The National Interest

Are the signs in Eastern Europe pointing to peace? On the surface, one could interpret several recent trends in this way. 

On one hand, Ukraine is under enormous pressure, both on the battlefield and on the international stage. Russian troops are slowly but surely advancing in the Donets Basin and Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are having an ever-stronger effect.

In the United States, President-elect Donald Trump has announced that he wants to end the war as quickly as possible. In Western and Central Eastern Europe, a phalanx of populist parties has emerged, for whom international law, European solidarity, and democratic values, and thus the fate of Ukraine, are of secondary importance at best. 

Not only radical left and right-wingers, but also some centrist politicians, such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, are conducting election campaigns as would-be peacemakers, whose level-headedness is allegedly preventing an escalation of the war.

On the other hand, Putin's rule in Russia is coming under economic pressure. Inflation is rising and the ruble is falling. Russia's human and material losses on the Ukrainian front are enormous and Moscow can only partially compensate for them. In the Middle East, South Caucasus, and Central Asia, Russia is being ousted as a power factor, and with that, Putin's reputation as a geopolitical strategist is being lost. 

In both Ukraine and Russia, recent polls now show majorities in favor of a quick ceasefire in the Donets Basin.

Does this finally give Europe a chance to end the war permanently? Hardly, because most of the well-meaning approaches and well-intentioned proposals in this direction lead to deadlocks. 

For one thing, several ceasefire plans and more far-reaching ideas for a settlement do not take into account the involved parties’ basic preferences. They run counter to both, Russia's ambitious hegemonic aspirations and/or Ukraine's fundamental security interests. The echoed statement “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” is not only a noble political maxim but also a guarantee of survival for Kyiv. Russia is seeking not only to curtail the Ukrainian nation but to abolish it as an independent cultural community and sovereign nation-state.

On the other hand, many peace projects either consciously or unconsciously develop conflict resolution strategies that imply rewarding Russian military aggression and punishing Ukrainian nuclear abstinence. Similar to the consequences of careless treatment of the natural environment, the international acceptance of a Russian victory in Ukraine would plant a time bomb under the international security system. A partial ceasefire might be possible today for a certain period. 

However, the codification of territorial gains for Russia and/or sovereignty losses for Ukraine would encourage their repetition and imitation by later Russian or other revisionist governments.

Furthermore, a treaty-regulated territorial and/or political reduction of the Ukrainian nation-state would become a warning sign for other countries around the world that are relatively weaker than their neighbors. Whether democratically elected or having come to power undemocratically, many governments would rethink their national security strategies. Regional arms races would be likely, and new atomic weapons programs and an end to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as to the conventions on chemical and biological weapons would become a distinct possibility.

Many proponents of a partial capitulation of Ukraine are now posing as friends of peace and opponents of war. However, the price of a Russian Siegfrieden (victorious peace), currently the only possible temporary end to the war, would not only be blatant injustice to Ukraine. It would also mean the undermining of the international system of states.

Mankind would enter a kind of “New Old World”: Borders would again be shifted by the might of the stronger, weaker states would be militarily suppressed by imperial powers, and expansionist governments would commit genocide with impunity. Only those who are willing to pay this high price have the right to demand an end to arms supplies to Ukraine, a reduction of sanctions against Russia, and the transfer of Ukrainian spoils of war to Moscow: occupied territories, deported children, expropriated real estate, etc.

Many apparent friends of peace do not recognize their rhetorical support for Russian imperialists and the warmongers of this world. Most of the alleged war opponents in Europe forget or keep quiet about the fact that they are talking about rewarding a campaign of conquest, thus making future wars more likely. Allowing an aggressor to reap the fruits of his aggression is considered to be de-escalatory, and not a mistaken pacifist strategy that makes new use of force more attractive.

In addition to their ignorance of the high level of collateral damage to the world and the security policy of a Russian victory, many advocates of negotiations suffer from political cretinism regarding Russia’s imperial intentions. Today's Moscow leadership may not yet have fully fascist qualities, but it wants much more than a mere restriction of sovereignty and cession of territory in Ukraine. The ultimate goal is to abolish the independent Ukrainian nation-state as far as possible.

Ukraine is also a political testing ground, geostrategic instrument, military deployment zone, and resource reservoir for Russia in pursuit of its broader goals in Eastern Europe and beyond. Since 2022, both Moscow's hostility and its objectives vis-à-vis the West have steadily expanded. 

The subjugation of Ukraine is now less of a prize than the first step in a fundamental revision of European and world politics that Moscow is seeking. This does not yet mean an immediate continuation of kinetic warfare beyond Ukraine's borders. Moscow's repeated threats against the West with conventional weapons and ones of mass destruction are less-so announcements of action than part of a hybrid toolbox for corroding democratic societies, states, and organizations.

At certain stages, diplomatic activities are also suitable instruments of subversion for Moscow rather than an alternative approach to conflict resolution. 

As the Swedish political scientist Charlotta Rodhe recently put it, the “Russian negotiation theater” has more performative and manipulative than practical functions. A minimal goal of negotiations can be to stall the negotiating partner, and a maximal goal can be to extract concessions that would otherwise have to be won by purely military means. 

Foreign advocates of negotiations today act as welcome "useful idiots" for the Kremlin, facilitating Moscow's hybrid warfare and unconsciously hindering an actual and sustainable peace solution by strengthening Ukraine.

Russia's attack on Ukraine is not only a war of conquest and extermination but also acts as a wedge for Moscow. The debates about helping Ukraine and ending the war are fragmenting Western parties, parliaments, governments, and alliances. The flood of refugees from Ukraine is boosting anti-Western populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany and the Sarah Wagenknecht Union in the Federal Republic of Germany. 

Last but not least, a Russia that conquers Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, or by a combination of the two, would use it as a springboard and resource for Moscow's activities further west, whether kinetic or hybrid.

In particular, European states, but also other Western and non-Western countries, should have a range of national interests in a just peace to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. This will only be possible, however, if there are new successful Ukrainian offensive operations based on good equipment with modern weapons. 

As long as this basic condition is not met, the search for a balance and compromise with Moscow will only further fuel Russia's already adventurous foreign policy ambitions, rather than containing them.

Dr. Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

Image Credit: Shutterstock.com.

A historian writing about the 2022 war in Ukraine would probably spend a lot of ink and pages on unmanned aerial systems and their impact on the fighting.

Thousands of Drones

Both Russia and Ukraine are using thousands of drones to support their ground forces on a scale never before seen in warfare. The Russian military, in particular, has been heavily relying on the deployment of drones to achieve kinetic results both on the contact line and against Ukrainian urban centers.

For example, in November, the Russian forces launched approximately 2,300 one-way attack drones of varying types against Ukrainian military positions and urban centers. That is a record number of kinetic drone attacks, and the volume of drone attacks keeps increasing every month.

“Monthly [drone attack] numbers have been increasingly consistently throughout 2024, with significant increases—greater than 200 on the previous month—since July 2024,” the British Military Intelligence assessed on Monday.

Equipped with explosive charges of varying destructive capabilities, ranging from grenade- to missile-level, one-way attack drones are very useful and can take out an enemy command and control posts and incapacitate heavy main battle tanks.

“It is likely that through September-November 2024, as many as 50-60% of the total launches were ‘decoy’ [One Way Attack Uncrewed Aerial Systems] OWA UAS,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

But the Ukrainians are also using drones quite effectively. For example, the Ukrainian military has killed and wounded scores of North Korean troops in the Kursk Oblast with suicide drones,

“The rate of increase from October to November dropped in comparison to previous months. December 2024 launch figures show approximately 850 launches so far. However, it is likely that weather has impacted operations in December, evidenced through some nights with significantly larger waves following a period of low or no activity,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

Moscow has received thousands of unmanned aerial systems from Iran, as well as the know-how to replicate Iranian drones in Russia.

“With no impact on launch sites of production, it remains likely that Russia can sustain numbers at least in excess of 1,500 per month. Russian OWA UAS maintain coverage of targets across the entirety of Ukraine, enabling Russia to maintain pressure while allowing Long Range Aviation Missile stocks to replenish,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

The First Drone War

In many ways, the war in Ukraine is the first drone war. To be sure, unmanned aerial vehicles have been around for decades—the U.S. Intelligence Community and military pioneered their use in intelligence gathering and precision strike missions in the 1990s and 2000s.

But, until the large-scale invasion of Russia in Ukraine, there hadn’t been such a prolific employment of drones by two conventional militaries against one another. Today, in the trenches of Ukraine, ordinary foot soldiers can rely on the support of several drones when advancing or defending, while they have to keep an eye out for enemy surveillance and one-way attack unmanned aerial systems.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com

The Russian forces continue to make tactical gains in the direction of Pokrovsk, in the Donbas.

A key point on the Ukrainian defensive line, Pokrovsk is a logistical hub that supports both offensive and defensive operations in the region. The Russian forces have been trying to capture it for months, throwing tens of thousands of troops and thousands of heavy weapon systems against it.

The Fight for Pokrovsk

“Russian forces are gradually advancing south and southwest of Pokrovsk, but it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit these gains to envelop the town or if they intend to advance to the administrative boundary of Donetsk Oblast,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest operational estimate of the war in Ukraine.

One of Russia’s main claims in the war is that the Donetsk Oblast should gain its independence (alongside Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea Oblasts) and secede from Ukraine.  

“It remains unclear which effort the Russian military command will prioritize, as Russian President Vladimir Putin may have tasked the Russian military with securing territorial gains rather than seizing significant settlements,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

But capturing Pokrovsk might not be the Russian military’s ultimate goal. With the prospect of peace negotiations in the background, it is likely that the Kremlin wants more land to strengthen its bargaining power.

“Putin appears to be increasingly characterizing Russian advances in terms of square kilometers instead of highlighting the seizure of particular settlements as he had previously done. Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

Based in Washington, DC, the think tank has been providing timely and critical analysis on the strategic, operational, and tactical developments of the conflict.

Russian Casualties

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take heavy losses on the ground. Over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces had approximately 1,630 troops killed or wounded in the fighting. In addition, the Russian forces lost approximately forty-seven tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, forty-four unmanned aerial systems, thirty infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, ten artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket launchers, nine main battle tanks, and three pieces of special equipment.

Overall, the Russian forces have lost almost 780,000 troops in the fighting, with approximately 200,000 killed and 580,000 wounded. These casualties reveal the reality of Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine.

The Russian leader believed that his “special military operation” would last for three days to two weeks. Putin was convinced that his forces would sweep through Ukraine, while a friendly Ukrainian people would welcome them with open arms and flowers. Well, there were arms, but of a different kind than what Putin and his Kremlin advisers expected.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Jose HERNANDEZ Camera 51 / Shutterstock.com

Just a few weeks ago, the Atlantic Council posted a caustic headline that bleated, “In a war against China, the US could quickly exhaust its weapons.” Their solution is “A new Indo-Pacific defense initiative.” 

Sadly, the Atlantic Council is only half correct. 

