Defence`s Feeds

German Serval Light Special Forces Vehicle

This article initially appeared in the 7th issue of European Defence Matters, the magazine of the European Defence Agency.
Click here to access the full digital edition

Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq… The Cold War aftermath has seen European armed forces engaged in a wide variety of operational commitments around the globe, vastly expanding the set of missions they have to conduct. “Nowadays, soldiers often operate among civilian populations in a set of missions ranging from emergency humanitarian relief to crowd and riot control, counter-insurgency and interposition between warring factions”, Jean Michelin, detached to the EDA as an intern from France and acting as Project Officer Engage, points out. But in these complex and demanding situations, the soldier on the ground can no longer rely on the sole use of his weapon if he wants to avoid a catastrophic escalation of violence; somewhere in the broad range of requirements that have fallen on the shoulders of modern armed forces, the need for non-lethal capabilities (NLC) has emerged.

Lessons from Kosovo

For western armed forces, the Kosovo conflict acted as an eye-opening experience in that regard. “In 1999/2000, we had to resort to using non-lethal capabilities during our mission in the city of Mitrovica, where Austrian units were deployed within German, British and French troops in order to prevent the escalation of riots”, Colonel Erich Weissenböck, Deputy Head of the Force Development Division in the Austrian Ministry of Defence, explains. “As soldiers were attacked with stones and explosives, they used wire barriers and other tactics to try and contain the threat. But eventually they had to use tear gas, shotguns and even snipers to stop the demonstrators”, he adds.

With today’s military experience from various theaters of operation around the globe, non-lethal capabilities could be regarded as a logical step forward for military expeditionary forces, especially when operating under the UN flag and the blue helmet – and yet, somehow, their development has been very slow. Currently, apart from the notable crowd and riot control era experienced by NATO forces in Kosovo, they are virtually non-existent in land forces across the globe, despite an identified shortfall. 

“To ensure that a potential threat doesn’t enter a protected perimeter, or to deter an angry crowd from approaching a compound, it often boils down to the use of the warning shot, which is most of the time impractical and dangerous, let alone can lead to collateral damage”, stresses Jean Michelin, who is also a French Army officer with significant operational experience. “Moreover, using conventional weapons in a non-lethal manner will usually deter a potential hostile action by an individual, but its impact on a crowd is less reliable, especially when there is a threat of violence escalation”, he adds.

Maritime domain

But land forces are not the only ones who might benefit from the development of NLC. The EU-led counter-piracy operation Atalanta conducted off the Somali coast has demonstrated the need for naval forces to neutralise potential pirates before they can attack nearby commercial ships. “In combination with audible or visual warnings, non-lethal weapons provide a stand-off with regards to the threat, thus allowing to identify the real intentions of a potential adversary”, Colonel Weissenböck details. 

With an identified capability gap on one hand and a proven operational need on the other, ten Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden) expressed in October 2007 their will to set up a dedicated NLC project team under the framework of the European Defence Agency. Over the last seven years, and under a proactive chairmanship from Austria, the project team focussed on four main strands of work, starting with a development of a NLC concept by the EU Military Staff (EUMS), in synergy with similar efforts previously conducted under a NATO framework.

The project team also dealt with information exchange between Member States, so as to provide them with a forum to remain aware of national initiatives in terms of procurements, cooperation potential, interoperability as well as research and technology (R&T). The effects of non-lethal capabilities were also explored, with a specific attention on legal issues and the medical impact of NLCs.

Future systems © Austrian MOD

Perhaps the most visible output of the project team’s work in the field of NLCs, two R&T studies are conducted in order to assess technologies available for future non-lethal weapon systems. “Based on operational experience, a need for longer-range capabilities has already been identified”, explains Colonel Erich Weissenböck, who also happens to be the Chairman of EDA’s NLC project team. “Additional applications, such as the protection of vehicles and convoys, also need to be explored”, he points out. While one of the studies focuses on microwave-based NLC systems, the other explores optical and acoustic solutions.

These two studies help to provide a comprehensive picture of the current state-of-play regarding NLC technology development, as well as of the challenges arising in research. “For example, the technology to direct a non-lethal energy beam at a hostile individual already exists”, Jean Michelin underlines. “However, it is still far from the technology-readiness level needed to integrate it into a portable, easily deployable, autonomous and ruggedized device that would match basic operational requirements”, he adds. 

Equipment opportunities

Although it is still being discussed, the project team’s next step could be the identification of NLC equipment opportunities for Member States, as well as the definition of a set of common requirements based on the available technology and an agreed concept of operation. “This in turn could lead to the establishment of a common project whose exact scope will have to be decided by the Member States”, Jean Michelin underlines. 

