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Télécom Paris et Netexplo ont officiellement lancé hier (20 mai) l'observatoire « Technologies & Souveraineté numérique » qui veut réunir les entreprises et startups ainsi que les acteurs politiques pour suivre les avancées en la matière.

Bosnie-Herzégovine : la RS veut relancer la construction de centrales sur la Drina
Centrale hydroélectrique sur la Drina : les écologistes appellent l'ONU à l'aide
La Bosnie-Herzégovine annule un projet de centrale hydroélectrique sur la Drina
Pollution : une marée de déchets envahit la Drina

/ Barrages Balkans, RS sécession, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Environnement, Relations régionales

Bosnie-Herzégovine : la RS veut relancer la construction de centrales sur la Drina
Centrale hydroélectrique sur la Drina : les écologistes appellent l'ONU à l'aide
La Bosnie-Herzégovine annule un projet de centrale hydroélectrique sur la Drina
Pollution : une marée de déchets envahit la Drina

/ Barrages Balkans, RS sécession, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Environnement, Relations régionales

Das EU-Parlament fordert die Kommission auf, ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Irland einzuleiten. Das Land habe es versäumt, die Datenschutzgrundverordnung (DSGVO) angemessen durchzusetzen.

Der Bund will ein Covid-Zertifikat für Geimpfte, Getestete und Genesene einführen. Und damit auch das Reisen erleichtern. Auch auf EU-Ebene hat man sich nun auf ein europaweites Zertifikat geeinigt. Was wird also aus den Sommerferien?

Hétfőtől e-mailben lehet kérni az oltási igazolást. Átadták a komáromi kórház új gyógyszerészetét, jelen volt az egészségügyi miniszter is. Szombaton Érsekújvárban, vasárnap pedig Léván kezdi meg működését egy-egy nagy kapacitású oltóközpont. Az első negyedévben a COVID-19 volt a leggyakoribb halálok. Csütörtöki járványügyi jelentés: 409 új fertőzött, 10 további halálos áldozat.

Laila Shawa (Palestine), The Hands of Fatima, 1989.

By Vijay Prashad
May 21 2021 (IPS-Partners)

Israel’s massive war machine attacks the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) with total disregard for international law. Since the OPT is an occupied territory, the United Nations does not permit the occupier – Israel – from altering the character of the land under occupation. However, this has not impeded Israel, whose attempt to evict families in Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood resulted in the entry of Israeli border troops inside the al-Aqsa mosque, followed by waves of aerial bombardment that has resulted in daily death and injury toll that will be known only when the dust settles.

Importantly, the Palestinians did not surrender to this violation of international law. They fought back in Jerusalem and across the West Bank, in Gaza and the lands surrounding Israel. Thousands of people marched to the Jordan-Palestine border and the Lebanon-Palestine border, disregarding Israel’s threat to fire at them. From Gaza, different factions fired rockets to pressure Israel to desist from its violence in Jerusalem. The rockets from Gaza followed the violent and illegal provocations by Israel in the OPT; these rockets were not the first mover in the events of May 2021.

For the past fifteen years, Israel has punctually bombed Gaza in 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2018, and 2019. Apart from this hot violence, Israel has persecuted a policy of strangulation against not only Gaza but all of the OPT, a policy of cold violence that seeks to get Palestinians so demoralised that they leave the OPT. If Israel refuses the one-state solution (a democratic state of Palestinians and Jews) and the two-state solution (Israel and Palestine), it seeks instead a three-state solution (sending the Palestinians to Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon). This is by definition ethnic cleansing. The bombings of 2021 have been particularly harsh, the targets including buildings that house the press and refugee camps. In Shateh (Gaza), a bombing raid on 15 May left scores of people dead. The Abu Hatab family lost ten members, eight of them children. Grotesque violence of this kind defines the Israeli apartheid project to annihilate the Palestinians; Rogers Waters calls this violence ‘primal disdain’.

Juhaina Habibi Kandalaft (Palestine), Jaffa, 2015

Given the clear violations of international law and the asymmetrical violence of the Israeli bombings, it was widely expected that the UN Security Council would call for a ceasefire. But the US government of President Joe Biden informed the other members of the Council that it would not vote for any resolution of that kind. The US alone blocked the release of a council statement on the worsening situation last week. The US also initially opposed holding an open session on Friday – as proposed by Norway, Tunisia, and China – which was eventually held on Sunday. For these reasons, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked the United States and twenty-four other countries for standing with Israel. Amongst these countries is Brazil, whose president, Jair Bolsonaro, backed Israel’s right to use terrible force against the Palestinians. This statement from Bolsonaro came just a few days after the police operation against the people of Jacarezinho in Rio de Janeiro, which resulted in the massacre of twenty-five people. The gap between Jacarezinho and Gaza is only one of scale, the brutality equivalent.

