The National Interest

China is reportedly developing two stealth bombers: the H-20 strategic bomber and the JH-XX tactical bomber. If China is capable of finishing either project, the military implications for the region could be significant, giving China a tool that to date only the Americans have ever possessed.

The Stealth Bomber

Only one country has ever developed and fielded a stealth bomber – the US and their B-2 Spirit. And when the B-2 was first delivered, in 1993, the aircraft was a legitimate game changer. Suddenly, the US possessed the ability to fly undetected, across enemy lines, and deliver either nuclear or conventional ordnance; the B-2 added another layer of sophistication to the US’s nuclear triad, which constituted the US’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

Times have changed, however. The B-2’s stealth technology is no longer cutting-edge; it’s radar cross section is no longer as impressive. Air defense systems have grown more sensitive, challenging the B-2’s ability to operate undetected. Accordingly, the Air Force is working on an updated stealth bomber, the B-21, which will presumably feature a smaller RCS.

Respect is still due: The B-2 was ahead of its time; over thirty years later, no nation has offered an equivalent technology. But now China is reportedly working to do just that, with not one stealth bomber but two.

China’s Efforts

Little is known about the Chinese efforts to field a stealth bomber. Details are exceedingly scant. But what is understood is that the H-20 project will offer a strategic option while the JH-XX will offer a tactical option. What does that mean? The H-20 will have a larger combat radius, perhaps upwards of 5,000 miles, and will feature advanced radar systems like the AESA. The H-20 would serve in a similar capacity as the B-2, giving the Chinese a credible method for delivering nuclear weapons via air, hence creating a credible nuclear triad.

The JH-XX meanwhile can be expected to have similar features but will be a smaller, regionally focused bomber that may include fifth-generation fighter technologies i.e., thrust vectoring, data fusion, network connectivity, supercruise, and an internal weapons bay. Granted, that’s not much to go on. Yet, the existence of the project has been confirmed through official channels; according to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China Military Power report, “The PLAAF [ People’s Liberation Army Air Force] is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets…stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development of these new bombers, which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025.”

The report added that the JH-XX “will have additional capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets, and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design.” That’s not a lot to go on. The significant takeaway is simply that the Chinese are working on a stealth bomber, an ambition that is consistent with Xi’s overarching ambition of enhancing Chinese military prowess and revisionism.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Russian state media reported that an airstrike was carried out on Wednesday in the Ukrainian-occupied Kursk region involving a Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback). The fighter-bomber launched guided glide bombs at ground targets, while it was escorted by a Sukhoi Su-35S (NATO reporting name Flanker-M).

"The crew of a Russian Aerospace Forces Su-34 multi-role supersonic fighter-bomber delivered a strike on a cluster of Ukrainian military manpower and armored and motor vehicles near the border in the Kursk Region," the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement to Tass.

"After completing the combat mission, the entire group successfully returned to the base airfield. According to the intelligence report, the targets were successfully hit," the Defense Ministry added.

The airstrikes were allegedly carried out on a "Ukrainian stronghold," and the Kremlin claimed multiple Ukrainian personnel were killed and several vehicles destroyed. Kyiv has not commented on the strike or confirmed that it suffered any losses.

Replenishing the Losses

It was just weeks ago that the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), a subsidiary of the military-industrial conglomerate Rostec, announced that it had delivered a new batch of Su-34s multirole fighters to the Russian Aerospace Forces.

UAC didn't state how many fighters were delivered in the latest consignment, but it has been reported that Moscow's rate of attrition has been outpacing production throughout the ongoing conflict. Last month, Stavros Atlamazoglou, writing for The National Interest, cited Oryx open-source data that found thirty-seven Su-34s had been to that point.

Russia was believed to have around 163 operational Su-34s at the start of the conflict nearly three years ago. Though the Kremlin didn't confirm the loss of one in October, Russian military bloggers (mil-bloggers) acknowledged that a Su-34 was shot down by an American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon. It marked the first successful air-to-air kill involving the F-16 in Ukraine.

Russia's Fullback

The Sukhoi Su-34 multirole strike aircraft is a twin-engine, twin-seat, all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber, initially developed for the Soviet Air Forces in the 1980s. A derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO reporting name Flanker), the Su-34 was developed to operate in all weather conditions and conduct attack, bombing, and fighter missions.

The development of the aircraft was one of the Kremlin's many programs that were forced on the backburner following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that followed. The Su-34 program was only revived in earnest in the early 2000s, with eight pre-production aircraft built for trials and evaluations. The aircraft formally entered service in 2014 – although there are reports that the strike aircraft was employed during the Russo-Georgia War of 2008.

As Atlamazoglou further emphasized, the aircraft was designed with "an enhanced cockpit with additional armor to withstand anti-aircraft ground fire," while it also is equipped with "advanced electronic warfare countermeasures to jam or defeat enemy anti-aircraft missiles." The Su-34 is capable of reaching Mach 2 (approximately 1,500 miles per hour) and is able to carry 18,000 pounds of ordnance on its 12 hardpoints. It can conduct air-to-air attacks beyond visual range (BVR), but also be employed in a fighter-bomber role – which appears to be how the Kremlin is now mostly using the aircraft.

Though it can strike targets up to 160 miles away, that doesn't seem to be far enough for the fighter-bomber to avoid hostile air-defense fire, or enemy aircraft as noted in the October encounter with the F-16.

Thus while the Su-34 remains among Russia's most capable multirole aircraft, and it has been widely used in the ongoing war, it clearly isn't invincible. The question now is whether Russia will be able to replace the losses – especially as Ukraine is to receive additional F-16 Fight Falcons and French-made Mirage 2000s.

The Su-35S

As previously reported, the Sukhoi Su-35 has been touted as one of the most advanced 4++ generation aircraft systems, combining many fifth-generation elements. It is also a heavily upgraded derivative of the Su-27 aircraft and was originally intended for export.

As UAC failed to initially find foreign buyers, the Su-35S first entered service with the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2014 and made its first combat deployment in Syria in 2015 – where it was employed to provide cover for other Russian aircraft on bombing missions.

While sharing broadly the blended wing-body design of the Su-27, the Su-27M/Su-35S can be visibly distinguished from the basic version by the addition of canards, which are small lifting surfaces, ahead of the wings. The Su-35's large and powerful Saturn AL-41F1S engines provide it the ability to supercruise for a long time, while it can reach supersonic speeds without using an afterburner.

The engines are also noted for employing three-dimensional thrust vectoring, which makes the Su-35 very maneuverable. Currently, it is the only production fighter to use two-plane thrust vectoring nozzles.

Designed primarily to be an air superiority fighter, the Su-35 has secondary air-to-ground capability and can carry an enormous amount of weapons. It has 12 wing and fuselage hardpoints, which allow for it to carry ordnance with a maximum weight of up to 8,000 kg (17,630 pounds), including a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation, and anti-ship missiles, as well as a number of TV, laser-, and satellite-guided bombs. The Su-35's armament also includes a GSh-30-1 30mm autocannon with 150 rounds.

The multirole aircraft can further be equipped with an electronic warfare pod, which provides it with powerful jamming capability. It has been reported that its advanced jammers can reduce the performance of enemy radars, and can blind onboard radars found on missiles, notably the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Russia is reported to have around 120 Su-35s in service, while at least six are believed to have been lost in the fighting in Ukraine. It would seem that the Su-35S may have a new role – namely protecting the Su-34 when it carries out its ground attacks.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Even one of the greatest weapons of mass destruction has what could be described as a "shelf life." On Tuesday, the United States Department of Energy announced that its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had completed a program to keep the B61-12 nuclear bomb in service for decades to come.

The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) was initiated in 2008, with a specific focus on upgrading the family of B61 gravity bombs, "which are deployed from U.S. Air Force and North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) bases." The latest modification of the original bomb, the B61-12 is a twelve-foot-long, approximately 825-pound, air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilizes an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target.

According to NNSA, the B61 has already been in service for more than five decades, yet remains both "the oldest and most versatile weapon in the enduring U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." The B61-12 LEP is meant to further extend the service life of the bomb stockpile by at least another 20 years. That will include refurbishing, reusing, and if necessary even replacing some of the nuclear and non-nuclear components.

As a result, instead of entirely fresh ordnance, the B6-12s are a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. On December 18, 2024, NNSA completed the Last Production Unit (LPU) of the B61-12 LEP – the culmination of an effort that began almost 20 years earlier.

"Completing the B61-12 on schedule is the latest example of what we've been saying for several years now: NNSA is delivering capabilities at the pace and scale needed by our Department of Defense partners and our deterrence requirements," said Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby. 

The total cost of the program was reported to be approximately $9 billion.

