From Iraq to Syria, in Lebanon and in Yemen, both are competing for dominance in an ever-deepening tussle for supremacy across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Yet to understand what may happen in the coming years, is to push past the one-tracked, sectarian explanation of current hostilities, and to construct a more multi-faceted and profound, realist-oriented discussion of the conflict.
The ‘tool’ of sectarianismToby Mathieson- in discussion with the Council on Foreign Relations- described Riyadh’s use of sectarianism as a ‘tool they use’ to mobilize Sunni support both at home, and across the MENA region. Former US State Department adviser, Vali Nasr, concurs, attributing Nimr’s execution to a Saudi desire to ‘rally Sunnis at home’, as well as to shore up Sunni support from a variety of regional actors.
For Riyadh, a mobilization of internal and external Sunni support is necessary for purely realist reasons – to reinforce the House of Saud’s legitimacy, and subsequently to guarantee its survival, in the face of a revitalized Iran.
The hastily convened ‘Islamic Military Alliance (sans Iran and Iraq) is a convenient sectarian front for what is ostensibly a zero-sum competition for leverage in the Middle East. Further evidence abounds with the Saudis’ role in attempting a rapprochement between wary Sunni ‘bedfellows’, Egypt and Turkey.
Quite simply, Saudi Arabia is using the highly divisive issue of sectarianism to shroud its true intentions – to prevent the hegemonic rise of a re-energized and unshackled Iran. Its policy actions for a number of decades point to such a conclusion.
The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 was designed to counter Iran’s rise after its 1979 Islamic Revolution, and to support Saddam in his nearly decade-long conflict with Iran.
Iranian rancor at Saudi support for Saddam still remains to this day. The Islamic Military Alliance must be viewed in the same light as the formation of the GCC.
An attempt to assuage intra-Sunni squabbles (in the case of Turkey and Egypt) is a further policy prescription by which Riyadh can present a united front against Tehran.
From an Iranian perspective, since the ascension of the Ayatollah Khomeini to the position of Supreme Leader, Iran has sought to buttress links with co-religionists across the region, forming a Shiite crescent comprising Assad’s Alawites and Lebanon’s militant group, Hezbollah.
This ‘crescent’ is wholly fuelled by Iranian desires to return to what Tehran sees as its rightful place within the Middle Eastern order – as the true regional hegemon; a re-Persianization of Iran’s status if you will. Covert support for Yemen’s Shiite Houthi rebels is additional sign of Iranian strategic designs on the MENA region. Iranian exportation of its Shiite ideology across the region must therefore be understood within the context of a regional balance of power, and Iranian attempts to dominate as it has done so before.
Saudi insecurityThe Saudi kingdom is afraid. Its grip on power is predicated upon its religious legitimacy and the social contract that binds the House of Saud to its citizens, in a sentence – bountiful financial benefit in exchange for continued support. Both of these legitimizing tenets have been jeopardized in the past year, through the Hajj disaster and the global collapse of the oil price.
Riyadh has been forced to dig into its (admittedly huge) foreign exchange reserves. It has also announced its first cut to benefits. Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has even announced that Aramco will be partly privatized. Saudi decision-making has always been of a politically realist nature. For the Al Saud family, survival is the goal. Thus its extraneous actions will always be predicated upon ensuring the regime and the state’s survival.
Currently, Riyadh is also facing the very real threat of the Islamic State, which looms large on its border, and even within the kingdom. Thus aside from its regional hegemonic battle with Iran, the House of Saud is being bedeviled by what it views as a number of existential threats.
Nimr’s execution can thus be understood as a Saudi ploy to illustrate its might and its determination to meet what it perceives as existential threats, with overwhelming force. Playing the anti-Shiite card is one small part of this strategy.
Saudi insecurity has also been irretrievably heightened by the Iranian nuclear deal, which Riyadh fears will draw Tehran closer to the United States. Since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, Riyadh has dominated America’s Middle Eastern relations. Thus with Iran slowly being accepted back into the international fold, a great Saudi fear is that in any future clashes between Riyadh and Tehran, Washington could conceivably side with Riyadh’s great enemy, a wholly unpalatable scenario for the Saudi rulers.
NO to direct confrontationToday’s hostilities do not point towards a shift from cold to hot in what is already an extremely precarious situation.
