Defence`s Feeds

The Taleban use Pakistan as a sanctuary: most of the movement’s leaders are settled there and it is the movement’s preferred place for training, meeting and as a rear base. It is also the prime destination for ‘rest and recuperation’ (R&R) and the rehabilitation of wounded fighters. But how do the Taleban move between the battlefields of Afghanistan and their bases in Pakistan? AAN’s Fazal Muzhary and Borhan Osman have been analysing the jihadi ‘commuting routes’ between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The information in this dispatch is largely based on conversations with Taleban fighters, former Taleban officials who have recently quit the movement, local residents and doctors in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan and with Afghans living in Pakistan’s Balochistan province who have contacts with the Taleban. The two authors have been collecting information on this subject since 2014, while doing other research in these areas.

When Mullah Akhtar Mansur was officially taking over the Taleban leadership in 2015, more than 2000 field commanders travelled from across Afghanistan to Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balochistan province and the Taleban’s effective headquarters. Responding to an urgent call by the leadership council (also known as the Quetta shura) for a ‘general assembly’ planned for 31 July 2015, they arrived within three days. During that time, according to eyewitnesses, flocks of armed Taleban crossed the Durand Line. Traces of dust followed the convoys, each made up dozens of cars and motorbikes, driving along the dusty, gravel routes which cross the border in southern Afghanistan.

The Taleban did not need to think hard about which crossing points to choose for entering Pakistan. Among the dozens of options available, they were familiar with the crossing points used by their comrades who routinely cross the border. They did not need to worry about anyone intercepting or stopping them on these routes. On the Afghan side, most of the territory they were passing through was already under Taleban control. On the Pakistani side, areas near these crossing points were either lawless or manned by government security forces who did not seem bothered by the movement of militants fighting the Afghan government and its allies.

Such ease of movement between the two countries has made it possible for local Taleban cadre to commute, on a regular basis, from one side of the de facto border to the other. Before going into details about two of the Taleban’s favourite crossing points, it might be useful to have an overview of the general cross-border movements of people between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The border is too long to be sealed

The Durand Line, which serves as the de facto border between the two countries, is about 2,400 kilometres long and passes through a third of Afghanistan’s provinces. It is non-demarcated and extremely porous, arbitrarily dividing communities who continue to maintain relations across the line. According to a former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah Mohmand, there are 235 crossing points along the border, which translates into almost one crossing point per 10 kilometres. Only 20 of them are used frequently and only two of them have all the essential border controls in place, such as immigration, customs and security checkpoints. These are the most frequented: one is the Torkham Gate in eastern Nangarhar province and the other is the Wesh–Chaman Gate in the southern Kandahar province. While these two crossing points are used by people from across Afghanistan, the 18 other frequently used crossings are used mostly by the local population on both sides of the line and are motorable. They are also used by smugglers and traffickers of illicit drugs, as well as by militants fighting in both countries who want to reach major urban centres in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The rest of the crossing points are mostly local trails connecting one community or part of a community to another, but they do not usually lead to major cities in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

The multiplicity of routes along the long, porous Durand Line and the rugged terrain it runs through have long made it, in practice, impossible to completely ‘seal’. Long before the current wave of insurgency, in the 1980s, demands to seal the border were much stronger than they are now. Then, anti-government mujahedin insurgents regularly moved across the Durand Line to launch attacks inside Afghanistan. Like the Taleban, the mujahedin used Pakistan as a sanctuary, training centre and supply base, but in a much more open, public way. The then government in Kabul with support from the Soviet Union tried much harder to stop the cross-border movement of fighters and weapons. They failed. A declassified CIA report from 1981 concluded that closing the border to insurgent infiltration was not feasible unless the Soviets and the government in Kabul conducted massive and long-term operations and put in far greater resources than the Soviets were then doing. Taleban ‘commuting’ is therefore a time-honoured technique and its effectiveness well-proven.

The Taleban’s favourite entryways for infiltration and exfiltration

To illustrate the Taleban’s movement across the Durand Line in some detail, here is a brief description of the two crossing points most frequented by the insurgents along the southern zone, the Baramcha and the Badini crossing points:

1. The Bahramcha crossing point

Located in Helmand’s remote Dishu district, the Bahramcha crossing point is 300 kilometres south of the provincial capital, Lashkargah. The border passing through Dishu is 163 kilometres long. On the Pakistani side of the border line lies Chaghi, a predominantly Baloch district Chaghi, a district of Balochistan province, with  the Gerdi Jangal (sometimes spelled Jungle) town and refugee camp . The majority of the population on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border used to be Baloch, while, particularly on the Pakistani side, Pashtuns – mainly from the Eshaqzai tribe – have moved south latest since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as refugees. Dishu has been out of the control of the Afghan government since as early as 2003.

The wider area in which the Bahramcha crossing point is located saw some of the earliest signs of insurgency, starting in 2002, a year after the fall of the Taleban, according to the memoirs of one of its participants. Neither the Afghan government, nor the Pakistani authorities have any offices for registering the movement of people and supplies in Bahramcha. It is used both as a foot and motor crossing. It is the most used route for drug trafficking in Afghanistan and the border area hosts one of the biggest networks of heroin labs. The terrain is divided between sandy and mountainous environments.

Bahramcha is one of the most important crossing points for Taleban fighters, especially those from the south and south-western, as well as western provinces, such as Helmand, Farah, Nimroz, Herat and Ghor. (Kandahari and Uruzgani Taleban mostly use a crossing point in the Registan district in Kandahar province). Bahramcha and the broader Dishu district is lawless in terms of there not being a regular government, leaving the area to be ruled by the shadow government of the Taleban. The insurgent movement is in control of the drug market and its lucrative tax flow. Bahramcha is not only a major hub of drug processing labs, but also home to Taleban training camps and bomb production factories. This infrastructure supplies the Taleban battlefield in Helmand as well as in neighbouring Farah and Nimroz provinces.

The Afghan Taleban use this point for moving their fighters and transferring their wounded for treatment in Pakistan. Wounded fighters are mostly taken to private hospitals in the closest towns on the Pakistani side of the Durand line, namely Dalbandin and Chaghai. Those in need of further or more complicated surgical operations are taken to Quetta or Karachi. The Taleban also use this crossing point to connect to one of the main meeting places of the movement, Gerdi Jangal. Situated 360 kilometres from Quetta and 90 kilometres from the Afghan border, Gerdi Jangal is inhabited mostly by Eshaqzai , the majority of them originally from Helmand. This is the same tribe from which many Taleban leaders are drawn, including the powerful late leader Akhtar Mansur.

Taleban commanders and fighters from the southern, south-western and western provinces use this route for normal movement, between their homes in Pakistan and the battlefield, or if they live in Afghanistan, to visit leaders in Quetta and enjoy some R&R. One south-based Taleban cadre told AAN that some in the ranks move between Gerdi Jangal and Helmand on an almost regular basis, commuting weekly. They ride non-stop in groups of five to 15 on motorbikes from the southern districts of Helmand to Balochistan.

The same route is also the most preferred for high-level Taleban. According to senior Taleban sources, Akhtar Mansur was as familiar with the terrain and people on both sides of the border as any normal local trader. He would frequently move around the areas in and around Bahramcha and had an extensive network of contacts with the local population in the border areas from Bahramcha up to Nimroz, befriending influential figures along the border in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. According to sources familiar with his movements, Bahramcha and surrounding areas were also Mansur’s favourite retreat when he wanted to hide from the Pakistani authorities, when, for example, he came under pressure. Current Taleban leaders, such as key commanders, military chiefs and governors, also use the same route to travel from their homes in Pakistan ‘on mission’ to oversee operations on the ground. Several Taleban sources told AAN that at least six of the most senior military and civilian Taleban leaders have crossed into Helmand province using Bahramcha this year, alone.

When it comes to the experiences of insurgent networks with this border crossing, it was not the Taleban who discovered this route. In the 1980s, the Afghan mujahedin also used Bahramcha in a similar way, to get training and supplies from Pakistan and then move into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation forces and the PDPA regime. Most of the mujahiden fighters who were active in the southern provinces, particularly in Helmand, used it for moving weapons, recruits and injured people. Beside the mujahiden, most Afghans from southern, south-western and western provinces seeking refuge in Pakistan also used this route. When the fight against the Soviets was over and civil war broke out between mujahedin factions, some mujahedin commanders smuggled the Russian military equipment they ‘inherited’ from the Soviets and the Kabul government into Pakistan for sale, using this same crossing point.

2. The Badini crossing point

Named after the area on the Pakistani side of the border, the Badini crossing point is located in the Shamulzai district of Zabul province. It borders Zhob district of Balochistan province on the Pakistani side and is located about 75 kilometres south of Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul. According to a former Taleban official who was in charge of customs in Badini during the Taleban regime, this crossing point used to have all the usual border controls. During the Taleban era, he said, it was manned by security posts and goods were checked for customs.

After the fall of the Taleban in 2001, it seems the Afghan government has since tried to maintain active checkpoints here, manned by the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP). However, the number of the forces deployed is limited and does not cover all the motorable trails which travellers could take to cross the de facto border. This crossing serves as the most accessible and favourite entryway for the Taleban of Zabul and Ghazni and parts of Uruzgan, Wardak and Paktika provinces. It connects these provinces directly to a town known for being home to many Taleban in Pakistan, Kuchlak, 25 kilometres north of Quetta. There is a significant overlap in the tribal makeup of the local population on both sides of the line, with Kakar Pashtuns in the majority.

