have been reluctant to criticise their US allies. A Afghan government statement said it was confident the US investigation had “been conducted in a thorough manner and will reveal measures that can be taken to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future.” Most earlier statements by government figures, moreover, had falsely accused MSF of hosting Taleban fighters. Even now, in the government’s statement, President Ghani is still largely blaming the Taleban for the hospital attack: “‘Such mistakes can and should be avoided, but it is also a painful demonstration of the cost of war being brought upon us by terrorist groups and enemies of Afghanistan.’”

The seriousness of the actions and failures revealed in the US military’s investigation were great, major enough, it seems, for the command to release the report on the eve of one of the quietest days in the US Calendar – Thanksgiving. They must have hoped it would be a good day to bury bad news.

 

(1) The journalist was referring to the fact that the US officially has a ‘non-combat mission’ in Afghanistan. As AAN has reported, the US’s declared non-combat mission in Afghanistan has long actually been, in part, a combat mission. The US under its agreement with the Afghan government has a ‘train, assist and advice’ role, although the agreement says “US military operations [in support of Afghan operations] to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate.” Self defence is also always permitted whether or not the mission is combat or non-combat. In this instance, however, US troops were not under fire and the strike was ordered to protect Afghan forces against the Taleban, not al Qaeda.

(2) See for example, Human Rights Watch’s 2008 report “Troops in Contact” which looked at the US military’s use of airstrikes in Afghanistan to protect ground troops, and the deaths and injuries done to civilians in those attacks:

The cases described here raise concerns as to whether the attacking forces acted in accordance with their obligation under the laws of war to exercise “constant care to spare the civilian population” and take “all feasible precautions” to minimize loss of civilian life. This obligation requires that combatants do everything feasible to verify that targets are “military objectives,” and not civilians; that the means and methods of warfare are chosen to minimize civilian loss; and that the expected civilian loss is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected. Attacks that do not meet these requirements must be cancelled or suspended.

 (3) The International Committee of the Red Cross’ online database cataloguing the 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law includes the following (original legal citations can be seen online): 

Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

Rule 11. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. 

Rule 12. Indiscriminate attacks are those:

(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law;

and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

Rule 15. In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

(4) See for example the ISAF commander’s Tactical Directive (‘directive’ is another term for rules of engagement) of 30 November 2011 which includes the order:

Presume that:

Every Afghan is a civilian until otherwise apparent;

All compounds are civilian structures until otherwise apparent;

In every location where there is evidence of human habitation, civilians are present until otherwise apparent.

 

ANNEX

Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Campbell via teleconference from Afghanistan 

News transcript 

General John F. Campbell, commander, U.S. forces in Afghanistan; Captain Jeff Davis, Director, Defense Press Office; Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication, Operation Resolute Support, Afghanistan

GENERAL JOHN CAMPBELL: Well, good evening and good morning back in Washington, D.C. I received a report of the U.S. national investigation into the strike on Doctors Without Borders, MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan on October 3, 2015. Let me start by offering my sincere condolences to the victims of this devastating event. No nation does more to prevent civilian casualties than the United States, but we failed to meet our own high expectations on October 3.

This was a tragic, but avoidable accident caused primarily by human error. It was important that the officers investigating the incident had the requisite seniority and independence to conduct a thorough and unbiased inquiry. For that reason, I requested an outside investigative team.

U.S. Central Command supported my request and sent an army major general, independent of U.S. forces-Afghanistan, to lead the investigation. He was assisted by two brigadier generals, one from the Army and one from the Air Force, also outside from my command.

The report included specific findings relating to systems, processes and personnel, and I’ve already approved some of the findings and recommendations. Based on the recommendations, I’ve already directed some immediate changes to ensure we learn and apply the right lessons from this incident. In addition to the U.S. national investigation, a NATO and Afghan partner combined civilian casualty assessment team, or CCAT, also conducted an investigation.

The findings of both reports were generally consistent. I personally briefed the NATO secretary-general, General Breedlove SACEUR, President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah on the results of the CCAT. NATO will release the CCAT report in the coming days. Also, earlier today, I briefed MSF on the results of the U.S. national and CCAT investigations.

