Diplomacy & Crisis News

With COVID-19 spread across the globe and spikes of cases emerging, economies have fallen into recession and energy markets have been severely impacted, bottoming out in April. The global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 is now projected by the International Monetary Fund to decline to -4.9%; global GDP in 2019 was 2.9%. Furthermore, historic changes in energy supply and demand has elevated calls for structural sectoral change. The energy industry has been adversely impacted as consumption has dovetailed with restrictions on economic activity and personal mobility enacted to prevent the spread of the virus.

Stable energy markets are essential to have a modern society function smoothly and for sustained economic growth. The COVID-19 impact is a prime demonstration of energy market volatility, which has broad global impact from oil producing nations to net importing countries and various stakeholders in the value chain. The pandemic has emboldened a mounting group of industry voices, advocates for climate policy and politicians to call for a system redesign to create stability of the current energy system and mix.

One of COVID-19’s lasting impacts may be such an energy transition. The impacts could reshape the way people live and energy demand may not return to 2019 highs. Oil majors have lost billions of dollars in revenue. To compensate, British Petroleum, for example, took a $17.5 billion write-down of its assets. Royal Dutch Shell is writing down up to $22 billion of its assets. These actions and market forces will force, for now, broader exploration operations to be slowed and for the companies to build strategies to operate in a less volatile market. BP has previously pledged to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 and Shell details its carbon strategy in the plan it calls Net Carbon Footprint.

Oil as important and volatile as ever

As a result of the pandemic and measures to limit the spread of the virus through mobility and economic restrictions globally, oil consumption has decreased substantially.

World oil demand is predicted by the OPEC to fall by 9 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2020 compared to 2019, which would be a record. In the United States, the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that U.S. crude oil production will average 11.6 million b/d in 2020 and 11 million b/d in 2021, the 2019 average was 12.2 million b/d. However, a historic rebound could follow suit. In 2021, demand is predicted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to be the largest one-year gain in history by adding nearly 6 million b/d to 97 million b/d.

Crude oil has a long history of volatile price fluctuations but the volatility in April was historic. When demand and consumption plummeted, the market dropped off a cliff. With demand dried up so drastically, there was excess oil. Traders were actually paying buyers to alleviate the glut. The price of West Texas Intermediate futures contracts for May 2020 turned negative for the first time in history bottoming out at $-37. Producers needed to slow their production to ease supply of the liquid to stave off further saturating the market and, as a result, prop up prices.

The global crisis has created circumstances which require collaboration to overcome the unique obstacle. OPEC+, composed of OPEC member countries and other oil exporting countries (Russia chief among those), agreed in April to cut crude oil production by nearly 10 million b/d through July to ease the oversupply and as a contingency to attempt to provide stability for the market. Due to the precipitous drop in demand, there simply was too much oil for the market to absorb, let alone physically store.

As the OPEC+ production cut agreement actions were implemented, United States production was reduced and China and other countries lifted restrictions to “reopen” their economies, a relative market rebound followed suit. The current price of both WTI and Brent Crude has settled around $40 per barrel. Despite the gradual uptick in demand, there remains the uncertainty that the virus may bring another severe shock and consumption will plummet again. The collapse provides an opportunity for a top to bottom evaluation of the sector and examine potential transformations to less volatile markets.

Investment

The precipitous drop in energy demand, reduced earnings from lower prices and bills that will go unpaid by consumers yields shortfalls of tens of billions of dollars for governments and industry. The equation is a recipe for contracted energy investment in 2020. The IEA estimates that investment could drop by 20% compared to 2019, the largest decline in energy investment ever.

Electrify demand reverses course

After years of consumption growth, electricity demand has dropped by more than 20% in some countries as a result of the coronavirus and corresponding restrictions. The EIA predicts electricity consumption will drop 6% compared to 2019 in the United States. Electricity consumption has increased in residential applications, however, the reduction in industrial and commercial sectors, which are larger consumers, have a greater impact on the generation mix.

Renewables See the Light

Renewable energy has been a relative bright spot during the COVID-19, especially the impacts among the electricity mix. Its output is unaffected by demand, has low operating expenses and its costs have been continually decreasing for the better part of a decade making it cost competitive or even cheaper than other energy sources in some regions. In the U.S. the cost of building solar and wind power plants has decreased remarkably by 40% and 80% respectively over the past decade. With decreased electricity demand, increasing the utilization of renewables is sensible as other sources feedstocks can be costly and are subject to volatile markets. As such utilities have been increasing renewable energy uptake and demand for coal has been reduced (natural gas has a substantial role too).

Renewables have made steady progress increasing its presence in the global electricity mix. In 2019 renewables dwarfed conventional generation sources in terms of both capacity additions and investment. Nearly 78% of the net gigawatts of generating capacity added globally in 2019 were in wind, solar, biomass and waste, geothermal and small hydro facilities. Investment in renewables excluding large hydro was more than three times that in new fossil fuel plants, with developing countries now investing more than developed countries – about $280 billion total was invested, according to the IEA.

Natural gas weathering the storm

Oil touches most aspects of economic activity but natural gas plays a vital role as well. Natural gas has not been as adversely impacted as oil thus far. Consumption is predicted to decrease by 4% in 2020 due to the COVID-19 impact but also lower demand thanks to a warm winter. Major gas markets are at the forefront of the fall in demand. Developed markets in Asia, Eurasia, Europe and North America account for about 75% of decreased consumption in 2020. Half of the consumption drop is from power generation. Industrial, commercial and residential sectors account for the other half. The key driver for the global gas market return will be liquefied natural gas exports, however, currently there is overcapacity. In the U.S., the EIA expects that LNG exports will decline through the end of the summer.

Coal Drop Continues

In many developed nations, coal power plants have been phased out or replaced by natural gas or renewables prior to COVID-19. As electricity demand has fallen as a result of the virus, though, the fact that solar, wind and natural gas power plants are cheaper to operate could force utilities’ hand to continue the steady progression of the transition to natural gas and renewables. Coal demand could decline by 8%, with decreased demand for electricity also playing a large role. China’s coal large consumption offsets larger declines in other countries.

Emission are Dropping

Global carbon emissions have been curtailed 8% coinciding with the pandemic, the largest year-on-year reduction ever, according to the IEA. EIA forecasts that U.S. energy-related carbon emissions will decrease by 14% in 2020, another record. To maintain reductions and not just being a result of a pandemic, a rise in clean energy investment is necessary. If economic activity resumes full bore, the reductions may be short-lived as emission may return to prior levels or increase. Energy investment capital is either dried up or waiting on more evidence of new trends prior to sinking any new money in projects. Renewables have been trending in the right direction, though, to harness more investment. Government and companies will need to implement more policies to catalyze investment and to continue the decrease in emissions in an attempt to reach the targets in the Paris climate treaty.

