Diplomacy & Crisis News

Given the history of intercommunal violence in Guinea, two high-level UN Officials voiced concern on Tuesday over the risk of “incitement to hostility, discrimination or violence” as the country gears up for elections on 18 October.

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Recent high-level diplomatic visits to Taiwan risk rupturing permanently the U.S.’ “One China” policy. This policy is the foundation of the U.S.-China peaceful relationship. As Taiwan is the most preeminent security issue in U.S.-China relations, a miscalculation from either side, leading to a military conflict cannot be entirely ruled out.

U.S.-China relations are currently quite abysmal and tensions run the full gamut of issues, including trade, technology, human rights, security, and now health due to COVID-19. Additionally, recent U.S. bans on TikTok and WeChat have made the results of U.S.-China tensions more readily visible to more Americans.

While there have been legitimate issues involving trade and human rights in China, from the U.S. perspective, the pace at which additional issues have been added to these original ones has become quite frenetic in current U.S. China policy. From the Chinese perspective, China has finally emerged from its “Century of Humiliation”. Because of historical reasons, territorial integrity is seen as a key component of this emergence. Any Chinese administration, not just the current one, would face an extreme test of its legitimacy from its own people if, after having regained Hong Kong and Macao, it failed to eventually do the same on the Taiwan question.

The current crisis in the Taiwan Strait mirrors other crises, from The Cold War and beyond. Both The Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as The Ukraine Crisis, clearly illustrate that great powers are not keen on other great powers intruding into their own perceived sphere of influence, or “near abroad”. Fortunately, The Cuban Missile Crisis ended with no military engagement between the U.S. and The Former Soviet Union. However, despite not getting as much news coverage as before, The Russo-Ukrainian War resulting from The Ukraine Crisis is still ongoing, with no end in sight.

At the beginning of the The Cold War, China was a revisionist power bent on exporting its ideology to its region, if not the world. Today’s battlefield is also a clash of ideologies, with China’s state-run capitalist model, the so-called “Beijing Consensus” facing off against the U.S.’ own market-driven capitalist model, the “Washington Consensus”. Both models are being evaluated globally in terms of their resiliency in the face of extraordinary circumstances, like financial and health crises, internal socio economic stability, as well as their effectiveness in bringing sustained economic benefits to the bulk of their respective populations. 

It is in this soft power front, affecting both trade and economic issues, that Washington faces a truly daunting adversary in today’s China, the most significant state challenge the U.S. has ever faced. No power the U.S. has ever confronted has had the same economic heft of today’s China. Even when China and the U.S. actually engaged each other militarily, during The Korean War, China was nothing like the global power it is today. Also it bears mentioning that, at the time of The Korean War, China did not yet possess nuclear weapons.

Because of this, from China’s perspective, Taiwan is seen as being a pawn on the chessboard of the increasing U.S.-China great power competition game. Taiwan provides the U.S. a convenient model for what China could possibly be, provided it made the necessary ideological changes to its current form of government.

As important as exceptionalism and ideology are however, China chose the avenue of pragmatism in 1972 when it accepted Nixon’s overtures. The Middle Kingdom did not do this out of an abiding love for democracy and free markets, but out of self-interest and self-preservation. Even then, it was not a full-fledged U.S. ally, but only a “strategic partner”. With the U.S. as this strategic partner, China was not as vulnerable when facing hostilities from its erstwhile ideological ally, The Former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, only in time did China’s pragmatism allow it to re-engage with the West and reap the concordant economic benefits. However, no political reform was ever promised by China through this re-engagement. Perhaps not codified, but understood implicitly by the U.S., was that this new arrangement would have China following the U.S.’ lead in Asia in perpetuity. Now, it is abundantly clear that China never saw it that way. 

Deng’s Southern Tour inspired new modes of thinking in China such as “To get rich is glorious” and “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice”. The latter slogan was an admission that a state’s ideological orientation mattered less when it came to being able to pragmatically provide economic benefits for one’s own people. For sure, China saw the benefits of economic re-engagement with the West, which enabled it to lift more people up out of poverty than ever before in human history.

