Ideas on Europe Blog

Last week, the pound briefly jumped 1% against the US dollar when the EU’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier said, “We are prepared to offer Britain a partnership such as there never has been with any other third country”.

His comments boosted hopes that a Brexit deal can be struck after all – maybe even along the lines of Theresa May’s beleaguered Chequers plan.

Under that plan, the UK would benefit from a kind of cherry-picked, quasi-access to the EU’s Single Market for our traders in agricultural and industrial goods only, along with a friction-free customs border.

But the reality soon dawned when Mr Barnier gave more details in an interview with the German radio station Deutschlandfunk. He told the station:

“We have been willing to form a strong relationship from the beginning.

“Twenty-seven heads of state and government, including Angela Merkel and the French president and other heads of state, have proposed a unique partnership with the United Kingdom.”

The new arrangement between the EU and the UK could be unprecedented, he said, in that it went further than just an agreement on tariff-free trade.

The new arrangement could also take in areas from “aviation to university and research cooperation, to internal and external security and foreign policy”.

And then came Barnier’s big BUT:

“It cannot be built to the detriment of who we are. The internal market, the home market, is indeed our most important asset…

“We respect all the red lines of the United Kingdom. They do not want to abide by the rules of the court of justice, they do not want to follow our legal framework, they do not want to pay, they do not want freedom of movement.

“All of these are the cornerstones of the single market and the EU.

“So we have to preserve and protect what makes us.”

This should come as no surprise. At the beginning of August, Mr Barnier already explained at a press conference that Theresa May’s proposals for a new customs arrangement and trade in goods represented a threat to the integrity of the EU.

Essentially, Mr Barnier forensically tore apart the Prime Minister’s white paper into little pieces – and in doing that, he has the solid and unanimous backing of all the other EU27 countries (of course he does: he was appointed by them and works for them).

So where does that leave Mrs May’s Chequer’s proposal?

It’s ‘dead’, wrote Daniel Boffey in The Guardian, their Brussels bureau chief. ‘The zombie white paper just doesn’t know it yet,’ he added.

There are others who don’t know it yet, most especially Theresa May herself. Writing for today’s Sunday Telegraph, she insisted that she will, “not be pushed into accepting compromises on the Chequers proposals..”  The Telegraph ran the headline:

‘Theresa May declares she won’t surrender to Brussels over Chequers plan’ 

That approach was reflected last week in a speech in France by David Lidington, Theresa May’s ‘de facto’ deputy Prime Minister, who warned EU leaders to accept the Chequers plan, or face the UK leaving the EU without any deal.

The Guardian ran the headline:

‘No-deal Brexit is only alternative to Chequers plan, says Lidington’

Reported The Independent: ‘His speech marked part of a concerted effort by the UK government to persuade EU member states to back the Chequers plan despite opposition from officials in Brussels.’

During the summer, the Prime Minister sent her cabinet ministers across the EU to sell her Chequers Brexit plan, but it really was to no avail.

What our government – and many Brexiters – simply don’t get, or don’t want to get, is that it’s pointless going around the backs of the EU Commission officials to try and do a side-deal with the heads of EU states.

That’s because the Commission is the servant of the EU, not its master. Their masters are the EU27 (along with the European Parliament) – so whatever the stance of Michel Barnier, it’s what the EU27 have instructed.

This was confirmed earlier last week by French President, Emmanuel Macron, when he gave a speech to a gathering of French ambassadors from around the world. Mr Macron told the diplomats:

“Brexit is a sovereign choice which must be respected, but it is a choice which cannot be made at the expense of the European Union’s integrity.

“It is what the British people have chosen for themselves, not for others, and France would like to maintain a strong, special relationship with London, but not at the cost of the European Union breaking up.”

He added:

“…we have to defend the integrity of our values, of our foundations and of the European Union.”

(All accurate, except for two key points:

Brexit is NOT the ‘sovereign choice’ of the UK – our Parliament in Westminster has never actually debated, or voted, on the specific question of whether the country should leave the EU.

 Brexit is NOT “what the British people have chosen for themselves”. Most voters in the UK did not vote for Brexit – only a minority of voters chose ‘Brexit’ for Britain).

So, here’s the bottom line (which I have written many times before, and post it here again, because nothing, absolutely nothing, has changed):

Last May in Parliament, Theresa May, summed up her promises for Brexit: “no hard border on the island of Ireland” and “as frictionless trade as possible with the European Union”.

Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.

The Brexit promised by Theresa May and her government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliver

The EU27 are not going to allow an ex-member to have the same or better benefits as themselves (something that Theresa May actually said before the referendum).

Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.

The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are EU members, or part of the EU Single Market, or in its customs union.

The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick.

If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire raison d’être of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other ‘third countries’.

It’s not going to happen.

Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones it signed recently with Canada and Japan. The EU has already offered us that.

But those agreements don’t include frictionless access to the EU’s cherished Single Market, and those agreements don’t cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don’t cover services, or free movement of people.

All vital to tens of thousands of British businesses and hundreds of thousands of British jobs.

It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we already have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU.

So, let’s repeat it, and shout it loudly. EU membership is best.

It’s not too late for Britain to agree to a democratic U-turn on Brexit. All we need is a #PeoplesVote.

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The post Michel Barnier’s big BUT appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Es ist 6 Uhr morgens in Boston. Ich bin seit über einer Stunde wach. Jetlag. Zeit, um eine Replik auf “Das Ende der Geduld” von Dr. Hannah Bethke – selbst Politikwissenschaftlerin – in der FAZ zu schreiben. Eine Replik mit Blick auf unser Fach und die Natur von wissenschaftlichen Großkonferenzen wie die ECPR.

Ich bin in Boston auf dem Jahrestreffen der American Political Science Association (APSA). Getagt wird, nicht wie bei der ECPR-Konferenz, die in dem Beitrag kritisiert wird, in Universitäten in ganz Europa, in den gleichen Räumen wo auch Studierende tagtäglich lernen und wo Kolleginnen und Kollegen normalerweise lehren. Getagt wird hier stattdessen in einem überdimensionierten Tagungszentrum zwischen zwei Konferenzhotels. Aber das weiß man, bevor man hierher kommt.

Ähnlich ist es mit der ECPR-Konferenz, wie sie gerade in Hamburg stattgefunden hat. Man weiß, was man bekommt, bevor man hinfährt, außer man fährt zum ersten Mal hin. Man kann trotzdem, wie Hannah Bethke, das Format und die Größe und den Rhythmus der Konferenz kritisieren. 10-Minuten-Vorträge zu spezifischen Forschungsthemen, zum Teil fünf an der Zahl, dazu eine Diskussion durch eine Fachkollegin, und dann noch ein kurzes Q&A, alles in knapp über 1 1/2 Stunden, sind eine Zumutung.

Sie sind aber auch eine Chance. Die Chance, nicht nur ein Duzend Kolleginnen und Kollegen zu treffen wie auf einem klassischen Workshop, versteckt in den kleinen Nischen unserer Forschungsfelder. Hier trifft sich das weitere Forschungsfeld und die Profession. Auf Empfängen lernt man neue Kolleg*innen kennen, oder trifft diejenigen, mit denen man an anderer Stelle mal gearbeitet hat und wo sich die Wege in den verwobenen akademischen Karrieren verlaufen haben.

Eine Großkonferenz ist dabei von ihrer Natur her auf den ersten Blick wie das Fastfood in der Shopping-Mall des Wissenschaftsbetriebs.

Genauso, wie ich manchmal einen vegetarischen Döner zu mir nehme, höre ich mir da auch gerne Vorträge in Forschungsfeldern an, in denen ich vielleicht nur lehre aber nicht forsche. Als Ideen-Happen für zwischendurch. Aber auch um mir über neue Methoden Gedanken zu machen, denn Innovation lebt davon, dass man über den eigenen Tellerrand guckt. Dann sind die Happen weniger Fastfood als die Gänge in einem Gourmet-Restaurant, wo ich auch nicht verstehe, wie der Koch das macht und ich trotzdem das Ergebnis mit einem Bissen genießen kann.

Aber die ECPR-Konferenz ist auch nicht das einzige Format, in dem wir Wissen austauschen. Allein bei der ECPR gibt es das Konzept der “Joint Sessions“, eine jährliche Multi-Workshop-Konferenz, in der man bis zu einer Stunde Zeit pro Forschungspapier hat. Dazu zig Spezialist*innen-Workshops. Aber selbst auch ohne diese Alternativen und ohne die Fastfood-Metapher ist der Blick von Bethke auf die ECPR zu eng.

Gleiches gilt für die Kritik, unser Fach wolle nur “quantitativ orientierte Sozial-, nicht ideengeschichtlich fundierte Geisteswissenschaft sein.”

In unserer Sektion “21st Century International Bureaucracy” mit acht Panels, die an zwei der drei Tagen der ECPR-Konferenz stattfanden, gab es quantitative Studien genauso wie ethnographische Forschung; es wird auf die Ideen von Max Weber genauso verwiesen wie auf Modelle, die hier in den USA als “formal theory” bezeichnet werden; es gab extrem kurze Vorträge von unbekannten Kolleg*innen, die nur kurz da waren, aber auch detaillierte Nachgespräche mit Kolleg*innen, mit denen man seit Jahren zusammenarbeitet, lose oder eng, in Deutschland, Europa und darüber hinaus.

Das ist keine “kalte Wissenschaft ohne Herz – und manchmal auch ohne Verstand” wie Bethke schreibt.

Es ist liebevolle Politikwissenschaft zwischen ehrlicher und konstruktiver Kritik, auf der Suche nach Lösungen für schwierige Forschungsfragen, mit Zeitknappheit ringend, aber das beste daraus machend. Wir schreiben uns nach der Konferenz Emails und bedanken uns für gute Kritik, machen Pläne für neue Forschung und freuen uns auf das Wiedersehen.

Das hat nichts mit Methoden zu tun, die warm oder kalt sind, es hat etwas mit einem modernen Wissenschaftsverständnis zu tun, wo die meisten von uns wissen, dass bei allem Wettbewerb wir nur arbeitsteilig Wissen sammeln können – da ist die Politikwissenschaft nicht anders als die Physik oder die Linguistik oder die Humanbiologie.

In unserer Sektion zu internationalen Verwaltungen – wie in vielen anderen Sektionen auch – zeigt sich dabei über alle Panels hinweg die Vielfalt der modernen Politikwissenschaft, die sich nicht in ein Korsett von “Quanti“ oder “Quali”, und in alte Debatten zwischen “Ideengeschichte ohne Methode” oder “ideenlosem Methodenfetischismus” drängen lässt.

Klar gibt es Grabenkämpfe und Wagenburgen, Begriffsstreitigkeiten und Methoden-Kleinklein. Einzelne Vorträge sind besser als andere. Manche sind innovativer, kreativer, eingängiger, andere sind es nicht.

Aber selbst hier, auf einer amerikanischen Großkonferenz, wo die quantitative Politikwissenschaft noch mehr Gewicht hat als in Europa, könnte ich vier Tage lang nur auf ideengeschichtliche oder stärker geisteswissenschaftlich orientierte Panels gehen und gibt es Panels, wo ein quantitativer Survey mit syrischen Flüchtlingen im Libanon genauso in 12 Minuten präsentiert wird wie handgezeichnete ethnographische Karten von Post-Konflikt-Gemeinden in Burundi.

Das einzige Lob für die ECPR-Konferenz in Hamburg, das Bethke einfällt, richtet sich ausgerechnet auf den Plenar-Vortrag von Rainer Forst. Forst stelle “im einzig langen Vortrag der Konferenz die alte Frage neu, wie die Politikwissenschaft die Kluft zwischen ihrem normativen und ihrem empirischen Selbstverständnis überwinden kann“.

In diesem Vortrag zitierte Forst über 45 Minuten nur tote weiße Männer aus Europa und Amerika, knapp 15 an der Zahl. Keine einzige Frau wurde erwähnt, keine Idee ausgeführt, die die vielfältigen Erkenntnisse und Perspektiven der modernen empirischen und normativen Politikwissenschaft aufnahm, deren Erkenntnisse es über Weber und Foucault hinaus geschafft haben. Kein signifikanter Verweis auf Ideen von außerhalb des Westens.

