Defence`s Feeds

On the president’s order, six convicts sentenced to death were executed by hanging in Pol-e Charkhi prison on the morning of 8 May 2016. The executions came after the president’s speech at the joint session of both houses of Parliament on 25 April 2016, in which he announced that the time for unjustified amnesty was over. Although the death penalty is legal in Afghanistan, according to both the criminal code and Islamic law, actual executions have been implemented on an ad-hoc basis. The recent executions, however, may signal an end to the informal moratorium on capital punishment that has been in place for the past fifteen years, partially at the urging of the international community. The public’s increasing impatience with insurgent violence and the desire of the Afghan government to present itself as acting decisively seem to point in that direction. AAN’s Ehsan Qaane and Jelena Bjelica take a closer look at the issue.

On the morning of 8 May 2016, six convicts who had been sentenced to death were executed by hanging in Pol-e Charkhi prison in Kabul. According to information released by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) following the executions, the six were:

1. Muhammad Usman, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for planting an improvised explosive devise (IED) in Khairkot district of Paktika, which killed seven police officers. (No further details are available)

2. Khan Agha, also known as Abdul Rahman and a member of al-Qaeda, who was convicted for his involvement in the attack on Abdullah Laghmani, the deputy head of the NDS in 2009. Laghmani, local officials and 14 civilians were killed and 56 injured in the attack that took place outside a mosque in Mehtarlam.

3. Hamidullah, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for being involved in the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul on 20 September 2011. Burhanuddin Rabbani was one of the founders of Jamiat-e-Islami, a former president of Afghanistan during the mujahedin era and head of the High Peace Council since 2010. (1)

4. Muhammad Ismail, a member of the Haqqani network who was convicted for his involvement in the planning of the suicide attack on Finest Supermarket in 2011. In this attack, Ms. Hamida Barmaki, a commissioner of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was killed together with her husband and four children; in total nine Afghans and five foreigners died in the attack.

5. Hujatullah, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for planting an IED on a vehicle in Paghman province. The explosion killed nine civilians and injured others. (No further details are available)

6. Akmal, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for planning the attack on the Muhammad Daud Khan Military Hospital in 2011. The attack killed at least six people, including four members of the Afghan National Security Forces and injuring more than 20.

Presidential order

The execution of the six convicts comes in the wake of President Ghani’s hard-hitting speech at the joint session of both houses of Parliament on 25 April 2016 and a deadly attack in Kabul on 19 April 2016, which killed 68 and injured 347 people, and for which the Taleban claimed responsibility. In his address, which signalled the government’s hardening position on the war, on peace talks and on the Taleban (see AAN’s previous analysis here), the president avowed his resolve to implement tough justice, including through capital punishment:

The time for those who enjoyed unjustified amnesty is over. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is committed to resolutely implementing decisions of the courts and judicial entities, including the rulings of execution.

At the same time, Ghani assured MPs (and a wider audience, including the international community) that his committment to punishing those who commit terrorists acts would be accompanied by respect for human rights, the rule of law and the Afghan constitution:

The enemies of Afghanistan should know that if they are caught on the combat field while committing terrorist acts against the people of Afghanistan, they will be brought to justice and the rule of law will be fully implemented. I assure you, respected representatives, elders, and the noble people of my country that as president and protector of the rights and security of the people of Afghanistan, I will resolutely deal with those who shed the blood of our soldiers and our innocent people and I will not hesitate to punish them. […] Our resolute acts have one clear message: our hand of justice is long and powerful and can reach all criminals and terrorists. Obviously, our firmness in establishing justice goes with our respect for our constitution, our human rights commitments and justice seeking policy.

He even thanked judges who had tried and ruled death penalties, and promised to protect them from revenge attacks: “I thank those who have tried the baghis (2) and ruled to execute them, and I assure them that we shall protect them.”

Ghani’s deputy spokesperson said on 29 April 2016 that “a week ago” the president ordered a review of the death sentences in accordance with the country’s legal system, which is based on Islamic law, Afghanistan’s constitution and human rights values. Indeed, a couple of days before his speech in parliament, the president established a committee to review all death sentences handed out so far, prior to their carrying out. While the exact composition of the review committee is unclear, AAN was told that it is chaired by the Attorney General and includes the deputy Attorney General, a member of the Supreme Court and unidentified “independent experts.” The president’s office reportedly also asked the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to join the committee, but they were said to have refused. With at least two or three members of the committee affiliated to the country’s judiciary organs, which prosecuted and tried those sentenced to death, they are essentially put in charge of reviewing their own institutions’ work. This raises possible questions about the impartiality of death sentence reviews.

During the first week of the review committee’s work, ten cases were considered. The committee ruled that in six of the ten cases all legal standards had been met. A press release, issued by the presidential palace (Arg) on 8 May 2016, stated that the president had signed the execution orders “after careful consideration, completion of due process and [ascertaining the] fairness of the trials conducted.” According to Afghanistan’s legal system, once a death sentence has gone through all judiciary instances (Primary Court, Appeals Court and Supreme Court), execution orders for each death sentence still require the president’s signature.