What Comes Next?

With the recovery, however, markets are still pondering how the rebound will be impacted if a sustained uptick in COVID-19 appears in the near-term or months from now with a second-wave and consumption crashes again. Whenever there is a steady increase in investment it is worth pondering where will the money be going? Will the money flow back to oil and gas or will there be a more dramatic shift to renewable energy, energy efficiency, grid modernization and battery storage? Of utmost importance is also to try to understand how consumption patterns may be altered in a new normal if and when the COVID-19 pandemic is beaten.

It is not an option to underestimate uncertainties in all energy markets.

 

 

The post COVID-19’s Impact on Energy Markets appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2020).
Myriam Benraad propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside et Charlie Winter, The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (Hurst, 2020, 328 pages).

Signé par trois auteurs reconnus dans leurs domaines, cet ouvrage se veut une étude pionnière sur l’État islamique, à travers l’analyse des « mots » employés par ses membres. Basé sur la mobilisation critique d’un vaste échantillon de textes, documents, discours et vidéos (traduits de l’arabe ou directement adressés à des publics anglophones), il a pour ambition d’évaluer dans quelle mesure le langage en lui-même a structuré toute l’évolution de cette mouvance, appréhendée par phases, de la fin des années 1990 jusqu’à la période la plus récente. L’objectif est d’offrir au lecteur clarté et nuances quant aux transformations historiques et stratégiques de ce groupe, par un recours méthodologique aux sources primaires et leur exploitation systématique, exercice qui a souvent fait défaut par le passé.

Les trois premières parties de l’étude s’attachent à resituer la trajectoire du mouvement en insistant sur le fait que celui-ci, contrairement à une idée courante, n’a pas émergé en 2014 mais voici déjà près de deux décennies. Il fut en effet pensé à l’origine par le Jordanien Abou Moussab Al-Zarqawi, qui a laissé sur le groupe et ses chefs une empreinte profonde bien après sa mort en 2006. Tout d’abord à la tête d’une faction restreinte de combattants dans les marges du Kurdistan irakien, Zarqawi profite de l’invasion militaire américaine de 2003 en Irak pour étendre peu à peu son aura, et s’imposer dans les rangs de l’insurrection sunnite qui fait alors rage dans le pays. Revendiquant de multiples attaques sanglantes contre les forces étrangères, plusieurs représentants de la communauté internationale, et les nouvelles autorités politiques à dominante confessionnelle chiite, le mentor djihadiste a très tôt pour visée d’établir un « État » révolutionnaire d’obédience salafiste, reposant sur la « méthode prophétique ». L’assaut armé donné sur la ville de Mossoul en juin 2014, puis la proclamation, par son second successeur Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi, d’un « califat » viendront donner corps à ce projet.

En matière de choix et d’efforts de rassemblement des sources, on reconnaîtra aux auteurs d’avoir réalisé un travail méticuleux et exhaustif, de la fondation de l’« État islamique d’Irak » à l’automne 2006 à la fin de sa matérialisation territoriale en 2018. Après une mise en exergue utile de ses structures internes, telles que les djihadistes les conçoivent, un dernier chapitre décrit les circonstances du déclin qu’illustrent, par exemple, l’ultime déclaration du porte-parole syrien Abou Mohammed Al-Adnani, vétéran des premières heures, et les derniers discours d’Al-Baghdadi, éliminé lors d’une opération américaine en octobre 2019. Chaque revers militaire y est dépeint comme une temporalité passagère, une « épreuve » sur le chemin du djihad appelant à s’armer de patience jusqu’à la « purification » finale et la reviviscence d’un État.

D’un chapitre à l’autre, chaque source convoquée est retranscrite autour d’extraits représentatifs, puis commentée selon une approche thématique. Dans l’ensemble, la lecture est fluide et plaisante, et l’ouvrage constitue un apport scientifique original et convaincant pour quiconque entend saisir le défi djihadiste dans le temps long.

Myriam Benraad

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Washington must move past the myths of liberal internationalism and reconsider its views about world order.

Peu de livres auront autant marqué une génération d'intellectuels que « Les Damnés de la terre », avec la célèbre préface de Jean-Paul Sartre, en 1961. La pensée de Frantz Fanon mérite cependant d'être revisitée à la lumière des indépendances et de la terrible guerre civile qui a ravagé l'Algérie dans les (...) / Algérie, France, Martinique, Colonialisme, Histoire, Idées, Intellectuels, Guerre d'Algérie 1954-1962, Mouvement de libération - 2012/07

Le voyage vise parfois à retrouver un mode de vie jugé plus « vrai », car plus rudimentaire, auprès de populations qui, elles, aspirent bien souvent à la modernité. / Malaisie, Animal, Développement, Écologie, Logement, Loisirs, Relations Nord-Sud, Tourisme, Forêt, Brunei, Commerce, Environnement - (...) / Malaisie, Animal, Développement, Écologie, Logement, Loisirs, Relations Nord-Sud, Tourisme, Forêt, Brunei, Commerce, Environnement - 2012/07

La crise économique a ravivé de vieux souvenirs en Grèce, notamment celui des ingérences alliées, comme en 1944, lorsque le Royaume-Uni préféra écraser la Résistance locale et collaborer avec les milices d'extrême droite plutôt que de voir le pays échapper à sa domination. / Allemagne, Balkans, Grèce, (...) / Allemagne, Balkans, Grèce, Méditerranée, Royaume-Uni, Armée, Communisme, Extrême droite, Guérilla, Histoire, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Seconde guerre mondiale 1939-1945, Fascisme, Répression - 2012/07

In "The Europeans," Orlando Figes shows how Europe’s cosmopolitan culture developed in the nineteenth century.

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Trump tried to overturn U.S. foreign policy without offering a substitute. The result is a United States and a world that are worse off.

Dépassements d'honoraires, désert médical qui gagne du terrain dans les zones rurales et pauvres… En France, la santé est en péril. Après quarante ans d'érosion continue du système de soins, la nouvelle ministre osera-t-elle la rupture ? / France, Entreprise, État, Finance, Protection sociale, Santé, (...) / France, Entreprise, État, Finance, Protection sociale, Santé, Service public, Médecine - 2012/06

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2020).
Rémy Hémez propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Philippe Boulanger, La Géographie, reine des batailles (Ministère des Armées/Perrin, 2020, 368 pages).

« Le terrain commande » : l’expression bien connue des soldats met parfaitement en lumière le rôle clé de la topographie dans la manœuvre. Pour autant, l’apport de l’essai de Philippe Boulanger, professeur de géographie à la Sorbonne, dépasse la question du terrain. Comme le rappelle l’auteur, « nulle opération ne peut être envisagée sans compréhension du milieu physique et de la population au préalable ».