Wer sich nach Alte-Weiße-Männer-Ideengeschichte sehnt, ist aus meiner Sicht in der modernen Politikwissenschaft noch nicht angekommen.

Meine Politikwissenschaft ist vielfältiger, mit tollen Kolleg*innen, die zwischen intersektionalem Feminismus und quantitativen Großstudien zu Krieg und Gewalt gegen Frauen keine Barriere sehen. Ich sehe Kolleg*innen, die sich für ein halbes Jahr in eine eine internationale Organisation begeben, um den Zynismus der dortigen Mitarbeiter zu erleben, während andere Kolleg*innen mit statistischen Daten zu verstehen versuchen, wie postkoloniale Machtverschiebungen in den Vereinten Nationen passieren oder warum an mancher Stelle immer noch das Verhältnis von Globalem Süden und Globalem Norden aufrecht erhalten wird. Andernorts wird die (Ideen-)Geschichte populistischer Politik genauso analysiert wie der Wahlerfolg rechtspopulistischer Parteien.

Das heißt nicht, dass Politikwissenschaft in 2018 keine Probleme hat. Dass es nicht hunderte Baustellen gibt, an denen wir tagtäglich arbeiten sollten. Dass es keine Verteilungskonflikte oder keine seltsamen Moden oder keine schlechten Arbeiten gäbe.

Aber Politikwissenschaft ist eben auch nicht das, was man auf 1-2 Tagen ECPR-Konferenz bekommt, schon gar nicht, wenn man nicht sieht, dass ein 10-Minuten-Vortrag einer jungen, innovativen Kollegin – mit einem prekären Vertrag – mehr Gehalt und Veränderungspotenzial haben kann als 45 Minuten philosophisches Namedropping von einem Professor, der das Privileg des Plenarvortrags nicht für Veränderung sondern nur zur Reproduktion der bestehenden Verhältnisse nutzt.

Und noch eine letzte Anmerkung: Etwas kulturpessimistisch wird im Beitrag von Hannah Bethke der Blick auf das Smartphone oder den Laptop während der ECPR-Vorträge  kritisiert. Den Beitrag “Zum Ende der Geduld” habe ich auf Facebook gefunden, geteilt durch eine Kollegin aus München. Gelesen hab ich ihn während der Konferenz hier in Boston. Auch Wissenschaftskommunikation findet in 2018 nicht nur physisch im Raum sondern auch digital statt. Deswegen teile ich diesen Blogpost jetzt auch auf Twitter und hoffe auf viel Kritik. Oder Ignoranz.

Es ist jetzt 7:30 Uhr in Boston. Um 8 Uhr beginnt der zweite von vier Konferenztagen der APSA-Konferenz. Ich freue mich drauf. Genauso wie auf den DVPW-Kongress Ende September in Frankfurt.

NB: Die aktuelle Fassung ist im Vergleich zur ersten Version um einige Rechtschreib- und Grammatikfehler ärmer.

The post Replik auf “Das Ende der Geduld” (FAZ): Ein anderer Blick auf die ECPR-Konferenz und moderne Politikwissenschaft appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2018 Graduate Research Conference

Russia and the European Union (EU) emerged as twin products of the end of history, writes Daniel Matthews-Ferrero. Arguing that the return of history is exemplified in both domestic politics (through the decomposition of liberal democracy, best expressed through the rise of populism) and in international relations (increasing multipolarity, best expressed through the Ukraine Crisis with Russia), he analyses the latter case and the challenge it poses for the EU.

Geopolitical concept of the Ukraine military conflict © kirill_makarov/Adobe Stock

Russia and the EU emerged as twin products from the end of history. The EU was a product of liberalism’s global victory, while Russia was the product of the defeat of the revolutionary ideas behind the Soviet state.

With the Leninist extinction, it was supposed that liberal democracy would gradually extend across the globe, with world history on autopilot. However, this conception has suffered increasing setbacks.

There are two exemplary cases of the resulting return of history. One arises in domestic politics: through the decomposition of liberal democracy, best expressed through the rise of populism. The other arises in international relations: through creeping multipolarity, best expressed through the Ukraine Crisis.

In domestic politics, liberalism’s global victory entailed shackling democracy domestically through a withering away of politics (i.e. policy subject to popular contestation). Politics is the inevitable task of any state applying bureaucratic discretion to the distribution of scarce resources among determinate social groups.

With the victory of our global liberal path dependency, the possibility for mass publics to alter the direction of their national democracies has become increasingly remote, giving rise to political apathy and declining turnouts. Once the financial crises necessitated political opposition, the lack of institutionalised possibilities gave rise to Western populism.

The illiberal turn with the rise of Western populism represents the return of history in domestic politics. History has also marked its return in international relations, however.

Europe’s economic instability and political turmoil have accelerated the reemergence of an assertive Russia. Its transition to democracy is looked back on as a humiliating phase of kowtowing to Western interests. It has consequently asserted its national sovereignty through authoritarianism. This has resulted in a classic nation-state, contrasting with a post-modern transnational EU.

Yet, both polities have come to resemble one another in their domestic politics more than is commonly admitted. Managed democracy has taken hold in both polities through a de-politicised administration of things.

The paths followed towards this destination differ, but the end result is similar: In the EU we find democracy without sovereignty, in Russia sovereignty without democracy.

Ukraine, as the borderlands between these polities, has come to mark the external limits of the end of history.

The groundwork for Ukraine’s nation-building were laid by its dominant Russian Other under Bolshevik nationalities policy, later complimented by quasi-genocidal repression under Stalin. The contradictory results, with nation-building on the one hand and Siberian gulags on the other, represent the conflicting dual legacy Ukraine confronted when deciding its post-Soviet future.

Independent Ukraine thus faced a choice between two competing spheres of influence. The EU denies the existence of such a logic, yet even the shape of its neighbourhood policy would be arbitrary were it not for EU strategic interests. The mutual incompatibility of economic integration into Russia and the EU’s trade agreements gave the game away.

The EU’s historically oscillating treatment of Ukraine also betrays a realist logic. The EU’s “Russia first” policy sees Ukrainian EU accession efforts relegated behind Turkey’s, with this policy eventually giving way to more aggressive expansionism. Such changes would be inexplicable without a sense of the EU tactically and tacitly manoeuvring around spheres of influence.

Yet, Ukraine violated realist expectations when it chose to de-nuclearise in the early 1990s. This is because foreign policy cannot be the automatic product of some realist formula; it must be constructed as a choice, after subjectively surveying available options.

Ukraine’s internally constructed policy to de-nuclearise ultimately relegated the nation to a bystander to its own national crisis, with other great nuclear powers tussling over its territorial sovereignty in realist fashion.

Given the interpretative, constructivist basis of internal foreign policy formulations, when it comes to preventing crises, communication between great powers is vital. This is how they come to understand the likely reactions arising from different policy options.

In this context, what has been described as the EU’s “autistic disorder” becomes particularly problematic. After all, it made it possible to muddle into war.

The explanation for this troubling situation can be found in the structure of the post-Cold War unipolar world order, with the US as global hegemon. Detached from hard power considerations by the institutional division of labour with NATO and member states while nestled comfortably under the US security umbrella, it became natural to survey the surrounding international scene with a rosy tint.

If, as the EU claims, each nation has a right to choose its foreign policy alignments irrespective of great power strategic interests, why did the West not make more forceful overtures towards Ukraine when it was still a part of the USSR? The reality of Soviet power precluded it, of course.

The vacuum eventually brought about by Soviet collapse was exploited by the West and EU. The liberal theories used to justify this are only now catching up to the creeping multipolar reality. They are evidently struggling to adjust, with the end of history slamming into a brick wall with the Ukraine Crisis.

For now, the EU continues to deny basic realism and the possibility for other powers to defend strategic interests that impinge on any country’s supposed right to choose its foreign policy alignments ex nihilo. It is as if the EU’s economic magnetism were an insignificant factor compared to the attraction of its norms and values in the global extension of liberalism through an end of history logic.

By maintaining such delusions, further conflicts are only made more likely for the liberal order externally. Internally, doubling down against populism through an entrenchment of de-politicising liberal policy frameworks will only accelerate the current disintegrative spiral of liberal democracy.

In this way, the unfolding of liberalism’s own internal logic since the end of history has given rise to a domestic and an international crisis.

The survival of the EU, the intellectual product of liberal triumphalism at the end of history now depends on its ability to adjust to the realities of the return of history.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2PmvO0i

Daniel Matthews-Ferrero | @MatthewsFerrero

Daniel completed a BA in European Studies at the University of Kent, UK and an MA in European Interdisciplinary Studies at the College of Europe, Poland. He is due to start a PhD at the University of Aberdeen from October, on the POLITICO programme on political concepts in the world. His primary research interest is in populism.

The post Russia, the EU and the Return of History appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 12-13 July 2018, forty postgraduate and early career researchers gathered at KU Leuven in Belgium to present and receive feedback on their work on contemporary Europe and the European Union.

The theme of this year’s conference was ‘An Actor on Multiple Stages: the EU as a Local, Regional and Global Power’, introduced by Kolja Raube (KU Leuven) in his keynote lecture.

When we speak about EU's legitimacy, we should focus not only on internal legitimacy (from within the EU) but also the external dimension – @raube_kolja @UACESgf #UACESgf18

— Diāna Potjomkina (@DianaPotjomkina) July 12, 2018

"The EU is not just an organisation but a community… and we need to explain why this community matters." says @raube_kolja in his #UACESgf18 keynote.

— Anna Wambach (@AnnaWambach) July 12, 2018

Five research sessions took place over the next two days, with presentations by delegates from a range of countries and disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. They examined the different stages on which the EU is present, and how these are reflected in the challenges it is facing: e.g. Brexit, Russia’s awakening, the future of the eurozone.

The final plenary session, chaired by UACES Graduate Forum Committee member Kamila Feddek, featured Nisida Gjoksi European Commission and academic and Katja Biedenkopf (KU Leuven). Their fascinating discourses were focused on the power of the European Union and its challenges in specific areas.

Katja Biedenkopf discussed EU external governance and diplomacy in the fields of environmental protection and climate change, global environmental and climate governance, while Nisida Gjoksi delivered a presentation on the EU’s enlargement policy and the role that the European Commission plays in this area, and also, on the policy towards the Western Balkans and the specificity of this enlargement wave. Nisida Gjoski emphasised the EU’s significant power towards this region which somehow contrast the view that the EU is losing power and Katja Biedenkopf focused on the historical evolution of EU climate leadership and presented four scenarios for its future based on her recent published research.

Nisida Gjoski

Both presenters initiated thought-provoking debate and they answered several questions related to constantly changing and complex role that the European Union currently plays on local, regional and global stage.

The conference was co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union. Thank you to all the speakers, the Graduate Forum Committee and past committee member Thibaud Deruelle, our hosts Kolja Raube and Daan Fonck, and to the staff members at KU Leuven who chaired the research sessions.

• View Twitter Story 
• View Flickr photos
• View Facebook photos

The programme and papers are available here.

Over the next few months, we’ll be publishing blog posts on Crossroads Europe, videos and podcasts arising from the conference. Follow and like @UACESgf to stay notified.

Blog posts:

• ‘Russia, the EU and the Return of History‘ – Daniel Matthew-Ferrero

Very happy to be attending this year's UACES graduate conference, which kicked off with an inspiring keynote by @raube_kolja, followed by an even more inspiring discussion. Exiting times are ahead of us as a future generation of EU studies scholars! #UACESgf18 https://t.co/Cw9lLBCkUj

— Vladimir Bogoeski (@bogoeskiv) July 12, 2018

A pleasure to chair a panel and lively debate on #Euroscepticism and #EUpoliticalparties at #UACESgf18 @UACESgf https://t.co/cQxu6rvAXQ

— Alex Andrione-Moylan (@AndrioneMoylanA) July 12, 2018

Hello from our Chair @AnnaWambach during the 1st day of #UACESgf18!