However, Deng and others also recognized that “If you leave the window up, some flies are bound to come inside”, meaning that more economic freedom always posed the risk of increased political freedom being demanded by the population, now exposed to external values. However, China was never going to change its mode of government and become a “like-minded partner” of the U.S., at least not in terms of values. By the late 1980s, China had seen the beginning of the unravelling of state power in The Former Soviet Union due to increased political freedom there and decided not to repeat this mistake. This was made abundantly clear at Tiananmen, the reaction to which Deng also spearheaded.

Though difficult, more tolerance and appreciation for different forms of government within the global system architecture will lead to overall system stability. Continued intolerance towards the full diversity of forms of government in today’s global ecosystem will only lead to further system instability. Further increasing system instability is the impact of global pandemics and irreversible environmental degradation. By working together, on the Covax initiative for example, both China and the U.S. would demonstrate to the world their commitment to keeping this system stable. COVID-19 and forest fires so huge that they are visible from space do not care about the ideology of their victims, and neither should we.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère 
(n° 3/2020). Alain Antil, directeur du Centre Afrique subsaharienne de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Une guerre perdue. La France au Sahel (JC Lattès, 2020, 200 pages).

Dans cet essai, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, spécialiste des conflits, du Nigeria, de Boko Haram, tente de dresser le bilan de l’action de la France au Sahel, en particulier de sa lutte contre le terrorisme depuis l’intervention de l’opération Serval. Comme on l’aura deviné avec le titre, la tonalité est résolument pessimiste. L’auteur pense en effet que les effets négatifs de l’action antiterroriste française au Sahel dépassent ses conséquences positives.

Une approche par trop sécuritaire, une méconnaissance, ou tout du moins une sous-évaluation des problèmes politiques des États comme des enjeux de pouvoirs locaux, une coopération qui parfois contribue involontairement, comme c’est le cas au Tchad, à maintenir un régime kleptocratique en place : le diagnostic est sévère. Le livre s’attache d’abord au Mali, puis élargit sa réflexion au Sahel, appuyant sa démonstration de multiples pas-de-côté historiques ou géographiques (débat sur le djihadisme, Kenya, Soudan, Nigeria…).

La partie centrale du livre – « Les erreurs de diagnostic » – est la plus stimulante. Consacrée à l’analyse des causes profondes de la conflictualité au Sahel, elle parle évidemment de la France et, au-delà, de l’ensemble de la communauté internationale. Parmi les biais d’analyse, l’auteur pointe la « labellisation terroriste » des conflits, qui a « favorisé des mécanismes qui ont contribué à entretenir et exacerber les conflits » – à travers la militarisation outrancière de la réponse ; des partenaires techniques et financiers qui ferment les yeux sur les dérives multiples des régimes politiques, au motif que ceux-ci combattent un « péril global » ; la survalorisation du djihad globalisé dans l’analyse des conflits ; la pauvreté invoquée comme facteur direct des conflits, alors que la relation pauvreté-conflit est à resituer dans des configurations plus complexes et labiles, et est toujours médiée par d’autres facteurs ; la survalorisation du facteur religieux au détriment des dynamiques sociales et politiques ; les limites des approches de « déradicalisation »…

Au total, cet essai vaut mieux que son titre, et que certaines de ses pages, inutilement polémiques. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos pointe avec justesse à la fois les erreurs d’analyse et de réponses politiques aux phénomènes combattus. Si une approche par trop militarisée peut apporter quelques améliorations ponctuelles et des répits politiques, les interventions internationales risquent de contribuer in fine à allonger les durées des conflits, ce qui ternit, et ternira, l’image de la communauté internationale.

L’ouvrage ouvre enfin un débat plus vaste, sur les politiques de la communauté internationale qui contribuent à maintenir, sinon des régimes, du moins des ordres politiques contestés par des segments de plus en plus larges des opinions publiques sahéliennes. Les violences, et les conflits que l’on labellise « terroristes » ne sont qu’un des aspects des transformations de ces ordres politiques qui sont en train de maturer, avec probablement de nouveaux types de dirigeants et surtout de nouvelles sources de légitimité. Ces questionnements rejoignent d’anciens travaux de l’auteur, où il montrait que les interventions extérieures avaient plutôt tendance à allonger les cycles de conflits en bridant les processus historiques à l’œuvre.