The Taleban have used the Badini crossing point since the insurgency kicked off in nearby provinces, from around 2005. One Taleban fighter, who travelled to Pakistan using this crossing point in 2010, said he did not see the Afghan National Border Police or any other security force at the crossing point. When he got to the Pakistani side, he said there were Pakistani border police, who let him and his comrades continue their trip unhindered. “The Pakistani border police did not stop us,” he said. “They just waved to us as a sign of welcome. We moved on with our motorbikes to reach Quetta. No one stopped us along the way.”

Taleban fighters usually pass the Badini crossing point in convoys of cars or motorbikes. For the wounded, if they can not be treated in local or regional hospitals inside Afghanistan, such as the major hospital hub in the Nawa district of Ghazni province, they are taken to Pakistan using Badini.

Just recently, in summer 2017, Taleban fighters in Ghazni and Zabul reported to AAN that the crossing point was blocked from the Afghan side. The rumour was that US forces were deployed to the border, making it impossible for Taleban to cross. Local officials in Zabul, however, rejected the reports of the deployment of foreign forces along the Durand line. In a couple of instances AAN know of, wounded Taleban fighters who could not be transferred to Pakistan due to the closure of Badini died from their wounds. In September 2017, Taleban fighters said the border crossing was opened for motorbikes and foot traffic only. It still closed to general vehicles.

The wider Badini area has also attracted the attention of government officials in the south because of what they say is the existence of Taleban training camps on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The police chief of Kandahar, General Abdul Raziq, said in 2011 that the Taleban had training camps on the Pakistani side of the border near Badini. Raziq said that Taleban fighters were getting training not far from the eyes of the Pakistani police, one near the crossing and another nearby in Qamaruddin Karez and then were being sent to Afghanistan to fight.

Like other crossing points, Badini also has a history of cross-border movement from the 1980s, during the mujahiden insurgency against the Soviets. The mujahiden of the southern front, specifically Zabul, Ghazni, Uruzgan and partly Wardak provinces got their supplies from Pakistan and moved their men across the border using Badini. The border area remained out of the control of the then Soviet-backed government. Civilians from the same set of provinces also used this crossing point to flee to Pakistan.

Why do the Taleban find it easy to move across the border?

There are several reasons for the Taleban’s smooth cross-border travels at crossing points such as Bahramcha and Badini. What follows is a closer look at the major reasons, specifically the absence of government, the permissive behaviour of the Pakistani security agencies, the shared communal bonds across the border and the abundance of illegal networks that provide cover for the insurgents.

First, the absence of government security forces along these crossing points means the Taleban can readily travel between the two countries. The de facto border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is long, poorly demarcated and there are a multiplicity of formal and informal border crossings. This means it would need the deployment of a huge force and supporting resources to watch all the crossing points, even just the motorable ones. There has been no serious effort from the Afghan government to deploy troops to all the border points along the Durand Line which are, or could be used, by militants. It has established check points only at a limited number of the crossing points and the Taleban normally avoid these. The problem is that the main entry points used by the Taleban have long been out of the control of the Afghan government, meaning the government cannot deploy a force there.

It has been the Taleban’s well-thought out strategy when initiating its insurgency to threaten the government’s control around these crossing points. That is true for both Bahramcha and Badini. They were some of the earliest areas to slip out of the government’s control as the Taleban stated their comeback from 2003 onwards. It seems this was part of the Taleban’s strategy when planning their return in those early years. According to a former Taleban official who witnessed the initial discussions of comeback in the early years, many of the first-tier commanders of the first military shura that was formed in late spring 2003 started their operations from the areas near the border with Pakistan, in the provinces of Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand. The plan, he said, was to establish a toehold in areas with easy exit routes to Pakistan. Badini and Bahramcha along with the surrounding areas saw some of the highest concentration of commanders in those early years.

The second reason has been the permissive, friendly response that Taleban fighters receive from Pakistani forces. While the Afghan security apparatus has been unable to control the cross-border movement, or the government has been unwilling to allocate sufficient resources, there is apparently no such problem on the Pakistan side. As evidenced by the Taleban fighter’s quote above, the Pakistani forces posted there often greet the Taleban with a welcome, rather than trying to disrupt their movements. The lack of cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani border forces, or to put it more straightforwardly, the Taleban-friendly attitude of the Pakistani forces to the Afghan government’s enemies has encouraged Taleban fighters to travel as often as they want to.

Thirdly, the interwoven network of the tribal communities residing on the two sides of the Durand Line facilitate cross-border movement. In most cases, it is the same community with the same tribal structure divided only by a virtual border line. The communal relationship and the need for daily movement within such communities is the main reason why the Durand Line remains porous. This also allows insurgents who strike a chord with these communities to operate freely, using communal bonds. Initially, it is often insurgents with the same tribal affiliation who serve as trailblazers for such a route. Once the ‘co-tribalist’ Taleban find their way into a community, others follow suit, using the network and sympathy their comrades have made for the movement. Such relationships are enough for the local communities to make it easy and safe for Taleban to navigate the border areas. The Ishaqzais around the Bahramcha crossing point and the Kakars around Badini (but also beyond these areas) have long been key supporters of the Taleban.

Fourthly, there is an abundance of networks of smugglers and drug traffickers who have been using the same border crossings for a long time. The smuggler networks pre-date the current insurgency, and also facilitate it. They provide a cover for the militants, and relations between the two groups are usually cooperative. The Taleban can, therefore, find cover within the trans-border, local communities which are sympathetic to the insurgents and within the networks of illicit traders. In both cases, the Taleban are easily absorbed within the crowds of non-insurgent ‘commuters’.

The Taleban’s increasingly homeward movement

Since early this year, the Taleban have appeared to be suffering new pressure from their hitherto largely friendly host, Pakistan (possibly because Islamabad is under pressure from the United States to rein in the insurgents). With the caveat that this section is an ‘at-first-glance’ impression based on limited accounts from local residents and Taleban along the southern border (the same pressure is reported along the south-eastern border as well, according to local sources in Paktika, although AAN has not dug deeper here), rather than the result of in-depth examination, nevertheless, our interlocutors have said the Taleban are experiencing new pressure from Islamabad. They say the Taleban have been increasingly looking for alternatives to Pakistan inside Afghanistan for various ‘services’.

The trend had started much earlier, after 2014, of trying to rely less on Pakistan and move training camps and medical services inside Afghanistan. In 2015, many Taleban military leaders also moved into southern Afghanistan, using the Bahramcha crossing point, after some members were detained and others threatened after they failed to show up for talks hosted by Pakistan with the Afghan government (read more here). The movement into Afghanistan was also encouraged by the drawdown of international forces at the end of 2014, which, along with a change in targeting (with orders to concentrate on al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Khorasan Province or ISKP) meant a substantial decrease in the air power that had been used to target both Taleban leaders and mid-level commanders. The Taleban started to open local health facilities in the different areas of the south and hire local doctors to treat their wounded. One of the largest such centres, which was developed before 2014, is in Nawa district of Ghazni. However, air strikes by both the United States and Afghan airforces have been intensifying, as reported here, making it difficult for the Taleban to pursue their ‘Afghanisisation’. The insurgents will most likely have to scale back their hopes for coming home.

Restricting the militants’ movement is possible, but not stopping it

If border crossing could be made more difficult, the Taleban would likely look for shelter and bases within the civilian population inside Afghanistan. Increased air strikes would discourage them from building training camps, military bases and their own health facilities in ways visible from the air, but the movement would likely try to adapt, possibly by using civilian population centres and public facilities (for example, existing health centres and schools) as cover. The most important element of the insurgency, aside from the human, weapons, are increasingly available inside Afghanistan. Individual Taleban get arms when they are seized from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and then split them as ‘war bounty’. Or, they buy them directly from members of the ANSF or from the black market. The exceptions are certain bomb-making explosives and chemicals.

Whether the Taleban’s cross-border infiltration and exfiltration could be made significantly more difficult is another question. The government would need to take control of the border areas where the most commonly used crossing points are located and introduce border controls. Such a concentrated and sustained effort has yet to be tried. Sealing the Durand Line entirely is, in practice, unfeasible without the commitment of a huge force permanently deployed to the 2,400-kilometre long de facto border and/or the solid support of local populations. It would also be politically undesirable: the Afghan government would not want to appear to be recognising the Durand Line by sealing it and dividing the local communities. This means the government is generally in favour of free, cross-border movement. Kabul wants the border to remain porous and with movement unrestricted for everyone, but for the militants. However, at the moment, they do not have the control to be able to pick and choose who moves.