Indeed, had you been reading anything I’ve written for the last three years you’d already know about the staggering drain of critical weapons stores the U.S. military has been made to endure (due to increased demand being met with a hopelessly sclerotic national defense industrial base). 

No more multilateral bureaucracies, please

The solution, contrary to what the bureaucrats in DC think, is not to create more multilateral regional bureaucracies. Already, the attempt to create a “NATO of the Indo-Pacific” in things like the much-ballyhooed Quadrilateral (Quad) partnership consisting of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia or the meandering Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) nuclear submarine construction consortium has floundered.

In fact, these attempts at regional defensive alliances, while admirable, are looking as wasteful as the old Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance that the Americans crafted during the Cold War.

America’s problem is not a lack of allies in the region. Nor is its problem a lack of multilateral bureaucracy that mirrors the byzantine (and outdated) NATO alliance in Europe. The quandary America faces is simple: its defense industrial base, especially its military shipyards, is broken. Pouring more money into the industrial base is not the solution. We’re so far beyond that, it’s not even funny. 

Washington needs to ask itself: why, precisely, was the United States able to create all these complex, multilateral regional alliances in the previous century? 

Restoring America’s dying industry and failing economy must be the priority

It was industrial might and economic heft. America’s industries today are, as noted, shells of their former selves. Shipyards cannot keep up with existing demand, let alone meet the increased demand of wartime that would inevitably occur within a few weeks of any major great state conflict. 

More importantly, the overall industrial base cannot reliably keep the U.S. military (or its allies) supplied under present conditions. Should a general war erupt between the United States and a near-peer competitor, such as China, the Americans will be gutted. 

With a new administration set to take power soon, regardless of which candidate wins this Tuesday, the new government in Washington must prioritize getting its industrial base in order—no matter the burden or the cost. 

At the same time, with the rise of the so-called “BRICS” bloc (it’s really just a Chinese-led Eurasian geoeconomic counterweight to the United States), with the U.S. economy sputtering along, and a Greek-style debt crisis appearing to be at hand (regardless of who wins the White House), the U.S. economy is nowhere near as attractive as it was a century ago when things like NATO were founded. 

Even if the United States can somehow avoid a massive debt crisis in the next decade, the BRICS challenge to the U.S. dollar is real. And that means America’s massive debt—as well as its profligate deficit spending—is enough to weaken the American ability to attract allies in their bid to counter China.

Here’s why nuclear war is a real threat

What this means is that, as the Chinese and Americans inch closer to war, with America’s conventional strength waning and China’s rising, the prospect of nuclear war increases exponentially.

For example, the United States will find itself likely boxed out of the critical strategic area of the South China Sea under current conditions. Whatever may happen in the long run, the Americans will be hard-pressed to break into any region that China is contesting due to Beijing’s relative military superiority in that area of operation.

And should China be foolish enough to open any potential war on Taiwan with a series of surprise attacks on U.S. military facilities throughout the Indo-Pacific (such as Guam) or by attacking, and possibly sinking, U.S. aircraft carriers, the chance for uncontrolled escalation into nuclear warfare is very real, particularly due to the aforementioned limits of America’s conventional forces today.

If, however, the Chinese can contain their rage and keep things just below the threshold of war, the prospects of nuclear warfare diminish. Neither Donald Trump nor Kamala Harris will risk war with China, especially nuclear war, if U.S. assets are not attacked by Chinese forces. This is why a blockade against Taiwan is China’s most likely move. It delays and stymies the American military response while giving Beijing’s forces escalation dominance in the near term. 

The way forward (not war)

Instead of building more and more alliances, the Americans should spend the next decade engaged in realistic diplomacy while doing whatever it takes to enhance the country’s defense industrial base, its indigenous human capital base, its ailing infrastructure, its domestic industries, and restoring trust as well as confidence in its failing institutions. 

Once that is achieved, the Americans will again be on top of the world, as there is simply no other regime out there capable of competing with a restored America governed according to its constitution.

To better defend Taiwan and defeat China, America must nation-build at home.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

To most naval history buffs, the term “battlecruiser” evokes thoughts of warships of a bygone era, an era that ended with World War II and was arguably most famously represented by the pride of Britain’s Royal Navy at the time, the HMS Hood (Pennant No. 51). To Star Trek fans, meanwhile, the term is more likely to conjure up the image of a fearsome future spaceship that enforces the will of the Klingon Empire.

Whether one chooses to interpret it as a throwback to the past or as going “Back to the Future” (sorry, I couldn’t resist using a second sci-fi franchise reference here), the only remaining nation in the world using battlecruisers is Russia. Say “Privyet (Hello)” to the Kirov-class battlecruisers.

What Exactly Is a Battlecruiser?

For present-day contextual purposes, the Naval Encyclopedia roughly defines “battlecruiser” thusly:

“If the term ‘battlecruiser’ is frequently use by historians to describe them, both official records and NATO designations only mentions ‘heavy missile cruisers’. The only ship for the USN that could roughly match this was the unique 1960 USS Long Beach, matching its superior radar and command capabilities, nuclear power, but its missile armament and overall displacement and size did not matched [sic] the Soviet ships. None of the subsequent cruiser [sic] ever arrived close, especially not the almiost [sic]-contemporary Ticonderoga class, which were more destroyers with more advanced capabilities. The last true USN cruisers were the West Virginias in the 1970s. They were half the tonnage of a Kirov.”

From there, we get some early history in addition to technical context:

“Heavy nuclear missile cruisers of project 1144 ‘Orlan’—a series of Soviet/Russian multi-purpose steam/nuclear (CONAS) guided missile cruisers for oceanic operations and fleet coordination, built at the Baltic Shipyard from 1973 to 1996: Kirov, Admiral Lazarev, Admiral Nakhimov and Peter the Great. Chief designer was B. I. Kupensky. The end design became the largest and most powerful non-aircraft carrier combat surface ships with nuclear power plant [sic] in the world, and record holder in terms of armament. According to NATO classification, the project received soon the term “battlecruiser” due to its huge size, armor and powerful armament, but it still remained a ‘large missile cruiser’ in the Soviet inventory. As of 2020, only one, Peter the Great is operational, while ‘Admiral Nakhimov’ is under modernization, expected completion in late 2023.”

Kirov-Class Battlecruiser Additional Early History and Specifications

As already indicated, the Kirov—named for Bolshevik revolutionary and Joseph Stalin toady Sergei Mironovich Kirov (March 27, 1886—December 1, 1934) —was the lead ship of the class laid down on March 27, 1974, launched on December 26, 1977, and commissioned on December 30, 1980 (coincidentally a mere three weeks of the inauguration of U.S President Ronald Wilson Reagan, who would initiate a foreign policy that would accelerate the collapse of the Soviet Union).

The Kirov and her sister ships bore/bear the following specifications and vital stats:

• Displacement: 28,000 tons fully laden
• Hull length: 252 m (827 ft)
• Beam Width: 28.5 m (94 ft))
• Draft: 9.1 m (30 ft)
• Propulsion: 2-shaft CONAS, nuclear propulsion with steam turbine boost; 140,000 shp
• Max speed: 32 knots (59 km/h; 36 mph)
• Crew Complement: 727 core crew of commissioned officers and enlisted sailors; eighteen aircrew, fifteen flagstaff
• Armament:    
  
  • 2 × AK-100 100 mm (3.9 in)/L60 DP guns.
  • 8 × AK-630 hex Gatling 30 mm/L60 PD guns            
  • twenty P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) antiship missiles
  • 12 × 8 (96) SA-N-6 Grumble (S-300PMU) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

NOTE: For the basis of comparison & contrast, World War II battlecruiser HMS Hood had a hull length of 860 ft 7 in (262.3 m), a displacement of 47,430 tons, and packed a main armament of eight 15-in (381 mm) guns and a secondary armament of fourteen 4-inch (102 mm) guns.

Operational History and Current Performance Issues

The Kirovs were originally conceived to counter the U.S. Navy’s submarines with its large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles, and were later intended to operate alongside prospective nuclear-powered aircraft carriers for global power projection—but that never came to fruition (and we all know what a sick joke the Russians’ lone aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, has turned out to be). Meanwhile, in a classic example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, the commissioning of the Kirovs spurred the U.S. Navy into recommissioning its Iowa-class battleships (true, old-school battleships with the 16-inch guns to prove it).

The Kirov class has turned out to have a pretty inauspicious past and present. My colleague Brandon J. Weichert elaborates in a September 13, 2024 article for The National Interest titled “Russia’s Kirov-Class Nuclear-Powered Battlecruiser ‘Has Outlived Its Usefulness’”:

“The Kirov-class battlecruisers played a major role in the Cold War, projecting Soviet power in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Their operational history has been marred by several incidents and accidents, including the accidental explosion of the Kirov’s nuclear reactor in 1990, which, naturally, led to its decommissioning … Due to their age and operational limitations, these warships have seen limited deployment in recent years, reducing their overall utility to the Russian Navy—especially in a time of war. Russia needs every platform it can get. The Kirov-class battlecruiser simply doesn’t deliver.”

About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense Expert

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: Shutterstock

According to Harrison Kass, “The State Department has approved the sale of Boeing’s new F-15EX to Israel. The $18 billion sale consists of 50 brand new F-15EXs and upgrades to 25 existing Israeli F-15s.” But the probability that Boeing can deliver on this order is very much in doubt, especially in the wake of all the problems the corporation has struggled with—both in its civil aviation division as well as its spaceflight department.

Clearly, there are systemic problems within the company and the Israelis should be questioning the wisdom of their decision to purchase these systems from the embattled American aerospace firm.

The strategic stakes 

Israel has been engaged in a massive regional war since the horrific Iran-backed Hamas terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. From the Gaza Strip to Syria to Lebanon—and even Iran itself—Israeli forces have been engaged in round-the-clock conflict in an attempt to crush Hamas and prevent future rounds of terrorism from these malign actors.

As Israel’s closest ally, the United States continues to provide unfettered aid to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). This, of course, has come with its own bit of controversy in the West, in which many have come out against Israel for its military action.

So, not only is Israel entering into an agreement with a very weak Boeing but it is, more generally, relying upon a United States that has become more skeptical of its alliance with Israel. It’s not a tenable scenario. What’s more, it’s not even a good move.

The F-15 in general is a phenomenal American warplane, and the F-15EX Eagle II promises to be an extraordinary platform. Its designers have dubbed it a “fourth-generation+” bird. Others, meanwhile, have described the F-15EX as a flying “missile truck” because of its impressive armaments package.

Yet, the F-15EX is still a fourth-generation warplane in an era when fifth-generation warplanes are already flying.

Israel needs fifth-generation warplanes 

For instance, the Israelis possess a force of specialized F-35 Lightning II planes (the F-35I). These birds were used with great success against distant Houthi targets in Yemen. However, there is now grave concern that the recent Iranian missile attack against the Nevatim Air Base in Israel where many of these units were housed may have either damaged or destroyed the F-35I arsenal (this is heavily disputed by Israeli sources).

