Leopard 2A6 and Leopard 2A4 suffer their first losses in Ukraine
Recent reports of the Spring Offensive in Ukraine have started off with mixed news for Ukraine. While there have been reports of some gains, the recent destruction of a dam has flooded an area south of Kherson, narrowing the territory where Ukraine can conduct their offensive. While Ukraine does have some amphibious vehicles, Russia’s numerous BMP-3s would likely be the dominant weapon in assaulting or repelling attacks in water logged regions. A ground offensive to take this now flooded territory has likely been halted, blunting the southern push against Russian fixed defences south of Kherson.
Images and video of newly supplied NATO weapons being destroyed have also appeared from the front line in Ukraine. The loss of what looks to be two Leopard 2A6s and one Leopard 2A4 was accompanied by the loss of several American made Bradley fighting vehicles. The loss of so many Bradleys will be surprising, but the loss of what was promoted as the iron fisted Leopard 2 tanks is something Russia will use to regain their reputation as a strong and capable military force.
During the 1991 Gulf War, there were very few losses of American tanks and vehicles to enemy fire. One of the most notable losses was a crew member who was killed when a Soviet made BMP-1 used its low velocity cannon designed in the 1950s to penetrate the turret of a Bradley fighting vehicle. While the Bradley is a remarkable machine, it is not invincible or as well protected as a tank. The advantage of the Bradleys were to move troops quickly to needed areas and support troops with its cannon. The Bradley’s also have two TOW missiles that can eliminate most Russian tanks, but direct fire or artillery fire on a Bradley will almost always take them out of a fight.
The Leopard 2s were always a mixed solution for Ukraine. In the past, versions of Turkey’s Leopard 2A4s were damaged and destroyed fighting militants in Syria. While the Leopard 2A6s are the most modern version of the tank given to Ukraine, they are not invincible, especially against artillery. The front of the 2A6s, while very well protected, does not extend with the same level of protection on the sides and back of the Leopard 2A6. There are only a limited number of high value weapons NATO countries can spare, and there are not an unlimited amount of Leopard 2 tanks available NATO allies can do without.
The confidence NATO has in the Leopard 2s are likely well founded, but with Ukraine now on the offensive against fixed positions, there will be big losses for the attacking side. While publicly unexpected, Ukrainian Forces have known that losses would also include some of the best weapons on the field. Heavy losses were expected, and images of burning NATO tanks should have been known to be used by Russia. The images of advanced Russian tanks exploding and losing their turrets formed much of the narrative of a weak and disorganised Russian military. Images and videos of NATO tanks perishing in much of the same manner will be used to change the narrative. The biggest loss for Ukraine will not be Leopard 2 tanks, but the will of the West to support its offensive against Russia over time.
Losing the support of NATO may come in different forms. A successful attack by Ukraine in pushing Russian forces back to the the 2014 lines may encourage many allies to push for a cease-fire, especially if weapons are depleted and local politics in ally countries turn against further combat support. As mentioned above, a change in narrative with the view of NATO tanks and equipment suffering losses to the once embarrassed Russian Army may turn ally and adversary opinions over once again as it did with Russia’s retreat from the assault on Ukraine’s major cities. Ukraine depends greatly on the morality of their cause, and NATO allies depend greatly on its popular support from their people. Losing Leopard 2 tanks in the field in horrific ways will most likely change the narrative rapidly.
Another form of lost support for Ukraine will come from a slow degradation of support for their cause within ally countries themselves. The anti-war movement in the United States seems to pass to both sides of the aisle. Scenes of a recently fallen Afghanistan are mixed with the aftermath of recent conflicts there and in Iraq as American servicemen and servicewomen are back home dealing with the after-effects of being in combat. Policies that do little to quell conflict in Ukraine also turn the public against the war. Lives could be saved if foreign drones were prevented from freely making it to Russia to be used as terror weapons. Policies should be changed to use North American energy reserves to displace the large war chest being paid for by still persistent exports of Russian Oil and Gas.
