Ideas on Europe Blog

I’ll be frank with you: I’ve never done a full party conference. Some fringe activities, yes, but not the whole shebang. Indeed, the nearest I’ve got is the pile of DVDs of an early 2000s UKIP conference, back when I worked more on euroscepticism (and when UKIP sold DVDs of their conference).

This is all a prelude to saying that I also don’t think that party conferences matter as much as some say.

In media terms, they are convenient staging posts in the year, with all the merits of having the key players in one place for long enough that they might let their hair down a bit. In political terms, the gathering also allows for plotting and planning.

But for European policy, conference is almost never the place to look. None of the major interventions in either Brexit or the pre-Cameroonian period came from conference, but from stand-alone speeches and events.

That’s largely because both Conservatives and Labour are split, have been split and (probably) will continue to be split on matters European. And basic party management says you don’t wash your dirty laundry when everyone’s watching.

I write this despite having marked Birmingham as one of the key staging posts to an Article 50 deal (along with Salzburg). On reflection, that was because I thought by Birmingham, Tory Chequers-rebels would have had to have made their move, rather than at the conference proper.

That they didn’t – possibly couldn’t – reflects my long-held view that May is the convenient scapegoat, carrying the UK out next March with whatever’s needed to avoid immediate disaster, only to be cast aside by critics who will point to their grumblings now as evidence of “why this was never the right way to go about it.” Why own the problem when someone else is there to carry the can for you?

It also underlines how wedded to Chequers May has become. Ironically, the range of criticism seems to have made it easier for her to bluster through her conference speech, redirecting fire at second-referendumers and connecting Brexit to a domestic project. Conference season appears to have had no appreciable impact on her policy.

This is Brussels calling

But this is not to say that policy isn’t changing.

The coming week is going to see a lot of work going into Article 50 negotiations, building up to next Wednesday’s release of a draft Political Declaration by the EU.

That work will entail movement by both sides, but also some careful framing of what is happening.

Importantly, the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration aren’t going to embody ‘Chequers’, in the sense that the focus of the former is on the ending of the UK’s EU membership and the focus of the latter is a set of principles guiding the negotiations for a future relationship. Those principles do not necessarily – maybe even necessarily cannot – map out the specific shape of that relationship, given the incompleteness of both sides’ positions.

Thus the Article 50 ‘deal’ potentially could be sold not as ‘Chequers’, but as a stepping stone to what comes next. For all those Tory rebels and opposition parties planning to ‘vote against Chequers‘, this might come either as a nasty surprise or as a means to get themselves out of a hole (given that there’s little enthusiasm for a no-deal alternative).

With rumours of new options on the Irish dimension flying about, it is going to be in Brussels that this next stage of Brexit is going to be determined, rather than Birmingham (or even London).

This was both inevitable and necessary.

Brexit was never just about the UK, but also about the UK’s relationship with the EU. To pretend that as long as the British had worked out what they wanted, that was that, was always a foolish enterprise. Instead, it needs the involvement of both the UK and EU in finding mutually-acceptable solutions.

If that much is now better recognised by British politicians and commentators as a result of the past and coming weeks, then we should count that as an advance in our public understanding of how the EU (and Brexit) works.

Perhaps also it will underline how the contingent issue of Brexit (and it’s a huge contingency) sits within the bigger picture of the UK’s place in the world.

I’ll fall back on that trope of self-help instagram posts – “no man is an island entire of itself” – with its message that connections and context are indispensable.

And then I’ll remind you that this particular stanza finishes with the equally famous line about who the bell is tolling.

 

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Apart from protection from hostile forces, security also refers to a wide range of other issues, such as the absence of harm, the presence of an essential good, quality or conditions in which equitable and sustainable relationships can develop within political systems, institutions and states.

 

There are various hazards, faced by the Ukrainian state in the region of Transcarpathia (Zakarpattya), rich in cultures, ethnicities, political preferences and bordering Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The challenges of insuring constitutional order, prevention of separatism by co-opting and locking-in, surprisingly, could be done by promotion of neopatrimonial ties, clientalism, patronage and policies of controlled corruption and other informal mechanisms.

 

In the December 1991 referendum 78% of the region´s voters approved a proposal for Transcarpathian autonomy. Rather than employing force, the Ukrainian state exerted other kinds of control on local officials. Regional movements were defused through co-opting and brokeraging mechanisms, in which local politicians were included into the political networks with the center, whereby the voices demanding autonomy were stifled.

 

Dissatisfaction and high aspirations for separate identity recognition and redistribution of resources and power present obstacles for stability internationally and successful nation-building/consolidation domestically. Various political groups thus tend to vigorously compete for their right to influence the level of societal (in)security. Since 1991 Ukraine demonstrated an easily identifiable polarization along regional and cultural lines. These cleavages attained political dimension through regionally based political parties. This polarization often led the country to the brink of political confrontation. An examination of this regional case shows the importance of the actual control means in the ability to defuse separatist movements.

 

Regionalism is the constant factor in Ukrainian political life, and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. The country’s principal regional cleavages are result of a historically separate political development under heavy foreign domination. In this context, unconstitutional establishment of autonomy structures may inflame tensions and raise various hazards, as groups may mobilize different ethnicities around the issue. Furthermore, once an autonomous structure has been established, it can easily serve as an institutional foundation for separatist movements and inflate claims. Region´s elites advancing their own political careers may use autonomy as a vehicle for the mobilization of ethnicity, thus producing violent conflict.

 

Authoritarian governments often view autonomy claims as a zero-sum game, responding harshly and provoking further resistance. Violent conflict may also be more likely under authoritarian regimes because minority groups often fear that extreme action will be the only way to produce a response from such a government. More democratic regimes, however, are more likely to deal with demands more pragmatically, with a strategy resulting in non-violent compromise. In the state hierarchy, based on the Weberian legacy, the center is stronger than the periphery and commands the local agents, who entertain control on the exercise of power in the region. The exceptions to this model may include the situation, where local actors hold stronger de facto control, often by informal means.

 

Ukraine´ state leadership successfully exercised informal mechanisms of control in relation to the periphery. It allowed and even encouraged corruption by local elites. But the state also collected information on illicit activities of local elites and carefully stored it. When directives from the center were given to local elites for implementation, the locals had nothing but to comply in order to avoid criminal prosecution.  Another means of control was the promise of jobs and positions to individuals who support central policies of elites. These types of patronage control are quite effective and inexpensive, compared to direct coercion.

 

Hub-and-spoke pattern of a network with little connection between subunits is a more effective way of control, compared with other. This type of structure balanced the power in favour of the center, as regional actors had to go through the center in order to communicate with each other, and “blackmail state” could effectively forbid collusion between regional actors.

 

The elite that emerged in independent Ukraine came out of the old Soviet-era nomenklatura bred in a neo-patrimonial culture. Thus in Ukraine emerged the system of party of power, characterised by dependence on state, rather formal ideology, barely realized in practice, and strong linkage to specific interest groups, who increasingly took control of political power. The parties were not meant to become autonomous political forces in their own right, but were utilised by the center. They also served the regime in upholding a network of patronage relationships with the major socio-political, economic and administrative actors.  At the same time Ukraine has not managed to achieve a level of national consolidation where regional and national identities could be complementary rather than competitive.

Alexander Svetlov

 

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Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

Perceptions of vulnerability within small states can lead to stronger national identity, but also to affiliations with bigger organisation, such as the EU, which grant external shelter. Using Scotland as an example, Alastair Mackie asks whether these dynamics can impact European identity among citizens of small states.

Scottish parliament building at Holyrood, Edinburgh © TheStockCube/AdobeStock

‘Chèrs collègues, do not let Scotland down!’ Scottish MEP and member of the Scottish National Party Alyn Smith received a standing ovation for his speech in the European Parliament on the 28th of June 2016.

He was eager to point out that 62% of Scottish voters had chosen to remain in the European Union. Smith also mentioned that he considers himself to be both Scottish and European. The Brexit vote marked the beginning of a new argument being used by those seeking Scottish independence: that Scotland will be taken out of the EU against its will.

Two years earlier, in the run-up to the referendum on Scottish independence, continued EU membership was still used as an argument against independence. Clearly, the role of the EU within the debate has changed.

Although the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence resulted in a strong wish to remain in the United Kingdom, a large number of people in Scotland continue to support independence and hope for a second referendum. In this second independence referendum campaign, Brexit and the European Union would inevitably feature heavily.

I am interested in the role of European identity in this debate. How have the independence and EU membership referendums influenced the perception of European identity in Scotland? Will Europe’s role in the formation of local identity change?

In January 2018, I started a PhD project which is to be an ethnological study on small state perception of European identity. Here, I present the framework I will use for my study.

An independent Scotland would be a relatively small state in Europe, and as other small states, it would have to work around the consequences of its size. It has been argued that small states are more vulnerable than larger states due to their limited (natural, human, military, etc.) resources. Such states therefore need to find strategies to counteract this vulnerability. There are two common strategies: (1) the building of an internal buffer by focussing the interests of the state and remaining flexible; and (2) by taking external shelter with a larger state or international organisation, such as the European Union.

Small state studies have predominantly focussed on these political and economic consequences of state’s size, not as much has been done on how size influences identity within the state. It has been argued that a perception of vulnerability within small states might contribute to a stronger sense of national identity. If we follow that argument, a vulnerable small state with a strong national identity should seek political and/or economic shelter by joining the European Union. However, it is unclear what the impact of such perceived vulnerability is on the formation and perception of European identity within small states.

Identity can be understood as being created by the stories we tell ourselves and others. These stories form the boundaries that define us and our communities (the Self), and those outside them (the Other). European identity, like other collective identities, can be understood as a shared narrative that controls the boundaries of a network of actors, as argued by Klaus Eder. Different understandings of European identity are based on differences in how this narrative is constructed in relation to Europe. By researching narrative networks, we can learn the role of Europe in people’s identity construction and how it might relate to perceptions of size and vulnerability. To conduct such a study, a bottom-up, ethnological approach is necessary, which focusses on people’s personal narratives of Europe.

In his speech, Alyn Smith emphasized progressive values shared by Scotland and Europe: ‘I want my country to be internationalist, cooperative, ecological, fair, European.’ By doing so, Smith used Scotland’s ‘Europeanness’ to make a clear distinction between it and the majority of the UK which voted for Brexit. In other words, his European identity was supporting his vision for an independent Scotland. It will be interesting to see whether this attitude is widespread among Scots.

Scotland is of course not a state, even though it already functions as one because of the devolved status of its parliament. But the possibility of it becoming one while its relationship with the EU is being questioned at the same time has put into focus the questions I would like to research: (1) what role does Europe play in the identity formation of small state’s citizens, (2) how do perceived size and vulnerability influence the perception of Europe and (3) how is the perception of Europe used to counteract the perceived vulnerability of the state’s citizens?

These research questions will form the basis of ethnographic fieldwork I will be undertaking during 2019. By means of participant-observation and ethnographic interviews in a variety of communities around Scotland, I aim to learn about how people’s narratives of Europe are used in connection to their local narratives.

Although I will start by focussing on Scotland, the findings of the research may be applied to other small European states at a later stage. The results of the project will offer a new perspective on how Europe is understood in small states.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Alastair Mackie is a PhD candidate at Heriot-Watt University investigating how European identity is perceived in small states, with a particular focus on Scotland.

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In her new book, based on long-standing research on the politics of nuclear energy in the European Union, Pam Barnes, associate researcher at the EU-Asia Institute (ESSCA School of Management) retraces how public perceptions and political discourses on nuclear power have evolved since the signing of the EURATOM treaty in 1957.

Researching developments in EU environmental and energy policies from the early 2000s I became increasingly aware that the EU’s evolving energy and climate strategy included the use of nuclear energy. But I was confronted by a riddle. How could something that seemed to have so much early promise have created so many controversies? Indeed the use of nuclear fission technology to generate electricity in the European Union is arguably the most controversial of all the available electricity generating technologies: nuclear energy deeply divides public opinion both within and between the EU’s member states.

In the early 2000s civil use of nuclear as an energy resource had been portrayed by the European Commission as ‘a less than perfect energy option…’ linked as it was to military use of the technology. At that time, levels of support for the sector still suffered from the widespread devastation caused by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. As the 2000s advanced, however, a number of factors combined to lend a new credibility to nuclear energy.

I began to question why this change had taken place and what the implications of the change might mean for the future of the nuclear energy sector in the European Union. Today, the peak periods of reactor development in the EU European states have clearly ended but this does not mean the demise of nuclear energy in the EU. As a consequence, the structures that have been developed within the EU for safety and research cooperation and collaboration, supported by the often over-looked 1957 European Atomic Energy Community Treaty [Euratom], continue to have value and must be maintained.