Opting even for the less resource-intensive task of taking control of the main border crossings frequented by the Taleban could have a significant impact on the Taleban’s scale of operations. However, it would be unlikely to be decisive in turning the tide against the insurgents. As long as the insurgency continues to enjoy local support in some areas of Afghanistan, the Taleban could continue to operate within Afghanistan, despite restrictions on their cross-border travel.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

 

 

 

 

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On 16 October, Ana Fotyga, Chair of the SEDE committee, extended her condolences to the people of Somalia following the massive terror attack in Mogadishu. She said:

"This weekend's terror attack in Mogadishu is an unconscionable atrocity. I condemn the perpetrators in strongest terms and would like to extend my sincerest condolences to the people of Somalia. Terrorism is a threat that affects us all and knows no borders. We will continue to do our utmost to support the Somalis and our international partners including the African Union in their fight against this scourge."
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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French Jaguar Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle

The European Defence Agency (EDA) today published a call for papers on the topic of Maritime Surveillance which is open to defence industry, academia, research institutes and associations or groupings of industrial suppliers. The call is part of EDA’s new approach towards establishing a structured dialogue and enhanced engagement with industry in the context of the ongoing Capability Development Plan (CDP) revision and aims at associating defence industry to an upcoming EDA Maritime Surveillance Workshop with defence planners and relevant experts.

Following a first workshop focusing on Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) which took place on 12th September 2017, the EDA is now organising a second one-day workshop to be held on 1 February 2018 to explore the mid to long-term (20 years ahead) aspects of Maritime Surveillance.

This workshop will not be a forum for discussing the commercial aspects of current systems, but a dialogue intended to enrich the CDP long-term view with industry inputs on the long term industrial and technological outlook in the specific capability area of Maritime Surveillance.

In this perspective, the EDA is inviting National Defence Industry Associations (NDIAs) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) to reach out to their members and encourage them to respond to the call for papers.

Selected industry representatives will be invited to share their views of long-term outlooks focusing on the questions listed in the questionnaire. Speakers will be selected based on this call for papers, which will be evaluated by the EDA.

Submissions are sought from as wide as possible a range of industries involved in aspects of development related to Maritime Surveillance. Though responses to all questions in the questionnaire are encouraged, submitters may develop answers to specific questions in greater detail based on their area of expertise. This will allow thematic discussion panels to be formed.

Submissions will be judged on their innovativeness and relevance as well as ability to stimulate discussion on the future role of Maritime Surveillance. Participation in this call for papers is open to companies of any size as well as academic, semi-governmental research institutes and associations or grouping of industrial suppliers.
 

How to submit :

• Download the call for papers: Maritime Surveillance CDP Industry Questionnaire
• Send your completed files to EDA at cps@eda.europa.eu with a copy to eric.girard@eda.europa.eu
• Deadline for submissions is 17 November 2017.

 

Contact:

Eric Girard
Head of Unit Maritime Domain
Eric.girard@eda.europa.eu
T +32 2 504 28 72

 

More information:

• Maritime Surveillance (EDA project page)

French Griffon Armored Personnel Carrier

There has been a six per cent decrease in the number of civilians killed and wounded in the conflict this year compared to the first nine months of 2016 – a year which saw record highs in civilian harm. The latest UNAMA report on civilian casualties provides, as always, sobering statistics of how Afghan civilians are being killed and injured in the war and by whom. AAN’s Kate Clark has been looking at the figures and assessing what they say about trends in the conflict. She also takes a special look at what the recently announced, intensified air campaign by the United States and Afghan air forces may mean for Afghan civilian casualties.

This latest report from UNAMA covers the first three quarters of this year (1 January to 30 September 2017), comparing them with the same period in 2016. It can be read here.)

There is some good news in UNAMA’s latest report, primarily that civilian casualties have fallen compared to the first nine months of last year. However, it was a slight decrease and masked a one per cent increase in civilian deaths. It was also only a reduction from a record high for civilian casualties in 2016. Such fluctuations in quarterly reporting have been seen before without annual reductions. (The last annual fall was in 2012 compared with 2011 – see AAN analysis here.) Even so, the reduction of six per cent in civilian deaths and injuries is welcome. In total, UNAMA documented 8,019 civilian casualties in the first nine months of the year (2,640 people killed and 5,379 injured).

What UNAMA defines as anti-government elements, ie insurgent groups, (1) were responsible for the bulk of the casualties: 5,167 overall (1,760 deaths and 3,407 injured) or 68 per cent of the total during the first nine months of 2017. They caused one per cent fewer civilian casualties compared to the same period last year. UNAMA attributed 66 per cent to the Taleban, 10 per cent to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), aka Daesh, and the remainder to “unidentified Anti-Government Elements, including self-proclaimed Daesh/ISKP.” The figure for ISKP is huge, considering their limited territorial footprint, but is a consequence of their willingness to attack unprotected gatherings of civilians for sectarian reasons. (See recent AAN analysis here.)

Civilian casualties attributed to pro-government forces – UNAMA’s term for Afghan government and international forces (primarily the United States, which is now the only country with a combat mission in Afghanistan) and militias under their control (2) – were 19 per cent lower, compared to the first nine months of 2016. Pro-government forces were responsible for 1,578 civilian casualties (560 deaths and 1,018 injured), or 20 per cent of the total. Over half of these occurred during ground fighting.

UNAMA said it could not attribute eleven per cent of civilian casualties to either side, but said they occurred during fighting. (3)

Causes of civilian deaths and injuries 

The fall in civilian casualties so far this year was particularly marked in ground engagements, which is still the largest overall cause of civilian harm. Deaths and injuries here fell by 15 per cent overall and by 37 per cent in those attributed to pro-government forces. UNAMA reported a seven per cent rise in casualties from anti-government elements in ground engagements. Ground engagements caused 35 per cent of civilian casualties in the first nine months this year – 2,807 overall (684 deaths and 2,123 injuries)

UNAMA said the government’s commitment to mitigating civilian casualties had “led to fewer civilian deaths and injuries from their operations.” This was particularly marked in the north-east. (4) This was a change in tone from UNAMA’s 2016 annual report when it called for a cessation in the use of indirect use of mortars, rockets, grenades and other weapons in civilian-populated areas. “[C]lear tactical directives, rules of engagement and other procedures,” it said, needed to be developed for the use of explosive weapons.

The other factor, however, reducing the casualties in ground engagements was that there were less of them this year. Frontlines have been relatively static in the south, (5) unlike last year which saw heavy fighting in both Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, including two attempts by the Taleban to capture Lashkargah in Helmand and insurgent offensives against Tirin Kot in Uruzgan, as well as attacks on many of the districts of those two provinces. In the north, the Taleban also overran most parts of Kunduz city, before being driven back. This year, so far, there have been no major Taleban offensives against any large population centres.

One factor, not mentioned by UNAMA, may be the increased threat to the Taleban from the air, with both the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and US Air Force increasing the numbers of sorties flown and munitions dropped (more on this below). This may be reversing a trend seen from 2014 onwards, when ground engagements became the main cause of civilian casualties (the trend was visible from 2013. This had come about, as international aircraft were withdrawn and the Taleban were able to mass in large numbers and launch ground offensives without fear of being wiped out from the air. Significantly, the increase in the casualties from the Taleban side this year were largely from “small arms fire”, not heavy weapons.

Both the US and Afghan air forces have become more active in 2016 and that is reflected in the civilian casualties resulting from aerial strikes. Although still representing only six per cent of the total number of civilian casualties reported, the increase in the actual numbers was sharp: 52 per cent more civilians were killed and injured from the air in the first nine months of 2017, compared with the same period in 2016, with two thirds of the casualties women and children. 466 civilians were killed and injured in aerial operations in the first nine months of the year (205 deaths and 261 injuries). UNAMA attributed 38 per cent of those casualties to the international military (the remainder would be either from the Afghan Air Force or made up of incidents which could not be attributed to either.) The issue of airstrikes will be analysed in more detail below.

Other trends made evident in UNAMA reporting were a four per cent decrease in casualties from suicide and complex attacks, although that included 13 per cent more deaths. Such attacks result in 20 per cent of total civilian casualties – 1,584 in all (382 deaths and 1,202 injuries).

There was also a reduction in the number of civilian casualties from IEDs. They were responsible for 18 per cent all civilian casualties in the first nine months of the year, a reduction of eight per cent compared to the same period in 2016. There were 1,403 casualties (498 deaths and 905 injuries) from IEDs. The use of indiscriminate and therefore unlawful pressure-plate IEDs on roads used by civilians led to 803 civilian casualties (371 deaths and 432 injured), reflecting an 11 per cent increase in deaths from these devices. A quarter of these fatalities were children.

Many more civilians have been killed and injured in targeted and deliberate killings this year: there was a 13 per cent overall increase in casualties and a 33 per cent spike in civilian deaths. UNAMA said it had documented “disturbing trends of intentional killings targeting religious leaders, civilians perceived to support the Government or Afghan national security forces, and continued attacks against civilian Government workers and judicial and prosecutorial figures.”

Another troubling statistic was the many Shia Muslim Afghans killed and injured in the first nine months of the year. There were 278 civilian casualties (84 deaths and 194 wounded) of worshipers targeted as they attended mosques or religious ceremonies. (See recent AAN reporting here).

Air strikes and Civilian Casualties

Only six per cent of all civilian casualties in the conflict up to 30 September 2017 were a result of air strikes. While bearing this in mind and also the tendency for air strikes, particularly those conducted by the US Air Force, to receive a disproportionate attention in the Afghan and international media, it seemed reasonable to look at this issue in more detail, given the 52 per cent rise in casualties caused by them in the first nine months of the year (a trend continuing from 2016). It is especially relevant given the plans to intensify the US and Afghan air campaign further and, on the US side, the loosening of restrictions on when air strikes can be ordered.