The end objective is to provide European soldiers with a common tactical doctrine and even a common set of tools when it comes to NLC operations, thus greatly increasing their effectiveness and interoperability. But this will not be a quick win. “In contemporary operations like in cooperative capability development, the only lasting achievements require commitment, caution, time and effort”, the French army officer points out. “It is through small victories and determination that we will succeed in reaching our objective, however far it may seem.” 

More information

• Non-lethal capabilities
• Non-Lethal Micro-Wave State-of-the-Art (HPM)
• Non-Lethal Optical and Acoustic Systems (NLOAS)

 

Russian T-95 Main Battle Tank

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Czesław Mroczek, Secretary of State in the Polish Ministry of National Defence, visited the European Defence Agency today for discussions with Chief Executive Jorge Domecq. They exchanged views on the preparation of the European Council on defence in June 2015 as well as the cooperation between Poland and EDA.

During the meeting, Jorge Domecq confirmed his personal commitment to working closely with the Member States and thanked Poland for its involvement in some of the Agency’s flagship programmes: the Multi-Role Tanker Transport project, research on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, as well as the GovSatcom preparation phase. Poland is among others also actively involved in the Improvised Explosive Devices Detection Programme, SESAR and various industry and market related work strands. Mr Domecq and Mr Mroczek also exchanged views on support to defence industry in Central and Eastern Part of Europe and the importance of security of supply.

Jorge Domecq will visit Poland on 20 April on his series of visits to all EDA Member States.

Russian Armata Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Today, in a signing ceremony held as part of the EDA Steering Board, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Defence Agency brought into force an agreement to work together to deliver the European Helicopter Tactics Instructor Course (HTIC).  This course is designed to give selected European helicopter crews an enhanced awareness of helicopter tactics, operational employment and multi-national integration. 

At the end of the course, which is divided into three phases (ground-school, simulator and live flying), graduates will be qualified to delivering tactical instruction during home-based training; multinational courses and exercises; and on operations. They will also be capable of providing helicopter tactical advice at 1 Star level, as well as leading multi-platform complex Composite Air Operations (COMAOs).  

A proven concept

The concept of creating the HTIC was approved by the EDA Steering Board on 9 March 2011. The EDA in partnership with the UK Joint Helicopter Command and the Armed Forces of Sweden developed the concept during 2011/12 and the first course, jointly funded by Sweden and the UK was delivered at RAF Linton-on-Ouse and FMV Test Range, Vidsel in Northern Sweden in April-May 2013. The course consisted of 14 Students from Germany and Sweden and 14 instructors from the UK and received unanimous praise from all participants. 

Consequently, a year later, a second course was delivered.  Enlarged and with additional financial support from the Multinational Helicopter Initiative, the 2nd course graduated students from Austria, Czech Republic, German, Sweden and the UK.  Swedish graduates for the first course became staff instructors on the second – beginning the process of creating a self-sustaining cadre.  Nineteen students graduated from six helicopter types: Kiowa, Mi-171, CH-53, UH-1, AS330, and NH90. The course also involved eight fast-jets (Alca 159, Hawk, Gripen) from the Czech Republic, Sweden and the UK. These were used as “red air” both in the academic sorties teaching fighter evasion and also in a free role, trying to prevent the helicopters completing their “mission”.

Upcoming events

The next course, No3 HTIC, will be the first organised under the new arrangements. It will take place in August-September 2015. Once again, the simulator phase will be delivered at the EDA simulator facility at Royal Air Force Linton-on-Ouse and the flying phase will be hosted by Sweden at Vidsel.  The graduate instructors will go on to teach on future HTIC and also become mentors on the EDA Helicopter Exercise Programme.

More information

• Learn more about the EDA’s helicopter initiatives

The European Defence Agency (EDA) today published the aggregated defence data for 2013 of the 27 EDA participating Member States. 

2013 was no exception to the recent years’ trend across EDA Member States to cut defence spending. Despite the fact that EDA increased from 26 to 271 Member States in 2013, the total defence expenditure of its Member States decreased by EUR 1.7 billion or 0.9%, compared to 2012, to EUR 186 billion. In real terms², the total defence expenditure has been declining since 2006, dropping by over EUR 32 billion or about 15% from 2006 to 2013.

Both as a share of GDP and as a share of the total government spending, defence expenditure has decreased for the seventh year in a row to its lowest value since 2006, 1.45% and 2.97%, respectively.

