Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The European Union (EU) is seeking out new partnerships and to strengthen existing ones, particularly with Global South states, to enhance its open strategic autonomy. This includes a resilient supply of raw materials for its twin transition to a digital and green economy. Hosting many transnational corporations, several of these partners advocate for a binding international standard to regulate business and human rights beyond the non-binding United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs). Thus, the EU should establish a mandate and actively engage in the negotiations for a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights (BHR) to consolidate its image as a defender of human rights internationally. Multilateral negotiations enable dialogue and mutual cooperation that regional and national laws on supply chain due diligence do not, and thus risk acceptance by international partners once implemented. This poses a challenge for mutual cooperation, which is necessary to achieve corporate accountability.

After approximately 20 years of negotiations, the EU and the Mercosur countries agreed on a joint trade agreement in 2019 – however, it has not yet been concluded. The objection of the countries blocking the agreement was that the Brazilian president at the time, Jair Bolsonaro, did not put a stop to the large-scale slash-and-burn clearances in the Amazon region. However, since the new head of government, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, took office, there has been growing confidence that the agreement will be concluded quickly.

But still, one key question remains with regard to the trade agreement with the Mercosur countries, that is, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay: Is trade possible without the risk of deforestation? Civil society and some EU member states, such as France and Austria, claim the clauses in the draft are not enough because they are not enforceable. They are calling for effective protection against deforestation and forest degradation that will endure even if agricultural land-use pressures increase – not least because of the export opportunities created by the agreement. Effective sanctions are a key element here, but they are difficult to implement because modifications to the current text version are challenging.

The new EU regulation for deforestation-free supply chains offers some leverage. It is planned to be adopted in spring 2023 and enter into force at the end of 2024. According to this regulation, certain products such as beef, soy, coffee, and palm oil may only be made available to the European market if they have been produced in a way that does not involve deforestation or forest damage. The deciding factor is that they cannot come from areas that have been deforested after the end of 2020. Future expansion of the product range and ecosystems to be protected is possible.

The regulation creates due diligence obligations. European companies will no longer buy raw materials or products if it cannot be ensured that they comply with the requirements of the regulation. Essentially, this comes very close to a sanction.

Unilateral EU regulations decrease the agreement’s appeal

However, to leave enforcing sustainability solely at the reference to the new regulation would ignore the potential of an interplay between agreement and regulation. In its 2022 Communication “The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth”, the Commission identifies effective sanctions as a last resort for enforcement, but it also highlights the importance of partnership cooperation and the linking of trade agreements with unilateral measures.

Such a cooperative approach is also warranted in light of the EU-Mercosur Agreement, as the regulation has raised serious concerns among producing countries. They have to exert considerable effort to stop deforestation by effectively enforcing their own laws. Apart from the fact that the EU is thus unilaterally defining requirements and specifications, future exports to the EU will require considerable investments in certification and logistics as a result of the new regulation. This poses major challenges for small and medium-sized enterprises in particular, but also for farmers in supplier countries. And last but not least, unilateral requirements can reduce the incentive for joining a trade agreement, at least with regard to the sustainability obligations contained therein.

Partnership roadmap for sustainability

This is where a cooperation for the implementation of the agreement and the regulation could play a role, linking targets, measures, and corresponding support with a concrete timetable within the framework of a roadmap. In the case of the EU-Mercosur Agreement, it could be adopted as an addendum that allows for a later expansion to include additional products from the outset, as is also possible under the regulation. This could be conceivable for sugar cane and maize, both of which are subject to a possible expansion of production that risks deforestation due to the greater European market access provided in the agreement.

Similar cooperation would be possible retroactively for trade agreements that have already entered into force and vice versa as an incentive for future agreements. They are future-oriented for trade agreements, unilateral measures, and as well their interlinkage. One reason is because they can significantly promote the establishment of new trade agreements and the implementation of existing ones. But also, because the need for a cooperative partnership accompanying unilateral measures will increase with the Timber Trade Regulation, which has been in place for some time, and the planned regulations on due diligence obligations for corporations.

Whether it is market access, trade diversification, or geo-strategy – the EU is seeking new trade relations, not least because of experiences following Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In doing so, it must not lose sight of its sustainability goals and must remain attractive to partners. The agreement with the Mercosur countries provides a good opportunity for this.

A revolutionary state in trouble

Event Video 
Photos

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IPI together with the Gender, Justice and Security Hub cohosted a discussion on March 13th on the topic of Women’s Agency in Post-Conflict Reconciliation in  Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.

Women in Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda have figured prominently among the victims of war. They also face complex challenges in overcoming the legacies of war, rebuilding their livelihoods and communities, and confronting the horrors of the past. When women feel empowered and have agency, they can  become strong advocates and facilitators of reconciliation processes, as well as peacebuilders in their communities.