Recommendations dealing with systems and processes will be managed within this command and adopted consistent with current operations. Matters regarding individual accountability will be managed in accordance with standard military justice and administrative practices for joint commands. I have decided to refer some of the recommendations to the command of U.S. Special Operations Command for his review and action, as appropriate.

I won’t discuss individual cases because our system requires fairness and the discretion of individual decision-makers. I can tell you that those individuals most closely associate with the incident have been suspended from their duties, pending consideration and disposition of administrative and disciplinary matters. Because I am still in the process of reviewing the investigative report and investigating officers report, I will defer any questions today to my spokesperson, Brigadier General Shoffner, as mentioned earlier.

That said, I’m able to provide an accounting of the events of October 3rd, 2015.

The report determined that the U.S. strike upon the MSF trauma center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan was the direct result of human error, compounded by systems and procedural failures. The U.S. forces directly involved in this incident did not know the targeted compound was the MSF trauma center.

The medical facility was misidentified as a target by U.S. personnel who believed they were striking a different building several hundred meters away where there were reports of combatants. The report also determined that the personnel who requested the strike and those who executed it from the air did not undertake the appropriate measures to verify that the facility was a legitimate military target.

It’s important to place events leading up to this tragic incident in context. On the evening of September 27th, Kunduz City was suddenly attacked by a significant force of Taliban and associated insurgents. By the evening of September 28th, local Afghan forces quickly withdrew, leaving the Taliban in control of most of the city. On September 29th, MSF sent the coordinates of their trauma center in Kunduz to multiple recipients within the U.S. and NATO chains of command.

Those coordinates were received and distributed by this headquarters to subordinate headquarters. The United States special operation forces and their Afghan counterparts were rapidly deployed to a camp adjacent to the Kunduz airfield in the early morning on September 29th. By that evening, they were forced to defend the Kunduz airfield from a Taliban attack.

U.S. SOF maintained defensive positions at the airfield throughout the night, until the early morning on September 30th. Later that day, U.S. SOF and their Afghan counterparts moved from the airfield into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police, or PCOP, compound. Between the time that the team was established inn the PCOP compound and the time of the incident on October 3rd, U.S. and their Afghan SOF partners repelled heavy and sustained enemy attacks and conducted multiple defensive strikes in Kunduz.

By October 3rd, U.S. SOF had remained at the PCOP compound longer than intended in continued support of Afghan forces. As a result, by the early morning hours of October 3rd, U.S. SOF at the PCOP compound had been engaged in heavy fighting for nearly five consecutive days and nights.

During the evening of October 2nd, Afghan SOF advised the U.S. SOF commander that they intended to conduct a clearing operation that night. This included a former national director of security, or NDS, headquarters building they believed was occupied by insurgents. The Afghans requested U.S. close air support as they conducted their clearing operation. The U.S. SOF commander agreed to have the support on standby. He remained at the PCOP compound during the operation and was beyond the visual range of either the NDS headquarters or the MSF trauma center as he monitored the progress of his Afghan counterparts.

The report found that from this point forward multiple errors occurred that ultimately resulted in the misidentification of and the strike on the MSF trauma center.

First, the AC-130 aircraft designated to provide close air support in Kunduz city launched 69 minutes early, in response to a troops-in contact situation.

This type of emergency requires an immediate response. But the result was that the aircraft launched without conducting a normal mission brief or securing crucial mission essential related materials, including the no-strike designations which would have identified the location of the MSF trauma center.

Because this AC-130 aircraft and crew were ultimately not needed for the initial troops in contact mission, they were diverted in flight to provide close air support to the U.S. SOF commander in Kunduz. During the flight, the electronic systems onboard the aircraft malfunctioned, preventing the operation of an essential command and control capability and eliminating the ability of aircraft to transmit video, send and receive e-mail or send and receive electronic messages. This is an example of technical failure.

In addition, as the aircraft arrived in the vicinity of Kunduz, the aircrew believe it was targeted by a missile, forcing the aircraft to move away from its normal orbit to an orbit approximately eight miles from the mission area. This degraded the accuracy of the certain — this degraded the accuracy of certain targeting systems which later contributed to the misidentification of the MSF trauma center.