Even if these claims that the F-35Is were damaged are true, Israel should take the time and spend the money to reconstitute that force as it is far more capable than the F-15EX.

Further, Israel should insist that America sell its vaunted F-22A Raptor to the Israelis. There are a few reasons why this hasn’t yet happened. The first is that the U.S. Congress will not allow the F-22 to be sold to any foreign power because it is so much more advanced than anything else in the world. The second reason is that the production line supporting the F-22 was canceled prematurely in 2010 by former President Barack Obama for budgetary reasons.

Selling this system to Israel, though, would allow for that production line (a costly affair) to be reconstituted—at cost. Plus, the Israelis would have decisive advantages over their regional foes if they had a force, however small, of F-22s at their disposal. This would put the Israelis light-years ahead of their regional foes and make them more dependent on the United States at a time when Israeli leaders have reason to question the sustainability of their country’s relationship with the United States.

There’s a problem

Boeing is having trouble fulfilling the order of F-15EXs. At two per month, for an order of fifty, the war might be over before that force is fully prepared for war. If that’s the case, it begs the question as to why the Israelis would even waste their time (and money) on a system that is inherently less capable than either of America’s two fifth-generation warplanes. Israel should either buy more F-35s from the United States or use all its diplomatic leverage and economic incentives to induce Washington to sell Tel Aviv the F-22.

The F-15EX Eagle II is simply not worth the time, money, or effort that Israel is putting into purchasing the system at this critical juncture for the tiny country.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

Pity the poor Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation stealth fighter. This latest & greatest brainchild of Lockheed Martin’s legendary “Skunk Works” division just can’t seem to escape controversy, in terms of reliability issues and seemingly never-ending cost overruns. At least the ones owned by the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. By contrast, the Israeli Air Force (Zroa HaAvir VeHahalal) pilots have used their F-35I Adir (“Mighty One”) in combat multiple times quite successfully, and multiple Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers whom I’ve interviewed on the subject (including Air Commodore Angus Porter, the air attache for the Australian Embassy in the United States) have told me straight up, “We love them!”

That said, the latest stateside kvetch about the F-35 is the relative lack of proverbial “bang for the buck” relative to its exorbitant cost, or more literally, the mileage that this controversial warbird generates relative to the U.S. taxpayer dollars spent on it. Let us explore this further, shall we?

The Latest Growing Pains

The crux of the story comes courtesy of my colleague Maya Carlin, in an October 20, 2024 article for The National Interest titled “The Navy’s F-35 Has an Embarrassing Flaw It Would Rather Not Admit”:

“The F-35C variant offers a combat radius of 600 nautical miles [690 mi; 1,111 km], slightly surpassing the F/A-18 Super Hornet’s 570 nautical miles for air-to-air missions. However, its reduced payload and reliance on carriers for refueling require carriers to operate closer to adversaries, exposing them to advanced Chinese A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] systems with missiles reaching 2,200 nautical miles [2,531 mi; 4.074 km].”

To put that fuel inefficiency in a dollars & sense perspective, the approximate unit cost of an F-35 is $109 million; which equates to $181,666,666 per nautical mile. (Boy, and you thought gas prices for automobiles were bad enough!)

Head-to-Head with Other Stealth Fighters

To put the Lightning II’s range shortcomings in numerical perspective, let’s see how it compares with the ranges of other fifth-generation fighters, both foreign and domestic:

• Lockheed Martin (Skunk Works again) F-22 Raptor (USA): Ferry range of 1,600 nmi (1,800 mi, 3,000 km) or more with 2 external fuel tanks; a combat range of 460 nmi (530 mi, 850 km) clean with 100 nmi (115 mi; 185 km) in supercruise, 595 nmi (685 mi; 1,102 km) in so-called “clean subsonic” mode
• Chengdu J-20 Weilong (“Mighty Dragon”; NATO reporting name “Fagin”; China): Ferry range of 5,500 km (3,400 mi; 3,000 nmi) with 2 external fuel tanks; a combat range of 2,000 km (1,200 mi, 1,100 nmi)
• Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name “Felon”; Russia): 3,500 km (2,200 mi, 1,900 nmi) subsonic, 4,500 km (2,796 mi; 2,429 nmi) from 2 outboard fuel tanks; 1,500 km (930 mi; 810 nmi) at supersonic speed

The Way Forward?

In spite of all of these controversies, the F-35 continues to attract foreign military sales (FMS) customers who continue to line up in droves to buy the fighter. Besides the aforementioned RAAF and Israeli Air Force, the following foreign entities have enthusiastically purchased the fighter:

-Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF); twelve F-35As delivered, according to the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft (WDMMA; using 2021 figures), with an additional 134 airframes on order

-Belgian Air Component (Luchtcomponent); one F-35A delivered out of thirty-four ordered

-Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF); eighty-eight F-35As, with deliveries taking place from

-Royal Danish Air Force (Flyvevåbnet); ten F-35As delivered out of twenty-seven ordered

-Finnish Air Force (Ilmavoimat); sixty-four F-35As ordered as of 2022

-German Air Force (Luftwaffe); thirty-five F-35A ordered as of 2023

-Hellenic (Greek) Air Force (Polemikí Aeroporía); twenty F-35As on order, with delivery expected between late 2027 to early 2028 from 2026 to 2032

-Italian Air Force (Aeronautica Militare) and Navy (Marina Militare); ninety F-35As and F-35Bs delivered, with an additional twenty-five on the way

-Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNoAF; Luftforsvaret); forty F-35As delivered

-Polish Air Force (Siły Powietrzne); thirty-two F-35A “Husarz” ordered, with deliveries starting sometime this year and concluding in 2030

-Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF; Daehanminguk Gong-gun) and Navy (ROKN; Daehan-minguk Haegun); twenty F-35Bs planned

-Republic of Singapore Air Force; twelve F-35Bs on order as of February 2024 with first four specimens to be delivered in 2026

-Swiss Air Force (Forces aeriennes suisses); thirty-six F-35As ordered, with deliveries commencing in 2027 and culminating in 2030

-United Kingdom Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm; thirty-four F-35Bs delivered, 138 more on order

Meanwhile, the Czech Air Force, Romanian Air Force (RoAF; Forțele Aeriene Romane), and Portuguese Air Force are all in the process of finalizing F-35 purchase deals.

All in all, not too shabby for such a seemingly overpriced and fuel-inefficient, short-range warbird, eh?

About the Author:

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: Shutterstock.

If the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 taught us one thing (or should have) it was that the United States is far too reliant on China for its most basic supplies. Everything from antibiotics to car parts to syringes—and almost everything else we take for granted today—mostly is derived from supply chains emanating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that rules China with an iron fist knows this weakness and has plans to exploit it when a geopolitical crisis erupts between Washington and Beijing (which is coming sooner than most realize).

Despite knowing about this weakness for decades, and that weakness being laid bare for the world to see during the pandemic years ago, Washington has done little more than pay lip service to the need for diversifying America’s supply chains. There have been some moves to detach U.S. supply chains from China. But those movements are minuscule compared to the kind of drastic action that is required to overcome this supply chain vulnerability.

Trade Vulnerabilities 

Now, it might be too late to mitigate these vulnerabilities with a geopolitical crisis so close at hand. Should a conflict erupt between China and the United States, America would find itself cut off from those basic goods that the civilian economy—and even the U.S. military—relies upon. Expect antibiotic shortages, complications to basic consumer goods, food supply shortages, and even aircraft part cutoffs to utterly decimate the U.S. economy.

The United States has never experienced a situation like this. It would be the equivalent of what Germany went through during Britain’s blockade of the country during World War I (and that’s a best-case scenario). No one is prepared. Just look at what happened recently with the potential port worker’s strike that was narrowly averted. Had that gone through as planned, life in the United States would have ground down to a halt.

A war with China, in which Beijing eviscerated the supply chains leading back to America, would be like that.

Americans would struggle to find basic supplies. Prices would go up as would inflation. Most experts believe that the United States would enter a “long depression” if the supply chains linking the United States and China together were severed due to a war between the two great powers.

Americans are barely getting by today as it is. 

A war with China would utterly collapse the economic order here in the United States. What’s more, it’d further destabilize the social and political order, leading to even greater levels of domestic extremism from both sides of the political aisle (further weakening the United States globally).

As of 2023, China was ranked as the world’s top exporter. Most sources believe that China exported around $3.73 trillion worth of goods globally. In fact, that was widely considered to be a 4.6 percent increase in the exportation of goods since 2021 for Chinese firms. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, from 2017-2022, China’s reported exports have steadily increased, indicating a clear trend. 

China’s top trading partner is the United States, which accounts for around $551 billion of Chinese exports. So, any severing of trade ties due to a war with America would harm Beijing, too. Yet, China’s deft moves to shore up new alliances with the Global South under the imprimatur of the informal BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economic alliance is likely an attempt by Beijing to open new markets for the inevitable day when they can no longer trade with the United States.

Meanwhile, the United States exported $2.3 trillion worth of goods to the world, with Canada being the largest recipient of US goods. Although, 55 percent of essential goods for Americans are produced by China, which means that China severing ties will have a disproportionately negative impact on the United States. 

Avoid a crisis in the near term

All this, of course, would impact the war effort in any potential conflict with China. But China’s ability to shift exports to the Global South will play a decisive role in ameliorating any economic damage from the war. 

Certainly, it’d be devastating for China’s economy in the near term. The real question is: how devastating would it be for America’s? It is my opinion that, in the near term, the damage to America would be far greater than it would be to China.

The best solution is for cooler heads to prevail and to avoid this outcome for as long as possible—all while following the recommendations of people like former U.S. trade representative Robert Lighthizer to make ourselves as free of Chinese trade as possible in the long run. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Paul R. Jones / Shutterstock.com

The presidency of James Earl “Jimmy” Carter Jr., from January 20, 1977, to January 20, 1981, was not a particularly happy or prestigious period in the history of the United States of America. In terms of domestic affairs (stagflation, “malaise,” “misery index“) and foreign affairs (the Iran hostage crisis, especially the tragically abortive military rescue operation, Operation Eagle Claw AKA Desert One), Americans had a rough time.

However, in the spirit of being fair & balanced, then-President Carter did have his accomplishments too, particularly the Camp David Peace Accords of 1979. Moreover, he did serve honorably as a U.S. Navy officer, graduating with the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1947 (ranking sixtieth out of a class of 821 midshipmen), earning a commission as an ensign, and serving seven years of active duty and an additional seven years in the Naval Reserve as a submarine officer under the hard-charging, take-no-prisoners Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. So then, perhaps it is fitting that a U.S. Navy submarine bears Carter’s name. Say hello to the USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23).

USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) Early History and Specifications

USS Jimmy Carter is a nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarine, hence the U.S. Navy hull classification of “SSN.” As noted by USCarriers:

“The Jimmy Carter (SSN 23) is the third and last Seawolf-class submarine and the first ship of the U.S. Navy named in honor of the 39th president of the United States who is the only submarine-qualified man that went on to become the nation’s chief executive. He was the nuclear engineer officer on the Pre-Commissioning Unit Seawolf (SSN 575) in the 1950s.”

