Diplomacy & Crisis News

Mark Episkopos

Hypersonic Missile,

Russia’s hypersonic Tsirkon missile has undergone yet another round of testing, bringing the weapon a step closer to combat readiness.  

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Russian Navy has reportedly decided to fast-track the remainder of Tsirkon’s state trials, with a flurry of testing activity planned over the course of August.

Russia’s hypersonic Tsirkon missile has undergone yet another round of testing, bringing the weapon a step closer to combat readiness.  

Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced on Monday that its Navy had performed a test launch of the Tsirkon test launch from the White Sea at a notional surface target on the coast of the Barents Sea. “According to live monitoring data, the Tsirkon missile successfully hit a target directly at a range of over 350 km. During the test, the tactical and technical characteristics were confirmed. The flight speed reached nearly 7 Mach,” the defense ministry said in a statement. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence published a brief video clip from the exercise on its Youtube channel. The footage showed the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, clearly demarcated by its pennant number 454, moving into firing position. The video then showed the Tsirkon missile being launched and flying at an upwards trajectory from several different angles.

Tsirkon, also known as “Zircon,” was launched at least four other times from Admiral Gorshkov since January 2020, hitting both ground and sea targets at distances ranging from 350–500 kilometers. Tsirkon is a winged, hypersonic anti-ship missile that is reportedly capable of reaching speeds of up to Mach 9 and performing mid-flight maneuvers. Tsirkon’s operational range remains unclear, with estimates ranging from 1,000–2,000 kilometers depending on the circumstances of the engagement. A defense insider recently told TASS news that Tsirkon boasts a range of roughly 1,500 kilometers for ground targets and “slightly less” than that for hitting naval targets. Tsirkon appears to have the potential to hold U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups at risk and to significantly impede these formations from operating effectively.  

The Russian Navy has reportedly decided to fast-track the remainder of Tsirkon’s state trials, with a flurry of testing activity planned over the course of August. “The first launch from the Admiral Gorshkov frigate within the state trials is planned for the first part of August,” a defense industry insider told TASS state news. “The second part of August will see flight trials of Zircon from the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine," the source added. 

Live-fire tests from submarines are the next major step on Tsirkon’s path to combat readiness, as the hypersonic missile is expected to figure prominently into the capabilities of Russia’s new Yasen-class of nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. Reports surfaced earlier this month that the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Golovko will become the first active-service vessel to receive the Tsirkon upgrade. Other possible Tsirkon fittings include the Kirov-class battlecruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Petr Velikiy. Russia’s Ministry of Defence is also eying select corvettes from the Gremyashchiy-class and Karakurt-class. Russian president Vladimir Putin previously appeared to suggest that a land-based Tsirkon variant is in the works, but the status of those development efforts remains uncertain.

Defense industry insiders told Russian state media earlier this year that Tsirkon is expected to enter service in the “first half of 2022,” pending the success of its upcoming submarine trials.

Mark Episkopos is the national security reporter for the National Interest. 

This article first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

A case of Ebola virus has been confirmed in Côte d’Ivoire for the first time since 1994, the country’s Ministry of Health has confirmed. The World Health Organization (WHO) is coordinating the delivery of vaccines to the country.

Voilà bien un pays destiné par nature à connaître des troubles. L'endroit où il se situe pourrait être aujourd'hui, comme son histoire l'a démontré dans le passé, l'un des points vitaux stratégiques du monde, entre la Russie, le Pakistan et la Chine. C'est en passant par ses défilés montagneux que les (...) / Afghanistan, URSS, Politique, Relations Est-Ouest, Diplomatie, Frontières - 1965/12

Washington ignored Islamabad funding and supplying the Taliban. Now Afghans are paying the price.

Mark Episkopos

Guns,

A more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. 

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. 

One of America’s most popular service handguns, the Glock 22 got even better in 2020 with the vaunted Gen5 upgrade.  

First introduced in 1990, the Glock 22 is a .40 S&W version of the iconic Glock 17. The .40 Smith & Wesson round was designed specifically for law enforcement in 1990, following the infamous 1986 Miami Shootout in which eight FBI agents were outgunned by just two robbers. The Glock 22 became one of the first mass-produced .40 S&W guns, widely adopted by police departments across the United States. Their visual similarities notwithstanding, the Glock 22 employs a slightly different frame from the Glock 17 to account for its heavier .40 S&W rounds. It also carries two less rounds, for a total of fifteen as opposed to the Glock 17’s seventeen. The baseline Glock 22 is only slightly heavier than the Glock 17 but boasts an identical barrel length and trigger pull.  