Last year, in its 2016 annual report on the protection of civilians, UNAMA called for “an immediate halt to the use of airstrikes in civilian-populated areas and… greater restraint in the use of airstrikes where civilians are likely to be present.” It also wanted “[C]lear tactical directives, rules of engagement and other procedures” developed and implemented for the use of armed aircraft. In this report, it “reiterated its concern at continued increases in civilian casualties from aerial attacks, particularly among women and children.”

On 10 October 2017, the US and NATO commander in Afghanistan General Nicholson warned the Taleban that “a tidal wave of air power is on the horizon.” Both the US and Afghan air forces are flying more sorties, dropping more munitions and planning further increases in operations. The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported a 24 per cent increase in personnel in the Afghan Air Force in the second quarter of 2017, compared to the first quarter and an 83 per cent increase in sorties flown over the same three months. Some of that was due to “a slightly lower tempo of operations in the winter months,” it said, but it was largely due to “a considerable increase in the AAF’s recent operational activity.” It did not report on the number of munitions dropped.

Meanwhile, the US Air Force has also been more active, dropping munitions in quantities not seen since ‘the surge’ – the period 2009 to 2012 when 100,000 US troops came to be deployed to fight the Taleban (NB the first easily available data on US air munitions and sorties is from 2012) (6). The US Airforce has reported that September 2017 “marked a record high month for weapons employed in Afghanistan since 2012, with 751 munitions being delivered against Taliban and ISIS–Khorasan targets; a 50 percent jump from August.” The nearest known comparable months are July and August 2012, with, respectively, 504 and 509 munitions dropped. The comparable yearly figures are 947 munitions delivered by the US Air Force in Afghanistan in 2015, 1,337 in 2016 and, already in the first nine months of this year, 3,238. (Data here)

In testimony to the US Congress on 4 October 2017, Secretary of State for Defence Jim Mattis described how President Trump had made it easier to launch air strikes. (His comments were widely reported, although the transcript of the hearing has yet to be published):

“At one time, sir, we could not help Afghan forces unless they were in extremis” — that is, under direct, urgent threat, Mattis said. “And then eventually that was rescinded, but they still had to be in proximity. They had to be in contact [ie coming under fire from insurgents]. Today, wherever we find them, the terrorists — anyone trying to throw the NATO plan off, trying to attack the Afghan people and the Afghan government — then we can go after them.”

President Obama had already loosened restrictions imposed under the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) which had only allowed combat operations against al Qaeda and “its associates”. From June 2016, strikes could also be ordered against the Taleban and for “strategic effects” (for example to prevent a population centre falling to the Taleban) and not just “counter-terrorism” (for more detail, see earlier AAN analysis on the US military strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, who also testified to Congress, gave further details or the changes.

“The conditions aren’t specific to, as Sec. Mattis alluded to, a specific engagement or a specific time,” Dunford added. “So if they’re in an assembly area, a training camp, and we know they’re an enemy and a threat to the Afghan government, our mission or our people, [US and NATO commander in Afghanistan] Gen. Nicholson has the wherewithal and flexibility to make that decision.”

Significantly, the extra 3500 or so US forces, announced on 3 October 2017 as being deployed to Afghanistan are operating at a much lower level. They are operating in battalions, rather than just advising at corps headquarters. Mattis referred to them as combat troops: “The fighting will continue to be carried out by our Afghan partners,” he said, “but our advisers will accompany tactical units to advise and bring NATO fire support to bear when needed… Make no mistake, this is combat duty.” It seems the post-2014 fudge when President Obama wanted to carry on fighting in Afghanistan and insist that the combat mission was over, when it was not clear which US forces were involved in ‘the can be combat’ US Freedom Sentinel’s mission and the non-combat NATO Resolute Support mission is at an end. US forces will now be openly deployed in the field, calling in airstrikes and providing direct tactical advice on the front lines to Afghan forces.

The Afghan Air Force is doing better than it has before – although the historical precedents are very poor. War crimes reporting from before 2002 shows the sustained use of the Afghan Air Force to target civilians, when it was controlled by the PDPA (a junior partner to the Soviet air force which carried out widespread bombing of rural areas in the 1980s) and later by Shura-e Nazar and Jombesh, who got hold of the remnants of the air force after the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992 and used them to bomb civilian areas during the civil war in Kabul (all factions also used artillery indiscriminately in the capital). The Taleban, who seized some of those even fewer remaining air assets also used them to bomb civilians, including the hospital and Oxfam office in Yakowlang, in Bamyan province in 2001, and opposition-held parts of Dara-ye Suf district, in Samangan province in 2000, even bombing people who fled the town and tried to seek shelter in the mountains.

The current Afghan Air Force may not be targeting civilians as its previous incarnations did, but it has to do much more to avoid civilian casualties. UNAMA notes that, in October 2017, the Government formally endorsed the National Policy on Civilian Casualty Prevention and Mitigation, which covers all of the ANSF, not just the air force. The UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, said there must be a full implementation of the new policy and in particular: “…ensure the impartial examination and systematic tracking of civilian casualties and is legally obliged to ensure independent investigations into any incidents causing civilian casualties that may amount to serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

It is especially necessary to watch how the Afghan Air Force develops, given that its role is planned to expand markedly in the next five years. This expansion is a key component of the current US/Afghan military strategy (see here and here) and training, hardware and considerable US funding is in the pipeline. (7)

Assessing the plans to intensify the air campaign

That many more Afghan civilians have been killed and injured in air strikes so far this year compared to 2016 is clear. From the data available, though, it is impossible to determine whether, proportionate to the number of strikes, more civilians are being killed and injured (which would indicate poorer efforts to protect civilian casualties) or not. In calculating the overall calculus of civilian harm from air strikes, the decrease in casualties from ground engagements, which may partly be a result of the increased air deterrent on the Taleban, would also need to be factored in. Nevertheless, there are elements of the US and Afghan strategy to increase the use of air strikes which already ring alarm bells.

First, compared to the pre-2014 period, the US military command is far less transparent: in those earlier years, there was a real engagement with national and international organisations (including the UN and concerned NGOs, such as AAN) on how to mitigate civilian casualties. There was also a genuine effort, in training, tactical directives, (8) command and control, reporting and investigating, to minimise the harm to civilians. The US motivation was the realisation of the damage that dead and injured Afghan civilians were doing to its war effort. That emphasis on protecting civilians is no longer evident.

Pre-2014, there was also much more political pressure to avoid civilian casualties: an angry President Karzai and frequently outraged Afghan media has been replaced by the rather silent President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah and a far more subdued media. The current government recognises its dependence on the US and has been far less likely to criticise. If civilian casualties really rise, however, popular discontent may force this onto the political agenda again.

The second question, however, is what is the overall aim of this policy? General Nicholson, delivering Black Hawk helicopters to the Afghan Air Force at what The Washington Post described as an “elaborately staged ceremony at Kandahar Air Base [which] marked the formal launch of an ambitious plan to modernize and expand the Afghan air force over the next five years” (see here), vowed that the escalation of the air campaign would be “the beginning of the end for the Taliban.” His words brought a strong sense of déjà vu, not only claims made during the surge years, but even earlier, to 2001, claims that in the end amounted to nothing.

If the intensified air campaign is just aimed at pushing the Taleban back, although we may see that happen, we would also likely see the insurgents adapting their strategy. They did this before, after suffering huge losses in ground engagements in 2006 and 2007. They also bounced back very rapidly after US surge troops left and then most international forces withdrew in 2014; Afghan forces proved unable to hold the territory that the foreign troops had won. The Afghan insurgency tends to adapt, which means that new strategies and the creation or expansion of forces have not, in the long run, lead to territory being held, civilians protected or there being any decisive reduction in the level of violence: the war continues, in different ways. The US and Afghan strategy only makes sense – unless a forever war is really the preferred option – if any gains against the Taleban are exploited politically and the same energy and commitment is put into finding a political, negotiated end to the war, as has been shown in fighting it.

 

 

 

(1) In UNAMA’s 2016 Protection of Civilians, it wrote:

Anti-Government Elements encompass all individuals and armed groups involved in armed conflict with or armed opposition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. They include those who identify as ‘Taliban’ as well as individuals and non-State organized armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities and assuming a variety of labels including the Haqqani Network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, groups that identify as “Daesh”/Islamic State Khorasan Province and other militia and armed groups pursuing political, ideological or economic objectives including armed criminal groups directly engaged in hostile acts on behalf of a party to the conflict.

(2) UNAMA in its 2016 Protection of Civilians report wrote:

The term “Pro-Government Forces” includes the Afghan Government’s national security forces and other forces and groups that act in military or paramilitary counter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control of the Government of Afghanistan. These forces include, but are not limited to, the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Border Police, National Directorate of Security and Afghan Local Police – which operate under Government legal structures – and pro-Government armed groups and militias that have no basis in Afghan law and do not operate under formal Government structures. This term also includes international military forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces. 