Alain Antil

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Depuis 1993, les réformes des retraites, qui toutes ont conduit à une baisse globale du niveau des pensions, entraînent des conséquences plus négatives encore pour les salariées. La nouvelle ne semble guère s'en démarquer. / France, Économie, Femmes, Inégalités, Protection sociale, Travail, Droits des (...) / France, Économie, Femmes, Inégalités, Protection sociale, Travail, Droits des femmes, Retraites - 2013/09

L'octroi de prêts et la mise à disposition de produits d'épargne ou d'assurance permettraient aux plus démunis d'entreprendre afin de s'extraire de la pauvreté. Il n'en est rien. / Aide au développement, Banque, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, Finance, Inégalités, Pauvreté, Spéculation, Crise financière (...) / Aide au développement, Banque, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, Finance, Inégalités, Pauvreté, Spéculation, Crise financière - 2013/09

Dans le numéro 3/2020 de Politique étrangère, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos a proposé une analyse croisée de plusieurs ouvrages consacrés à l’insécurité en Afrique subsaharienne. L’auteur d’un de ces livres, Jacob Zenn, professeur associé à l’université Georgetown et chercheur à la Jamestown Foundation, a demandé à bénéficier d’un droit de réponse.

In Politique étrangère (n°3/2020), Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos reviewed my book, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), but with much misrepresentation. This article addresses those misrepresentations by quoting Montclos’ review and the book itself.

Montclos claimed Unmasking “utilized no French academic literature on the Sahel.” However, Unmasking cited two French-language Olivier Meunier book chapters. One chapter demonstrated 1990s Nigerian and Nigerien Salafi scholars’ close contacts and the other revealed an “Algerian merchant” constructed Niger-based Islamic school, Moufidah (p. 33). The relevance in Unmasking related to Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) member, Hacene Allane, being a Niger-based Algerian merchant in 1993 before becoming the GIA’s first Nigeria-based operative in 1994 (p. 30). Furthermore, the Salafi preacher hosting Allane in Nigeria ran an Islamic school that supported Moufidah. Although I suspected Allane constructed Moufidah, I withheld making that claim in the book.

French scholar Emmanuel Grégoire’s book chapter was also citedfor noting Niger’s Salafis were called “new jihadists” in 1993 (p. 33). Although Niger’s Salafis rebuffed GIA recruitment attempts, Nigerian intelligence officials observed Allane’s recruiting Nigerians to the GIA and inviting diaspora Nigerian al-Qaeda members back to Nigeria (p. 39). Unmasking contends this represented the Nigerian jihadist movement’s beginnings.

Another French scholar cited was Christian Seignobos, whose research demonstrated when Ansaru faction members reintegrated into Boko Haram in 2013 they would have encountered Cameroon-based zarquina road-robbers (p. 213). Further, Mauritanians Lemine Salem and Zekeria Salem’s French-language works were cited regarding Abu Muhammed al-Yemeni and Muhammad al-Hassan Dedew. Al-Yemeni was Usama Bin Laden’s Nigeria envoy and was hosted by Allane (p. 48); Dedew frequented a Mauritania-based Islamic camp where “Nigerian Taliban” youths studied in 2003 (p. 96).

Lastly, a Montclos French-language report was cited because it argued Boko Haram lacked “diaspora links” and Sahelian jihadist ties. However, Unmasking argues Saudi Arabia-based diaspora Nigerians contributed to Boko Haram’s founding (p. 37) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) trained, financed, supplied weapons, and advised Boko Haram before it launched jihad in 2010 (p. 152). Given Unmasking’s citing French scholars, including also Gilles Kepel (p. 21), and French-language publications, including Tunisia-based Jeune Afrique, Cameroon-based L’Oeil du Sahel, and Senegal-based Dakaractu, it is remarkable Unmasking was criticized for not citing French scholarship.

Montclos further asserted Unmasking focused only on “international connections” and “a few individuals who tried extending sect networks towards the Sahel.” However, Unmasking’s introduction argues for “understanding how international, national, regional, and local forces produced the Boko Haram phenomenon (p. 9).” Moreover, Chapter 4 examines Nigeria’s domestic Islamic milieu, including oil magnate Muhammad Indimi, who befriended George Bush’s family and selected Salafi Jaafar Mahmud Adam over Sufis to preach at his Maiduguri mosque (p. 81). This mosque is where Adam’s disciple, future Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf, eventually preached.