In the decades that followed, Glock released a steady stream of revisions—dubbed “generations”—to keep pace with competitors. The informal second generation brought minor frame revisions and caliber options for certain models; Gen3 was a more comprehensive upgrade package, offering numerous ergonomics updates in addition to a universal accessory rail for mounting such tools as lights or lasers. Introduced in 2010, the Gen4 revision featured a new backstrap system and Rough Textured Frame (RTF) surface for additional grip support, among other quality of life improvements.

The Glock 22, along with its smaller Glock 23 counterpart, was recently upgraded to the Gen4 standard. But in 2020, the Glock 22 made the leap to Gen5—Glock’s latest handgun platform. Gen5 brings nDLC  (diamond-like carbon) coating for added protection against scratches and corrosion, the new  GLOCK Marksman Barrel (GMB) with superior rifling, flared magwell for more streamlined reloads, ambidextrous slide stop, smoother and more ergonomic trigger design, and the removal of finger grooves to better accommodate all possible hand sizes.

The Gen5 Glock 22 is available in two variants: the baseline model, and the Modular Optic System (MOS) variant that adds compatibility with popular aftermarket optics solutions. The Gen5 iteration of the Glock 22 has little interchangeability with prior models.  

Not terribly impactful by themselves, Gen5’s slew of small-but-thoughtful changes quickly add up to produce a more formidable Glock 22 that’s not only more accurate but offers better handling and improved durability. Nevertheless, the .40 S&W caliber’s popularity has declined precipitously in recent years; even the FBI, which originally commissioned the round, has stopped using it, returning instead to higher-capacity, softer-shooting, and more compact 9mm guns. Although too unwieldy for law enforcement, the 10-millimeter caliber has recently resurfaced as an increasingly popular option for consumers (especially some hunters) who want the stopping power and don’t mind the recoil.

The Gen5 upgrade breathes much-needed new life into Glock’s .40 S&W range, but it likely won’t be enough to reverse the .40 S&W ongoing downwards spiral in the consumer and law enforcement markets. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

This piece first appeared earlier this year and is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Creative Commons

Mark Episkopos

Tempest Stealth Fighter,

There's no hiding from the cost. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Tempest project’s current partners include Italy and Sweden. The government, which has always been clear that the financial solvency of the Tempest project hinges on securing a steady stream of foreign investment, is also currently exploring partnership opportunities with Japan.

The United Kingdom is forging ahead with its ambitious project to produce a home-grown stealth warplane, even as it strives to retain its status as one of the core partners in the F-35 stealth fighter jet program.

London is doubling down on plans to indigenously produce its upcoming BAE Systems Tempest jet fighter, a next-generation successor to the United Kingdom’s Eurofighter Typhoon fleet. In a March 2021 Command Paper to Parliament, the British Ministry of Defense (MOD) reiterated that the Tempest fighter will be a major procurement priority into the coming decades. “Tempest will exploit our unique industrial base to create a 6th generation combat air enterprise centred in the UK,” the paper reads. “This fully digital enterprise will transform delivery, achieving pace and lowering cost and disrupting traditional approaches to defence procurement.”

The Tempest project’s current partners include Italy and Sweden. The government, which has always been clear that the financial solvency of the Tempest project hinges on securing a steady stream of foreign investment, is also currently exploring partnership opportunities with Japan.

As with most other next-generation fighters, the Tempest fighter will offer its own form of sensor fusion. The fighter’s ambitious Tempest’s Multi-Function Radio Frequency System (MFRFS) data collection protocols will be “four times as accurate as existing sensors in a package 1/10th the size,” according to defense contractor and Tempest partner Leonardo. The MFRFS will filter the battlefield information it collects through its onboard processor suite, generating a dynamic picture of the battlefield that can include everything from enemy movements to terrain layout. Like the F-35 jet, the Tempest fighter can also act as a flying command and control center by feeding some of that information to nearby friendly units. The Tempest project is betting big on future-oriented experimental avionics systems, with BAE Systems working on a “wearable cockpit” interface that replaces both analog and digital inputs with augmented reality (AR) display, supported by an integrated network of artificial intelligence (AI) features.

The Tempest’s project’s preoccupation with unorthodox prototype technologies extends to its weapons loadout. At a Rome seminar on missile defense, Italy’s General Enzo Vecciarelli suggested that the Tempest fighter could incorporate directed-energy weapons to counter hypersonic missiles. “On Tempest there will be a large amount of energy available and I don’t rule out the use of directed energy,” Vecciarelli said. It was previously confirmed that the Tempest fighter will also carry hypersonic missiles of its own, in addition to being able to operate drone swarms.