Upgrades to Continue

The B61-12 LPU came three years after the First Production Unit (FPU) was achieved in November 2021, and 17 years after its design and development was first initiated.

"NNSA's program managers and experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the Pantex Plant, the Savanah River Site, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the Kansas City National Security Campus worked in close collaboration with NNSA on the design, development, qualification, and component production," the Department of Energy explained.

"Completion of the last B61-12 testifies to the successful collaboration we've had with our U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense partners. The momentum built through B61-12 production and delivery will continue into delivery on the other six active weapons modernization programs and on additional programs that will become active in the coming years," explained Dr. Marvin Adams, deputy administrator for Defense Programs at the DoE. "Achieving LPU in FY 2025 demonstrates our ability to execute, not only to our partners and stakeholders in DoD and Congress but also to our adversaries and allies. This demonstration is itself a contribution to deterrence and assurance."

Even as the B61-12 LEP has reached its end, NNSA will look to the B61-13, which will further build on this last upgrade effort. It is scheduled to reach its FPU in the department's fiscal year 2026 (FY26).

An Air-Launched Nuclear Weapon

The B61-12was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally, and the weapon is also being certified to be carried on the Air Force's B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Last March, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) confirmed that the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II achieved its nuclear certification to carry the gravity bomb in October 2023, becoming the first fifth-generation nuclear-capable aircraft. With that certification, the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant stealth fighter further became a "dual-capable" aircraft able to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons internally.

However, it was noted at the time that the F-35A can only carry the upgraded B61-12 variant – but that is essentially a moot point now that the program has reached its LPU. In addition, the certification did not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C. It remains unclear if and when those variants could receive the certification – and as the F-35A can carry the current variant, it is expected it will be certified for the B61-13 as it enters service.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Uncle Sam is getting his rear-end kicked by the Russians and Chinese (heck, even the North Koreans are starting to outdo the Americans) in the all-important realm of hypersonic weapons. Indeed, it’s possible that China is even already creating working defenses against hypersonic weapons (meaning that Beijing is doubling up on success whereas the Americans are still languishing in the design phase).

But a new US defense project is desperately trying to change that. This author remains highly skeptical about the endeavor. Given how key hypersonic weapons are, and will continue to be, the effort by the Defense Department and the defense firm known as Kratos, must be assessed. 

Kratos Saves the Day?

Under the rubric of “MACH TB 2.0” Kratos is attempting to “enhance the United States’ capabilities in hypersonic technology through rapid, affordable testing,” according to Kalif Shaikh at Interesting Engineering, a trade publication.

Both the Kratos leadership and the top brass at the Pentagon believe that one of the key reasons that the Russians and Chinese have surpassed the Americans in developing a reliable, real-world hypersonic weapons capacity has to do with the extreme costs of hypersonic weapons development and testing. 

In fact, when it comes to testing hypersonic systems, the United States is far behind the curve. Wind tunnels are key elements behind testing hypersonic systems. Guess where the world’s most powerful wind tunnel is for testing hypersonic systems? If you guessed the United States, you’d be wrong—it’s actually in China. 

Kratos is leading a group of powerful defense contractors, including the likes of Leidos and Rocket Lab, all of which are keen on expediting the R&D cycles of American hypersonic weapons. Kratos believes that they can reduce the risks and costs associated with hypersonic weapons development by accelerating the delivery of these systems in the field. One way to do that is by deploying advanced flying testbeds to allow for researchers to assess the efficacy of their hypersonic systems in real-world conditions.

Is the Problem Fundamental or Can It Be Resolved Quickly?

Pentagon insiders (and those at Kratos) do not believe that the United States lacks the fundamentals to achieve parity with both Russia and China in hypersonic weapons. They think the problem is taking all the disparate pieces the Pentagon has been assembling for hypersonic weapons research and development and simply accelerating those projects. There might be something to this theory. 

After all, hypersonic weapons have been researched since the last part of the Cold War. It’s not really new technology. The Americans, however, ignored the need to develop these systems which left a gap for both Russia and China to fill.

So, it might very well be that this is an application problem rather than a fundamental inability to compete. Of course, the United States is being shown up by its rivals, notably China, in multiple other domains. Yet, the Americans are right to give the Kratos team a chance to see if they can simply accelerate the American development of hypersonic weapons. If Kratos is right then the US could achieve real parity with China and Russia in hypersonic weapons in the five years or so.

There are some problems with this outlook. 

Fundamentally, the defense industrial base is broken and the procurement systems for these weapons systems are increasingly corrupt and inefficient. The quest for greater weapons has been reduced to little more than massive profit motive by defense firms—even at the expense of national readiness.

Should the Kratos team be wrong, and the problems affecting America’s hypersonic weapons development are far more fundamental and systemic, then the United States will find itself in a world of hurt, as Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons rise that can threaten the homeland in ways that conventional missiles simply cannot. 

A global arms race is occurring, and the Americans are in the unenviable position of being on the defensive. Hopefully Kratos can help overcome these problems soon. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East prove true Vladimir Lenin’s infamous quote that, “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” That’s because about a month ago the entire geopolitical framework that has existed in the Mideast for decades was completely upended in a relatively short amount of time. 

For the first time since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which loosed the Islamic Republic of Iran from its strategic box, the Iranians have been placed on the defensive and their overall strategic position in the region is utterly crumbling. 

As a result of these incredible actions in just a little more than a month, Iran is desperately flailing about in a spasmodic attempt to restore its unstable regional security situation. Recent days have seen pronouncements about rapid Iranian nuclear weapons development meanwhile since last month news about Iran’s mysterious drone mothership has slowly leaked out to the West. 

Earlier this week, Iran’s state-controlled Channel 3 made an ominous prediction that, “In the coming hours, the world will witness unusual scenes and developments.” 

No one knows for sure what that means. It is likely just another desperate act from a regime that, let’s face it, is about to feel the squeeze from the incoming Trump administration if President-Elect Donald Trump’s running commentary on Tuesday, January 7, about Iran and the hostages being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip are any indicator. 

A Drone Mothership is Born

Regardless, Iran is clearly doing everything in its power to restore its unstable and rapidly deteriorating security situation. An area that should cause some alarm among Western security officials is Iran’s drone carrier, the Shahid Bagheri. This vessel is a modified container ship. Specifically, it is an augmented 24-year-old container ship named the Perarin. The ship was transformed at the Iran Shipbuilding & Offshore Industries Complex Company near Bandar Abbas in Iran.

Significant structure modifications were needed to make the old container ship into a weapon of war. An angled flight deck and a specialized ski-jump takeoff ramp were installed on the boat. Of course, the ship retains its original superstructure. Angled decks for launching and recovering drones was, therefore, necessary. Those modifications included white markings to guide flight operations, indicating that the Iranians are serious about precision in their onboard drone operations. 

Designed to carry a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including medium-range altitude, long-range endurance drones, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones, and one-way attack drones, the vessel’s capacity suggests she will carry a significant and lethal array of drones. One can assume what kind of drones will be present onboard this ship, but the Iranians have been characteristically mum about the details. Although, the fact that there is a ski-jump ramp indicates the likelihood that the Iranians plan on launching jet-powered drones and/or heavier, longer-range systems from this boat. It’s a significant force multiplier.

The Shahid Bagheri apparently left its port the week of November 12. Its whereabouts are not publicly known (it is very likely that US intelligence has a clear understanding of where this boat is, though). The ship is a perfect example of Iran’s method for keeping up with larger military powers that are competing with the Islamic Republic. By taking existing civilian technology, like the container ship, and converting it into a relatively cheap drone carrier, the Iranians just enhanced their naval power projection significantly on the cheap. 

A Master of Asymmetrical Warfare on the High Seas

By having the Shahid Bagheri (other drone carriers are under construction, too), the Iranian Navy can engage in destabilizing military operations against international shipping passing through the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. 

Shahid Bagheri’s role in asymmetrical warfare will be crucial for keeping Iran in the great geopolitical game, especially in light of its recent bad luck at the hands of Turkey and Israel in places like Syria. 

There are, of course, downsides to this jerry-rigged vessel. While it is insanely cheap and gives the Iranian Armed Forces significant capabilities boost, the vessel was not originally designed as a military ship. Therefore, there are inherent limitations to the ship. This is especially true in light of Iran’s serious lack of protective escorts for the drone carrier. 

Beyond that, though, this ship is relatively easy to spot and track for most modern intelligence agencies. So, its threat is likely still limited. Indeed, it was tracked as it left its homeport by the civilian Western satellite firm, Maxar Technologies. 