Learn more about our #PhD & #ECR #europeanstudies conference and view the programme at: https://t.co/us7exFmL77 pic.twitter.com/AHEWmJOFeJ

— UACES Graduate Forum (@UACESgf) July 12, 2018

 

Report by Kamila Feddek and Helena Cicmil

To take advantage of future UACES events and opportunities:

• Become a UACES Student Member
• Join us for the 2018 Doctoral Training Academy
• Follow @uacesgf on Twitter and on Facebook
• Join the EuroResearch mailing list

The post UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018 | KU Leuven appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The new reform of EU drone regulation is likely in order to establish a precise common framework for drone operations, at least in the civil field, taking into account both the Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Air Systems: Framing the future of aviation, of 6 March 2015[1], and the Resolution of the European Parliament on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as UAVs, in the field of civil aviation (2014/2243(INI)) (October 20, 2015) that followed (hereinafter, REP of 20 October 2015)[2] as well as the proposal by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to establish common rules for drone operation in Europe from September, 2015[3], developed and materialized in a recent Proposed Amendment (NPA) first published in 2017[4] and after that adopted as Regulation (EU) 2018/1139  which will entry into force on 11 September 2018[5].

While Regulation 216/2008 refers to aircraft and drones within this group in a general way, it also therefore does so for unmanned aircraft regardless of whether they are remotely controlled or not (automated aircraft that include a flight program), the REP of October 20, 2015 refers specifically to RPAs, that is, to remotely controlled drones. Moreover, this REP differentiates between two different categories of RPAs according to their nature, which should then be subject to different requirements within the EU regulatory framework: those for professional use and those for recreational use.

In addition, the REP of 20 October 2015 is clear in its anticipation of the need to “develop a clear, harmonized and proportionate European and global regulatory framework”, removing the 150 kg threshold, and “replacing it with a regulatory framework for the EU that is coherent and comprehensive”, on the basis “of a risk assessment that avoids the imposition of disproportionate regulations for companies, which are likely to undermine investment and innovation in the RPAs sector, while at the same time providing appropriate protection for citizens and helping to create sustainable and innovative jobs” (statements 20 and 21).

This is the main of the new EU common rules (Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)  which include drones within the scope of more ambitious general civil aviation regulation in the European Union which principal aim is “to establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in the Union” (article 1(1) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139) and the “Single European Sky airspace” (article 40) which is based on a risk-based approach and the principle of proportionality (statement 27), and therefore attending “to the nature and risks associated with the different types of aircraft, operations and activities” (statement 12).

It is important to note that the New common rules include “unmanned aircrafts”, i.e. drones, not only RPA, meaning “any aircraft operating or designed to operate autonomously or to be piloted remotely without a pilot on board” (article 3(30) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139). There are doubts regarding the application of the new regulation for drones used indoors, in fact De Molina suggests that the EU regulation is based on the Single European Sky airspace and therefore “still only applies to outdoor drones” and therefore the solution is ethics (de Molina et all, 2018)[6].

The specific regulation for drone technology is in the Section VII of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 “Unmanned Aircraft”, articles 55 to 58, based on a certification system to be implemented by the Commission.

Of course at national or local level, the possibility of domestic regulation is determined by European regulation (Sarrión Esteve, Benlloch Domènech, 2017: 123) and the new EU common rules although being a general regulation leaves EU member States the competence for regulate drone carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, border control and coastguard or similar activities and services undertaken in the public interest by or on behalf public authorities and the personnel and organisations involved in these activities (article 2(3a) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139). Nevertheless, Member states can consider – due to safety, interoperability or efficiency gains grounds- preferable to apply instead of their national law the EU regulation (statement 18 and article 2(6) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)[7].

But although the EU regulation is also open to a degree of flexibility “taking into account various local characteristics within individual Member States, such as population density” (statement 27 new EU common rules) it not allows EU Member States to except the application of the regulation to the design, production, maintenance and operation activities of unmanned aircrafts (article 2(8) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)[8].

Nevertheless, the new EU common rules stipulate that EU Member States have the possibility to “lay down national rules to make subject to certain conditions the operations of unmanned aircraft for reasons falling outside the scope of this Regulation, including public security or protection of privacy and personal data in accordance with the Union Law” (article 56(8) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139).

Therefore, National Legislation can introduce more requirements for drone operations under public security or fundamental rights protection issues in accordance with the EU law[9].

Acknowledgements. This post has been developed thanks to the Independent Thinking UNED Research  project Actual challenges for the regulation of the civil use of drones (DroneLawChallenges).

I will present my paper Actual Challenges for fundamental rights protection in the use of drone technology” in the upcoming UACES Annual Conference, Bath, at the Panel 408: UACES Research Network: Advances in Unmanned-Vehicle Research in a European Security Context  

More about dronelawchallenges:

De Miguel Molina, M., Santamarina Campos, V., Carabal-Montagud, M.A., De Miguel Molina, B. (2018). Ethics for civil indoor drones: a qualitative analysis, International Journal of Micro Air Vehicles, 2018. Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1756829318794004

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2014). Actual Trends and Challenges of the Constitutional Fundamental Rights and Principles in the ECJ Case Law from the Perspective of Multilevel Constitutionalism. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2656394  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3014376

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2017). El régimen jurídico de la utilización de los drones. Una aproximación multinivel a la legislación europea y española. Revista de la Escuela Jacobea de Postgrado, 12, 103-122.

Sarrión Esteve, J. Benlloch Domènech, C. (2017). Rights and Science in the drone era. Actual Challenges in the civil use of drone technology. Rights and Science: R&S, 0, 117-133. Available at https://rightsandscience.juri-dileyc.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/10/J.-Sarrio%CC%81n.-C.-Benlloch.-Rights-and-science-in-the-drone-era.pdf

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2018). Actual Challenges for Fundamental Rights Protection in the Use of Drone Technology (August 27, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239562

[1] Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Air Systems: Framing the future of aviation, 6 March 2015, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/doc/2015-03-06-drones/2015-03-06-riga-declaration-drones.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2018)

[2]  European Parliament resolution of 29 October 2015 on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as UAVs, in the field of civil aviation (2014 / 2243 (INI)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0390+0+DOC+PDF+V0//ES (September 27, 2016)

[3] EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency, Proposal to establish common rules for the operation of drones, presented firstly on September 2015, available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/download/ANPA-translations/205933_EASA_Summary%20of%20the%20ANPA_ES.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2016)

[4] EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency, Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-5 (A) Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of drones, available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/NPA%202017-05%20%28A%29.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2018)

[5] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. OJEU L 212/1 (August, 22, 2018).

[6] However, the EU new common rules introduce an open concept of unmanned aircraft and if one reads article 2 It is not so clear that it only applies to outdoors drones, it seems to me that the Regulation covers in general drones.

[7] In particular a Member State may decide to apply concrete EU rules in the activities of national competence “where it considers that, considering the characteristics of the activities, personnel and organisations in question and the purpose and content of the provisions concerned, those provisions can be effectively applied”. This decision must be notified to the Commission and the Agency with all relevant information (art. 2.6 New common rules).  It is a revocable decision.

[8] It is interesting because EU Member States may decide to exempt from the EU regulation several categories of aircrafts: aeroplanes, helicopters, sailplanes, powered sailplanes with some requirements, but not for unmanned aeroplanes, unmanned helicopters, unmanned sailplanes, unmanned powered sailplanes.  There is a general presumption of more risk in unmanned vehicles that in human drived ones.

[9] There is a map with national regulation development at DroneRules.eu, Dronerules consortium, Facilitating Access to Regulation for Light Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), http://dronerules.eu/en/recreational/regulations [Accessed 25 August 2018], and UAV Coach Master List of Drone Laws, https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws/ [Accessed 25 August 2018].

The post The new EU drone regulation: some remarks appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So today sees the publication of the first tranche of ‘no-deal’ preparedness notices from the British government.

I’m writing ahead of this, so maybe this’ll be out of date within a few hours, but let’s see what we can piece together so far.

The basic issue for the government is that it’s now caught on the horns of a dilemma.

On the one hand, it wants to demonstrate that ‘no-deal’ is a viable option for the UK to pursue, in order to given credibility to the ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ line that has been poo-pooed for so long by observers. In so doing, it might be able to leverage more concessions out of the EU in the Article 50 process.

On the other, it doesn’t want to make ‘no-deal’ look too unproblematic, for the simple reason that the government recognises that it would be very substantially worse than any likely agreed deal. Detoxifying ‘no-deal’ might encourage backbench pressure to actively pursue that route.

Add in much talk about (another) resurrection of ‘project fear’, plus the negative reaction to the impact assessments finally released earlier this year, and it’s not hard to see why this element of the process has been one the government might not be particularly enthused about.

And yet, pursue it, it must.

Just as the EU has been working on its own contingency planning, it was always necessary that the British government do the same.

In purely abstract terms, it is necessary both to know what your alternative to a negotiated outcome might be and to prepare for it, just in case. That’s necessary because a negotiation is definitionally not only in your hands, but also in the hands of others: if they falter, for whatever reason, then you have to be covered.

In the case of Brexit, that fundament is very much more important for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the structure of Article 50 means that the critical decision has already been taken at the point of notification, which means that the default outcome is the UK’s exit from the EU without a deal next March: only an active decision and agreement by both sides will change that.

Secondly, the novelty of the process raised the likelihood of difficulties in negotiating.

And finally, the lived experience of Article 50 has further raised the chance of problems, with the exciting mixture of a lack of British strategic intent and a repeated willingness to lose negotiation time to domestic political battles.

As a result, not only should we expect preparation for ‘no-deal’, but we should have been more concerned if that preparation didn’t take place.

Of course, there’s preparation and there’s preparation.

Here, the track record doesn’t look so good for the government. The impact assessments were cursory and successive White Papers have been largely devoid of the level of detail required to operationalise a contingency plan.

That said, the volume of notices – some 80 in total – suggests more work has gone into this round of work. So the bigger challenge is how to handle the uncertainty of what will be what come 30 March.

This is really the weakness of going ‘no-deal’: the fundamental uncertainty about what will hold and what will give.

From the limited leaks so far, the government appears to be suggesting unilateral maintenance of pre-exit rules and regulation in many areas, plus some short-term emergency stock-piling to get through the critical first weeks. That suggests a model of emergency talks with the EU to resolve critical systems, before a much longer-term reconstruction of relations.

Put like that, it rather makes sense: don’t frighten the horses any more than they already are, while working on a fix in the background.

But this model runs in various problems. Most crucially, while it might address internal activity within the UK, it cannot fix cross-border activity, again for the reason that the EU’s actions will be in the hands of the EU, not London.

Keeping pre-exit rules in place is one thing, but it doesn’t – and can’t – mean that the EU (or anyone else) has to extend the same regime, or accept UK compliance, which would be operating on a unilateral basis.

So even before we get into businesses’ concerns about supply-chain disruption (or even the possibility of stockpiling in the first place), there’s a big question mark over the entire approach.

All of which brings us back to the dilemma.

While contingency planning is to be welcomed, it shouldn’t be taken as a mark of the British government giving up on securing a deal on the Withdrawal Agreement. The costs, and the uncertainties about the costs, of ‘no-deal’ are already generally understood in both economic and political terms, and have already pushed the UK towards a much more robust pursuit of an agreement.

Sadly, pursuits don’t always succeed, so the better we are prepared for the alternative, the better.

The post Giving up on Article 50? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So far fears that Brexit would lead to the unravelling of the EU have proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal on the future of European integration remains open to much debate and speculation. Whether Brexit spell boom or doom for European integration was the topic of a recently published report for the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The report’s editor, Tim Oliver, sets out some of the report’s key findings. 

Britain’s relationship with the EU and European integration has rarely been smooth. Britain’s decision to leave might, therefore, free the Union of what Sheffield University Professor Stephen George, in his 1990 book, termed ‘an awkward partner’. But note the word ‘might’. As with any Member State, the extent to which the UK has shaped European integration is difficult to accurately measure and assess. Britain might be described as ‘an awkward partner’ but that doesn’t mean it’s ‘the awkward partner’. Other Member States have also been awkward and Britain’s own contributions can often be overlooked in favour of a focus on when it has been difficult.