As the Tempest project moves further along in the development stage, the fate of the UK’s massive F-35 jet procurement plans hangs in the balance. As a “Level 1” partner in the F-35 program, London previously stated it will purchase as many as 138 units of Lockheed Martin’s fifth-generation stealth fighter. London, however, has so far only ordered forty-eight F-35 jet fighters. The MOD says it plans to “grow the [F-35] Force, increasing the fleet size beyond the 48 aircraft that we have already ordered,” but is dragging its feet on whether or not it remains committed to an acquisition target of 138 F-35 fighters.

The Tempest fighter is projected to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by 2035.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

Tightly bound kinship networks aren’t vestiges of the past. They’re a modern—and effective—form of political organization.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Child Tax Credit, Americas

There were still some concerning numbers, such as nearly 30 percent of adults in households with children had a hard time paying for their household expenses in the previous week, which was down only slightly from the previous month.

There only has been one round of payments from the expanded child tax credits, but it appears that it is already having a sizable impact on millions of struggling Americans amid the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.

According to the latest Census Bureau Household Pulse Survey that was released earlier this week, parents who have received the funds reported less trouble affording food and paying for household expenses.

The poll added that approximately 10 percent of American households with children sometimes or often didn’t have enough to eat over the past week—the lowest percentage registered since the pandemic started a year and a half ago.

However, there were still some concerning numbers, such as nearly 30 percent of adults in households with children had a hard time paying for their household expenses in the previous week, which was down only slightly from the previous month.

How Money Was Spent 

Outlining how the tax credits were spent, paying for school expenses topped the board. Nearly 60 percent tapped into at least part of the direct cash to pay for books and supplies, tuition, tutoring, school transportation, or after-school activities. Moreover, nearly half of parents used at least some of the money for food, 28 percent forked over cash for the Internet, cell phones, and other utilities, and about 25 percent targeted more clothing.

The survey further revealed that about 27 percent of parents admitted that they already have spent the child tax credit payment and 32 percent said that they mostly saved the funds. About 40 percent of the respondents said that they used the money to settle outstanding debt.

As for when eligible parents can expect to see the second batch of payments for this month, do take note that they are expected to arrive two days earlier because the usual pay date of the fifteenth falls on a Sunday.

Thanks to President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, the federal government is now allowing eligible parents to receive as much as $3,600 per year for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen.

Broken down further, what this all means is a $250 or a $300 payment for each child will be deposited into the bank accounts of parents each month through December.

CTC’s Future

There also has been increasing talk regarding continuing the expanded credits for years to come. One recent report put together by the Annie E. Casey Foundation showed that a permanent expansion of the credits could potentially lift more than four million children out of poverty.

“Every child needs food, health care, and safe and stable housing. Millions of households with children already lacked these necessities before the pandemic,” the report noted.

“To continue on progress already made on recovery, the foundation recommends: making the expansion of the federal child tax credit permanent,” it added.

Furthermore, the Center on Poverty and Social Policy at Columbia University has estimated that the credits will cut U.S. poverty by over half.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

The president is taking flak from all sides, but the timing of the Taliban takeover could minimize the political damage.

As desperate Afghans were trying to escape the Taliban and board planes, during chaotic scenes at Kabul airport on Monday, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for international unity on Afghanistan, in a briefing to an emergency session of the Security Council. 

Mark Episkopos

Drones,

They call it "Thunder."

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Grom drone can deliver “precision strikes” against enemy infrastructure or high-value targets without putting its accompanying aircraft at risk.

Fresh details have emerged concerning the new, next-generation Russian combat drone that was previously described as the “loyal wingman” to the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter.

The manufacturer of the upcoming Grom (Russian for “thunder”) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), Kronstadt, gave a far-reaching interview to the Russian outlet TASS earlier this week, noting that it will be able to control a swarm of ten smaller Molniya (“lightning”) drones. These Molniya drones, added Kronstadt, can be operated in strike or reconnaissance configurations: “Reconnaissance drones are capable of flying back. Strike drones, as in the case with loitering munitions, are kamikaze UAVs. Molniya drones will constantly interact with each other and the carrier drone,” said the Kronshtadt representative.

“Molniya drones constantly exchange data among themselves. It is possible to alter an assignment for each member of the swarm,” Kronstadt explained. “They can transfer leader roles and are interchangeable. Artificial intelligence allows a group of drones to fulfil its assignment without constant communications with the carrier aircraft.”

Grom was unveiled, alongside a slew of other attack and reconnaissance drones, at Russia’s ARMY-2020 military exhibition. Though it was previously known that the Grom UAV can operate a drone swarm, Kronstadt’s interview has shed light on the Molniya drone’s operational flexibility and ability to carry out tasks without direct orders from the lead aircraft.