This event shared research findings on women’s roles in post-conflict reconciliation in Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, as well as potential synergies between women peacebuilders in all three contexts. Despite being “disproportionately represented among the victims of armed conflict,” as highlighted by IPI Women, Peace and Security Head Phoebe Donnelly, women are still too often omitted from peace processes.  This comparison of the three cases helped identify opportunities for women to build peace in their countries and promote awareness of these specific contexts.

During the event, Policy Analyst at UN Women Pablo Castillo Díaz, evoked a discussion on the challenges of labelling. Speakers shared their insight on their respective countries:

In Uganda, co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub  explained that the use of the term “post-conflict” can be problematic and/or contradictory considering the war ended 40 years ago, and that there are several ongoing conflicts. In many cases there is real conflict, and “post-war” would be more suitable.

In the case of Sri Lanka, “conflict should not be labelled as over until there is rebuilding” stated Visaka Dharmadasa,  co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub. She also asserted that women must be part of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process (DDR) and another R should be added for “Rebuilding” (DDRR).

In Colombia, co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub   said that people are using the term “post-accord” which has to do with the fact that the country has had over 20 peace processes, including current negotiations to achieve sustainable peace.

The protection, participation and power of women peacebuilders is key for reconciliation and sustainable peace. Read more about the work of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub, and how they amplify the voices of women and marginalized groups here>>

Opening remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Kirsten Ainley, Co-principal Investigator of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub and Associate Professor of International Relations, Australian National University

Panelists:
Angelika Rettberg, Co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub  and Professor of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes
Visaka Dharmadasa, Founder of the Association of War Affected Women in Sri Lanka and project partner on the Gender, Justice and Security Hub
Josephine Ahikire, Co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub and Associate Professor of Gender Studies at the School of Women and Gender Studies, Principal of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Makerere University
Pablo Castillo Díaz, Policy Specialist, UN Women

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of the Women, Peace, and Security Program, International Peace Institute

 

for social media Evyn had me remove “the contexts of,” not sure if we need/should keep it. [MZ1] [MZ1]

 

let’s remove [AS2] [AS2]

 

“can…” is included in the concept note, without it it seems like a loaded statement [MZ3] [MZ3]

 

or “peacebuilding and reconciliation processes”  (peace processes to avoid repetition) [MZ4] [MZ4]

 

Do I need to include “Associate Professor of Gender Studies at the School of Women and Gender Studies, Principal of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Makerere University, and Co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub”? As it is quite lengthy and also right below… [MZ5] [MZ5]

 

 

Let’s just use “Co-director of Gender, Justice and Security Hub.” We do need to include an affiliation here. [AS6] [AS6]

 

 

Do I need to include “Founder of the Association of War Affected Women in Sri Lanka and project partner on the Gender, Justice and Security Hub”  ? [MZ7] [MZ7]

 

I added (DDRR) at the end, and all capitalized since it’s a title. [MZ8]

 

include “Professor of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes and Co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub” ? [MZ9] [MZ9]

 

Again, “Co-director” only here. [AS10] [AS10]

Opening remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Kirsten Ainley, Co-principal Investigator of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub and Associate Professor of International Relations, Australian National University

Panelists:
Angelika Rettberg, Professor of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes and Co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub
Visaka Dharmadasa, Founder of the Association of War Affected Women in Sri Lanka and project partner on the Gender, Justice and Security Hub
Josephine Ahikire, Associate Professor of Gender Studies at the School of Women and Gender Studies, Principal of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Makerere University, and Co-director of the Gender, Justice and Security Hub
Pablo Castillo Díaz, Policy Specialist, UN Women

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of the Women, Peace, and Security Program, International Peace Institute

In Israels ultrarechter Regierung wird offen mit einer Vertreibung aller Palästinenser(innen) geliebäugelt, sagt Nahost-Experte Peter Lintl. Im Gespräch mit der FURCHE erklärt er, warum er von „De-facto-Annexionen“ des Westjordanlandes ausgeht, die umstrittene Justizreform in eine illiberale Demokratie führen wird – und weshalb Protestanten laut „Orbibi“ rufen.

Pour les Géorgiens, Moldaves et Ukrainiens, l'Union européenne incarne la liberté, l'Etat de droit, la dignité de la personne humaine, le respect des frontières et une prospérité qui leur a longtemps été confisquée. C'est pour cela qu'ils rejettent la Russie de Poutine qui ravive les souvenirs d'un passé totalitaire, écrit Jean-Dominique Giuliani.

Selon la dernière enquête d'opinion, le Parti de la coalition nationale (KOK) de Petteri Orpo arriverait en tête des élections législatives du 2 avril, avec 20,8% des suffrages, devant le Parti social-démocrate de la Première ministre sortante, Sanna Marin, qui obtiendrait 19,9% des voix, et le Parti des Finlandais (Perus S), dirigé par Rikka Purra, 19%.