Nevertheless, with Britain headed towards the exit, the EU needs to assess how it will be changed by the departure of its third largest Member State. Before the UK’s referendum, views were expressed that a vote for Leave could bring about significant changes to European integration. On the one hand stood the prospect of the EU unravelling, with the UK’s vote triggering similar referendums elsewhere in the EU, perhaps even provoking the Union’s disintegration. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the UK’s withdrawal could lead to the strengthening of the Union by facilitating further integration. As of the summer of 2018, fears that the UK’s withdrawal would lead to the unravelling of the EU have proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal on the future of European integration remains open to much debate and speculation.

To assess what the full effect might be, the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs commissioned a report into the topic that was released recently. ‘The Impact of the UK’s Withdrawal on EU Integration’ was edited by myself and with contributions from Catherine Barnard, Steven Peers, Matthias Matthijs, Linda Hantrais and Garvan Walshe. We approached the question by looking back at the UK’s positive and negative effects on European integration in several areas. From this, we drew up an assessment of how the UK’s withdrawal would affect future European integration. The areas chosen were the internal market, social policy, justice and home affairs, the Eurozone, and foreign, security and defence. These areas were chosen because they cover the EU’s political economy (internal market and the Eurozone), society (social policy), and Europe’s security and international standing (the area of freedom, security and justice, and foreign, security and defence cooperation). Each of these areas has seen varying degrees of integration both historically and more recently. The UK’s involvement also varies in each area, due, for instance, to its non-membership of the Eurozone contrasting with its central role in the internal market and its ambivalent role in defence and security policy.

The full report – which can be found here – was presented to the AFCO committee by Garvan Walshe at a special workshop on 11 July. The report shows that in some areas the UK has delayed or blocked European integration, making it more of an awkward partner in European integration than most other Member States have been. The UK’s opposition to European integration stems from the UK’s domestic politics, where, in contrast with the situation in other Member States, British politicians have rarely if ever pursued anything more than a transactional approach to EU membership. The UK’s departure could, therefore, be an opportunity for the remaining EU to integrate further.

However, it should not be overlooked that, often, the UK’s delaying and blocking tactics have been bypassed. One famous example is in the Eurozone, where Britain’s opposition to the Fiscal Compact led other Member States to establish the agreement outside the EU. The UK’s withdrawal is also not a short-term process; as it continues there is a risk that the UK could become a non-EU alternative that appeals to Eurosceptics in the remaining EU Member States. Furthermore, other Member States have also been awkward partners. Their awkwardness is now likely to play out in a process of differentiated integration, where some Member States integrate more quickly in some areas compared to others.

While the EU is unlikely to disintegrate because of the UK’s withdrawal, the report notes that significant systemic challenges remain, not least within the Eurozone and in facing a range of international pressures. This means the effect of Brexit on European integration will be determined by a balance between two effects. First, the UK’s success or failure outside the EU and how this is perceived within the remaining Member States. Second, the EU’s ability to overcome its systemic challenges, and so continue to demonstrate to EU citizens that, compared to other options, it can respond to their political demands and provide effective solutions to the problems they face.

This article first appeared on the Loughborough University London blog. 

The post Does Brexit spell boom or doom for European integration? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Susan Robertson

‘Making & Doing Technoscientific Futures Better’ was the title of the sixth CPERI (The Changing Political Economy of Research and Innovation) workshop that took place on the 23rd and 24th July in Lancaster (UK), just before the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology EASST 2018 conference. CPERI presents itself as ‘a unique global forum for the exploration of scholarship regarding the political economy of research and innovation (R&I), and hence at the intersection of STS [Science and Technology Studies], political economy and multiple other cognate disciplines, including geography, sociology, politics, law, education, medicine, engineering, computing & philosophy’. Previous CPERI workshops have taken place in Lancaster (2012), Toronto (2013), San Diego (2015), Liege (2016) and Boston (2017).

 

What is political economy of research and innovation or technoscience? Kean Birch defines the political economy of technoscience by ‘the ways that the economy is ethically, socially and politically organized and configured and how this shapes technoscience and is constituted by technoscience in turn’ (Birch 2013: 49; see also Tyfield et al. 2017). His proposed research agenda ‘is based on the claim that STS needs to take account of contemporary economic and financial processes and how they shape and are shaped by technoscience. This necessitates understanding how these processes might impact on science, technology and innovation, rather than turning STS gaze on the economy’ (Ibid).

 

The 2018 CPERI workshop in Lancaster brought together some 30 established and emerging researchers from around the world. Among them were those who have already attended one or more CPERI workshops as well as newcomers to this growing community. Topics discussed during these two days included technoscience and biomedical futures, responsible research and innovation, platform capitalism and its impact on universities.

Discussion chaired by Janja Komljenovic

 

Responsibility in science, technology and innovation

Discussion of responsible research and innovation futures addressed broader issues of responsibility in science, technology and innovation as well as more specific concept of ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI) that in the last ten years has been promoted by a number of research funders in Europe (De Saille 2015; Rip 2016). Stevie de Saille raised important questions for implementation of the RRI concept such as ‘can society really modify the direction of a research agenda, let alone say STOP once a trajectory is in motion?’ and ‘what constitutes ‘responsibility’ in a global field, and how might that change not just in place or time, but in light of other developments along the value chain?’ The workshop participants were particularly interested in her concept of ‘responsible stagnation’ that she defines as a particular configuration of change guided by restraint and living gently and where ethics matters more than growth (see also De Saille and Medvecky 2016). Inga Ulnicane applied ideas of responsibility to dual use research and technology. She argued that ‘responsible dual use’ approach becomes particularly relevant in the context of changing security and research funding landscape in the European Union (EU) where in addition to traditional support for civilian research in the Framework Programme, the EU is also allocating funding for dual use research and developing support for defence research.

 

Overall discussion of RRI touched upon the potential future of this concept considering that current discussions on EU research policy are dominated by concepts such as ‘missions’ and ‘three Os’ of Open Innovation, Open Science and Open to the World. In the long-term, concepts and framings in research and innovation policy tend to change presenting old ideas in novel ways, as it has happened with many ideas before such as ‘triple helix’ or ‘Mode II’ knowledge production (Ulnicane 2015). Recently Arie Rip has suggested that ‘RRI will disappear as a Brussels thing, not at the level of member states and organizations. It might change its acronym’ (Calvert and Rip 2018: 193).

David Tyfield

 

Platform capitalism, academic capitalism & digital knowledge capitalism

One of the main topics of the workshop was the development of platform capitalism and impact of digital platforms on universities. Janja Komljenovic analysed the case of Linkedin demonstrating how it has been strategically targeting higher education sector and building digital market place for skills (Komljenovic 2018). In her keynote ‘The University in an Age of Platform Capitalism’, Susan Robertson set out an innovative research agenda to study different kinds of platforms in the academy. Her approach to comparing platforms focused on the purposes and processes of knowledge production, for example, curating, publishing and learning. By looking at platforms as infrastructures, she asked major questions about what kind of futures are being created and do these new infrastructures create and make ‘better futures’ for whom.

 

Further changes in academic capitalism were discussed by Elena Simukovic in her presentation on politics and realities of facilitating open access and their impacts on the science system. Tereza Virtova’s talk on chronopolitics in experimental physics focused on implications of project work in contemporary academia. Mark Carrigan’s keynote discussed the institutionalisation of social media use in the higher education sector. Ismael Rafols presented his approach to help pluralising decision-making in science policy and aligning research priorities to societal needs. Luca Marelli discussed the EU General Data Protection legislation as a novel tool for biomedical research. David Tyfield argued for a new social contract for university in the times of digital knowledge capitalism. After the workshop, the Institute for Social Futures and the Centre for Higher Education Research & Evaluation hosted a public debate between Phil Mirowski and Steve Fuller. They debated if neoliberalism is a threat or an opportunity for the future of universities.

 

Debates and talks of the workshop sketched out some of the most urgent questions in contemporary political economy of research and innovation as well as many ideas for making and doing tehnoscientific futures better would it be by moving to open and responsible knowledge platforms or to new social contract for research and innovation.

 

References:

Birch, K. (2013) The political economy of technoscience: An emerging research agenda’ Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 7(1):49-61.

Calvert, J. and A.Rip (2018) “Things Can Be Done Here That Cannot So Easily Be Done Elsewhere”. Jane Calvert Talks with Arie Rip. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 4: 183-201.

De Saille, S. (2015) Innovating innovation policy: the emergence of ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’. Journal of Responsible Innovation 2(2): 152-168.

De Saille, S. and F.Medvecky (2016) Innovation for a steady state: a case for responsible stagnation. Economy and Society 45(1): 1-23.

Komljenovic, J. (2018) Linkedin, platforming labour, and the new employability mandate for universities. Globalisation, Societies and Education. Published online 2 August 2018.

Rip, A. (2015) The clothes of the emperor. An essay on RRI in and around Brussels. Journal of Responsible Innovation 3(3): 290-304.

Tyfield, D., R.Lave, S.Randalls and C.Thorpe (eds) (2017) The Routledge Handbook of the Political Economy of Science. Oxon: Routledge.

Ulnicane, I. (2015) Broadening Aims and Building Support in Science, Technology and Innovation Policy: The Case of the European Research Area. Journal of Contemporary European Research 11(1): 31-49.

The post Making and Doing Technoscientific Futures Better appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Last May in Parliament, Prime Minister, Theresa May, summed up her promises for Brexit in just 15-seconds: no hard border on the island of Ireland, and as frictionless trade as possible with the rest of the EU.

Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.

The Brexit promised by the government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliver

The former Brexit Secretary, David Davis, promised a trade and customs agreement with the EU “that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have.” Of course, he could not deliver that. That’s probably why he walked away.

Prime Minister, Theresa May, also said that Brexit can have “the same benefits” as we have now for free trade with the EU. It’s pie in the sky.

Also promised by the government:

• an agreement with the EU that’s fully negotiated by March next year;
• no payment for access to the EU market;
• a complete end to EU rules and regulations;
• converting around 40 EU trade agreements with 65 countries into UK bespoke deals “one second after midnight” on 30 March 2019.

Promises, promises, promises.

And the truth? These promises cannot be delivered. Brexit cannot work.

Last month, Jacob Rees-Mogg, indicated that it could take 50 years before the benefits of Brexit were fully realised.

He told Channel Four news:

“We won’t know the full economic consequences for a very long time, we really won’t.”

He added:

“The overwhelming opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years.”

50 years? Is he having a laugh?

Many people reading this will be dead and buried before then. We should instead bury Brexit. It’s dead. It cannot be revived, because it was never a viable living entity in the first place.

Because it’s now obvious that Brexit cannot work and cannot be delivered, Brexiters are starting to blame the EU for its obvious and impending failure.

• It’s the EU’s fault that Britain cannot keep membership benefits as an ex-member!
• How dare the EU turn Britain away, such an important country!
• We saved Europe from two world wars, don’t you know!
• We used to have an Empire that ruled half the world, don’t you know!
• For goodness sake, we even invented eggs and bacon for breakfast!
• The rest of Europe clearly needs us more than we need them, with their stupid rolls and jam for breakfast!
• You wait, you just wait, at the last minute the EU will cut us a deal, they will give Theresa May everything she wants, because it would be cutting off their noses not to.

But the EU won’t.

Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.

The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are part of the EU Single Market or in its customs union.

The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick.

If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire ‘raison d’être’ of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other ‘third countries’.

It’s not going to happen.

Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones signed recently with Canada and Japan. But those agreements don’t include frictionless access to the EU, and those agreements don’t cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don’t cover services or free movement of people.

It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU.

That is just one of many reasons why Reasons2Remain is campaigning for a democratic reversal of Brexit.

Last month, Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless borders with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.

SNP MP, Angus MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were “pie in the sky”.

Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky.

Before the referendum, Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.

Of course, it’s not going to happen. Of course, it’s not going to work.

What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?

The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May’s pie in the sky proposals.

► So, here’s the bottom line:

• Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU.
• We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.
• We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.