The Arg press release also noted that the decision to carry out the death sentences had taken into account “the repeated requests of the families of the victims of terrorist attacks” and highlighted that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the president are “committed to justice and punishing criminals who committed the criminal and terrorist acts, killed innocent people, or put security and public safety at risk.”

The six executions could be the first of many. According to palace officials in October 2014, shortly after Ghani came to power (quoted by Khaama news here), there were, at the time, 400 cases still waiting to be reviewed or signed off for execution by the president. Around 100 of these cases had been approved by the Supreme Court at the time and were awaiting the president’s signature. The remaining 300 had yet to be approved by the Supreme Court. This figure does not appear to have changed since then.

The 400 cases represent approximately 600 individuals sentenced to death.
 AAN was told that the majority of these individuals have been sentenced for ‘ordinary’ crimes, such as murder, while a notable number—estimated to be around 100 individuals—were sentenced for mass murder through acts of terrorism. It appears that the review process is focused on this latter category of convicts.

Taleban reaction

The Taleban issued an initial statement on 29 April 2016 in reaction to Ghani’s speech to the Parliament and the press statement made by the president’s spokesperson on the same day. In their statement, the Taleban said that the call for execution “holds no legal basis because these political prisoners are handed the death penalty by the most corrupt and incompetent judicial body in the world.” It also said that the “known individuals or unions and their workers advocating implementation of such crimes [ie execution]”, will “be classified as legitimate military targets.” The Taleban statement called on “international human rights organizations, independent media outlets, the ICRC and other free impartial committees not to remain indifferent in using their influence concerning [the] matter of prisoner execution.”

Following the 8 May 2016 executions, the Taleban issued two more statements. The first one, issued on the morning of the same day, was rather generic, lamenting the poor conditions in the overcrowded Afghan prisons and the lack of fair trials and accusing the Afghan government of torturing prisoners. The statement, which seems to have been prepared ahead of time and was probably not in response to the executions, was addressed to the United Nations and called on the UN’s shared responsibility to ensure that the Afghan government adhered to its international commitments.

The second statement issued in the evening of 8 May (available in English here) directly referred to the executions that were carried out, describing them as a “vindictive barbarity” that “spinelessly martyred six defenseless Mujahideen inmates.” The statement reiterated the warning to those involved in the executions, saying they would become “the top priority during military planning” and that “they will not be allowed to breathe peacefully, nor will they ever be able to feel secure.”

After 14 executions were carried out in 2012, the Taleban also demanded that the United Nations, Islamic countries, international human rights organisations and the Red Cross prevent prisoners’ executions (see AAN previous reporting here). Two days after the executions took place on 23 November 2012, a massive truck bomb by the Taleban targeting a joint Afghan/ISAF command facility in Wardak province was labeled as a “revenge attack.”

Public opinion and political complexities

The death penalty is legal in Afghanistan, according to both the criminal code and Islamic law. Public opinion also seems to be strongly in support of the capital punishment. Nader Nadery, a former commissioner of the AIHRC and currently a senior adviser in the presidential palace, told AAN in 2012 “there is more public demand for the death penalty because the rate of crime is increasing.” After the execution of five men found guilty of gang rape in Paghman province, carried out on 8 October 2014, local human rights groups as well as officials in Afghanistan welcomed the executions and the Afghan media found “public opinion appears solidly behind capital punishment,“ despite concerns over rushed proceedings and a possible lack of due process. In 2016, the rhetoric and position on capital punishment remains unchanged. When a young Afghan girl was raped and killed in Iran earlier this year, Afghan civil society activists went public with their demand for capital punishment for the perpetrator.

Arman-e Melli, a daily that is close to the National Union of Journalists of Afghanistan, wrote on 8 May 2016 under the headline “Well done, Ashraf Ghani!”: “The president has taken a good and constructive measure and we believe that such measures can have a positive impact on stability and security in the country… We support the measure taken by the president of our beloved country in this particular issue….” The privately owned Mandegar daily wrote that “the people of Afghanistan welcome the executions of terrorists and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and they expect these executions to be carried out and reported in full transparency… The media outlets should be present where the executions take place so that they can document the executions and report on them.” Daily Afghanistan, linked to Muhammad Mohaqqeq, now deputy to the CEO Dr Abdullah Abdullah, also welcomed the executions, adding that “The previous governments in Afghanistan did not take the war against the Taleban seriously… By taking this action, it seems that the government is no longer showing leniency towards the Taleban… This reaction puts the Taleban in a difficult situation and sends them a message that if they do not make peace, they are practically at war with the government and the government will treat them this way.”

Victims’ families, MPs and intellectuals have often been strong advocates for capital punishment. On 4 May 2016, for instance, Balkh MP Mawlavi Rahman Rahmani said at a Wolesi Jirga session that he had received a list of the 631 criminals who had been sentenced to death. “President Ghani has said he will seek the views from the international community and human rights organisations on sentencing these criminals to death,” Rahmani added that in his opinion “the criminals should be punished, otherwise we will continue to face the consequence we have been facing until now.”