Where Shahid Bagheri can do the most amount of damage is in the waters surrounding the Middle East. If, however, Tehran gets it in its head that this boat can be used to project military power across distances, such as the Atlantic Ocean, they would find whatever advantages the ship gave their navy utterly negated.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Few remember the Vought A-7 Corsair II. The Navy attack jet simply lacked the cultural presence to make any sort of staying impact – despite serving for one quarter century. The reason, I suspect, is because the A-7 was quite ugly.

Making an Impact

While the average member of the public may not track military aircraft, most seem to have a general awareness of the basics. Many aircraft gain some mainstream traction either through their use in entertainment, or through some sort of policy/budgeting debate. The F-14 and F/A-18, for example, were featured in the Top Gun franchise and resultingly gained presence amongst the general public. To a lesser extent the A-6 gained exposure through Flight of the Intruder; the F-16 through Iron Eagle. Other aircraft, like the B-1, the A-10, and the F-35, were in the news frequently—thanks to development or budgeting debates—enough to have become somewhat recognizable. Still, other aircraft simply serve before being decommissioned and, ultimately, fading entirely from the public’s conscious. The A-7 is one such aircraft.

As a quick aside, the A-7 was featured in a film, The Final Countdown, starring Kirk Douglas and Martin Sheen, albeit in a limited role.

Anyways, the A-7 was a capable aircraft, despite its lack of cultural staying power. Carrier-compatible, the A-7 entered service in 1967, at the beginning of the Vietnam War, as an intended replacement for the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. The A-4 stayed in service, however, meaning that the A-7 never did serve as a direct replacement for the A-4. Nevertheless, the A-7 was integrated into the Navy as a valuable attack aircraft.

The distinguishing performance feature of the A-7, perhaps, was its subsonic flight speed. In an era where jets were being made to push the speed envelope, to break the sound barrier, the A-7 was designed to fly about as fast as a commercial airliner. The reason: subsonic jets could be made smaller and cheaper and were simpler to maintain.

Derivative of a Gunfighter

The A-7 was derived from Vought’s F-8 Crusader, a single-engine, supersonic, air superiority jet that was known as “The Last of the Gunfighters.” The F-8 was first flown in the 1950s, and served with the US Navy until 1976. The A-7 would adopt the general layout of the F-8, only shorter, with a stubbier nosecone—making for an ungainly appearance. Yet, despite the A-7’s appearance, the jet would perform admirably. Notably, the A-7 could perform rapid aileron rolls, even when weighed down with its impressive six-ton payload, which happened to make for double the payload capacity of the A-4. In addition to a massive payload capacity, the A-7 had impressive range—again double that of the A-4—making the A-7 an effective candidate for bombing missions.

The pilots noted that the A-7 was easy to fly, with excellent forward visibility. Although the jet was not perfect, lacking stability on crosswind landings, suffering from poor stopping performance, and lacking adequate thrust (which would later be addressed with an upgraded TF30-8 engine). The pilots also gave the A-7 a nickname, perhaps the most enduring feature of the now-obscure aircraft: “SLUF,” which stands for “Short Little Ugly F****.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have long suffered from the effects of blanket economic restrictions that crippled the economy and gave rise to widespread black-market activity and cronyism. The broken licensure system hindered humanitarian operations and paralyzed essential infrastructure in the energy, health, and education sectors. At the same time, targeted sanctions, colloquially known as “smart” sanctions, were actively evaded using a complex network of shells that Assad publicly boasted about for years.

World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing of General License 24 (GL 24) is a first step towards reforming sanctions, signaling to regional partners and Syrians a shift in policy while supporting the reconstruction of Syria post-Assad. For the incoming Trump administration, it is key to any new Middle East security architecture, especially as the outgoing administration expands its military footprint through Operation Inherent Resolve, which has long followed a misguided “by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.

The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’s list of states sponsoring terrorism published in 1979. However, it was not until the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 that Washington ramped up sectoral sanctions. With Assad’s intransigence and continued regional destabilization, the Bush administration issued executive orders that extended export controls to cover the transportation, banking, and telecommunications sectors. This included listing the Commercial Bank of Syria as a primary money laundering entity, bringing correspondent banks and Exim operations to a halt. Executive Orders 13441 and 13460 reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.

As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictions expanded to include the central bank and energy sector, forcing foreign firms to declare force majeure and halt production-sharing agreements. Those contracts were a major source of ill-gotten gains as Assad’s investment funds, like Al-Mashreq, were actively used to divert oil revenue and enrich his family. The regime’s persistent collocation of its criminal regional enterprise to official government institutions resulted in a complex web of export controls under the broad aegis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. In 2017, the U.S. Congress introduced the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.

A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such as Resolution 2253. Others are unilateral U.S. designations under the authority of Executive Order 13224, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation for entities and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) for individuals—including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa. Notably, GL 24 draws a thin line authorizing HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.

In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.

Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions are reversible. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.

The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existing IEEPA law requiring sanctions evaders to face civil or criminal penalties. As a result, Assad hid his assets as the Ultimate Beneficiary Owner, using nominee shareholders to pierce the U.N. procurement system and buy time for the ten-year sunset clause on penalties to lapse. It took two years for the U.S. treasury to close the controversial 50 percent loophole that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.

On Captagon, Secretary Blinken deflected requests to designate the regime as a major illicit producer and transit state despite the large body of evidence. The designation would have stripped Assad of revenue, stopped him from procuring precursor chemicals, and given jurisdiction to the U.S. judiciary and Drug Enforcement Agency. The U.S. Department of State also missed an opportunity to reveal Assad’s net worth by limiting its reporting to open-source information. The State Department’s Office of Sanction Coordination hesitated on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.

On Caesar, the White House has been treading water in reform and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.

Despite the embedded exemption for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the scope of the authorization is limited. While GL 24 authorizes energy-related transactions essential to early recovery, it is limited to donations and requires special licenses for commercial exports. Hence, the current Export Administration Regulations (EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.

A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According to humanitarian stakeholders, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations, the situation in Syria is dire. Hence, the general license was warranted and supported by precedent. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.

Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase its assistance to the Syria Recovery Trust Fund and provide paired expertise for capacity building. This would help implement vital International Humanitarian Law modalities like Cash and Voucher Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.

Ultimately, the warped worldviews held by the White House NSC, colored by frustrations from the Obama era, complicated the Syria crisis and prolonged Assad’s control. The incoming Trump administration is left with the tall task of sanctions reform. This will entail restructuring the U.S. deployment in Syria and Iraq, as well as redefining the legal definition of the government of Syria under ambiguous circumstances. However, before embarking on such a wide regional realignment, an urgent disaster response is needed from the United States and the West, given their roles as the largest humanitarian donors to Syria.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.

Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Arab nationalism is, for all practical purposes, dead. The so-called “Arab World” has lost its unifying concern, Israel, and its outside support. It has disintegrated into geopolitical blocs, with three major non-Arab powers, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, competing for domination of the Levant region. Indeed, the heyday of twentieth-century Arab nationalism, when Egypt sought to unite the Arab people and Arab nationalist movements dominated the politics of the region, has been long over.

Egypt gave up its role as the leader of the Arab World after the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, just before Iran emerged as the prime revolutionary force in the region. In 1991, the radical Arab regimes lost their key global backer, the Soviet Union, and the region came under American hegemony.

In the aftermath of the disastrous U.S.-led Iraq War, today’s Middle East looks very different, including in terms of its place in the international system. The United States has begun to disengage from the region in the aftermath of the Iraq War, and Russia has ceased to be a Middle Eastern power after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Regional powers are now in charge,

In a way, much of what has been referred to as the Levant, a sub-region that borders the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to the west and Iraq to the east, has been balkanized with Iran, with its hegemonic objectives, Israel, led by a nationalist government, and Turkey, whose leader daydreams about reviving the Ottoman Empire, maintaining spheres of influence.

In that context, the Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are playing a secondary role in this new balance of power. In 1973, they assisted their Arab brethren in their attack on Israel. Now, they are cooperating with Israel to contain Iran.

Israel’s sphere of influence includes, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza, also the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, much of southern Lebanon, and Syria’s Golan Heights and Mount Hermon.

After the loss of its proxies in the Gaza Strip (Hamas) and Syria (Assad), Iran still maintains its influence in Lebanon through the weakened Shia Hezbollah group and in Iraq through its Shia allies and regards Israel as its chief strategic rival in the region.

Turkey, like Israel, has been a beneficiary of the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, hoping that the Islamist regime in Damascus would embrace it as a military and economic patron, which it probably would.

Turkish Armed Forces and its ally, the Syrian National Army, have occupied areas of northern Syria since the Syrian Civil War, a mini-state under the dual control of the local council and Turkish military administration.  

At the same time, Turkey has been concerned over what it sees as the threat of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, where during the Syrian Civil War, the Kurds established the Autonomous Administration of North and East of the country backed by the United States.