  ► And yet:

• We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.
  
• We are leaving for no good reason, not one.
  
• We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.
  
• We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.

What’s the point? There’s no point.

There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work. It’s all built on sand.

Has this sunk in yet?

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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Brexit is built on sand

→ 1-minute video: Brexit is built on sand – Watch and shareWHY BREXIT WON’T WORK Last May in Parliament, Prime Minister Theresa May summed up her promises for Brexit in just 15-seconds: no hard border on the island of Ireland, and as frictionless trade as possible with the rest of the EU. Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.The Brexit promised by the government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliverThe former Brexit Secretary, David Davis, promised a trade and customs agreement with the EU “that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have.” Of course, he could not deliver that. That’s probably why he walked away. Prime Minister, Theresa May, also said that Brexit can have “the same benefits” as we have now for free trade with the EU. It’s pie in the sky. Also promised by the government: an agreement with the EU that’s fully negotiated by March next year; no payment for access to the EU market; a complete end to EU rules and regulations; converting around 40 EU trade agreements with 65 countries into UK bespoke deals “one second after midnight” on 30 March 2019.Promises, promises, promises.And the truth? These promises cannot be delivered. Brexit cannot work.Last month, Jacob Rees-Mogg, indicated that it could take 50 years before the benefits of Brexit were fully realised.“We won’t know the full economic consequences for a very long time, we really won’t,” he told Channel Four news. He added, “The overwhelming opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years.”50 years? Is he having a laugh?Many people reading this will be dead and buried before then. We should instead bury Brexit. It’s dead. It cannot be revived, because it was never a viable living entity in the first place. Because it’s now obvious that Brexit cannot work and cannot be delivered, Brexiters are starting to blame the EU for its obvious and impending failure. • It’s the EU’s fault that Britain cannot keep membership benefits as an ex-member!• How dare the EU turn Britain away, such an important country!• We saved Europe from two world wars, don’t you know! • We used to have an Empire that ruled half the world, don’t you know! • For goodness sake, we even invented eggs and bacon for breakfast!• The rest of Europe clearly needs us more than we need them, with their stupid rolls and jam for breakfast!• You wait, you just wait, at the last minute the EU will cut us a deal, they will give Theresa May everything she wants, because it would be cutting off their noses not to. But the EU won’t. Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are part of the EU Single Market or in its customs union.The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick. If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire ‘raison d'être’ of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other 'third countries'. It's not going to happen.Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones signed recently with Canada and Japan. But those agreements don't include frictionless access to the EU, and those agreements don't cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don't cover services or free movement of people.It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU. That is just one of many reasons why Reasons2Remain is campaigning for a democratic reversal of Brexit.Last month, Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless borders with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.SNP MP, Angus MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were "pie in the sky". Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky. Before the referendum, Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.Of course, it’s not going to happen. Of course, it’s not going to work.What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May's pie in the sky proposals.► So, here’s the bottom line. Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU. We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive. We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.► And yet: We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left. We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal. We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.What’s the point? There’s no point.There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work. It’s all built on sand.Has this sunk in yet?• Article and video compilation by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1028734556369838080********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend and review Reasons2Remain. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 12 August 2018

The post Brexit is built on sand appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

University of Burundi. Photo from http://www.ub.edu.bi/

Olivier Provini

The main focus of the paper ‘Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi’ is to question public policy processes in so-called “fragile” states. Indeed, my research deals with policy analysis in non-western contexts with a special focus on African case studies. Analysing public action in the majority of African contexts raises a certain number of questions given that analytical frameworks are mostly based on empirical and sectorial experiences from studies conducted in North America and Europe. Moreover, institutional and social capacities in Africa are sometimes so low that the very concepts of the state or policies could be problematic. The category of “fragile” states would question several results of the literature on policy science, especially on policy transfer studies. In “fragile” states, the policy process would be delegated to external agents, who would implement internationally manufactured and projected models into national and local policy sectors. The specific aim of my research is to discuss the relation between the dependence of international aid and the circulation of public policies. Therefore, I use the empirical example of the implementation of the European higher education model LMD (“Licence-Master-Doctorate”) at the University of Burundi in Africa.

 

What is the LMD model at the University of Burundi about?

Since 2007, the Burundian higher education sector has been involved in a reform process which is financed by the French cooperation. Through the implementation of the PARES programme (“Projet d’Appui au Renforcement de l’Enseignement Supérieur”), the Burundian government, with the assistance of the French donors, has organised a new tertiary system, which has been widely destructured through the Burundian civil war (1993-2006). The aim of the French cooperation and the Burundian government has been to implement the LMD reform throughout the whole territory including the private institutions in order to improve the recognition of the university community. The reform is structured into several steps: i) the creation of a steering group to supervise the reform; ii) an overview of the situation of the sector after the civil war; iii) and an audit of the university curricula and different classes to develop new programmes at the University of Burundi. The making of new curricula and classes for the University of Burundi is achieved by imitating the programmes offered in European universities, where most of the Burundian experts, lecturers and professors have pursued their university education. A Burundian expert explains this copy-and-paste practice:

“First, there is the task of doing literature research. Which means, for instance, at the Faculty of Law [of the University of Burundi], we use the example of the Faculty of Law of [the French University of] Nanterre. And we study the structure of the organisation of the teaching units, the included teaching elements, and after that, depending on the needs and the priorities of the country, we then see which courses we have to adjust and which one we pick. That is the way we proceed. We do not invent the wheel which is turning”[i].

 

How can policy-makers (re)negotiate the policy process in Burundi?

The making of the university curricula and classes implicates discussions on numerous technical aspects, which are widely depoliticised in Burundi. Given this technical nature of the policy, experts play a major role in the reform process which can also explain the top-down circulation of the external engineering. Nevertheless, some elements of the LMD reform aggregate critical challenges, which involve political stakeholders and issues. In the paper, I show that the transfer of the LMD model in Burundi presents an opportunity for political and academic stakeholders to reshape the system of elite formation and to reconsider the delicate balance between Hutu and Tutsi in the administration, which is one of the core questions of the higher education system in the Burundian post-conflict situation.

 

For instance, the debates on the Law on Higher Education of November 2011 question the norms regulating the appointment process within the university administration regarding the ethnic balance between Hutu and Tutsi occupying higher positions of political responsibility or in the public administration. During an interview, one of the policy makers reveals that the debates in the Burundian Parliament are essentially related to the issue of the appointments of Deans based on ethnic criteria rather than on technical aspects of the implementation of the LMD in the private and public institutions:

“The law was not well understood by the Assembly. I have to say that our Parliament is not like yours, the quality of debates is very poor [he is laughing]! […]. We could see that the tendency was rather to consider only political aspects rather than academic and scientific aspects. The debates were related, for instance, to the appointment of Deans, it was rather that: of which ethnicity and of which political party must the Deans come from?”[ii].

 

What are the impacts for the theoretical debate?

The case study of the LMD reform in Burundi reveals several insights to the theoretical debate:

– First, the empirical study of the circulation of the LMD reform highlights two contrasting results. When focussing on the technical aspects of the reform, like the establishment of the curricula offered at the University of Burundi, we observe a top-down transfer. The local administrators of the institution imitate, copy and paste the programmes offered in European universities. However, by shifting the focus on the voting process of the Law of November 2011, my paper highlights new and diverging results. The transfer of the LMD model in Burundi presents an opportunity for political and academic stakeholders to transform the system of elite formation and power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi, which constitutes one of the core question of the higher education system in the Burundian post-conflict situation.

 

– Second, the study confirms broader results of the scientific literature on policy transfers in Western contexts about the (re)negotiation of policy models. Even in a “fragile” state, which heavily depends on the financial support of donors and international organizations, policy circulations are shaped by bargaining and compromising between international, national and local actors.

 

– Finally, we can discuss, through the theoretical framework of policy analysis, the adjectives describing and categorizing the capacities and attributes of states (as “fragile”, “failed”, “ghost”, “neopatrimonial”, “liberal” or “developing”). By using concepts of policy analysis, this paper questions the category and the nature of “fragile” states. I demonstrate to what extent policy analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of the state rather than restricting its shape to one characteristic.

 

 

This blog post is based on the paper “Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi”. This paper won the 2017 Award of Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation’. The paper was presented at the International Conference on Public Policy in Singapore in 2017.

 

Olivier Provini is an Assistant Professor of political science at the University of La Reunion (France) and an affiliate member of the Legal Research Center (CRJ, University of La Reunion). In his PhD he dealt with the circulation of higher education reforms in East Africa, by comparing reform processes in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. His scientific interest lies in public policy analysis, state building and higher education reforms. He currently coordinates the research programme “Making public policies in Africa” (FAPPA) at Sciences Po Bordeaux (France). He is the editor of a special issue dealing with public policies in Africa published in the French review “Gouvernement et action publique”. He has also published a comparative study on the marketization of higher education reforms in Kenya and Tanzania in the journal Higher Education.

 

[i] Interview with a Burundian expert (27/03/2013, Bujumbura).

[ii] Interview with a policy maker (27/03/2013, Bujumbura).

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The next EU budgetary framework period starts at the beginning of 2021. It is none too early for a serious debate about what should be the priorities. The only suggestion that has received publicity so far is President Macron’s proposal for a euro zone budget. This could be a good idea but not for the reasons given by him or most others. The euro has lasted for almost two decades without a budget of its own and can continue to do so. One country, Greece, needs debt relief. Other countries may need help with crucial public services and investments at a time when their own constraints, including their debt, make these difficult to afford. But suggestions that stronger economies should help weaker economies for no other reason than that they are stronger will always be resisted by the stronger economies, given that they are already making significant net contributions.

The purposes of EU budgetary spending need to be re-examined from first principles. Most spending over the last 30 years other than agricultural support has been on helping poorer countries improve their transport and communications infrastructure, based on the proposition that this is a condition for economic growth. Most EU countries now have fairly good infrastructure of this kind and there is little reason that its further expansion is necessary.

New priorities: migration

There are however major priorities that have recently emerged. The most obvious is the handling of migration pressures, which are not likely to go away. One priority should be for EU countries to make a contribution, along with other countries from Lebanon to Uganda, in receiving migrants fleeing wars in Syria, Sudan and elsewhere. Many of the newer EU member states do not want to make such a contribution. That should be respected as their right but given that this issue is now one of the major ones confronting the world including the EU, the EU budget should be accordingly re-oriented to helping those countries that are willing to take in refugees. Given that the new member states may resist that – and budgets require unanimity—the only answer may be to have a euro zone budget because it is primarily euro zone countries that are –whether voluntarily or involuntarily—taking in refugees from war, as well as other migrants.

Funding is specially needed for the handling of the migration flows coming across the Mediterranean. Many of those coming from sub-Saharan Africa can possibly be returned. For example, while there is war and terrorism in parts of Nigeria, other parts are peaceful so those fleeing the unstable parts of the country should be able to go to the more stable parts. But it is clear that this can only be managed in a way which respects human rights, if Nigeria is helped financially and in other ways to absorb internal migrants while for those who reach Europe sorting those who clearly have refugee rights under the Geneva Convention from those who can be returned is itself an expensive and demanding process which countries like Italy and Greece struggle to afford. The idea that there is a clear division between refugees and economic migrants that can easily be identified is a myth. Between those clearly one or the other is a very large grey area, including those mentioned above from countries where some regions are in conflict.

And environment

Another priority area which has come to the fore since the EU’s current budgetary policy was formulated when Jacques Delors was Commission president is the wide range of environmental challenges facing EU member states and the world as a whole. The terrible and lethal fires both sides of Athens in July are only the latest example of increasing damage to the environment and human life from such forest fires affecting all south European countries and more recently also north European countries. Research and action is needed for example through breaks in forests to halt or reduce the spread of such fires but there is also a need for more investment and current spending on fire-fighting services, that budgetary constraints in Greece and elsewhere have instead reduced. Such spending should be another priority of EU budgets in both the short and medium term.