On 15 May, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and No Cold War held a seminar, ‘China, USA, and Brazil’s quest for an independent foreign policy’. Former President Dilma Rousseff spoke about how, during her presidency (2011-2016) – and during the administration of her predecessor Lula da Silva (2003-2011) – the Workers’ Party led a process to establish institutions of multipolarity such as the expanded G20 (2008) and the BRICS project (2009). These are not perfect systems, certainly, but they were intended to produce platforms that were not fully subordinated to the United States. Neither have been able to live up to their potential; ‘asymmetrical relationships’, she said, ‘are not equal to multipolarity’. The G20 continues to take its lead from the Western powers and BRICS has been weakened by the rightward shift in Brazil and India. ‘The B and the I of BRICS suffered problems’, she said. ‘The B because of Bolsonaro’. Regarding the strategic necessity of returning to the project of multipolarity for economic recovery, Rousseff explained, ‘Our recovery would have to be necessarily political’.

Gabriela Tornai (@gabrielatornai_) / Design Ativista, Comida, direito do povo! (‘The people’s right to food’), 2021.

Brazil, being the largest economy in Latin America, would need to play a key role in the construction of multipolar institutions and in opening up the possibility for international law to set aside the imperial vicissitudes of the United States and its allies. For Brazil to play this role, the political bloc that stands against Bolsonaro and the right has to strengthen, and it has to be converted into a winning electoral coalition for the presidential election in 2022. Only if the left returns to power in Palácio do Planalto can Brazil once more play a role in building a multipolar world order.

Our May dossier, The Challenges Facing Brazil’s Left, from Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research (Brazil) delves deeply into just this subject. To better understand the problems and possibilities for the Brazilian Left, the team in São Paulo interviewed five leaders amongst the range of Brazil’s left: Gleisi Hoffmann, a chair of the Workers’ Party; Kelli Mafort of national board of the Landless Workers’ Movement or the MST; Élida Elena, vice president of the National Union of Students and a member of the Popular Youth Uprising (Levante Popular da Juventude); Jandyra Uehara of the National Executive Board of the Unified Workers’ Central; Juliano Medeiros, national chair of the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL); and Valério Arcary, a member of PSOL’s national board. Through conversations with these leaders, the dossier traces the path followed by the Brazilian Left, examining the instruments used to foster unity of the organised sections of the Left and of the people behind these sections. It also explores the debate over whether to build a wider anti-Bolsonaro broad front or a narrower left front, as well as the impact of Lula’s recent pardoning from false corruption charges and his newly renewed eligibility to run for office in the next presidential election.

Cristiano Siqueira (@crisvector) / Design Ativista, Atenção, novo sentido (‘Attention: new direction’), 2019

Polls released recently show Lula ahead of Bolsonaro in the first round by 41% to 23%; in every second round scenario, Lula defeats his opponents (55% to Bolsonaro’s 32%, for instance). MST leader Kelli Mafort says that ‘The Lula factor exercises tremendous influence over the Brazilian left. The urgency of the current situation calls for him to continue to be a leader in solving Brazil’s problems, but it also helps urge activists to carry out base building work, expand solidarity actions, and confront the fascist Bolsonarism [that permeates] the working class’. To root out Bolsonarism would require that Brazil settle accounts with Bolsonaro’s criminal behaviour during the pandemic, which has already set in motion a charge of crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Evidence of Bolsonaro’s genocidal policies was made clear in June 2020 by Chief Raoni Metuktire of the Kayapó, who said, ‘President Bolsonaro wants to take advantage of the virus; he is saying that the Indian has to die’.

Mafort’s point about the need to build the bases of the key classes is echoed by the others interviewed for the dossier. They assert that winning the election is fundamentally important but that, in order to secure not only the presidency but a new project for Brazil, building the strength of the working class and the peasantry is essential. The contours of this new project will contain a programme for the post-pandemic scenario for Brazil and the importance of an independent, internationalist foreign policy for Brazil.

Letícia Ribeiro (@telurica.x), photography by Giovanni Marrozzini / Design Ativista, Guardiãs (‘Guardians’), 2019.

Since last year, the United States has used its position of political pre-eminence to get several Arab monarchies (Morocco and the United Arab Emirates) to recognise Israel, which means to set aside the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. This process of undermining Palestinian rights will continue if the US is left unchallenged on the world stage. Genuine multipolarity would prevent the US from using its force against the Palestinians, the Yemenis, the Sahrawis, and others. The defeat of the ruling classes in countries such as Brazil and India – subordinate to US interests – is essential for advancing the interests of the people of the world, from Palestine to Colombia.