The Kurdish population of Syria is the country’s largest ethnic minority, the majority of whom were originally Turkish Kurds who crossed the border during the twentieth century and are concentrated around the Syria-Turkey border. Many of them seek political autonomy for what they regard as Western Kurdistan, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

From that perspective, both Turkey and Israel face a challenge from two stateless peoples, the Kurds in the case of Turkey and the Palestinians in the case of Israel, who seek political independence.

Yet both Ankara and Jerusalem insist that full political independence for those people would pose an existential threat to them. At best, both peoples have been offered a limited form of political autonomy.

And then there is the large Druze minority in Syria as well as Assad’s sect, the Alawites, that had ruled Syria during his regime. One can expect continuing ethnic and sectarian tensions in the country in the coming years that may involve the Israelis (on the side of the Druze), the Iranians (on the side of the Alawites), and the Turks (on the side of the Sunni majority).

At the same time, President-elect Donald Trump, who may come under pressure from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear military facilities, would probably decide to refuse the invitation to inject U.S. military forces into the region and its many conflicts.

And if the Iranians end up acquiring a nuclear military capability, it is more likely than not that the Turks would have to consider the nuclear option as well, raising the specter of a mutually assured destruction (MAD) posture involving three regional powers.

Leon Hadar is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Drone warfare has utterly transformed the face of warfare in this century. No longer is it about how many tanks an army has or how many aircraft carriers a navy can maintain, it’s all about rapid maneuverability, stealth, affordability, and mass. Both the Russians and Ukrainians have proven this with their drone-swarming techniques that the two armies regularly use against one another in the ongoing Ukraine war. 

Now, this philosophy is migrating to the sea. 

We live in a time when the power projection capabilities of the United States Navy, notably in the all-important Indo-Pacific, are under constant strain. This is in part due to the development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems by American rivals. The U.S. Navy is further strained, though, by the domestic woes of a sclerotic U.S. defense industrial base and an increasingly cash-strapped U.S. government that is both unable to fund the systems the Navy wants and is unable to fundamentally adapt to the new multipolar strategic environment.

Yet, thanks to some innovative design concepts of the United States military’s research arms, the Navy is slowly starting to embrace the idea of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Going back to 2017, the Navy began developing what has become known as the Orca. This is a multi-mission platform designed for a multiplicity of important mission sets, ranging from surveillance to undersea cargo delivery, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine clearing, and strike missions. 

The Orca is considered an “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle” (XLUUV).

Boeing is building this system for the Navy. It is based on design architecture from Boeing’s earlier Echo Voyager, meaning that the Orca was built with modularity in mind. (This modularity is key for Orca’s multi-mission capabilities. It means that Orca has a plug-and-play design). Its modular payload means that Orca is capable of adding up to 34 feet in length and can host an eight-ton payload. Again, this is a key tenet of a multi-mission platform like the Orca. 

In fact, Orca is essentially meant to be a drone mothership. Its cargo hold has a capacity of 2,456 cubic feet, meaning it can bring with it multiple other, smaller unmanned vehicles or drones. Orca is the apotheosis of network-centric warfare. She represents a true transition from the warfare of yesteryear to something entirely new today. A new kind of warfare that is more devoid of the human element than at any time before. 

Sure, this reduction of the human elements ensures U.S. sailors are better protected from dangerous missions. At the same time, though, many people should be concerned that removing that human element from combat could have unintended ethical complications. What’s more, it might ensure that warfare is more likely to occur amongst the great powers using these systems.

Orca itself is powered by an advanced hybrid diesel/lithium-ion battery system that enables the vehicle to operate submerged for extended periods, recharging via diesel vehicles when surfaced. 

Since this is still an experimental vehicle, it is unlikely that the Orca will be the Navy’s final XLUUV design. Its top speed right now is reported to be at nine miles per hour (so she isn’t a speed demon), but its typical operational speed is likely to be slower at just shy of four miles per hour. Orca has an impressive projected operational range of around 7,480 miles.

Boeing delivered its first Orca to the Navy in December 2023, meaning that the program had shifted from development testing to operational capability. The vehicle’s autonomous nature means that it can be deployed easily from a friendly pier and navigate on its own to its destination completely free of human involvement. This makes the Orca a relatively simple (and, therefore, cheap) platform because its logistical footprint is as small as its overall operational footprint. 

One of the promises of developing autonomous systems was that they would be cheaper than their manned counterparts. For the Navy, with its complex platforms, such as the aircraft carrier, this seems like a smart move.

Yet, Orca went about 64 percent over budget, according to the Government Accountability Office, thereby continuing a dangerous trend, especially for the Navy, of all new Pentagon platforms going over their intended budgets. What’s more, like the manned counterparts to Orca, the Orca program ran over its allotted timeline by about three years. 

Unlike many of those manned Navy platforms that have gone over budget and time, however, the Orca’s sea trials have proceeded apace with no complications whatsoever. Indeed, the testing phases for this XLUUV have been successful in proving the vehicle’s endurance, functionality, and the reliability of its autonomous systems. 

Make no mistake, unmanned systems will be an important way for the Navy to cut down on its costs. The hard lessons learned from the Orca program will be applied to future unmanned undersea vehicles. 

Eventually, the Navy will have an impressive fleet of these drones that will serve as critical force multipliers and help to protect the costlier manned warships and submarines of the fleet that are increasingly under the threat of enemy A2/AD systems.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

America’s sixth-generation stealth bomber is closer to full-scale production.

According to reports, three B-21 Raider prototypes are actively participating in flight testing, propelling the program forward.

At least three B-21 Raider prototypes are participating in flight testing as part of the program’s initial steps to an operational fleet.

Revealed in 2022, the B-21 Raider is moving at a fast pace. Northrup Grumman, the manufacturer, is conducting the initial flight testing for the program. Data gathered during this phase will be used in the subsequent production of the B-21 Raider fleet.

All in all, the new stealth strategic bomber has been in production for over a decade, and the Air Force wants an operational capability before the decade is out. In addition to flight testing, the prototypes are testing new technology on board the B-21 Raider.

The B-21 Raider is designed to cement the U.S. Air Force’s global strike capability. The U.S. military already has superior strategic bombing capabilities with its fleet comprised of the B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit, and B-52 Stratofortress (and potentially the F-117 Night Hawk for some niche missions). The addition of the B-21 Raider in place of the B-2 Spirit will ensure that the Air Force’s global strike capabilities remain cutting-edge.

However, the additional capability won’t come cheap. Although Northrup Grumman and the Air Force are still haggling over the price of the new stealth bomber, it is likely that each B-21 Raider will cost between $600 and 750 million. That is an extremely high price tag and the equivalent of about six F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. And yet, it is up to $1.4 billion cheaper compared to the B-2 Spirit it will be replacing, which costs an astronomical $2 billion per aircraft.

The Pentagon has been careful about releasing information on the stealth strategic bomber’s actual capabilities. Back in 2022, when Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin unveiled the aircraft during a ceremony, he provided some intel on the aircraft’s bomber capabilities, low-observability, and durability.

“Let’s talk about the B-21’s range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won’t need to be based in-theater. It won’t need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Austin had said.

As a strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider will need to fly thousands of miles to reach targets deep inside a near-peer adversary’s territory. It needs to be efficient with its energy consumption while retaining its stealth characteristics.

“Let’s talk about the B-21’s stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” the outgoing Secretary of Defense had added.

The U.S. military is a leader in stealth technology and already has three stealth aircraft in active service, more than any other country: the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II, and B-2 Spirit.

Finally, Austin gave some information on the B-21 Raider’s durability. An aircraft that can’t fly because of maintenance issues is not very useful. “Let’s talk about the B-21’s durability,” he said. “You know, we really don’t have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built,” the Pentagon’s top official added.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

Video game publisher Tencent was one of several Chinese companies that the United States Department of Defense (DoD) claimed had links to China. On Tuesday, the Pentagon announced it had added dozens of Chinese-based firms – including Tencent, battery maker CATL, AI firm SenseTime, ChangXin Memory Technologies, Quectel Wireless, and drone maker Autel Robotics – to the list of " Chinese Military Companies" (CMC).

The DoD's list is updated annually and now includes 134 companies.

While not officially banned in the United States, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)  2024 bans the DoD from working with any of the designated companies beginning in June 2026. According to a report from Nikkei Asia, the inclusion on the list is also "a blow to the reputation of affected companies and represents a stark warning to U.S. entities and firms about the risks of conducting business with them."

Tencent – A Gaming Giant

The Shenzhen-based Tencent was founded in August 2003, and it currently owns shares in more than 600 companies in the electronic entertainment sector. It fully controls Riot Games, maker of League of Legends, and Grinding Gear Games, creator of Path of Exile; while it has partial ownership of Epic Games and Ubisoft.