I’d like to refer you to the chart now in order to show you key locations as I describe the events. To give you some scale, the distance from the top to the bottom of this graphic is approximately 1,000 meters. The U.S. SOF command on the ground was located at the provincial chief of police compound, depicted by the green dot in the upper right of the chart.

Through his joint Terminal Attack Controller, or JTAC, the U.S. SOF commander provided the aircraft with the correct coordinates to the NDS headquarters building, the intended target of the Afghan SOF. The green 1 depicts the location of the NDS compound. Again, this was the building that the U.S. SOF commander intended to strike. But when the aircrew entered the coordinates into their fire control systems, the coordinates correlated to an open field over 300 meters from the NDS headquarters. The yellow 2 on the chart depicts the location of the open field.

This mistake happened because the aircraft was several miles beyond its normal orbit and its sensors were degraded at that distance. The investigating officer found that the aircrew visually located the closest, largest building near the open field, which we now know was the MSF trauma center. The MSF trauma center is depicted by the red 3 on the chart.

The physical description of the NDS headquarters building provided by the Afghan SOF to the U.S. SOF commander roughly matched the description of the MSF trauma center as seen by the aircrew. At night, the aircrew was unable to identify any signs of the hospital’s protected status.

This second chart shows the MSF facility pre-strike. This is what the aircrew was able to visualize, although it would have been seeing the facility at night. According to the report, the aircrew concluded, based on the JTAC’s description of a large building near a field, that the MSF trauma center was the NDS headquarters.

Tragically, this misidentification continued throughout the remainder of the operation, even though there was some contradictory indicators. For example, once the aircraft returned to its original orbit, the aircraft’s grid location system correctly aligned with the NDS facility instead of the open field. However, the crew remain fixated on the physical description of the facility, and at that point, did not rely on the grid coordinate. Also, the investigators found that the aircrew did not observe hostile activity at the MSF trauma center. These are examples of human and procedural errors.

The report determined that as the operation proceeded, the U.S. SOF commander, through the JTAC, requested the aircraft to engage a building that the aircrew mistakenly believed was the NDS headquarters.

The report found that, under the circumstances, the U.S. SOF commander lacked the authority to direct the aircrew to engage the facility. The investigation also found that the U.S. SOF commander relied primarily upon information provided by Afghan partners and was unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building at the MSF Trauma Center.

According to the report, one minute prior to firing, the aircrew transmitted to their operational headquarters at Bagram Airfield that they were about to engage the building. They provided the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center as their target. The headquarters was aware of the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center and had access to the no-strike list, but did not realize that the grid coordinates for the target matched a location on the no-strike list or that the aircrew was preparing to fire on the hospital.

This confusion was exasperated by the lack of video and electronic communications between the headquarters and the aircraft, caused by the earlier malfunction and a belief at the headquarters that the force on the ground required air support as a matter of immediate force protection.

The strike began at 2:08 a.m. At 2:20 a.m., a SOF officer at Bagram received a call from MSF, advising that their facility was under attack. It took the headquarters and the U.S. special operations commander until 2:37 a.m. to realize the fatal mistake. At that time, the AC-130 had already ceased firing. The strike lasted for approximately 29 minutes.

This is an example of human and process error. The investigation found that the strike resulted in the death of 30 staff, patients and assistants and the injury of 37 others. U.S. Air Forces Afghanistan is currently working hand-in-hand with MSF to identify the injured and the families of those who lost loved ones in order that we may offer appropriate condolences.

Based upon the information learned during the investigation, the report determined that the approximate cause of this tragedy was a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures. In addition, the report found that fatigue and high operation tempo contributed to this tragedy. It also identified failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident.

These included the loss of electronic communication systems on aircraft, the nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations at Kunduz City and the lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list. We have reviewed each of these failures and implemented corrections as appropriate.

We have learned from this terrible incident. We’ll also take appropriate administrative and disciplinary action through a process that is fair and thoroughly considers the available evidence. The cornerstone of our military justice system is the independence of decision-makers following a thorough investigation such as this one. We will study what went wrong and take the right steps to prevent it in the future.