Built by General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB), SSN-23 was ordered on June 29, 1996 (coincidentally just before the 1996 Summer Olympics commenced in Atlanta, a city in Carter’s home state of Georgia), laid down on December 5, 1998, launched on May 13, 2004, christened on June 5, 2004, and commissioned on February 19, 2005. The warship bears the following specifications and vital stats:

· Displacement: 12,139 tons fully laden

· Hull length: 138 m (452.8 ft) overall

· Beam Width: 12.1 m (39.7 ft)

· Draft: 10.9 m (35.8 ft)

· Propulsion: 1x S6W PWR 220 MW (300,000 hp), HEU 93.5%, 1x secondary propulsion submerged motor, 2x steam turbines 57,000 shp (43 MW), 1x shaft,1x pump-jet propeller

· Max Speed (submerged): greater than 25 knots (46 km/h; 28.7 mph)

· Test Depth: 490 m (1,600 ft)

· Crew Complement: 15 commissioned officers, 126 enlisted seamen

· Armament: 8× 26.5 inch torpedo tubes, sleeved for 21-inch weapons (up to 50 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles/Harpoon anti-ship missiles/Mk 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) heavyweight guided torpedoes carried in torpedo room)

In addition, the Jimmy Carter was fitted with a special 100-foot-long, 2,500-ton module called the Multi-Mission Platform. The U.S. Navy acknowledged that the MMP space can accommodate undersea drones, SEALs, and much more.

Operational History

USS Jimmy Carter’s active-duty career got off to a rather inauspicious start: on October 14, 2005, the submarine was en route from Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut, to its new homeport at the Bangor Annex of Naval Base Kitsap, Washington, when it was forced to return to New London when an unusually high wave damaged the boat. Luckily, the damage was repaired quickly, and the big sub re-departed New London the following day, finally making port at Bangor the afternoon of November 9, 2005.

Soon enough, the former POTUS’s namesake would make history in a more positive fashion, albeit in a mission whose specifics are still shrouded in secrecy. My colleague Peter Suciu elaborates in a September 9, 2024 article for The National Interest:

“Yet, the submarine has been seen returning to port flying the ‘skull and crossbones,’ a tradition among submarine crews that its mission was conducted successfully. The boat has Battle Efficiency awards and a Presidential Unit Citation, suggesting it has conducted some important – and likely even dangerous – missions. This may have included tapping undersea fiber-optic communications and conducting intelligence-gathering missions.

We may not know what missions the boat was involved in, but it should be noted that the motto of the USS Jimmy Carter is ‘Semper Optima’ (‘Always the Best’) – and it certainly does seem to be very good at what it does.”

Where Are They Now?

“They” as in the vessel and its real-life, flesh & blood namesake, that is.

SSN-23 remains in active service, homeported at the Bangor Annex of Naval Base Kitsap in the State of Washington.

As for former President Carter himself, he’s still alive and recently celebrated his one-hundredth birthday. However, he’s in poor physical health; on February 18, 2023, the Carter Center (located in Atlanta) announced that following a “series of short hospital stays,” the former POTUS decided to “spend his remaining time at home with his family in Plain, George, to “receive hospice care instead of additional medical intervention” for an unspecified terminal illness.

Godspeed, Mr. President.

About the Author:

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: DVIDS

One hundred and ten years ago, during what was to become the bloodiest conflict the world had seen to that point, the fighting stopped for Christmas. It wasn’t planned, but on the evening of December 24, 1914, the guns along the Western Front were mostly silent, and fittingly, “Silent Night”—or “Stille Nacht” in German—was heard being sung on both sides of the lines.

The First World War had begun less than six months before, but soldiers on both sides of the lines had already dug into trench warfare. Winter had arrived, and military planners looked to spring to break the stalemate.

At that point, the horrors of gas warfare, constant artillery barrages, and futile attacks across no-man’s-land had yet to be seen in full. However, there were already trench lines running nearly from the English Channel to the Swiss border that stopped any forward movement.

Silent Night

As both sides didn’t expect an attack at Christmas, the guns fell silent until the singing started. Soldiers stopped shooting, and on Christmas morning, some soldiers came out of the trenches waving white flags.

However, the celebrations weren’t as widespread as contemporary media depictions may suggest. Yet, they took on something of a legend.

Today, there is a common image—thanks to the stories that came about ten years ago to mark the centennial of the truce in 2014—of soldiers crossing no man’s land to greet one another. The irony is that while it has been written about countless times in the past century, during the war, the military leaders of the UK, France, and Germany attempted to keep a tight lid on the news getting out.

The last thing any commanders wanted was for their respective soldiers to suddenly have the desire to stop fighting and make a de facto peace with the enemy.

Any mention of the truce went largely unreported for more than a week. It was only on New Year’s Eve that The New York Times reported that an unofficial truce had broken out. Moreover, accounts only circulated as families at home found out, not through the daily newspapers but from firsthand accounts in letters from the front lines. The British newspapers, The Mirror and Sketch, eventually printed front-page photographs of the soldiers mingling.

The French press all but blocked the truce, confirming only that it was limited to the British sectors—which it was not—and that it was short-lived, which it largely was. While not as common as in the British sectors, there were accounts of it occurring with some French and Belgian soldiers taking part.

Coverage in Germany was as muted, but when it was reported, it openly criticized those taking part. That fact isn’t surprising as Germany, at that point, believed itself to be winning, having conquered most of Belgium and made significant inroads into France.

That, too, may explain why the French and Belgians were less eager than their British allies to participate. Soldiers from those countries were less likely to shake hands with the invaders of their homelands!

How The Myth Took Hold Like many myths, the truce became larger than life in the years after the war. The first fictionalized account was the 1933 German play Petermann schließt Frieden oder Das Gleichnis vom deutschen Opfer (Petermann Makes Peace). Written by war veteran Heinz Steguweit, who was an early member of the Nazi Party, the play was far from uplifting as it ended with a German soldier shot dead by a sniper while singing Christmas carols!

However, the Nazis also stamped out any attempt to acknowledge it occurred, and with the clouds of war on the horizon, few wanted to remember even one happy moment where peace broke out.

The Christmas Truce of 1914 was chronicled briefly in the 1969 musical satire Oh! What a Lovely War.

A similar scene served as the backdrop for Paul McCartney’s 1983 music video “Pipes of Peace,” in which the former Beatle played both a British and German soldier who meet in no man’s land. The video was noted for offering a fairly accurate depiction of the trenches at that stage in the war. The song wasn’t released as a single in the U.S. but did reasonably well in the UK charts, reaching the number one spot for two weeks.

The video inspired a 2014 ad campaign from the UK-based Sainsbury grocery store, which was released to mark the centennial of the truce. The campaign featured British and German soldiers singing “Silent Night” before both teams shook hands, played football, and stopped fighting. 

The 2005 French film Joyeux Noël is most notable for depicting the events from the perspective of German, Scottish, and French soldiers. While it is heavily fictionalized, it also offers a realistic look at the situation in December 1914.

The Legacy of the Truce

Sadly, the war didn’t end on December 25, 1914. Moreover, the worst was yet to come—those artillery duels, mustard gas, and senseless offensives. It wouldn’t be until 1918 that the guns would fall silent, and there was peace on the Western Front.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Lucas Alvarez Canga / Shutterstock.com. 

“Well, I’m a Son of Satan’s Angels/And I fly the F-4D/All the way from the Hanoi railroad bridge to the DMZ/I’m one of ol’ Hoot Gibson’s boys and mean as I can be/I’m a Son of Satan’s Angels and I fly the F-4D”—Dick Jonas, Lt. Col, USAF (Ret.), former Vietnam War F-4 Phantom II pilot turned professional singer

Even if the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom weren’t immortalized in song by the people who flew her, she would still go down in history as arguably the single best and most famous third-generation jet fighter.

(NOTE: McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing in 1997; however, unlike, say, the merger of Lockheed with Martin Marietta to form Lockheed Martin in 1995, or the 1994 merger of Northrop and Grumman to form Northrop Grumman, only one of the predecessor companies’ names, i.e. Boeing’s, was retained.)

F-4E early history and specifications

The F-4 Phantom made her maiden flight on May 27, 1958, and officially entered into operational service with the U.S. Navy in 1961, with the Air Force and Marine Corps following suit shortly thereafter.

Nomenclature-wise, the Phantom II was the "sequel" (in a manner of speaking) to the short-lived 1940s vintage FH Phantom, which made history in her own right during her brief service life as both the first U.S. jet aircraft to take off from and land on an aircraft carrier. Subsequently, it became the first U.S. jet fighter in operational service with both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

The F-4E was the last variant of the venerable Phantom to be built, produced between 1965 and 1973. The F-4E has the following specifications and vital stats:

·        Fuselage Length: 63 ft 0 in (19.2 m)

·        Wingspan: 38 ft 5 in (11.7 m)

·        Height: 16 ft 5 in (5 m)

·        Max Takeoff Weight: 61,795 lb (28,030 kg)

·        Max Airspeed: Mach 2.23 (1,280 kn; 1,470 mph; 2,370 km/h)

·        Service Ceiling: 60,000 ft (18,000 m)

·        Combat Range: 370 nmi (420 mi, 680 km)

·        Armament: 20 mm (0.787 in) M61A1 Vulcan cannon mounted internally under the nose, 640 rounds; Up to 18,650 lb. (8,480 kg) of ordnance on nine external hardpoints; 4× AIM-9 Sidewinder (U.S. versions) or Python-3 (Israeli Kurnass version) air-to-air missiles on wing pylons

Regarding the Phantom II’s combination of speed and weight, Vietnam veteran pilot Dick Anderegg joked that this overgrown speed demon provided “proof that if you put enough thrust behind a brick you can make it fly” (a comment echoed by Dick Jonas in his book RBAAB: The Red-Blooded All-American Boy). She set a whopping sixteen world speed and altitude records between 1959 and 1962; five of those records would stand until the F-15 Eagle—another McDonnell Douglas product—came along in 1975.

Operational History (In Brief)

The Phantom II served the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps faithfully from the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s and early 1970s all the way to the 1991 Persian Gulf War AKA Operation Desert Storm (with the F-4G Wild Weasel V variant providing the warbird’s aerial combat swan song [bad pun intended]).

During the Vietnam War in particular, after initially starting off behind the power curve against North Vietnamese MiG-17 “Frescoes” and MiG-21 “Fishbeds” (thanks to the ridiculous rules of engagement imposed by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara), USAF F-4 MiG Combat Air Patrol (MiGCAP) missions ended up with a far more desirable 5.5:1 kill ratio while their USN counterparts finished with an even more impressive 6.4:1 figure.