Actions by NATO allies to create the image of support hurt Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia if those actions do not lead to positive and practical outcomes. An absurd example comes by way of the treatment of Canadian NATO members who diligently have gone to Poland and Latvia to support NATO forces helping Ukraine. Canadian Forces in Europe have been ignored by their Government to the point of being a health and safety risk. Many Canadian soldiers in Poland were not given food to eat while in Poland, to the point of going into personal debt to compensate while contributing their lives to Canada, NATO and Ukraine. Canadian soldiers in Latvia were sent on training missions without protective gear, notably helmets. Their Government have ignored these issues, all while promising more Canadian Forces member’s help, money and now even a big plane. Canada said they would not meet NATOs minimum contributions as they gave more than any other nation to help Ukraine(not nearly as much as Poland), but the end result put well intentioned Canadian soldiers in danger. When assistance is given, but done to the detriment of your population who want to help, it obviously sours support for your united cause.
Ukraine’s successes or failures in pressing south to the Black Sea and fighting to re-gain territories lost in 2014 must be measured with the amount of support they realistically expect to achieve at each level of the conflict. If Ukraine can manage expectations of their successes with images of losses, they would have just managed one piece of the larger support puzzle. Objectives of success may differ in the minds of NATO allies. Accepting support from allies who’s good faith does not extend back home to their own population or troops will damage future campaigns without question. It is important to be careful in this regard.
A long and detailed Washington Post article about the work of the Department of Justice and FBI in investigating the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and related efforts to overturn the result of the 2020 presidential election shows officials being highly reluctant to include in any investigation the actions of Donald Trump, despite his key role in the events in question. An aversion to taking any action that could possibly be portrayed as having a political motivation left a major line of inquiry unexplored for about a year until the facts of the case left no choice but to perform what now constitutes the January 6 portion of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation.
This picture is, of course, the opposite of what Trump’s defenders continue to assert is a political bias in the department that has made investigators and prosecutors eager to go after Trump and to single him out for disparate treatment. That assertion is being heard again this week on Capitol Hill, with Republicans inviting testimony from John Durham, who was given the job during Trump’s administration of trying to find a “political witch hunt” behind an earlier FBI investigation involving Trump’s relations with Russia and who failed to find any, being reduced to making criticisms about analytical rigor and the like. That failure was hardly surprising, given that the Department of Justice inspector general had already determined that the opening of the FBI’s investigation into the matter was justified, given what is in the public record about Trump’s relationship with the Russians along with important and still unanswered questions about that relationship.
The Post’s reporters evidently had well-placed sources inside the department. Their account is so detailed that the story tells itself in a way that would make it difficult to impart a spin to the narrative, even though it would be safe to assume that at least some of the sources were happy to have this reportage become public because it refutes the false accusations of investigations being politically biased.
Viewed from another angle, however, the account does not put the Department of Justice in an especially favorable light. Officials were so scared of being subjected to political criticism from pro-Trump elements that they dragged their feet in pursuing lines of inquiry that they probably should have pursued with alacrity. They viewed the politically safest way of investigating January 6 to be a “bottom-up” approach that gave priority to prosecuting individual rioters who attacked the Capitol. It was a small-fish approach that intentionally shoved aside any attention to big fish, notwithstanding evidence they already had of a more organized seditious conspiracy. It was not until Smith assumed his present duties that the scope and speed of the investigation reached levels that it would have reached months earlier were it not for the trepidation about a political backlash.
The principal consequence has been a delay in having open questions resolved and justice served. Whatever problems may arise from prosecutions bumping up against the 2024 political calendar are due less to any intentional bumping—by either pro-Trump or anti-Trump elements—than to timidity-based slowness within the department.
The pusillanimity in investigating Trump has given rise to a double standard of sorts in matters involving political candidates—but again, in a direction opposite from what Trump’s supporters allege. The Post article mentions an episode from the past that evidently weighed heavily on the minds of prosecutors and investigators: the announcement by then-director of the FBI James Comey, just eleven days before 2016 presidential election, that the bureau was re-opening an investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of an email server—only to determine later that there still were insufficient grounds for bringing any criminal case. Critics charged, with good reason, that this election eve announcement probably contributed to Clinton’s defeat. Officials in the FBI and Department of Justice, faced with considering Trump’s role in events of 2020 and 2021, did not want to do anything that might have similar political repercussions, or might be perceived as having them. They overcompensated not only in avoiding any politically ill-timed announcements about investigations but in failing for months to investigate certain important matters at all.