There were some other misgivings, but not with regard to the death penalty per se. Atta Muhammad Nur, the acting governor of Balkh, for instance, was quoted on the Nunn.asia website on 10 May 2016, as saying that the convict’s family had not been consulted on the execution of Rabbani’s assassin – which he said should have been done and had been agreed upon. Atta added that “this person had many secrets about Rabbani and with his execution all those secrets were also buried.”

At the same time, Afghanistan faces pressure from donor countries, mostly by those who have abolished capital punishment themselves. The European Union has traditionally been the most outspoken in trying to convince Afghanistan not to implement death sentences. As EU Special Representative to Afghanistan, Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin wrote in an earlier editorial published by Pajhwok news agency on 5 October 2015:

The European Union and its member states hold a strong and principled position against death penalty. Its abolition represents one of the main objectives of our Human Rights Policy – not only in Afghanistan, but worldwide. To honour the European & World Day against the Death Penalty, we therefore urge the Government to establish a moratorium with immediate effect that suspends the execution of death sentences in Afghanistan. Afghanistan needs less – not more violence.

Executions from 2001 until 2015

From the beginning, the EU and human rights organisations encouraged president Karzai, if not to abolish capital punishment entirely, to at least declare a formal moratorium on executions until the criminal justice system was sufficiently reformed to ensure that all convicts received a fair trial.

In April 2004, Abdullah Shah, a military commander from Paghman convicted for multiple murders committed during the country’s civil war, was executed in Kabul – the first execution since the establishment of the interim government in late 2001. He had been convicted in October 2002 in special court proceedings, which, according to Amnesty International, fell far short of international fair trial standards: Abdullah Shah had had no defense lawyer at his trial, the hearing was held in a closed court and the chief judge in the initial trial was dismissed for accepting bribes. The case was also criticised by those who saw it as an attempt to eliminate a key witness who could have implicated powerful figures in past human rights abuses.

President Karzai’s then chief spokesperson, Jawed Ludin, called the execution of Abdullah Shah an exception rather than a new rule, and stressed that this did not mean that the execution process had started.

Indeed no executions took place in 2005 or 2006, but in 2007 Afghanistan carried out fifteen executions and in 2008, eighteen death sentences were carried out. After another two years without executions, there were again two in 2011, fourteen in 2012, two in 2013, six in 2014 and one in 2015 (see here for the list of crimes that are punishable by death in Afghanistan).

Since taking office on 29 September 2014, Ghani signed one other execution order before the 8 May 2016 cases: on 28 February 2015, Rais Khudaidad (also known as Rais Saidullah) was hanged after being convicted of murder, kidnapping and armed robbery one month earlier. At least 12 new death sentences have been imposed for murder and rape under the new government, but have yet to be implemented.

Five more individuals were executed on 8 October 2014, shortly after Ghani became president. Their execution order for armed robbery and rape had been signed by Karzai only days before he handed over power and was carried out by Ghani, despite UN calls for a stay of executions, see here and here).

Walking a tightrope

President Ghani is walking a tightrope as he tries to show both the Afghan people and the international community that he can deliver on his promises to be tough and decisive on the insurgency. The government’s new position on executions, while playing to public demands, still sits uncomfortably with the international community, particularly the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations issued a press release following the executions, in which the organisation reiterated its “continued call for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty.” The United Nations noted that there is no conclusive evidence of the death penalty having any deterrent value and that its use does not contribute to public safety, encouraging the Government of Afghanistan to expedite legal reforms, which would allow death sentences to be commuted to life imprisonment. Human Rights Watch (HRW) on 10 May 2016 called on President Ghani to “impose an immediate death penalty moratorium” and called on Afghanistan’s donors, who have bankrolled the reform of the country’s judicial system, to make ending the death penalty “a top priority.” Part of the context is that, apart from doubts regarding due process in all cases, torture is still an existing practice among Afghan security organs and that it cannot be ruled out that, in certain instances, confessions are obtained by such means.

However, with the review of the many pending cases having just begun and in a climate where executions seem to be welcome and wished for by the public, as well as with the government seeking to project a tougher position on its armed opponents – who show no signs of dropping terrorism from their agenda – the six executions carried out on 8 May 2016 may be just the beginning.

 

(1) For more background on Hamidullah’s role in Rabbani’s assassination, see earlier AAN reporting here, here  and here (the last dispatch also has the transcript of a video recording of Hamidullah’s confession, that was released by the NDS on 4 October 2011).

(2) Baghi is a legal term in Islamic jurisprudence used for a specific group that transgresses and conducts violent acts against a legitimate Islamic authority. In the context of Sharia law, baghis are outlaws and criminals that need to be eliminated.

 

Jorge Domecq, EDA’s Chief Executive, was in Bratislava on 10 and 11 May for talks with the Slovak Minister of Defence Peter Gajdoš, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Ivan Máčovský, as well as other senior officials in the MoD and the Armed Forces. Mr. Domecq also participated in a meeting of the National Armament Directors of the Visegard Group, attended the International Defence Exposition Bratislava (IDEB) and met with industry representatives.