The economic, political and social environments for the nuclear sector in the EU are very different in the twenty-first century from those of the mid twentieth century when European governments began to support the use of the technology to generate electricity. There has been no significant large-scale reactor building programme since the 1990s in the EU, with many currently operating reactors being at risk of closure before the end of their operating licenses. At the end of 2017 only 4 reactors were under construction in EU countries with major controversies surrounding a small number of planned developments.

Some EU states evidence a long standing and deeply held opposition to the use of the technology [Austria, Denmark]. Germany’s energy transition programme the ‘Energiewende’ is based on twin objectives – to move from fossil fuels to a largely carbon free sector and at the same time to phase out nuclear generation of electricity by 2022. Even in France, second only to the US as a producer and user of nuclear energy globally, a decision was taken in 2015 to cut back on the use of the technology from 75% of electricity generated to 50% by 2025, although more recent debates in the French government suggest the target year will rather be 2035.

This does not however signal the end of use of nuclear technology to generate electricity in the EU. The process of enlargement from 2004 to 2013 increased the number of EU member states where nuclear energy was generated and used. Enlargement of the EU also increased the challenges of EU energy dependency and the search for indigenous energy resources. Nuclear energy relies on small amounts of imported uranium and with the potential for re-processing nuclear energy could arguably be included as an indigenous resource. As such, nuclear energy has a role to play in providing energy security at a time of high import dependency.

But the most important factor gathering support for continued use of the technology has been the questionable identification of nuclear energy as a sustainable, low carbon, and thus desirable, energy resource in the transition to a low carbon economy in Europe.

Despite spectacular growth in the use of renewable technologies, green technologies are portrayed as incapable of reducing fossil fuel consumption in European countries in the short to medium term. Indeed in most policy scenarios the search for an environmentally and economically sustainable energy resource to replace fossil fuels includes consideration of nuclear generation of electricity.

The longer-term future for nuclear energy in the EU appears to be as a resource in an increasingly diversified energy mix as more use of renewable technologies is made. The outcome may bring a new dimension to the European nuclear sector with a focus on more limited electricity generation but with increased levels of employment in a range of varied technology developments associated with small modular reactors, fusion technology and the growth of de-commissioning and waste management programmes and facilities.

In any event using nuclear technology will be reliant on a combination of consensus in the political discourse and acceptance in the public discourse. It depends on the credibility of emerging storylines in the narrative that portray nuclear energy as capable of making a significant contribution to curbing greenhouse gas emissions and providing energy security, both of which are contested arguments. Public attitudes to the use of nuclear technology remain divided but re-framing the discourse in terms of the threat from climate change has brought with it an element of acceptance and some of those previously vehemently opposed to nuclear energy are ‘thinking again’. The discourse presents a ‘win-win’ situation from using nuclear electricity as it is depicted as a significant provider of volume base-load energy that limits greenhouse gas emissions and enables access to electricity at a stable price. But this political discourse would appear to have been captured by a narrative that represents ‘cynical idealism’ [global warming and environmental protection need the use of nuclear technology, irrespective of economic costs and public concerns] and pragmatic acceptance [energy demands may only be met by the use of nuclear technology], rather than unconditional and enthusiastic public support.

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It’s not because the messenger is particularly unpleasant that the message is necessarily wrong. And its not because many of his messages are plain lies, narcissistic bragging or whining paranoia that each and every message is automatically beside the point.

This may be, in an admittedly crude nutshell, one of the main lessons for Europeans in its dealing with Donald Trump. Almost two years into the Trump presidency, the research seminar on the current state of transatlantic relations held on 21 September at the Paris campus of ESSCA School of Management (and which I had the pleasure to attend) was an excellent opportunity to bring together again some of the authors of the excellent special issue on transatlantic relations put together by Anna Dimitrova in spring 2017 for L’Europe en formation, the bilingual quarterly on European Integration and Federalism studies.

Kristian Nielsen

As Kristian L. Nielsen from Copenhagen Business School rightly reminded the audience, ‘Trump is a fact of life’ and Europeans in general (and European political leaders in particular) would be well advised to ‘keep their emotions’. In the field of security and defence policy, for instance, it was under Barack Obama’s presidency that European NATO members committed to reach the 2% of GDP threshold in defence spending. Trump may be wrong in many details about the functioning (and actually the purpose of NATO), but he definitely ‘has a point’ in reminding Europeans that they are currently not assuming their responsibilities.

And fact-checking Jean-Claude Juncker’s argument according to which EU member-states are so much more generous when one includes development and humanitarian aid in the equation reveals the embarrassing truth that the figures don’t quite add up in his sense.

As for Germany – who is certainly not short on money – Angela Merkel’s growing awareness that ‘the times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over’ and that ‘Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands’ has so far not been followed by really significant measures to upgrade the Bundeswehr, whose equipment is reportedly in a pitiful state. For Kristian Nielsen, blaming the traditionally pacifist German public opinion or a lack of absorption capacity for inactivity in this field boils down to an increasingly objectionable pretext for not being up to one’s own commitments.

Thomas Hoerber agreed. As he pointed out in his paper, ‘the peace dividend of the 1990’s is no longer there, and the world has become a more dangerous place.’ Trump-style populism, with its high dose of anti-intellectualism, and his utter lack of reliability, does not contribute to making it safer again. Trust, once lost, is not so easy to obtain again. I guess that much will depend on how the US institutions and political class will digest the Trump years (whenever these will be over…).

In the meantime, as Thomas recalled, history shows that the Trump administration’s translation in financial terms of ‘the return of realism in international politics’ – the permanent request for a ‘Return-on-Investment’ – is nothing essentially new: ‘John Foster Dulles, in the 1950s, was even more serious on this point’. What strikes Thomas as new, however, is the rather permanent rhetoric battle against European integration. A very worrying trend indeed – who needs an enemy when you have a best friend like this?

Anna Dimitrova

Worrying, but explicable. According to Anna Dimitrova’s meticulous analysis of the four major facets of American foreign policy strategy, Trump’s ‘MAGA’ mantra is not just a baseball cap slogan, but can be understood as a ‘resurgence of Jacksonianism’, a 21st-century update of the seventh president of the United States. Trump’s mix of ‘neo-isolationism-sovereignism-unilateralism-protectionism’ is not all of his own making but strikes a chord in US foreign policy history.

What did I take home from this thought-provoking exchange?

Mainly that now is a moment to keep calm. But also one to worry on. Focusing on transatlantic relation, on how they are currently suffering under Trump and how their deterioration may actually provide a welcome push for Europeans to intensify their cooperation on security and defence issues, turns our eye away from the greatest damage that Trump may be causing in the long run: the harm he is doing, day after day, to democracy itself. By shredding truth to pieces and creating ‘alternative facts’, by turning other powers than the executive into ‘enemies of the people’, by polarising and radicalising a political debate that no longer deserves this name.

Transatlantic relations always had their ups and downs. In the long run, even major disagreements can be fixed, that’s what diplomacy is for. But these relations always have included various forms of cultural transfer, too. It’s in the spill-over of what is currently happening to liberal, pluralistic democracy in the United States that the real reason to worry lies.

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Poland and Hungary are the main members of the Visegrad group. They have common cultural and political interests and have shown similar standpoints on the EU’s migrant relocation scheme or the burden sharing policy, but they starkly differ on whether to do business with Russia or America. In fact last week we witnessed that Hungary is opting for Russia’s Putin, while America’s Trump was Poland’s choice in forming new economic and security alliances. Most crucially however both of these countries are facing the Article 7 procedure of the Treaty of the European Union.

Just to give a little bit of background to the most talked about Article 7 of the EU Treaty; it was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty so to mitigate and prevent member states from backsliding on European values and the rule of law. It is activated against a member state, when it has been thought that there is “a clear risk” of an EU member state breaching the bloc’s core values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. It includes two mechanisms: preventive measures, if there is a clear risk of a breach of EU values; and sanctions, if such a breach has already occurred.

However activating the Article 7 is not the first option in the context of handling the misbehaving member states—there is the process of Rule of Law Framework of 2014. The European Commission adopted this process when it felt confronted with crisis events in some EU countries that revealed systemic threats to the rule of law. The objective of the Rule of Law is to prevent emerging threats to the rule of law to escalate to the point where the Commission has to trigger the mechanisms of Article 7.  This is done through dialogue which consists of three key stages: Commission assessment; Commission recommendation and monitoring of the EU country’s follow-up to the Commission’s recommendation. If no solution is found within the rule of law framework, Article 7 of the TEU is the last resort to resolve a crisis and to ensure the EU country complies with EU values.

In the case of Poland, initially the European Commission launched an inquiry under its new Rule of Framework into whether Poland’s government has breached the EU’s democratic standards. This was followed by a number of recommendations to the Polish government as to how they could improve the situation in Poland, as well as in the hope of forming a constructive dialogue with the Law and Justice Party (PiS) . However when its efforts fell on deaf ears, in December 2017 the Commission proposed to activate the Article 7 of the EU treaty against Poland and then in January 2018 Members of the European Parliament voted by a large majority in favor of urging the EU to put Poland on the path toward sanctions for breaching the bloc’s laws by passing constitutional reforms that undermine the independence of the judiciary. Whereas in the case of Hungary, most recently the Article 7 was launched against Hungary on 12th September 2018, when the European Parliament passed a motion, with 448 votes in favor and 197 against, declaring that Hungary is at risk of breaching the core values of the Union – judicial independence, freedom of expression, academic freedom, rights of minorities and others, in other words approving Sargetini’s report of April 2018.

So far Poland and Hungary have presented an uncompromising attitudes towards this process; in fact the PiS and the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) continue to fiercely defend their controversial reforms or policy choices. This means that the EU is left with activating the subsequent stages of the Article 7. 

Ultimately what drastic action the Article 7 allows the EU to take is impose sanctions against Poland and Hungary, such as suspension of its voting rights in the European Council. This is however unlikely to happen since sanctions require a unanimous sign-off from EU governments. It is believed that both of these countries will support each other out by blocking the process. That said the Bulgarian government also expressed their support for Hungary if and when the process comes to that stage.

So what is the point then?

As seen from the above the processes of the both Rule of Law Framework and Article 7 are time consuming and involves meticulous work on the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s part. However it does not look like they are making any impressions on the Polish and Hungarian governments, since they continue business as usual. Then one asks: what is the point of activating the Article 7 against Poland and Hungary if there is not going to be any consequences for their departure from the core values of the EU.

I believe these processes are successful about putting pressure on the member states like Poland and Hungary. Since these processes produce vast amount of expert knowledge and information about the details of what reforms and the policy the PiS and Fidesz are making, the general public, journalists, policy-analysts,non-governmental organisations and the governments of other member states and non member states do get informed about these countries and their standings in the EU. Having legal frictions with the European Commission and the European Parliament do not only damage these countries’ standing in the international relations, but it is also a cause of concern for the countries that the Polish and the Hungarian governments would want to do business with. Clearly the Polish and the Hungarian governments have not yet felt negative implications of their policy choices in their relations with other countries, but this may be on the horizon for them.

Additionally, one reason why these countries are uncompromising for now is because they have a strong sense that at the next European Parliament elections the right-wing and anti-migration political parties will increase share of seats in the European Parliament, which will then strengthen the PiS’s and Fidesz’s hands in the European Parliament and at the EU level. Recent study however has shown that there is not a surge for the right-wing political parties in Europe as it is suggested in the Media and by some academics. Thus I believe after the next European Parliament elections, the PiS and Fidesz will begin to put their policy choices in line with the core values of the EU. 

Of course, let’s wait and see.

 

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This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018 (12-13 July, KU Leuven, Belgium)

While progress has been made, the EU-Mercosur association agreement still struggles to get off the ground. Bruno Theodoro Luciano argues that some of the greatest challenges are the insufficient discussion of political cooperation as well as the EU’s preferential treatment of Brazil.

Mercosur Parliament, Montevideo © Dario Ricardo / Adobe Stock

Over the past few years, after almost two decades of negotiation, the EU-Mercosur association agreement is very close to be concluded. However, both sides recognise that there are still some key standing issues to be resolved before reaching a political commitment. This article argues that although the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur association agreement is closer, important issues remain open, which could once again paralyse these bi-regional negotiations. Moreover, the privileged Strategic Partnership with Brazil might hinder the potential of EU-Mercosur relations to move beyond a mere free trade agreement, towards a more political and multi-dimensioned dialogue.