In shying away from timely and vigorous investigation of anything involving Trump, the timorous officials not only delayed serving justice but did not avoid political brickbats from Trump’s supporters anyway. Trump’s party had been pushing hard the theme of a supposedly politicized law enforcement bureaucracy even before its more recent hostile reactions to the indictment of Trump regarding the Mar-a-Lago documents. It is difficult to imagine that the themes and reactions would have sounded any different if the officials in the department had conducted investigations with the speed and intensity they deserved. And even a carefully researched article in the Washington Post is unlikely to change the minds of ordinary supporters of Trump who have internalized those themes.
False claims about political bias affecting the work of law enforcement and security bureaucracies undoubtedly are partly just partisan rhetoric. But there probably is a genuine difficulty in understanding the mindset and professional ethic of the public servants who work in those bureaucracies. The people making the claims are political animals; those against whom they are making accusations are not. The latter self-selected into work in which apolitical performance of duties is part of the organization’s code of conduct. Refraining from partisan bias is part of their professional raison d’être.
Of course, people working in bureaucracies have personal political views, which they express in the privacy of the voting booth and possibly openly after they retire. But the resistance to letting any such views contaminate their performance of duty as long as they wear a badge in an organization such as the Department of Justice is strong and reflexive. I have seen the strength of that resistance first-hand in the intelligence community, where part of the organizational code of conduct is neutrality with respect not only to parties and candidates but also to policies. It is thus not surprising that many professionals within the department would strive to the point of excess to avoid doing anything that could possibly be construed as departing from neutrality.
The false accusations about bias have multiple costs. They are, in the first instance, slurs against honest people doing their jobs with dedication. They impede the full and proper functioning of something like a law enforcement agency in the current matters involving Trump. They create a constituency for possible moves that really would weaponize law enforcement and make the Department of Justice a political servant of whoever happens to occupy the White House.
Even if those advocating such destructive moves do not get the opportunity to make them, the false accusations encourage over the long term more of the sort of mission-impairing hesitancy that the Post article describes. The damaging falsehoods centered on Trump will lead investigators and prosecutors in the future—faced with cases involving other politicians well after Trump has left the scene—to be afraid to pursue a case vigorously to wherever the facts may lead.
Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.
Image: Shutterstock.
Last November, the research nonprofit OpenAI unleashed ChatGPT, its artificial intelligence (AI) powered chatbot, on the world. Mere months before, conversations about AI were relegated to academic conferences and science fiction conventions. But, as ChatGPT exploded to become the fastest-growing consumer application in history, AI rapidly became a kitchen table issue. Now, policymakers are shining a spotlight on the industry and asking the question: how much regulation is necessary to mitigate potential risks without stifling innovation?
From government reports to briefings and hearings to legislation, AI is the topic du jour on Capitol Hill as lawmakers attempt to answer this question. While legislative proposals regarding AI vary widely, the ethos behind such proposals can generally be grouped into two categories. The first consists of proposals aimed primarily at mitigating potential risks of AI, which typically take a more heavy-handed approach to regulation in the name of consumer protection. The second takes a broader view of the AI ecosystem, attempting to foster innovation and global competitiveness with a more light-touch regulatory regime.
While both approaches are well-intentioned, the latter focusing on innovation and competitiveness holds greater promise. After all, the United States is not the only country developing AI systems, and amidst the Great Tech Rivalry it is essential that we remain globally competitive in cutting-edge technologies. If Washington is too heavy-handed in regulating AI, it risks becoming an innovation desert, like Europe.
The Heavy Hand…
The heavy-handed approach is typified by Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA). As one of the very few members of Congress holding degrees in computer science, Rep. Lieu has been one of the most vocal lawmakers on the question of AI regulation. Just before introducing the first federal piece of legislation itself largely written by an AI, Rep. Lieu opined in the New York Times:
The rapid advancements in AI technology have made it clear that the time to act is now to ensure that AI is used in ways that are safe, ethical and beneficial for society. Failure to do so could lead to a future where the risks of A.I. far outweigh its benefits…. What we need is a dedicated agency to regulate A.I.