Discussions with the Minister of Defence mainly focused on the upcoming Slovak Presidency of the European Union, Slovakia’s current and potential future contributions to EDA projects and programmes, the general state of play in European defence cooperation as well as several upcoming important defence-related milestones: the publication of the new EU Global Strategy in June, the Warsaw NATO summit in July and the European Commission’s Defence Action Plan expected to be presented by the end of this year. „Slovakia is currently considering its participation in some of the projects organised by EDA. We are evaluating available information and the possibility of our future involvement,” said Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic Peter Gajdoš.

Mr. Domecq ensured Minister Gajdoš of the Agency’s support to any defence related events organised in the framework of the Slovak Presidency. Potential topics for seminars discussed were cyber defence and access to EU funding for dual-use R&T projects. Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic Peter Gajdoš also informed Mr. Domecq about the preparations that Slovakia is currently undertaking and about the events it is organising during the Slovak Presidency.

The meeting of the National Armament Directors of the Visegard Group mainly included discussions of a Multinational Training Centre, Security of Supply and airworthiness. Based on an EDA analysis through the Agency’s Collaborative Database (CODABA), the Group also engaged in in an exchange of views on opportunities for cooperative capability initiatives. National Armament Directors received a presentation of a study on the Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States by the EDA.

Mr. Domecq attended the opening of the IDEB which was followed by discussions with representatives of Slovak and Czech industry representatives. 

More information

• News "EDA Chief Executive visited Poland" (28 April 2016)

Two more sets of slides today, both from the panel on Color Revolutions and Regional Security. The first set goes with the speech by Major General Sergei Afanasyev, Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff. While the text of the speech is not available, there is a video with English translation (starts at approximately 3 minute mark).

(Scroll down for slides provided by President Putin’s internet advisor.)

The second set of slides goes with the speech by German Klimenko, the advisor to President Putin on the internet. Unfortunately, I haven’t found a video or text of his speech online. If anyone has a link, please email it to me or point to it in the comments.

American Independence Class Littoral Combat Ship

Belarusian MZKT-74295 Tank Transporter

Want to keep up to date on the SSR field? Once a week, the CSG’s Security Sector Reform Resource Centre project posts pertinent news articles, reports, projects, and event updates on SSR over the past week. Click here to sign-up and have the SSR Weekly News Roundup delivered straight to your inbox every week!     Centre for

A number of people have asked me to post the slides from the MCIS conference. I have a number of sets. First up is Valery Gerasimov’s presentation. These slides can be usefully combined with the Russian text of his speech or the translated English language video of his remarks.

Russian Ataka Anti-Tank Guided Missile

AAN has done a series of twelve in-depth interviews with families of Afghans who recently travelled to Europe. The conversations provided a fascinating insight into the practicalities of both the decision making processes and the journey, the complex interplay between economic and security considerations and the mixed feelings families often have once their loved ones have finally, safely, reached Europe. In this first instalment, AAN’s Lenny Linke takes a closer look at the reasons families gave for either sending or allowing their sons or brothers to leave for Europe.

This series of three dispatches is based on twelve interviews done for a joint project with (and funded by) the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and resulted in a joint study titled “’We Knew They Had No Future in Kabul’: Why and How Afghan Families Decide to Leave” published on 27 April 2016.  The data collection was conducted in the spring of 2016 with selected Afghan households to explore the decision-making processes at the family level of a small number of migrants. (1) The three dispatches present the main findings and place them in a wider context. The second dispatch will focus on the details of the journey, the routes taken and practical preparations. The third dispatch will take a closer look at what has happened since the migrants arrived in Europe and lays out the hopes and concerns their families have now that they are there.

The decision-making process

The demographic of the migrants in the sample was relatively young (all under 30) and predominantly male. (1) Many family members reported that it was their sons or brothers themselves who had initiated the discussion about going to Europe.

When my son told me he was thinking of going to Europe, I approved; we decided that if my son continued living in Afghanistan, there would not be an improvement in his or our current situation, so it was better for him to go to Europe… We all agreed and there was no reason to disagree. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

To be honest, we thought he was joking when he said he wanted to leave, but once he got his Iranian visa, we started believing him. He himself brought up the issue of going to Europe. He used Facebook on a daily basis to read about the situation along the route and he read that the border between Turkey and Greece was open. He might have been motivated by this… (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

In several cases, family members, including wives and fiancées, were initially opposed to the migrants leaving, but several of the migrants subsequently persuaded their relatives to give their blessing and to support them, even if some were still reluctant.

…finally their father agreed to send them, because many times the boys had planned to leave without letting us know. Their father was compelled to send them with his blessings, rather than sending them off to deal with unreliable people. (Mother of a 15-year and an 18-year old migrant from Kabul)

One migrant from Maidan Wardak, whose father was interviewed, had left without telling his family or talking about possibly leaving beforehand: “I was not at home when my son left for Europe… When he reached Turkey, he called and said he was in Turkey and would leave for Europe.”

In some cases, however, families remained antagonistic towards the idea of their relative going to Europe, even after son or brother had left. The brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar said, “Well, we all opposed his leaving,” while the brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand said “To leave was his personal decision after the economic crisis hit Afghanistan. His wife and children begged him not to leave.”