The EU budget effectively limited to 1% of GDP is very small in relation to the public expenditure controlled by member states and it is unrealistic to suppose that this is going to be changed in the foreseeable future. But some items of spending should be reduced and others increased. Moreover, there should no longer be a bias in favour of capital over current spending given that current spending for example on migration is an urgent priority. There may well be a case for reducing EU-wide spending, if agreement on priorities cannot be reached. A significant euro zone budget could then be initiated without necessarily increasing the total for euro zone members of the EU plus the euro zone budget above the present 1% of GDP.

 

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Professor Amelia Hadfield and Chris Logie:

© luzitanija / Adobe Stock

Tune in for another episode of ‘Make America Great Again!’ You’ll remember June’s episodes saw President Trump scupper the Canadian G7, cozy up to Kim Jong-Un and instigate wide-ranging steel and aluminium tariffs against the EU, Canada and Mexico.

De-sensitized as we’ve become to Trumpian geopolitics, we were unprepared for the untrammeled lunacy of July. Pissing off the Canadians was clearly just the beginning.

July 2018 highlights included a stormy NATO summit, followed by a non-State visit to Britain where Trump continued to confuse bilateral with bipolar by criticizing British PM Theresa May’s Brexit plan and then not. The episode reached its agonizing conclusion in Helsinki where Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin, publicly savaged the reputation of US intelligence and security agencies by denying Russian interference in the 2016 US election, then suggesting to an outraged Washington caucus that he simply misspoke.

Trump followed his lackluster retraction with the edifying suggestion that there are “a lot of people out there.” It’s an interesting idea. Let’s therefore examine the folk comprising Europe’s security order to see what transpired during the initial NATO Summit in Brussels, before the inevitable diplomatic cataclysms of August.

Prior to the NATO summit, European allies were reportedly “scared s***less” at the possibility of Trump trashing NATO before cozying up to Putin in Helsinki. This produced superbly dramatic headlines including “How Trump and Putin could kill NATO”[6] or “Can Nato survive US President Donald Trump?”. In analyzing the summit, the real question therefore is the separation of predictable official business from the truly unexpected.

 

It’s Not Unusual

The American refrain of increased defence spending was top of the list. Underlying this demand is the American suspicion that European NATO members persist in paying little into NATO, while receiving a hefty, permanent dividend of protection under the US security umbrella. Accordingly, US defence secretaries and presidents alike have routinely demanded that NATO members contribute more. In 2011 for instance, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned that NATO faced “a dim if not dismal future”should NATO members fail to raise defence spending. President Obama however succeeded in formally committing NATO members to the goal of 2% national GDP at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, to be reached within a decade.

Critics could argue that European defence remains largely aspirational in both spending and strategy. Supporters meanwhile point to dramatic uptakes in defence governance within both NATO and EU structures, with NATO members approaching the 2% target, making Europe the “fastest-growing region in real-terms defence spending” in 2017.

Against this background, Trump’s limited grasp of NATO’s modus operandi and transactional view of international relations produced a predictable tirade on spending thresholds. By the end of Day 1, Trump’s plain views had been made plainer still. Trump repeated the same message On Day 2 in increasingly hysterical tones, with accusations of Europeans enjoying a free lunch on the US, followed by meretricious attacks on Germany, Spain and the Benelux. At the emergency meeting hastily convened to contain further outbursts, Trump then fired off a trio of demands. First, he demanded the 2% spending timetable be brought forward; second that “after 2 percent, we’ll start talking about going higher… I think 4 percent is the right number”, and third, that in the absence of European cooperation on defence spending, the US could ultimately “go it alone.”

The first claim demand is not entirely unreasonable, but currently unmanageable for most. The second claim can be dismissed as ‘rounding up’ on the basis of Trump’s false claim that US defence spending now exceeds 4% (it’s closer to 3.5%). Overall, the summit’s arithmetic arguably produced “a new sense of urgency due to President Trump’s strong leadership on defence spending”, in the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. However, this does not equate to the summit breakthrough that Trump subsequently credited himself with, claiming that NATO allies have “stepped up like they’ve never stepped up before”. Indeed, the $30 to $40 billion of ‘new’ defence spending touted by Trump is not new money, but the trajectory of increased spending that NATO members committed under the far defter work of President Obama, as members confirmed at the summit’s conclusion.

 

The Twilight Zone

Trump’s third argument – to abandon NATO entirely – tipped the summit from punchy to imperiled, and brought into question key assumptions underlying European security. Trump’s differential worldview has been evident for some time. But by censuring Germany for its Russian natural gas imports, shirking the role of Article V to defend a threatened NATO member, and finally threatening a US-free NATO, Trump has seriously diminished America’s existing commitments to Europe.

Why? Is Trump genuinely intent on weakening, even demolishing NATO, or is he merely in a permanent state of campaigning: spouting abroad what plays well at home? From a short-term perspective, I agree with Judy Dempsey and Tomáš Valášek that “the drama that Trump creates” makes a difference to his home base as “it shows him as resolute. He’s causing crises for the sake of crises” because “what matters is whether he is seen as getting things done”. The problem, as I’ll argue in my next blog, is the consequences of such behavior, particularly when they backfire in multilateral settings.

For NATO, Trump’s temper tantrums over defence jeopardizes the broader structure of European deterrence. Threatening to pull the US out of NATO is a not only a dangerous, but treacherous option. It calls into question the very rationale of the post-war east-west balance that NATO represents, and suggests that new NATO initiatives – including the July agreement in Brussels “to reinforce eastern allies in a crisis” is mere saber-rattling. At best, it leaves NATO profoundly skeptical of American support while Trump remains in office. At worst, it could embolden Russian activity on a variety of fronts.

 

Parting Shots

In terms of key relationships, the damage is done. Trump took aim at Germany over its Russian gas imports, followed by a breathtakingly venal display in front of Russian President Putin at the Helsinki summit less than a week later. Trump named the EU a foe while threatening to withdraw the US from NATO. He demanded defence increases blithely unaware of Permanent Enhanced Cooperation (PESCO), the new European Intervention Initiative or increased funding for the European Defence Agency, recent developments, all of which catalyze European defence spending.

But Trump’s post-summit on Montenegro (NATO’s newest member) takes the cake. Displaying a catastrophic lack of regional awareness, including NATO’s own efforts to cultivate delicate relationships in the Balkans between Greece and renamed North Macedonia, Trump suggested Montenegrins are “very strong people, they’re very aggressive people. They may get aggressive and, congratulations, you’re in World War Three”. Laying to waste members old, new and prospective, as well as questioning the foundations of the current alliance, Trump’s abrasive and reckless approach has now made the entirety of NATO’s goals harder to achieve.

Under any US President, NATO would be reckoned a good bet, with rising member spending, new members and widening commitments in Europe and beyond. Indeed, in budgetary terms, the US’ material commitment to Europe continues to increases, with its planned European Defence Initiative set to receive $6.5 billion in funding in 2019 (up from $4.8 billion in 2018 and $3.4 billion in 2017). Unfortunately, the Brussels summit did not achieve “a tremendous amount of progress” because Trump focused solely on money, sowed discord among Western allies and ignored the cardinal tenets of collective defence. Instead, “money was the issue, not protecting shared values; not projecting security; not deepening solidarity in an alliance that the United States founded”.

Unsurprisingly, the summit takeaway is that the US cannot currently be relied upon as a reliable global partner. Is it any wonder that there are now “genuine fears that a second Trump term could leave Nato marginalised and its transatlantic spine deeply damaged”?

 

 

About the Authors

Professor Amelia Hadfield is the Director of the Centre for European Studies at Canterbury Christ Church University. 

Chris Logie is the CEFEUS 2018 UG Research Assistant.

Professor Hadfield is participating in the plenary session at UACES 2018 in Bath on “Transatlanticism in the Times of Trump and the UK’s Withdrawal from the EU” (4 September 2018). 

 

[1] Trump alleged Germany was “totally controlled by Russia” both because of its current consumption of Russian gas, and support for the controversial Nordstream 2 Baltic Sea gas pipeline designed to increase the Russian gas supply to Europe. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-44793764/trump-germany-is-totally-controlled-by-russia. Trump further incorrectly asserted that 60 to 70% of German energy came from Russia: it is actually less than 20% of Germany’s energy mix and half its gas consumption. 

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The EU and Japan have just signed an unprecedented free trade agreement which will create one of the world’s largest trading blocs.

The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is the largest trade deal ever negotiated by the EU. It will create a trade zone covering 600 million people and nearly a third of global GDP.

It is of course good news for the EU and Japan, but not for Britain if we leave the EU. We won’t benefit from the EU-Japan trade agreement after Brexit.

And the UK is never likely to get a free trade agreement with Japan – or any other country – anywhere near as good as the one achieved by the EU.

But Brexiters have quickly responded:

If Japan can get this, then why can’t we?

Doing the rounds following the signing of the agreement were these comments by  Brexit campaigners:

Does Japan have to sign up to:

– Freedom of movement? NO
– Single Market? NO
– Customs Union? NO
– European Court of Justice? NO
– The EU’s “common rulebook”? NO
– Paying £40 Billion? NO

…so why should we?

But these Brexit comments reveal a serious misunderstanding about the EU and how its Single Market and Customs Union operates.

Free trade is not the same as frictionless trade.

The EU has already told the UK that it can have a trade deal with the EU “along the same lines” as the ones the EU has now concluded with Japan, Canada and South Korea.

So, yes, we can have that.

The problem is that the UK’s economy, to continue to thrive, needs much more than these types of free trade deals can offer us.

We need completely frictionless trade on ALL trade, and on ALL exports and imports with the EU, which is an entirely different matter.

The EU Japan free-trade liberalises the bilateral goods trade, primarily agricultural exports. For instance, tariffs on EU beef and pork will be reduced, and for EU cheese, the tariffs are eliminated altogether.

But the agreement does not cover anywhere near the amount and range of trade that the UK does with the EU – which is by far our biggest, most important trading partner.

And the trade agreement does not cover services, which forms around 80% of Britain’s economy.

The difference between the EU free-trade agreements with Japan, Canada and South Korea and the EU’s Single Market and customs union is immense.

The goods tariffs under these various deals are reduced or sometimes eliminated, but in the EU Single Market and customs union they disappear entirely as a matter of law.

Shipments to the EU from Japan, South Korea and Canada all have to be (and will continue to be) checked by EU customs authorities to ensure they are actually from those countries and that they conform to local safety rules, even if no tariffs are due.

But within the EU customs union, ALL goods cross borders without any checks at all. That’s the fundamental difference.

Single market membership also entails the rights for EU citizens from any country to work in any other country as a right. This freedom of movement does not exist (and will not exist) for EU citizens as regards access to the Canadian, Japanese and South Korean labour markets.

So, in essence, the EU-Japan free trade agreement does not offer frictionless trade, and that’s what the UK needs to ensure that our economy does not crash, that jobs are not lost, and that there is no hard border on the island of Ireland.

Of course, such frictionless EU trade needs to be governed by laws democratically agreed by its members, and those laws overseen by a court, with one judge from each EU member country. (And what’s wrong with that?)

Ironically, frictionless trade is what we have now in the EU. So, why leave? I still cannot find even one valid or validated reason, despite years of searching.

As for paying £40 billion, this is what the UK agreed to pay the EU whilst a member. That’s a different issue. Japan, I am sure, would not renege on paying its bills.

• Photo: Rotterdam, the EU’s number one port, with a cargo throughput of over 467 million tonnes a year. 

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Our Prime Minister, Theresa May, has urged the public not to be “worried” by her government’s plans to stockpile food and medicine to prepare for a no-deal Brexit.

She is taking us all for fools.

Gary Lineker got it right when he responded:

“A wealthy nation putting itself in a position where it has to stockpile food, medicine, etc., in times of peace is utter madness. What Are We Doing?”

‘Utter madness’ is the appropriate description of what’s going on.

When a former football player can say what’s happening but our political leaders cannot, you can tell that the country is in deep, deep trouble.

Theresa May has tried to play down the impact of the impending disaster that a no-deal Brexit means for Britain.

Ms May confirmed that plans for stocking up on essential goods are underway – in case imports from the EU are cut off by clogged ports, or regulatory disputes.