En sept chapitres, Philippe Boulanger étudie toutes les dimensions qui font de la géographie « la reine des batailles ». Il décrit d’abord l’essor de la géographie militaire à partir du XVIIe siècle dans la foulée de la naissance de la topographie, l’invention de méthodes d’analyse du facteur géographique physique et humain à des fins stratégiques et tactiques au XIXe siècle, ou encore le rôle et la place de la géographie militaire pendant les deux conflits mondiaux. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment cette science est devenue un « savoir stratégique » à haute valeur ajoutée, à travers le rôle croissant qu’elle tient dans la gestion de crise et sa place renouvelée dans des engagements de plus en plus divers, tout en expliquant la restructuration des services dédiés. Philippe Boulanger met ensuite parfaitement en lumière le fait que la pensée géographique militaire dépasse le cadre du terrain. Il revient pour cela sur les concepts de géotactique, géopérationnalité et géostratégie, soit les trois échelles du raisonnement géographique militaire.

Le quatrième chapitre détaille les liens entre milieu naturel et géographie militaire, l’approche la plus anciennement prise en compte. La connaissance de nombreux milieux – au centre desquels se trouve le désert – est de plus en plus nécessaire pour des militaires engagés sur des théâtres d’opérations variés. Toutefois, l’environnement n’est pas seulement physique, il est aussi humain, et c’est l’objet du chapitre qui suit. La nécessité de « penser l’autre » apparaît véritablement à la fin du XIXe siècle et revient sur le devant de la scène au début des années 2000, notamment pour « gagner la guerre des perceptions ». L’avant-dernier chapitre traite de façon très complète du geospatial intelligence (geoint), l’auteur en étant le grand spécialiste français. Cette « fusion de données géolocalisées et géoréférencées » a pour objectif de « réunir sur un même support visuel la représentation cartographique, l’imagerie spatiale, un ensemble d’informations géolocalisées issues de toutes les autres formes de renseignement et une analyse géopolitique ». Philippe Boulanger analyse son apparition aux États-Unis dans les années 1990, son développement en France et dans plusieurs autres pays, son utilisation opérationnelle, ou encore, les défis qui attendent cette nouvelle science d’information géospatiale. Enfin, le dernier chapitre décrit les enjeux et défis de la « révolution géographique numérique », à l’œuvre depuis les années 1990, qui engendre une véritable rupture dans la façon de penser et d’exploiter la géographie militaire.

Cet essai brillant et érudit offre une perspective inédite sur la géographie militaire, ses liens avec les opérations, ses dimensions historiques, ou encore les nombreux enjeux auxquelles elle fait face. Après sa lecture, il n’est plus possible d’en douter : les cartes sont une arme.

Rémy Hémez

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Tandis que le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies exhortait Khartoum à retirer ses troupes du district contesté d'Abyei, le médiateur de l'Union africaine Thabo Mbeki poursuivait ses efforts en vue d'une reprise des négociations entre les deux Soudans. Une profonde méfiance oppose Khartoum et Juba, (...) / Chine, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Soudan, Conflit, Guérilla, Pétrole, Guerre civile, Soudan du Sud - 2012/06

Plus instruites que leur aînées, les jeunes générations voient leurs aspirations contrariées par la précarité qui les frappe. Au point parfois de déclencher une colère contagieuse. / Chili, Espagne, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Économie, Éducation, Finance, Inégalités, Jeunes, (...) / Chili, Espagne, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Économie, Éducation, Finance, Inégalités, Jeunes, Mouvement de contestation, Répression, Crise économique, Crise financière, Néolibéralisme - 2012/05

Google recrute des militants des droits humains, Hillary Clinton soutient des projets humanitaires mêlant affaires et technologie ; en Afrique, l'omniprésence du téléphone mobile, même dans les régions les plus pauvres, en fait un outil au service du développement ainsi qu'un terrain de conquête. (...) / Afrique, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Kenya, Action humanitaire, Communication, Entreprise, Finance, Information, Internet, Mutation, ONG, Pauvreté, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Télécommunications, Diplomatie - 2012/05

La rédaction de Politique étrangère vous offre de (re)lire des textes qui ont marqué l’histoire de la revue. Nous vous proposons aujourd’hui un article de A. Suat Bilge, intitulé « Le conflit chypriote, vu de Turquie », et publié dans le numéro 4/1964.

Pour comprendre les positions et les buts des parties dans ce conflit, il est raisonnable de prendre l’année 1954 comme point de départ. Car c’est durant cette année-là que le conflit prit un caractère vraiment international. Depuis lors il a suivi un développement mouvementé au cours duquel les parties ont défendu leurs points de vue devant l’opinion publique et ont lutté pour les faire admettre.

Nous allons essayer de résumer ci-dessous le point de vue turc sur le déroulement de ces événements.

I. Les premières positions prises par les parties

L’origine du conflit chypriote et la lutte entre les communautés turque et grecque remontent à des temps très anciens. Mais pour discerner la vraie cause du conflit on peut se contenter de prendre l’année 1954 comme point de départ. Les revendications réciproques, les mésententes et même les conflits armés entre les communautés vivant dans l’île, devinrent une question internationale lorsqu’en 1954 la Grèce porta le différend devant les Nations-Unies. Pendant cette première période, le conflit chypriote était présenté au monde comme aspiration à l’ auto-détermination d’un peuple colonisé.

Profitant du courant de décolonisation, les Grecs de Chypre et la Grèce ont tout d’abord proclamé que le seul peuple européen qui vivait sous une administration coloniale était les Chypriotes grecs, qu’il fallait mettre fin à cette administration et donner la possibilité à ces Chypriotes de choisir librement le gouvernement sous lequel ils vivraient et même de réaliser l’union de l’île avec la Grèce. Ainsi les revendications des Grecs qui apparaissaient comme le prélude de la lutte d’un peuple opprimé contre une puissance coloniale, l’Angleterre, passait sous silence les aspirations de la communauté turque vivant dans l’île, ainsi que les intérêts de la Turquie.

L’île de Chypre était mise juridiquement sous une administration coloniale, mais en fait sa situation avait été différente de celle des autres colonies. Comme l’on sait, Chypre avait été conquise en 1571 par les Ottomans et administrée par eux pendant 307 ans. En 1878, l’administration de l’île de Chypre passa aux Anglais, afin de fortifier la sécurité et la défense de l’Empire, par un traité qui fixait le but et les conditions de cette administration. La Turquie et l’Angleterre ayant participé à la première guerre mondiale dans des camps opposés et la Turquie étant sortie perdante de cette guerre, elle fut obligée de renoncer en 1923 à ses droits sur l’île de Chypre par le traité de paix de Lausanne. L’île de Chypre, département de l’Empire Ottoman, était ainsi soustraite à la souveraineté turque. A cause de ce développement historique il était difficile pour la Turquie et pour les Turcs de l’île de considérer le conflit chypriote comme une question coloniale quand le sort de l’île se trouva de nouveau en jeu à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale.