Chapter 4 also mentions the 1982 Borno government report recommending banning the Salafi Izala movement for promoting takfir against Sufis (p. 67). Further, political calculations compelling Izala’s “godfather” Abubakar Gumi to ally with Sufis to counter northern Nigerian Christian political influence is analyzed (p. 76). Tensions between Gumi, anti-government Salafi radical Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, and Shia revolutionary Ibrahim al-Zakzaky are also assessed (p. 71). However, Gumi’s, Datti Ahmed’s, and al-Zakzaky’s receiving Saudi, Libyan, and Iranian support, respectively, demonstrates Nigeria’s religious marketplace was inseparable from international influences.

Other Nigerian Salafi preachers mentioned in Chapter 4 for post-9/11 pro-al-Qaeda preaching include Aminu Daurawa, Abubakar Gero Argungu, Yahya Farouk Chedi, and Isa Ali Pantami, who collectively impacted Muhammad Yusuf’s followers (p. 86). Nigerian Scholars Muzzamil Hanga, Abdullah Saleh “Pakistan”, and Bashir Aliyu Umar, whose experiences with Pakistani, Iranian, Sudanese, and Saudi scholars shaped their religious worldviews, were also analyzed because they eventually renounced radicalism (pp. 73-76). Furthermore, Chapter 8 described Kogi-based Salafis who joined Boko Haram and Ansaru (p. 201), while Chapter 9 discussed Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)’s financing around Lake Chad (p. 246). One can imagine my wonderment about allegations that Unmasking focused only on “international connections” and “a few” Boko Haram members with Sahelian ties.

Another Montclos claim is Unmasking “says nothing about Nigerian army failures” or abuses. This is patently false, and is rebutted by Chapter 9, whichstates “revenge for arrested, abused, or slain cofighters must have motivated Boko Haram members” (p. 246). The chapter also mentions Nigerian soldiers’ castrating Boko Haram members and asserts Nigeria’s “military alienated traders when their goods were taxed by ISWAP but then seized and destroyed by the army” (p. 290). Additionally, Nigerian security forces’ extrajudicial killing of Muhammed Yusuf, which inspired Boko Haram’s fighting “under the banner of the global jihad movement” like al-Shabaab, is analyzed in Chapter 6 (p. 142).

Montclos also faults Unmasking for showing “little interest” in Nigeria’s 1999 return to civilian rule, 2001 sharia implementation, and post-2001 Islamist disillusionment, which inspired Islamists’ turn to jihadism. However, Chapter 5 argues influential Saudi-trained Nigerian Salafis easily observed Saudi Salafi scholars’ pre-1999 voting prohibitions because Nigeria had few democratic elections. However, after Nigeria democratized in 1999, Nigerian Salafis gradually softened their sharia demands and promoted voting for Muslim leaders. Therefore, Boko Haram preachers claimed Nigerian Salafis liberalized by embracing democracy to the point of infidelity whereas only Boko Haram retained “pure” Salafism (pp. 82, 100, 115). Montclos clearly overlooked this analysis.

Finally, Montclos finds both my omission of Abubakar Lawan and Muhammed Yusuf’s alleged birthyear of 1970 as “troubling.” However, Lawan is deliberately omitted in Unmasking to avoid speculating on individuals when sources are uncorroborated. The original source regarding Lawan is civil society activist-turned-politician Shehu Sani’s 2011 Vanguard article asserting Lawan was a 1990s-era Boko Haram founder. However, no Boko Haram members’ interviews, primary source documents, or scholarly fieldwork proves Lawan even existed. Contrarily, ample evidence revealed in Unmasking indicates al-Qaeda operative Muhammed Ali cofounded Boko Haram alongside Muhammed Yusuf (p. 87). Likewise, no evidence substantiates Yusuf’s 1970 birthyear. Contrarily, Boko Haram’s Yusuf biography states Yusuf’s birthyear as 1388 hijri, or 1967 (p. 65). Thus, these are hardly “troubling” claims and Montclos’ nitpicking digresses from more important discussions.

A lesson learned from Montclos’ book review is reviewers must perform a close reading or risk being exposed for misinterpretations, inaccuracies, and outright falsehoods.

Jacob Zenn

Raphaële Chappe and Mark Blyth respond to Sebastian Mallaby's article "The Age of Magic Money."

