Defence`s Feeds

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The latest flying event organised as part of the Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP) was successfully conducted from 22 June to 3 July in Viterbo, Italy. More than 1000 personnel and 30 helicopters from seven countries attended this multinational training, the largest of its kind organised in Europe this year.

Over the course of Italian Blade 2015, 201 missions and 445 sorties were flown by the participants, accounting for a total of 618 flight hours. Missions of increasing complexity were conducted, with scenarios including air assault, close air support, combat search & rescue or medical evacuation.

 “Italy has provided great support to this year’s HEP exercise as host nation”, Andrew Gray, EDA Helicopter Programme Manager, underlines. “Next year the HEP will move to Finland for exercise Cold Blade, which will provide participants with a totally different yet very relevant training environment”, he adds.

To date, more than 350 crews and 200 helicopters have taken part in EDA-developed HEP exercises. The overall HEP project was endorsed at a Ministerial Steering Board in November 2009, and a formal programme arrangement was signed in November 2012 by 13 contributing Member States: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom; as well as Norway.

More information

• Other EDA Helicopter Initiatives
• Italian Blade 2015 factsheet

 

Military working dogs (MWDs) are of great value in Counter-IED operations, and the pooling and sharing of this capability at the European level has long been a subject of discussion among C-IED experts. Late last month, the European Defence Agency organised the first Ad Hoc Working Group on MWDs at the Austrian Military Working Dogs School facilities of Kaisersteinbruch, in Austria.

Twenty-two participants from Austrian, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden gathered for three days  to discuss national capabilities and their respective level of ambition. The C-IED Centre of Excellence and representatives from academia also took part in the event.

Several training opportunities were also staged on the margins of the meeting. Four MWD teams (each comprising a dog and its handler) from Hungary and the Netherlands attended the event, as well as teams from host nation Austria. Capabilities of Labrador dogs were also demonstrated, while a full day was dedicated to training at the Austrian MWD school. Attendees took the opportunity to train teams with specific innovative explosive conditioning materials in a pure multi-national environment.

The Working Group also had the opportunity to receive lectures on innovative solutions for MWDs preparation as well as on previous operational deployment experiences and lessons learned. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts from the Austrian Armed Forces provided support by preparing specific scenarios for military search performance by the teams.

Big interest was showed by all participants and planning for the next Ad Hoc Working group meeting is currently on-going. It is envisaged that MWDs teams will participate in further multi-national C-IED related exercises in 2016. Thus, such a capability will be fully included within the planning process and subsequent execution of C-IED related tasks at the mentioned events.

More information

• Counter-IED project page

This study provides an overview of China’s current approach to foreign policy and external relations. It focuses more particularly on the role and actions of China in global governance, its territorial claims and relations with countries in Asia, and its emergence as an important actor in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. It assesses the implications for the EU and makes recommendations on how the EU should deepen its strategic partnership with China. The study argues that China has not made a unilateral and exclusive turn towards assertiveness in its foreign policy. China’s foreign policy assertiveness represents a policy choice that should be understood in the broader context of its external relations, which is one of uncertainty. Both the impact of China’s emergence in international affairs and the use China intends to make of its power and influence remain uncertain. This uncertainty is explained by the interdependence between a number of international and domestic factors as well as by the absence of a grand strategy. The uncertainty in China’s foreign policy opens avenues for the EU to influence China and further deepen the scope of the EU-China Strategic Partnership.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The UK is investing in additive manufacturing research and development to maintain its place at the forefront of innovation in the global aerospace market.

A study co

German Enok Light Protected Vehicle

German Bison Recovery Vehicle

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Italian HH-101A Caesar Special Operations Helicopter

At a busy e-Learning tradeshow at London Olympia in the spring of 2014, over a hundred companies exhibited innovative learning technologies for corporate and public sector clients. But only 3 or 4 had prior experience in doing work for the military. This was understandab

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel, Stanislas de Finance, Ralf Drachenberg

This 25-26 June 2015 summit witnessed an intense debate. While the agenda originally covered Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the digital single market and the European Semester, in addition to a presentation from David Cameron, United Kingdom Prime Minister to outline his vision on renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU, the summit became a crisis Council. Many discussions again focused on the situation in the Mediterranean, with several lively exchanges. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel described the issue as the ‘biggest challenge’ Europe had faced during her time in office.

The Council’s conclusions nevertheless managed to address all issues on the agenda. The Heads of State or Government concentrated on three key dimensions of the European Commission’s agenda on migration: the relocation/resettlement of migrants; their return/readmission/reintegration; and cooperation with countries of both origin and transit. Clear differences in opinion persisted on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the relocation scheme, but agreement was reached on ‘the temporary and exceptional relocation, over two years, from the frontline Member States: Italy and Greece, to other Member States of 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection’.