L’intérêt manifesté par les Turcs à l’égard de Chypre était en étroite relation avec leur préoccupation d’assurer la sécurité de l’Anatolie. Cette préoccupation historique n’était pas née chez les Turcs. Tous les anciens maîtres de l’Anatolie avaient témoigné des mêmes soucis. C’est pourquoi le sort de l’île avait toujours suivi celui de l’Anatolie dans le passé. Quand les Turcs établirent leur domination sur l’Anatolie, ils furent amenés à imiter leurs prédécesseurs par la nécessité stratégique devenue historique et ils firent la conquête de l’île en 1571. La cession administrative de Chypre à l’Angleterre était motivée par la même nécessité de défense. En effet, cette cession était motivée par la préoccupation des Ottomans d’assurer et de faciliter la participation de l’Angleterre à la défense de l’Empire. En 1878 il n’était pas question de renoncer à l’île de Chypre, mais bien de l’utiliser comme une base de défense. L’enlèvement de l’île à la Turquie en 1923 fut une décision imposée au peuple turc du fait de la première guerre mondiale.

Le rôle stratégique de Chypre a aujourd’hui toujours la même importance pour la défense de l’Anatolie. Une longue expérience historique ne permettait pas à la Turquie de négliger les dangers auxquels elle a dû toujours faire face. Malgré le désir des Turcs d’achever le développement économique de leur pays et de consacrer tous leurs efforts à ce but, nous étions dès la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale l’objet de menaces et même de revendications territoriales. La persistance de cette menace a obligé la Turquie à assurer sa sécurité par des alliances défensives telles que l’OTAN et le CENTO. L’île de Chypre contrôle par sa situation les routes maritimes et les ports par lesquels la Turquie espère recevoir l’aide de ses alliés. Quand il fut question d’un changement du statut international de Chypre, il était naturel que la Turquie ne le considérât pas comme une simple affaire coloniale. On nous pose souvent cette question : Pourquoi l’objection de la Turquie à l’annexion de Chypre à la Grèce puisque ces deux pays collaborent à l’intérieur de l’OTAN et sont deux pays alliés. Nous Turcs sommes alliés aux Grecs pour lutter contre les dangers communs. Mais ce fait n’empêche malheureusement pas la Grèce d’avoir des visées expansionnistes sur l’Anatolie et de revendiquer ce territoire quand il est possible, comme cela s’est produit à la fin de la première guerre mondiale. Il est donc prudent pour la Turquie d’assurer sa propre défense.

L’intérêt que porte la Turquie à Chypre ne se limite pas «exclusivement à des considérations défensives. A Chypre vivent plus de cent mille Turcs. Leur installation dans l’île remonte à la conquête. Les soldats qui avaient participé à cette conquête furent, après l’opération, démobilisés et établis dans l’île. Un noyau de trente mille anciens combattants est à l’origine de la communauté turque auquel se sont jointes des familles émigrées de l’Anatolie.

La communauté turque établie ainsi à Chypre a conservé des attaches avec les Turcs d’Anatolie sur le plan national, religieux et culturel. Elle a adopté les réformes réalisées en Anatolie et a suivi un développement social parallèle à celui des Turcs d’Anatolie. Cet attachement des Chypriotes turcs pour leurs frères d’Anatolie a aussi un aspect psychologique. Les Chypriotes turcs manifestent un intérêt continu pour les progrès réalisés en Anatolie. Les fêtes nationales turques sont toujours pour eux une occasion de manifester leur solidarité à l’égard des Turcs d’Anatolie. Actuellement, les journaux turcs paraissent avec des titres rouges selon l’habitude en Turquie et publient des articles exprimant l’attachement des Chypriotes à l’Anatolie. Un coup d’oeil aux journaux suffit pour se rendre compte que les Chypriotes turcs font partie intégrante de la population anatolienne. Les Chypriotes turcs viennent très souvent en Turquie, soit pour leurs études, soit pour y recevoir des soins médicaux, soit pour toute autre raison. Un autre lien additionnel est l’existence d’une communauté chypriote en Turquie. Celle-ci s’y est établie après l’annexion de l’île par le Royaume-Uni ; elle compte aujourd’hui plus de deux cent mille âmes. Quant il fut question du statut international de Chypre, il était donc naturel que les Turcs d’Anatolie s’y intéressent tout particulièrement et Fin tervention de la Turquie dans cette affaire était inévitable. Aucun Etat ne peut négliger la protection d’une partie de sa population.

L’interdépendance de l’Anatolie et de Chypre d’une part, la communauté turque vivant sur l’île d’autre part ne permettaient pas à la Turquie de considérer le conflit chypriote comme un problème colonial.

Les Grecs de Grèce et de Chypre voulaient par ailleurs s’appuyer sur le principe de l’autodétermination pour réaliser l’annexion de Chypre à la Grèce. Ils prétendaient que c’était une injustice de les priver de ce droit. La Turquie ne s’opposait pas à l’application du principe de l’autodétermination aux Chypriotes. Elle exigeait seulement que les particularités de la population soient prises en considération. En effet, à Chypre il n’y a pas un peuple distinct : Grecs et Turcs y vivent. Les Grecs veulent l’union avec la Grèce et les Turcs aspirent à s’unir avec la Turquie. Les Grecs demandaient avec insistance que le principe d’auto-détermination soit appliqué exclusivement en leur faveur. La Turquie exigeait que le même principe soit appliqué également aux Chypriotes turcs.

Les Chypriotes grecs refusaient de reconnaître ce droit d’autodétermination aux Turcs. Ils prétendaient que les Chypriotes turcs, moins nombreux, ne pourraient s’opposer à la volonté de la majorité. Mais la particularité de la population chypriote ne permettait pas de considérer la situation sous l’angle d’une relation entre une minorité et une majorité. En effet, les traités internationaux et les auteurs, y compris les Grecs, définissaient toujours la notion de minorité en relation avec une nation distincte. Selon la définition généralement acceptée, la minorité est un groupe moins nombreux, différent de la majorité d’une nation par le critère de la religion, de la langue, de la culture ou de la race. Cette définition ne prend pas seulement en considération la relation numérique entre deux groupes, mais elle suppose l’existence d’une nation distincte. Or, à Chypre, il n’y avait pas une nation chypriote assez distincte pour qu’on puisse parler d’une minorité différente. Il existait une communauté qui se considérait grecque et une autre qui se considérait turque. La relation entre ces deux communautés ne pourrait se définir selon le critère du nombre. Le vrai aspect de cette relation était celui qui existe entre deux groupes appartenant à deux nations différentes. Même si l’on ne va pas jusqu’à prendre la relation numérique existant entre les nations auxquelles appartiennent la communauté turque et la communauté grecque, il fallait reconnaître la particularité de la démographie de Chypre et traiter en conséquence les deux communautés. La logique exigeait que soit reconnu à ces deux communautés le même droit d’autodétermination.