As I said in an earlier statement, this was a tragic mistake. U.S. forces would never intentionally strike a hospital or other protected facilities. Our deepest condolences go to all of the individuals and families that were affected by this tragic incident. We will offer our assistance to Doctors Without Borders in rebuilding the hospital in Kunduz.

Doctors without Borders is a respected humanitarian organization that does important life-saving work, not only within Afghanistan, but around the world. Alongside our Afghan partners, we will work to assist and support them in this critical role that they play in this country.

Again, thank you very much time — thank you very much for your time. I will be followed by General Shoffner as he will take your questions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILSON SHOFFNER: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and good morning to those of you joining us from Washington, D.C. I’m Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, the spokesman for Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

Regarding the investigation, what we’ve said from the beginning is that we are determined to ensure this investigation is both thorough and transparent. The fact that we’re even doing this press conference today is unusual, but as Secretary Carter has said, we are committed to ensuring full accountability on this incident.

This investigation is an important step, but it is only one step in the overall process. U.S. authorities may determine that additional investigations are required, and if so, that process will take additional time. We also have to ensure that due process for anyone who may be involved in this process.

In an effort to be transparent, we are going to share everything that we possibly can at this point. Once the investigation is redacted, the full report will be posted to the U.S. Central Command website and we’ll provide you a link to that at the completion of this press conference.

At this time, I will take your questions and Lynn O’Donnell, let’s start with you.

Q: Thank you.

Talking about suspensions — (inaudible) — and followed the due process, et cetera. It sounds like a lot of — violations — multiple violations of the rules of law here dressed up as human error. There is a chain of command, there has to be a point of responsibility. Where does the buck stop? Does it stop with General Campbell, who took his authority directly from the President — Are we looking at him being forced or even a matter of honor offering his resignation?

The other thing that interests me about this is that Afghan officials have said all along that the hospital — they specifically referred to the hospital as they command and control center for the insurgents. So you know, when did the NDS come into this? In the process of making the decision whether or not to continue with the attack, when does the NDS come into this?

And in terms of — you know, I think like a contradiction. So I’m just wondering what impact will this whole incident have on the level of trust between U.S. NATO and Afghan forces going forward? Because you have to work very closely going forward.

GEN. SHOFFNER: To the first part of your question, the investigation found that some individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

In terms of what happens next, as I said, the investigation itself is an important step in the process, but it is just one step toward full accountability.

Based on his findings, the investigating officer made several recommendations. General Campbell has decided to retain some of those recommendations at his level and he has referred others to the commander of the U.S. SOCOM for his review and action as appropriate.

The individuals most closely associated with the incident have been suspended from their duty positions. I won’t comment on the recommendations that have been made while those reviews are underway, and I won’t comment on individual cases that are underway, as we have to allow for due process for those involved and we must allow for the independent review by the decision-makers involved.

To the second part of your question, I won’t speak for Minister (Stanikzine ?), but I will point out that on the civilian casualty assessment team investigation that was done, that wasn’t just a U.S. investigation. It was a NATO investigation. The members of the team consisted of coalition partners, U.S. and non-U.S. It consisted of seven Afghans that were appointed by President Ghani.

On the civilian casualty assessment team, and I need to point out the purpose of that was different from the 15-6. It was intentionally narrow in purpose. It was designed to determine the basic facts and then to validate whether or not these civilian casualties had occurred. It did that. And the results of the civilian casualty assessment team report informed the 15-6 investigation.

As to your final statement or your final question, we remain committed to working with our Afghan partners to help them build sustainable security in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

Q: (inaudible) — New York Times.

Can you tell us how many individuals were suspended? And also, was — was General Campbell himself interviewed by the investigators?

GEN. SHOFFNER: All I can tell you is that some individuals have been suspended from their duty positions. I can also say that U.S. authorities may direct additional investigations to determine whether further actions are warranted regarding actions of specific individuals that were involved.

Should additional investigations be required, those will be made public once complete and redacted. Again, we have a responsibility to ensure due process for those involved.