Although the debate on CSDP fell short of its original ambition, the Council conclusions included a statement that the European Council ‘will keep security and defence policy on its regular agenda’, thereby clearly underlining the future importance of CSDP.

United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron’s presentation of his vision on renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, did not outline any specific details, however, it provided an impetus for European level discussions on this issue, with Council President Donald Tusk seeing it as ‘the first step in a longer process that will also end at the European Council’. This issue is certain to reappear on the agenda for the Council meeting in December 2015.

The significantly shortened debate on the Commission communication on a Digital Single Market strategy for Europe, nevertheless led to Council conclusions calling for the rapid adoption of the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, the Directive on Network and Information Security, and the Data Protection package. Heads of State or Government also stressed that action must be taken on key components of the Commission communication, such as eliminating mobile roaming charges. On this issue, on 30 June 2015, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, reached agreement to end roaming surcharges by 15 June 2017.

The EPRS publishes briefings on the European Council before summits, and European Council outcome briefings (next to be issued just after the European Council of 15-16 October 2015).

Read this Briefing on Outcome of the 25-26 June European Council in PDF
Filed under: BLOG, Institutional and Legal Affairs, Policy Cycle Tagged: briefings, CSDP, digital agenda, economic governance, EPRS briefings, European Council, migration, Post-European Council Briefing, Ralf Drachenberg, Stanislas de Finance, Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq travelled to Spain yesterday to visit the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED CoE), a multinational organisation with which the European Defence Agency is cooperating closely.

During the visit, Jorge Domecq received briefings from commander Colonel José Zamorano González as well as other C-IED CoE staff. Together they discussed the Centre’s missions and projects  as well as its current priorities in the field of information sharing, technology & development, and training.

In January 2015, a cooperation framework agreement was signed between the EDA and the C-IED CoE allowing for coherent progress in C-IED capability development initiatives and potential participation in joint projects. It will also avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.

“The good cooperation we have in place with the C-IED CoE allows us to exchange lessons learned and enlarge the European C-IED community of interest, which ultimately benefits capability development in this crucial field with the aim of mitigating and/or preventing IED threats”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stressed during the visit. “I expect our cooperation to grow based on our Member States’ needs for robust capabilities to fight improvised explosive devices in operations as well as in the homeland”, he added.

More information

• C-IED CoE website
• EDA C-IED project page

Italian Alenia Aermacchi (SIAI MArchetti) SF.260 Trainer Aircraft

European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides visited the European Defence Agency today to exchange views and cooperation opportunities with EDA staff and top management.

The Commissioner started his visit with a meeting with EDA Chief Executive as well as the Agency’s top management, with whom he exchanged views on the EDA’s way of working, especially its role of interface with wider EU policies, as well as on current workstrands that might contribute to support Humanitarian missions and initiatives.

After the meeting, Commissioner Stylianides met with EDA project officers who briefed him on some of the Agency’s ongoing initiatives in the field of operations support, satellite communications or medical. Current EDA projects focusing on maritime surveillance, personnel recovery or airlift support to humanitarian missions were also discussed.

“A lot of activities and projects developed under the framework of the Agency have a potential dual-use role, and thus can be as useful in humanitarian missions as they are in high-intensity conflicts”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq commented during the visit. “As part of our close cooperation with the European Commission we stand ready to provide support  in areas of dual-use capabilities and dual-use research, while at the same time enhancing the pooling and sharing of capabilities”, he added.

More information

• Link to Commissioner Christos Stylianides' website
• Link to EDA Operations Support project page

Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), and Massimo Garbini, Managing Director of the SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Its purpose is to establish efficient cooperation and support between the two organisations with regard to SESAR deployment.

“Europe’s military fleets include some 9,500 diverse aircraft accounting for more than 150,000 flights each year. In other words, they form the single biggest ‘airline’ operating in Europe today. The challenges of the Single European Sky programme and the modernisation of European air traffic management are manifold. However, it is the role of the EDA to ensure that the European air forces will continue to have free and safe access to European airspace for training purposes, air-policing, as well as air defence missions. The financial and technological impacts of the programme need to be mitigated to ensure that they do not adversely affect European defence capabilities. Only through constructive cooperation between military and civil stakeholders, our shared vision of an efficient, safe and flexible European airspace can be realised. It is in this spirit that we sign the Memorandum of Understanding today”, said Jorge Domecq at the signature ceremony. 

Massimo Garbini, “This MoU reflects the kind of relationship we aim for with all stakeholders. Only through efficient cooperation and mutual support between both civil and military stakeholders, we can deliver the modernisation of European Air Traffic Management technology together.”