Les Grecs disaient aussi que du point de vue juridique, la Turquie avait abdiqué tous ses droits sur Chypre en acceptant les dispositions du Traité de paix de Lausanne. Selon les articles 16 et 27 de ce Traité, la Turquie ne pourrait dans l’avenir revendiquer aucun droit sur Chypre. Mais la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale a confirmé dans une décision consultative que les dispositions de ces articles se limitaient aux frontières fixées par le Traité de Lausanne. Si l’on voulait changer le statut international de Chypre et par voie de conséquence l’ordre et la balance politiques établis par le Traité de Lausanne, il était naturel qu’on revienne au point de départ et que chaque partie reconsidère sa position.

En effet, dès qu’un changement dans le statut international de Chypre s’est dessiné, la Turquie a affirmé son droit comme une partie intéressée et a déclaré son intention d’intervenir dans l’affaire afin de sauvegarder les droits de la communauté turque et ses intérêts stratégiques.

La thèse de la Turquie est apparue comme un slogan en faveur du partage. Mais cette idée n’était en réalité que l’application des dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies au conflit de Chypre. Comme l’on sait, quand il est question d’accorder l’autodétermination à un territoire non autonome (ce qui était le cas pour Chypre sous la souveraineté du Royaume-Uni) la règle applicable est l’article 73 de la Charte. Selon le paragraphe b) de cet article on devait tenir compte des conditions particulières de chaque territoire et de ses populations en vue de donner le droit d’autodétermination. Or la particularité territoriale de Chypre n’était autre que sa situation géographique. Cette situation ne pourrait être dissociée de la notion bien connue de proximité. Et celle-ci amenait inévitablement à considérer Chypre sous ses rapports géographiques avec l’Anatolie.

Ces rapports supposaient certainement les besoins de défense de l’Anatolie. A cet égard il suffit de se rappeler la décision de la Société des Nations au sujet des îles Aaland. Quant à la particularité des populations de Chypre, il fallait commencer par souligner que l’article en question amenait à considérer les aspirations politiques des populations (au pluriel), c’est-à-dire de tous les habitants. Comme on vient de le dire plus haut, à Chypre il n’existe pas une population homogène, mais deux communautés. Les aspirations politiques de ces communautés ne s’accordaient pas. La communauté turque ne voulait pas vivre sous la domination des Grecs. Aucun principe ne pourrait exclure cette détermination de la communauté turque. S’il fallait donc accorder l’autodétermination à Chypre, il était nécessaire de prendre en considération ces particularités démographiques et donner à la communauté turque le droit d’exprimer elle aussi sa volonté. Ces considérations aboutissent par voie de conséquence au partage de l’île. On voit que le partage de l’île n’était que l’application à Chypre de l’article 73 de la Charte.

Il. Les premiers développements du conflit chypriote

Jusqu’à la soumission officielle du conflit chypriote à l’ONU, la Turquie a multiplié les démarches amicales afin de ne pas compromettre la paix du Proche-Orient et l’amitié turco-grecque. Malgré ces avances, la Grèce a soumis en 1954 le conflit chypriote à l’ONU. La Turquie a dû prendre position et affirmer ses droits et ses intérêts vitaux. Durant les discussions à l’O.N.U. sur Chypre, les représentants turcs ont souligné les liens juridiques, historiques, économiques et défensifs entre la Turquie et Chypre et ont déclaré que la Turquie ne pourrait rester spectatrice devant le changement du statut de Chypre. En 1954, l’O.N.U. n’a pris aucune décision sur le conflit chypriote. D’autre part, la communauté turque de Chypre avait commencé à réaffirmer son existence et à résister aux pressions des Grecs. Le conflit armé entre les communautés turque et grecque était évité grâce au sang- froid de la première.

Au mois de septembre 1955, une conférence s’est tenue à Londres efttre le Royaume-Uni, la Turquie et la Grèce sur le conflit chypriote. Mais les parties restèrent sur leurs positions. D’autre part, l’apparition du terrorisme à Chypre a détérioré les relations entre les deux communautés.

En 1956, le terrorisme à Chypre est arrivé au stade du conflit armé entre les deux communautés. Les efforts de conciliation ont échoué. À cet égard il faut mentionner le rejet du projet constitutionnel de lord Radcliffe par les Grecs de l’île et par la Grèce.

En 1957, les Nations Unies ont discuté deux fois le conflit chypriote, sur l’insistance de la Grèce. Les Nations Unies ont recommandé aux parties intéressées de trouver par les voies pacifiques une solution conforme à la Charte des Nations Unies. La Grèce a également rejeté, au mois de mars, l’offre de conciliation du Secrétaire Général de l’O.T.A.N. Le terrorisme a, cette année, continué à Chypre en augmentant le nombre des victimes.

Le conflit armé entre les deux communautés à Chypre mettait en danger les rapports entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Ainsi la collaboration entre les deux pays dans les alliances de l’OTAN et du Pacte Balkanique a souffert de cet état de choses pour aboutir à une paralysie complète en 1958. Pour améliorer cette situation, le Conseil de l’OTAN a renouvelé deux fois ses offres de conciliation. Le conflit de Chypre fut discuté dans le Conseil sans arriver à une solution. Entre- temps, le plan de MacMillan fut rejeté de nouveau par les Grecs. […]

>> Lire la suite de l’article sur Persée <<

History is everywhere in India, deployed to enrage and incite.

What’s becoming apparent to anybody without some form of clinical myopia is that American liberalism is struggling to deal with certain broad political developments. Consider societal virtues characteristically American—public, often free form political discussion; individualism; egoism; checks-on-power; short-lasting and directly-elected representatives—these things are not conducive to a fast-acting political system and consequently make our “American Experiment” not particularly well equipped to handle recent forces such as the biblical COVID-19. The real problem, though, is that other systems of government are well equipped.

For instance, lacking certain (in this case) restrictive American principles, China was able to effectively control the virus through a combination of mass surveillance and quarantine measures implemented quickly from the top-down. China behaves very much like an animal, willing to self-amputate limbs if caught in a bear trap. There are no questions of principle in the liberal sense, no considerations of rights, and any “communistic” principles espoused by the government are spurious. Cold, systemic efficiency—this is what the Chinese government advertises with its authoritarianism, this is what it believes in, and it’s already using this efficiency to gain clout on the world stage by mass producing medical equipment.