Defence expenditure breakdown (billion EUR and % change on previous year)

Operation and maintenance and R&D/R&T expenditure increase slightly

In terms of the distribution of defence expenditure, there were some shifts in 2013. Personnel-related expenditure decreased by over 4%, from EUR 95.7 billion in 2012 to EUR 91.8 billion in 2013, and for the first time since 2006, its share in the total defence expenditure dropped below 50%, to 49.3%. Personnel expenditure expressed per person employed in defence (military and civilian) has been increasing since 2006 to reach its highest value of EUR 51,475 in 2011, and started to decrease the year after. It decreased further from 2012 to 2013 (-2.6%), to EUR 49,836.

With a share of 25.1% - the biggest since 2006 - operation and maintenance expenditure remained the second largest component of the total defence spending in 2013, and, despite minor annual fluctuations, it appears to be on an upward trajectory. From 2012 to 2013, it increased by EUR 2 billion or 4.4%, to EUR 46.8 billion, and almost reached its highest level of EUR 46.9 billion recorded in 2007. By contrast, defence investment, comprising equipment procurement and R&D (including R&T) expenditure, following a sharp decrease in 2011 (-10.5%), increased slightly in 2012, but decreased again in 2013 below the level it was in 2006, to EUR 37.5 billion or 20.1% of the total defence expenditure. This resulted from a decrease in one of its components - equipment procurement - which reduced by EUR 1.5 billion or 4.9%, to EUR 30 billion (16.1% of the total expenditure).

The second component - defence R&D expenditure - increased slightly to EUR 7.5 billion (4% of the total expenditure), breaking a downward trend observed since 2006 (with the exception of 2010, when it marginally increased). R&T expenditure - a subset of R&D - followed a similar path. Being on a decline since 2006 (except 2011), it increased by just over 3% from 2012 to 2013, to reach EUR 2.1 billion. In real terms, defence investment decreased by EUR 4.8 billion or 11.3% from 2006 to 2013, whereas its components – equipment procurement and R&D - decreased by EUR 1.7 billion (-5.3%) and EUR 3.1 billion (-29.1%), respectively.

Defence expenditure in current and constant1 prices (billion EUR)

Collaboration3: a sharp decrease in procurement and a marginal increase in R&T

Since 2012, it has not been possible to have a comprehensive picture of the total EDA Member States’ expenditure on collaborative (including European collaboration) defence equipment procurement and R&T projects or programmes, as several Member States were not able to provide this data. A glimpse into the partial 2012-2013 data reveals a worrisome trend, particularly for defence equipment procurement. Between 2012 and 2013, reported collaborative equipment procurement expenditure decreased by 20.7% to the lowest level since 2006 of EUR 4.75 billion. In relation to the total defence equipment procurement, collaborative expenditure accounted for 15.9%, suggesting that over 84% was spent nationally. European collaborative equipment procurement experienced an even sharper decrease of 21.6%, and in 2013, amounted to EUR 4.5 billion, accounting for 94.6% of the total collaborative equipment procurement.

The total collaborative defence R&T expenditure of the EDA Member States that provided the data also shrank, though less dramatically (-0.9%), to EUR 203 million. Its share in the total defence R&T was 9.7%, the remaining 90.3% being regarded as national expenditure. Although the reported European collaborative defence R&T expenditure increased by 21.4% between 2012 and 2013, with a total of EUR 168 million, accounting for 82.5% of the total collaborative defence R&T, it nevertheless remained record-low.

 

Defence expenditure and investment per military decrease despite reduced personnel numbers

2013 saw the seventh consecutive reduction in the number of personnel working in defence (both military and civilian), caused mainly by internal restructuring processes. The total personnel decreased by almost 600,000 or 24% between 2006 and 2013, while the number of military and civilian personnel decreased by over 500,000 (-26%) and almost 80,000 (-16%), respectively, during the same period.

In 2013, there was a total of 1,435,693 military and 407,245 civilian personnel in EDA Member States - a decrease of 0.9% and 3.6%, compared to 2012. A share of military in the total personnel has also been decreasing from the highest of 80.6% in 2008 and 2010 to the lowest of 77.4% in 2012. In 2013, it was 77.9%. For the first time since 2006, defence expenditure expressed per military decreased by 0.05%, from EUR 129,878 in 2012 to EUR 129,814 in 2013.

So did defence investment per military, which has been on an overall increasing trend since 2006 due to declining military personnel, rather than increasing Member States’ investment. In 2013, defence investment per military was EUR 26,122 - a 2.9% reduction on the 2012 figure of EUR 26,906.