Tencent's Hong Kong-traded shares fell 7.3% on Tuesday following the DoD's announcement.

"As the company is neither a Chinese military company nor a military-civil fusion contributor to the Chinese defense industrial base, it believes that its inclusion in the CMC List is a mistake," Tencent said in an announcement to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, per CBS News.

Tech Firms Links to Beijing

It isn't uncommon for any and all Chinese firms to end up on such blacklists, in no small part due to Beijing's military-civil fusion (MCF), which encourages private firms to partner with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The goal is to achieve a world-class military by 2049 or earlier.

As the Foundation for Defense of Democracies explained, "This law and associated regulations require Chinese private firms to permit Beijing direct access to their data and mandates their cooperation in protecting Chinese national security interests. This process ensures that the PLA and other elements of China's security and intelligence services can dramatically expand the scope of their reliance on China's civilian economy to bolster their strength and challenge the United States more effectively."

This is why a video game publisher, one that has ties to international studios is suddenly on the DoD's CMC list.

"The core concern with companies like Tencent is that it can conduct surveillance and intelligence opens by gathering large amounts of data on large amounts of players," Dr. Matthew Schmidt, professor of national security and political science at the University of New Haven, told The National Interest.

"It's a game of probabilities. 99% of players are uninteresting targets, but in a population of many millions you'll find some good fish to hook," Schmidt said.

Game Chat Monitored

Video games that are hosted online can record vast quantities of data – including messages between players. That may not seem significant, but Schmidt explained the problem is far deeper than meets the eye.

"They can monitor personal messages between players, use that data to analyze political views and establish any relationships those players may have to classified information or to people with classified information, and create target lists for espionage," Schmidt continued.

The game publisher even has the ability o track movements as people log on to play the game or send messages from different destinations.

"These are the kinds of things that would allow the Chinese military's intelligence branch to gather the back-end information that supports targeting people they exploit based on the information gathered from chats and what that info gives them about other platforms and movement patterns to build the social network diagrams that help Chinese agencies focus on the most likely people they could exploit for access to information," Schmidt continued. "It's the same thing the U.S. does in reverse."

Many companies gather this kind of information and could do this kind of analysis if they wanted. The DoD is especially concerned when it involves China due to MCF.

"Remember the axiom of the Internet Age: if you don't know what the product is they're selling, you're the product. That is, the data you generate when you use Facebook or X/Twitter is where the value is because it allows companies that do sell things to target you," Schmidt told The National Interest. "It's the same science; it's just that one organization targets you for espionage, the other for marketing. The end goal is different, but the process is basically the same."

Gaming Could be a Voter Issue

Even today, video gamers are dismissed as teenage boys in their bedrooms or basements—but it is a multi-billion dollar global industry. The question will be how to balance the economic interests in supporting the digital economy with political interests and not anger millions of constituents by obstructing the digital services they want, and the legitimate security concerns of the government.

"To the generations now of voting age, gaming isn't a fringe issue, it's becoming a core political concern," suggested Schmidt.

Just as we have seen with TikTok, many Americans are less concerned with security and more focused on being able to use the app they've come to love. Gamers could be even more passionate if they were to lose access to League of Legends or the next big hit that Tencent brings to market.

"We haven't figured out the balance yet, and I'd suspect the elder statesmen in power now won't be the last word. My kids fight for more screen time and the ability to play games I ban, every day," Schmidt added. "Someday they'll be power and, as they remind me, they'll let their kids play whatever they want."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

As geopolitical tensions across the globe continue to escalate, the race to produce sixth-generation technology is on. The U.S., Russia and China are working to develop their respective next-gen bombers and fighters alike. Washington’s Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) and B-21 Raider, Moscow’s PAK DA and Beijing’s Xi’an H-20 represent just some of these futuristic proposals. Due to its ongoing Ukraine invasion, Russia may be less equipped financially and resource-wise to introduce its stealth bomber as planned. The PAK-DA, designed to rival the American-made B-2 Spirit and the upcoming Raider, would guarantee Moscow aerial clout in the skies if produced before its competitors. While limited information surrounding Russia’s new project is available, the upcoming stealth bomber will allegedly be equipped with conventional, nuclear and hypersonic weapons.

Introducing Russia’s sixth-gen stealth bomber

Described as Moscow’s sixth-generation bomber, PAK DA will incorporate a range of advanced attributes when introduced. From stealth and internal weapon bays to supersonic flight capabilities, PAK DA is set to rival its cutting-edge near peers. In fact, many of the qualities being woven into the sixth-generation design mimic the U.S.-made B-2 Spirit. Like the older American platform, PAK DA has a “flying wing” shape. Unlike typical aircraft design, the Spirit (and PAK DA) do not possess the typical parts of an aircraft, a fuselage, wings, and an empennage or tail assembly with flight control surfaces. Instead, the platform relies on an advanced flight control computer to retain stability in the air. Additionally, the Russian bomber will also fly at subsonic speeds and feature a low radar cross-section.

While Russia’s previous attempts at producing “stealth” have not been overly fruitful in the past, the PAK-DA certainly has the stealth look with its sleek flying wing design. Despite the bomber’s potential, it is unlikely that Moscow will be able to produce PAK-Das any time soon. Russia has been embroiled in its Ukraine invasion for nearly three years, quickly running through its financial and material supplies in the process. Since the Kremlin’s priorities are currently centered on achieving their war objectives in Ukraine, the development of future technologies appears to have taken a back seat.

How does PAK-DA compare to its counterparts?

China and the U.S. are also striving to introduce their own stealth bombers in the upcoming years. Developed by Northrop Grumman, the Raider will serve multiple roles for the Air Force once in commission, including as an intelligence collector and as a stealthy battle manager. Limited information surrounding the specs and capabilities of the B-21 have been made public, however, the platform will undoubtedly feature the latest and greatest technologies as it will represent the aerial component of America’s nuclear triad. China’s H-20 bomber is expected to function similarly and is certainly being designed to achieve full air superiority. Notably, Western analysts believe the H-20 could have a range of 8,500 kilometers, which is concerning since a bomber with this range could reach beyond the First Island Chain off the coast of China and into the Philippines, Japan, or even the U.S. territory of Guam.

Since tensions between Beijing, Washington and Moscow are only mounting, a sobering look at each nation’s stealth bomber progress is essential.

Maya Carlin is a National Interest security contributor, an analyst with the Center for Security Policy, and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

The Ukraine war is doing for the evolution of weapons and tactics in modern war what conflicts like the Spanish Civil War did in the previous century. New ideas and methods of attacks are being experimented with by both sides, forcing rapid adaptations. These changes, in turn, are setting brutal examples for the other great powers in the world as they prepare to wage their next round of war in the near future. 

One such wild system that has been deployed by the Russians as a way to overcome the stifling Ukrainian drone threat to Russia’s Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) has been to build what has been nicknamed the “Turtle Tanks.” Looking like some retro machine you’d find in the Amazon series Fallout, the so-called “Turtle Tanks” are essentially steel boxes on tracks with a turret. 

The steel box is meant to protect the tank itself from exploding Ukrainian drones. 

Interestingly, the Turtle Tanks are not entirely new systems. They are merely existing Soviet-era tanks, like the Soviet-era T-62, T-72, and T-80. Russian designers had added improvised steel roofs and siding around the tanks that make the tank look like it is covered by a steel shell—just like how a turtle’s back is covered by a hardened shell that protects it. Metal sheets, corrugated metal, and sometimes even chain-link fences over the tank are welded over the tank to create the “shell.” 

Some variants of these tanks have anti-drone slat armor, mine-clearing collars, and electronic warfare (EW) systems to jam drone signals. This transformation has mutated these tanks into massively armored, very slow fortresses. Much like the original “Land Battleship” concept of the earliest tanks that fought in World War I, the “Turtle Tanks” are essentially bulky, slow-moving fortresses. 

The point of Turtle Tank is to absorb drone attacks when Russian forces are advancing on the front. By absorbing the drone attacks, the Turtle Tanks divert Ukraine’s attention away from other Russian forces advancing that lack the “shell” protections, allowing for those less armored Russian vehicles to move forward in relative safety. Whenever leading assaults or clearing minefields, these tanks serve as “breachers” or “pioneers,” pushing forward and taking enemy fire to allow for other, specialized units to move in for the kill.

Contrary to the rosy predictions of Western media sources and governments, the Turtle Tanks are proof that Russia’s military is rapidly adapting to the combat environment it finds itself in. Thus, the notion that the Russians are failing in the Ukraine war should be viewed with skepticism. Multiple reports from the frontline where these tanks were deployed in combat indicate that the Turtle Tanks can indeed survive multiple drone strikes.