China is emblematic of a phenomenon Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek characterizes as the end of the marriage between democracy and capitalism. China exhibits in idiosyncratic ways forms of capitalism —whether it be Chinese billionaires or venture capitalists—unmarred by authoritarianism. How can liberal capitalist nations respond to Zizek’s “problems of the commons” such as COVID, or ecological destruction? It’s clear that individual-oriented responses to these issues are specious—most fossil fuel emissions are the product of merely 100 companies, who remain entrenched in the legislative system, and a hands-off approach to the pandemic is currently failing in several states. Illiberal capitalist countries can always point to their aforementioned animal efficiency. What will liberal countries do when, facing imminent ecological destruction, Chinese-style authoritarianism is seen as the only viable method of fast action?

Smug, turgid defenses of liberal values which idealize theoretical virtues but mask an underbelly of elitism and hypocrisy do no good. Reflect on arguments given by Steven Pinker, and Adam Gopnik. Where do they leave us? All they do is laud liberal values of tolerance and enterprise, forever looking back on “’formal’ victories of liberal democracies” as opposed to “the lived experience” of many people. Where is the urgency to acknowledge the failure of liberal countries regarding, say, the devastation in Yemen? Or to acknowledge the United States’ complicity? Where is the addressal of arguments which fueled right-wing momentum in 2016? The most recent American reactionary movement and its subsequent mainstream manifestations (Bannon et al.) are reactions to real problems—the withering of the American rust belt as a result of globalization, America’s perceived failure to maintain a hegemonic position, the failures of liberalism with respect to social mobility, etc.—that offer false solutions. Trade wars and performative, petulant diplomatic shenanigans are not going to re-establish American liberalism as hegemonic. But the points outlined by many liberal apologists are trite.

A detractor may claim that here I’m just stating problems without providing solutions. This is unequivocally correct. The analysis is descriptive, not prescriptive. I’m writing this piece as all politically plausible (meaning election-winnable) solutions to these problems, both internal and external to liberalism, fail to hit the mark, opting for either lip service or suicidal death-drive nihilism. Members of the younger generation are scared—it’s an abstract yet ambient terror that people my age feel talking about the state of the art so to speak with respect to liberalism and the sustainability of capitalist democracy.

When forced, however, by circumstance to engage with these problems prescriptively, the correct response is not to advocate for knee-jerk reaction or to settle for apologetic self-assurance. It is not immediately obvious that there are quick solutions, and I advocate for a brand of armchair theorizing which may be derided as unpragmatic by some in support of the aforementioned clinically myopic positions. But this piece is highly interrogative because asking questions is important. Simply identifying the problems, taking them seriously, and engaging with them theoretically is a step above-and-beyond a large number of both those championing liberalism regardless of its faults and those offering regressive solutions via nativism and blatant ignorance.

If liberal capitalism is to survive the century then it must confront itself, expand its imagination, and most importantly stop being overconfident and cavalier about its ability to self-correct in dire straits. Because with daunting alternatives clambering up over the horizon and making jarring amounts of headway, even after the triumphant and meant-to-be-epochal victory of western liberalism at the end of the Cold War, certainty is an intellectual sin.

The post Liberalism Going Forward appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

There has been some discussion comparing modern times to that of the pre-First World War period. While that era was characterized by the social and economic effects of industrialization with little labour protections and the struggle of people living under colonial rule, the comparisons could likely be made to any era that suffered from conflict. What characterizes today’s era in relation to that period is how actions against minority groups were often ignored, even if they were done en masse and in a brutal fashion. The most stark example from that period in human history is the human rights atrocities taken against the Armenian people, actions that are often still ignored to this day and that have scarred their community indefinitely.

When looking back on our generation, it will likely be the case that those in the future will see that a lot of symbolic acts were committed to, while actual torture and human rights atrocities were almost wholly ignored. People that have suffered some of the worst treatment in modern human history, especially against women, has occurred under our watch. Minorities like the Yazidi women and girls have been brutalized to such a degree that it rivals tortures done during the Holocaust. Movements to acknowledge and help them have been more or less muted with the exception of a few small aid groups and those who are aware, committed to, and have sacrificed to save Yazidis, especially to help those women and girls who are the targets of sexual violence and torture. Many groups in the same region are some of the oldest living communities in human history, and many of those are in the process of being wiped out because they are a minority group. Human rights need to apply to everyone, even if it is not politically expedient. Consciously not doing so could be considered a criminal act.

The manner in which media and some governments have muted the actions taking place in Hong Kong is also quite surprising. For many countries there is a significant community of people from Hong Kong living there, along with historic ties to the British Commonwealth where a similar system of government and democracy exists. For those that are democratic cousins with the people of Hong Kong it might be the case in the future that we will look back at our era and ask why so little was done to assist people who share our values and commitment to a democratic system. While some countries have opened up their immigration and refugee systems to those who wish to leave Hong Kong, there is little discussion and understanding as to why the dismantling of a democratic country is so troubling, and how the value of such a society and culture would be an eternal loss to the world community. The acceptance of the loss of Hong Kong’s democracy is a reflection on how those who live in democracies view their own freedoms and rights. When democracy is devalued by those that oppose it, it is common place, when it is discarded by those who are free under it, it will be seen as absurdity by future generations.

The post Our Lost Generation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director-general of the World Health Organization (right), with Houlin Zhao (Zhao Houlin), secretary-general of the International Telecommunications Union, in 2017. (Photo: M. Jacobson-Gonzalez, ITU Pictures)

President Trump has clearly decided to deflect blame for the disastrous impact of the COVID-19* pandemic in the United States by attacking China and the World Health Organization (WHO). Of the two, the one that is likely to suffer more, with more consequences for the United States and the rest of the world, is WHO.

Trump has ratcheted up his attacks at an accelerating pace. He first teased at withholding funds from the organization on April 7 but then backtracked only minutes later. Then a week after that, on April 15, he announced that he was suspending U.S. funding for WHO “until its mismanagement, cover-ups, and failures can be investigated.” By the end of April, he had ordered the intelligence community to investigate whether China and WHO had conspired to conceal information about the virus and its origins.

On May 18 Trump sent a letter to, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO director-general, giving him 30 days to commit to “major substantive improvements” (otherwise unspecified) or the United States would end its funding permanently and reconsider its membership in the organization. Other members, including U.S. allies, voiced their opposition to this and support for the agency. Then, on May 29—just 11 days after his 30-day ultimatum and apparently without consulting his advisers or other relevant officials—Trump inserted into a policy statement on China that he was “terminating our relationship with the World Health Organization” and redirecting funds to other global health needs.