 

Increasing numbers of troops available for deployment and actual deployments

Between 2012 and 2013, the average number of troops deployed outside the EU territory increased for the first time since 2008, both in absolute terms (+17.2%) and as a share of military personnel (from 3.4% to 4%). EDA Member States together deployed on average 58,086 troops on a continuous basis throughout 2013, which constituted 4% of the overall strength of their military personnel. In 2013, there was also an increase in the total number of deployable (land) forces (+7%) and that of sustainable (land) forces (+1.5%). The 27 EDA Member States had in total 481,001 deployable (the highest number since 2006) and 110,433 sustainable (land) forces. The ratio between sustainable and a pool of deployable (land) forces remained stable at 1:4.4.

Meanwhile, after a five-year-long upward trend, the costs related to deployed operations4 decreased for the second time in a row, both in absolute terms - from EUR 9 billion to EUR 7.4 billion (-17.1%) – and as a share of the total expenditure - from 4.8% to 4% - between 2012 and 2013. Operations costs per military deployed decreased by 29.3% and stood at EUR 127,989 in 2013.

 

Background

The European Defence Agency (EDA) collects defence data on an annual basis. The Ministries of Defence of the Agency’s 27 Member States (MS) provide the data. EDA acts as the custodian of the data and publishes the aggregated figures in a yearly defence data booklet.

 

Defence investment breakdown (billion EUR and % change on previous year)

More information

• The booklet is available for download here. 
• A summary article is published in the latest issue of the EDA magazine, European Defence Matters

 

---------------------------------

1 Data does not include Denmark which is not an EDA Member State. 2006-2012 data does not include Croatia which became the 27th EDA Member State on 1 July 2013.
2 In order to measure real growth and ensure a “real” comparison between years, inflation needs to be taken into account. Thus, data from 2006 to 2012 has been inflated to 2013 economic conditions (Source of deflator: European Commission ECFIN - based on weight of EU-28).
3 All 2012 and 2013 figures on collaboration are partial, as several Member States were not able to provide data.
4 2013 figure is an estimate, as several Member States were not able to provide accurate data, therefore sound comparisons with the previous years are limited.

Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Lockheed Martin have been selected by the Defense Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) for the design and development of 120 indigenous fighter jets. The team beat out competition from Korean Air (KAL) and Airbus. The 8.6

Russia’s Long Range Aviation Command (LRA) has assumed an increasingly prominent role in recent years, commencing with the resumption of regular bomber patrols in August 2007, and particularly through the course of 2014/2015, as Russia’s resurgence has adopted a distinctly

Another Oxford Analytica piece, this one from mid-December.

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Russia is the second-largest arms exporter in the world, behind only the United States. In the period 2009-13, Russia accounted for 27% of total world arms sales.

However, Russian arms sales have been highly dependent on a few major customers, with India, China and Algeria accounting for over 60% of Russian purchases in the last five years. Another 15% of Russian exports went to other Asian countries, primarily Vietnam, Indonesia and former Soviet Union states.

Russia is particularly hopeful of expanding its sales to Indonesia and Vietnam — which are both looking towards naval expansion, which have to date included systems ranging from aircraft to combat ships to infantry fighting vehicles.

The main targets of Russian weapon sales are gradually shifting. Sales to China, have been in decline for years as Beijing has pursued a programme of shifting to domestic manufacturing of advanced weaponry.

India

India has replaced China as Moscow’s main foreign customer. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that between 2009 and 2013 Russia supplied 75% of weapons imported by India. However, serious delays such as the transfer of the modernised aircraft carrier — the Vikramaditya — have dented Russia’s reputation as a reliable partner.

Therefore, Delhi seeks a diversity of supply from sources including the United States and several European countries. This is evidenced in India’s preference for French Rafale fighters in the multi-billion dollar Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) fighter tender.

India’s MMRCA tender is for procuring 126 fighters to replace squadrons of MiG-21s. The deal will see France supply a number of aircraft fully built and ready to fly — while the remainder will be built under a technology transfer agreement by Hindustan Aeronautics.

Moreover, India is looking to be 75% self-reliant in defence production by 2020-25. It will also seek to become a weapons exporter and probably promote partnerships with Russia. The BrahMos Aerospace programme has been a particular noteworthy area of close cooperation between Russia and India with the creation of the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile.

Pakistan

Pakistan may also provide a new opening for Russia. On November 20, Russia and Pakistan signed a military cooperation agreement, reportedly involving a deal for Moscow to supply 20 Mi-35 transport helicopters to Islamabad.

Middle East

Besides Asia, Russia has been actively looking for new customers for its arms in the Middle East. Russia has recently concluded significant contracts with Iraq for helicopters and air defence systems worth 4 billion dollars and Egypt for air defence systems worth 2 billion dollars.