In other families, the decision to leave for Europe had been a joint decision, where family members had decided to send the migrants away or had urged them to go to Europe. In these cases, worsening security had often been the main, or at least an important, driver for leaving Afghanistan.

It was a family decision to send my brother abroad. We all agreed because we wanted him to live longer and to not die in the war… When security began to deteriorate, we started discussing whether he should go to Europe. We discussed this for a month, and after a month we decided he should go to Europe. We also talked about what he might do in Afghanistan if he didn’t go to Europe.  (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

Due to the fact that his employment as a driver with an organisation brought him threats, my father persuaded my brother to leave the country for a safer place. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz).

In fact, we had never thought about such words as ‘going to Europe’ nor did my brother evoke them. In the end, though, we said, “Where should he go?” We thought, “Should he go to Pakistan or Iran?” The media were broadcasting reports of people leaving for Europe. We said, “Let’s trust God. You will arrive somewhere.” (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

After the insurgents killed our brother and set our house on fire, the decision was made to send our brother away…. All the family decided together that we would send our brother to Europe so he could help out the whole family financially once he made it … We expected that our brother would be accepted as an asylum seeker in Germany and that he would be able to bring the whole family to Germany, because there is nothing left for us in Afghanistan. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

It was decided by my family that I should leave after I received threatening letters from the Taleban because of my work with NGOs and also because I had worked for the US forces as a translator and project facilitator in rural Kandahar… My mother, my sisters and my wife were the driving force for me and also my brother leaving for Germany, as there was an imminent threat against the entire family as long as we stayed in Kandahar. (27-year old migrant from Kandahar, who was interviewed in Kabul after he was forcibly returned)

In several cases, where deteriorating security had been a main concern, there was a longer period of contemplating going ‘somewhere.’ For example, the brother of the migrant from Herat said:

He [the migrant] was feeling unsafe. I said “You can come to Kabul.” He said “Even there, they will reach me.”… He’d had threats from some Taleban. He’d also had threats from some unknown people. The threats had increased. He had been thinking for a while and talking about what he should do. For a long time, I tried to persuade him to stay, but in the end, as the threats against him increased, he said, “I have to go.”

While most migrants travel alone, some leaving wives and children behind, there was one case where a whole family left together.

It’s very difficult [for a father] to keep a family in Herat, both financially and morally, when you are not there. He decided that if they would face any difficulties, they would face them together. (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

Motivations for leaving

People’s motivations for going to Europe, as reflected in the twelve interviews, were often a combination of frustration felt over the lack of jobs and/or educational opportunities as well as concerns over the deteriorating security situation. Even in cases where the lack of opportunities for employment and education were mentioned as the primary reason for migration, these were usually followed by explicit and implicit references to the security situation. None of the respondents cited the lack of opportunity as the exclusive reason for leaving.

What also emerged from the interviews was that in at least four cases, migrants had either come under threat because of their past employment and/or could no longer find or take on work due to direct insurgent threats or the fear of being exposed to insecurity because of their work.

A lack of economic and educational opportunities

Many of the migrants’ relatives mentioned the lack of economic and educational opportunities as an important factor in the decision to leave. Several of the migrants had just finished high school or university and were unable to find employment or to continue their education.

His main motivation [for leaving] was his failure to get into university. If he had succeeded in the exam, other factors wouldn’t have played an important role. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

…we thought he should go to Germany, continue his education there and then help us to get there too. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant fom Kunduz)

[Advice I gave to my brother:]…you are a medical student in the 6th semester and you can’t finish your education here, [but] you can keep your education up there. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

When my son finished high school, we thought since there are no jobs and the situation is getting worse day by day, it would be good if he went to Europe, where he could find a good job and have a good future. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

When the boys were studying in school, I could not afford to send them to a private school for better quality education. … My husband is disabled and I am the only breadwinner in the family. Due to financial and family problems, my eldest son could not continue his education. He studied until the 8th grade and then started to work and earn money for the family. … He was working during the day and therefore could not go to regular school. I managed to find a job and my eldest son returned to school. He went to evening school so that he could continue working during the day as well. He was looking for a better paid job but could not find one… (Mother of two migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

He said he had studied for almost 18 years, but could not find a job and nobody would hire him. He thought it would be better for him to go to Europe and maybe try to find a job there. It seemed a relatively new decision to leave, which he made after he had sent his CV off to several organisations and not received any positive responses. He only seemed to have decided to leave once his frustration in Afghanistan became too much. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak)

He was jobless and it was difficult to feed 15 people with the money he earned as a bus conductor. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Wardak)

The main motive was economic. Because his work situation [ability to find a well-paying job] had not been good in recent years, he thought it would be better to leave Afghanistan. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

Everyone agreed that because of our family’s bad economic situation there was nothing to do about it except send him away. (Brother of migrant from Takhar)

In one case, the mother of an 18-year old migrant explained that while the general lack of income opportunities had been one factor, the need to earn money in order to get married had also featured in her son’s decision to leave:

Her father asked for 240,000 Afghanis [just over €3,000] as the bride price but my eldest son could not earn that money in Afghanistan and get married quickly. (Mother of two migrants from Kabul) 

Others who did not cite the lack of economic or education opportunities as a primary factor for leaving often brought it up as a secondary factor behind the more dominant security considerations.