Despite the dramatic charges of mismanagement, cover-ups, and failures, an official fact sheet made only two specific complaints. The first is what David Fidler, a former legal consultant to WHO, interprets as a “failure to provide urgent information.” The charge required interpretation because the official White House document buries it in anti-Chinese rhetoric, such as “the WHO has shown a dangerous bias towards the Chinese government,” and assertions that “the WHO repeatedly parroted the Chinese government’s claims” about the disease and its characteristics. The wording would suggest that Trump is most bothered by the fact that WHO to deferring to China rather than to him. The second specific complaint is that WHO disagreed with the administration regarding the value of travel restrictions, or, as the fact sheet put it, “put political correctness over life-saving measures by opposing travel restrictions.”

These are not justifications for cutting off funding for WHO. As Fidler points out, the administration did not have to struggle with WHO to impose its travel restrictions. WHO is required to make recommendations; it generally makes the same one when it comes to travel restrictions in a health emergency; and the administration is not obliged to comply with it. As for information, the administration has multiple sources, including its own intelligence services. (At one time it actually had specialists on this very issue stationed in Wuhan, China, but it closed that program down.) If the administration had information from an alternative source telling it that China was misinforming WHO about what was happening, then it should have shared that information with WHO. In any event, if WHO was delayed in distributing important information, it was not as delayed as the Trump administration’s responses.

Let us quickly review the sequence of events. WHO received word of an outbreak of an “atypical pneumonia” on December 31, 2019, apparently from sources other than China, and then solicited a confirmation from the Chinese government. China verified the report via Twitter on January 4. (Presumably as a favor to China, WHO used the passive voice in reporting its first information, allowing people to assume that China had officially notified it as it was required to do under the International Health Regulations.) Chinese scientists published the coronavirus genome on January 12. On January 13 a COVID-19 case appeared in Thailand; at this point COVD-19 became a potential matter of international concern rather than a matter solely internal to China and its jurisdiction. WHO tasked a German group to develop a test for it, which was made available to countries on January 16. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declined to adopt it and then botched its own test, delaying the onset of testing in the United States. China announced on January 20 that the coronavirus was a serious threat and that local authorities had suppressed the information. (Whether true or not in this instance, that is actually a major problem in countries like China, where local authorities face multiple, conflicting demands from the capital and are held responsible for anything that goes wrong, often without regard to actual responsibility.) A WHO delegation visited Wuhan briefly for the first time, on January 20–21, and stated that there was evidence of human-to-human transmission but that more analysis was needed. On January 22, Dr. Tedros, WHO’s director-general, began giving daily press briefings, encouraging countries to engage in testing, contact tracing, and the isolation of infected persons. WHO declared COVID-19 a “public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC) on January 30. On that day Trump announced the formation of a coronavirus task force under Secretary Alex Azar of the Department of Health and Human Services, and he imposed partial restrictions on travel from China the following day, January 31. In mid-February, Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases said that it could have the makings of a global pandemic. A more substantial WHO visit to Beijing and Wuhan came on February 16–24. On February 25, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, said, “Ultimately, we expect we will see community spread in the United States. It’s not a question of if this will happen, but when this will happen, and how many people in this country will have severe illnesses.” She added, “Disruptions to everyday life may be severe, but people might want to start thinking about that now.” Rather than heed the warning, Trump put Vice President Mike Pence in charge of the coronavirus task force on February 26 and instructed him to tamp down the alarmist talk before it spooked the stock market. Following the lead of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, Trump’s primary concern was that any acknowledgment of a potential crisis—or any overt effort to counter it—might roil the markets and hurt his reelection chances. It was March 15, after the markets had already begun to tank, when the Trump administration recommended social distancing and locking down the economy in the United States.

Some have complained that after its January 30 PHEIC declaration, it took WHO until March 11 to declare a pandemic. But officially, a PHEIC declaration is all there is, and the authority to declare a PHEIC has existed only since 2005; there is no such thing as an official WHO pandemic declaration. It seems that Tedros started using the scarier term pandemic to attract the attention of countries that were still not taking the issue seriously enough. (As an official WHO timeline describes the March 11 statement, “Deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the alarming levels of inaction, WHO made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.” [Emphasis added.]) Trump’s social-distancing decision came six weeks after the PHEIC declaration and weeks after warnings from his own public-health officials. How much did the delay matter? Researchers at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health looked into that question and came up with the following estimates:

In a retrospective analysis, the researchers find that, nationwide, 703,975 confirmed cases (62%) and 35,927 deaths (55%) of reported deaths up to May 3 would have been avoided if observed control measures had been adopted one week earlier—on March 8 instead of March 15. In the New York metropolitan area, 209,987 (80%) of confirmed cases and 17,514 (80%) of deaths would have been avoided if the same sequence of interventions had been applied one week earlier. Had the sequence of control measures occurred two weeks earlier, the nation would have seen a reduction of 960,937 (84%) cases and 53,990 (83%) deaths, and a reduction of 246,082 cases (94%) and 20,427 deaths (94%) in the New York metropolitan area.

Are Travel Restrictions “Life-Saving Measures”?

A major shortcoming in the administration’s argument is a fundamental failure to understand—or even to try to understand—the issues at hand. Take, for example, this statement: “The WHO put political correctness over life-saving measures by opposing travel restrictions.” Trump, it appears, simply assumes that travel restrictions are life-saving measures. It is indeed possible for travel restrictions to slow the spread of contagions. WHO itself said that restrictions, when imposed early and of limited duration, can give countries time to prepare for the arrival of the contagion (which Trump failed to do, evidently believing that the travel restrictions were sufficient in and of themselves). On the other hand, travel restrictions do not stop the spread of contagions and they cause problems of their own. Apart from the general social and economic disruption, travel restrictions make it harder to get emergency personnel into the affected area in order to combat the outbreak or slow or prevent the spread of the disease to other areas. Additionally, fear of eliciting travel and trade restrictions can lead some countries to cover up their disease outbreaks, producing worse outcomes overall. Also the announcement of imminent travel restrictions can cause panic-driven movement by people who fear being caught in a containment area. Trump did this three times in announcing restrictions related to China, then Iran, then Europe. The Europe-related announcement, in particular, led to a flood of people overwhelming airports—creating large, packed crowds, mixing virus carriers with susceptible subjects—and may well have contributed to the massive outbreak in metropolitan New York. WHO has also stated that travel restrictions can produce a “stigma,” which may be the root of Trump’s reference to “political correctness,” but that is hardly the core of the argument. For these reasons WHO generally advises against restrictions, as do other public-health authorities.

That’s Not How Any of This Works!