The Saudis’ military capacity does not match up to the Iranians. Iran has around 500,000 ground troops, compared to less than 200,000 for the Saudis. From an economic perspective, oil sustains the Saudi regime. Oil revenue is used to buy support within the kingdom and friends outside of the kingdom.
The majority of this oil lies in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, a demographic disaster, as the area is predominantly Shiite. Therefore it is vital for Saudi Arabia not to incite trouble (or too much trouble) with Iran so as to ensure its safeguarding of the fundamental Eastern province.
Moreover, Iran will not want to jeopardize its recent welcome back into the international fold and the ensuing lifting of sanctions on the Iranian economy. As a longstanding US ally, Saudi Arabia would expect to receive American support, making overt Iranian aggression against Riyadh unlikely.
What will happen is an intensification of proxy Saudi-Iranian conflicts across the MENA region. Saudi military largesse in Yemen – estimated to be costing the kingdom in Riyadh the princely sum of $1 billion a month – is unlikely to be discontinued. The war shows few signs of abating, with recent talk of a ceasefire failing to staunch the frighteningly large amount of civilian deaths (said to be at nearly 3,000 according to the UN). Nimr’s execution has put a stake through the heart of any Yemeni peace process.
Nimr’s death is also likely to reduce the likelihood of an agreement on the Syrian track in Vienna, as both the Saudis and Iran both reinforce their stances behind their respective Syrian clients. Iran will harden its resolve to see Assad remain in power, while the Saudis will continue to support anti-Assad rebels in Syria, ploughing money and arms into extremist hands.
A solely sectarian-based argument as the catalyst behind the Saudi-Iranian conflict is missing the wider point of international relations. Of the recent spate of Saudi executions, only 4 (out of 47) were Shiite. Contrary to noise emanating from the White House, Nimr was not all that he was cracked up to be. He had clear, public links to Hezbollah al-Hejaz, an armed, Khomeinist group, highly active in the Saudis’ Eastern Province. Nimr has called for an armed struggle against the ‘illegitimate’ Saudi regime. Hezbollah al-Hejaz was even behind the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed numerous Americans.
Instead, the death of Nimr will serve to intensify the Middle Eastern, geopolitical competition of the past decade, as both sides seeks to shore up their claims of regional (and religious) leadership.
This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Sam Julius.
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Written by Matthew Barbari
While Americans are focusing on the upcoming U.S. Presidential elections, the United Nations is beginning its own election season. With current Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon term ending this year, the search for his replacement has begun. The UN has stated that it wants this current election to be the most transparent. The difficulty with the nomination revolves around the approval needed from the permanent members of the UN Security Council—The United States, The United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—which have veto power over who is selected for the position.
Qualifications
There is a push for the Secretary-General to be from a region of the world that has yet to be represented, which is the case of Eastern Europe. They must have support from their government, as well as the support from most countries in the region. Previous experience in foreign affairs as well as the ability to communicate fluently in the official UN languages (minimum of 2) is required for the candidate.
This is also the first time that the calls for a woman Secretary-General are being adequately met. Many groups such as the 1 for 7 Billion campaign have called for a woman in the highest office of the United Nations. Under Ban Ki-Moon and the Sustainable Development Goals initiative, the issues of gender equality and the rights of women have been targeted as areas of improvement throughout the world.
Many critics of the UN would point out that only 25% of top UN positions are occupied by women. A major step in the fight for gender equality would be to have a woman as the face of the UN. These are the four current nominees with the best credentials and most support:
Irina Bokova
Bulgaria’s candidate for the position is considered to be the front-runner. The current Director-General of UNESCO as well as former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador, Bokova has a long and respected track record within the United Nations. With the ability to speak several languages fluently, as well as being highly respected for her communication and passion towards peacekeeping and dialogue, she enjoys support from the five Security Council permanent members.
Vuk Jeremić
Serbia’s candidate is the former president of the 67th Session of the General Assembly Vuk Jeremić. Jeremić is another strong candidate considering his work within the UN as well as his support for women’s education, calling for a United Nations Youth Assembly to hear Women’s Rights advocate Malala Yousafzai speak on her struggle for equal education rights in Pakistan. Jeremić had been selected as a potential candidate back in 2012 but was held back by his poor reputation among other countries in the region due to his steadfast denouncement of the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence from Serbia.