Negotiations started in 1999, in a very different context for both regions: Mercosur countries aimed to counterbalance trade talks with the United States in the framework of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The EU saw Mercosur as a promising regional integration project in the Americas, as well as a relevant market to be explored. However, due to protectionism on both sides, the negotiations reached a deadlock in 2004. Although formally revived in 2010, the EU-Mercosur agreement only gained a new momentum more recently, from 2016 onwards. The political changes observed within South American countries, especially in Argentina and Brazil, altered Mercosur’s political agenda. Therefore, trade liberalisation via the negotiations of trade agreement with external actors became a foreign policy priority in the region.

For the EU, the paralysis of the commercial negotiations with the United States via the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – most remarkably since the beginning of the Trump administration – pushed the European Commission to intensify and diversify its trade agenda with other global partners. Therefore, the EU readjusted its external trade strategy, aiming to both sign new trade agreements with countries as Canada, Japan and Korea, and to conclude negotiations previously paralysed such as the association agreement negotiated with Mercosur.

While Mercosur countries such as Brazil have in the 2000s invested in deeper relations with other nations from the Global South, especially with the other members of the BRICS countries (Russia, India, China and South Africa), the EU in the past years had to deal with its successive crises (financial, economic, migratory), being Brexit the most recent one. Now, contextual transformations in both regions, led to the strengthening of a relationship that was never prioritised by either sides.

The bi-regional deal would represent one of the world’s biggest trade agreements ever signed. However, there are still some important chapters of the negotiations to be closed. As stated by the European Commission after the conclusion of the June 2018 round of negotiations, areas such as cars and car parts, geographical indications, maritime transport and dairy still require further discussion. Moreover, the section on subsidies is still a problematic chapter of the negotiations, even though the EU has presented a revised proposal to Mercosur countries.

Besides trade, the initial set up of the EU-Mercosur agreement included two additional spheres, cooperation and political dialogue, as the main pillars for the future bi-regional relationship. Neither was thoroughly addressed during the last rounds of negotiations. However, the proposal submitted by the EU to include a ‘regional integration clause’ might point to the direction of adding more political aspects of a so far very much commercial talk. In this sense, the future of EU-Mercosur relations within the areas beyond trade are not clear-cut.

Furthermore, the EU and Brazil (biggest Mercosur country) signed a Strategic Partnership in 2007, which may hinder the potential of Mercosur to become a more relevant regional actor. This agreement expanded bilateral relations between the EU and Brazil in many sectorial dialogues, marginalising the rest of Mercosur countries from the discussion of many multilateral issues with the EU. Privileging individual relations with Brazil has raised discourses of fragmentation and rivalry within Mercosur countries, especially with regard to Argentina, Mercosur’s second biggest country.

Considering the previous stalemates of these bi-regional negotiations, the conclusion of EU-Mercosur agreement is not a guaranteed outcome. Sensitive sectors in both regions might still stall the negotiations depending on the level of concessions given in key areas such as agriculture and beef. Also, the future electoral outcomes in Brazil might turn again the political wind of the region and also undermine the negotiating progress recently achieved. In addition, the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU may alter the political pendulum within the EU’s decision-making, reducing the European support to conclude free trade agreements worldwide.

Nonetheless, the eventual conclusion of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement might not substantially transform the nature of this bi-regional agenda. Even though South American countries are nowadays more open to trade liberalisation, the region is much more interested in integrating its market to the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular to China, which has recently become the top trade partner of several Latin American countries. Moreover, the conclusion of EU-Mercosur agreement will probably follow the tendencies observed within the EU’s relations with the rest of Latin America. Although the EU has signed many trade agreements with the countries and regional blocks of the region, the signature of these deals has not necessarily pushed forward the relationship of Europe with Latin America to new domains, indicating how both regions, despite contextual changes, have not been a priority to each other.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2xk7J2P

Bruno Theodoro Luciano is a Doctoral Researcher in Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. He was a visiting researcher at the Institute for Latin American Studies (ILAS), German Institute of Global Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, and at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research focuses on regional integration and regionalism and he is developing a PhD investigation on the institutional development of regional parliaments in Europe, Latin America and Africa.

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One year ago, on 20 September 2017, I gave a talk for Stratford4Europe called, CAN BRITAIN STOP BREXIT?

In my 50-minute presentation, which included over 100 graphics and historical video clips, I gave a resolute response to the title of the talk:

“Yes. Britain can stop Brexit, if that’s what Britain wants. Anything democracy decides, democracy can also undo.”

But, I pointed out, the more important question is:

‘Should Britain stop Brexit?’

In my presentation, already watched by tens of thousands of people, I explain how the EU was started, how Britain joined, and how we’re now leaving based on an entirely flawed referendum.

All the points in my talk are as valid today as one year ago – more so, because we are now possibly just weeks away from Brexit reaching a point of no return.

For anyone who wants a clearer understanding of how Brexit represents the biggest con in recent British history, please watch and share this video. Here’s an easy-to-remember URL link so you can tell all your friends, family, colleagues and associates:

CanBritainStopBrexit.com

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Away from Salzburg and its repeat performance of ‘how we don’t really understand each other‘, the question that I’m getting asked a lot is whether there can be a second referendum.

This is an interesting one, because it’s often asked of me by people who’d like to see the end of Brexit and a return to How Things Were. In that sense, it’s a bit of an advance on fighting the first referendum, time and again.

That’s not to say it’s a bad thing to pursue, but rather to invite some reflection on the politics of it all and especially the framing.

Why do it?

Importantly, much hangs on why a second referendum would be happening at all, since at present there is very little chance of this government taking this course of action.

That matters because right now the people pushing for it, as I’ve just mentioned, are those who clearly would like a result that allowed a stop to the process of leaving. The overnight comments of the Czech and Maltese PMs that they’d also support such a vote merely reinforces that impression.

If Theresa May were now to accept the need for a vote, it would go much against what she has previously argued and worked to, namely as limited as number of people making decisions as possible: remember how hard she fought against even just Parliament having a role.

For that to change, May would have to find herself fully out of alternative options, probably after a hostile Parliament left her no other choice. Despite everything, that still looks a long way off.

As long as a second vote looks more like a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, it will struggle to have the credibility of the 2016 referendum (insert any punchline you feel like here), at least in the sense of having a fighting chance to overturn that decision.

How to do it?

That problem is heightened by the very obvious challenge of what might be on the ballot paper.

The UCL Constitution Unit has written a series of fine pieces on this (here), looking at technical ways one could manage the various options, but ultimately this would be an intensely political choice.

Broadly speaking, either you’re offering voters a choice between leaving with a deal or leaving without one, or also adding in an option not to leave at all. And that’s on top of any issues around wording (which were already problematic last time around).

Because that basic choice will be a political one, it offers up much scope for campaigners to suggest that the exercise is ‘rigged’ in some way that hurts their interests: two of the three options are about leaving; two of the three are about a deal; why muddy the waters with staying at all?

That’s problematic if the object of the exercise is to calm passions and rebuild popular engagement with the process and with the political system at large. If nothing else, a three-way vote risks an outcome that ‘wins’ without an absolute majority of votes.

These problems are well-understood and form a big part of the resistance to holding another referendum, but it’s worth chucking a couple more points to ponder.

Firstly,it’s not clear what a second referendum would be on.

As a reminder, the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) is a very limited document. It covers the resolution of various liabilities arising from the end of UK membership, including finances, regulation and governance, plus some arrangements to bridge to whatever new relationship might arise in the future (as long as that arises by the end of 2020).

What that document doesn’t do is set out that new relationship. Yes, there’ll be a Political Declaration alongside the WA, but that will not have the same full force of law and will be necessarily vague about the aspirations that both sides in that still-to-be-started negotiation might have.

As such, ‘Chequers’ doesn’t really get much of a look-in; certainly not in the WA, and not very much in the Declaration. That makes it harder to mobilise a narrative of ‘rejecting Chequers’, because it’ll not be the locus of the documents under consideration.

Moreover, what is the locus is not that pretty for the UK. It’s about the settlement of financial liabilities, the creation of an Irish backstop, the continuation of legal and regulatory obligations and a transition period where the UK is a pure rule-taker. The counterbalancing goodies in the Declaration are promissory and vague.

If you wanted to get people to vote against that document, then you’d find it easy to paint a picture of a failed negotiation process and of an opportunity to escape the grasping hand of an EU that seems to just take and not give.

The people factor

Secondly, any discussion of a referendum needs to take account of how people might vote.

Here, the evidence is very mixed. John Curtice points to the centrality of economic calculations, while YouGov reminds us that there’s no clear consensus on any outcome. In short, there’s no slam-dunk on the table, for anyone.

That matters because a second referendum is likely to be a one-shot policy: the chances of a third vote within the medium-term would be effectively zero. As Sarah Ludford rightly noted at an event I spoke at this week, it’s the best change for Remainers to stop Brexit, but it comes with a sizeable risk of resulting in a no-deal outcome.

(and just a quick reminder here that the last two national votes – in 2016 and 2017 – didn’t go how their authors thought they would)

Taken together, all of this points to a number of substantial issues that campaigners on all sides will need to get their heads around and then actively prepare for. Otherwise, we might find that a second referendum leaves more questions open than before.

The post The framing of a second referendum appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s 72 years ago, on 19 September 1946, that war leader and former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave his landmark speech at the University of Zurich in Switzerland. He called for Europe to, “build a kind of United States of Europe” to create lasting peace.

Following the Second World War, Churchill was convinced that only a united Europe could guarantee peace. His aim was to eliminate the European ills of nationalism and war-mongering once and for all.

He proclaimed his remedy, just one year after the end of the war:

“It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom.

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe.”

Although Europe did not become, as Churchill then visioned and promoted, a federal ‘United States’, it did become a Union of 28 independent sovereign countries, trading and working together in peace and prosperity.

In remembering his grandfather’s speech, Conservative MP Sir Nicholas Soames said in the House of Commons:

“The speech was of great prescience and great vision. And it was also a speech of the most profound analysis.”

Sir Winston Churchill is recognised as one of the 11 ‘Founding Fathers’ of the European Union.

At the time of his 1946 speech, Churchill envisaged Britain helping to establish the ‘Union of European countries’, but not actually joining it.

But Churchill’s views later changed, as the British Empire and Commonwealth diminished, and Britain’s world influence shifted.

Churchill made his last speech about Europe at London’s Central Hall, Westminster in July 1957; some four months after six founding nations established the European Economic Community by signing the Treaty of Rome (France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg).

Churchill welcomed the formation of a ‘common market’ by the six, provided that ‘the whole of free Europe will have access’. Churchill added, ‘we genuinely wish to join’.

But Churchill also warned:

‘If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.’ *

* (Source: Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches Vol. 8 page 8681)

During the 1960s Churchill’s health rapidly declined, but his support for a united Europe didn’t.

According to Churchill’s last Private Secretary,  Sir Anthony Montague Brown, in August 1961, Churchill wrote to his constituency Chairman:

‘I think that the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community..’

Sir Anthony also confirmed, in his book  ‘Long Sunset’, that in 1963, just two years before he died, Churchill wrote in a private letter:

‘The future of Europe if Britain were to be excluded is black indeed.’

• Watch an extracted version of Winston Churchill’s speech of 19 September 1946, together with a commentary in the House of Commons by his grandson, MP Sir Nicholas Soames. (Video production by Jon Danzig):

• Related article by Jon Danzig: Winston Churchill: A founder of the European Union

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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MPs debated a petition on Monday 10 September to withdraw Article 50 if Vote Leave broke electoral laws. But hardly any MPs turned up.

The petition, which had almost 200,000 signatures, requested:

‘If Vote Leave has broken any laws regarding overspending in 2016 EU referendum then Article 50 should be immediately withdrawn and full EU membership continued.’

Of course, we all now know that Vote Leave did break electoral rules, with allegations of fraud currently being investigated by the police.

But Tory and Labour frontbenchers rejected the calls to withdraw Article 50 over Vote Leave’s overspending.

Some MPs complained that the debate, in Westminster Hall, clashed with another debate in the main House of Commons chamber on the same afternoon on ‘Legislating for the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement’.

When I Tweeted a photo of the debate in Westminster Hall with hardly anyone there, many Tweeters expressed their fury.