Though Rep. Lieu admits that his proposal has little chance of actually passing through Congress this session—and concedes that the first step toward an AI regulator is a “study and report” approach—Lieu and many of his colleagues are hyperfocused on heading off consumer harm that largely remains theoretical. Such an approach seeks to create a regulatory regime based on what these technologies “could” or “might” do in the future.
This prospective framework is antithetical to rapid innovation. For evidence, we need only look to Europe.
Brussels has a long tradition of onerously regulating technologies in the name of mitigating risks to consumers. Take for instance the European Union’s comprehensive data privacy framework, the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR has three primary objectives: protecting consumers with regard to the processing of personal data, protecting the right to the protection of personal data, and ensuring the free movement of personal data within the Union. To differing degrees, the GDPR arguably succeeded at the first two of these goals; the legislation created strong consumer protections around the collection and processing of personal data.
However, the GDPR has mostly failed to achieve the goal of ensuring the free movement of data. This is primarily because data, which flows seamlessly across physical borders, cannot be impeded nearly as easily. Tech platforms and applications have had a difficult time complying with the GDPR, which in turn has restricted the voluntary, free flow of personal information rather than ensured it.
According to one study that examined over 4 million software applications, the implementation of the GDPR “induced the exit of about a third of available apps.” Perhaps even worse, the GDPR has led to a dearth of technological innovation throughout Europe. That same study found that the market entry of new applications halved following the implementation of GDPR.
The European Parliament is now developing legislation that it intended to be “the world’s first comprehensive AI law.” While this proposed EU AI Act is not a one-size-fits-all policy akin to the GDPR and other European tech regulations, it will create strict rules for any system utilizing AI technology. Such strict rules around new applications for AI systems, imposed regardless of concrete, provable harms, are likely to strangle the little commercial innovation around AI that remains in Europe.
…versus the Light Touch
The United States cannot afford to follow in Europe’s footsteps and implement heavy-handed regulations that might hamper innovation for the sake of mitigating unproven harms. With China leading the way in both AI innovation and regulation, we must be considerate in our own approach to both. AI systems certainly present novel and unique risks in practically every aspect of human life. But these new technologies also present novel and unique opportunities that should not be handicapped by a heavy-handed approach driven by moral panic.
As two of my colleagues recently wrote in American Affairs, getting AI regulation right “requires a commonsense approach that can account for both the mind-bending dynamics of cutting edge AI systems, while also right-sizing the risks of AI regulations and AI gone wrong.” While Rep. Ted Lieu and his colleagues in the “sky is falling” camp go too far in the direction of onerous European-like tech regulation, there is another camp that recognizes the importance of a light-touch approach to supporting domestic innovation and global competitiveness.
A prime example of this is the recently introduced legislation from Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Mark Warner (D-VA), and Todd Young (R-IN). Based on the American Technology Leadership Act from the last Congress, this revised proposal would establish a new Office of Global Competition Analysis. The purpose of this new office would be to assess America’s global competitiveness in strategic technologies and provide policy recommendations on ways to protect and improve competitiveness. As Sen. Bennet stated, the goal of the legislation is to “lose our competitive edge in strategic technologies like semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence to competitors like China.”
This second camp, as typified by Sen. Bennet and his colleagues, is less reactive, more constructive, considers the importance of global competition, and recognizes that caution is necessary to avoid imposing heavy-handed regulations that hinder innovation and hamper a nation’s ability to keep pace with AI advancements. To be clear, these lawmakers are not ignoring the real risks presented by AI systems. Rather, they are putting such risks into a global perspective and making a more well-informed calculus about the proper level of regulation.
Maintaining American Innovation
By fostering an environment that encourages both domestic and global competition around AI technologies, and by providing a regulatory framework that promotes responsible AI use, the United States can maintain its global leadership in this crucial field. By embracing light regulation focused on global competitiveness, policymakers can encourage investment, attract top AI talent, and foster an environment that enables American companies to lead in AI development. By allowing room for experimentation and adaptability, the United States can remain at the forefront of AI innovation, providing economic and societal benefits while maintaining a competitive edge on the global stage.