A major problem with the Turtle Tanks, though, is that they are not well-defended against artillery. With so much armor encasing the tanks, artillery is a real problem. If hit with artillery or heavy munitions, the tank is quickly turned into a burning coffin. 

Oh, and the adaptations on these tanks listed above significantly limit the tank’s ability to rotate its turret and reduce the visibility for the crew. So, the Russians have been presented with a one-step-forward-two-steps-backward approach to the Ukraine war. 

The West needs to come to grips with the fact that the Russians, thanks to their greater strategic depth and ability to innovate and adapt to the environment, are likely to win. Systems like the Turtle Tank only show that the Russians are massively adapting to the environment. The Turtle Tanks are ugly and slow, but they get the job done. And that’s what counts. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Degtyaryov Andrey / Shutterstock.com

The Kremlin has pledged to “retaliate” after reportedly shooting down eight American-made long-range missiles at the start of the new year. According to Russian officials, Ukraine deployed Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) targeting positions roughly 25 miles north of the border in the Belgorod Oblast. In addition to shooting down these missiles, Russia’s Ministry of Defense claimed that its air defenses also took down six dozen aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Kremlin pledged that Ukraine’s recent barrage, “supported by Western curators, will be met with retaliation.”

Moscow also launched strikes targeting Kyiv in the new year, deploying a total of 81 drones toward Ukrainian territory over the weekend. Ukraine’s Air Force Command noted that Iranian-designed Shahed UAVs were used in this attack.

An overview of ATACMS

While Kyiv’s military leadership had lobbied the U.S. for its ATACMS since Russia’s invasion commenced nearly three years ago, the Biden administration just recently authorized Ukrainian forces to use these missiles to target positions inside Russia in November. These surface-to-surface missiles were designed during the tail end of the Cold War to give soldiers the immediate firepower to “win the deep battle,” as its manufacturer Lockheed Martin likes to say.

ATACMS is packaged in a MLRS launch pod and deployed from the MLRS Family of Launchers. Since its introduction to service, the missile system has undergone several facelifts in order to improve its guidance systems, software and command and control. The current ATACMS weighs just under 4,000 pounds and can fire missiles with a top speed of Mach-3.0 and a flight ceiling of 160,000 feet. The standard variant of ATACMS, Block 1, is used to target high-value assets including SAM sites, airfields, command groups and supply areas. As detailed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, this variant possesses an inertial guidance system that increases the likelihood that the target will be successfully hit. The Block 1A Unitary is a unitary warhead variant of the Block 1A missile, which can use a warhead from the SLAM-ER missile or the AGM-RGM-48 Harpoon. Designed to limit collateral damage when fired, this version can strike targets located 300km away.

Has Kyiv’s use of ATACMS escalated the war?

Equipped with ATACMS and given the green light to strike inside Russian territory, Ukrainian forces have been able to launch more offensive operations since November. Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), the senior Republican on the Armed Services Committee, noted in a statement that the long-range ATACMs proved “that Ukraine can notch battlefield victories when given the right tools.” The senator also added, “Ukraine can put a target on every Russian asset in Crimea, including critical ammunition and fuel depots. Imagine if they had these missiles two years ago.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin has remained unambiguous in his declarations that the approval and use of Western-designed long-range missiles into the ongoing Ukraine war would result in “retaliation.” When Donald Trump takes office later this month, Kyiv’s ability to deploy long-range ATACMS may be severed.

Maya Carlin is a National Interest security contributor, an analyst with the Center for Security Policy, and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

The dispatch of First Son Donald Trump Jr. to Greenland has revitalized speculation that the incoming President Trump will attempt to purchase the world’s largest island. President Trump, during his first presidency, was explicit about a desire to purchase Greenland, calling the transaction “an absolute necessity.” Greenland, meanwhile, has been equally clear that it is not for sale.

Let’s consider why Trump has eyes for Greenland.

Emerging Resources

The icecaps are melting and as they do, the geopolitical implications will be profound. Whereas for much of modern history, Greenland and the Arctic have been an inaccessible wasteland, the melting icecaps are sure to improve access to the seas and lands of Greenland, and to the northern climes of our globe, generally. The result of improved access will be one, (arguably) the ability to harvest untapped resources, and two, the emergence of sealines where once there was only ice.

No doubt front of mind for Trump is Greenland’s abundance of natural resources, including oil, gas, and rare earth minerals that are increasingly in demand for their use in emerging green technologies like electric cars and wind turbines. The purchase of Greenland would perhaps allow the US to gain ground on China, who currently “dominates the global rare earth production and has already threatened to restrict the export of critical minerals and associated technologies, ahead of Trump’s second term,” CNN reported.

“There is no question at all that Trump and his advisers are very concerned about the stranglehold that China appears to have,” Klaus Dodds, professor of geopolitics at the University of London, told CNN. “I think Greenland is really about keeping China out.”

And as the ice melts, shipping routes are opening. In the last decade, Arctic shipping increased 37 percent. As transit through the waters of Greenland increases, so does the value of the island.

Strategic Value

Greenland’s strategic value with respect to the Arctic is obvious. But the island also holds strategic value with respect to US-European relations, and with respect to security implications stemming from a revisionist Russia. The US already has a military presence on Greenland, at Pituffik Air Base (formerly Thule Air Base), which hosts the 821st Space Base Group, the 12th Space Warning Squadron, and the 23rd Operations Squadron. In all, about 200 active-duty US Air Force and Space Force personnel are stationed at Pituffik, which holds the distinction as the Department of Defense’s northernmost installation. Were Trump to purchase the island, the Pentagon would likely look to expand the American presence in Greenland, as a show of solidarity with NATO, and as a bulwark against Russian incursions in the region.

Will It Happen?

Greenland has been perfectly clear how it views the proposed acquisition.

“We are not for sale and will never be for sale. We must not lose our years-long struggle for freedom,” wrote Greenland’s Prime Minister Mute Egede on Facebook last month.

Kuupik V. Kleist, a former Greenland PM, reiterated the unlikelihood of a sale: “I don’t see anything in the future that would pave the way for a sale. You don’t simply buy a country or a people.”

Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Like so many general aviation pilots, I trained on a variety of Cessnas – the 152, 162, 172, and 182. The Cessna is synonymous with general aviation, enjoying vast swathes of the market share for weekend warriors and aspiring commercial pilots. And for good reason. The distinctively high-winged Cessna is aerodynamically stable, easy to maintain, and intuitive to operate. But Cessna’s reliable aircraft are not exclusively for general aviation. Indeed, the US military has previously employed Cessna aircraft in surveillance roles—most notably the O-2 Skymaster.

Introducing the Skymaster

Nicknamed the Oscar Deuce, the O-2 is a Cessna 337 Super Skymaster converted for forward air control and psychological operations. The O-2 enjoyed a multi-decade service life with the US Air Force, US Navy, and US Army—having been introduced in 1967 and only retired in 2010.

The O-2 was developed in the 1960s as a cheap and simple aircraft, with twin-engines, as a supplement to Cessna’s already-serving forward air control prop, the O-1 Bird Dog. The tell-tale Cessna high-wings were perfectly suited for giving occupants an unobstructed view of the battlespace below. To further enhance viewing capability, the O-2 was designed with two seats, with one observer’s seat located directly behind the pilot’s seat – whereas the civilian 337 was designed with six seats in three rows of two. Other changes were made, too. Notably, the 337’s opaque doors were outfitted with transparent viewing panels; flame-retardant foam was installed in the wing-mounted fuel tanks; civilian communications gear was swapped in favor of military communications gear. The end result was a 5,400 pound aircraft, which weighed one thousand pounds more than its civilian counterpart. To accommodate the increased weight, the O-2 was strengthened structurally. The added weight did slow the O-2 down relative to the 337. But the Air Force deemed the performance reduction acceptable given the low-speed nature of the forward air control mission.

Built for Vietnam

The USAF accepted delivery of their first O-2 in early 1967, towards the beginning of what would be a nearly-decade-long American effort to quell communism in Vietnam. The O-2 served admirably as a forward air control aircraft, which entailed coordinating close air support for troops on the ground. And the O-2 doubled in a psychological operations role. Accordingly, the O-2 was outfitted with loudspeakers and a leaflet dispenser, for pushing propaganda.

Flying the O-2 proved to be hazardous; over the course of the Vietnam War, 178 O-2s were lost.

The USAF had intended to phase out the O-2 for the garage-designed OV-10 Bronco. But the O-2 continued to serve even after the OV-10’s introduction, most especially for nighttime missions (the original OV-10 had a highly illuminated cockpit, which made nighttime reconnaissance difficult to perform for the crew, thus the O-2 remained the USAF’s best nighttime option until a revised OV-10 was developed with dimmed cockpit instrumentation.