• “Absolutely disgraceful, what has happened to MPs supposedly representing their constituents?” Tweeted @NotWhatIBelieve.
• “This image is a clear demonstration of how little our politicians care about the fact that Vote Leave cheated,” Tweeted @JayPatrol
• “How far has UK democracy sunk, that cheating is dismissed with a shrug of the shoulder,” Tweeted @julian_rowden.
• “Shows how grossly irresponsible and cowardly most MPs are being over Brexit,” Tweeted @ChristophBennet.
• “Outrageous,” Tweeted @Akinsey08
• “This is such a joke. Incompetent government, useless opposition, upholding the result of a fraudulent referendum. Democracy is dead; there is no integrity left in British politics,” Tweeted @audrymaeve.
• “If anyone remains in any doubt as to the democratic credentials of both Tory and Labour parties this should  clarify. This Country is mired in corruption,” Tweeted @MichaelMandb01.
• “I despair. MPs not doing their job. Democracy dead. Corruption admired. Fascist britain looms,” Tweeted @Jennie_Pawson.
• “That is our MPs for you.  Only interested in themselves and their own advancement,” Tweeted @Johnantifas.
• “If it was about a pay rise it would be standing room only,” Tweeted @ASupermum.

Many directly Tweeted their MPs to demand to know why they were not at the debate.

• “@ChrisRuane2017 As my MP and someone who claimed to support Remain in the 2017 GE, where are you in this picture? If you weren’t there, why not?” Tweeted @wible1
• “@DLidington as one of your constituents can you please advise me why it’s ok for politicians to break the law?” Tweeted @KatherineRoe
• “Did you attend this important debate @JDjanogly? If not, why not, when @vote_leave broke electoral law?” Tweeted @amandarandall5
• “@alexsobel did you attend this?” Tweeted @AngryRemainer.

Alex Sobel, Labour Co-op MP for Leeds West, and a strong anti-Brexiter, was one the only MPs to respond.

• “I was in the main chamber for the Legislating the EU Withdrawal Bill debate. Here is my contribution http://bit.ly/2CGgJF8 It was a big mistake to timetable two Brexit debates at the same time,” he Tweeted back.

Today, Mr Sobel emailed me the following comment:

“The Government knew there was a Westminster hall debate that day, triggered by many thousands of signatures. They then chose to put down their own Brexit debate on the same afternoon in the commons chamber, the houses premier debating chamber.

“It is regrettable that many MPs had to make the choice about which debate to attend. If the public are to trust that petition debates are valued, scheduling must be done better.”

Tonight I have asked Andrea Leadsom, Leader of the House of Commons, to respond. After all, it’s her job to announce every Thursday the timetable for Commons proceedings for the following week.

When Ms Leadsom announced that there would be a debate in the House of Commons on the afternoon of Monday 10 September, she already knew that the Commons Petitions Committee had also scheduled the debate on the petition to rescind Article 50 on the same afternoon.

(I will report back here if I receive a reply from Ms Leadsom).

During the debate about the petition in the empty Westminster Hall, the Brexit minister Chris Heaton-Harris said that while the government “respects the views and wishes” of those who signed the petition, the referendum result was one that “cannot be ignored”.

And Labour’s shadow Brexit minister Paul Blomfield said the law did not provide for overturning referendum results for cheating.

The government’s formal response to the petition stated:

‘The British people voted to leave the EU and the Government respects that decision. We have always been clear that as a matter of policy our notification under Article 50 will not be withdrawn.’

The response added:

‘The British people voted to leave the EU, and it is the duty of the Government to deliver on their instruction. There can be no attempt to stay in the EU.

‘The result of the referendum held on 23 June 2016 saw a majority of people vote to leave the European Union. This was the biggest democratic mandate for a course of action ever directed at any UK Government.

‘Following this, Parliament authorised the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50, passing the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act.

‘In last year’s General Election, over 80% of people then voted for parties committing to respecting the result of the referendum.

‘It was the stated policy of both major parties that the decision of the people would be respected. The Government is clear that it is now its duty to implement the will of the electorate.

‘This was not a decision made after just a few weeks of campaigning, but one that came after a debate that had taken place both in Parliament and across the country for decades.’

The statement added:

‘The British people can trust this Government to honour the referendum result and get the best deal possible. To do otherwise would be to undermine the decision of the British people.

‘The premise that the people can trust their politicians to deliver on the promises they make and will deliver them in Parliament is fundamental to our democracy.’

But the statement, by the Department for Exiting the European Union, made no reference to the cheating by the Vote Leave campaign and did not answer the premise of the petition, that Article 50 should be rescinded in the event that Vote Leave broke electoral laws.

The government’s statement concluded:

‘It is the Government’s duty to deliver the will of the people and reach a desirable final outcome.’

So, it appears the government believes that promises made by their politicians need to be ‘honoured’, even if those promises are based on lies, and the campaign to win the EU referendum was based on cheating. So much for democracy and fair elections.

But even if Westminster Hall had been filled to the rafters with MPs, it would not have made any difference. Although almost 200,000 people signed the petition for the Article 50 notice to be withdrawn if Vote Leave cheated, petitions carry no weight in Parliament.

Petitions debated by MPs in Westminster Hall cannot directly result in a change to legislation or policy. The only motion that can be voted on is that ‘This House has considered the petition…”

Of course, the vote can only be ‘Aye’: the petition has been considered by MPs. But it’s meaningless. Petitions to Parliament are meaningless. Democracy in the UK is becoming meaningless.

• Watch the video of the debate:

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• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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National Technical University of Ukraine ‘Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’ Photo credits: Oksana Turysheva

Myroslava Hladchenko

During the last decades, the development of the knowledge economy in Western societies has significantly changed both the roles played by universities and the relationship between the university, industry and government, resulting in the emergence of the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) as one of the global models of world society (Meyer 2010). The main idea behind the Triple Helix lies in the expansion of the role of knowledge in social development more broadly and of the university in the economy more specifically (Etzkowitz 2002). The university is expected to extend its traditional missions of knowledge transmission (teaching) and production (research) to include economic and social development (Pinheiro et al. 2015; Benneworth et al. 2015).

 

Similar to other global models of world society, the Triple Helix originates and has been applied in the context of developed or mature economies, but less developed countries have also made attempts to implement this global model into their specific national contexts. Meanwhile, the specific national context as an institutional environment can be characterised by a high degree of institutional complexity caused by means-ends decoupling at the state level (Hladchenko and Westerheijden 2018; Hladchenko et al. 2018). Means-ends decoupling (Bromley and Powell 2012) at the state level implies that policies and practices of the state are disconnected from its core goal of creating public welfare. Such means-ends decoupling occurs, for instance, in oligarchic economies, where the state is captured by exploitative, rent-seeking oligarchies in business and politics. This bleak picture describes numerous post-communist countries, one of which is Ukraine.

 

In a recent article ‘Implementing the Triple Helix model: Means-ends decoupling at the state level?’, co-authored with Romulo Pinheiro we explore how means-ends decoupling at the state level affected the implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine. The data emanate from personal interviews with the senior managers of four universities and science parks established within them who were directly involved with the pursuit of public policy geared towards promoting the implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine. For our research we selected the science parks located in universities with different disciplinary profiles: Technical University, Classical University, University of Economics and University of Life Sciences.

 

Means-ends decoupling at the state level

Decoupling is one of the main concepts of sociological institutionalism. Bromley and Powell (2012) distinguish between policy-practice and means-ends decoupling. The former refers to a gap between policy and practice, the classical object of implementation studies. The latter refers to a gap between practices and outcomes (Bromley and Powell 2012), that is, policies are executed according to plan yet intended outcomes are not achieved. It occurs because the implemented practices are compartmentalised from the core goals of the actor in question, e.g., state, organisation, individual (Bromley and Powell 2012). Consequently, means-ends decoupling entails an “efficiency gap” (Dick 2015) and the diversion of critical resources (Bromley and Powell 2012). Means-ends decoupling at the state level results in institutional complexity for organisations when they confront incompatible prescriptions emanating from a single or multiple institutional logics, thus experiencing institutional complexity (Meyer and Höllerer 2016). Meanwhile, institutional complexity promotes organisations in applying means-ends decoupling to attain legitimacy (Bromley and Powell 2012).

 

Backdrop to the Case: Means-Ends Decoupling at the State Level in Ukraine

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was established as an independent state in 1991 which also involved the transition to a market economy.  However, state policies aimed at lustration, de-Sovietisation and decommunisation were not adopted and civil society remained underdeveloped. Moreover, inconsistently implemented privatization allowed a post-Soviet oligarchy consisting of the Soviet political elite and actors from the Soviet shadow economy to emerge. Drawing on our theoretical framework, in the Ukrainian case, means-ends decoupling was sustained at the state level, as the policies and practices of the state were disconnected from its core goal of creating public welfare. It resulted in inconsistencies within the institutional logic of the state, leading to a high degree of institutional complexity experienced by organisations and individuals that did not belong to the privileged group of so-called “rent seekers”.

 

Diffusion and Implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine

The diffusion of the Triple Helix model in the Ukrainian context was initiated by the National Technical University of Ukraine ‘Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’, acting as an institutional entrepreneur. In the period 2004–06, KPI participated in the EU’s TEMPUS project together with European higher education institutions. As a result of this collaboration the first Ukrainian science park (Kyivska Polytechnika) was established in 2006. In 2009-2010, in the context of implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine, the government awarded the status of ‘research university’ to 13 flagship universities. However, the implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine turned into means-ends decoupling at the state level due to the rent-seeking behaviour of the powerful actors from the governmental institutions. Urgent domestic reforms to foster the knowledge economy were not undertaken while the research universities lacked funding for infrastructure.

 

Means-ends decoupling at the state level – the cause of the diversion of intellectual capital

Means-ends decoupling at the state level, caused by the rent-seeking behaviour of business and political oligarchies, led to the implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine also reflecting a case of means-ends decoupling. Consequently, contradictions within the institutional logic of the state resulted in a high degree of institutional complexity experienced by the science parks established at the case universities. What is more, means-ends decoupling at the state level causes the means and ends of the organisational actors to be also decoupled due to the institutional complexity that they confront. That is, institutional complexity triggers means-ends decoupling at the organisational level, as claimed by Bromley and Powell (2012). In addition, the more senior managers of the university and the science park maintain the logic of confidence in practices that deviate from the Triple Helix model, the greater rent-seeking and means-ends decoupling at the organisational level.

 

One of the many negative consequences of means-ends decoupling at the state level and rent-seeking behaviour of powerful actors in governmental institutions is the loss of intellectual capital through brain drain. Thus, the longer means-ends decoupling and rent-seeking will persist both at the state and organisational levels, the further will Ukraine move away from the so-called ‘world society’ and its corresponding institutional arrangements.

 

Myroslava Hladchenko is an associate professor at the University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine.

 

References

Benneworth, Paul, Harry de Boer, and Ben Jongbloed. 2015. Between good intentions and urgent stakeholder pressures: Institutionalizing the universities’ third mission in the Swedish context. European Journal of Higher Education 5(3): 280–296.

Bromley, Patricia, and Walter Powell. 2012. From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world. The Academy of Management Annals 6(1): 483–530.

Dick, Penny. 2015. From rational myth to self-fulfilling prophecy? Understanding the persistence of means-ends decoupling as a consequence of the latent functions of policy enactment. Organization Studies 36(7): 897-924.

Etzkowitz, Henry, and Loet Leydesdorff. 2000. The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university–industry–government relations. Research Policy 29: 109–123.

Hladchenko, Myroslava, and Romulo Pinheiro. 2018. Implementing the Triple Helix Model: Means-Ends Decoupling at the State Level? Minerva First Online: 7 July 2018.

Hladchenko, Myroslava, Don Westerheijden, and Harry de Boer. 2018. Means-ends decoupling at the state level and managerial responses to multiple organisational identities in Ukrainian research universities. Higher Education Research & Development: 1-14

Hladchenko, Myroslava, and Don Westerheijden. 2018. Means-ends decoupling and academic identities in Ukrainian university after the Revolution of Dignity. European Journal of Higher Education 8(2): 152-168.

Meyer, John. 2010. World society, institutional theory, and the actor. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 1–20.

Meyer, Renate, and Markus Höllerer. 2016. Laying a smoke screen: Ambiguity and neutralization as strategic responses to intra-institutional complexity. Strategic Organization 14(4): 373-406.

Pinheiro, Rómulo, Patricio Langa, and Attila Pausits. 2015. One and two equals three? The third mission of higher education institutions. European Journal of Higher Education 5(3): 233–249.

 

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Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

The personalities of the High Representative (of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security within the European Union [EU]) have fascinated journalists and academics since the position was created. Michaela Korsch argues we should move pass the gossip and introduce rigour and method in our understanding of an individual who is pivotal in translating the preferences of twenty-eight member states into a consistent foreign policy.