Danilo Türk
The former President of Slovenia, Danilo Türk brings decades of experience working in the United Nations to his potential appointment as Secretary-General. Türk has overwhelming support from his home country as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. Starting as the Representative of Slovenia, Türk has been within the UN system for nearly 30 years, spending time as Assistant Secretary-General under Kofi Annan, as well as a member of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. His experience and respect make him a very popular candidate and his history of supporting human and gender rights has garnered a lot of support.
Vesna Pusić
One of the founding members of the Croatian People’s Party, Vesna Pusić is a popular candidate for the next Secretary-General due to her support for gender equality, LGBT rights and liberal democracy. Having spent five years as the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs for Croatia she has some experience in foreign affairs. Her lack of United Nations experience is a negative as well as her very vocal support for the LGBT community might not be well received in Moscow.
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On Sunday, Pyongyang launched a long-range missile, despite the protests of the United States, South Korea and Japan that have immediately condemned the initiative as a further outrageous violation of the UN sanctions, preventing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from using any ballistic missiles technology. The UN Security Council promptly summoned an emergency meeting to express its strong condemnation. While China still opposes expanding sanctions on the DPRK, Washington has recently stressed its determination to support South Korea and Japan against the threat represented by the DPRK nuclear ambitions.
During the last few weeks, Washington has coordinated an intense diplomatic offensive, urging for a Chinese intervention in response to the dangerous escalation characterizing the latest missile crisis. Few weeks ago, Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Beijing to make the case for a more proactive Chinese role over the issue of the North Korea’s nuclear program, the main threat to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
While both countries have agreed upon the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Beijing has strongly stressed the need of supporting diplomatic initiatives, aiming to strengthen the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK’s nuclear program activities have intensified after the alleged announcement concerning the North Korea’s acquisition of thermonuclear weapons, causing the unanimous condemnation of Japan, the United States and South Korea while China and Russia have expressed serious concerns about consequences of the DPRK nuclear program.
Albeit, China and the DPRK have shared a certain level of ideological affinity, their strategic partnership has waned over the last two decades. Beijing remains the DPRK’s biggest trade partner, providing a vital food and oil supply lifeline. But after the leadership change in North Korea, relations have cooled down. Kim Jung-un took the power in 2011, and quickly set the North Korean nuclear program as one of the top priorities for the regime. However, despite the evident erosion of China’s ability to use its leverage on Pyongyang, Washington demands from Beijing a more steadfast role with regard to the evolution of the Korean crisis.
Chinese interest in the Korean Peninsula
Since the end of the Korean War, Chinese leaders have valued the preservation of the balance of the power in the Korean Peninsula as the most important precondition for regional stability. To preserve the status quo, China strongly opposes the rise of the DRPK’s as a nuclear power. The pragmatic Chinese leadership is not per se concerned with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea but rather, it is worried about the consequences of a growing level of insecurity among the neighboring countries such as Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan, inclined to acquire nuclear weapons of their own as a source of deterrence.
Eventually, the North Korean nuclear program could push Seoul and Washington to pursue a military intervention, resulting in a reunited Korea under the control of the South and an increased American military presence in China’s backyard. Since the partition of the peninsula, the DPRK has played an important role as a buffer state between China and the South Korea where more than 30.000 U.S. troops are currently stationed. Moreover, this scenario could increase tensions between China and Washington and its allies, given Beijing’s growing perception a strategic containment fostered by Washington as part of the “pivot to Asia” launched by the Obama Administration in 2011.
From an economic perspective, the event of the collapse and assimilation of the North Korea would trigger a severe humanitarian crisis. This would be a serious challenge to the Chinese leadership, undermining its role in a delicate phase of transition that is currently characterizing President Xi’s rule. Consequently, preventing any alterations in the current Korean peninsula architecture is the main priority for Beijing.
The harsh rule that has characterized Kim Jong Un’ leadership keeps irritating Beijing especially after the execution of Jan Sung-taek in 2013. Due to his close relations with Beijing and role as a supervisor of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) located in the northeast provinces, close to the border, the execution of Jan Sung-taek was considered by many China watchers as a clear attempt to undermine Beijing’s influence while sending a warning to those opposing Kim Jong Un’s rule.