En France, des journaux vendent des prestations événementielles aux collectivités locales pour tenter d'équilibrer leurs comptes. / France, Économie, Médias, Personnalités, Politique, Presse, Publicité, Région - 2013/09 / France, Économie, Médias, Personnalités, Politique, Presse, Publicité, Région - 2013/09

Le lien entre philosophie et anarchisme a longtemps paru défait, si ce n'est infondé. L'anarchisme, expliquait-on, aurait disparu de la scène sociale et politique dans le désastre de la guerre civile espagnole. En outre, à l'inverse du marxisme, la pensée libertaire n'aurait jamais constitué une (...) / Histoire, Idées, Syndicalisme, Socialisme libertaire, Anarchisme - 2009/01

Corruption sours healthy economies, always places freedoms at risk and awards the worst of the worst for doing the most damage they can possibly imagine. Much of the slide from corruption into a full totalitarian regime comes from purging those who may limit the powers of elites who wish to dominate their fiefdom. In many cases, corruption gives more power to those at the top of it than possessed legally by King or Queens in those nations where they still exist. Constitutional powers limit the ability for a monarch to become an unelected dictator, with punishments ranging from fines to prison time. A corrupt leader seeks to infect all systems of government with corruption, so that even checks and balances via different branches of government are suppressed or outright eliminated. Different government structures operate in different ways, but when one person at the top can direct justice or jail for those they choose to oppose, the sickness of corruption in a democracy will take hold of it completely.

There are few resolutions to entrenched corruption, except for preventative measures to limit the powers of anyone who is given that degree of control and state wealth. Over 800 years of civilization created modern democratic systems as we see today. For this reason, once a democracy is injured or corrupted, it is extremely difficult to return to balance. Accounting for the most democratic systems currently, the British Parliamentary system, often referred to as Parliamentary Democracies as well as the systems that came out of the French Republic, a system based on a President limited by checks and balances seemed to have produced the most freedoms in modern times. To get to that point, many of those combating tyranny died fighting for it, from the streets of Napoleon’s France to the beaches of Normandy during the Second World War.

A key element of corrupt regimes is for that newly formed government to set upon their political enemies soon after taking power. This includes whistle blowers that seek to promote an openness in society, as an open and transparent society is harder to corrupt. Protests in Belarus are an example of a country that wishes to nip further corruption at the start of government regime taking power. As seen in Venezuela, a state that has fallen to a generation of corruption regularly places opposition leaders in jail or sequesters them using fear. Canada, a country now mired in its second corruption scandal in a two year period had a third major ongoing invisible scandal where a top Admiral was punished for exposing political ties to a shipping contract. The current Prime Minister used his power to go after him personally for being a whistler blower, apparently done in his first meeting of his new government. Corruption is almost impossible to eliminate, and it is why in Brazil, in a remarkable move by those in its judicial branches of government set out to purge the country of as much corruption as possible, even placing some ex-Presidents in jail for crimes against the nation.

Recently actions in Mexico has reflected elements of what has occurred in Brazil and Canada, but mainly due to an ex CEO of PEMEX being targeted by what he claims to be a corrupt system, including three ex-Presidents of Mexico. Emilio Lozoya, the ex-CEO and accused comes from an influential family, and has worked closely with Mexico’s government for many years. His personal crusade to clear his name may activate Mexico’s judiciary against former and current political leaders as evidence leaks out from Lozoya’s time working closely with Mexico’s elite. While there are questions regarding his political loyalties to various factions in government, the exposure of his case may shed some light on how corruption works in Mexico. It is up to Mexican citizens and the Judiciary to withstand pressure from elite leaders, a situation where even Canada was unable to prevent fully. Punishing a powerful individual may help average Mexicans in the process, if that process is able to remain visible.

To lead the post-pandemic world, the United States must broaden its approach to national security and renew the foundations of its power.

A défaut de montagnes ou de mers, l'homme a inventé toutes sortes de frontières pour se protéger de l'Autre : grillages, barbelés, murs, barrières électrifiées, etc. Aucune, pourtant, n'a résisté à l'irrépressible volonté – ou nécessité – de passer outre. Fils de la Martinique, dont il défend depuis toujours (...) / Idées, Géographie, Frontières - 2006/10 L'ère des paradoxes

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère 
(n° 3/2020). Pierre Grosser propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Jochen von Bernstorff et Philipp Dann, The Battle for International Law: North-South Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (Oxford University Press, 2019, 496 pages).