Q: And General Campbell, was he interviewed by the investigators?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I won’t comment on General Campbell’s position, as he is reviewing some of the recommendations that have been made in his capacity as the appointing officer for the investigation.

COL. LAWHORN: (inaudible) — on one — (inaudible) — at this time, Roger, can you hear us at the Pentagon?

CAPT. DAVIS: We — we hear you just fine. Can you hear us?

COL. LAWHORN: Yes.

GEN. SHOFFNER: Yeah, we’ve got you. Go ahead.

Q: Hello. This is Bob Burns from Associated Press, General.

Question for you about — you referred to the rules of engagement were violated. Aside from reaching the point where there were a combination of human error and other malfunctions, was the basic decision to use air power under these circumstances justified, given the noncombat role that the U.S. assumed at the end of 2014? In other words, there are very limited, narrow circumstances under which is the use of force is permitted, and did that — did this fit that circumstance? thank you.

GEN. SHOFFNER: Under certain circumstances, U.S. assets can be used to support Afghan forces if they request air support. Ultimately, that decision is in the hands of a U.S. commander. I won’t get into the specific rules of engagement on that, but I will tell you that we are determined to learn the right lessons from this.

We’re committed to ensuring that this doesn’t happen again. We will evaluate all the recommendations in this report and use them to improve our systems and our processes. We take all reports of civilian casualties seriously and we review each one of them thoroughly.

General Campbell has already directed a thorough review of our planning process as well as our targeting process. This will take place at all echelons of command and we’ll conduct a thorough examination of how we develop and how we use no-strike lists.

Q: General, a very quick follow-up from Bob Burns. Do I understand your answer to mean that no, this is not the proper circumstance under which to use combat power? Is that what you’re saying?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

Q: Jim Miklaszewski from NBC News. General, Doctors Without Borders, which has proven to be a pretty reliable source in regard to what happened there in Kunduz, said that they made at least two phone calls, one just prior to and one during the airstrike, to the Pentagon. And we’ve been told that that information was relayed from Joint Staff to the NMCC that they were under attack.

Did that information ever reach the operators there in the battlefield?

GEN. SHOFFNER: What I’d like to do is, to better answer that question, just briefly review the sequence of events leading up to the issue at hand. Approximately 12 minutes after the firing commenced, Doctors Without Borders called to report the attack. Unfortunately, by the time U.S. forces realized the mistake, the aircraft had stopped firing.

It’s important to remember that this was a complicated and a chaotic situation. The AC-130 had already been shot at by a surface-to-air missile. U.S. personnel at the time were focused on doing what they had been trained to do. That said, chaos does not justify this tragedy.

Let me be very clear. We did not intentionally strike the hospital. We are absolutely heartbroken over what has occurred here and we will do absolutely everything in our power to make sure that it does not happen again.

You mentioned Doctors Without Borders. We have great respect for the important and life-saving work Doctors Without Borders does in Afghanistan and around the world. We’re committed to working with them. We’re committed to helping them, as General Campbell mentioned, rebuild the hospital and provide condolence payments for those affected by this terrible tragedy.

We appreciate their dedication toward easing the suffering of those affected by conflict and we will do everything within our power to enable their efforts.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s take one last one from the Pentagon before we lose their connection.

So Pentagon, go ahead.

Q: General, just a couple of quick follows up — follow-ups. Did the flight crew aboard the AC-130 ever express any concern or question the validity or legality of the target they were about to strike? And if there were so many problems with systems and with comms and with identifying targets, why was not — why was that attack allowed to proceed?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I’ll tell you that the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

CAPT. DAVIS: Tom Bowman from NPR.

Q: General, Tom Bowman. A couple of questions.

When was the MSF called, looks like less than halfway into this attack and it took 17 minutes, you guys say, for the commanders to realize they made a mistake. That’s almost half the amount of time of the attack itself. Why did it take so long? Did you ever get an answer to that?