Les systèmes de retraite font régulièrement l'objet de débats dans les États membres et de discussions au niveau européen en raison de leurs poids sur les budgets et de l'évolution démographique de l'Europe. Alors que chaque pays dispose d'un système particulier, la Fondation propose un tableau comparatif pour mieux comprendre la situation de chacun et les enjeux qui en découlent.

Afin de répondre aux conséquences économiques et sociales de la pandémie de Covid-19, l'Union européenne a mis en place un fonds de relance de 672,5 milliards €. Le 8 mars, Malte et la Slovénie ont reçu leur premier versement. Le 9 mars, l'Estonie a demandé à la Commission d'ajouter un chapitre REPowerEU à son plan. Le 10 mars, la Commission a rendu une évaluation préliminaire positive de la demande de paiement de l'Autriche. La Fondation vous propose une carte interactive des plans pays par pays, pour en connaître les montants, les calendriers.

Les 7 et 8 mars, les ministres européens de la Défense réunis à Stockholm ont discuté du soutien militaire à l'Ukraine, en particulier de l'achat conjoint de munitions d'artilleries et de la formation des soldats ukrainiens via la mission d'assistance militaire de l'l'Union à l'Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine).

La Première ministre finlandaise Sanna Marin s'est rendue le 10 mars à Kiev où elle a réaffirmé que l'avenir de l'Ukraine est en Europe. Elle a discuté avec le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky du soutien européen et des efforts pour juger les crimes de guerre ruses. Les deux dirigeants ont condamné la "rhétorique nucléaire irresponsable" de la Russie.

Antonio Guterres, secrétaire général des Nations unies, s'est rendu à Kiev le 8 mars. Il a rappelé que l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie est une violation de la Charte des Nations unies et du droit international et s'est engagée à atténuer les impacts du conflit, notamment d'un point de vue humanitaire.

Les ministres chargés de l'aide au développement, ainsi que le vice-Premier ministre ukrainien chargé de la reconstruction,. Oleksandr Kubrakov ont discuté les 8 et 9 mars à Stockholm du soutien de l'Union européenne à la reconstruction de l'Ukraine.

Pour apprendre le français depuis l'ukrainien l'ONG Bibliothèques Sans Frontières propose l'application gratuite "Bonjour France", accessible depuis l'application Kajou. L'application propose 50 thématiques pour s'orienter au quotidien, 100 podcasts et plus de 1 000 exercices pour s'entraîner en français ainsi qu'un lexique avec 600 phrases pré-enregistrées en français.

Le Conseil et le Parlement sont parvenus le 10 mars à un accord pour réduire la consommation finale d'énergie de l'union de 11,7% d'ici à 2030. Cette limite de la consommation sera contraignante pour les États membres qui devront contribuer à la réalisation de cet objectif par le biais de leurs plans nationaux en matière d'énergie et de climat (PNEC). Cet accord prévoit aussi que l'objectif annuel d'économies d'énergie augmente progressivement et que le secteur public soit tenu de réaliser des économies d'énergie supérieures à la moyenne.

Le 9 mars, la Commission a approuvé une modification du règlement général d'exemption par catégorie (RGEC) et a adopté un cadre temporaire afin d'accélérer le soutien à la transition écologique et numérique, conformément au plan industriel du pacte vert. Le texte simplifie et étend les possibilités de subventions publiques aux projets contribuant à réduire les émissions de CO2 de l'Union européenne, en réponse aux subventions américaines et chinoises qui font craindre une fuite des investissements verts hors d'Europe.

La Commission a publié le 10 mars ses propositions pour renforcer la stratégie de sûreté maritime de l'Union, ainsi qu'un plan d'action actualisé pour sa mise en œuvre. La nouvelle stratégie prévoit des mesures renforcées contre les nouvelles menaces mais aussi un cadre pour permettre à l'Union de protéger ses intérêts en mer. Elle promeut la paix et la sécurité internationale mais aussi la protection des océans et leur biodiversité.

La Commission a présenté le 10 mars une communication sur la stratégie spatiale européenne pour la sécurité et la défense. Elle propose notamment une coopération renforcée face aux menaces spatiales, des actions visant à renforcer la protection des systèmes et services spatiaux dans l'Union, la maximisation de l'utilisation de l'espace pour la sécurité et la défense ainsi que la promotion d'usages responsables de l'espace au niveau international.

La Commission a publié le 8 mars ses orientations pour les politiques budgétaires des États membres, les appelant à la prudence. Elle recommande des politiques qui garantissent la soutenabilité de la dette à moyen terme et favorisent la croissance, notamment par l'investissement public. La clause dérogatoire générale du pacte de stabilité et de croissance sera désactivée à la fin de 2023 et sera remplacée.