But, asked if it was “alarming” for people, the Prime Minister responded:

“Far from being worried about preparations that we are making, I would say that people should take reassurance and comfort from the fact that the government is saying we are in a negotiation, we are working for a good deal.

“I believe we can get a good deal, but, it’s right that we say – because we don’t know what the outcome is going to be – let’s prepare for every eventuality.”

She added:

“This is not just about stockpiling. That concept, what it is, is about making sure that we will be able to continue to do the things that are necessary once we have left the European Union, if we leave without a deal.”

Read her words carefully. She is giving the country reasons to panic, and at the same time telling us not to panic.

We may not have enough food. Don’t panic!

We may run out of medicines. Don’t panic!

The ship is about to hit the rocks. Don’t panic!

The ship is sinking. Don’t panic!

Stockpiling food and medicines, says Mrs May, is about “making sure that we will be able to continue to do the things that are necessary once we have left the European Union…”

Continuing to do the things that are necessary?

Such as being able to eat food to enable us to live?

Such as being able to get the medicines many of us need to stay alive or stay well?

Mrs May says we should take “reassurance and comfort” from the government’s plans to save the country from a no-Brexit deal by ensuring we have enough food and medicines.

The Prime Minister hasn’t a clue about offering “reassurance and comfort”.

She was the Home Secretary who warned the country that Brexit was not in the country’s best interests.

Then she volunteered to be the Prime Minister to do to the country what she previously said would be bad for the country.

The only way to provide Britain with “reassurance and comfort” is to stop Brexit.

It should be obvious by now that Brexit is doing huge damage to Britain before it’s even gone ahead.

And if it is allowed to go ahead, it will inflict grievous injuries to our nation state and its inhabitants for years and decades to come.

The workers at Honda and Airbus who voted for Leave are now learning that ‘Leave really means Leave’.

Yes, those companies and many others are now preparing to leave Britain as a direct consequence of Brexit.

Our economy needs frictionless access with our most important, most vital, and most profitable international market place – the EU.

Without that, many of our most successful businesses in the UK cannot be profitable. They cannot survive here.

Brexit cannot give Britain frictionless trade with the EU. How many times do we have to repeat that before it sinks in?

Forgive the voters. They could not have had any real idea that voting for Brexit would mean losing their jobs and result in shortages of food and medicines and the basics of life.

Blame the politicians who sold the damned lies of Leave, and not the voters who unwittingly fell for them.

But now we must wake up.

We can’t trust those politicians who told us that Brexit would lead us to the promised land, only to take us on a journey to a barren Britain that’s impoverished, depleted and demeaned.

Here, we warned the nation to see that Brexit would bring us pain.

But now, we can all feel the pain – and feeling is believing.

The only way to stop the pain of Brexit is to stop Brexit.

Speak up. Squeal. Shout. Scream. Brexit is avoidable. But very soon – very, very soon – it will be too late.

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It is a poor reflection of the pro-Remain campaign that even two years after the referendum, much of Britain is still basking in shocking ignorance about how the EU functions, the reason it exists, and how it is a democracy run by its members for the benefit of its members.

We are leaving the EU based entirely on a misunderstanding and worse, a pack of lies.

There is probably less than a 10% chance of another referendum, and if there is another referendum, currently only a 50-50 chance of Remain winning.

Unfortunately, the Remain campaign, starting from May 2015 up until now, has been entirely inept, disorganised, and without a dynamic and effective strategy.

It could have been very different.

We should have won the 2016 referendum without much difficulty. But the Remain side was smug, and not at all prepared for the panzer warfare launched with such brilliant effect by the Leave campaign, albeit all based on lies, deceits and false promises.

Remainers lost forty years of opportunities at awareness raising since winning the 1975 referendum. We let the likes of the Daily Mail, the Daily Express and the small UKIP party pollute the nation with misinformation about the EU and EU migrants.

For most of the forty years it didn’t seem to matter. Leaving the EU was not a mainstream call or promise of the main parties. There were grumblings, but these were on the sidelines of politics, occupied by a few diehard Eurosceptics.

Complacency ruled. If there was another referendum, of course the status quo would win. David Cameron banked his prime ministership on it. But he lost, and left.

It was a huge shock that Leave won the referendum – a shock to Remainers, and a shock to Leavers.

Few expected Brexit to win. It’s rare indeed for a referendum to go against the advice of the government, of Parliament, of the main parties and, dare I say it, of most experts.

The official ‘Stronger In’ campaign lacked panache, flair and any sense of direction. Their strategy was no match for the Leave campaign.

Trying to scare voters into opting for Remain was no way to win. The Remain campaign spent precious little time or energy explaining to the nation how the EU works, how it is a democracy, and how Britain has greatly benefited from its membership.

Fear, not facts, ruled the day. Or so the Remain strategists thought.

But when the day came, fear lost.

We should have learnt. The British don’t like to be scared or cowed into doing something. They react the opposite way.

That should have been known from the stoical reaction of the Brits to the Blitz, when the Nazis thought they could frighten Blighty into submission. How wrong they were.

And how wrong was Stronger In. Their strategy didn’t work.

They lost the Referendum, but they also lost the arguments. The Leave lies about the EU won, and there was little in the way of an effective counter attack, using the only antidote known to work against lies: the truth.

Well, that was two years ago. What of the truth now?

Unfortunately, misinformation about the EU still prevails. And there is still no effective counter-attack.

There is no national, prominent, brilliant and well-funded ongoing awareness raising campaign by any pro-EU, anti-Brexit group to undo the lies of Leave.

(Yes, there are many smaller groups trying, often valiantly, but nothing that is anywhere close to a dazzling, nation-wide, compelling campaign that’s needed to undo the lies of Leave politicians).

Across the country, enormous numbers of people still believe that the EU is a dictatorship run by unelected, faceless bureaucrats.

They still believe that the EU rules over us, without us having any real say.

They still think that the EU annual membership fee represents poor value for money, which would be better spent on something else.

They still believe that we have uncontrolled borders, with too many citizens from the rest of the EU coming here, without any restrictions.

They still think we’ll get our country back as soon as we’ve left the EU.

They even still believe that the EU accounts are a sham that the auditors refuse to sign off.

And so on, and so on, and so on.

All these beliefs are based on myths; on misinformation that has been carefully and successfully imbued into the nation’s psyche and mindset over many years.

And they could all be undone by a proper explanation to the nation of the truth. Because when properly explained, truth outshines lies, at least eventually.

We know this from many awareness raising campaigns of the past, whether it’s a campaign to explain that smoking causes cancer; the campaign to demonstrate that wearing a seatbelt saves lives; the five-a-day campaign to eat more fruit and veg; the NHS FAST campaign to help people recognise strokes.; the campaign to boycott products from apartheid South Africa…

All these successful campaigns and many others were based on getting facts and the truth out to the public in an effective, believable, emotive and memorable way.

It’s something the pro-Remain movement has not done well. It’s hardly done it at all.

The focus currently is getting a new referendum – coined the ‘people’s vote’. But there will be no point getting a new vote unless we can decisively win that vote.

Not just a reversal of the last vote: 52%-48%. But a conclusive vote of 60%-40% or more, to see this matter settled for at least a generation.

But that’s not going to be achievable if large parts of the country still believe the lies that won the 2016 referendum – lies that would be used again if there is another referendum.

There’s an old saying: look after the pennies, and the pounds will look after themselves.

The nation needs a compelling reason to have another vote. Demolish the lies that led to Brexit, and the call for a new vote will look after itself. And be truly winnable.

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  New article forthcoming (in 2018) in History of Humanities and posted to SSRN: Democracy and the Vernacular Imagination in Vico’s Plebian Philology

Abstract:

This essay examines Giambattista Vico’s philology as a contribution to democratic legitimacy. I outline three steps in Vico’s account of the historical and political development of philological knowledge. First, his merger of philosophy and philology, and the effects of that merge on the relative claims of reason and authority. Second, his use of antiquarian knowledge to supersede historicist accounts of change in time and to position the plebian social class as the true arbiters of language. Third, his understanding of philological knowledge as an instrument of political change, and a foundational element in the establishment of democracy. By treating the philological imagination as a tool for bringing about political change, Vico’s plebian philology is radically democratic, and a crucial instrument in the struggle against the elite, from antiquity to the present.

The post New article on Vico and Democracy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Berlin Wall, constructed in 1961 to separate East and West Berlin during the Cold War, is a cause and consequence of a plethora of historical events and processes. It is also a symbol for artificial separation of peoples and ideas behind artificially created borders. In this respect it can serve as a perfect proxy, which allows to draw parallels to the EU-Ukrainian boundaries and their surmounting.

The Berlin Wall serves as a popular motive for various notions, often contradictory, like much in human life, such as free will, its suppression, activism and passivity, opposition and unity, migration and border control. But it is also a symbol for the break with the whole epoch of the Cold War and global confrontation.

The Soviet Block portrayed the Wall as a protection from Western fascist elements who conspired to circumvent the “democratic will of the people”.  This strain of reasoning is clearly and logically manifested in the continuity of today´s Russia aggressive policy against Ukraine. Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, disguising it under the same false pretenses of “protection against fascism” – the democratic Ukraine and the West in this case.

 

A GDR-built Trabant car, produced almost unchanged from 1957 to 1990, is a popular mention of the Communist era, stifling not only creativity and innovation but any human desires. Graffiti on the wall of the East Side Gallery.

The line of the original wall, chipped away by hoards of tourists.

A picture of a preserved 70-metre section of the former border strip, photographed from the roof of the Berlin Wall Memorial, located at the historic site on the Bernauer Strasse.

Berlin Wall graffiti art: lifting of borders as an overarching theme.

The motifs are numerous, like that of a fleeing man.

The world-famous Checkpoint Charlie booth, the Berlin Wall crossing point, transferred from its original stand in 1990 to the Allied Museum, which was inaugurated in 1998.

The Berlin Wall is an integral part of the public exhibition at the Topography of Terror history museum, located  on the site of the former Main Security Office of the Nazi Germany.

A watchtower, one of the last relics from the GDR era, can be found north of central train station. It is named in memory of Günter Litfin, who was the first victim to be killed by East German border troops. A memorial, established in 1992 on the initiative of his younger brother, is located in the watchtower.

This notorious painting, called “My God, Help Me to Survive This Deadly Love”, was created in 1990. It depicts Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker in a fraternal kiss, a mimicry of a photograph that captured the moment in 1979.

Division and unity, when put in a broader context. Another piece of graffiti art on the Berlin Wall.

 

Photos and copyright: Alexander Svetlov

 

 

 

 

 

The post The Berlin Wall put in context appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Berlin, as a site and a backdrop of many epochal events, used to play a central role during the East-West confrontations in the 20th century. Nowadays the city turned into coulisse for many historical events, commemorations and discourses. As the past conditions our present, Berlin as a spot is also seen pertinent to the generally and specifically “european” interactions with Ukraine. Common history, as surveyed bellow, connects Ukraine as geographic and socio-political entity with Western Europe, personified by Berlin.

Berlin city plan, as presented at the Berliner Stadt-Modelle (Mitte).

Diorama of the Siege of the Berlin Reichstag by the Soviet Army in 1945 at the Deutsch-Russisches Museum Berlin-Karlshorst.

View from the Flak tower at Humbolthain.

Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam, south of Berlin. It is the last palace built by the House of Hohenzollern that ruled the German Empire until the end of World War I. In 1990 it became part of the UNESCO World Heritage. The palace was used for a summit by the G8 foreign ministers in May 2007.

But first it was the location of the Potsdam Conference in 1945, in which the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States made decisions affecting the  post World War II time. The red star was planted by the Soviets well in advance of the meeting to imply the dominating position.

Negotiation table of the Potsdam Conference.

The view from the second floor.

The Soviet War Memorial in Tiergarten, erected in 1945, within a few months of the capture of the city.

The memorial is a place of active commemoration and a popular tourist attraction.  It is a site of pilgrimage for war veterans from the countries of the former Soviet Union, whereby wreath-laying ceremonies are held at the memorial. The site and adjacent cemetery are maintained by the City of Berlin.