While the O-2 is now retired from all branches of the US military, the aircraft can still be found in service worldwide. Botswana, Costa Rica, Iran, Namibia, Solomon Islands, and Uruguay – these are a few of the nations still operating the O-2 today.

Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

As the new year begins, Israel will need to find a strategy for the war in Gaza. Several factors are at play in this decision. First, the war has gone on for more than fifteen months since it began with the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Although Israel has fought long conflicts in the past, such as the Second Intifada and the war in Lebanon that began in 1982 and lasted for eighteen years, the war in Gaza has been of greater intensity and complexity than those other wars. This is because the war in Gaza also set off Iranian-backed attacks on Israel from multiple fronts. It is also due to the fact Hamas still holds 100 hostages captive in Gaza.

The conflict in Gaza is challenging because there is evidence Hamas continues to recruit and also controls a large swath of the area. “We are not yet at the point of defeating Hamas entirely,” Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser told ILTV in December 2024. A separate report at The Jerusalem Post noted that Hamas is recruiting more members.

Taken together, these assessments point to a recurring trend. The IDF has operated in Gaza primarily by going into areas, clearing them of Hamas and other terrorist groups, and then leaving the area. In some cases, the IDF has stayed for the long term, such as in the border area in southern Gaza called the Philadelphi Route along the border with Egypt. The IDF has also carved out another corridor south of Gaza City. However, in many urban areas, the IDF withdraws after weeks or months of combat. This was the case in Khan Younis, where an IDF division spent several months fighting between December and April 2024. Today, in Jabaliya and several areas in northern Gaza, the IDF spent three months trying to remove Hamas members, detaining and eliminating thousands of enemy fighters, and yet combat continues.

Although the fighting in Gaza is not as intensive as it was a year ago when it first began in the fall of 2023 and the first months of 2024, the IDF is suffering casualties every week. On January 6, a company commander in the 932nd Battalion of the Nahal Brigade fell during combat in the northern Gaza Strip, the IDF said. Another soldier was also killed. Civilians in Gaza continue to be caught in the maelstrom. Most of the two million residents of the Gaza Strip have been displaced by the fighting.

The tough choices ahead for Israel relate to several key factors in the Gaza war. First of all, Hamas took 250 hostages on October 7, of whom ninety-six are thought to remain in Gaza. Recently, Hamas released a video of one of the hostages. However, Hamas has refused to provide Israel with a list of the total number and names of the hostages who remain alive. Despite various reports over the last six months, The Israeli prime minister’s office clarified on January 6 that a recent list of hostages circulating in the media was “not provided to Israel by Hamas but was originally given by Israel to the meditators in July 2024.” Despite reports of a deal taking shape, Hamas appears to be stalling. Changes may occur once President-elect Donald Trump takes office later in the month. Trump has said several times recently that he wants the hostages released or else “there will be hell” for Hamas.

The hostage deal appears to have been stuck for a year with little progress. It requires a rethink in terms of a strategy. Leaving living and dead hostages in Gaza for a long period of time would appear to be a macabre end to the October 7 attack and send a message that Hamas can get away with its crimes. On the other hand, the Israeli political leadership appears wary of a deal similar to the one in 2011 when one Israeli soldier held hostage in Gaza for five years was released in exchange for 1,000 Palestinians, many of them convicted terrorists. Some, like Yayha Sinwar, were even involved in the October 7 attack.

Israel could choose to continue negotiations in Gaza with limited military incursions, as has been the norm over the past year after fighting became less intense in the spring of 2024. However, Israel’s initial military campaign in Gaza was designed to apply military pressure to secure hostage deals. That pressure largely ended in the spring of 2024 after the first deal took place in late November 2023. Israel could choose to renew pressure on Hamas and try to remove the group from areas it controls in Gaza, such as the central Gaza Strip. The IDF has never entered central Gaza in force, despite the long war, leaving Hamas in charge of key urban areas such as Deir al-Balah and Nuseirat.

The hostage deal and military pressure are not the only challenges in Gaza. A related challenge is the question of whether Hamas will be replaced as the governing authority in Gaza. When the war began, Israel’s political leadership compared Hamas to ISIS and said it would be crushed in the same way ISIS was defeated. ISIS was removed from areas in Iraq and Syria after a multi-year campaign between 2014 and 2019. However, Israel’s goals in Gaza appear to have shifted since October 2023 statements about removing Hamas completely.

After fifteen months of war, there is no alternative being put forward for controlling Gaza. Hamas continues to control all the areas where civilians are present in Gaza. What this means is that, unlike the war on ISIS, where civilians were able to leave areas such as Mosul and move to IDP camps under the control of the Iraqi government or the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, civilians in Gaza have not been provided a non-Hamas option for civilian rule. This is why Hamas is able to continue recruiting and also able to continue to control areas where humanitarian aid is supplied. In essence, this puts Hamas astride the supply lines and in possession of many key urban areas in Gaza.

When the October 7 War began, Hamas was able to call on support from other Iranian-backed groups in the region. Hezbollah began attacks on Israel from Lebanon. The Houthis in Yemen began attacks on Israel and attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq began attacks on U.S. forces and also prepared to target Israel. This multi-front war made it difficult for Israel to vanquish all these enemies. However, fifteen months later, things have changed in Israel’s favor. Hezbollah is greatly weakened. The Iranian-backed militias in Iraq appear to have stopped their drone attacks on Israel. The Assad regime, which was a conduit for Iranian weapons transfers to Hezbollah, fell on December 8. This leaves Hamas and the Houthis still standing, although Hamas has been greatly weakened since 2023. Israel also faces increasing attacks from the West Bank by groups linked to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other armed factions.

The overall challenge for Israel in 2025 now returns to Gaza. Although the Iranian nuclear program and other fronts remain, Gaza is where the war began and where it will have to end. A long war in Gaza fighting Hamas for years does not appear to be in Israel’s interest. However, leaving Hamas in control would inevitably enable the group to reconstitute its threat to Israel. Replacing Hamas requires a strategy and coordination with other countries that want to see a peaceful, stable Gaza.

Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

North Korea’s ambitious weapons programs continue their long march forward, even as South Korea implodes and the United States becomes increasingly distracted. As the world was celebrating the start of a new year, the Japanese Defense Ministry reported that Pyongyang launched a ballistic missile that blasted its way over to the Sea of Japan. 

The Japanese Defense Ministry assessed that the launch fell “outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone, with no damage to planes or ships.”

Of course, that only tells half the story.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the weapon North Korea tested over the Sea of Japan may have been an experimental hypersonic weapon as opposed to an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). And if that’s the case, then the whole world has a major problem on its hands. Because, as it stands, only the Russians and Chinese have any semblance of working hypersonic weapons in their arsenals (with the Russians being the most advanced in hypersonic weapons).

Nothing has been confirmed as to whether the weapon North Korea fired was a hypersonic weapon or an IRBM. What is known is that the weapon traveled around 683 miles with a ceiling of around 62 feet. North Korea has long intimated that it was working on advanced hypersonic weapons.

Specifically, according to Kyodo News, Pyongyang has claimed to be developing “missiles tipped with hypersonic warheads, designed to travel at more than five times the speed of sound [that can] follow low-altitude trajectories and evade detection by changing direction mid-flight.”

The increasingly close relationship between North Korea and Russia, the world’s leader in practical hypersonic weapons, could mean that, in exchange for North Korea sending its troops to help Russia fight against NATO-backed Ukraine, Russia gave advanced weapons technology to Pyongyang. 

Given that large numbers of North Koreans have been committed to the fight and that, for many years since the war began in 2022, the North Koreans have supplied large numbers of weapons and ammunition to Russia, Pyongyang is probably receiving technical assistance with hypersonic weapons development from Russia.

Thus, the Ukraine war has created yet another threat vector with which the United States was unprepared to contend. Alas, this is the nature of our current moment. The Americans take an utterly irresponsible and implacable stance on what should be an ancillary issue (to Washington), like Ukraine, and effectively help to create one of the greatest coalitions of anti-American powers in Eurasia since the Axis Powers existed in World War II. 

The only reason that North Korea even likely has some form of a hypersonic weapon is because the Ukraine war has forced the Russians to embrace Pyongyang as a matter of course. 

Russia is waging an existential war in Ukraine and it needs allies. North Korea needs military technology to stay ahead of Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Therefore, it’s all quite congruous.

Plus, by developing hypersonic weapons and testing them before the presidential changeover in the United States, North Korea has a significant bargaining chip to use whenever the new Trump administration comes looking to continue their previous diplomacy with Kim Jong-un.