Memorandum of Understanding

The scope of the MoU covers the SESAR deployment of sets of functionalities in accordance with the relevant regulations1. The EDA and SDM will work together to support the Member States in translating the regulation into projects to be deployed nationally with financial support from the EU. The EDA will ensure that military viewpoints and needs are captured in the SESAR Deployment Programme and support the bidding and execution processes of the projects. At the same time, the Deployment Manager will coordinate with the military through the EDA to avoid any adverse impact on national and collective defence capabilities. This involves inter alia enabling and exploiting military contributions as well as optimising the use of expertise and avoiding duplications. The EDA and SDM also agree to put in place effective coordination procedures to ensure efficient synchronisation and the timely exchange of relevant information. A Steering Committee will be set up to ensure the effective functioning of the Memorandum.

 

Single European Sky ATM Research

The Single European Sky (SES) aims at realising the optimisation of the airspace organisation and management in Europe through a combination of technological, economic, and regulatory efforts. SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) is the technical pillar of this. SESAR involves developing a new ATM system to handle more traffic with greater safety and at a lower cost. Its new technologies and procedures will also seek to reduce the environmental impact of flying. The resulting efforts will be deployed in a synchronised manner involving all stakeholders, civil and military.

 

About SESAR Deployment Manager

SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM) is the industrial partnership that synchronises and coordinates the modernisation of Europe’s air traffic management system under the political oversight of the European Commission. The main task of the SESAR Deployment Manager is to develop, submit to the European Commission for its approval and execute the Deployment Programme, a project view strictly drawn from the Pilot Common Project (PCP) set by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014, as well as any subsequent Common Projects in future regulations. Through the Deployment Programme, the SESAR Deployment Manager will ensure efficient synchronisation and coordination of implementation projects required to implement the PCP, as well as the related investments. The tasks of the Deployment Manager are described in Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 409/2013.

 

Role of the EDA

In order to ensure that the effects on military aviation are understood and taken into account, Member States entrusted EDA with the task of facilitating the coordination of military views from and in support of Member States and relevant military organisations and to inform military planning mechanisms of the requirements stemming from SESAR deployment. In 2014, EDA established a dedicated SESAR Cell to ensure that the military views and requirements are taken into account in the implementation of SESAR.

 

More information

• Single European Sky project page
• SESAR Deployment Manager website

---------------------------------------------- 

1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 409/2013 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014

American Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile

#CCLKOW this week turns to the matter of confronting insurgency. Seemingly beaten to death, I would submit that the subject is in fact in need of some rigorous thought, especially as there are clearly two defined schools of strategic approach, broadly characterized by their different focuses. Where one is concerned to fight the insurgency as manifest, the other seeks to undermine the terms of its strength to vastly reduce the intensity of the conflict, or anti-insurgency and counter-insurgency. Understanding the difference between the terms and consequences of different strategic approaches is important given that with the geo-strategic landscape and the role of rapid communications we may find ourselves in a time when might, as expressed in destruction, no longer sufficiently or reliably translates to right. Rather, might applied to the resolution of root causes is an alternative path to right that deserves better and more serious attention against the changing landscape of conflict. So, read the piece and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.   

 

The subject of confronting an insurgency being less in favor these days seems to me to present the best opportunity to examine it with a bit more dispassion, and hence more rigor. In particular, here I would like to consider how we use COIN. As it stands, COIN is used broadly to describe all approaches to warfare against an insurgency. However, I find this unsatisfying as there is significant divergence in what people mean by this term. To rectify this problem, I propose new terminology to distinguish  between strategies which make the use of force against the rebellion the primary effort versus those that seek to undermine and eliminate the sources of support to the rebellion first thus reducing the scope of direct confrontation. Both envision scenarios which seek attrition, it is simply the means in each which differ. However, I believe there is an importance to this difference, and I think terminology which recognizes it is thus necessary. To describe these distinct approaches I use anti-insurgency and counter-insurgency accordingly, or AINT and COIN.

For clarification, a few points of terminology must be settled. (1) To begin, when I speak of insurgency, I mean a conflict within governed space against the standing order. Those in opposition are characterized by a committed cadre at center, are generally weaker than the forces of the prevailing order, and often resort to asymmetry and other alternative and low cost/low training means. While they may enjoy popular support, it is enough that the population simply be neutral to apathetic. With respect to the pivotal terms of this essay, I will offer that my understanding of this distinction between anti- and counter- goes back to an old lecture on terrorism in my early academic days that has stuck with me for its clarity and utility. In brief, it sorted the approaches to dealing with terrorism into the two categories depending on the focus of effort, whether at dealing with acts and actors directly by fighting terrorists in the act and seeking them when not, or at undermining their ability to organize and act to reduce frequency, efficacy and numbers of attacks.