In 2014, the last time Israel bombed Gaza with this level of extreme ferocity, the Iraqi poet Sinan Antoon watched as families fled from their bombed homes for UN schools, which were also bombed. He imagined the danger through a conversation between a child and a grandfather (sidu). They are talking about Jaffa (now inside Israel) and wondering about the Palestinian’s right to return, guaranteed by UN Security Council resolution 194 (1948).

Are we going back to Jaffa, sidu?
We can’t
Why?
We are dead
So are we in heaven, sidu?
We are in Palestine, habibi
and Palestine is heaven
and hell.
What will we do now?
We will wait
Wait for what?
For the others
….
to return

This story was originally published by Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research

Die Menge johlte, trank, feierte. Als der EV Zug vor zwei Wochen Meister wurde, gab es eine spontane Party mit 5000 Teilnehmern. Die Befürchtung, die Mega-Party könnte zum Corona-Hotspot werden, bewahrheitete sich offenbar nicht.

La prise d'assaut des murs de la ville de Ceuta n'était que le dernier maillon d'une série répétée de tentatives de migration irrégulière vers l'Union européenne à travers les enclaves espagnoles de Ceuta et Melilla. C'est l'histoire de ces deux enclaves.

Albanie : pourquoi les États-Unis bannissent-ils maintenant Sali Berisha ?
Quatre morts en Albanie : la manifestation de l'opposition vire au drame
Albanie : Gërdec, l'épine dans le pied du gouvernement Berisha
Albanie : la tragédie de Gërdec, un désaveu pour Sali Berisha
Albanie : comment reconstruire une opposition à Edi Rama ?
Albanie : l'opposition, la démocratie et le mythe de la « communauté internationale »

/ Albanie, USA Balkans, Défense, police et justice, Politique intérieure, Lapsi

Albanie : pourquoi les États-Unis bannissent-ils maintenant Sali Berisha ?
Quatre morts en Albanie : la manifestation de l'opposition vire au drame
Albanie : Gërdec, l'épine dans le pied du gouvernement Berisha
Albanie : la tragédie de Gërdec, un désaveu pour Sali Berisha
Albanie : comment reconstruire une opposition à Edi Rama ?
Albanie : l'opposition, la démocratie et le mythe de la « communauté internationale »

/ Albanie, USA Balkans, Défense, police et justice, Politique intérieure, Lapsi

Eine gute Kondition ist nicht nur wünschenswert – sie ist für zentral für die Gesundheit. Ein Sportmediziner klärt auf.

Le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) a rendu public le mois dernier, un nouveau rapport sur les perspectives économiques régionales éditions d'avril 2021 : ‘'Faire face à une longue pandémie". Ce rapport a été présenté ce jeudi 20 mai 2021 à la presse béninoise lors d'une rencontre virtuelle en présence de plusieurs responsables du ministère de l'Economie et des Finances. Face à la crise, le Bénin affiche un taux de croissance économique de 3,8 %.

Selon le représentant du FMI, Younes Zouhar, les chiffres 2020 en Afrique subsaharienne sont un peu meilleurs que ceux attendus. La récession est de 1,9 % contre une projection initiale de 3 %. Mais, elle reste la pire jamais enregistrée dans la région.
Pour l'année 2021, il y a une légère révision de la croissance (3,4% contre 3,1 % projeté initialement). Les plus fortes révisions de la croissance du PIB sont celles de l'Ethiopie, du Nigéria, de la Côte d'Ivoire et du Bénin.

Malgré cette performance positive attendue en 2021, l'Afrique subsaharienne sera la région du monde où la croissance sera la plus lente. La reprise de l'économie mondiale devrait être à la traîne de celle du reste du monde, avec une croissance cumulée du PIB par habitant de 3,6 % sur la période 2020-2025, soit bien en deçà de celle du reste du monde (14 %). Le PIB par habitant dans beaucoup de pays ne devrait retrouver son niveau d'avant la crise Covid-19 qu'en 2023.

La reprise lente en Afrique, comparativement au reste du monde est due à plusieurs facteurs. Il y a l'accès restreint aux vaccins en Afrique et leur déploiement.
« La pandémie continue d'affecter les perspectives qu'au point où, il y a encore des pays qui font face à de nouvelles vagues de contamination, et d'apparition de nouvelles souches Covid-19. (...) les livraisons de vaccins attendues en Afrique subsaharienne d'ici fin 2021 ne seront pas suffisantes pour que 60 % de la population adulte soit vaccinée », a indiqué Y. Zouhar.