For his part, Kim Jong-un has stated that the system tested over the Sea of Japan was a hypersonic missile. According to a speech he gave shortly after the test, “The hypersonic missile will reliably contain any rivals in the Pacific region that can affect the security of our state.” 

This makes sense. 

After all, there are no viable defenses against modern hypersonic weapons. Some have speculated that the U.S. Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) platform could potentially knock out incoming hypersonic weapons. But there are not enough of these systems available. Further, using THAAD against hypersonic weapons is entirely unproven.

Western analysts remain skeptical. They highlight recent failures involving North Korea’s Hwasong-16 IRBM, leading them to question how Pyongyang could have possibly perfected an even more complex system. Again, though, the likelihood that Russia (or China) helped the North Korean program along could answer some of these questions from skeptical Western observers. 

Plus, having been shown up significantly by tiny North Korea, it is highly unlikely that any major power would want to admit that publicly. Especially since the hypersonic weapons programs of the West are so far behind those of the autocratic Eurasian powers.

When he is sworn in as president, Donald J. Trump is likely going to be faced with a much different North Korean threat than when he was president the first time around.

If North Korea has mastered hypersonic weapons, and if Pyongyang can mass produce them quickly enough, then the next Trump-Kim spat might not end so amicably for the United States. It’s time for the Americans to take hypersonic weapons development far more seriously. In fact, the moment is now for Washington truly develop anti-hypersonic weapon defenses.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

Turkey under the Islamist rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is back as a world power. What’s more, if the decades of rhetoric from Erdogan’s Islamist political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is at all an indication of intent, then the rebirth of the Ottoman Empire, with Erdogan as its new sultan, is at hand in the Middle East. 

Using Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is a hodgepodge of former jihadists (from terror groups like Al Nusra Front and even ISIS, for example) who had been fighting in Syria and have now been rebranded as “moderate Syrian rebels,” Turkey was able to force the ouster of Syria’s Alawite dictator, Bashar al-Assad. 

This move by Turkey, in turn, has placed both the Russian Federation and its ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran, on their hind legs. These moves by Turkey risk fundamentally undermining Israeli security in the long run (because Turkey has vowed to destroy the predominantly Jewish state of Israel). 

All this has been in service to the idea of an Ottoman imperial restoration.

As if that wasn’t enough, Turkey is now making major plays to ensnare the Sunni Arab states, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), into its growing orbit. One of the key ways that Ankara is looking to spread influence over the Sunni Arab states (those likeliest to be opposed to any kind of restoration of an ethnic Turkish Sunni empire in the Middle East) is to sell advanced weapons and platforms to the Sunni Arabs. 

Specifically, Riyadh intends to purchase around 100 of the Turkish-built fighter (TF) Kaan. 

The TF-Kaan is not just another warplane. It is a serious upgrade for the Turkish Air Force (as well as any air force purchasing the export model). TF-Kaan was designed to replace Turkey’s aging F-16 Fighting Falcon fourth-generation warplanes with indigenously built, fifth-generation planes.

Indeed, the real reason behind Turkey even building its TF-Kaan warplanes was that the United States officially kicked Turkey out of the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter program. Needing to ensure they did not lose capabilities as their F-16s aged out, Turkey opted to place its faith in its own capabilities. Thus far, its gambit has worked out. The Kaan is built by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI). The warplane is on par with the F-35 that Turkey was denied from purchasing. 

The Kaan is 69 feet long and has a wingspan of 46 feet.

Since the TF-Kaan is a fifth-gen bird, it has stealth features, making it harder to detect by enemy radar, just like the American fifth-generation planes possess. There are blended and faceted surfaces as well as specialized skin coatings to ensure the plane is undetected. 

This warplane comes with an Active, Electronically-Scanned Array (AESA) radar system and, most interestingly, the Turkish Air Force plans to have these planes riding along with advanced drones for additional layers of protection and to serve as a force multiplier while in combat. A secure datalink will ensure seamless, uninterrupted connectivity between the cockpit and the drones.

What makes this such an interesting component for the TF-Kaan is that the Americans are seemingly refusing to place similar systems on their F-22A Raptors or their F-35s. Instead, the Pentagon is demanding that Congress pay gobs of tax dollars to build entirely new sixth-generation warplanes that will support the “Loyal Wingman” drone program. 

The more resourceful Turks are happy to ensure their fifth-generation planes come equipped with a “Loyal Wingman”-type drone system.

Given its multirole mission, Turkey designed these planes to carry a multiplicity of armaments, including air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, guided bombs, and even miniature explosives, according to The Defense Post. These various armaments all fit nicely inside internal weapons bays, increasing the plane’s stealth features.

Twin General Electric turbofan engines power these birds, allowing for a top cruising speed of Mach 1.8 (1,381 miles per hour) and it can fly up to an altitude of 55,775 feet. The plane itself looks almost like the American F-35. 

Like Turkey, the Saudis had wanted to be part of America’s F-35 program. Yet, the Pentagon was taking its sweet time in approving Riyadh’s request to join the program, prompting the KSA government to look to Turkey. 

An agreement between the U.S. government and that of Israel stipulates that the Americans must sell systems that are “superior in capability” to the Israelis compared to the systems that America sells to Israel’s neighbors. Currently, Israel possesses a potent F-35 variant, the F-35I Adir. There is concern that the Americans giving Saudi Arabia access to the F-35 program would deprive Israel of the qualitative edge their armed forces have worked so hard to achieve.

So, Riyadh is looking to Ankara. And Turkey is only more than pleased to oblige. This move will create deeper linkages between the two Sunni Muslim powers of Turkey and Saudi Arabia and may lead to a far darker geopolitical outcome for Israel, as the tiny Jewish democracy struggles to restore the security it had lost on October 7. 

The TF-Kaan, therefore, is more than another warplane. This system is a symbol of Turkey’s growing international pull and its very real status as a rising power in the Middle East.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Spiffy Digital Creative / Shutterstock.com

The U.S.-made F-16 Fighting Falcon hasn't been able to turn the tide for Ukraine in its war against Russia, but the multirole all-weather fighter has increased Kyiv's defensive capabilities significantly. On Tuesday, the Ukrainian Air Force claimed that last month a pilot shot down six missiles in a single sortie.

"For the first time in the history of the Fighting Falcon, an F-16 fighter jet destroyed six Russian cruise missiles in one combat mission," the Ukrainian Air Force Command said in a post on Facebook.

According to Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat, the action took place on December 13, 2024, when Moscow's forces launched 200 drones and 94 missiles at targets in Ukraine.

"They say that even Americans couldn't believe you did it," Ihnat added, while the post explained that the pilot – who has not been identified – closed in on a group of cruise missiles. Despite their electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures, the pilot was able to down one pair of the Russian weapons with his medium-range missiles, while he struck another pair with short-range missiles.

Two more missiles were shot down with the F-16's cannon, believed to be the first time it was accomplished. As Newsweek reported, while the Ukrainian aviators have been trained "to shoot down missiles with aircraft cannons in simulations," it had not been previously carried out.

"At first I was looking for a target at the bottom - nothing. Then I reached the altitude, raised the radar and saw her. Did everything as taught instructors in the USA, as worked on a gym. A few cannon turns - and a blast... then there is one more! Detonation again," the pilot claimed.

The destruction was confirmed by Ukraine's Air Force Command.

"Based on objective control, we have one hundred percent confirmation that for the first time in history in anti-air combat, an American fighter F-16 shoots down six winged missiles, two of them [from] an air cannon," Ihnat added.

Gunfight Over Ukraine

According to General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, maker of the F-16 Gatling Gun System, the 20mm weapon "features the M61A1 six-barrel Gatling gun and a linkless ammunition feed system. The M61A1 provides up to 10 times the reliability of single-barrel guns, firing at 6,000 shots per minute and placing a controlled dispersion of projectiles in the path of the target. The double-ended linkless ammunition feed system incorporates a compact lightweight composite rotary ammunition drum to store unfired and fired ammunition."

The Fighting Falcon is able to carry 511 rounds of 20mm ammunition, and given the high rate of fire, pilots must employ short bursts.

More F-16s Coming

Kyiv is set to receive as many as ninety American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole combat aircraft – and it is reported that around two dozen of the fighters are now in service. Multiple NATO members including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway have pledged to provide the aircraft, which are being replaced by more advanced fighters – notably, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.

The first F-16s arrived in August, and the fighters were quickly put into action.

However, even as additional aircraft are headed to Ukraine, there have been concerns that pilot training is already being rushed, and even further abridged to get more aircraft in the sky. It would appear that at least one Ukrainian aviator took all of the lessons to heart by downing the six missiles, including the two with the 20mm autocannon.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.