© kasto/AdobeStock

For the next High Representative, leading experts already dream of a job advertisement that sounds something like this: ‘Candidates that will be considered must be well-known, highly respected, and experienced politicians in foreign policy with agreeable strategic objectives in international politics. And most importantly make sure you have a ‘bright and shiny’ personality!’

When considering media coverage on the personalities of the High Representatives, it appears that having the best dirt raises your status: Federica Mogherini, currently the High Representative, was attributed a nerdy personality when Brussels started to think of her as a successor to Catherine Ashton (the first holder of the position from 2009-2014).

Well, if ‘nerdy’ is referring to Mogherini’s degree in political science and her knowledge of three languages, things could be worse.

In comparison to Catherine Ashton, the former Italian foreign minister got off lightly. At the beginning of her term Ashton was referred to as ‘Lady Who’, a not exactly flattering comment on her appearance. It became even worse when Rod Liddle attested Ashton had the ‘charisma of a caravan site on the Isle of Sheppey’. Wait, does a caravan site have a personality? Anyway.

Academic literature on EU foreign policy has noticed these expressions about the High Representatives, as those mentioned above. However, I suggest that what (possibly) works for a journalist, might not work as well for a political scientist.

So here is my claim: less chatter, more methodology!

Let us find the means to thoroughly investigate the personalities of the High Representatives instead of only quoting ‘gossip’; to understand a personality is more than a reflection of superficialities (speaking of ‘nerdy Federica’) or picking up chitchat from London (‘Lady Catherine Who’). It can shed light on how the EU as a foreign policy actor sees the world and subsequently acts.

Foreign Policy Analysis, a subfield of international relations, offers valuable insights for this. The operational code approach addresses the beliefs of foreign policy actors on their context of action as well as their preferred strategy to achieve goals. To investigate the leadership style of an actor the leadership trait analysis is a well-known tool within the field. Media coverage will of course still work to stress certain ideas.

Why (of all foreign policy actors out there) investigate the High Representative? Of course, the position’s influence is limited (compared to the national foreign minister of, e.g., Germany or France), but calling it ‘more an embarrassment for the EU than a support’ falls short of an explanation. It is time to take the personalities of the High Representatives seriously (credits for this ‘evergreen’ quote go to Andrew Moravcsik).

Both Ashton and Mogherini have shown they are able to enhance the EU’s foreign policy. In 2015, Mogherini negotiated (with international partners and based on Catherine Ashton’s groundwork) the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Ashton stood out for reaching an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013 which normalized their relationship, just one of serval of her successes. A ‘charisma free zone’ certainly looks different.

Having said this, note that like other EU offices the choice for a High Representative is the result of a horse trade – just in case you are waiting for the next incumbent to be the glorified person identified by our leading experts. Twenty-eight member states take part in a system of unanimous voting while insisting on their preferences and facing different challenges in international relations. Of course, they also seek to protect their national sovereignty.

What the EU needs is a High Representative with a personality able to translate this ‘horse trading mentality’ into a more consistent EU foreign policy. Arguably this is the best solution for a Union still waiting to act on a global scale. I doubt that there is room for an ‘EU foreign minister’ being a leader like a national foreign minister can be. The key is to adjust the expectations of what the High Representative is expected to be and how.

So, it is time to ask what the ‘bright and shiny’ personality of the High Representative looks like in scientific terms – it is a safe bet that the answer would be more elaborate and rigorous than what we currently know and how it influences EU foreign policy. Perusing the literature on the EU’s foreign policy shows there is a glaring gap to be filled.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Michaela Korsch (Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt) is a political scientist and external PhD candidate investigating the personal influence of the High Representatives Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini.

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On this week’s BBC Question Time, Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart, said we couldn’t have a new ‘People’s Vote’ on the final Brexit deal because, basically, it’s too complicated for a referendum choice.

When QT presenter, David Dimbleby, asked the minister if the government would put the final Brexit deal to an election, Mr Stewart replied that the Chequers deal “involves 17 different components. It’s not appropriate for a referendum choice.”

So, we were asked a simple question in 2016 on whether or not we should remain a member of the European Union. But now we’re not allowed any say on the complicated answer. How democratic is that?

If the terms of us leaving are too complicated to be decided by a referendum, then the same argument can be applied to the original question of whether we should remain in or leave the EU.

Because the decision about our membership of the EU doesn’t involve just ’17 different components’. It involves tens of thousands of components.

Mr Stewart talked of the Chequers deal as if it is a done deal. But the rest of us know that it’s a dead deal.

Many MPs – both Remainers and Brexiters – say they won’t vote for it. More crucially, the European Union say they won’t accept it.

So what deal will we get? Nobody knows, but a no deal, which would be catastrophic for all our lives, is increasingly looking likely.

We must have a democratic say on this. It’s vital.

The problem is that binary choices don’t work. Not in our own lives, and not in politics.

• Do you say a simple yes or no to a holiday? No, you also need to know where you’re going, when, and how much.
• Do you say a simple yes or no to a new job? No, you also need to know what the job entails, the salary, and the conditions of employment.

When we know the actual final details of the Brexit deal or no deal, the electorate needs to have a say on it.

It’s no good giving us a yes or no choice to a complicated question, and then telling us we can’t have any say on the detailed answer.

We need another referendum, or another snap general election.

We cannot allow incompetent government ministers to decide the future of this country, and all our lives, without any further input from us, the people.

Mr Stewart proclaimed on Question Time that:

“If we don’t leave the European Union, there will be a political crisis that will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.”

No, Mr Stewart.

Most of us can now see the exact opposite: leaving the European Union will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.

Give us a say on our future. That’s democratic.

The government’s view is that they can go ahead and decide our future for us, without any say by us.

That’s not democratic. That’s dictatorship.

• Watch the 90-second video of the Prison Minister saying that the Brexit deal is not appropriate for a referendum choice:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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'Brexit deal is too complicated for a referendum'

→ 1-minute video: Freudian slip by the prisons minister – Please share'FINAL BREXIT DEAL IS TOO COMPLICATED FOR A REFERENDUM'Last night on BBC Question Time, Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart, said we couldn’t have a #PeoplesVote on the final Brexit deal because, basically, it’s too complicated for a referendum choice. When QT presenter, David Dimbleby, asked the minister if the government would put the final Brexit deal to an election, Mr Stewart replied that the Chequers deal “involves 17 different components. It’s not appropriate for a referendum choice.”So, we were asked a simple question in 2016 on whether or not we should remain a member of the European Union. But now we’re not allowed any say on the complicated answer. How democratic is that?If the terms of us leaving are too complicated to be decided by a referendum, then the same argument can be applied to the original question of whether we should remain in or leave the EU. Because the decision about our membership of the EU doesn’t involve just ’17 different components’. It involves tens of thousands of components.Mr Stewart talked of the Chequers deal as if it is a done deal. But the rest of us know that it’s a dead deal. Many MPs – both Remainers and Brexiters – say they won’t vote for it. More crucially, the European Union say they won’t accept it.So what deal will we get? Nobody knows, but a no deal, which would be catastrophic for all our lives, is increasingly looking likely. We must have a democratic say on this. It's vital.The problem is that binary choices don’t work. Not in our own lives, and not in politics.Do you say a simple yes or no to a holiday? No, you also need to know where you’re going, when, and how much. Do you say a simple yes or no to a new job? No, you also need to know what the job entails, the salary, and the conditions of employment.When we know the actual final details of the Brexit deal or no deal, the electorate needs to have a say on it. It’s no good giving us a yes or no choice to a complicated question, and then telling us we can’t have any say on the detailed answer.We need another referendum, or another snap general election.We cannot allow incompetent government ministers to decide the future of this country, and all our lives, without any further input from us, the people.Mr Stewart proclaimed on Question Time that, “If we don’t leave the European Union, there will be a political crisis that will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.”No, Mr Stewart. Most of us can now see the exact opposite: leaving the European Union will tear this country apart for the next 50 years. Give us a say on our future. That’s democratic. The government’s view is that they can go ahead and decide our future for us, without any say by us.That’s not democratic. That's dictatorship.• Words and video compilation by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1040609288090214400• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel. Please share, and follow our channel. https://youtu.be/kMzoo14K_qI Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Friday, 14 September 2018

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Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

The process of European integration has always faced challenges, but the complexities in which the European Union finds itself today are unprecedented, Karlis Bukovskis reflects. Following his participation at the UACES GF 2018 Conference, Bukovskis offers a conceptualisation of the recent wave of populism and trends in integration, in order to contemplate Europe’s institutional future.

© Jakub Jirsák/Adobe Stock

Challenges and crises are part and parcel of the European integration process. Indeed, they have often been a driving force for deeper integration, with countries delegating sovereign-decision making power to supranational institutions to address them.

Even when a member decides to leave the European Union (EU), overall integration deepens; in the case of Brexit, we have seen the emergence of European defence structures, an area previously less integrated than the economic, foreign policy, or even the justice and home affairs sectors.

The EU has been in a prolonged self-evaluation process — a process initially caused by the sovereign debt crisis and then exacerbated by the migration crisis and Brexit. Together with a slow recovery of the economy, the recent surges of populism and Euroscepticism, the EU project is undoubtedly yet again in a complex situation.

What, then, does the future hold for the EU, in relation to populism and its institutional developments?

Populism in Form / Populism in Substance

Populism – broadly, the appeal to anxieties of the masses – has been part of the political process and rhetoric since the dawn of politics.

We can distinguish two sides of the recent populist wave in democratic countries. On the one side: populism in form, which seeks to address as many voters as possible via all means possible. On the other: populism in substance, aimed at destroying existing policies, multilateral and economic ties by appealing to anti-globalisation and anti-Europeanisation.

The first is a product of modern technological developments putting a world of information at one’s fingertips. The consequent changes to the political process and voter mobilisation have been monumental; Facebook heroes, Twitter warriors and television are performing the function of mass electoral mobilisation — previously the domain of mass party politics and political ideologies.

Ad-hoc issues and topical matters dominate the political rhetoric and electoral process. Differences in values, policies, historical interpretations, regimes and policies – traditionally an endless well for political rhetoric – will continue to be used by both marginal and mainstream politicians exercising and promoting populist rhetoric: this is populism in form.

Populism in substance is exemplified in modern foreign policy through oversimplified positions and solutions. For example, the utilisation of EU-Turkey relations in domestic political debates and the maximising of the rift between the positions of current administration of the United States of America and the EU by politicians seeking popularity points. Similarly, the developments in the Visegrad group countries and those in Western European countries are used as political vehicles by fellow member states.

In spite of the results of the Dutch national elections and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in last year’s French presidential elections, Euroscepticism still finds ears among voters. It is largely due to the towering complexity of the EU to the everyday voter and the European Commission’s lost reputation as neutral arbiter since J.-C. Juncker’s rule.

Brexit and the emergence of internal opposition, especially in the form of the Visegrad group countries, signify the EU’s re-entry into an era of inter-governmentalism after prolonged periods of de facto federalisation. A willingness to see the EU’s supranational institutions as instruments for the promotion of national interests has been around since its birth.

Today, Visegrad elites are balancing the revival of national self-esteem and the wish to remain in the EU, resulting in harsh rhetoric and shattered relationships.

Evidently, after being subjected to prolonged periods of conditionality, transition and transformation, the post-communist countries are now ready to be treated as equal partners, not only by their fellow member states, but also by the supranational institutions. And this wish plainly sells among voters.

The Institutional Future of the EU

The prolonged reality of the multispeed Europe is principally due to the federalism/inter-governmentalism debate. Different intensities of integration between countries are based on their national interests, economic exposure and political views of particular ruling elite or even individual politicians. The Schengen area, the Eurozone, the PESCO are just some examples of enhanced cooperation advancing and reshaping, and thereby making more complex, the institutional structures of the EU.

Moreover, every opt-out has been a chance for countries and their societies to put their foot down and say ‘no’ to EU integration without impeding overall integration. As a result, not only does the current shape of the EU allow various levels of collaboration, but the same stands also for engagement levels with third countries.

It is no longer just about membership of the EU. DCFTAs, FTAs, FTAs+ are free trade area formats that provide an opportunity for the EU to secure permanent cooperation and Europeanisation of countries that will never be part of the EU, and especially not part of the EU core.

Meanwhile, the EU core and the Banking Union are becoming more and more distant not only from the already existing EU member states, but also from membership aspirers. As the EU core becomes more homogenous, it also becomes more demanding to semi-core and periphery countries of the EU.

As a result, countries championing EU membership will have to go to much greater lengths and delegate much more sovereignty than countries of previous enlargements. For instance, further European Monetary Union integration makes EU accession a much greater leap for nation states.