Aside from acting as a swarm drone carrier, the Grom UAV can is designed as a robust combat platform. The UAV, which appears to have a length of 13.8 meters and a wingspan of around ten meters, will have a payload capacity of 1.3 tons, take-off weight of seven tons, and operational range of around 800 km. Grom’s four hardpoints can accept a wide range of weapons, including the Kh-38 air-air-surface missile, KAB-250 and KAB-500 guided bombs, and a new “item 85 smart air bomb.” The Grom UAV not only bears a striking outward resemblance to the U.S.-made Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie, but offers some of the same capabilities.

The Grom drone can deliver “precision strikes” against enemy infrastructure or high-value targets without putting its accompanying aircraft at risk. Additionally, the Molniya drones could be able to saturate and potentially even eliminate certain types of air defense systems. They can also perform unspecified electronic warfare tasks in conjunction with the head aircraft.

Grom’s interoperability with the Su-57 was not explicitly mentioned in Kronstadt’s recent TASS interview—in fact, the manufacturer did not discuss compatibility with any specific aircraft. However, Kronstadt’s Head Designer Nikolai Dozhdkov previously confirmed to Russian media that Grom will be compatible with both the Su-57 and Su-35 fighters.

The Su-57 was also confirmed to pair with the S-70 Okhotnik-B, a stealth-capable multipurpose drone from the same family of Russian next-generation UAV’s as Grom. It is possible that Grom is being developed as an alternate loyal wingman choice for missions requiring swarm drone capability. Whereas Okhotnik-B is scheduled to enter service in 2025, no development or production timeline has been provided for Grom.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Russian Ministry of Defense

Michael Rubin

Afghanistan,

The Taliban may claim victory today but, for Afghanistan, they represent less the end of fighting than one chapter in a bloody history.

The Taliban seized the presidential palace in Kabul, completing their blitzkrieg through Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani fled in disgrace. “They tied our hands from behind and sold the country,” Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi wrote. “Curse Ghani and his gang.”  Meanwhile, a humanitarian tragedy is underway. The Taliban are executing those who worked with the United States and reportedly raping their families.

Within Washington, the blame game is underway. President Joe Biden blamed his predecessor, President Donald Trump, and the peace deal with the Taliban that set a deadline for American withdrawal. The Trump-era deal was ill-conceived, but Biden’s excuses are disingenuous for three reasons. First, the Taliban did not abide by the deal and so voided it. Second, its deadline for American withdrawal passed several months ago and, lastly, Biden did not abide by other Trump-era deals about the border wall and Keystone XL pipeline, and so the notion that Trump had tied his hands was nonsense.

That said, while the flag of the Islamic Emirate now flies over the presidential palace in Kabul, the Taliban victory is not the end of the story. The Taliban rampage is less a measure of their popularity and more the result of their Pakistani support and momentum: Afghans seldom fight to the death but instead defect to the stronger side. Biden’s projection of both weakness and callousness was a gift to Taliban leaders seeking to sway provincial governors to step aside in exchange for their lives.

The Taliban, however, are not as strong as they might appear. In March 2000, I visited the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. At the time, the Taliban controlled ninety percent of the country. They lobbied Washington to recognize them as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had and argued that they “were no more extreme than Saudi Arabia.” I drove through the Khyber Pass from Peshawar, Pakistan and then visited Jalalabad, Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar. In every city, Afghans said that the security the Taliban had promised when they initially arrived disappeared quickly as the Taliban themselves started preying on the people.

While some progressives, isolationists, and other critics of traditional American foreign policy say that the Reagan administration created the Taliban, this is anachronistic nonsense: The United States supported the mujahideen like Ahmad Shah Masood and others who became to core of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban. The Taliban itself formed in 1994. It is fair to criticize Reagan and the Central Intelligence Agency on other matters, but neither armed those who were Kindergarteners when the Soviets invaded.

During this period, the Northern Alliance held out. Many transited the Tajik border that was among the few open to them. In 1997, I had also visited Mazar-i-Sharif that at the time was under the control of Abdul Rashid Dostum. Then, I had entered from Termez, Uzbekistan, which was the route through which Uzbekistan and Turkey supported their proxy warlord. In 1999, Iran and the Taliban almost went to war after the Taliban had slaughtered Iranian diplomats and intelligence agents at their Mazar-i-Sharif consulate. While he did not control territory, the Iranians supported Ismail Khan as their proxy warlord.

Each of Afghanistan’s neighbors with the exception of Pakistan fears the Taliban. Expect each to sponsor over the next several weeks militias and warlords who will try to seize territory along the border to act as a buffer. Certainly, Russia will aid the former Soviet Republics that border Afghanistan since Russia fears radicalization among its growing Muslim population.