The second most important reason was his future, his education and the financial support [he could give] to the family. We wanted him to live in a peaceful place, pursue his education and help his family in Afghanistan. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant form Baghlan)

But there were also migrants for whom life in terms of economic opportunities and professional satisfaction had been good and who, according to their families, would have been better off staying in Afghanistan—had that been possible.

There are many advantages in Europe, but people can’t count on them. For traditional people, people who have jobs, journalists with credibility in this country, who have a salary, [for them] life is good. But then, when it comes to safety, there is no choice… If there had not been any threats, he would have stayed…For an Afghan man, this might be the biggest adventure he can have: having a salary, a car, a wife, kids. What more do you want? (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

Security threats

About half of all interviewees stated that their family members had gone to Europe because of reasons related, at least in part, to security. While some seemed mainly threatened by the overall deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and did not have any direct exposure to threats or violence, others left because of direct threats or exposure to violence, as experienced by themselves or their immediate family members.

He’d had threats from some Taleban. He’d also had threats from some unknown people. The threats had increased. … With no clear idea of the future and of what might happen in Herat – he thought there was no better future in Herat because of the increasing threats and the insurgency in the western region. (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

My brother began talking about [leaving], but we did not agree with him. When security began to deteriorate, the family agreed to send him abroad. …The deteriorating security situation was the main reason for my family finally agreeing to send my brother to Europe. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

As he’d worked as an interpreter for two weeks, the insurgents told him that because he had been an interpreter for the Americans, he had become an infidel. He could neither come to Sar-e Pul, nor go anywhere else. He was just stuck in Mazar, trapped. As security got worse each day, the obstacles he faced amplified. If he had stayed here, he might have been killed. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

After the insurgents killed our brother and set our house on fire, the decision was made to send our brother away. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

Interestingly, while some respondents initially only mentioned the lack of economic opportunities as a primary motive for leaving, during the course of the interview it often became apparent that the migrant of the family had in the past been directly exposed to traumatic events. Even though these events were not given as a reason to leave, they did seem to have contributed to the overall decision.

One day (in late 2014) we had gone for a feast in Logar with relatives there. A boy’s car was attacked; he was taken out of his car and dragged along behind a motorbike. Someone had told the insurgents that the boy was working in a government office. At the time, we were close to where the incident took place. After that incident, we were more frightened. Also, when the explosion happened in the Police Academy [in August 2015], the boys were on their way to Qargha Lake [just west of Kabul]. At the time of the explosion, the boys were in the car in the area and witnessed the incident. They saw the dead bodies of police lying on the ground. After the incident, for three nights, my boys could not sleep. (Mother of two migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

Another reason behind his decision was security. We are from Maidan Wardak, the situation there has not been good and so we chose to move to Kabul. My brother could not go back to Maidan Wardak either, as security there is still bad. People told him that as he was an engineer, it was not good for him to go to Maidan Wardak because the insurgents would try to kill him…. He didn’t feel safe even in Kabul, because once when my father went to the mosque in Kabul, someone threw a hand grenade at him. It only injured him and did not kill him, but this had a bad effect on my brother. He had never previously had any thoughts about going to Europe, but the situation got very bad in Karzai’s final years and it is even worse under the new government. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak)

Beyond direct threats, the deteriorating security situation has clearly been concerning enough, or has affected people’s lives enough to warrant sending a family member abroad. Sometimes even rumours were all it took to make the decision.

…there were rumours that, if there are two young men in a family, the Taleban would take one as a fighter – that’s how we came to the decision. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

The insecurity and lack of income/educational opportunities nexus

The lack of security and economic and educational opportunities were the two main reasons given by the respondents for why family members left. But some interviewees clearly struggled to just name one, or to determine which one had been the most important.

 He left because of insecurity and joblessness… at the same time, we see the security situation getting worse and worse. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Wardak)

Several interviewees highlighted the connection between declining security and rising economic pressures on migrants’ families.

Well, in a way the worsening economic situation is an outcome of the bad security situation. He would say that [even] if we were rich in Afghanistan, we would be threatened and if we were poor, again we would be in a bad condition. He was also threatened by insurgents because he used to work with international organisations. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

From the interviews, it is apparent that because of their jobs, migrants faced increasing insecurity and threats. In some scenarios, these threats forced migrants to give up their employment or prevented them from seeking new jobs.

My brother was an intelligent guy, he was top of his class throughout high school. He completed a two-year English course and learnt English fluently. Later, he applied for a job as an interpreter in Sar-e Pul. The US forces sent him to Mazar and then they [the US forces] wanted him to work in Helmand province, but because of the risk my father told him not to take the job and never go to Helmand or to other places. Hence, after two weeks working as an interpreter in Mazar, he didn’t go back to work. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

 Being associated with certain activities deemed as inappropriate by the insurgency, for example, put people at risk:

…he was working as a driver and taking female colleagues home from the office … we thought it was becoming more dangerous for him. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

His wife is a teacher and a social activist; he would take his wife to participate in programs organised by these international organisations. People thought badly of him because of this. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

A specific scenario cited by several interviewees concerned the possible recruitment of their sons or brothers into the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Without prospects for other jobs or further education, some migrants said they had intended to join the ANSF as a last resort, which caused their families to fear for their security to the extent that they considered it safer to send them to Europe.