L'Afrique subsaharienne face à de nombreux défis

Les défis en Afrique Subsaharienne sont donc entre autres : faire face à des perspectives de croissance divergentes et affronter une longue pandémie de Covid-19.
Aussi, les pays de la région devront-ils s'attaquer aux séquelles de la crise Covid-19 puisque selon les données, le nombre de personnes vivant dans l'extrême pauvreté en Afrique subsaharienne a augmenté de 32 millions en 2020.
Le nombre de jours d'école manqués est plus de quatre fois plus élevé que dans les pays avancés. L'emploi a baissé d'environ 8,5 % en 2020.

Il est également nécessaire d'assainir les bilans publics et privés. Les trains de mesures budgétaires liées à la pandémie dans la région n'ont atteint que 2,6 % du PIB en moyenne en 2020.
La dette publique en Afrique subsaharienne a atteint plus de 66 % du PIB en 2020 ; le niveau le plus élevé depuis près de 15 ans.
Les bilans du secteur privé ont été sévèrement touchés par la pandémie (effondrement des ventes mensuelles des entreprises, pertes des revenus des ménages et prêts improductifs). Il faudra donc catalyser des financements extérieurs (améliorer le climat des affaires, diversifier l'économie, favoriser l'initiative privée) et opérer des réformes porteuses de transformations (potentiel de numérisation et de diversification).

Résilience de l'économe béninoise

Malgré les chocs exogènes, la croissance économique du Bénin est établie à 3,8 % (contre 2 % projeté). « Il n'y a pas eu de baisse du PIB réel par habitant. Il a été maintenu et la croissance démographique qui est autour de 3 % effectivement il y a eu une légère amélioration », a signalé le représentant du FMI.

Selon M. Aristide Mèdénou, directeur Général des Affaires Economiques (DGAE), la gestion de la pandémie très innovante au Bénin a préservé les affaires tout en permettant à l'économie de bien réagir. « Cela justifie les performances économiques que nous avons », a-t-il affirmé. Les perspectives économiques pour 2021 annoncent une croissance de 6%.

« Au Bénin depuis 2016, nous avons décidé de mettre l'accent sur la transformation structurelle de l'économie et donc cela fait partie des enjeux en cours de mise en œuvre. Nous allons continuer dans cette lancée », a ajouté le DGAE.
La croissance du Bénin est tirée par les branches "Administration publique et sécurité sociale" (0,9 point), "Education" (+0,6 point) "Agriculture" (+0,4 point), "Bâtiment et Travaux Publics" (+0,3 point) et les "Autres services" (+0,3 point). Le secteur tertiaire est le principal contributeur à la croissance (+2,3).

A en croire le Directeur général Adjoint des affaires économiques Adechina Colaholé Elie Idohou, le Bénin projette déjà retrouver en 2022, le rythme de la croissance d'avant la crise Covid-19 (6,9 %), l'équilibre budgétaire et un niveau d'endettement plus maîtrisé (40 % environ).

Il va falloir donc plus de financement, maintenir la crédibilité de l'économie béninoise vis-à-vis des institutions et des bailleurs de fonds. Ce qui permettra de lever plus de ressources tout en maitrisant le taux d'endettement afin de pouvoir bâtir une économie solide.

A.A.A

Die Zeiten ändern dich – die Spieler der Schweizer Nationalmannschaft träumen laut vom Titel, die Fans von einer Medaille. Ist das realistisch?

Sieben Personen, gegen die wegen des Todes der argentinischen Fussball-Legende Diego Maradona im vergangenen November ermittelt wird, sind wegen vorsätzlichen Mordes angeklagt worden. Das erfuhr die französische Nachrichtenagentur AFP aus Justizkreisen.

Koronavirus.gov.hu: További 657 magyar állampolgárnál mutatták ki az új koronavírus-fertőzést, ezzel 801.025 főre nőtt a Magyarországon beazonosított fertőzöttek száma. A kórnak csütörtökön 47 halálos áldozata volt – akiknek a "többsége" a magyar kormányzati portál szerint: "idős, krónikus beteg volt"...

Central and Eastern European countries need to set national coal phase-out dates by 2030 at the latest in order to fall in line with the climate goals of the Paris Agreement, environmental campaigners write.

Stadler-Rail-Boss Peter Spuhler übernimmt bei der Firma Swiss Steel ein Aktienpaket von Martin Haefner, dem milliardenschweren Besitzer des VW-Importeurs Amag.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.