(3) Some will have resulted from ‘explosive remnants of war’ left over from fighting. They killed 134 civilians and injured 378, most of them children. The Afghan government has now formally ratified Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons concerning explosive remnants of war. “The implementation of this protocol,” said Danielle Bell, Chief of UNAMA’s Human Rights Service, “which will come into effect in February 2018, will prevent many similar and avoidable casualties from occurring in the future”

(4) UNAMA includes in the northeastern region, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces.

(5) UNAMA defines the southern region as comprising Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul.

(6) Thanks to Jack Serle from the Drone Warfare project at The Bureau of Investigative Journalism for pointing out, after publication, that there is data cached. While the US Air Force has stripped away old numbers, he said, Alexa O’Brian has archived pre-2012 air power summaries here.

(7) SIGAR’s most recent report, to the end of June 2017, reported that:

As of May 18, 2017, the United States has appropriated approximately: $5.2 billion to support and develop the AAF since FY [financial year] 2010, with roughly $1.5 billion of it requested in FY 2017. Of the total amount since 2010, $2.2 billion was spent on the Special Mission Wing, the special operations branch of the AAF. CSTC-A [Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan] noted that the FY 2017 figure includes DOD’s recent request to Congress for $814.5 million to fund the Afghan Aviation Transition Plan (AATP), which will replace the AAF’s aging, Russian-made Mi-17 fleet with refurbished, U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters obtained from U.S. Army stocks. 

It added:

The AAF’s current inventory of aircraft includes:

• 4 Mi-35 helicopters
• 46 Mi-17 helicopters (19 unusable)
• 27 MD-530 helicopters (one unusable, two combat losses)
• 24 C-208 utility airplanes
• 4 C-130 transport airplanes (one unusable)
• 19 A-29 light attack airplanes (12 are currently in Afghanistan and seven are in the United States supporting AAF pilot training)

SIGAR also said that:

As part of the AATP, over the next several years, the AAF will receive a significant number of new or refurbished airframes to grow the AAF’s inventory. According to USFOR-A, in FY 2017, two more A-29 aircraft have been purchased, but not yet fielded. In order to replace the AAF’s aging Mi-17s, the United States has also procured 53 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as well as 30 MD-530s, three AC-208s, and four additional A-29 aircraft (for a total of six) using FY 2017 funds.289 While the delivery timelines and training requirements are still being determined, by the end of the AATP in 2023, the AAF will have a total of 61 UH-60s, 58 Fixed Forward Firing UH-60, 54 MD-530s, 24 C-208s, 32 AC-208s, 4 C-130 aircraft, and 25 A-29s.

(8)  In 2012, the then commander of US and NATO forces, General John Allen issued a new ‘fragmentary order’ altering the tactical directives outlining offensive fires could be delivered. Civilian residences could no longer be targeted unless, as Allen said, “my troops are pinned down, can’t move, and the only option they have is to deliver fires on these structures, or I decide, the senior leader out here, I decide to deliver fires on these structures.” The result, he of the new order, he said, was that civilian causalities as a result of air fires, “plummeted immediately.” Before then, air fire had been the main way in which civilians were killed by ‘pro-government forces’ (international military and ANSF together), killing four times as many civilians as any other tactic.

 

 

will take place on Wednesday 22 November, 9:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30 and Thursday 23 November, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

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On 10 October, the European Defence Agency (EDA) held a workshop and networking event aimed at facilitating transnational cluster partnerships among European defence stakeholders (industry, research organisations, academia, etc.). The aim was to help interested parties benefit from EU funding opportunities and participate in relevant calls for proposals, in particular the ongoing COSME-funded call for proposals for defence-related clusters.

This the second time that the EDA organized such a workshop this year. The events were attended by 20 defence-related clusters from 13 EU Member States, representing over 1,000 defence stakeholders (SMEs and larger enterprises, academia, research and technology organisations, etc.).

During both workshops, European Commission representatives presented their activities in defence-related domains while EDA’s experts brought forward Agency’s recent work on R&T+I prioritisation, the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), industry engagement and the wide spectrum of EU programmes able to fund Key Strategic Activities (KSA) and EDA’s Overarching Strategic Research Agenda priorities.

Some 30 cluster-to-cluster (C2C) meetings took place during the two EDA workshops, either building new partnerships or enhancing existing ones, a practical example of the EDA’s role as an interface between Member States’ Defence ministries and industry, on the one hand, and the European Commission and other EU institutions, on the other.

 

Testimonials from participants:

 

• Eduards Filippovs (Coordinator for International Relations of Cluster of Security and Defence of Latvia): “EDA is fulfilling a very important mission: bringing together public officials, industry and professional by encouraging to make new partnerships and cooperation, as well use of new instruments we have never had before in the defence sector”.
• Eugenio Fontán (General Manager of Madrid Aerospace Cluster): “EDA is developing a set of concrete actions to implement the political strategy of Innovation in Defence”.
• Klaus Bolving (CEO, Center for Defence, Space & Security, DK): ”The workshop provided participants with high-value information on new business and investment opportunities within the dual-use and defence areas in a very comprehensive and clear way. Moreover, the much appreciated C2C session led to new opportunities, which look promising with regard to closer collaboration between the European defence-related clusters. I look forward to following EDA and the European Commission’s continued work on facilitating European growth, jobs and capabilities for the benefit of a greater and more secure Europe”.
• Tomas Žalandauskas (Director of the Baltic Institute of Advanced Technology and Vice-president of NGPA, clustering national defence industry in Lithuania): “It is hard to overestimate the value of direct contacts in such a conservative field like defense industry. We are grateful for EDA for excellent opportunity to find future partners and relevant information on funding possibilities for Europe wide initiatives”.
• Ziga Valic (Head of European & International Affairs at the French Cluster Optitec): “EDA workshop for defence-related clusters is a welcome initiative offering a thorough overview of funding opportunities on European level and an excellent transnational networking opportunity benefiting clusters from all over the Europe. We hope this event will be organised on annual basis as it is a real value-added”.

 

More information and useful links:

 

• Access to EU funding (EDA project page)
• COSME web-Platform
• ESIF web-platform
• EDA’s ESIF success stories
• EDA’s industry info
  
  
  

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Hosted by the Hellenic Air Force, the Annual Military Airworthiness Conference was opened in Athens this Wednesday by Roland van Reybroeck, EDA Director Cooperation Planning & Support, followed by a keynote speech from Lieutenant General Christoforos Smyrlis, Inspector General of the Hellenic Air Force.

The two-day event (11th and 12th October) brings together key stakeholders from national aviation and airworthiness authorities, European agencies, international organisations and industry, for presentations and discussions on a variety of topics related to the harmonization of military airworthiness requirements, their  implementation and further evolution as a critical enabler for deeper defence cooperation.

In his speech, Mr Van Reybroeck recalled that the excellent work performed in the context of the Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAWA) Forum delivered “a full and mature set of European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs) that is now available to Member States”. Their progressive implementation and the mutual recognition of National Military Airworthiness Authorities “is key in paving the way for more and deeper cooperation”, he said.  He emphasized that “The next harmonisation phase should now focus on further evolution of the regulatory and oversight framework”. Referring to the longer term perspective, he stated: “Once a harmonised European Military Airworthiness System will have been fully developed and sufficient confidence is gained from its implementation, steps could be taken towards the formation of a European Military Joint Airworthiness Authorities Organisation (EMJAAO)” as envisaged by Ministers of Defence in 2008, emphasising that this would in no way whatsoever  be a supranational authority. Mr Van Reybroeck reiterated that the European Defence Agency remains committed to facilitate the ongoing work and cooperation, and to coordinate the military views of the participating Member States including through the organisation of supporting events such as this Military Airworthiness Conference.
 

Further Evolution

The MAWA community will continue to harmonise views and approaches to overcome fragmentation. Thus, further development and maintenance of harmonized military airworthiness requirements and supporting documents will remain a key objective of the MAWA community. At the same time, harmonization of processes and procedures to support recognition and increase efficiency in oversight will unlock further benefits for industry and national authorities alike. Emerging topics such as RPAS airworthiness requirements and safety management will set the scene for future activities and must be appropriately addressed in a joint and coordinated manner, in close coordination with relevant civil and military stakeholders.
 

More information:

• EDA project page on European Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum (MAWA)

 A new political group called ‘Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan’ has emerged in Afghanistan’s crowded political field. It presents itself as being in opposition to the National Unity Government and has called for “a return to the constitution.” The group has been seen from the outset as pro-Karzai. He, meanwhile, seems to have intensified his attempts (once again) to stage a comeback in the political arena. Yet, there are also growing political differences between the group and former president. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili (with input by Thomas Ruttig) looks at the background of some of the group’s leading members and its perceived link with the former president and asks where the two might diverge or converge.

The launch

On 16 July 2017, another new political group called Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan (the People’s Axis of Afghanistan) declared its existence with the pointed motto of “returning to the constitution” and in so doing, “returning to political legitimacy.” The new group’s motto makes clear – as have its leading members ­– that it considers the National Unity Government (NUG) unconstitutional and illegitimate because it has not fulfilled some of the core stipulations of the September 2014 agreement which formed the basis of its existence. The NUG had a deadline of two years to convene a loya jirga tasked with deciding whether to amend the constitution and create a permanent post of executive prime minister. To convene the jirga, it also had to hold elections for district councils ­– the constitution stipulates that the heads of district councils attend – and parliamentary elections – now more than two years overdue. (Read the full text of the agreement here) (1) The NUG has failed to carry out these tasks within the deadline.