And also, if there’s no fire coming from the hospital, no clear threat, why would they think this was a legitimate target?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Well, the investigation found that the medical facility was misidentified as a target by U.S. personnel who believed that they were striking a different building several hundred meters away where there were reports of combatants. I think it might be helpful to put this in context. At the time of the incident, U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunduz had been fighting for five days when the incident occurred. Both U.S. and Afghan forces had reports of Taliban throughout the city of Kunduz.

Again, we are determined to learn the right lessons and we’re committed to ensuring that this does not and cannot happen again.

Let’s go to a question here in Kabul.

COL. LAWHORN: We’ll take the questions here in the room. We’ll just — (inaudible).

Q: (off-mic)

GEN. SHOFFNER: So General Campbell has already directed that all U.S. personnel in theater receive training on targeting authorities and on the rules of engagement. General Campbell has also directed that we conduct a comprehensive review of our planning process, as well as our targeting process at all echelons of command. He has directed a thorough examination of how — what we develop and how we use no-strike lists.

Q: May I continue?

GEN. SHOFFNER: You may, please.

COL. LAWHORN: Do you have a follow-up?

Q: You want to continue that kind of close air support to the Afghan forces in the future?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Again, I will state that we remain committed to working closely with our Afghan allies as we assist them in their efforts to build sustainable security for this country.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s go to — (inaudible) Washington Post.

Q: Yes. (inaudible) — Washington Post. A few hours before the MSF strike, an NDS building and buildings surrounding were actually struck by U.S. airstrikes. So the location was totally known. How do you — how do you account for this discrepancy a few hours later? The coordinate shift, and as you say, the MSF hospital was mistaken for the NDS building when just a few hours earlier, there had been an attack, had been — (inaudible) — there and had a strike in that area.

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that the U.S. special operations forces commander did rely on information provided by the Afghan partners on the location of the NDS compound. However, the investigation determined that those grid coordinates given by the Afghan forces to that NDS compound were correct.

And let me comment on — just a minute on how we came to that conclusion. The investigative team went to great lengths to ensure a full and impartial accounting of the facts and the circumstances. They were driven by the need to be thorough, not by a timeline. Investigative team consisted of three general officers and a dozen subject-matter experts.

They spent a full three weeks completing their report. They visited the Doctors Without Borders site. They visited other sites within Kunduz. They interviewed over 65 witnesses. And they compiled over 3,000 pages of documentary evidence.

They also visited and engaged with each echelon in the chain of command. We stand by their findings and recommendations. And we support the process by which they conducted the investigation.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s go to — (inaudible) — and — (inaudible).

Q: (inaudible)

(inaudible) — asking for — (inaudible). Do you share the — (inaudible)? What was — (inaudible) — response — (inaudible)?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I’m sorry. Could you repeat the first part of your question?

Q: (inaudible) — asking — (inaudible) — investigation — (inaudible). What was your response?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Thank you.

General Campbell did meet with representatives from Doctors Without Borders. When he met with them, they provided their initial review. General Campbell read and considered that initial review. He also gave it to the investigative team. They read it and they considered that as they wrote their report.

I’ll also point out that the findings of the U.S. national investigation, the 15-6, were consistent with that of the CCAT, the combined civilian casualty assessment team. So again, we’re confident with those two investigations coming to the same conclusions, we’re confident in those findings.

Q: (inaudible)

Are you going to allow an international independent investigation? General Campbell is the commanding officer and apparently also the adjudicating the officer. And it seems the investigation team was all American — also the forces involved in the attack were all American. Is there any problem with that? While you say it’s not an intentional strike, that in no way abrogates the laws of the rule of war.

Every U.S. servicemen from basic training all the way through and prior to deploying must be — must review the basic laws of war, including proportionality and distinction. Even if you had struck the proper place, do you think that the attack was proportional?

And in terms of – its not just rules of engagement, in terms of the basic laws of war why would more training make things better?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigative team has completed a thorough investigation. And we’re confident with the facts and the evidence collected.

With regard to your question on the rules of engagement, the investigation, the investigation

Q: laws of war, not rules of engagement, laws of war

GEN. SHOFFNER: I can tell you what the investigation found, and the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

With regard to your question on proportionality, the investigation found that the actions of the aircrew and the Special Operations Forces were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officer’s recommendations on this have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition. I cannot comment further on that part as that matter is under review.