It is evident that domestic integration problems will dominate the agenda at least until 2025 with the EU’s internal structure becoming increasingly complex. This will weigh heavily on relations both inside and outside the EU.

Already incomprehensible to a non-professional audience, the EU and its institutions will be further estranged from its population.

In external relations, the EU will become more complex to deal with and more complicated to integrate into. At the same time, however, new formats of association and engagement with the EU will allow flexibility in relations towards the third countries.

The EU is now debating its future, domestically, at the European Parliament, and in the Council regarding the finalization of the Economic and Monetary Union. This is an opportunity for the member states and their leaders to express their wishes and fears regarding the EU. The pertinent question remains, however, of the extent to which the non-professional audience will be able to participate, both in comprehending and in shaping, this “ever complex Union”.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Karlis Bukovskis

Karlis Bukovskis is the Deputy Director and a researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), the author of numerous articles, and the scientific editor of several books. Bukovskis is a lecturer on global political economy, international financial system and the EU integration at Riga Graduate School of Law and Riga Stradins University.

The post The Future of Populism and the Institutional Setting of the “Ever Complex Union” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

How did the European Union respond to the Ukraine crisis? Maryna Rabinovych considers the EU’s approach as a development exercise and suggests how its policy can be improved in the nearby future.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kiev © Natalia Bratslavsky/AdobeStock

The 2013 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent aggression in Eastern Ukraine posed a complex challenge to EU’s policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. The Union’s foreign policy response to the Ukraine crisis involves three key aspects: sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia; selective engagement with Russia and, finally, the intensification of development cooperation with Ukraine. Following the logic of the Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts and Crises (presently converted into the Integrated Approach), the EU managed to develop a large-scale multi-aspect development response to the Ukraine crisis, disposing of a rich toolbox.

However, since this response was conducted outside the realm of EU’s development policy and related assessment instruments, it is useful to reconsider the EU’s ENP to post-Euromaidan Ukraine as a development exercise. Such analysis is highly relevant for improving EU’s development engagement with Ukraine, given the ENP’s declared pivotal role in the EU’s general effort to implement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, an insight into the development aspect of the ENP is crucial for conceptualizing the joint Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument in terms of the 2021-2027 EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework.

Policy’s Comprehensiveness and Systemic Response

Apart from constituting a major threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine exacerbated the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, absorbing around 20% of the country’s GDP annually. It also brought to the surface systemic military, political and institutional issues within Ukraine, involving inter alia corruption, the absence of checks and balances and a dysfunctional judicial system. The complexity of these issues as well as the trend towards a comprehensive EU external action (stemming from the adoption of the Agenda 2030 and the stipulation of general policy objectives in Art.21 (2) TEU) have determined the comprehensiveness of EU’s development response to the Ukraine crisis.

The EU’s policy towards post-Euromaidan Ukraine can be considered as comprehensive in several regards. First, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) that fully entered into force in 2017 is perceived as “the most advanced agreement of its kind ever negotiated by the European Union”. Of particular significance is the parties’ creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), directed to “Ukraine’s gradual integration to the Internal Market”. Moreover, the implementation of the AA is reinforced by ‘overarching’ technical support projects (e..g, “Association4U”) and projects on individual DCFTA disciplines (e.g., state aid, public procurement).

Second, parallel to the implementation of the AA, the EU has been conducting an ambitious state-building programme in Ukraine since 2014, based on macro-financial assistance and budget support. The 2014 State-Building Contract for Ukraine followed an OECD ‘menu’, involving multi-aspect reforms (e.g., public finance management, civil service and electoral law reforms). Third, the comprehensiveness of EU response is exemplified by its sector-specific blends of macro-economic and technical assistance projects, involving civil society support.

Despite the comprehensive scope and rich toolbox of the above engagement, the integration and state-building axes lack a common conceptual prerequisite (such as the sustainable development concept) and encourage few synergies. Furthermore, although there is an engagement with SDGs (e.g., Goal 8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” and Goal 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”), the development-related targets and indicators are absent and no link is made to Ukraine’s own efforts to achieve SDGs. These drawbacks lead us to the problem of policy coherence in the Union’s development response to Ukraine.

Donor Coordination and Policy Coherence

The Agenda 2030 and the new European Consensus on Development distinguish several aspects of coherence: donor coordination, goals’ integration (focus on cross-cutting themes), and horizontal policy coherence/Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. According to DG Development and Cooperation, donor coordination platform should have been established in Ukraine to conduct multi-donor projects and measure progress. The emphasis on “Mobilization, coordination and disbursement of assistance” (to be exercised by the EEAS/DEVGO and Ukrainian Government) was also made in the 2014 Agenda for Reform.

However, no such platform was created internationally. This testifies to the EU’s failure to engage other donors into a truly comprehensive effort to promote Ukraine’s development, thereby juxtaposing it to Russian aggression. Moreover, Ukraine’s national foreign aid coordination project “OPENAID” project ceased to exist in 2017, following the notorious dismissal of its coordinator Olena Tregub. This raises additional concerns regarding the transparency of large aid flows Ukraine presently gets and aid effectiveness. Hence, so far, the positive examples of EU-led donor coordination in Ukraine remain sector-specific, and include “U-LEAD” project (involving German GIZ, Swedish SIDA, Polish Aid and Swiss SDC) and “PRAVO-Justice” (involving authorized bodies of France, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany), targeting decentralization and the rule of law, respectively.

Next, the integrated approach to reforms or the introduction of cross-cutting areas were barely distinguished in EU’s aid delivery to Ukraine. Some cross-cutting fields (e.g., gender and human rights) are distinguished in the 2015 Special Measure to Ukraine (focusing on decentralization). The link between the “deep” disciplines of the DCFTA and the economic dimension of the rule of law (promotion of legal certainty, transparency and accountability standards) remains highly underestimated. The single positive example of integrated approach to economic and political goals is the can be found in the “PRAVO-Justice” focus area “Property Right Protection and Ease of Business”.

As opposed to development policy, horizontal policy coherence is seldom mentioned in the ENP context, largely due to the fact that ENP is often viewed as “internally coherent by default”. An additional reason is the lack of a single unifying concept, such as development or sustainable development, as stipulated in the Agenda 2030 and EU development policy documents.

Conclusion

The analysis demonstrates that the EU managed to develop a comprehensive development response to the Ukraine crisis in terms of the ENP and State-Building Contract for Ukraine, addressing various reform fields through creative blends of development instruments. The continuation of the Union’s development engagement with Ukraine can benefit from building bridges between the “association” and “state-building” axes of aid; strengthening the role of “sustainable development” in the ENP; expanding the opportunities for donor coordination; strengthening of Ukraine’s domestic dimension of aid transparency and aid effectiveness, as well as promoting horizontal policy coherence.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Maryna Rabinovych

Maryna Rabinovych works as a Global Community Manager at the Ukraine Democracy Initiative, based in Sydney. She also pursues a PhD research that focuses on the legal aspects of the EU’s rule of law promotion via free trade agreements in the Eastern Neighbourhood and beyond.

 

The post Reinventing EU Neighbourhood Policy as a Development Exercise: The Case of Post-Euromaidan Ukraine appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In this piece, Samuel D. Schmid, Andrea C. Blättler, and Joachim Blatter summarise the key findings from their winning article of the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize: ‘Democratic Deficits in Europe: The Overlooked Exclusiveness of Nation‐States and the Positive Role of the European Union’ (Vol 55, Issue 3), available here.

State parliament (Landtag) in Berlin © Matyas Rehak/Adobe Stock

The European Union, many believe, has a democratic deficit. The sovereign nation-state is seen as democratically superior. Even more, it is often argued that the EU undermines the functioning of national democracies, compounding this alleged democratic deficit.

In our article we show that when it comes to the electoral inclusion of immigrants, nation states suffer from a democratic deficit and the EU plays a democracy-enhancing role. European democracies are much more exclusive than they should be according to normative standards derived from democratic theory. The EU has been key to mitigating the exclusiveness of democracies. By requiring its member states to enfranchise non-national EU citizens on the local level, it pushes one of the currently most relevant “frontiers of democracy” in the right direction.

Why should democracies include long-term immigrant residents?

Normative theorists of democracy, whether they are liberals, republicans, or communitarians agree that democracies should – in order to retain full legitimacy – grant voting rights to all adult, legal and long-term residents. The same goes for Robert Dahl, one of founding fathers of empirical democracy measurement. He defined inclusive suffrage accordingly when he introduced his concept of polyarchy.

Currently, the most significant group often excluded in this definition of the demos are long-term immigrant residents. They far outnumber disenfranchised resident citizens (e.g. criminal convicts, the mentally disabled). In the article, we deduce a strong normative demand that immigrants have to be included into the demos after five years of continuous residence. Democracies can opt to do so either by allowing immigrants to naturalize or by providing them with alien voting rights.

Constructing the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX)

Taking this position as a benchmark, we construct an evaluative assessment tool: the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX). It has two constitutive dimensions. The de facto dimension contrasts the number of people who are actually included with the number of people that should be included with regard to both mechanisms of inclusion. The de jure dimension assesses the laws regulating the immigrants’ access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement in light of the normative demands.

The details of measurement, normalization, and aggregation are elaborated in the article. We draw on extensive original data collection and established resources such as the electoral rights indicators (ELECLAW) and the citizenship policy indicators (CITLAW) provided by the GLOBALCIT Observatory based at the European University Institute.

The exclusiveness of 20 European democracies – and the positive role of the EU

Having selected the 20 most established democracies with stable territorial boundaries among all EU member states[1], the first and main result of our study is the stark discrepancy between the laws and practice of electoral inclusion in these established European democracies and the ideal of ‘universal suffrage.’ In Figure 1 below, ‘universal suffrage’ equates a value of 100 on our IMIX scale. Even Sweden, the most inclusive country in our sample, is far from reaching this standard and suffers from a notable democratic deficit.

Figure 1: How 20 EU democracies fare in immigrant electoral inclusion – and how Switzerland compares

Legend: Figure 1 shows the scores on the IMIX scale for the 20 EU member states evaluated, plus the scores for Switzerland, as case for which we estimate a hypothetical “EU support” in a later study. Data clusters around 2010. Blue is the IMIX score without “EU support”. Yellow is the proportion attributable to “EU support”. We talk about “EU support” and not about an “EU effect” because we do not claim a causal role for the EU in each country, but a functional role as a safeguard in all countries.

The second main insight is the positive function of EU membership. According to EU law, EU members must grant voting rights to non-national EU citizens in local legislative elections. This EU norm plays a supportive role for the electoral inclusion of immigrants and reduces the democratic deficit of member states. This became also very visible when we added Switzerland to our sample in a further study . Currently, Switzerland is one of the most exclusive countries in Europe. Membership in the EU would make a huge difference since it would allow the many immigrants from EU countries to have a vote at least on the local level (which is currently only the case in a very limited number of cantons and municipalities).

Not only the least inclusive European democracies (could) get a boost in inclusiveness through EU membership. Almost all countries that fall into the ‘fairly inclusive’ category are greatly aided in achieving this label by applying EU law. For instance, Belgium’s de facto score is 34 percent due to enfranchised non-national EU citizen residents; and only Sweden would remain in the ‘fairly inclusive’ category if ‘EU support’ was subtracted from the IMIX score. We thus conclude that the EU plays an important democracy-enhancing role when it comes to immigrants’ electoral inclusion in EU Member States.

Avenues for supranational and postnational citizenship – and democracy measurement

In times when the EU faces an unprecedented legitimacy crisis and when there are claims that the EU continues to suffer from structural democratic deficits and produces such deficits on the national level, it is important to highlight existing shortcomings within national democracies. These democratic deficits within EU Member States do not reduce the democratic deficits of the EU per se; however, they put into perspective the often-proclaimed superiority of national democracies. Moreover, our analysis shows that the EU plays an important role in reducing this democratic deficit.

In contrast to most indices in the field of immigration, integration, and citizenship, the IMIX uses an approach grounded in the tradition of democratic theory and democracy measurement. As we show in our working paper, new democracy measurement tools represent major steps forwards in aligning methodology to theory and practice. Nevertheless, regarding the fundamental dimension of electoral inclusion there is still a gap between measurement tools, theoretical discourses, and practical struggles. The aspect of inclusion was side-lined in almost all significant democracy indices in the 20th century, supplanted by the notion of participation (of those already included). It is only taken up on the margins of the two most recent and sophisticated democracy measurement tools, the Democracy Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy Project.

Therefore, we hope that the IMIX also inspires democracy measurement projects to better capture one of the currently most important “frontiers of democracy” – that is, to include inclusion in an adequate way.