The venerable fighter-bomber also acquitted herself in aerial combat at the hands of the Israeli Air Force during multiple Arab-Israeli conflicts including the War of Attrition (July 1967-August 7, 1970) and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, before being finally retired by the Israeli Air Force in 2004. Renamed the Kurnass (“Sledgehammer”), Israeli Air Force Kurmass drivers ended up hammering 116.5 enemy aircraft out of the sky. 

Where Are They Now?

There are now a total of three remaining users of the Phantom: NATO members and therefore American allies Greece and Turkey (though Turkey’s status as a U.S. ally nowadays is only nominal at best)…and, ironically, Iran, one of the worst enemies of the U.S. and Israel alike, which dubs America and Israel as “The Great Satan” and “Little Satan” respectively. (I was going to include South Korea on this list, but upon further review, it turns out that the Republic of Korea Air Force retired its Phantoms this past June.)

According to the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft, the Hellenic Air Force, Turkish Air Force, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) have a total of thirty-three, forty-eight, and sixty-three Phantoms; all three of these users have the RF-4E all-weather tactical reconnaissance variant, and the Iranian air for e also has some F-4Ds and F-4Es in service.

In the case of the Iranians, the jets are holdovers from happier times when Iran was still under the rule of Mohammed Reza Shah, a staunch ally of both the United States and Israel. Iran continues to fly the Phantom due to the fact that international arms sanctions have made finding more modern replacement warbirds rather difficult. The IRIAF has certainly continued to make judicious use of the F-4E in combat; BBC News reports the Iranians used the planes in combat as recently as 2014, in strikes against the Islamic State terrorist group. 

About the Author

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: Giannis Papanikos / Shutterstock.com

A month ago, tech entrepreneur Elon Musk made very clear in a post on X that he wasn’t a supporter of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. Musk shared a video of a Chinese drone formation and offered his opinion, “Meanwhile, some idiots are still building manned fighter jets like the F-35.”

That sparked a backlash from the aviation community, which defended the fifth-generation stealth fighter and argued that while drones are likely part of the future of military aviation, it is unlikely they could replace the role of the jet fighter in modern warfare.

Lockheed Martin UK Responds

Earlier this week, Paul Livingston, chief executive of Lockheed Martin’s UK division (the F-35’s manufacturer), also defended the F-35 in an interview with The Telegraph newspaper.

He told the publication of record, “I think Elon is an amazing brain and he’s done some incredible things, particularly with SpaceX. Who doesn’t admire that stuff? But there’s an understanding of the threat that he won’t have, because he doesn’t have the clearances to understand that. On this subject, he’s wrong.”

Thus, as Livingston suggested, Musk’s opinion of the fighter may be based largely on open-source and public information. That fact isn’t likely to change.

Even as the billionaire behind SpaceX has become a close ally of President-elect Donald Trump, Musk is unlikely to receive a higher security clearance due to his admission of past drug use. Musk is reported to hold a “top-secret” clearance, which has taken years to obtain.

Are Other “Idiots” Building Manned Fighters?

Livingston further defended the F-35—widely seen as the most successful fifth-generation fighter built to date, with more than 1,000 now in service around the world—and pointed out that Beijing is building its own stealth fighter.

This could beg the question of whether there are “idiots” in Beijing and Moscow pushing for manned fighters. If the United States were on the wrong path, perhaps Beijing wouldn’t have pulled out all the stops at last month’s fifteenth China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, where it unveiled the twin-seat variant of its Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighter, known as the J-20S.

The event also saw the debut of the Shenyang J-35A, a carrier-based variant of the FC-31, further showcasing China’s growing fifth-generation aircraft capabilities.

“The Chinese are still building their J20 jets,” Livingston noted. “Maybe Elon thinks they’re idiots as well because those are manned fighters?”

Four F-35s Can Do A Squadron’s Worth of Work

The Lockheed Martin executive also highlighted the capabilities of the Lightning II, describing the jets as “flying computers” while touting their multirole capabilities.

“Before the F-35, if I was going to fly a mission into a peer nation’s territory to strike against a well-protected target, I would need a minimum of 16 aircraft,” Livingston told The Telegraph. “You would have jamming aircraft—which, by the way, says, ‘Hello, we’re coming’—then you’d send in suppression of enemy air defence aircraft, because you’d have to kill the radars off, then you’d send fast strike aircraft in.”

The F-35, Livingston said, can get the same job done much more effectively and efficiently.

“I can now do that same mission with four F-35s and no support. And they don’t need protection afterwards, because they can fight their way out,” he added.

Drones Are The Future

Musk has also taken the view that the F-35 is an “expensive and complex jack of all trades, master of none,” while arguing, “Crewed fighter jets are an inefficient way to extend the range of missiles or drop bombs,” adding, “A reusable drone can do so without all the overhead of a human pilot.”

Livingston doesn’t dispute that drones could play a significant role in air warfare, but he doubts whether the human element can ever be fully removed.

“Drones are going to be part of the future and they will be able to provide some level of air dominance, because there’s no doubt that once you take a human out of an aircraft the cost for your effects comes down,” the UK executive said in the interview. “But you’ve got to look at where we are today. And first of all, a drone has got to be able to see a threat, right?”

The Pentagon Sticking With The F-35

Even as Musk has publicly criticized the F-35, it would appear the U.S. Department of Defense is sticking with the manned fifth-generation fighter. Last Friday, Lockheed Martin was awarded a nearly $12 billion contract to produce an additional 145 Lightning IIs for the U.S. military and its international allies.

“This modification adds scope for the production and delivery of 145 F-35 full rate production (FRP) Lot 18 aircraft (48 F-35A aircraft for the Air Force; 16 F-35B aircraft and five F-35C aircraft for the Marine Corps; 14 F-35C aircraft for the Navy; 15 F-35A aircraft and one F-35B aircraft for F-35 non-U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) program partners; and 39 F-35A aircraft and seven F-35B aircraft for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers),” the Pentagon stated in the contract announcement.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Mike Mareen / Shutterstock.com. 

During the fiercest period of submarine warfare in human history, the United States relied heavily upon the Gato class—the first mass-produced submarine of World War II. The Americans built seventy of the Gato class (and derived the Balao and Tench class from the Gato), making her the most numerous of America’s World War II submarines. The diesel-powered Gato proved to be a capable vessel and is credited with destroying significant portions of the Japanese merchant marine, and to a lesser extent, the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Introducing the Gato class

Unlike modern attack submarines, which are designed to operate more independently, the Gato class was built as a supplement to the fleet, known as “fleet submarines.” A fleet submarine is a submarine that has the requisite speed and endurance to operate as part of the main naval fleet, which for the Americans during World War II, was built around the battleship.

The Gato was tasked with shooting out ahead of the main fleet and scouting the enemy position. When appropriate, the Gato would engage the enemy, incrementally degrading the enemy's abilities before the main fleet would arrive to encounter a hindered enemy force.

Because so many Gato submarines were made, the Navy had time to tinker and experiment; four different modifications of the class were offered. Variations included adjustments to the navigation bridge, a bulwark around the cigarette deck, periscope plating shears, and machine gun positioning. Generally, the Gato displaced 2,424 tons when submerged and measured about 311 feet long. The beam measured 27 feet while the draft measured 17 feet. For propulsion, the Gato relied on four diesel engines, two 126-cell Sargo batteries, and four high-speed electric motors churning two propellers. The propulsion system was good for 5,400 shp when surfaced and 2,740 shp when submerged. The Gato could hit top speeds of 24 miles per hour when surface (and just 10 miles per hour when submerged). The vessel could operate for a range of 11,000 nautical miles, could stay submerged for forty-eight hours at a time, and could stay on patrol for seventy-five days. The test depth was 300 feet. For armament, the Gato featured ten 21-inch torpedo tubes (six forward and four aft) and a stock of twenty-four torpedoes. When needed, the Gato could swap its torpedoes for mines (Mk 10 and Mk 12). Additionally, the Gato had one 76-mm/50-caliber deck gun, plus a 40-mm and 20-mm cannon.

After the war

When World War II ended, the Gato was essentially obsolete. With a test depth of just 300 feet, the Gato was already behind the times—despite being just two to four years old—a consequence of the rapid technological development made during World War II. The surviving Gato submarines were still put to use, however. Some of the Gatos were used as radar pickets while others were converted to transport oil. One Gato, meanwhile, was converted to fire the Regulus cruise missile. Still more Gatos were sent abroad, for operation in foreign navies (Brazil, Turkey, Greece). Today, the last remaining Gatos are on display in museums around the United States.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Gerald Peplow / Shutterstock.com

The fourth-generation Grumman F-14 Tomcat is one of the most famous American-made jet fighter aircraft of all time, thanks to both the “Top Gun” fictitious film franchise and the venerable warbird’s real-world historical combat performance.

(NOTE: In 1994, Grumman Aerospace Corporation merged with Northrop Corporation to form Northrop Grumman.)

So, imagine the tremendous irony that one of the last three remaining users of the Tomcat is one of the worst enemies of the United States, that being Iran, more specifically the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), which dubs America as “The Great Satan.”

Iranian-Owned F-14 Initial History and Specifications

According to the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft, the IRIAF has a total of twenty-six Tomcats, specifically the original F-14A variant, which made her maiden flight on December 21, 1970. The planes were sold to Iran when it was still under the rule of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (October 26, 1919-July 27, 1980). Mohammed Reza Shah was a staunch ally of both the United States and Israel, and the order for the Tomcats was placed in January 1974; deliveries commenced in January 1976 (when Gerald R. Ford was the U.S. president). 

The Why

So why does the IRIAF still have the battle-proven but now oh-so-antiquated Tomcat in its fleet? (Ditto for the third-generation McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II?) Well, a reason is the fact that Iran has been an international pariah ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 overthrew the shah and installed an Islamist and anti-American regime headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (May 17, 1900-June 3, 1989) as supreme leader.

Since then, as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been hobbled by sanctions that make it difficult for Tehran to acquire new systems as well as spare parts for existing systems.

Be that as it may, the Iranians have used their now-ancient F-14s quite effectively in combat. The warbird has an all-time air-to-air kill ratio of 135:4 according to MiGFLUG, and the overwhelming majority of those victories were scored not by U.S. Navy Tomcat drivers (sorry, Maverick!), but rather by the IRIAF during the Iran-Iraq War (September 22, 1980-August 20, 1988).

The Way Forward?

As for the prospect of Iran finding a replacement for both its F-14 and F-4 fleets (as well as the Soviet-designed fourth-generation MiG-29 “Fulcrum”), well … the Russians are trying to help them out of that jam, in accordance with Vladimir Putin’s new “axis of evil” with Iran, China, and North Korea, in the form of sales of the Sukhoi Su-35 “Super Flanker.” According to Aero-News Journal, a deal was inked between Tehran and Moscow back in November 2023; this deal would have also included Mi-28 attack helicopters and potentially the S-400 air defense system).