Again, we did not intentionally strike the hospital, and we are absolutely heartbroken over what has happened here.

Q: What about an independent investigation?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigative team has completed a thorough investigation —

Q: I mean, an independent international investigation. MSF has called for it, and the investigation panel has been activated. The U.N. mandated procedures in this — in this situation when there’s a humanitarian problem. They’re ready to go but they need the Americans and the Afghans to say yes, and it seems that you have said no.

GEN. SHOFFNER: We believe the investigation completed was full and impartial, and we stand by the findings and recommendations, and we support the process by which it was conducted.

Q: Sorry. How can it be impartial when your commanding officer and your adjudicating officer and the people investigating are in the same organization as the people that attacked?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Again, General Campbell has decided to refer some of the recommendations to the commander of U.S. SOCOM for his review and action as appropriate.

CAPT. DAVIS: All right. Let’s go here to this gentleman.

Q: (off-mic). This is not the first time that U.S. airstrikes caused civilian casualties previously even the U.S. forces bombarded the ANA compound — (inaudible). How do the U.S. assure — (inaudible) — that will not occur again?

GEN. SHOFFNER: We’re determined to learn the right lessons from this and we’re committed to ensuring it doesn’t happen again. The civilian casualty assessment team process that I mentioned is part of this headquarters procedures whenever we have an indication of civilian casualties or an allegation of civilian casualties.

It provides us the means of looking into it very quickly to determine if further investigation is needed. If further investigation is needed, as it was in this case, that will be done and we’ll use that investigation as the basis for adjusting our systems and procedures so that this does not happen again.

We have time for one more question.

COL LAWHORN: (off-mic) Jessica?

Q: Afghan special forces are saying that they relayed to U.S. special forces that they were firing coming from the building, so when the building was hit, presumably Afghan forces would have seen whether the firing was continuing or not. So what kind of messaging was passed between the Afghan special forces and U.S. special forces at the time. And if they continued to report that there was firing from the building when in fact the wrong building had been attacked – can it be trusted as a partner when carrying on these kind of strikes?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Well, I can tell you that the investigation found that U.S. Special Operations Forces commander did rely on information provided by the Afghan partners. The investigation also found that that information was correct. As I stated earlier, the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did violate the rules of engagement and we’ll take proper action on that —

Q: (off-mic) precautions, international humanitarian law that you have to take precautions with civilians. Was that also violated (off-mic) because it looks like your systems were not working. These systems were set up in order to protect civilians the — (inaudible).

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that — that the actions of the aircrew and the special operations commander were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officers’ recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition and I won’t comment on that further.

That’s all the time I have for questions, but before I depart, I want to emphasize we made a terrible mistake that resulted in unnecessary deaths. We have been committed from the beginning to a transparent and thorough investigation, and we will do everything possible to prevent this from happening again. This investigation was an important step in this process, but it is just one step toward full accountability.

And finally, we would never, ever do anything to harm innocent civilians.

Thank you.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The hearing will look at the use of private security companies in external operations and the relevant rules in Europe.
Location : Altiero Spinelli 3G-2
Programme
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

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The latest issue of "European Defence Matters", the official magazine of the European Defence Agency, is now available. 

With cyber defence being the leading topic, the ninth issue of "European Defence Matters" presents the EU, NATO and industry views on cyber defence with a special focus placed on the European Defence Agency's efforts in this area. It also comprises opinions of Luigi Rebuffi, Chief Executive Officer of European Organisation of Security on cyber security. 

In addition to cyber defence topic, this issue also includes an exclusive interview with Mauro Moretti, Chief Executive Officer & General Manager of Finmeccanica and President of the AeroSpace & Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), who presents his assessment of the European defence and security market. Another highlight is the interview with Etienne Schneider, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy, Internal Security and Defence of Luxembourg presenting a LuxGovSat project. This issue also encompasses an extensive report on this year's EDA Annual Conference "European Defence Matters."

More information:

• The latest issue of "European Defence Matters" is available here