If you were wondering about the title, this is where the odd construction becomes relevant. The “it” and “this” refer to two pieces written by others which illustrate the two models. They are important here because the first, on AINT, inspired the conceptualization, and the second motivated the writing in this moment. Very interestingly, they are both by British authors, representing two ends of the security spectrum and long traditions of service. The AINT article is a theoretical description of the model by William F. Owen, formerly of the British Army and currently active in the field of military affairs. (2) The second is a blog piece on neighborhood policing by an anonymous but currently serving British police officer of significant experience, Nathan Constable. (3) While it may seem unorthodox to use a policing example to describe a strategic approach insurgent conflict, the principle, parties and activities are similar enough for these purposes. Where the absolute scale of force and violence may differ, I believe that plotted relatively they are sufficiently comparable. Thus, as a good enough comparative, I will go further to add that in this case the conceptual box is safely, and I hope fruitfully, exceeded.

Turning to the first piece, in Owen’s “Seek and Destroy,” the AINT model is clearly explicated. As a counter-insurgency strategy, I cannot disagree with it more. However, under the AINT construct, while I may not agree with its utility, I must similarly recommend that it is an entirely correct construction. The opening sentence is unambiguous: “The purpose of this article is to argue that the destruction of the enemy’s forces lies at the heart of countering both terrorism and insurgency.” (p. 12) If the end is compliance with the status quo, this will be achieved by attrition, and more specifically by fighting the insurgent force in order to kill or capture its members. Elimination of the rebellion in arms will eliminate the rebellion. That is iconic AINT.

For COIN, the Nathan Constable blog on neighborhood policing includes a vignette fully describing the contours of the countering model. His piece deserves to be read in its entirety, but for our purposes here a brief synopsis of the relevant portion will suffice. The circumstances of the case were a local police force dealing with significant and recurrent problems of anti-social behavior (the “insurgency”) that demanded police resources without improving by their interventions. Watching this approach fail to do more than “stick a plaster on” the ritual disturbances (the “insurgent activity”), he shifted course.

This adaptation meant considering the problem in other terms. Using intelligence gathering to understand the nature of the disorder and its causes, who might be the ringleaders, and what motivated the presence of the larger numbers of participants, the author describes how he and his police force changed their approach to the problem. Learning that many of the participants in the trouble were at a loss for anything better to do on a Friday evening, the police reached out other agencies and organizations to create sport and other entertainments for local youth so that they had safe spaces to spend an evening. As well, to reduce the influence and draw of alcohol, they worked with local businesses to eliminate or reduce sales to those under 21. Although the cadre of troublemakers remained (the “committed cadre” who drive the insurgency), without the broader participation of other youths (the rank and file who give the movement its force) these numbers were more easily dealt with by traditional policing methods. More importantly, the broader results of this combined effort away from the point of conflict was a reduction in the number of calls to police for that area and an overall improvement in the quality of life for the community as previously unpleasant to unsafe spaces were reclaimed and the youth had positive attractions for their energies. That is, by countering the problem rather than continuing to fight the obvious manifestation it was more enduringly solved.

It should be clear these two approaches vary significantly in principle and in practice. As played out at the level of conflict and war when considering insurgencies these differences are important and manifest at every level, from political to tactical. While it is certainly not necessary in practical strategic terms to choose one at the complete absence of aspects of the other, representing as they do very different philosophical perspectives on the conflict and its proper resolution, the likelihood is that one or the other will dominate. That is, if presented with the same situation, Owen and Nathan Constable would, according to their models, design very different strategies to achieve the ends of peace and order. These differences matter in costs and consequences, and must be considered in detail in deciding which should be chosen, because despite Owen’s claim, the efficacy of one over the other, is not an “obvious and enduring fact.” Where force of arms has come to dominate Western conceptualizations of warfare, this preference is not necessary in war.

Given this, the question for this week’s discussion is broad, intended to drive consideration of the terms of each approach and debate their relative merits against historical or hypothetical cases. Simply, it is:

 

When and where is each the more practicable approach and why?

 

Add your thoughts on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

 

 

Notes:

(1) These are the product of a wide reading across history and military affairs. They are attributable to many and none. I can offer no real credit, but neither is there anyone else to blame. These are, simply put, my definitions.

(2) Owen’s piece was published in Infinity Journal, Issue 2, Spring 2011, “Seek and Destroy: The Forgotten Strategy for Countering Armed Rebellion,” pp 12-15. It is freely available to those willing to sign up with the journal.

(3) Due to my unorthodox interpretation and application of the case, I chatted with Nathan Constable regarding my use of the blog. He was curious to see the alternative application, and forwarded supporting public documentation of the events — news articles which provide detail on the circumstances and the steps taken by local police and naming the officers involved. I have no need or intention to identify him, but for the purposes of this essay the verification of the events only added weight to my thinking on it.

 

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Africa has been on something of a spending spree in the past few years, upping their stake in the global defence market while addressing urgent security challenges at home. For most states, reinforcing the reputation of a secure and civilised environment is the first step in encouraging