My older son had initially said he would join the national army. If he could not find any other job, then he would join the army. His father was frightened about the prospects of him joining the police or the army as the war was going on and he would be sent somewhere to the battleground. (Mother of two migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

My brother was not happy here because he failed the entry test to university. He wanted to join the Afghan National Army (ANA). We did not want him to join the ANA because he would be killed if he joined. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

Possible recruitment by the Taleban of unemployed youth was also a concern.

The Taliban were recruiting young men in the area to fight the Afghan government forces. We were afraid they might hire my brother. My brother was young and unemployed, so we feared he might make the wrong decisions. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

Sometimes even just the danger of travelling to and from the workplace was cited as an issue of concern. This was either due to not being able to safely access employment or the constant risk that a person is exposed to when leaving the house.

He did not have a good job here and could not go to Dai Mirdad [a district in the south of Wardak province] freely. On the way to Maidan Wardak, anything could happen to him. … He used to say “you [the entire family] are all at home and safe there. I have to deal with the risks and dangers because I have to earn money.” (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Wardak)

The primary motivation was to escape revenge killings and Taleban threats, the secondary motivation was to be able to find a good job, one which we could take on without feeling threatened. My brother and I could not have gone outside the house to find work anywhere in Kandahar because we were afraid of the Taleban and of revenge attacks – we stayed at home, borrowing money from others, relying on our extended family to provide for us as we dared not leave or have any routine, or take a public job, for fear of being discovered and killed. … Even in Kabul or Pakistan, I would not have been safe. I wanted to break the cycle of violence so as to not endanger my own family – the only way to do this was to leave the country. (27-year old migrant from Kandahar)

‘Pull’ factors

 In addition to the ‘push’ factors related to insecurity and the lack of income and education, about a third of the respondents mentioned that the final decision to leave had been influenced by the actions of others who had already gone to Europe. These interactions seem to have either contributed to the final decision, or appeared to have helped families justify their consent to the migrant leaving once the decision had been taken.

It was not long after we saw other people from the neighbourhood leaving that we decided that our son should also go. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

My younger son’s friends from our neighbourhood – there were three of them, one is 20 years old and the other two are also minors – left for Germany. He was in contact with them via Facebook. (Mother of two young migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

He decided to go because my niece, who was already in Europe, kept asking him to come to Europe. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

From my own family, my younger brother left for Europe. After he left, one of my paternal cousins and three of my maternal cousins left as well. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

He said he wanted to leave and take the risk, just like other people who were leaving. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

From the twelve interviews conducted with families of migrants, a picture has emerged of families either struggling to decide whether to send a family member, or scrambling to come to terms with the decisions already made by their relatives, usually sons or brothers. With regards to the motivation for the journey to Europe, although the majority of the respondents mentioned economic and/or educational opportunities as a main contributing factor, it was clear that in almost all cases declining security had also been a significant (primary or contributing) factor. In some cases where insecurity and threats had been a primary concern, the subsequent negative impact on the families’ income opportunities appeared to have become the final push in the decision to leave.

 

(1) The study consisted of twelve in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took place across Afghanistan’s regions as follows: four interviews in Kabul and Wardak province; four interviews in Takhar, Sar-e Pul, Kunduz and Baghlan; one interview in Nangarhar; two interviews in Helmand and Kandahar; and one interview in Herat. The ethnic composition and urban/rural population ratio in the provinces was taken into account in the selection of interviewees. The respondents were selected and located through a referral system, where AAN researchers reached out to their networks looking for families where at least one member had left for Europe in 2015. Respondents were interviewed about the departure of their family member(s), how decisions were made prior to their departure, details of the trip to Europe and thoughts on the future of the migrant in Europe. In addition, basic household information was collected for each of the families. For a shorter summary of the study, published jointly with FES, see here.

All migrants included in the study were male, with one exception where a whole family – husband, wife and young children – travelled together. In one case, two young brothers from one household travelled together and in one case a migrant who had been forcibly returned was interviewed directly. All migrants included in this study were between the ages of 15 and 30 years. Most of the interviewees giving information about the migrants in question were brothers and fathers (there was one mother and one sister). 

Romanian Marasesti Guided Missile Frigate

The Canberra Class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) are the largest vessels ever constructed for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Navantia and BAE Systems Australia constructed two 27,800t ships of the class under the Joint Project 2048 Phase 4A/4B.

BAE Systems has been awarded a $72m contract by the US Navy to manufacture and deliver propulsor systems for Block IV Virginia-class (SSN 774) submarines.

CybAero has successfully completed a test campaign with their ship-based system APID One on-board the Swedish Navy's Visby-class stealth corvette HMS Karlstad.