More generally, the administration’s arguments betray a basic misunderstanding of the nature of international organizations. They are rarely independent actors on the global stage. Rather, they are membership associations. WHO serves as a forum for debate among its members—that is, 194 separate countries that are represented in its governing body, the World Health Assembly—on issues of global health, as a vehicle for sharing information, as a pool of technical expertise, as a helper in policy coordination, and as an agent for its members in seeking to achieve common goals related to global health. In doing so, it performs an extremely useful function. But, to put it bluntly, WHO is not in a position to boss China around. It is not a supranational authority (nor, for that matter, is it an instrument of U.S. policy). The only international organization with the capacity to boss member states around is the UN Security Council, which can do so when passing resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”). And even in that case—if this had involved a threat to the peace and were being decided by the UN Security Council—China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, could veto any action directed against it. In any event, China, which held the rotating Security Council chairmanship in March, managed to keep the pandemic entirely off the agenda throughout that month. In April, when the Security Council finally did attempt to address the issue, it was stymied both by China’s singular focus on avoiding blame and by the United States’ singular focus on blaming China (and WHO). Thus, nothing of significance was achieved.

Of course, not all of WHO’s 194 bosses have an equal say in what it does, but enough of them do to complicate any controversial decision it has to make. That is especially true when members disagree or fight each other. In this case, the repeated efforts of U.S. representatives to condemn WHO’s pro-Chinese rhetoric, highlight the Chinese origins of the pandemic, and press for Taiwan’s last-minute addition to the World Health Assembly have served no purpose but to rile the Chinese leadership and obstruct progress in dealing with the disease. WHO is a repository for information filed by member states, and thus it is highly dependent on the member states’ willingness to issue reports. It was not in a position to force China to allow its inspectors into Wuhan, and China did not allow it to do so for several weeks. If WHO was unseemly in its praise of China, then presumably Tedros believed, rightly or wrongly, that doing so was necessary to elicit China’s cooperation. Naming-and-shaming, WHO’s one other alternative, can be counterproductive when dealing with thin-skinned governments. (An administration in which cabinet meetings begin with secretaries singing the praises of the president ought to understand this.) The political situation in the United States being what it is, we have grown accustomed to focusing on the rhetoric instead of the substance—such as Tedros’s admonitions to engage in testing, contact tracing, and quarantines—and have come to view the expression of outrage as an end in itself. We thus denounce Tedros for not wasting his time in counterproductive denunciations. In any event, it was WHO that successfully solicited China’s acknowledgment of the outbreak in the first place, provided the first COVID-19 tests, and declared the PHEIC. It does not deserve to be treated so harshly.

Deflecting Blame, Undermining the U.S. and Health

Trump’s response to the pandemic—which he seems to view primarily as a political problem—was twofold: (1) Hope the pandemic works itself out, and (2) Deflect the blame onto someone else. With regard to the domestic response to the pandemic, he has shifted the blame to the state governors, who he insists are responsible for such things. With regard to the causes of the pandemic, he has shifted the blame to China and WHO. The information failures for which Trump holds WHO responsible are primarily the fault of Chinese leaders who delayed and deceived, and even that was valid for only a few weeks.

Trump’s answer to this situation—rather than cooperate to deal with the pandemic—was to punish and defund WHO in the midst of the ongoing crisis. This does not further any positive goal. The possible consequences of this are also twofold. First, the real target of the punishment will be world health. Many countries do not have the wherewithal to fight a pandemic (and innumerable other health issues) on their own and rely on assistance from WHO. They will suffer and also serve as sources of disease for others. Americans will also suffer if the world’s unified response to infectious disease is undermined. Moreover, the United States will lose WHO’s vantage point with regard to looming health threats, which ironically is especially important in China. China’s combination of diverse live animals in close proximity to large numbers of people along with modern transportation infrastructure makes it a prolific source of infectious disease. (Ironically, China’s role as a source of disease increases the importance to WHO of its cooperation.)

Second, it could result in the United States ceding its place of leadership to China, a process already under way. The fact that China has recently pledged an additional $2 billion to WHO—nearly equivalent to the agency’s entire budget in a normal year—suggests that this is likely. If Trump was serious about his complaint that China had too much influence in the organization, this is hardly the way to resolve the issue.

Of course, WHO and international organizations in general are of secondary interest to Trump, well behind his interest in personal loyalty and his own political future, as indicated by some of his personnel decisions. His first Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and a senior adviser in that bureau were the subjects of a devastating inspector general’s report in August 2019 in which they were accused of mistreatment and harassment of staffers and retaliation against those deemed insufficiently loyal to President Trump. (The adviser had already left the department; the assistant secretary retired on his own terms in November; the inspector general who wrote the report was fired in May 2020.) As acting assistant secretary, Trump then appointed a former Sarah Palin associate known primarily for her ties to evangelical Christians and opposition to abortion. A Trump loyalist from the Presidential Personnel Office, with a reputation for assessing the loyalties of applicants for apolitical government positions, was then named Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management Issues with responsibilities for budgets, senior appointments to international organizations, and UN elections. As for WHO, the United States did not even have a representative on the agency’s rotating executive board until May 7, 2020, although the U.S. term on the board had begun in 2018 and expires in 2021. The administration nominated an Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services, a Trump appointee who was previously best known for being fired as the head of vaccine development at Texas A&M University in 2015. In fact, the administration nominated him three times—in November 2018, January 2019, and March 2020—before the Republican-led Senate took any action toward confirmation, suggesting a lack of confidence in the choice. With regard to the WHO budget, the United States was already in arrears on its dues for 2019, and Trump’s budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2021 had called for cutting the contribution to WHO by 53 percent even before the COVID-19 issue had arisen. 

In the meantime, China has taken advantage of U.S. disinterest in international organizations and increased its influence within the UN and its allied agencies. Chinese officials now run four UN agencies, and Tedros, an Ethiopian, was promoted for the WHO position by China as well as the African bloc. In response to China’s growing influence, instead of showing leadership and engaging more energetically in multilateral diplomacy, the Trump administration has taken the adversarial approach of naming a special envoy for countering Chinese influence at the UN (formally, special envoy for multilateral integrity). This approach is likely to divert attention from the actual tasks of the UN’s specialized agencies and alienate other countries. If the United States wants to keep WHO “honest” and balance the influence of China, then it must be active within the agency, act as a counterweight, and stop emulating China’s practice of prioritizing the protection of its own image. What Trump is doing merely cedes further influence to China.

As for the fate of WHO, much will depend on whether the United States actually leaves. Under U.S. law, withdrawal from WHO requires a year’s notice and full payment of all arrears, so things could still change. There will be calls for reforms either way, and there will certainly be room for reform. But we should keep in mind that even after reforms, WHO will not boss China around. That’s just not how it works.

*Multiple terms have been used to identify the category of virus, the specific virus, and the disease it causes. The category is coronavirus. The specific coronavirus, first encountered in Wuhan, China, in 2019, was temporarily labeled Novel Coronavirus 2019, or nCoV-19; then it was officially named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, or SARS-CoV-2. The disease it causes is Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19.

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