[1] We exclude the Baltic states because of the second criterion. Our concern about their territorial integrity is further connected to the fact that they have large non-citizen Russian-speaking minorities, which – if fully included – may undermine the autonomy of these polities.

This piece is based on the winning article of the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize: ‘Democratic Deficits in Europe: The Overlooked Exclusiveness of Nation‐States and the Positive Role of the European Union’ (Vol 55, Issue 3) available here.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of  Ideas on Europe, JCMS or UACES.

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Samuel D. Schmid is a graduate of the University of Lucerne and a current PhD Researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His thesis investigates the association between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship across 20 Western democracies from 1980 to 2010. Twitter: @samdschmid

 

Andrea C. Blättler graduated with a BA from the University of Lucerne and is currently completing joint master’s degree in political theory at Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main & Technische Universität Darmstadt and spent a DAAD-funded term at The New School for Social Research, New York. She works at the intersection of political and social theory on questions of power and social stratification.

 

Joachim Blatter is professor of Political Science at the University of Lucerne. He wrote his Habilitation at the University of Konstanz, and has been a research fellow at Harvard, the Australian National University, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB). His current research focuses on dual citizenship, the transnationalization of national democracies, and on the migration of migration policies.

 

The post How the EU Mitigates a Fundamental Democratic Deficit of European Nation-States appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The president of the European Commission, in his letter of intent accompanying the September 2015 State of the Union speech, announced that the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Dublin System, and Easo would be comprehensively reviewed. From May to July 2016, the Commission put forward a wide-ranging European Asylum package, which reformed the Regulations of Dublin and Eurodacas well as the Reception Conditions Directive, and which proposed the establishment of a common asylum procedure in the EU,a Qualification Regulation, a Union Resettlement Framework,and a European Union Agency for Asylum(EUAA).

While the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on 28 June 2017 on all twelve chapters of the regulation on the future EUAA, “an overall agreement will only be possible once the linkages with the other legislative proposals in the CEAS package have been resolved”. That is, the final adoption of the new EUAA Regulation will not take place until the whole asylum package is finalized (Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Malta aim to strike a difficult deal by June’s summit of European leaders). However, since negotiations are already well advanced, the core provisions of the Regulation on the EUAA will not substantially differ from the text partially agreed between the Council and the Parliament. This blog post thus zooms in on the key operational novelties of the text, which was partially agreed upon by the Council and the Parliament on 28 June 2017, and analyzes what changes these novelties would bring to the current mandate of Easo.

Although the EUAA will not be mandated to set out a comprehensive strategy of asylum, the agency, through guidance on the situation in third countries of origin, shall “ensure greater convergence and address disparities in the assessment of applications for international protection” (Proposal for a EUAA, COM(2016) 271 final, 04.05.2016, p. 7). The EUAA shall “develop a common analysis on the situation in specific countries of origin and guidance notes to assist Member States in the assessment of relevant applications” (article 10(1) partial agreement EUAA). Importantly, as soon as the EUAA’s Management Board endorses the guidance notes, accompanied by the common analysis, the Member States shall take them into account when examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to their competence for deciding on individual applications (article 10(2a) partial agreement on the EUAA).

The new monitoring role of the EUAA will also indirectly shape a common strategy of asylum in the EU. A key difference between Easo and the future EUAA will be its monitoring role in order to guarantee that the national authorities are sufficiently prepared to manage exceptional and sudden pressure in their asylum and reception systems. Should the EUAA’s information analysis raise serious concerns regarding the functioning or preparedness of a Member State’s asylum or reception systems, the agency, on its own initiative or at the request of the European Commission, may initiate a monitoring exercise (article 14(2) partial agreement EUAA).

The Member State concerned will receive the findings of the monitoring exercise and the draft recommendations of the EUAA’s Executive Director for comments. As soon as the agency takes the concerned Member State’s comments into account, the EUAA’s Management Board shall, by a decision of two-thirds of its members with a right to vote, adopt those recommendations (article 14(3a) partial agreement EUAA). As with the EBCG’s vulnerability assessments (article 13 Regulation 2016/1624), the future EUAA will be conferred a recommendatory power in order to put forward measures to be adopted by the national authorities. Nevertheless, Member States will still maintain indirect control of the EUAA’s recommendations (see, here) through the enhanced majority that is required in the Management Board.

Whereas the Commission did not initially propose that the EUAA’s Executive Director be able to appoint experts from the staff of the agency to be deployed as liaison officers in Member States, the provisional text agreed on 28 June 2017 indicated that liaison officers “shall foster cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the Member States’ authorities responsible for asylum and immigration and other relevant services” (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA). Like the EBCG’s liaison officers, the EUAA liaison officers will facilitate the monitoring role of the agency by reporting regularly to the Executive Director on the situation of asylum in the Member States and their capacity to manage their asylum and reception systems effectively (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA).

The EUAA will thus be in charge of monitoring “the operational and technical application of the CEAS in order to prevent or identify possible shortcomings in the asylum and reception systems of Member States and to assess their capacity and preparedness to manage situations of disproportionate pressure so as to enhance the efficiency of those systems” (article 13(1) partial agreement EUAA). With this aim, the agency shall namely assess the national procedures for international protection, staff available and reception conditions (i.e. infrastructure, equipment or financial resources) on the basis of the information provided by the Member State concerned and by relevant intergovernmental organizations or bodies,as well as information analysis on the situation of asylum and on-site visits that the agency may undertake (article 13 (3) and (4) partial agreement EUAA). This new monitoring task of the EUAA shall ultimately contribute to the effective and harmonized implementation of the CEAS by the Member States (see, here, here and here).

The second substantial novelty that the EUAA will bring is the possibility of making an emergency intervention if the functioning of the CEAS is jeopardized due to the insufficient action of a Member State to address the disproportionate pressure on the asylum and reception systems in a Member State (article 22(1)partial agreement EUAA), the refusal of the competent national authorities to request or accept assistance from the EUAA (article 22(1)partial agreement EUAA), or the unwillingness of a Member State to comply with the Commission’s recommendations to implement an action plan intended to address serious shortcomings identified during a monitoring assessment (article 14(3a)partial agreement EUAA).

The procedure set out in article 19(1) Regulation 2016/1624 of the EBCG regarding situations at the external borders requiring urgent action will be, to a more limited extent, replicated for the EUAA. While the proposal for a Regulation on a EUAA originally stated that the Commission would be the EU institution in charge of adopting a decision by means of an implementing act to be taken by the agency to support the Member State concerned, the provisional text finally states that the Council shall be the authority responsible for adopting such an implementing act.

Three days after the Council adopts its implementing act, the EUAA’s Executive Director shall draw up an Operational Plan and determine the details of the practical implementation of the Council’s decision (article 22(2) partial agreement EUAA). Subsequently, the Member State concerned will have three days to reach an agreement with the Executive Director on the Operational Plan and will immediately cooperate with the agency to facilitate the practical execution of the measures put forward (article 22(4) partial agreement EUAA). The Regulation of the EUAA under negotiation does not yet include a similar provision as article 19(10) Regulation 2016/1624, which indicates that if within 30 days a Member State neither executes the decision adopted by the Council nor agrees with the EBCG’s Director Operational Plan, the European Commission may authorize the re-establishment of border controls in the Schengen area.

The third novelty of the future EUAA in comparison to its predecessor Easo will be its involvement in the examination of international protection applications. Several provisions of the EUAA mention that the agency will assist or facilitate the Member States in examining the applications of international protection submitted to their asylum systems. Firstly, among the operational and technical assistance that the EUAA shall provide to Member States, the agency shall facilitate the examination of applications for international protection (article 16(2)(b) partial agreement EUAA) to the competent national authorities. In this regard, the Asylum Support Teams (ASTs) “should support Member States with operational and technical measures, including (…) by knowledge of the handling and management of asylum cases, as well as by assisting national authorities competent for the examination of applications for international protection and by assisting with relocation or transfer of applicants or beneficiaries of international protection” (recital 16 partial agreement EUAA).

Secondly, the operational plan that the Executive Director of the EUAA draws up shall also include organizational aspects such as the assistance of the agency to the Member States in examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to the competence of the national asylum systems to decide on individual applications (Article 19(2)(i) partial agreement EUAA). Lastly, the EUAA in the hotspots will be competent to not only register the applications for international protection, but to also examine such applications if the concerned Member State requests so (article 21(2)(d) partial agreement EUAA).

The Regulation does not yet specify to what extent the EUAA may assist or facilitate the competent national authorities in examining applications for international protection. The negotiations regarding the final text of the recital 46 of the EUAA’s Regulation reveal the tensions for regulating and limiting the “examination powers” of the agency. The text put forward by the European Commission for the recital 46 states that “the competence to take decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection remains with Member States”. The Commission clearly establishes that the EUAA cannot be conferred decision-making powers. The European Parliament, however, adds that this limitation should not preclude “the joint processing of applications for individual protection by a Member State and the Agency at the request of the Agency and within the framework set out in an operational plan agreed between the host Member State and the Agency”. Lastly, the Council considers that “the competence of Member States’ asylum authorities to take a decision on individual applications for international protection should remain unaffected”.

The question to be answered is whether the EUAA will be able to jointly process applications for international protection, and if it cannot, to what extent the agency may support the processing of asylum applications. In 2013, the Commission adopted a study in which the concept of “joint processing” was defined as “an arrangement under which all asylum claims within the EU are processed jointly by an EU authority assuming responsibility for both preparation and decision on all cases, as well as subsequent distribution of recognized beneficiaries of international protection and return of those not in need of protection” (p. 114).

The 2013 study of the European Commission on joint processing put forward four options that progressively move from supporting the Member States in processing asylum applications, to designing a centralized EU authority with decision-making powers and responsible for all asylum processing. Currently, the Member States are solely competent to adopt decisions concerning the admissibility and applications for international protection and Easo is mandated to operationally support the competent national authorities in preparing and reaching such decisions.

The next level of European integration would consist in introducing the mechanism of joint processing in situations where a Member State is subject to an extraordinary number of asylum applications. Joint processing teams of Easo would be deployed and make recommendations on asylum cases to the requesting Member State, which would continue to have exclusive decision-making powers. The ASTs of Easo deployed in the Greek hotspots are in practice adopting recommendations on the admissibility of the international protection applications, recommendations that the Greek officials largely rubberstamp when adopting a final decision (see here, here and here). Precisely, the future EUAA, upon the request of a concerned Member State, will be formally conferred the power to examine applications for international protection in the hotspots, as well as the task to facilitate the examination of such applications not necessarily under the hotspot approach to the competent national authorities.

However, the EUAA will be very far from processing and deciding every asylum application within the EU. Instead, the future Regulation on the EUAA opts for reinforcing the operational tasks of the agency and maintaining the Member States as the exclusive decision-making authorities. Although centralizing the asylum decision-making process would ensure a full harmonization of the national procedures and foster a consistent evaluation of the protection needs, this option would demand a “major institutional transformation” and “substantial resources” than can only be envisioned in the long-term. In other words, the transformation of Easo into an agency with decision-making powers to process all the applications for international protection in the EU is still a rather hypothetical scenario since the Member States’ sovereignty would be challenged, a complete overhaul of Easo and all CEAS legislation would be required, and a specialized court or board would need be created.

There are also doubts as to whether article 78(2) TFEU is a sufficient legal basis for conferring the power to exclusively adopt binding decisions on all asylum claims to a EU authority. Pursuant article 78(2) TFEU, the EU shall ensure: “(…) common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status”. On the one hand, TSOURDIbelieves that a EU-level processing scenario in which decisions are taken entirely by a EU authority instead of the Member States is legally impossible under article 78(2)(e) TFEU “which envisages that ‘a Member State’ is ultimately responsible for the examination of an application”. On the other hand, the 2013 Commission’s study on the feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications in the EU considered that article 78(2) TFEU, read together with articles 78(1) and 80 TFEU, represent an adequate legal basis and open up the possibility for a completely harmonized, EU-based approach for joint processing of asylum applications within the EU.

Hence, as is the case with the EBCG that does not establish a European System of Border Guards with autonomous enforcement powers to exclusively manage the European external borders (see here, here, here or here), the future EUAA will not be directly conferred decision-making powers in asylum matters either, but rather will be given an assistance role in examining applications of international protection (see here). It remains to be seen whether the EUAA will openly interpret its new and vaguely regulated examination prerogative, and to what degree the agency will examine the applications for international protection and exert an indirect impact on the final decisions that the national asylum systems ultimately will adopt.