Latin America

In Latin America, Russia remains hopeful of selling fighter aircraft to Brazil and Argentina. Russia has sold air defence systems to Brazil and hopes to develop a defence industrial partnership that might parallel its military cooperation with India.

Competitive sectors

The sectors in which Russian weapons systems are considered equal or superior to Western equivalents include air defence, fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and cruise missiles. These are the sectors in which Russia’s defence industry can compete with the most advanced Western suppliers, with weapons such as the S-300 air defence system, the Su-35 fighter jets and the Kilo class submarine being noteworthy. Russia can also be competitive in sectors such as tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, artillery, and small combat ships. These are sectors where Russian weapons are not as good as Western equivalents, but are generally significantly cheaper. This price difference has allowed them to be competitive in many countries despite lower quality and/or inferior characteristics.

Ukraine delays

However, Russian arms sales have largely depended on selling late Soviet designs, with new designs proving more difficult to manufacture. The freeze on military cooperation with Ukraine may lead to further delays as many Russian weapon systems depend on Ukrainian components and the transition to Russian domestic substitutes is expected to take two to three years.

Russian Armata Main Battle Tank

Russian Kurganets-25 Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Rumours abound that one of Africa’s most infamous terror groups may be on the cusp of falling apart, owing to the disintegration of its leadership. The militant group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) first sprang up in Uganda in the late 1980s and over the ensuing

Anthony Leather, Senior Consultant for Aerospace, Defense and Security at Frost & Sullivan, presents the top 10 cyber threats facing critical national infrastructure based on detailed analysis of the most recent incidents. According to Leather, the cyber threat will be the number one

Alongside the establishment of AFRICOM, the United States and other Western nations have placed greater focus on a “long war” against terrorism, which involves bolstering weak and failing states so that governments possess the security and public confidence to stave off

British Ranger Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

So, to re-cap the past week or so: the two-state solution is (almost) dead (again) after Bibi’s victory in the Israeli elections, the Americans came off the sidelines in Iraq with airstrikes in support of an offensive to re-take Tikrit from ISIS, Yemen’s President has reportedly fled the country and Saudi Arabia has now launched airstrikes against the Houthi rebels, Syria has dismantled 3 chemical weapons sites, Syria stands accused of continuing to use Chlorine weapons, Canada announced that it won’t bother to ask the Syrian government before attacking ISIS, oh and nine British citizens have reportedly entered Syria to work as medics in IS hospitals.

Spot the odd one out. That didn’t stop the nine medics making the front pages, though.

What is the British government to do about British citizens that are willing to travel to Syria and support ISIS? The Guardian called this “a test for British policy” and I agree, but it is a general policy problem that any state whose citizens get involved in irregular conflicts will have to face. I had a good debate on Twitter with Shashank Joshi regarding his argument that this constituted “material support” for terrorism, although the question he was asked was slightly different to its presentation. As I see it, the problem here is that two norms are in direct conflict with one another: the idea that the British citizens shouldn’t support ISIS, and the humanitarian impulse to save lives.

The key problem with any assessment is the same as most arguments about foreign fighters: we don’t really know what they’re up to except via scraps of information and rumours spread via twitter/instagram/the internet. As I see it, however, there are three ways that they could be involved (as medics): as a standard fighter with some medical expertise, as a dedicated medic working in a battlefield role, as a medic working in a hospital or similar facility. The first case is the easiest – even under international humanitarian law medical personnel can carry a light weapon for personal protection but lose the protection of their status if they act like standard personnel. The second is perhaps the trickiest issue. A battlefield medic would be providing material support, but at the same time, although medical personnel are integral to the conduct of military operations, they are commonly protected from attack precisely because international humanitarian law seeks to preserve the ability for medical personnel to tend to the sick and wounded while fighting rages. Even though debate rages about what constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” in non-international armed conflicts, this concept doesn’t include medical aid. Fundamentally, in international law there isn’t anything to prevent a person from pulling wounded people from a battlefield or tending to their wounds.

There is little doubt in my mind that the British government could figure out an argument for making it illegal to go to Syria and provide medical support for ISIS, even though this will be fundamentally a British law for British citizens. The question is, do we want to be seen to criminalise the humanitarian impulse? Will nine medical students really make much of a difference? In terms of narrative it seems a needless own-goal. If these students did go to Syria to heal people instead of kill them, the best thing the British government could do is ignore them and focus on something more important. Throw a dart at a map of the middle east, and it’ll probably land on something that should be a priority.

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Russian DT-3P Articulated All-Terrain Tracked Carrier