That failure has provided an opportunity for various political groups that have emerged over the past few years (AAN’s analysis here and here) to question the legitimacy of the NUG. (2) However, almost all of them have chosen not to burn all bridges with the government, as they mainly seek to pressure it in order to acquire, or regain, a share of government positions. Unlike these groups, Mehwar has presented itself in outright opposition to the NUG and has vowed not to become part of it, that is to say, it has said its leaders will not accept any positions that might be offered.

Criticism of the NUG as a jumping-off point

Rahmatullah Nabil, who acts as the unofficial leader of the group, turned into a vocal critic of the NUG after he resigned from his position as Director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) on 10 December 2015 over differences with President Ghani vis-à-vis Pakistan (read AAN’s report on his resignation here. In his speech at Mehwar’s inauguration ceremony, he called the NUG an “illegitimate authority,” as it had “come into existence, not on the basis of the people’s votes, but based on an agreement between the two election teams and in conflict with articles of the constitution.” He added that the NUG “itself is the fundamental challenge for [solving] all the existing problems and crises” and ruled out any prospect of working with it, saying: “Mehwar-e Mardom, in no way, wants to be a partner in political power with the National Unity Government. From this perspective, we announce emphatically that our struggle is not for acquiring position and status in this illegitimate authority.”

Senior members of Mehwar-e Mardom have adopted the same tone. Ajmal Baluchzada, a former civil society activist (3) and head of Mehwar’s secretariat, told AAN on 28 September 2017 that the NUG had “created a crisis, is not able to manage it and evades tackling it.” He explained this crisis as being the “unconstitutional formation” of the NUG, its failures to implement the political agreement, the persistent disagreements between the president and the chief executive, between the president and his vice-president and ministers, and the illegitimacy of the parliament, suggesting that all these factors have rendered the NUG incapable of reform.

Membership and prominent leaders

On the day of its launch, Mehwar issued a press release, describing itself as a “broad political umbrella, the shared home of ethnic groups and conscientious and elite citizens of Afghanistan,” which “wants to carry out its unending struggle towards institutionalisation of political legitimacy and realisation of democracy as a functioning, active opposition in conjunction and aligned with the people of Afghanistan.”

In a conversation with AAN on 14 September 2017, Nabil claimed that “Mehwar comprises of people from different provinces [and political backgrounds], both leftists and rightists, and people from different generations.” He further asserted that the group came together after “an in-depth analysis of the past 40 years” of Afghan conflicts which had concluded that those conflicts had an external source, namely “a group [that] emerged in the political arena, brought a [policy] copy from the Kremlin and disregarded the traditional society in favour of the intellectual class and rejected the traditional society.” This was a reference to the Soviet-backed, left-leaning People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (later Homeland Party; AAN background here) that ruled the country following a coup d’état between 1978 and 1992. According to Nabil, however, the Afghan people have suffered both from what is often categorised as leftist extremism and Islamic fundamentalism as well as ethnic discrimination. He said, “People were imprisoned or disappeared for the ‘crime’ of growing a beard. People were killed in their hundreds both for the ‘crimes’ of praying and not praying. People sporting surma (kohl) got killed [referring to Pashtuns], (4) people with small eyes got killed [referring to Hazaras], people with big noses [referring to Pashtuns] got killed.” He said that Mehwar intended to initiate a “cross-current” dialogue.

The group’s constitution says that it is run by a leadership council of between “40 and 101 members.” Nabil told AAN on 14 September 2017 there were around 75 founding members who, as a stopgap measure, “constitute the leadership council… [u]ntil the convening of the first general assembly of Mehwar,” as the group’s constitution sets out. This means that it is still open to new entries. There are conflicting reports, however, about who exactly is on this body, including from within Mehwar itself. Two senior leaders told AAN that they were still developing a list of the members. In the absence of such a list, Mehwar officials continue to contradict each other when it comes to who are is leading the group.

This said, Nabil (AAN’s previous reporting on his background here and here) and another leading member, former chief electoral officer and transport and civil aviation minister Daud Ali Najafi, confirmed to AAN that most of the names published by Kabul daily Etilaat Roz and Fars news agency on 17 July 2017, the day after the inauguration, were correct. In addition to Nabil and Najafi themselves, Mehwar members include:

At least four other former ministers from the Karzai era – Rangin Dadfar Spanta (former foreign affairs minister, now head of Mehwar’s political committee), Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defence), Daud Shah Saba (Mines), Karim Brahwi (Borders and Tribal Affairs, also a former governor of Nimroz), and a former deputy minister, Mirza Muhammad Yarmand (Interior);

At least two other former governors, Amer Muhammad Akhundzada (also Nimruz) and Tamim Nuristani (Nuristan)

MPs, including Shakiba Hashemi (Kandahar), Saleh Muhammad Saljuki (Herat) and Jafar Mahdawi (Kabul)

Civil society activists and prominent individuals, including Daud Naji, former journalist and currently senior member of the Enlightening Movement (see AAN’s reporting about the movement here and here), Azarakhsh Hafezi, head of international relations of Afghanistan‘s Chamber of Commerce and Industry and board member of the country’s International Chamber of Commerce, Metra Hemmat, another civil society activist, and Obaidullah Alekozai, head of the Ulema Council of Afghanistan’s eastern zone.

Najafi also provided the following additional names that he said were on the list of founding members: Zalmai Rasul, another foreign minister under Karzai and a 2014 presidential candidate; Spanta’s confidant, Daud Muradian, who runs the Kabul-based policy think tank Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies; and Shiwayi Sharaq, a member of the Uprising for Change Movement (see AAN’s previous report on the movement here). Moreover, unlike Nabil, Najafi also confirmed the membership of Kandahar police chief and strongman General Abdul Razeq and former deputy national security adviser Ibrahim Spinzada (better known as Engineer Ibrahim) who was one of the most influential people in the Karzai administration. Najafi added, though, that Razeq, as a serving general, did not participate in meetings.

Mehwar does not define itself as a political party, although some media do – see for example here and here). Nabil’s denial of Razeq’s association with Mehwar look to be aimed at protecting Razeq. Afghan law bans serving members of the security forces from joining political parties, and last month President Muhammad Ashraf Ghani issued a decree again banning members of the armed forces from joining political parties and also taking part in demonstrations). The Mehwar leaders might also have denied Razeq’s association with their organisation because he has well-known and long-standing allegations of torture and killings against him (by the United Nations Committee against Torture, as well as other human rights organisations. His membership would certainly contradict membership criteria, which, according to Nabil, are in place: “Those who join us should not,” he told AAN “be human rights violators recognised by Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the international community, be corrupt, tolerate discrimination, be wrapped in the politics of deal-making.”

Apart from Razeq, none of the politicians mentioned as Mehwar founders currently hold any government position. With this, as Hasht-e Sobh columnist Ferdaws put it, the group has drawn a boundary between itself, as opposition, and the government – in contrast to most of the other existing political groups that insist that they are not in opposition, but just critical of some aspects of the government’s policies. This includes the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, established under the leadership of Abdul Rabb Rasul Sayyaf in late 2015. Interestingly, two Mehwar leaders – Wardak and Rasul – were previously listed as members of this council.

Ex-president Karzai’s role

Despite the fact that former president Karzai was not present at the inauguration ceremony and is not an official member of the group either, from the very outset, Mehwar was seen in the Afghan media and by the public as a pro-Karzai political organisation. In the view of columnist Ferdaws, for example, “the presence of Najafi and a number of others in the political organisation of Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan shows that Hamed Karzai holds influence over this organisation.” The group, he said, is perceived as the “continuation of Karzai’s efforts to dominate the political environment of the country”.

Mehwar’s clear-cut opposition to the NUG indeed corresponds with Karzai’s repeated and fierce criticism of the current government. In advance of the NUG’s second anniversary on 29 September 2016 – which Karzai considers its expiry date – he repeated his call for a loya jirga to “restore legitimacy and confidence in the NUG,” warning that failure to do so would “cause problems for our land and increase discontent.” (See AAN’s previous reporting here) (5) This year, he has stepped up his networking activities and made a new push for his loya jirga plan. He used the Eid-ul-Adha holiday in early September 2017 to pay visits to the homes of influential politicians such as Muhammad Adib Fahim, the 32 year old son of the late Marshal Fahim and First Deputy Director of NDS, chairman of the Ahmad Shah Massud Foundation and leading member of the Jamiat-e Islami party Ahmad Wali Massud (AAN analysis here) and Second Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq. He is also a senior members of the semi-opposition group, the Coalition for Salvation of Afghanistan. (Also known as the ‘Ankara coalition,’ this quasi-opposition group was formed by internal NUG dissenters and northern strongmen and also includes First Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, foreign minister and acting chairman of Jamiat Salahuddin Rabbani, and Balkh governor Atta Muhammad Nur (see AAN’s previous report here). Former minister of water and energy and Herat strongman Ismail Khan also told the local Hushdar news agency, on 8 October 2017, that Karzai had called him a few days before to say that he would send documents outlining his programme for the way out of the current situation of the country and how to take action to solve the problems. According to a source close to Mehwar, Karzai had also approached a senior member during the Eid holidays and asked why the organisation was not supporting his jirga idea.