However, that deal has hit a snag. Back on April 21, 2024, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty announced that the Iranian government began denying the previous report:

“Reports in the Iranian media that the country is to receive the latest generation of aircraft in the next few days are incorrect, according to the Fararu news website. The media had referred to a report by the SNN news agency, which is close to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The agency itself denied the report on its Telegram page after consulting with the Defense Ministry, which last year announced that Iran had acquired Mi-28H combat helicopters and [Yakovlev] Yak-130s from Russia in addition to the SU-35 fighter jets.”

To make matters more confusing, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida had reported the previous week that Iran had indeed already received some of the Su-35s roughly a year prior but was unable to operate them due to a dearth of spare parts. Evidently, the Iranian Defense Ministry is a prime example of the proverbial left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing.

About the Author

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of theNaval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: BeAvPhoto / Shutterstock.com

“The Punisher,” the action-packed Marvel Comics franchise featuring vigilante protagonist Frank Castle, is a hugely successful comic book franchise. However, one real-life “Punisher,” the XM25 25x40 mm grenade launcher, the would-be successor to the M203 40 mm grenade launcher and M320 grenade launcher, turned out to be a failure.

Now there are two new weapons systems that aspire to succeed where the XM25 “Punisher” failed: the Squad Support Rifle System (SSRS) and the PGS-001.

The Basic Premise

According to Joseph Trevithick of The WarZone in a November 17, 2024, article titled “One Of These Futuristic Grenade Launchers Could Succeed Where The Army’s ‘Punisher’ Failed,” both the SSRS and the PGS-001 are finalists in a U.S. Army’s xTechSoldier Lethality challenge. This challenge is the army’s ploy to devise a high-tech 30 mm Precision Grenadier System (PGS) that troops could use to engage targets ranging from enemy personnel behind cover to light armored vehicles to unmanned aerial vehicles. The counter-drone requirement in particular is something that actually predates but has also now been given a far greater sense of urgency by the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Additional requirements for the PGS program include:

-An air-bursting “Counter Defilade Round” that can “precisely and quickly defeat personnel targets” behind cover.

-An overall length of 34 inches (60.96 centimeters) or less.

-A maximum weight of 14.5 pounds (6.57 kilograms).

-A minimum effective range of 1,640 feet (500 meters).

As Army Contracting Command prescribed in a contracting notice from February 2023:

“The PGS will be a man portable integrated weapon system that enables precision engagements to destroy personnel targets in defilade and in the open with increased lethality and precision compared to the legacy M203/M320 grenade launchers … The PGS will provide overmatch to comparable threat grenade launchers in near peer formations in future operating environments (jungle, urban, woodland, subterranean, desert, day/night/obscured). The PGS is envisioned to consist of a weapon, a fire control, and a suite of ammunition which enables the user to engage targets in defilade/cover, hovering UAS targets, conduct door breaching, engage close combat targets, and light armored targets.”

Finalist # 1: The SSRS

The SSRS is a joint venture between Barrett Firearms, best known for their legendary .50 caliber M82-series rifles, and MARS, Inc. The tandem showed off a model at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual conference in October 2024. The model had the following features and specifications:

· Caliber and Capacity: 30x42mm projectiles in a five-round box magazine (NOTE: this is a major step up from the single-shot capacity of the M203)

o Ammo Types: high-explosive, incendiary, armor-piercing, dedicated training rounds, “close quarters battle” (CQB) shell (buckshot-like canister round)

· Weight: Just under 14 lbs (6.35 kg)

· Pistol grip, trigger assembly, and fire control selector switch that all mimic AR-15/M16/M4-series rifles

· Topside attachment rail for optics such as the Vortex Optics XM157

Finalist # 2: The PGS-001

The PGS-001 comes courtesy of FN America, the U.S.-based subsidiary of famed Belgian small arms company Fabrique National Herstal (best known for the FAL 7.62x51 mm battle rifle and the P-35 Browning Hi-Power 9mm semiautomatic pistol). The company unveiled its model of the PGS-001 at last year’s AUSA.

As far as can be ascertained, the FN offering also fires some type of 30 mm projectile. However, Trevithick notes that known specifics are less readily available than in the case of the Barrett/MARS offering, but the layout is similar to the SSRS and is also able to accommodate the XM157 optic. The PGS-001 distinguishes itself from the SSRS via its large muzzle brake, which would help mitigate recoil (especially useful for firing rapid follow-up shots), but at the price of significant muzzle blast and flash.

The Way Forward?

The SSRS and PGS-001 are considered the two finalists. Trevithick notes that there is still at least an outside possibility for some dark horse contenders such as:

-American Rheinmetall Munitions Squad Support Weapon Achieving Precision Grenadier System Objectives.

-Knight Technical Solutions (not to be confused with Knight’s Armament Company) Multipurpose Intelligent Grenade System (MIGS) (a six-shot revolver-type design).

-Plumb Precision Products P3-M110 17.5 mm (though quite frankly, that caliber sounds more than a bit undersize for the Army’s requirements).

Time will tell.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: Shutterstock.

President-elect Trump believes that the United States has no important interests in Syria, or so he tweeted last week. This announcement has strengthened the view of some in the restraint community who reacted to his election with cautious optimism, hoping the new administration will turn away from decades of counter-productive foreign policies. More than a few people have suggested that the second Trump administration might prove to be a good one for advocates of restraint and that perhaps an embrace should be in the offing. 

Such a move would be a catastrophic mistake. The once and future president represents not a boon to strategic restraint but a dire, existential threat. No grand strategy will survive the association with Trump and the MAGA movement, and restraint is no exception.

The GOP is riding high now, but it will govern on a fragile foundation. Today, it is less of a coherent political party than a cult of personality, and cults do not outlive their leaders. Eventually, Father Time will catch up to the president-elect. Probably sooner rather than later, the taco bowls, filets-o-fish, and inactivity will contribute to his involuntary retirement from politics. And when that happens, the GOP will face a reckoning. No one will rise to take his place. No new voice will be able to match Trump’s appeal to the masses, his charisma, and his instincts. When he goes away, so does MAGA, at least as a force that can produce victory in national elections. Historians will mark November 5, 2024, as the movement’s high-water mark.

Since 2015, when Trump was on the ticket, the GOP has outperformed expectations. Without him, in the off-years and special elections, the GOP has underperformed. Only the Dear Leader can inspire the MAGA nation to go to the polls.

Trump 2.0 will be unrestrained by archaic constitutional notions of checks and balances and is likely to produce catastrophe and disgrace beyond the imagination of reasonable people. Not long after it falls, there will be a backlash against everyone who helped and everything this man claimed to stand for. Once MAGA withers, its values and shibboleths will be rendered anathema to the next generation. By 2034, it will be hard to find any serious Americans who will admit to having supported Trump.

If its proponents are not careful, strategic restraint will become a casualty of the poisonous Trump legacy. Its opponents already associate it with Charles Lindbergh, Father Coughlin, and the other quasi-authoritarians of the 1930s. If it becomes identified with the quasi-authoritarians of the 2020s, it will not survive as an option for grand strategy moving forward. Years of effort to distance restraint from the caricature of isolationism will have been for naught. Restraint—and perhaps realism itself—will never recover from association with MAGA.

Trump is a nativist. His policies may overlap with restraint, but only by coincidence rather than shared values or goals. The neoconservative is the intellectual enemy of both MAGA and restraint, but in this case, the enemy of my enemy is not my friend. Few restrainers have advocated for closing borders, restricting trade, or drawing lines between enemies and friends abroad. Even fewer support a massive buildup in the Pacific to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. In fact, restrainers tend to worry about the potential deterioration of that relationship and many others under myopic, manichean nativist leadership. And no restrainers support throwing more and more money at a bloated and wasteful Pentagon. Most are unified in their horror at Trump’s slate of unserious nominees for very serious jobs.

Prior to the rise of Trump, restraint had momentum in American strategic circles. Revulsion at unnecessary wars and preposterous defense spending levels was growing on both sides of the aisle. Money was even starting to flow into restraint-related coffers.

If the movement becomes synonymous with MAGA, that momentum will come to a halt—not today or tomorrow, but soon. And the damage could be permanent. Proponents may be willing to focus on the short-term gains that the new GOP’s leadership might bring, but they will be illusory.

The restraint tent must be wide and open to all political persuasions. However, if the movement is to be sustained, not everyone can be welcomed. The only acceptable outlook for those who want to build a truly sustainable route to restraint is to jockey for position on the anti-Trump bandwagon. There may be plenty of room now, but once the Dear Leader is gone, that bandwagon will become crowded quickly. 

Restrainers must not fall for short-term policy illusions or sell their souls, no matter how strong the temptation. Sulfur does not quickly wash off. Its odor will stick to whatever Trump touches and will bring down entire movements if their proponents are not careful and crystal clear in their values from the beginning of what promises to be a long four-year stretch.

Christopher J. Fettweis is a professor of political science at Tulane University. His most recent book is The Pursuit of Dominance: 2000 Years of Superpower Grand Strategy (Oxford UP 2015).

Image: Anna Moneymaker / Shutterstock.com. 

While the Biden administration’s views on energy policy are arguably of rapidly diminishing importance, the study on U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) released by the Department of Energy (DOE) on December 17 will define the Democrats’ views on the subject during the coming Trump administration. However, it is neither good policy nor good politics. While it did not conclude that the moratorium on new project approvals should be permanent, it warned against a policy of “unfettered” LNG exports on the grounds that it would increase emissions of greenhouse gases and drive up costs for American consumers. It places the outgoing administration squarely in the corner of the shrill “keep it in the ground” progressive wing of the Democratic Party.

By taking this tack, the Biden administration stuck to the strategy they had pursued when Biden was running for renomination. This aimed to prevent a primary challenge from the Left by pausing new approvals of LNG export projects. However, after handing the nomination over to Kamala Harris and seeing her lose to Donald Trump, they should have been freed of such constraints. There is still no indication in polling data that climate change is even a top issue for American voters, who are much more concerned about jobs and the economy. Opposition to all fossil fuels projects, however, is an important litmus test for a small but influential group of progressive activists.

Manmade climate change is real, obviously, and it is rational to support policies for the reduction of greenhouse gases. The question is whether limiting the production and export of natural gas from the United States really serves that goal. The DOE study made a very dubious set of assumptions to support the view that there was a substantial tradeoff between U.S. LNG exports and renewable energy—U.S. LNG would reduce zero-carbon energy development, and a lack of U.S. LNG would increase in it. That assumes that other exports would not become available—very dubious in a world with many stranded gas deposits—and that the LNG is being immediately used for power generation. A lot of gas in power generation is used as “firming capacity” for renewables, a backup for periods of low generation, making renewable use possible without sacrificing grid reliability. It also ignores the fact that, in many cases, LNG offsets coal use, allowing coal plants to be retired. It ignores the fact that in the largest LNG growth market, China, much of the incremental LNG is used for industrial purposes like petrochemical feedstock rather than to generate electricity.