Because the Taliban relied more on momentum than military prowess, this means they may soon lose some of the peripheral provinces. Herat, for example, is culturally Persian and, indeed, was once part of Iran. If the Islamic Republic makes a concerted effort to put a proxy in power there, it will likely succeed. They may also assert control over Farah and Nimruz, the other provinces with which they share a border. The same holds true for the Badakhshan region of northeastern Afghanistan that borders Tajikistan.

As Afghanistan’s neighbors become active and sponsor new proxies, it might take a year or two of low-intensity fighting with the Taliban before they establish their own zones of influence and once again divide Afghanistan as it was during the civil war period of the 1990s.

The wildcard is Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made no secret that he has no ideological problem with the Taliban’s extremist platform. Pre-Erdoğan Turkey helped support Turkic warlords in northern Afghanistan and provided medical and logistical support for them through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is unclear whether Erdoğan will allow that to continue although it is more likely he will try to play both sides to maximum commercial advantage.

As for Pakistan, it is today is riding high but they may rue the day. The Taliban was an indigenous movement in 1994 that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency co-opted. The ISI did so because their former proxy, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was wildly unpopular and so the Taliban, at least initially, was a better option. But the Taliban are the ideological cousins to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan which is responsible for the deaths of thousands of Pakistani soldiers and civilians. Every country that has supported jihadism for export only has suffered blowback, and Pakistan will not be immune. The end of the American presence also means there is no force there to prevent anti-Taliban Afghans to take an insurgency and terror campaign into the Pakistani homeland. Indeed, Afghans with whom I spoke over the years have promised to do so.

In short, the Taliban may claim victory today but, for Afghanistan, they represent less the end of fighting than one chapter in a bloody history. Get ready for the next phase in the Afghan civil war.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East.

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

Baltic Security,

NATO would have its work cut out for it. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: But if the Baltics have really been so vulnerable for so many years, why is it that the Russians have yet to attack?

Is NATO able to fend off a large-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states? No, according to most experts.

A 2016 RAND Corporation report, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” conducted a series of wargames simulating a Russian assault on the Baltic states. The report reached an “unambiguous” conclusion: Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) can steamroll NATO’s most vulnerable members at a moment’s notice, reaching the outskirts of Tallinn or Riga-- the capitals of Estonia and Latvia, respectively-- in sixty hours or less.

The report, authored by David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, attributed NATO’s crushing defeat to what is an entirely lopsided correlation of forces. The WMD (and to a lesser extent, Kaliningrad) units that would take part in the invasion not only vastly outnumber their NATO counterparts, but are qualitatively superior in most respects. The WMD has received a slew of modern hardware over the past decade, inducing the S-400 missile system, the new T-72B3M main battle tank (MBT), and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV’s).

The report argues that NATO’s light and under-equipped Baltic assets are little match for Russia’s motorized heavy divisions. The tactical disparity is so great, posit the authors, that NATO infantry wouldn’t even be able to retreat successfully from the Russian onslaught and would instead find themselves “destroyed in place.” Even when accounting for the effective use of NATO air power that could inflict noticeable losses on advancing Russian forces, NATO simply lacks the conventional means to resist a full-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states.

The report further argues that this “Fait Accompli” presents western leaders and NATO high command with three unpalatable options:

1) a bloody and likely abortive counteroffensive to retake the Baltics;

2) to threaten nuclear retaliation, with all of the escalatory risks that entail;

3) or to “concede at least temporary defeat,” thrusting the future of the alliance into question.

The report ends with a proposed course of action by which NATO can avoid the Fait Accompli altogether: a military buildup of about “about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities.” These forces are still not enough to defeat the Russian incursion outright but will deny Moscow a quick victory and impose severe losses on the invading army. The ensuing battle of attrition will favor the wealthier and more materially powerful west, establishing what the authors see as a sufficient deterrent against Russian aggression.

Five years later, the correlation of forces on NATO’s eastern flank has not drastically shifted. The Baltic states have gradually ramped up their defense spending and receive a steady stream of US military aid, but these modest measures are being offset by Russia’s continued military buildup on its western outskirts and in its Central European enclave of Kaliningrad. A 2021 paper, published by the Swedish Research Agency, largely replicated the 2016 RAND report’s conclusion that Russia’s military can overwhelm the Baltic region in a matter of days.

But if the Baltics have really been so vulnerable for so many years, why is it that the Russians have yet to attack?

Experts have noted that the likelihood of such an invasion remains exceedingly low under present circumstances, in large part because capability does not imply intent. It is indisputably true that Russia can annex the Baltic states with negligible short-term costs, but the avalanche of medium to long-term military, economic, and political consequences-- up to and including an escalatory spiral that could trigger WWIII-- far outstrips any of the dubious, ill-defined benefits that could possibly come from such an endeavor.

Mark Episkopos is the new national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Reuters.