On 13 September 2017, Yusuf Saha, a press officer for Karzai, tried to play down these contacts when he told AAN that the visits were not in pursuit of any political agenda. However, Ahmad Wali Massud, has confirmed that Karzai did come to see him to discuss the loya jirga. Saha said that Karzai:

…now proposes that if [the parliamentary] elections [scheduled for July 2018] are not held and the security situation continues to deteriorate even after the announcement of the new US strategy as it has deteriorated after the signing of the bilateral security agreement, the loya jirga is an alternative. The loya jirga will be for finding solutions to the crises and problems facing Afghanistan.

Karzai has also stuck to his sharp, anti-American rhetoric. While many Afghan politicians and large segments of the general public welcomed the new United States military strategy presented on 22 August 2017, Karzai announced his opposition to it in a series of tweets in English, as well as a statement in Pashto. (6) His latest denunciation, on 7 October 2017, during an interview with the BBC, even went as far as to accuse the US of “bringing up” and supporting Daesh. He also called for a ‘traditional loya jirga”’ to review the new US strategy and assure Afghanistan’s neighbours that its soil wold not be used in favour of American and others’ interest. Traditional loya jirgas, also called ‘consultative loya jirgas’, were a Karzai invention largely aimed at shoring up domestic support for actions that he wanted to take or wanted to avoid responsibility for taking, or sometimes to stir up debate (see AAN analysis here, here and here and here). As president, he was very much in charge of who attended and could steer the outcome; that would no longer be the case.

On the domestic level, Karzai has also tried to repair his image as a national figure by distancing himself from the Taleban. In particular, on 23 April 2017, two days after a deadly attack by Taleban infiltrators on the army corps headquarters in Balkh province, Karzai said that he would no longer call the Taleban his brothers: “With consideration of [this] act in which the [Taleban] killed our people, I can no longer call them brothers. I rather address them as a group which poses harm to Afghanistan; anyone who kills an Afghan for the sake of foreigners’ objectives is a terrorist whether it is Taliban, Daesh or anyone else.” A year earlier, he had caused an unprecedented outpouring of anger against him when he said in an interview with the BBC on 24 September 2016 that the Taleban were an “Afghan force that [can] come and capture a territory” and the Afghan National Security Forces, also as an Afghan force, did not have the right to take it back from the Taleban. As a response, during a ceremony held on 30 September 2016 to commemorate the anniversary of the death former president Borhanuddin Rabbani, some participants chanted “death to Karzai” while he was in attendance. See AAN’s reporting here.

Many Afghan and foreign observers have interpreted Karzai’s statements and active networking as signs that he continues to harbour ambitions of taking up a leading political position again, despite denials, and the fact that the constitution rules out a third stint as president. For instance, on 21 September 2017, Foreign Policy wrote: “It has been three years since the former Afghan president, once a close ally of the United States who depended on American backing, left his old role. He is adamant that he has no interest in returning to the presidency. But Karzai is far from retired.”

Karzai, however, did try and fail to exploit the NUG’s two-year anniversary to his advantage after many of the previously existing political groups with whom he had maintained some sort of connection did not pick up his call. In particular, the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan led by Sayyaf, one of Karzai’s key advisors when he was president, did not embrace his agenda.

Political divergence between Karzai and Mehwar

Karzai’s ambitions, his unstinting condemnation of the US and his rejection of elections as a way out of what is characterises as “the current crises of legitimacy with the parliament and the NUG alike” all seem to have made Mehwar reluctant to be seen to be associated with him. Karzai’s volatile behaviour in dealing with the international community, wrote one commentator in 8 Sobh newspaper, could become “the group’s Achilles heal,” given that Mahwar wants to be seen as a new political start-up.

Indeed, in contrast to Karzai, Mehwar-e Mardom has adopted a more cautious stance towards the new US strategy for Afghanistan. On 23 August 2017, in a Facebook post, it welcomed “President Trump’s new stance on how to tackle [the] terrorist heartlands” and “the US President’s decision to not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, including through the state-building exercise” and urged the US government to “take practical steps and mount the necessary pressure on Pakistan to destroy terrorist nests and fight terrorism.” At the same time, and corresponding with Karzai’s position, it expressed concern about “insisting on the use of military force” inside Afghanistan and Trump’s “ambiguity about the privatisation of Afghanistan’s war.”

Nabil has denied to AAN that Karzai is behind Mehwar. He insisted that the former president did not have “any role at all” in the organisation. He alleged that the government was “highlighting [a Karzai] role” to undermine the new group and said, “Most of our members are critical of Karzai Saheb.” Najafi reinforced Nabil’s point, “Since most of us worked with him [in the past], it is said that we are also currently with him.” A senior Mehwar member, who did want to be quoted by name, hinted that Karzai’s personal ambitions were a problem for the organisation, “I personally think that he [Karzai] wants something like: people saying in the jirga, ‘Mr President, please step in. The country is in crisis.’” Nabil, however, spoke dismissively of the possible jirga, indirectly putting down any possible hope Karzai might harbour of leverage it for political gain. “I believe that the jirga is just a tool,” he told AAN. “What will the outcome be? Is it just to [re-]distribute the [government] positions?”

On Karzai’s part, his press officer Saha was categorical about the former president’s position: he did not “have any direct relation with Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan and what is said in the media – that the president is leading the group – is untrue.”

On a side note, Mehwar has also sought to (at least publicly) disassociate itself from former foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who is a contentious figure because of his continued affiliation with Karzai and the views he shares with his former boss. One senior Mehwar member told AAN that Spanta was no longer a key member of the group due to his continued attachment to Karzai and that he had recently been replaced by Hamed Saburi as head of the organisation’s political committee. Yet, Spanta did speak during a recent Mehwar seminar, on 21 September 2017 in Kabul, held under the title, “The National Unity Government after three years”. In that speech, he said that friendly relations with neighbouring and regional countries were more important than strategic cooperation with America. A photo, taken of him speaking, featured on Mehwar’s Facebook page where he was still identified as a member of its leadership council.

The election issue

Offering evidence that Mehwar has no link to Karzai, both Nabil and Najafi told AAN they were opposed to the loya jirga plan advanced by Karzai. Nabil pointed out that he had rejected this as a Mehwar position at its inauguration ceremony. In its 16 July statement, the group said it “believes that the political power should be entrusted, through free, fair and transparent elections, to those political forces and groups that are victorious in democratic elections.” Nabil and Najafi both told AAN that Mehwar was engaged in intensive discussions regarding the viability of holding elections next year. Nabil said “We seek to discuss with all currents on whether elections are held or not. If yes, will they be transparent or plagued by corruption? Do you have any plan?”

Najafi said they had already had “three or four meetings with the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan [led by Sayyaf and including former minister of interior Omar Daudzai and several Jamiat leaders including Ismail Khan, Yunos Qanuni and Besmellah Muhammadi], the New National Front [led by former finance minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi (7)] and the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties [that includes, inter alia, former president Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, former vice-president and current head of the High Peace Council Abdul Karim Khalili and head of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan Sayyed Hamed Gailani]” and were working “on a plan about transparency and changes to the IEC [Independent Election Commission].”

These meetings have now culminated in the formation of a new group: Shura-ye Tafahum-e Jiryanha-ye Siyasi Afghanistan (Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan) which includes Mehwar-e Mardom, the Coalition for Salvation of Afghanistan (the Ankara group), Sayyaf’s Council for Protection and Stability, Ahadi’s New National Front; former interior minister Nur ul-Haq Ulomi’s Mutahed Milli (National United) Party, the Loy Kandahar Unity and Coordination Movement, the Eastern Provinces Coordination Council, Jombesh-e Guzar (the Transition Movement, a Tajik nationalist grouping which announced its existence on 11 May 2017 (see AAN’s report here) the Uprising for Change; and the Commission for Coordination of Political and Civil Organisations. The group issued a joint statement on 7 October 2017, calling for the replacement of the members of both electoral commissions (the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC)) with “other eligible members in agreement with political parties, civil society organisations and prominent political figures.”

This move indicates that Mehwar has already been working proactively with other political groups to carve out room for it to pressurise the NUG over elections. However, Mehwar’s position about elections is far from unambiguous. For example, Najafi said in his speech at the Mehwar inauguration that the group reserves the right “to resort to appropriate and acceptable solutions in consultation with the people and political groups if the government refuses to hold elections on its specified date by resorting to its own specific methods.” In conversation with AAN, Najafi also explained that, “if the government fails to deliver elections [in time], then we will work on an alternative plan which could include an interim arrangement, a loya jirga and international conference.”

Such a development, ie Mehwar coming round to supporting the convening of a loya jirga, could lead to a convergence between it and Karzai. A diplomatic source in Kabul told AAN that both Spanta and Nabil have explained in meetings that they would push for a loya jirga once – as they are certain – the National Unity Government and IEC fails to hold elections. Furthermore, a senior Mehwar member claimed that he had told Karzai he “should talk to those old political parties and figures and convince them. First you should bring them on side, and if they want [a loya jirga], we will also follow the rest.” He explained that Mehwar was “pursuing long-term politics with a long term vision.” This could indicate that Mehwar and Karzai may only march separately for the moment and might come together under certain circumstances in the future.