After the Jan Sung-taek incident, Beijing’s attempts to maintain a strong paternal influence over Kim Jong Un have produced limited results. Few days ago the special envoy for Korean affairs Wu Dawei returned to Beijing empty-handed. Additionally, recent remarks from the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang have alimented the speculations about China’s tense relations with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue.
Washington’s view
The challenge represented by the DPRK’s nuclear program unveils Washington’s concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Besides threatening regional and global security, the advancement of Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities is eroding the international community’s perceived ability to compel nations to abide by rules and regulations expressed by the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As mentioned earlier, China does not fear the DPRK as a nuclear power, yet the implications for the United States are different. Pyongyang’s ability to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the foreseeable future would enable the DPRK to strike targets within the continental U.S. in addition to the existing nuclear threat to neighboring countries.
(Source: International Maritime Organization, retrieved from Agence France Press)
Indeed, South Korea and Japan have increased the level of cooperation with Washington through the expansion of trilateral military exercises, improving the level of preparedness required for intercepting missile strikes. In the recent years, the impact of the nuclear threat has induced South Korea to take a more assertive stand against Pyongyang’s provocations. Japan, under Abe’s leadership, has launched a comprehensive package of security reforms to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to fight alongside the U.S. troops after more than 70 years of self-imposed restrictions.
Many analysts in Washington have stressed the correlations between the advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program and the growing instability of the young Kim Jong Un’s regime. Over the last three years, Kim Jong Un’s leadership has been characterized by a furious attempt to follow the steps of his grandfather Kim Il-Sung, the dynasty founder worshipped by millions of North Korean as a demigod.
However, the sudden appointment of Kim Jong Un as successor has surely left many influent members of the Kims close entourage skeptical about his real ability to rule. Beyond the propaganda façade, characterized by the blind adoration toward Kim Jong Un, his trembling power has mostly relied on purging powerful members of the party and granting privileges to his closest associates, following a pattern laid out elites selectorate model theory, common in authoritarian regimes.
Nowadays, Washington is calling Beijing for more significant and impactful sanctions to force the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In order to achieve this goal, China is expected to use its leverage to bring Pyongyang back to the table of negotiations. Additionally, from Washington’s perspective, given its aspirations as a rising power, committed to contributing to the global peace and security, China should share the responsibilities with the United States. It remains uncertain how President Xi will deal with the issue, but it is certain that the success or failure of Chinese diplomacy will strongly impact the region’s security environment.
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Last week, Twitter announced that it suspended 125,000 accounts since the middle of 2015 that it suspected of “threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily related to ISIS.” This statement was the first of its kind from one of the world’s most popular social media platforms and a favorite among extremist groups.
Twitter’s actions against ISIS accounts are not unique. Internet companies, especially those that manage massive social media platforms, have been combating a flood of terrorist propaganda that is saturating the digital landscape.
However, Twitter’s very public statement amounts to a declaration of war against ISIS contrasts with its contemporaries; many of whom chose to take a far less transparent stand in publicizing suspension activities against ISIS and other extremist groups.
ISIS has become so popular so fast that governments are struggling to keep up with the parasitic spread of its appeal. Twitter, being the preferred medium for recruitment, is facing a formidable challenge in its attempt to stop or, at the very least, stymie the proliferation of social media based propaganda operations.
The apocalyptic narrative ISIS is preaching has been buoyed by a grasp on the importance of creating and harnessing a prolific social media campaign that is capable of broadcasting a compelling narrative interlaced with religious extremism: in essence creating a Jihadist highlight reel showcasing its accomplishments to adherents across the globe.
The skills demonstrated on social media platforms are not that dissimilar to what the average millennial is capable of doing, but ISIS is the first terrorist organization to use it to such great effect. The ability of ISIS to spin the narrative to fit specific objectives makes offering up a counter-narrative very challenging—especially considering the lack of credibility Western nations have in regions where ISIS’ message is most popular. As long as ISIS is perceived to be winning the fight to establish a caliphate, whether based in fact or fiction, that message will continue to attract followers.