Luke Hogg is the director of outreach at the Foundation for American Innovation where his work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies and public policy. He is also an innovation fellow at Young Voices. You can follow him on Twitter at @LEHogg.
Image: Unsplash.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing from June 18–19 in an attempt to dial down tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and rekindle high-level communication channels to steady their wobbling bilateral relationship. Blinken’s trip marks the first for a U.S. secretary of state to travel to China since 2018, and he is also the highest-ranking American official to visit since the inauguration of President Joe Biden in January 2021.
In the context of worsening U.S.-PRC relations, Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali last November and agreed to tackle their disagreements responsibly. Blinken originally planned to visit Beijing in February this year. But he scuttled the trip soon after the United States detected and shot down a high-altitude balloon that U.S. intelligence says was used for espionage over North America.
In the intervening months after downing the PRC’s spy balloon, U.S.-China relations declined precipitously. Military-to-military contacts between Washington and Beijing have stalled. Yet, dangerously close encounters between the two militaries by air and sea have not ceased, as shown by the recent near collisions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up its support for Taiwan while charging Beijing for considering to give lethal support to Russia for Putin’s aggressions on Ukraine and strengthening the Chinese espionage base in Cuba to intercept and eavesdrop on signals and communication messages crucial to U.S. national security.
Recognizing the dangers accompanying a lack of dialogue, the Biden administration has sought a “thaw” in relations with Beijing. Beijing, however, has countered, accusing Washington of promoting a duplicitous two-pronged approach—seeking dialogue to set up “guardrails” with China on the one hand and forcibly containing China’s legitimate strategic and economic interests on the other. Congress enacting restrictions on the semiconductor trade and mobilizing allies across Europe and Indo-Pacific against the PRC are notable examples.
Thus, when Blinken arrived in Beijing, it’s no wonder his hosts were eager to put the onus of redressing U.S.-China relations on Washington. PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang claimed “that the China-U.S. relationship is at the lowest point” since 1979. Wang Yi, the top foreign affairs official of the Chinese Communist Party, attributed the “root cause” of deterioration to Washington’s “misperceptions toward China.” He demanded that the United States “reflect upon itself” and stop inflating the "China threat.” President Xi posited that the international community expects Washington and Beijing to “coexist in peace and have friendly and cooperative relations.” The Chinese leader asked Blinken to “make more positive contributions to stabilizing China-U.S. relations.”
Blinken’s Three Objectives and Outcomes
Secretary Blinken communicated that the Biden administration values a responsible relationship between Washington and Beijing. He set out three objectives for this trip, all predicated upon an overarching principle: “intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict.”
First, it is necessary to reopen lines of communication so both powers can responsibly manage their relationship and avoid misunderstandings. Second, Blinken asserted the significance of advancing the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners, including “speaking directly and candidly” about these concerns with Beijing. Thirdly, he believes the two nations can jointly “explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges.”
How many of these objectives did Blinken achieve in his two-day whirlwind visit to Beijing? According to the secretary’s press conference after his meeting with Xi Jinping and the State Department readout concluding the visit, there were no breakthroughs. This outcome was expected, but there are optimistic signs that communication is back on track, and both nations recognize the urgency to halt a downward spiral in relations. The State Department described the meetings as “candid, substantive, and constructive.” China’s Foreign Ministry reported “candid, in-depth and constructive talks at length on the overall bilateral ties and important issues.” Beijing also voiced the need to build “a stable, predictable and constructive relationship with the U.S.”
On areas of possible cooperation, the United States and China promised to reinforce “people-to-people” exchanges between students, scholars, and businesses, as well as increase direct flights between the two countries. Transnational issues like climate change, North Korea’s nuclear program, global economic stability, food security, international health, and the fentanyl crisis were also identified as areas for future discussion and collaboration.
Yet, for areas of contentions, deep fissures remain. Though Beijing has reassured the secretary that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine,” and Blinken confirmed there is no evidence contradicting that, he still raised concerns that Chinese companies “may be providing technology” for Moscow to bolster their military capacity. Indeed, in China, the ubiquitous influence of the CCP makes it challenging to distinguish between transactions made by state-owned businesses from those of private enterprises.