As Haiti struggles to recover from the devastating 7.2 magnitude earthquake that hit over the weekend, killing some 1,300 people, the UN is warning that many people are likely to be affected by Tropical Depression Grace, a storm which is expected to bring torrential rain, flooding and mudslides between Monday and Tuesday.

Mark Episkopos

Hwasong Missiles, Asia

This is what three of North Korea’s most powerful ICBM models—the Hwasong 14, 15, and 16—are capable of doing.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Whereas a solid-fueled ICBM can be launched nearly at a moment’s notice, deploying a liquid-fueled missile can take as long as eighteen hours. This gap makes liquid-fueled missiles less survivable and limits their value as second-strike nuclear weapons.  

“The United States and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat,” opened a recent Council on Foreign Relations report on the DPRK’s military capabilities. These concerns are not entirely misplaced; North Korea is believed to own a stockpile of around sixty nuclear weapons, including a powerful and steadily growing arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s). This is what three of North Korea’s most powerful ICBM models—the Hwasong 14, 15, and 16—are capable of doing.

Hwasong 14 

Hwasong-14 is a two-stage, liquid-fueled mobile ICBM, first test-launched in the summer of 2017. Hwasong-14’s single liquid-fueled engine seemingly bears wide-ranging similarities to its Hwasong-12 predecessor. North Korean authorities claimed the missile could “strike anywhere on earth”—although an obvious exaggeration, the Hwasong-14 does manage to set an important precedent. At a likely range of around 10,000 kilometers, it is the first North Korean missile capable of reaching mainland North America. This new range estimate is significantly revised from initial projections, which pointed to a significantly lower range of around 7,000 to 9,500 kilometers. The Hwasong-14 can deliver a payload of approximately 500-600 kilograms, according to the spectrum of western expert consensus. Though Hwasong-14 is a major leap forward for North Korean ICBM capabilities, the missile’s reliability has been called into question. As noted by the CSIS Missile Defense Project, “debate continues over the Hwasong-14’s reentry vehicle and whether it is capable of surviving the stresses associated with ICBM distance.”

Hwasong-15  

Hwasong-15 shares many technical characteristics with its Hwasong-14 counterpart—in particular, they appear to use similar propulsion systems. Still, the Hwasong-15 dwarfs its predecessor in most performance areas. It boasts a significantly greater range of around 13,000 kilometers and is capable of delivering a 1,000-kilogram payload; it also offers a substantially improved control system, allowing a greater degree of precision. Partly as a result of these performance upgrades, the missile is both larger and heavier than the Hwasong-14. It requires a nine-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL), as opposed to the eight-axle TEL of its predecessor.  

Hwasong-16 

North Korea unveiled its new “monster ICBM,” sometimes referred to as the Hwasong-16, at an October 2020 military parade commemorating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the North Korean Workers’ Party. At first glance, the missile appears to be a bigger and more capable successor to the Hwasong-15. In particular, the DPRK’s newest missile appears to support a much greater payload of around 2,000 to 3,000 kilograms. But the Hwasong-16 is, in some key ways, an apparent step backward for North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The new missile’s colossal size requires a similarly large TEL—it can’t travel very far and only has a small number of available travel paths, making its movements more predictable. By comparison, the Hwasong-15 is markedly more mobile and is still perfectly capable of delivering catastrophic damage with its 1,000-kilogram payload—it has also been successfully tested at least once. Hwasong-16 is, like all its predecessors, liquid-fueled, defying the widespread expectations of western experts that North Korea is finally ready to make the leap to solid-fueled ICBM technology. Whereas a solid-fueled ICBM can be launched nearly at a moment’s notice, deploying a liquid-fueled missile can take as long as eighteen hours. This gap makes liquid-fueled missiles less survivable and limits their value as second-strike nuclear weapons.  

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Reuters

Tunisia’s controversial president is seeking to preserve the legacy of the Arab Spring by stamping out corruption and promoting decentralized democracy.

Mark Episkopos

military, Eurasia

Russian officials have not publicly revealed a firm production timeline, but the Tsirkon hypersonic missile is widely expected to enter service in coming years.  

Here's What You Need to Remember: The missile boasts an operational range in excess of one thousand kilometers and up to two thousand kilometers depending on the launch platform and operating circumstances, enough to put the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups at risk and to impede the ability of carrier wings to operate effectively.

Following months of speculation, Russian authorities have revealed the first vessel to receive the vaunted Tsirkon missile upgrade.  