La TWAIL (Third World Approach in International Law, approche tiers-mondiste du droit international) a le vent en poupe depuis quelques années, déclinée le plus souvent dans des ouvrages collectifs fort onéreux.

La première étape a consisté à revisiter les fondements du droit international du XIe au XIXe siècle, afin de montrer que la plupart de ceux-ci, et notamment la souveraineté, étaient le produit de l’expérience impériale/coloniale, et qu’ils avaient divisé le monde entre « famille des nations civilisées » et « le reste ». Dans un second temps, et avec la participation d’historiens qui ont fouillé les archives, c’est le droit de la guerre (et le droit humanitaire), la création des organisations internationales majeures (Société des Nations unies, Organisation des Nations unies) et le régime international des droits de l’homme qui ont été revisités pour en extraire le substrat impérial/colonial, et pour rappeler les inputs venus de juristes de la « périphérie ». La troisième vague revient sur les combats du Sud dans les années 1960-1970 pour changer les règles du système international. Ces combats semblent avoir été vains, notamment celui du Nouvel ordre économique international, emporté par la vague néolibérale des années 1980.

Cet ouvrage collectif revient en introduction sur la chronologie de ce bras de fer Nord-Sud. Puis sont déclinés quelques-uns de ses thèmes majeurs, comme la question raciale, les droits de l’homme, le rôle des firmes transnationales, la reconnaissance des mouvements de libération nationale, l’héritage commun de l’humanité (avec peu de développements, paradoxalement, consacrés à la souveraineté sur les ressources naturelles). L’échec du Sud à peser sur l’évolution des institutions, notamment la Cour internationale de Justice et la Banque mondiale, est ensuite abordé. Enfin, le livre présente certains acteurs, notamment des juristes (R.P. Anand et Mohammed Bedjaoui notamment), mais aussi l’Union soviétique, qui semble aujourd’hui devoir être presque réhabilitée pour son rôle dans les régimes juridiques d’après-guerre et son soutien aux luttes émancipatrices du Sud. On notera la contribution d’Emmanuelle Tourne Jouannet sur Charles Chaumont, qui rappelle le rôle important que des juristes français et francophones ont tenu dans ces débats, notamment dans les années 1970.

Ce tour d’horizon est indispensable, non seulement pour les juristes, mais pour les historiens et les politistes. On regrettera que trop peu de contributions utilisent vraiment les archives, et surtout l’importante production historique récente sur ces questions. On regrettera aussi que les pays du Sud ne soient pas plus différenciés, avec une approche de leurs stratégies, mais aussi de leurs coalitions et de leurs rivalités, et que les acteurs politiques n’apparaissent pas davantage. Ce n’est là qu’un appel à travailler sur un grain plus fin.

Pierre Grosser

The United Nations has strongly condemned Saturday’s suicide attack on a government building in Nangarhar province, eastern Afghanistan, and underlined that the perpetrators must be brought to justice. 

As the number of U.S. forces on the ground dwindles and Russian and Iranian propaganda efforts increase, Col. Myles Caggins prepared the soldiers who remain for information warfare.

Dépouillée de ses valeurs culturelles, condamnée à une mendicité officielle, parée d'une bourgeoisie de pure fiction, la Martinique pourtant résiste à la politique d'assimilation. La Martinique est de plus en plus constituée en terre d'échange, où le circuit bien connu — fonds publics transformés en (...) / Caraïbes, France Outre-mer, France, Martinique, Colonialisme, Identité culturelle - 1977/06

An ambitious plan to make one of the world’s largest and most complex railway networks a net zero carbon emitter by 2030 is moving full steam ahead, although without the steam, thanks, in part, to support from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

What the world might be witnessing today is the dawn of an illiberal American century.

Trump’s physician expressed optimism about the president’s health after he tested positive for the coronavirus. But his hospitalization brings to light new questions on what happens if a worst-case scenario hits while Americans are casting their votes.

Trump is a pariah for top security experts, Biden won’t end U.S. trade wars, and Saudi Arabia’s bid to rejoin the U.N. Human Rights Council.