Twitter has dedicated a considerable amount of time and resources into identifying and suspending ISIS-related Twitter accounts. Unfortunately, given the nature of social media platforms and the anonymity of the internet in general, its efforts to curb ISIS participation is becoming a frustrating game of “whack-a-mole”; but that’s not to say that these efforts are without merit. The ramifications of not trimming the proverbial weeds, as it were, would be incredibly harmful, especially considering the alarming rate of metastasis in ISIS’s presence on social media.
It requires a tremendous amount of effort for ISIS to reconstitute social media networks that have been lost to account suspension—especially the type of massive crackdowns that Twitter announced. The rationale behind utilizing a comprehensive campaign of account suspensions to curb ISIS participation on Twitter is simple: if ISIS is spending its time recreating social media accounts lost to suspensions then it will spend less time spent actually operating those accounts to create and disseminate propaganda.
A study conducted by the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World found that in September 2014, 8% of ISIS’s online activity was being dedicated to reconstituting its social media network as a result of increased suspensions. The Brookings’ study also states “the pace of account creations has lagged behind the pace of suspensions,” which is a positive sign that an increased suspension regime can have a significant impact.
Jared Cohen, Director of Google Ideas and Senior Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations, while speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs discussed the idea of relegating ISIS to the outer fringes of the Internet, into the dark Web, the open-source network that lets you navigate the Internet anonymously—known as Tor.
These obscure and far-flung regions of the Internet, while difficult to track and monitor, are also difficult for the average person to access and require a higher degree of computer proficiency to operate—it’s not the prime digital advertising space that ISIS would prefer.
Traditionally, the process of radicalization has occurred directly, person to person. However, in the age of pervasive social media platforms and systemic access to the Internet, the gulf that previously separated a radical cleric in Raqqa and a potential adherent in Paris has been dramatically reduced. In the 21st century, it’s the indirect radicalization of an individual, or “self-radicalization,” that is proving the most difficult to combat.
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Sri Lanka has always been described as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. It is never easy for a small island nation to remain a completely sovereign while being located just a few dozen miles off the coast of a behemoth-like country with 1 billion people. Thus, the power relations are distorted in all aspects. No wonder Sri Lankan scholars and journalists refer to India as “big brother.”
The cultural and religious affinities are present in a vibrant history of economic and social interactions. But concurrently Sri Lanka has also tried to remain independent from the politics and conflicts of India, ensuring that a unique identity was developed for the islanders. Sri Lankan Nationalism has been at the forefront of trying to protect that identity.
The long running relationship between the two countries has had quite a few hiccups. The latest has been over the furthering of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. It has been under negotiations since 2003 as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), now renamed the Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA).
From the very beginning the CEPA has been controversial in Sri Lanka. There has massive civil society protests against any government’s attempt to finalize the agreement. The current national unity government has also faced the same issue with ETCA.
Trade between the two countries is obviously one sided. In 2014, while Sri Lanka exported $700 million worth to India while India exported $3.1 billion worth to Sri Lanka. It is a massive trade gap for Sri Lanka, but it can do little about it. Indian products have a huge price advantage over Sri Lankan’s.
Ingrained in the memory of many middle aged Sri Lankans are the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accords. The accords involved altering Sri Lanka’s constitution by adding the 13th amendment and introducing a large Indian Peacekeeping Force. To them, their motherland was once again invaded by Indians just 40 years after the British marched away. So now when the government says a new agreement could allow Indians to enter the workforce in the shipbuilding and IT industries, they see another invasion.
However it is worthwhile to take a brief look into the fledging Sri Lankan shipbuilding and IT industries. The shipbuilding is limited to basically two main operations. First is the Colombo Dockyard Company which is considered to be one of the leading dry-dock complexes in the South Asian region with a significant annual revenue. Second is the Sri Lankan Navy small vessel construction for its use in littoral waters. Expanding these operations in the short term will be tough due to the lack of skilled labor.
On the other hand the IT industry has been booming and expanding ever since the mid 2000s. Today,Sri Lanka has up to 80,000 IT professionals as a whole. Firms like WSO2, Millenium and Leapset/CAKE Labs are entrepreneurial, earning millions of dollars in revenues, with operations even in Silicon Valley.