The Mexican Navy has deployed Arcturus UAV's T-20 JUMP fixed-wing vertical-take-off-and-landing (VTOL) tactical unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) to perform unspecified missions.

German StG 44 Assault Rifle

The Australian Government has signed a long-term contract for the sustainment of Anzac-class frigates based in Western Australia.

The US Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Harry S Truman's (CVN 75) deployment in the Arabian Gulf to combat ISIS operations has been extended by 30 days.

Harris has received a $88m order from the US Navy to supply electronic jammers for F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet aircraft.

Nigerian Aradu Multi-Role Frigate

Last week, I was once again in attendance at the Russian MOD’s Moscow Conference on International Security (MCIS). This was the fifth such conference and the third that I’ve attended. In the past, I’ve summarized all the key speeches by Russian participants. That seems less necessary this year as video from the entire conference has been posted online, both in Russian and in English.  I do have the slides from most of the speeches, which have not been posted online by the organizers, and will post them over the next few days. Other than that, it seems more valuable to write up my general impressions, rather than focusing on the specifics of what was said.

The overall tone was less hostile toward the United States than last year. Last year, the speakers were quite open in declaring that the United States was creating threats to international security by undermining governments of states that refused to go along with U.S. “diktat.” This year, the formulations were much more indirect, along the lines of “some [unnamed] states are continuing to have a negative impact on international security by promoting exclusive military blocs, establishing military bases around the world, and dictating their will through the use of their military superiority.” While the target of such formulations is of course entirely transparent, the mere fact that the United States is not being mentioned by name is a sign that the Russian government is at least making an effort to shift its rhetoric to a less hostile stance.

The desire to reestablish a relationship with the United States was made clear when the topic turned to the threat of terrorism, the primary theme of this year’s conference. Here, the Russian officials made sure to argue that the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Syria shows that the two countries can work together and stated that they hoped that such cooperation could be expanded to a broader range of issues. This line was prominent in all the speeches, and particularly in those of Nikolai Patrushev, Sergei Shoigu, and Valery Gerasimov.

Of course, the unspoken subtext underlying this call for cooperation was predicated on the notion that Russia and the United States could solve all the world’s security problems if only the United States followed Russia’s prescriptions on how to act. This was most openly stated by Sergei Lavrov, who said that what the West needs to do is to drop its anti-Russian policies.

While Russia’s relationship with the West was still one of the primary topics for discussion, it was certainly less central than at any of the past conferences. The majority of the non-Russian plenary speakers were from Asian states, and one of the two initial substantive plenary sessions was on military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. After the usual opening lineup of Russian government heavy-hitters (Patrushev, Shoigu, Lavrov, Bortnikov), the first plenary on the threat of terrorism included the defense ministers of China, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as Hamid Karzai. The Asia-Pacific panel included more Asian defense ministers, this time from India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Laos. The most striking thing about this panel was the lack of any participation by Russian officials. Unlike the first panel, where Valery Gerasimov presented the Russian government’s view on the threat posed by international terrorism, the Russian government chose not to present its view on Asian security issues. The only Russian on the dais for this session was conference host and panel moderator Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov, who said little of substance on the topic at hand.

It seems to me that the Russian government’s lack of participation in the Asia-Pacific discussion was quite deliberate. Russia is in a bit of a bind in the region. One the one hand, it is dependent on its “strategic partnership” with China, especially since the deterioration of relations with the West. On the other hand, it is looking to develop security and especially economic ties with a number of Southeast Asian states — most particularly Vietnam and Indonesia — and to deepen its existing relationship with South Korea. The disputes between China and its Asian neighbors, particularly the maritime border dispute in the South China Sea, places Russia in a difficult position. I would not be surprised if the absence of a Russian speaker on the Asia-Pacific panel was a deliberate decision taken so as to avoid having to make the hard choices about how to thread the needle on the sensitive issue of China’s security relations with its neighbors.

Finally, a few words about the general atmosphere. The conference was much better organized than last year, when panels repeatedly ran over time and the agenda had to be modified on the fly. Shoigu was not visibly unhappy, as he was last year. The conference was also much larger than in the past. The plenary sessions took place in the large Congress Hall, rather than in the meeting rooms of the Radisson Ukraina hotel as in the past. The increase in size was also notable in the addition of breakout sessions and the expansion to a second day of panels.

While in the previous two years, one had a sense of being at a conference that was an opportunity for a wide range of representatives of rogue (and quasi-rogue) states to get together, this was largely absent this year. Sure, the Iranian Defense Minister took the opportunity to go on about “Zionist terrorism,” but this was the exception, rather than the rule. The 2016 list of speakers notably excluded senior officials from countries such as North Korea and Cuba, who had prominently featured in past years. They were replaced by representatives of countries such as Argentina, the Phillippines, and Chile. In addition, the presence of senior officials from South Africa and most major Asian and Middle Eastern states highlights the global nature of the event. The absence of Western officials, which looks set to continue as long as military cooperation between Russia and NATO remains frozen, prevents MCIS from becoming a truly global conference. But even absent the West, the high level of representation from a wide range of countries from around the world is a clear indication that the MCIS has become a regular stop on the global international security conference circuit.