A Russian defense industry insider source told TASS news that Admiral Golovko, the third frigate of the Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class, “will become the first standard carrier of Tsirkons.” This report has not been officially confirmed or corroborated as of the time of writing, but TASS is a major state news outlet with a long track record for reliable defense industry information. It was known for months that the Project 22350 line was one of the lead contenders for an early Tsirkon fitting; over the course of 2020, the upcoming missile was test-launched at least four times from the lead Project 22350 ship Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov. The TASS report contradicts prior speculation that the Kirov-class battlecruisers Petr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov were first in line to receive the Tsirkon upgrade as part of a larger weapons modernization program. The Admiral Gorshkov class is a line of fifteen modernized guided-missile frigates, displacing over five thousand tons and reaching top speeds of around twenty-nine knots. The frigates boast Russia’s latest Paket-E/NK anti-submarine/anti-torpedo system, along with a vertical launching system (VLS) for P-800 Oniks, 3M-54 Kalibr, and Tsirkon missiles. Of the fifteen planned Project 22350 frigates, two are active and the third—Admiral Golovko—has been laid down and is scheduled to enter service within the next several years.  

The 3M22 Tsirkon (also known as “Zircon”) is a winged, anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile with a reported speed of up to Mach 9 or roughly eleven thousand kilometers per hour. The missile was one of six new weapons unveiled by Russian president Vladimir Putin during his 2018 state-of-the-nation address. In addition to a wide range of surface ships, Tsirkon will be compatible with the new nuclear-powered Yasen-M cruise missile submarines.  

The missile boasts an operational range in excess of one thousand kilometers and up to two thousand kilometers depending on the launch platform and operating circumstances, enough to put the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups at risk and to impede the ability of carrier wings to operate effectively. Citing the missile’s sheer speed and ability to maneuver mid-flight, Russian military observers have argued that Tsirkon cannot be reliably intercepted by any tools currently available to NATO forces. Retired Russian Col. Mikhail Khodaernok posited in an op-ed published by RT that the Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers’ current surface-to-air systems were designed to neutralize supersonic cruise missiles like those carried by older Russian warships, but cannot effectively counter hypersonic threats. “Given the very high cruise speed of this state-of-the-art Russian anti-ship missile (Mach 8 and over), a potential enemy’s surface-to-air or anti-missile systems will be rendered ineffective due to zero reaction time (the gap between the moment of threat detection and the launch of an intercepting missile),” he wrote. “In other words, you don’t have any time to react, because your ship gets hit right after the missile is detected.” 

Russian officials have not publicly revealed a firm production timeline, but the Tsirkon hypersonic missile is widely expected to enter service in coming years.  

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

Mark Episkopos

military, Eurasia

Russia’s military is on the verge of accepting deliveries of its highly anticipated T-14 Armata tank.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The T-14 tank looks to be more than capable of giving NATO’s current MBTs a run for their money, but the tank has been unable to shake the cost concerns that have plagued the program since its inception. The Armata’s projected per-model cost of roughly $3.7 compares favorably against other fourth-generation platforms, particularly South Korea’s K2 Black Panther, but is still a major strain on Russia’s relatively modest defense budget.

Russia’s military is on the verge of accepting deliveries of its highly anticipated T-14 Armata tank. “The [tank’s] state trials will come to a close next year. It will actively go into serial production from next year,” Russia’s Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov told the state news outlet TASS. 

First unveiled at the 2015 Victory Day Parade in Moscow, the T-14 Armata is a fourth-generation main battle tank (MBT) that brings a wide array of cutting-edge design features to Russia’s ground forces. As noted by Jane’s Defence Weekly, Russia’s defense industry has been less than consistent in its messaging on the Armata tank’s production and development progress. Moscow previously planned to procure as many as 2,300 Armata tanks by 2020, a wildly optimistic estimate that was later pushed back to 2021 and then again to 2025. Manturov reportedly said on Russian state television in April 2020 that serial T-14 Armata deliveries would begin in 2021, seemingly contradicting his most recent statement to TASS. Manturov’s latest timetable appears to align with Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announcement in March that Russia’s armed forces will take deliveries of a “pilot batch” of T-14 tank’s in 2022, confirming that the tank has been delayed by another year. 