However, entrepreneurs do confess that there is a dearth of skilled graduates for recruitment within Sri Lanka. The government wants to increase the IT export revenue five fold by 2020 requiring massive expansions.
Yet where the investments will come is an issue. The Sri Lankan IT industry resists opening up to foreign investors and labor, fearing that it could destroy budding local entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka already has its own version of Uber, Pick me, Uber’s biggest local competition.
Liberal minded intellectuals and government politicians are calling the ETCA agreement a step forward to making Sri Lankan industries more competitive. Nationalists are calling it a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and identity.
However, Sri Lanka’s identity is already defined by a number of communities who have migrated to the island over the centuries. The Moors, Malay, South Indian estate workers, Gujarati and Chinese traders just to name a few.
Sri Lanka’s current fiscal status quo is starving for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The island state risks to lose its fiscal autonomy if it has to default on its debt servicing and falls under the thumb of the IMF. If properly utilized by the government, ETCA can be used to present Sri Lanka as having a liberal attitude toward trade and foreign investment.
Nationalism has played a decisive role in Sri Lanka ever since it became Asia’s first democracy in 1933. Politicians know exactly how to use it to serve their own interests. Nationalism of the Sinhalese majority turned chauvinism sparked the civil war and massive nationalization of private enterprises and property.
It drowned the country’s dreams of becoming the “Gateway to Asia” despite its geographic location. Today, government action towards recreating that dream is being opposed by nationalism once again. Some politicians are manipulating nationalism, claiming to be defending the sovereignty that Sri Lanka is not losing, only to return to power.
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French President Hollande at the COP21 in Paris.
Written by Matthew Barbari
When delegates from nearly 200 countries convened in Paris in late November 2015, many were hopeful about the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties or COP21. It could be a watershed moment when the world would unite and finally put forth a plan to combat climate change.
While similar sentiment was shared before the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 and the meeting in Kyoto in 1997, there was a feeling that now—with China, India and the United States on board—a universal climate policy could be agreed upon.
This, however, is not the end of the story. While an agreement was reached, many experts within the scientific community remain dissatisfied. The watershed moment for politicians arguing for their respective countries was not what environmentalists had envisioned, with many criticizing the agreement as nothing more than too little, too late.
Dr. James E. Hansen, a highly respected authority within the climate science community, sees the prospect of the Paris Agreement as “just worthless words,” and criticizing it as “no action, just promises.” Hansen makes a direct reference to the provision within the agreement that allows countries to set their own standards of emissions to keep the global temperature from rising by 2 degrees Celsius. Further arguments are also made about how much money developed countries should provide to developing ones in order to limit the latter’s carbon emissions, as well as any prevent any catastrophic events that climate change could trigger.
Dr. Hansen argues that the notion that renewable energy sources will magically replace countries’ dependence on fossil fuels is silly as long as those fuels remain the cheapest source of energy production. Dr. Hansen also argues for an increase in nuclear energy, which puts him at odds with some within the community.
He believes that nuclear power is necessary to combat climate change as it provides a massive source of energy that does not involve burning fossil fuels. Those against nuclear power point to the massive construction costs of nuclear facilities, events such as the disaster at Chernobyl and Fukushima power plants or the issue of getting rid of nuclear waste.
While the Paris Agreement aims high, it also limits itself to being nothing more than a promise: no penalties are imposed should nations not reach their own targets for limiting carbon emission and developing renewable energy sources. There are also several provisions within the agreement that are not binding, such as the fact that countries can withdraw from the agreement at any time without any penalties.
Further issues arise with the 2 degrees target. Environmentalists argue that this temperature rise would still cause a drastic change in the global climate and that the cuts need to be more severe. This is the biggest concern with the Paris Agreement: it does not attempt to stop climate change but only to mitigate the damages.
Besides these criticisms, there is much positive about the agreement. First, there is a formal agreement, as previous attempts have seen major powers such as the U.S. and China walk out of meetings. The biggest challenge of a universal agreement is the different level of economic development of each individual countries combined to the inherent asymmetry of climate change effects. This is why the agreement pushes for each country to develop a climate policy for themselves.
While the agreement might not have gone as far as some would have liked, it shows that nations around the globe are now finally getting serious about climate change. And that is something to be hopeful about.
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