Soviet tanks are renowned, and these constitute an inevitable piece of every WWII commemorative scene.

T-34 model, as built after 1944, at the pedestal at the German-Russian Museum Berlin-Karlshorst, which is the historical venue of the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht on 8 May 1945.

Airplanes, like tanks, are also impressive artifacts. This Handley Page Hastings transport plane deployed by the Royal Air Force is placed at the Allied Museum  museum, which was inaugurated in 1998, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Berlin airlift.

The US Air Force Douglas C-47B “Raisin Bomber” on the roof of the German Museum of Technology.

Tempelhof was one of Europe’s first airports, and its 1 km long main building was once among the top 20 largest buildings on earth.  The whole complex was designed to resemble a flying eagle with semicircular hangars forming the bird’s spread wings. It acquired an iconic status as the centre of the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49. Tempelhof Airport closed all operations in 2008, and the airfield has been subsequently used as a recreational space known as “Tempelhofer Feld”.

First air jets of the early 1950-s, as displayed at the former Royal Air Force Station Gatow (now Bundeswehr Museum of Military History): a Soviet jet…

… and a “Western” jet.

A West-German NATO propagating poster “His comrades are our allies” (Bundeswehr Museum of Military History).

A Soviet officer training an East-German pilot – a monument of the GDR-times. A clear connotation for the younger brother relations within one family, subtly and cunningly propagated in the Communist Bloc. (Bundeswehr Museum of Military History).

One of the cipher machines from the exhibition over the history of espionage and secret services at the Spy Museum, opened in 2015.

The KGB Prison in Potsdam near Berlin, situated in the command quarters of the KGB for Germany, was a detention centre run by the Soviet counter-intelligence. Soviet soldiers,  accused of desertion, espionage or close contact with the population, were imprisoned here until the mid-1980s. Until 1955 Germans were also interned here. The memorial site was opened in 2009.

A ward´s peephole in the cell´s wall.

GDR Museum, the 11th most visited museum in Berlin, is located in the former governmental district of East Germany. Opened in 2006 as a private museum, its exhibition depicts life in the GDR in a direct “hands-on” manner, as it does not focus on every single individual exhibit (of which there are thousands), but rather on the overall atmosphere.

Jewish Museum, opened in 2001, is the largest Jewish museum in Europe. Its modern building is erected in deconstructivist style, which gives the impression of the fragmentation, unpredictability, absence of harmony or symmetry.

The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe consists of a 19,000 m2 site covered with 2,711 concrete slabs, arranged in a grid pattern on a sloping field next to the Brandenburg Gate.

 

Photos and copyright: Alexander Svetlov

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The post The East-West history discourses in the Berlin´s context appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

At a time when the EU is undergoing a number of crises, some seen as existential and provoking an upsurge in theorising on the disintegration of the EU, Luis Bouza and Alvaro Oleart offer intriguing reasons for suggesting there is room for more optimism. In a succinct summary of their larger article, recently published in JCER, Bouza and Oleart here outline their argument that we are witnessing the normalisation of the EU as a polity, such that we can speak of an “empowering’ rather than “constraining” dissensus.

Depiction of TTIP with US and EU flags © Sangoiri / Adobe Stock

EU affairs have been only rarely controversial in Spain. This is an expression of the ‘permissive consensus’ on EU affairs that has been characteristic of many European societies. The campaign for the ‘no’ ahead of the 2005 Spanish EU Constitutional Treaty referendum illustrates the weakness of such debates, since in this case it was only driven by a few alter-globalisation groups such as Ecologistas en Acción (EeA) or ATTAC. Most leading civil society organisations, such as the trade unions CCOO and UGT or ADICAE (a consumer organisation), actively supported the ‘yes’ vote, as well as the political party in Government (PSOE) and the leader of the Opposition (PP).

In stark contrast, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations saw the development of a transnational campaign that gained momentum in various countries in parallel, including in Spain.

The driving forces of the Spanish anti-TTIP campaign are largely the same actors as those active in the 2005 Spanish ‘no’ vote campaign referendum, but this time they reached far beyond their traditional allies. Gaining some salience among media, civil society, trade unions and political parties, in 2016 the manifesto of the Spanish anti-TTIP campaign was signed by 340 organisations, including political parties such as Podemos and institutionalised civil society organisations such as CCOO and Greenpeace. The headline of the manifesto resembled strongly the frames used in the ‘no’ vote campaign: ‘People, the environment and democracy before profits and the rights of corporations’.

It was precisely this conundrum, i.e. why TTIP became a controversial issue in Spain, considering the generally ‘permissive consensus’ stance of Spanish civil society, that drove our most recent research project, the results of which were recently published in JCER.

In that article, we argue that the change of positions of Spanish civil society actors in relation to the EU in the case of TTIP can be explained by a change in the field of European affairs in Spain, a highly suggestive notion considering the degree of continuity in the identity of the entrepreneurs of the anti-TTIP campaign in relation to past EU-critical mobilisations.

Whereas during the 2000s the field of EU affairs in Spain was characterised by the involvement of only a few professionalised organisations along with some alter-globalisation activists, the STOP TTIP mobilisation constituted a turning point. Two streams of civil society activists that do not often mobilise together, institutionalised actors (such as CCOO or anti-poverty networks) and protest actors (EeA or ATTAC), combined their efforts to contest TTIP in what constituted the largest EU-critical mobilisation to date in Spain.

Even more notably, organisations not usually involved in political protest, such as professional associations of judges and taxi drivers, joined the network.

Figure 1 Network of the Spanish anti-TTIP campaign

Through a combination of methods, using semi-structured interviews and network analysis, we show that the Spanish anti-TTIP campaign has engendered a new type of resource in the Spanish civil society field vis-à-vis EU affairs: the ability to mobilise citizens on EU issues at the national level. We have also published an article on this subject, about how different actors have so far used the European Citizens’ Initiative.

Figure 1 represents the network of actors involved in the Spanish anti-TTIP campaign. This figure is a one-mode network (all members are actors except the central node, which represents the Spanish anti-TTIP campaign) representing the national campaign against TTIP. It includes organisations that have no European connections and were not involved in previous EU debates, such as associations of taxi drivers or public health workers.

The different colours represent different types of relationships: the turquoise links imply contacts in the context of the campaign in the form of engagement in debates and other informal exchanges. The yellow links imply formal membership in a coalition, whereas the red imply strategic collective action such as shared resources, coordinated action or leadership in the organisation of a coalition.

Our empirical analysis confirms that a small group of cause entrepreneurs (essentially led by EeA) managed to bring along powerful actors towards their EU-critical anti-TTIP campaign. Such a significant change can largely be explained by the increasing politicisation of Spanish civil society vis-à-vis the EU, induced initially by the 2011 Indignados movement.

Later, the politicisation of the EU was expanded by the anti-TTIP coalition, led by EU-critical cause entrepreneurs (ATTAC Spain and EeA), that amplified the movement’s frames of protest towards the EU. Spanish civil society actors increasingly see and treat the EU as a normal polity rather than as a benevolent entity. As a result, it is possible to challenge its policies without being labelled as ‘Eurosceptic’.

There is a body of literature that argues that the politicisation of EU issues will lead from a ‘permissive consensus’ to a national ‘constraining dissensus’ in terms of an increased political cost of EU decision making.

Instead, we argue that the introduction of EU-critical ideas can lead to an ‘empowering dissensus’. Dissensus is in our view empowering actors at the national level to influence EU policies, because the ability to mobilise citizens on EU issues – a rare resource for most Brussels-based organisations – acquires a renewed importance. The politicisation of EU policies at the national level would then be a symptom of the normalisation of the EU as a playing field. Rather than ‘constraining’ EU decision-making by the lack of consensus, dissensus can enlarge the field beyond the national political arena and ‘empower’ European issues to be considered matters worth discussing at the national level.

This introduction of political conflict over EU issues at the national level normalises the EU as a polity, and is therefore good news for European democracy.

This article is based on the authors’ article in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies (JCER) Vol 14 No 2. 

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, JCER or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2Nxv9b8

Luis Bouza | @luisbouzagarcia
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Luis Bouza is an assistant professor in Political Science at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. His main field of interest is the emergence of European debates in the public sphere. He is the author of ‘Participatory Democracy Civil Society in the EU: Agenda-Setting and Institutionalisation’ (Palgrave Macmillan).

Alvaro Oleart | @alvarooleart
Université Libre de Bruxelles (IEE-ULB)

Alvaro Oleart is a PhD researcher in political communication at the Institute for European Studies of the Université Libre de Bruxelles (IEE-ULB). His main field of interest is the European public sphere and the role of civil society in the EU policy-making.

 

The post From 2005’s ‘Permissive Consensus’ to TTIP’s ‘Empowering Dissensus’: The EU as a Playing Field for Spanish Civil Society appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This week Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless trade with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.

SNP MP, Angus Brendan MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were “pie in the sky”. Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky.

Before the referendum Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.

Of course, it’s not going to happen.

What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?

The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May’s pie in the sky proposals.

So here’s the bottom line. Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU. We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.

We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.

Has this sunk in yet?

We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.

We’re going to pay around £40 billion (the so-called ‘divorce settlement’) – money that will come from us, you and me – to try and achieve what we’ve got, but less of it, and on considerably inferior terms.

This is complete and utter madness. It will be much better to just keep the current arrangement. It will be cheaper, and we will all be better off.

• As an EU member:

① We have a say and votes in the running, rules and future direction of our continent. ② We have full and free access to the world’s largest free marketplace. ③ We enjoy the right to live, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent. ④ We enjoy state healthcare and education when living and working in any other EU country. ⑤ We enjoy free or low-cost health care when visiting any EU nation. ⑥ We are protected by continent-wide rights that protect us at work, when shopping and travelling. ⑦ We benefit from laws that protect our environment (and have, for example, directly resulted in Britain’s beaches being cleaned up). ⑧ We enjoy excellent EU trade agreements with around 60 countries, with more on the way, on advantageous terms that Britain is unlikely ever to replicate.

So, we’re going to throw that all away, just so we can get an inferior arrangement with the EU, in which we’d still have to agree to the rules of EU trade (over which we’d have no say) and we’d have less access to our most vital customers and suppliers outside of our home market.

We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.

We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.

What’s the point? There’s no point.

There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work.

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Pie in the sky Brexit

→ Brexit won't work. Get it? – Please sharePIE IN THE SKY BREXIT – Video and articleThis week Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless trade with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.SNP MP, Angus Brendan MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were "pie in the sky". Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky. Before the referendum Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.Of course, it’s not going to happen.What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May's pie in the sky proposals.So here’s the bottom line. Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU. We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.Has this sunk in yet?We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.We’re going to pay around £40 billion (the so-called ‘divorce settlement’) – money that will come from us, you and me – to try and achieve what we’ve got, but less of it, and on considerably inferior terms.This is complete and utter madness. It will be much better to just keep the current arrangement. It will be cheaper, and we will all be better off.As an EU member:① We have a say and votes in the running, rules and future direction of our continent.② We have full and free access to the world’s largest free marketplace.③ We enjoy the right to live, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent.④ We enjoy state healthcare and education when living and working in any other EU country.⑤ We enjoy free or low-cost health care when visiting any EU nation.⑥ We are protected by continent-wide rights that protect us at work, when shopping and travelling.⑦ We benefit from laws that protect our environment (and have, for example, directly resulted in Britain’s beaches being cleaned up).⑧ We enjoy excellent EU trade agreements with around 60 countries, with more on the way, on advantageous terms that Britain is unlikely ever to replicate.So, we’re going to throw that all away, just so we can get an inferior arrangement with the EU, in which we’d still have to agree to the rules of EU trade (over which we’d have no say) and we’d have less access to our most vital customers and suppliers outside of our home market.We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.What’s the point? There’s no point.There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work.• Words and video by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter.twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1020200409347100672********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. Instructions to ensure you get notifications of all our stories:1. Click on the ‘Following’ button under the Reasons2Remain banner2. Change the ‘Default’ setting by clicking ‘See first’.********************************************• Please rate Reasons2Remain out of 5 stars. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Thursday, 19 July 2018

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