The study also tunes out the geopolitical benefits the United States derives from LNG. When Russia invaded Ukraine, having a flexible supply of American LNG available offset some of Russia’s piped gas, which needed to be embargoed for sanctions purposes. It rightly points out that European gas demand is projected to flatten out in the long term, but that could be impacted now by the recent indications that the grid is becoming less reliable as intermittent renewables approach half of European power generation. With China—a U.S. adversary—the largest growth market, the study implies that we would be fueling the economic rise of a rival. Yet, that ignores the availability of other supplies and the power that the United States gains over China by having them dependent on energy and petrochemical feedstocks, which must come by sea, with the United States still the dominant naval power outside China’s immediate vicinity. Expanding LNG also strengthens the U.S. balance of payments overall and would help to reduce the trade deficit with China.

The study highlights how the Biden administration reverted to using the role of Secretary of Energy as a placement for someone of senior stature who needs a job rather than choosing someone who has a background in energy, big science, or nuclear technology. The Obama administration chose much more qualified secretaries. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz articulated a much more nuanced and intelligent view of the role of natural gas in the transition to a low-carbon economy, both in and out of government. 

The bottom line is that withholding U.S. LNG would force out other sources of supply and, in some cases, lead to more coal consumption. It makes sense to try to reduce demand for fossil fuels, but limiting U.S. exports is not going to force other countries to adopt the policy changes, which would make the straight tradeoff between LNG and renewables work in the manner that the study suggests it would. Trump’s chest-thumping about “energy dominance” is an exaggeration. Still, Democrats would do better, both politically and in terms of rational policymaking, to quit listening to the tiny sliver of American public opinion that insists on “keeping it in the ground.”

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and does consulting work related to political risk for the energy sector and financial clients. Previously, he was director of global oil at Eurasia Group and worked at the U.S. Department of Energy.

Image: Andrew Leyden / Shutterstock.com. 

A jihadist rebel group wants to build and govern a stable country that is at peace with its neighbors and recognized by the international community. As much as that may seem an impossible contradiction destined to end in failure and violence, there are reasons to believe that a positive outcome might be achievable. 

It has been two weeks since the hasty fall of the Assad regime, and the situation in Syria is surprisingly stable. This is despite the takeover of the capital by jihadist rebels, who are led by a commander once associated with both Al Qaeda and ISIS. In the south, Israeli forces occupy a buffer zone and conduct hundreds of targeted airstrikes on former government military assets. In the north and northeast, the prospect of a Turkish invasion looms over the Kurds. 

Outside observers have sought to explain the calm in Damascus by noting how Syrians are exhausted after almost fourteen years of civil war, pointing to lessons learned from other civil conflicts in other Arab countries. More importantly, however, the situation is relatively contained because of the desire of one man, Ahmed al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), to show the world that he and his followers are capable of governing in peace and deserving of international recognition. 

Journalists, academics, and other pundits have been trying to predict the future by looking back on how al-Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) handled governance in Idlib province during the civil war. Analysts search for signs that would indicate how they will tackle their new assignment at the national level. The results are a set of contradictions and mixed messages.

On the one hand, last year, HTS tried to pass a Public Morality Law that would have banned alcohol and deployed a morality police force on daily patrols. On the other hand, HTS walked back the proposals when they caused friction among religious scholars, other armed factions, the public, and international aid groups. This led al-Sharaa to say that the government should not impose Islam but rather encourage people to seek religion out of their own volition.

Al-Sharaa has been praised for helping to attract foreign investment and maintaining functioning electricity and medical services while at the same time being criticized for ruling like an autocrat in the face of popular protests. Consequently, experts remain confounded as to what version of HTS is the one currently ruling the fifth-largest Arab country by population, with more than 20 million citizens precariously positioned between Israel, Lebanon, Turkiye, and Iraq.

These attempts to read something into the past few years entirely miss the opportunity of the present moment. Current circumstances shape Ahmed al-Sharaa’s objectives. He is focused on gaining the recognition of the Syrian people and the international community for his movement, and in doing so, he is putting himself in a tight position that will make it difficult for him to walk back. He has renounced ambitions for transnational jihad, encouraged engagement with the West and an eventual diplomatic solution with Israel, and declared the need for the protection of all religious minorities. He has also promised to demobilize all militias and abolish conscription in favor of a volunteer army so that all arms are in the hands of the state, and even suggested that he may disband HTS in favor of reconstituting state institutions that reflect the diversity of the country. He continues saying all of the right things for both local and Western audiences despite sporadic off-message comments coming from some members of his group on key issues, such as roles for women and Shari‘a law. 

This is remarkable for a man who has effectively become the most successful jihadist in the post-9/11 era. HTS is on the verge of achieving something that no other jihadist group could have dreamed of—the control of a sovereign state that is capable of attaining international recognition. Neither the Taliban nor even ISIS could claim such a thing. Even many people in Syria who value liberal rights and freedoms might support a government comprised of moderate Islamists from HTS. We cannot underestimate the way that half a century of economic struggles, international isolation, and regime brutality have impacted the public’s hopes and expectations. The average Syrian only knows a binary world of state and mosque, not civil society, due to the severe restrictions imposed by emergency law, which has been in effect since the early 1970s. 

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s move toward the center puts him in a delicate balance with Syrians on all sides, and his transitional government will inevitably face criticism and protests from one constituency or another. Average Syrians want their interests represented. Damascus witnessed its first major protest last Thursday over comments by an HTS spokesperson about women’s roles in society. Al-Sharaa’s ability to maintain a balance, for now, may only be possible because the fighters who drove the Assad family away after decades of brutal repression believe they are witnessing a historical moment that will define the country for generations. 

Those fighters may have many different motivations. One motivation among them is the narrative in which their efforts in Idlib to create a functional government and a stable society within a broadly Islamic framework have served as a model for Syrians everywhere looking for an alternative to Assad. They may be willing to share power with other local and expatriate factions, but they will also expect their own abilities and contributions to be honored and respected. 

The international community, especially the United States and Israel, are understandably much more cautious about the claim that al-Sharaa and HTS have abandoned jihadism. For the United States, Al-Sharaa is personally responsible for American and coalition casualties in Iraq and known for his collaboration with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For Israel, HTS resembles Hamas, an undeniable example of the perils of trusting enemies when they make bold and ultimately baseless statements about fundamental change. Examples of just such a tectonic shift in Islamist ideology are incredibly rare in the region, with Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr more an imperfect exception than the rule. 

Al-Sharaa needs significant economic and technical support from the international community to rebuild the country’s infrastructure, economy, and institutions. The level of that support will depend on the Trump administration’s willingness to engage with the new government in Damascus, which means that al-Sharaa must reassure Washington about his intentions, especially those toward Israel. Netanyahu has been clear that he seeks to reduce the long-term threat from a resurgent Syrian military directed against Israel, with no intention of escalating into a broader conflict with the transitional government. He has even said that he supports exploring relations with the new Syrian Government. If al-Sharaa wants to put relations with Israel on a new footing, he will have to find a way to communicate with the Israelis without alienating the Syrian public during this limited window of goodwill that the transitional government currently enjoys. In this effort, he will benefit from a surprising amount of interest among many Syrian youth for a more positive relationship with Israel. 

The challenge for the next Trump administration is learning to decipher Ahmed al-Sharaa’s intentions and motivations. He may be offering a palatable alternative to more hardcore jihadist leaders in the region, but that does not mean that his followers will not seek other ways to subtly Islamicize society and export their Islamist ideology in the region. Obama and Biden engaged in a lot of virtue-signaling on Syria about the respect for international law and establishing a transitional process. Yet, they never set clear expectations and held the Assad regime to those commitments. President Trump must take a more realistic approach and hold the new government accountable to its pledges in exchange for any potential support or recognition while recognizing that the Syrian people are ultimately the best fail-safe against radicalization.

Hazem Alghabra, born in Damascus, Syria, is the founder and president of Frontiers Consultants, a Washington, DC-based consultancy firm that provides public relations and crisis management solutions with a focus on the Middle East and the United States. Alghabra previously held multiple positions with the U.S. Department of State, including Senior Advisor for Public Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Alghabra is a frequent commentator on a wide range of television stations, including i24, ILTV, Alarabyia, Sky News, and BBC.

Joshua Yaphe is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He previously served as Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Visiting Faculty at the National Intelligence University (NIU), and scholar-in-residence at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. He has a Ph.D. from American University and is the author of Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared (University of Liverpool Press, 2022). 

The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.

Image: Abidin Yagmur / Shutterstock.com. 

Christmas came early for the crew of the United States Navy's USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). "California dreams coming true," the official Facebook account for CVN-72 announced as the warship arrived home on Friday.

The fifth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier is now back at her home port of Naval Air Station North Island following a five-month deployment that included operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibly.

Unexpected Deployment to the Middle East

The USS Abraham Lincoln was originally deployed last summer to the Indo-Pacific region but was ordered to the Red Sea in August to relieve USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), as part of the service's ongoing carrier rotation in the Middle East.

There has been a continuous U.S. Navy CSG presence in the Middle East since October 2023 following the Hamas terrorist attack on southern Israel as well as missile attacks from the Houthis. USS Abraham Lincoln remained in the region until last month when she was ordered back to the Indo-Pacific.

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-76) transited the Suez Canal earlier this month and is now operating in the region.

First Combat For the F-35C During the Deployment

While operating as part of CENTCOM's 5th Fleet, USS Abraham Lincoln conducted air strikes on the Iran-back Houthi militants in Yemen. That included the first-ever combat sortie of a Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. In November, F-35C aircraft, assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) "conducted multiple strikes on Houthi weapons storage facilities within Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen," U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Fifth Fleet, explained.

According to CUSNC, the Miramar, California-based VMFA 314—"Black Knights"—of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing had operated the Boeing F/A Hornet until 2020, when it became the "first fleet squadron in both the Navy and Marine Corps to operate the 5th Generation fighter aircraft."

In addition, the U.S. Navy announced that E/A-18G Growlers, the electronic warfare (EW) variant of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, from Electronic Attack Squadron 133 (VAQ-133), were "deployed with the next generation jammer," marking the first use of the advanced jammer "both deployed and in combat, marking a generational leap in electronic warfare capability."

Home For the Holidays

For many U.S. sailors around the world this year, they will be home for Christmas only in their dreams. Yet, for the personnel of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (ABECSG), their holiday dreams have come true.

And it was one the crew truly earned.

"Our incredibly successful deployment of firsts includes the first combat employment of the F-35C Lightning II platform, the first employment of the ALQ-249 Next Generation Jammer, the first Nimitz-class aircraft carrier to re-fuel at sea with a commercial oiler, the first Multi-Large Deck Event with the Italian Navy's Cavour CSG in the Indo-Pacific, the first west coast CSG to conduct combat strikes to degrade Iranian-backed Houthi rebel combat capabilities, and the first carrier to pull into Malaysia in over 12 years to strengthen critical regional partnerships," said commander, Carrier Strike Group 3, Rear Adm. Adan Cruz. "All of this was made possible through the incredible hard work and dedication of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group Sailors and Marines, who are reuniting with their loved ones in time for the holidays."