Relations with the protest movements

Mehwar has also been attempting to attract the new grassroots protest movements that have emerged during the NUG’s tenure by speaking in their favour. In the group’s inauguration ceremony, Spanta criticised the NUG for its way of dealing with them. He tried to appeal to the Enlightenment Movement which was formed in May 2016 out of protests against the government’s routing of an important power line from Turkmenistan, known as TUTAP. One of its large protest marches, on 23 July 2016 in Deh Mazang in Kabul, was attacked by suicide bombers, leading to the death of more than 80 people (see AAN’s previous reporting on the perpetrators here). Spanta blamed the government for what he said was its “intentional” failure to ensure the security of the protest, saying:

The monopolistic and totalitarian machinery of the government for the first time in the last 15 years not only intentionally refused to ensure the security of the citizenry movements in Afghanistan, but also with organised negligence enabled the enemies to massacre close to hundred youths of the Enlightenment Movement.

Spanta also referred to the government response to the demonstrations in the wake of the 31 May 2017 Kabul terror attack (see AAN’s previous reports here, here and here as “bloody suppression and unabated use of government force” that turned “legitimate demonstrations by youths of the Uprising for Change Movement into bloodshed”. 

But aside from a few representatives among its founder-members, Mehwar so far has not proven able to incorporate either of these movements in their entirety. Leading representatives of these movements are keeping their distance, or expressing themselves with some scepticism about the new group.

Aref Rahmani, an MP from Ghazni and senior member of the Enlightening Movement, for example, told AAN on 24 September 2017 that there was a substantive difference between his movement and Mehwar. He said it was unlikely for the movement, which he said was of a purely civil nature and much broader than Mehwar, to come under a political umbrella like Mehwar, which is comprised of individual politicians and political currents. Another senior member of the Enlightening Movement who did not want to be named told AAN that its High Council was very upset with Daud Naji and Jafar Mahdawi for joining Mehwar because they had set a precedent for other members of the movement to join one or another political group ahead of the next presidential election. If that indeed happened, it could either contribute to the fragmentation of the movement or to the subsuming of at least of some of its elements under a political party agenda. At some point, the senior member added, Naji and Mahdawi might have to decide whether they stayed with the Enlightening Movement or worked with Mehwar.

Moreover, President Ghani has also been taking steps to accommodate the Enlightening Movement which makes it trickier for members to join the oppositionist Mehwar. Ghani issued a decree on 17 September 2017 appointing a commission – to include representatives of the Enlightening Movement – to “thoroughly review the demands emanating from the 500 KV power line project” and to organise an “official, government commemoration” to be held at the presidential palace for the protestors killed on 23 July 2016 by suicide bombers during their demonstration in Deh Mazang. The movement realises that if its members join political groups, particularly those who declare themselves in opposition to the NUG, this might harm the new negotiations with the government about their core agenda.

Meanwhile, and somewhat in contrast to the above, Omar Ahmad Parwani, a member of the Uprising for Change movement – that also has at least one leading activist among the Mehwar founders – told AAN on 24 September 2017 that his movement would be willing to cooperate with those criticising “the wrong policies of the government,” but that this cooperation would be issue-based and the movement would not compromise its independence.

Conclusion: a deniable nexus with Karzai?

Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan, the country’s newest political group, is made up of close Karzai allies and former aides. It has clearly defined itself as being an opposition to the government and has ruled out joining it. It has distinguished itself from most of the other new political alliances that have sprung up over the past few months and years, including Sayyaf’s Council and the ‘Ankara coalition’, which have keep their options of joining or continuing to work with the government open. (The only exception is Ahadi’s front.) However, despite the fact that Mehwar’s leading members have sworn not to accept any government position, it cannot be excluded that at least some of the leading politicians who participated in Mehwar’s launch, as well as other members (especially those who seem not to be clear if they are fully associated with Mehwar or not) might be tempted to break ranks if government positions were proffered.

Describing itself as a ‘political umbrella’, Mehwar’s apparent intention to tap into broader discontent with the NUG among the general public and grassroots movements has yet to pay off. The group’s perceived association – albeit denied – with former president Karzai and the suspicion that it could act as his vehicle back to power, has not helped it make headway.

Mehwar’s stated position of preferring elections over a loya jirga, at least for the time being, seems to have created a political divergence between it and Karzai. However, if parliamentary and district elections are not held next year – both key international stakeholders (8) and Mehwar leaders have said they doubt they will be – Mehwar might fall back on the alternatives, including demand a loya jirga. They might also join forces in this with Karzai. For the time being, though, Karzai represents a more radical (and more anti-US) strand among NUG opponents than Mehwar currently wants to be associated with. However, some of the statements made by Mehwar leaders quoted above show that the evolution of a Karzai-Mewar nexus cannot be ruled out, at all.

Karzai might also be tempted to soften his tone, in the interests of persuading Mehwar to come on board with the hope of winning a broader political mobilisation. Currently it looks as if Karzai, on his own, will not be able to muster enough political support to achieve what appears to be his objective – a political comeback through a loya jirga. Many constitutional hurdles would anyway still stand in his way to return to the presidency through elections.

Even if elections are held on schedule, Mehwar could still provide an organisational platform from which it and Karzai could work together to get their preferred candidates elected to parliament. They might also find their interests coalescing around a single candidate in the next presidential elections, with Mehwar finding it needed Karzai’s support, if it wanted to promote its ‘man’ in the poll.

 

Editing by Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

 

 

 

(1) The NUG, in its September 2014 founding agreement, imposed a two-year deadline on itself to convene a loya jirga in order to amend the constitution and consider the creation of the post of a permanent executive prime minister. The convening of a loya Jirga, as laid out in article 110 of the Afghan constitution (therefore it is called a “constitutional loya jirga”), however, is linked to both an elected parliament and district councils whose members would constitute the majority of its members. Article 110 of the constitution stipulates:

(…) The Loya Jirga consists of: 1. Members of the National Assembly; 2. Presidents of the provincial as well as district assemblies [councils]. Ministers, Chief Justice and members of the Supreme Court as well as the attorney general shall participate in the Loya Jirga sessions without voting rights.

The NUG agreement further stipulates:

On the basis of Article 140 of the Constitution, the national unity government is committed to holding district council elections as early as possible on the basis of a law in order to create a quorum for the Loya Jirga in accordance with Section 2 of Article 110 of the Constitution.

Parliamentary elections, however, have not been held; they were due in 2015; district councils have never been elected so far. For all loya jirgas held between the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003/04 (the one that approved the new constitution) and now, district council seats have been filled by surrogates from the provincial councils.

(2) Some argue that the NUG’s term ended with the expiry of the 2014 agreement in 2016 and that it should have been replaced by a new arrangement, either through a loya jirga (called for mainly by Karzai and his supporters) or snap elections (put forward mainly by former finance minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi’s New National Front). (See AAN’s previous analysis here).

(3) Ajmal Baluchzada was a civil society activist, mainly in the field of human rights. He was one of the founders of the Armanshahr/Open Asia Foundation. In 2014, he joined Zalmai Rasul’s presidential campaign, was later appointed as an adviser to NDS chief Nabil and now works with him in his new political capacity.

(4) Kohl, black eyeliner, is often used by male Pashtuns, particularly in the Kandahar region.

(5) The type of loya jirga Karzai proposes would, however, be different from the one envisaged in the NUG agreement. This agreement calls for a constitutional loya jirga in the composition explained in endnote 1. Karzai, meanwhile, advocates for a ‘traditional’ loya jirga where the president appoints all members. (More on different loya jirga concepts and Karzai’s use of them, in this AAN analysis.)

 

(6) The tweets read:

I very strongly oppose the new U.S. strategy towards Afghanistan as it is against peace and the national interest of Afghanistan.

The strategy excludes bringing peace and prosperity to Afghanistan and is focused on more war and rivalry in the region

U.S. must seek peace and stability in Afghanistan rather than extending conflict and bloodshed in Afghanistan and the region.

On 13 April 2013, after the US forces dropped the ‘Mother of All Bombs’ on an Islamic State in Khurasan Province (ISKP) position in Achin district of Nangarhar, (See AAN’s previous reporting here) Karzai, contrary to both camps in the NUG, who welcomed the bombardment, called it “brutal act” against Afghan people, the environment and the country’s sovereignty.

(8) For example, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Afghanistan Tadamichi Yamamoto, in his briefing to the United Nations Security Council on 25 September 2017, stated, “Timely elections will enhance the credibility of the political system and institutions. Many stakeholders, however, remain skeptical that credible elections will be held on time.”

 

 

 

A team comprising Lockheed Martin and Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM) has secured a new contract to construct an additional Freedom-variant littoral combat ship (LCS) for the US Navy.

Australian shipbuilding company ASC has partnered with Babcock Australasia to deliver in-service support for six of the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) Collins-class submarines.

The US Navy's AN / DVS-1 coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis (COBRA) Block I airborne mine detection system has attained initial operational capability (IOC).

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