To conclude, although the Commission refers to the future EUAA as a fully-fledged agency for asylum matters in the EU, the agency will neither be conferred decision-making powers regarding asylum applications, nor executive tasks on the ground. As with the mandate of Easo, the tasks to be conferred to the future EUAA are limited to “facilitate and improve the proper functioning of the CEAS and to assist Member States in implementing their obligations within the framework of CEAS, the European Union Agency for Asylum should provide Member States with operational and technical assistance(…)” (p. 15).

The post It will be a new agency. It will be an enforcement agency. It will be the European Union Agency for Asylum! No wait… it will be EASO appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s turning into a bit of a tradition.

I go to a UACES conference, talk with a range of European Studies colleagues, then write a long post, usually with a sweary title.

This year it’s Bath, and whereas London in 2016 I was angry (twice) and in Krakow in 2017 I was despairing, this time I’m going to be all about not just taking it.

That feeling comes re-reading those pieces and finding that we still have the same basic issues we had back then – a lack of strategic planning, compromised political leadership and a lack of comprehensive scoping of what’s involved – but also a growing appreciation that the incompleteness of things also generates an opportunity for our own agency.

That was brought home to during a roundtable yesterday, where that opportunity got tackled from a range of perspectives.

The question that discussion generated – for me and which I asked the panellists about – was simply one of how much have we already travelled down any particular road, be that on the form of Brexit, on the practice and notion of democratic debate or on the reformation of gender regimes.

And now, because I blog, I’ve reduced that to the more provocative title you see above (and which might have brought you here).

Fundamentals

Reflexively, I get the impression that it’s easier for academics to talk about the past than the future, because of our proclivity for evidence. Indeed, those who become politicised (in the most general of senses) and advocate future paths are often treated with a degree of scepticism: isn’t our job to help people understand their situation, rather than to advance our preferred change? Especially if that change isn’t directly in our field of research?

As a result, we often fixate on how we got here and on what costs have been sunk.

My thought, however, is that in so doing, we sometimes fail to consider how much isn’t locked in or set in stone.

Personally, that grates, if only because I have a real problem with the notion of inevitability in political settings: the point at which we declare that there’s nothing to be done, is the one at which we secure whatever latent agency we might have.

More importantly, it’s also the point at which we find ourselves having things done to us, by those who feel that things aren’t inevitable (or are inevitably going their way). And that’s not a healthy situation, especially in a democratic setting.

Therefore I always ask people to consider what they can do, because there is always something.

The openness of Brexit

And in the case of Brexit there is very much indeed that can be done, by all of us.

As I listened to that roundtable, I tried to note what was already fixed and I struggled.

Certainly, the invoking of Article 50 in March last year is a decision that is not easily changed, grounded as it is in the referendum of the year before, so in very many ways it is locked into the political environment. Those who would challenge its status still have yet to find a line of argument that resonates sufficiently with public opinion to seriously reopen the matter, although if I stick with my line of reasoning then it’s in their interests to keep trying.

But beyond that, there’s not much.

the Withdrawal Agreement – as seems to be forgotten all too often – isn’t a plan for a new EU-UK relationship, but a wrapping up of the old one. Its content focus on tidying up liabilities and providing mechanisms to bridge to the future situation.

That’s worth stressing, for two reasons.

Firstly, it means that what needs to be locked into that document in the next couple of months is a much more manageable list than all of ‘Brexit’. The Irish dimension is crucial here, but so too governance issues.

Secondly, the British obsession with future models – Canada, Norway, Jersey, etc – means that there’s less political attention or heat on the list of things to be done now. Cynically, I might wonder whether that’s intentional – distract from the coming compromises on Ireland by fighting about future customs models – but that bangs up against another of my basic assumptions, namely that it’s almost always cock-up rather than conspiracy.

In any case, there is still space to input to the WA debate, without loosing one position to get into that future relationship debate.

And that’s a debate that will roll on for a good long time yet.

If one makes a working assumption that the UK is leaving next March, then you have all the reason you need to go and try to shape what might come next, because that isn’t on a clear track to anywhere.

And, importantly, it’s even less clear how Brexit rolls back into the domestic arena and shapes the entirety of the body politic. All week, I’ve found myself talking with colleagues who see wide open spaces where “policy area X in the light of Brexit”  debates might be happening. A lot of people seem to be waiting for more clarity on the WA and on the future relationship, thereby letting opportunities to set agendas and promote ideas now.

Your agency

To come back to the title, it’s a provocation, because it implies that are indeed fucked*, which communicates a particular view on Brexit.  It’s worth saying now that that view is one that’s focused on the poor pursuit, rather than the notion in general. It’s not that it’s happening, but that it’s happening so chaotically.

In that, I find that I’m joined by more and more colleagues. Yes, there’s still a block that wants it to just go away and not to have happened. But as Heraclitus noted, we can never step in the same river twice: there is no status quo ante option here, because things have moved on.

And more basically, it can’t be enough to just stand there and hope things will change, however it is that you want them to change.

We have to work to secure it. You have to work for it.

The micro-personalisation of economic activity means that – for a price – you can get what you want, how you want it. But politics doesn’t work like that: it depends on us, as citizens, engaging with each other, to find ways forward towards our idea of the good life. And if we don’t do that, then others will do it for us, and not necessarily in a good way.

So I will leave this conference determined to encourage you all to make the most of the many opportunities for contribution that Brexit still contains. And that will be part of my own contribution.

All of which is to say that we’re only fucked if we let ourselves be, which might not be the grandest of sentiments, but then I’m not a very sentimental type.

 

* My working assumption as ever is that our social media people will assume I asterisked all the way through, not just the title. We’ll see.

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‘The Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation’ Standing Group @ ECPR 2018 in Hamburg. Photo credits: Mari Elken

Martina Vukasovic

This year’s ECPR (European Consortium of Political Research) General Conference took place at the University of Hamburg (Germany) August 22-25. The conference included 520 panels on a wide array of topics and representation from more than 2,000 academics from around the world. The ECPR Standing Group on the Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation, for the seventh time in a row (following Oslo 2017,  Prague 2016, Montreal 2015, Glasgow 2014, Bordeaux 2013 and Reykjavik 2011) organised a section with a total of six panels covering various themes related to knowledge policy governance.

 

European integration in the area of higher education and research continues to be in focus, and this year one panel explicitly focused on differentiated integration, specifically (1) the varied nature of policies and instruments on the European level, and (2) the varied national and institutional adaptation to these instruments. The panel opened with the presentation by Natalia Leskina on several overlapping initiatives in the post-Soviet countries aiming at establishing the Eurasian Higher Education Area and how European integration initiatives (specifically the Bologna Process) have been used as a model by the post-Soviet countries. Simona Torotcoi took the domestic side of differentiated integration as her point of departure and explored compliance and implementation of recommendations concerning two Bologna Process aspects – quality and social dimension – in Portugal and Romania. This was followed by Tim Seidenschnur and Jens Jungblut who identified four distinct narratives – concerns, hopes, beliefs and silent opportunism – that permeate German higher education perspectives on what the consequences of Brexit might be for, among others, student mobility (and in particular mobility of students preparing to be language teachers) and research cooperation. Brexit was also the topic of the paper by Amelia Veiga, who juxtaposed the reflections of academics from 10 European countries (Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom) concerning Brexit with the European Commission’s scenarios for 2025. Finally, Mari Elken and Martina Vukasovic discussed the European side of differentiated integration in higher education, in particular the implications of the existence of several overlapping policy arenas at the European level, how EU initiatives get diluted over time (shifting from big political aims to rather technocratic considerations) and what is the role of regional level integration (e.g. within the Nordic region) in the overall process of European integration.

 

The second panel went beyond Europe and explored issues of global knowledge governance. Meng-Hsuan Chou focused on recruitment of academics globally, specifically analysing, on the one hand, the policies and incentives developed in Singapore to attract more academics and, on the other hand, the rationales and motivations of academics themselves to choose Singapore as their academic home. Tero Erkkilä discussed the ideational linkages between the rise of numerical governance (i.e. governance by global indicators) and knowledge based competitiveness, stressing the role international organizations have in promoting these policy scripts. Janja Komljenovic presented her paper (co-authored by Eva Hartmann) on the role of global private actors in governing higher education, with a specific focus on graduate employability and skills and what are the actual practices and measures used by higher education institutions to mediate the transition of students into employment. These global private actors were also discussed by Miguel Antonio Lim, who highlighted how companies and individuals involved in the business of university ranking build their expertise and legitimate themselves and their products to a global audience, specifically positioning themselves as weak experts.

 

The next panel was dedicated to neo-institutional approaches to analysis of higher education, research and innovation. Jens Jungblut explored the diffusion of innovations from universities to pharmaceutical industry and hospitals and translation challenges that exist both between sectors characterized by different institutional logics as well as between different countries. Georg Krücken and Tim Seidenschnur presented their analysis of why management consultancy projects in universities are not particularly successful, in particular the role of different actors and communities within universities in ascribing or denying legitimacy to management consultants. Emma Sabzalieva presented her review of the concept of major institutional change in higher education, utilizing both the more generic literature on the topic and the higher education specific insights, and exploring the extent to which these perspectives can be utilized beyond its original Western context, e.g. in relation to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and implications this had for higher education systems and institutions. Alexander Mitterle focused on whether and how neo-institutional approaches can be used not only to study similarity, but also stratification in higher education, specifically contrasting several approaches to field theory, in particular how Bourdieu’s and Fligsten/McAdams’ concepts of fields can be enriched by a more phenomenological perspective to actorhood.

 

The fourth panel focused on a major intersection of science and politics – distribution of funding for research and innovation and is a follow up to a previous panel on research executive agencies in Oslo. Four papers were presented. Stefan Skupien discussed choices and tensions concerning asymmetrical research collaborations, such as the one concerning European cooperation (supported by both public and private partners) with African partners in the field of renewable energies. Thomas Palfinger and Peter Biegelbauer compared 12 innovation agencies operating in Europe and their 18 programmes, specifically discussing legitimacy of their funding decisions in relation to how evaluators are selected, what is their role, what project selection criteria they use, how are projects ranked and what are the decision-making procedures. Emina Veletanlic and Creso Sá focused on the Canadian largest research-funding agency (The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council) and how the shifts away from support for basic research and towards targeted programmes affects basic research in these fields. Thomas König and Sarah Glück concluded the panel with an exploration of agencification of EU research policy, specifically what is the relationship between European executive agencies and (1) the European Commission, (2) other EU institutions and (3) national administrative agencies and ministries involved in research and innovation.

 

Nicolas Rüffin presenting at the panel on Politics of Big Science and research infrastructures. Photo credits: Mari Elken

The fifth panel continued the focus on research, namely the politics of Big Science and research infrastructures. It was organised by recently launched Big Science and Research Infrastructures Network that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in large-scale research facilities and international scientific collaboration. Nicolas Rüffin presented his research on unanimity in decision-making at two large intergovernmental science organizations – CERN and European Space Agency. Isabel Bolliger in turn compared research infrastructure policies in Switzerland and Sweden demonstrating differences in development of their national research infrastructure roadmaps. Finally, Inga Ulnicane discussed political and scientific changes in research infrastructures highlighting that in addition to ‘good old’ intergovernmental large-scale facilities such as CERN new types of digital platform infrastructures are emerging according to differentiated integration approach that involves a number of EU member states as well as associated countries.

 

The final panel highlighted the normative power of Europe in shaping higher education and science policy environments, as well as the complex relationships between instruments and institutions in higher education, research and innovation. Que Anh Dang addressed theoretical and empirical challenges in using the ‘normative power’ approach for analysing developments in Asia. Specifically, she addressed the roles EU and China played, in particular the differences between a rather high-level promotion of European approaches and the people-to-people exchange policy within China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Claudia Acciai compared developments in innovation policy in France and Italy, primarily addressing the heterogeneity of actors and the implications this has for choice of policy instruments and the overall policy design. Elizabeth Balbachevsky highlighted the nested character of science as an institution, the implications this has for the institutional resilience of the University and what are the similarities and differences in how University of Sao Paulo in Brazil and University of Tampere in Finland responded to environmental expectations.

 

Standing Group meeting. Photo credits: Mari Elken

Apart from lively discussions within panels, the Standing Group also had its annual meeting focused on planning future activities, including ECPR 2019, which will take place in Wroclaw. The meeting was also marked by the Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar to Olivier Provini for his paper “Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi”. ECPR 2018 was another successful year for our Standing Group, gathering researchers currently based on three continents (Asia, Europe and North America). See you at the next ECPR General Conference in Wroclaw in September 2019!

 

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