The T-14 MBT weighs forty-eight tons and is capable of reaching speeds of up to ninety kilometers per hour. The T-14 tank features an unmanned turret scheme with an isolated crew capsule, boasting a twenty-five-millimeter 2A82-1M smoothbore gun with autoloader compatibility. Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov noted that the tank’s artificial-intelligence-powered weapons systems can handle the entire acquisition, tracking, and targeting process without any considerable degree of manual input. “The Armata crew does not need to aim accurately,” he said. “It only has to aim the gun roughly. Electronics will do all the rest: it will accurately determine the distance to the target and aim the gun at it. That is, the vehicle uses artificial intelligence elements that help the crew deliver fire.” Nevertheless, Chemezov added that only a human operator can make the final decision on whether or not to take the computer-calibrated shot. The tank also features the latest iteration of Russia’s advanced Malachit explosive-reactive armor and the Afghanit active protection system, the newest onboard digitized equipment, and reported quality-of-life features that include an on-board lavatory. The T-14 tank is based on Russia’s modular next-generation Armata Universal Combat Platform, which also includes the T-15 heavy infantry fighting vehicle and T-16 armored recovery vehicle 

The T-14 tank looks to be more than capable of giving NATO’s current MBTs a run for their money, but the tank has been unable to shake the cost concerns that have plagued the program since its inception. The Armata’s projected per-model cost of roughly $3.7 compares favorably against other fourth-generation platforms, particularly South Korea’s K2 Black Panther, but is still a major strain on Russia’s relatively modest defense budget. The Kremlin is eager to offset the tank’s long-term costs with a series of early export contracts, with Manturov telling TASS—without providing additional details about any possible ongoing negotiations—that several foreign states have expressed interest.

All the technical foundations for a cutting-edge MBT platform appear to be in place, but it remains to be seen if Moscow is able to reign in the T-14 tank’s costs as the tank enters serial production in coming years. 

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Que les salles de cinéma italiennes se vident, avant de fermer définitivement leurs portes, comme le montre Ettore Scola dans Splendor avec beaucoup d'émotion, et plus de finesse que Giuseppe Tornatore dans son trop fameux Cinema Paradiso, c'est une chose certaine. Que le cinéma continue, en (...) / Italie, Cinéma, Art, Culture - 1992/12

Mark Episkopos

T-60S,

In the end, the T-60S’ well-rounded performance and robust combat capabilities were not worth the risks stemming from its more eccentric construction choices.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Sukhoi T-60S project grew out of the older T-4 concept, a proposed Soviet reply to the XB-70 Valkyrie that never made it past the prototype stage.

One of the Soviet Union’s most ambitious postwar aircraft projects, the ill-fated T-60S bomber, offers a glimpse of the modern Russian bomber force that could have been.

In the mid-1980s, the Soviet military launched a procurement search for a new intermediate-range bomber to phase out its slew of aging aircraft. The early 1970’s Su-24 attack aircraft and Tu-22M strategic bomber were most in need of a replacement, but Soviet authorities were also interested in laying long-term plans for a versatile, modernized bomber platform to succeed the newer Tu-22M3.

The Sukhoi T-60S project grew out of the older T-4 concept, a proposed Soviet reply to the XB-70 Valkyrie that never made it past the prototype stage. The T-60S project was shrouded in secrecy since its inception, and many of the details surrounding its rocky development remain classified to this day. Still, it is widely believed that the T-60S is a variable geometry swing aircraft, equipped with two-dimensional thrust vectoring nozzles. The latter change is meant to mitigate control instability at high speeds, one of the chief problems confronting the prior T-4MS program. Capable of supercruising at Mach 2 and boasting a takeoff weight of roughly ninety tons, the T-60S is significantly lighter and marginally faster than the Tu-22M3. There were reports that the T-60S was to utilize new stealth features for enhanced deep penetration capabilities, though the precise nature of these efforts remains unclear.  

Boasting a combat range of 2,200 km, the T-60S was believed to carry a payload of up to 20,000 kg. The bomber’s armaments included cruise missiles from the Kh-101 and Kh-55/65 series, a large catalog of guided munitions, and conventional as well as nuclear unguided bombs—this makes the T-60S similar to the Tu-22M3 in armament configuration, albeit the latter boasts a noticeably larger payload of 24,000 kg.

A T-60S prototype was slated to undergo flight tests in 1996, with the bomber scheduled to enter service in 2003. The collapse of the Soviet Union put a swift end to these plans, with the project facing outright cancellation in the early 1990s. Still, there were some signs to suggest that the T-60S project was headed for technical disaster irrespective of the Soviet collapse. Sukhoi engineers apparently struggled to implement some of the T-60S’ unique design decisions, including controversial changes made to the wing construction.

In the end, the T-60S’ well-rounded performance and robust combat capabilities were not worth the risks stemming from its more eccentric construction choices. The Kremlin decided, not without sound reason, that the Su-34 fighter-bomber was a safer bet. The Su-34 has gone on to become a staple of Russia’s strike fighter forces, with as many as 120 models currently in service and several waves of modernization packages planned in coming years. Likewise, the upcoming Tu-22M3M—one of the handful of Russian aircraft confirmed to be compatible with the new, nuclear-capable Mach 10-speed Kh-47 “Kinzhal” missile—is slated to enter service this year.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for The National Interest. This article first appeared earlier this year.

Image: Wikipedia.