CVN-72 is the second U.S. Navy vessel named after the 16th president—after the Cold War-era George Washington-class ballistic missile submarine. She was commissioned in November 1989, and over the past three decades and a half decades in service, USS Abraham Lincoln has carried out multiple humanitarian missions in the Persian Gulf and Pacific region and has taken part in multiple combat operations.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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From the Vault

Could China Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier in a War?

USS Parche: The Navy Submarine That Could Self-Destruct

The United States cannot deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan nor win a long war without Indonesia. In conjunction with Australia, Indonesia could ensure a virtually impassable maritime blockade of Chinese commerce, enforced with only land-based aircraft and light patrol ships and backed up by the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships. Its collaboration would also be crucial for the protection of all convoys proceeding to friendly Asian littoral states routed through the Timor and Arafura Seas. 

Even on its own, democratic Indonesia, with a population of 280 million, a robust GDP of $1.3 trillion, an active military of over 400,000, and a historical suspicion of China, is a natural obstacle to Beijing’s aspirations in Southeast Asia. In January of 2018, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis described Indonesia as a “maritime fulcrum” in East Asia. In November of 2024, President-elect Donald Trump had a very positive conversation with Indonesia’s new President, Prabowo Subianto, who had received his staff officer training in the United States in the 1980s.   

U.S. aircraft carriers are the cornerstone of the blue water navy and guarantors of trans-oceanic commerce. Diverting these capital platforms to enforce a close blockade of the Chinese littoral in the event of a multi-year war over Taiwan is risking the United States’ preeminent great power status. A network of usable airbases already being constructed in the Philippines, such as at San Vincente Naval Airfield, are less than 600 kilometers from the Taiwan Strait and are a far more cost-effective staging area from which to interdict a Chinese amphibious crossing with combat aircraft and drones. At these distances, U.S. Air Force aircraft will be able to operate with maximum bomb load-outs and without the need for refueling. They will also benefit from the radar masking of their approach by Taiwan’s central mountainous ridgeline. 

China’s principal anti-carrier systems are its estimated thirty 1,800 km range DF-21D missiles and approximately 140 4,000 kilometer range DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, plus an H-6 bomber carried DF-21 variant in development, with a reaction time of less than twenty-five minutes. China’s Type 055 Renhai destroyer can also deliver the 1,000-kilometer range YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile. A 2,000-kilometer range system will cover Luzon, the Strait of Malacca, and all of the Bay of Bengal, problematizing the use of U.S. carriers there to enforce a blockade, and a 4,000-kilometer range system will encompass Guam, all of Indonesia, and the Central Indian Ocean. 

On September 25, 2024, China launched an 11,500-kilometer-range DF-31AG ICBM into the Pacific for the first time since 1980. This may have been a test of China’s space-based surveillance system to track surface ships. The low probability of a successful strike on a U.S. aircraft carrier increases substantially over the course of an entire blockade campaign, as weather, accidents, miscommunications, chance satellite observation, submarine interceptions, and electronic detection turn a possibility into a high aggregate cost probability of a disabling and subsequent sinking.

While unlikely to be decisive, like any form of sanctioning or interruption of trade, a complete naval blockade of China will contribute significantly to war termination by disrupting China’s export trade, which has grown from $2.2 trillion in 2013 to $3.3 trillion in 2023. Most of China’s imports of $2.16 trillion, 80 percent of its oil, and 90 percent of its overall trade are moved by ships. China is aware of its vulnerability to a blockade and has taken measures to achieve energy and food self-sufficiency. Beijing plans to double its fleet of nuclear reactors to 150 by 2035. 

By cultivating trade and connecting infrastructure to Russia through its overland route, Moscow will be able to provide oil, gas, grain, and key military technologies, even if Washington has the political will to bar the Bering Strait passage to Moscow’s tanker fleet. Beijing has passed legislation requiring local authorities to take responsibility for food reserves, as well as other measures promoting greater domestic productivity. China projects a further 16 to 30 percent increase in caloric demand by 2050 from the growth of its middle class. Of China’s $235 billion in food imports, its three principal suppliers of its largest commodity, soybeans, are Brazil, the United States, and Argentina.

The closure of Indonesia’s Strait of Malacca, through which passes $3.5 trillion in trade aboard 80,000 ships annually, like the 1967 closure of the Suez Canal, would impose an extra monthly re-routing of shipping cost of $2.8 billion, not including the increased cost of insurance. One-third of the world’s shipping, including 23.7 million barrels of oil per day and a substantial portion of the trade of the littoral Asian democracies, transit through the adjacent South China Sea. Needless to say, a war over Taiwan will severely disrupt global supply chains.

Indonesia’s four main straits are easily interdicted by boarding teams carrying patrol ships and helicopters and mobile land-based anti-ship missile platforms. The Strait of Malacca is only 2.7 kilometers wide at its narrowest choke point. The other three principal straits, from west to east, are the ten kilometers wide Sunda, the twenty kilometers wide Lombok, both of which were blocked by Indonesia in 1988, and the ninety kilometers wide Makassar. Other straits further east are the ninety-kilometer-wide Lifamatola, the thirty-five-kilometer-wide Wetar, the thirty-kilometer-wide Ombai, and the 20-kilometer-wide Dampier. 

According to the 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance, excluding frigates and coast guard equivalents (Bakamla and KPLP), Indonesia’s available strait policing forces consist of eight Exocet and sixteen torpedo-armed corvettes, fifteen missile-armed patrol craft (out of 159 patrol vessels), eight mine countermeasure ships, drone-ships, eleven Panther and eight AH-64 Apache helicopters, and about thirty maritime patrol aircraft. Given the narrowness of most of the straits, even an instrument as extreme as the use of nuclear weapons could not undo a land-based Indonesian blockade. 

Beijing’s option of directly seizing the Strait of Malacca would be possible but complex. Unlike Japan’s sweep through Southeast Asia in 1941, the major powers, including the United States, have been careful not to become irretrievably committed to conflicts elsewhere in Ukraine and the Middle East. China has six Marine Brigades, a Naval Special Forces Brigade, and six Army Marine brigades, totaling some 40,000 troops. This presumes China would then train new substitute army formations for an amphibious assault on Taiwan. 

Because China’s supply line through the South China Sea would be so precariously exposed to aerial interdiction, even supposing a neutral Vietnam, it would be necessary to seize the airfields of Western Taiwan, Luzon, Palawan, Natuna Island, and several hundred kilometers of Sumatra’s east coast. China would only need to land at Lingayen Gulf and defeat the Philippines’ under-armored 5th and 7th Divisions to neutralize the airbases in northern Luzon and push to Manila. 

Any prospect of securing the 800-kilometer Malacca Strait would require a diplomatic victory to obtain Malaysia and Singapore as bandwagoning allies of a Chinese attack against U.S. interests. A PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) landing would still confront three Indonesian maneuver brigades and four brigade equivalents of battalions, backed up by two Kostrad strategic reserve divisions in Java. 

The United States, Australia, and Japan have anticipated this possibility and have since conducted joint exercises with Indonesia on Sumatra. In November 2023, the United States and Indonesia announced a Joint Comprehensive Strategic Partnership aimed at improving maritime cooperation and as a lead-in to the signing of a future Defense Cooperation Arrangement. Accordingly, Jakarta is in negotiations for the purchase of 24 F-15EXs and additional F-16s. 

At the same time, Jakarta’s relations with Beijing have worsened since China extended its territorial claims to the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia’s Natuna Island. To comply with U.S. investment tax incentives, Indonesia has further imposed high tariffs on a number of Chinese imports and decreased Chinese shareholding in Indonesian nickel-mining concerns (the world’s largest reserves) related to electric vehicles. 

Indonesia, after General Suharto’s 1965 counter-coup against the Communist-influenced Sukarno regime, was a key Cold War ally, securing East Timor from Soviet domination, which had befallen other newly independent Portuguese colonies. Indonesia also plays a useful counter-balancing role against the influence of China, primarily because of its size, in Malaysia and Singapore. Current Malaysian prime minister Anwar Ibrahim has criticized Western hostility to the rise of China, tilting Kuala Lumpur towards Beijing as it seeks its economic investment. 

In a 2022 poll, 39 percent percent of Malaysians viewed China favorably. Singapore, whose 75 percent Chinese population is deeply sympathetic with China, was 67 percent favorable towards Beijing in a 2022 Pew Research Center poll. Although Singapore has shared a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States since 2015, providing basing for U.S. LCSs and P-8s, its principal strategy of hedging makes it liable to shift its support to Beijing if the United States appears weak.

Washington’s influence is, however, limited by Jakarta’s policy of non-alignment. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have all resisted U.S. efforts to subject the Strait of Malacca to international administration. China remains the largest trading partner with all of ASEAN as well as Indonesia and is a major contributor to a $132 billion industrial project and hydropower plant in Kalimantan. Indonesia is also torn between coordinating its response to China with India and privileging its historical alliance with Pakistan, an ally of Beijing.

Furthermore, most Indonesians and the Jakarta government see U.S. support for Israeli military action in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran through the prism of anti-colonialism and Islamic solidarity. Southeast Asia is about 40 percent Muslim. In Indonesia, 87 percent of the population practices Islam. Malaysia is 61 percent Muslim. In all of the first and second Trump administrations and the Biden administration, Washington’s diplomatic priority was to secure the normalization of relations between Israel and Indonesia as an extension of the Abraham Accords. There is little prospect of success at the moment, given Indonesian sympathy for the Palestinians. 

The best substitute for an extraordinarily inexpensive and low-risk blockade conducted from the shores of Indonesia would be for the U.S. Navy to retreat its cordon to the west of the Strait of Malacca and leverage access to bases near the Indian coast. In so doing, it would sacrifice the easy reach of coastal Indonesian airbases to interfere with the inshore shipping of the Gulf of Siam and South China Sea. Furthermore, Indian and U.S. ships operating anywhere in the Bay of Bengal and even the central Indian Ocean would be vulnerable to strikes by China’s DF-21/26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, guided by PLAN submarines operating out of Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, or possibly even South Africa. 

In the event that China secured the Malacca Strait with the help of Malaysia or obtained a land bridge from Thailand through the Kra Isthmus, shipping could still be interfered with from India’s bases on the Nicobar and Andaman Islands. If China’s naval expansion permitted it to deploy a permanent flotilla of two aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean by 2035–2040, it would still be hard-pressed to shepherd convoys against the littoral threat from Indian ships, aircraft, or submarines. 

Similar attempts to establish a permanent station, as the PLAN has practiced in the South Atlantic for the last decade, are unsustainable in wartime without being replenished in a well-protected allied safe harbor. In the further absence of support from Delhi in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Navy could operate further west from Oman’s Masirah Island near the Straits of Hormuz, Socotra Island at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, or from the Diego Garcia anchorage in the Chagos Archipelago.

Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is an associate professor of international relations at Concordia University and the author of Militarization and War (2007) and Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer of the 3rd Field Engineer Regiment from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11. He tweets at @Ju_Sp_Churchill.

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