As the United States and its allies stepped up efforts to ban China from access to advanced and sensitive technologies crucial to military and economic dominance, Beijing has as well taken punitive actions on American and foreign businesses operating domestically. Blinken sought to “disabuse” the Chinese view that the United States was aiming at “economically containing” or “decoupling” from China. He explained that the United States is merely “de-risking,” or “investing in our own capacities and in secure, resilient supply chains; pushing for level playing fields for our workers and our companies; defending against harmful trade practice; and protecting our critical technologies so that they aren’t used against us.” This is in line with the notion of “small yard and high fence” coined by Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, referring to “implementing carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China, premised on straightforward national security concerns.” The PRC wasn’t persuaded, as Wang asked the Blinken to “lift illegal unilateral sanctions against China, stop suppressing China's scientific and technological advances.” Xi told Blinken “neither side should try to shape the other side by its own will, still less deprive the other side of its legitimate right to development."
Differences over Taiwan
The Taiwan Strait remains the most rancorous sticking point for the United States and China. Beijing asserted that Taiwan is the “core of China’s core interests,” which “has no room for compromise or concession.” Blinken, nonetheless, reiterated the one-China policy mantra derived from the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He reminded Beijing of “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” The United States “does not support Taiwan independence” and is “opposed to any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.” Washington insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and meeting its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act, including ensuring that the island democracy can defend itself from invasion.
Regarding crisis management, the Xi government has rebuffed Blinken’s persistent requests to restart the military-to-military engagement put on hold since Pelosi’s Taiwan visit last year. The confrontational incidents between their respective fighter jets in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have made restoring these connections highly relevant. Still, Beijing may continue to act recklessly and brazenly in these scenarios to deter U.S. military movements.
Biden’s Optimism and Reality Check
It is unclear whether high-level diplomacy can meaningfully change the trajectory of U.S.-Chinese relations, which is still veering toward greater antagonism. But at the very least, resuming talks and contacts will allow each side to convey their intentions more clearly. Blinken’s visit will likely pave the way for more high-level official meetings between Washington and Beijing, including potential visits from Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and Climate Envoy John Kerry in the coming months. Beijing is particularly interested in meeting with American officials in charge of economic policy given China’s economic slowdown and their anxiousness over Washington’s bans on foreign investment and export of high-technologies to China. Xi is reportedly looking forward to his first visit to the United States since 2017 to attend the APEC meeting in San Francisco, where he is expected to meet with Biden.
Domestic politics, however, are at play. The Biden administration has already received mounting criticisms from congressional Republicans for slow-walking the delivery of weapons to Taiwan and the investigations into the February spy balloon incident and the origins of COVID-19. While calling Xi a “dictator” kept in the dark about the spy balloon incursion, Biden argued that the incident was more “embarrassing than intentional” for Beijing. The president plans to meet with his Chinese counterpart again to talk about their “legitimate differences” and areas where they can get along.
The president’s optimism aside, it remains an objective fact that U.S.-PRC relations are so brittle and their mutual trust level so low that any new conflicts can plunge their fragile détente into another disequilibrium. The PRC’s growing power and ambitions cannot but lead to heightened anxieties and vigilant responses from Washington. The January and November 2024 Presidential Elections in Taiwan and the United States, respectively, will introduce new uncertainties. Beijing’s belligerent reactions toward Pelosi’s Taiwan trip last August and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s transits to America this April illustrated how the island’s upcoming political transition—assuming another more nationalist candidate is elected—may further sharpen Xi’s conviction that the situation requires further escalation or even invasion. Come November 2024, Biden’s intense competition with the PRC may not be sufficient to satisfy the burgeoning domestic and bipartisan anti-China sentiments and ensure his reelection. A more hawkish White House will derail the modus vivendi that Blinken has worked so assiduously to reconstruct.
The Biden administration needs to be more clear-eyed about the extent and practicality of stabilizing relations with the PRC after years of adversarial postures from both sides. Whether the American public is willing to accept the president’s approach and whether Beijing is genuinely willing to reciprocate Washington’s overtures is not at all assured.
Dean P. Chen, Ph.D., is an associate professor of Political Science at Ramapo College of New Jersey.
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