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ANDRÁS ISTVÁN TÜRKE

THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKAN REGION AND THE REASONS FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA

A.I.T dedicate this analyse to the 70th birthday of Professor Ferenc Gazdag (born Sept. 24, 1946)



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Relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia before the war (1970-1991)^{1 2}

After the rupture with Stalin in 1948 Tito's Yugoslavia did not become a member of the Warsaw Pact and chose a policy of non-alignment with these partners by the Brioni declaration of 19 July 1956.

Shortly after the birth of the European Economic Community (established by the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957³), relations between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany became rather tense because of the Hallstein doctrine: On 19 October 1957 the Federal Republic of Germany broke off relations with Yugoslavia which had recognized the GDR.

The country acceded to the GATT in 1965 and, as a result of the new Ostpolitik by Willy Brandt in January 1968, resumed contact with the FRG. However, cooperation between Yugoslavia and the EEC began in the 1960s when the EEC established its Common Customs Tariff and a common commercial policy. For the first time in 1968, Yugoslavia formally took diplomatic relations with the Community⁴.

Among the commercial customers of the Community, Yugoslavia rose from 12th place in

1968 to 11th in 1978. It was 25th among the Community suppliers in 1968 and 1975 and 26th in 1978. As time went by, Yugoslavia became the second most important trading partner of the EEC after Algeria and the first partner for industrial products in the Community.

Community imports ⁵ from this country increased considerably in the 1980s (1982: ECU 2,8 billion, 1990: ECU 7,7 billion).

Manufactured goods accounted for 39% of these exports, machinery and transport equipment 35% and chemicals 13%. The EC's trade surplus of ECU 2.2 billion in 1981 has been steadily declining and in 1988 it has become a trade deficit of ECU 104 million.

In 1990, 90% of industrial imports into the Community from Yugoslavia took place at zero duty.

On 19 March 1970, official relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia began with the initial non-preferential agreement signed in Brussels⁶. It covered a period of three years and expired on April 30, 1973. It was replaced by a five-year agreement signed in 1973, which was in force until 30 September 1978, and was tacitly renewed.

Under the terms of these agreements, the two sides agreed to most-favored-nation (MFN)

¹ TÜRKE, András István, *Le géopolitique des premières missions de l'Union européenne dans les Balkans*, Paris, L'Harmattan, pp. 1-250., (Manuscript, Forthcoming)

² This analyse is published with the support of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences / Bolyai János Research Fellowship (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia / Bolyai János Kutatói Ösztöndíj) <http://www.mta.hu>

³ The official position of Soviet policy towards the EEC may be characterized by the words "non-recognition" or "fundamental refusal" until Leonid Brezhnev said that "the Common Market is part of the real situation in Western Europe.". Until that date, even if the countries of central and eastern Europe had come into contact with the EEC (*de facto* recognition, sometimes clandestinely), the recognition *de iure* was impossible. In 1973, the COMECON (in which Yugoslavia has been an "observer" since 1955 and an "associate" member since 1964) has officially made contact with the EEC. Source: European Parliament, Working Documents 1981-1982, Document 1-424/81, et Sophie Huber, *Polyphonie sur l'identité de l'Europe communautaire - Aux origines d'un discours (1962-1973)*, Genève, The Graduate Institute, 2013. eBook, <http://iheid.revues.org/771>

⁴ Dusko Lopandic, *The Development of Bilateral Relations Between the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro/the Republic of Serbia with the European Union*, *Agora Without Frontiers* Volume 12 (2) 2006: 84-91

⁵ 11.8% of total exports from Yugoslavia to the Federal Republic of Germany, 15.2% to Italy, 3.8% to France, 1.6% to the Netherlands, 0.6% to Belgium ; 3.4% to Poland, 3% to the GDR, 2.8% to Hungary, 1.8% to Romania, and , 3% to Bulgaria in 1970. Source : Mihalo Jovanic, „Yugoslav Trade with EEC and COMECON Countries”, <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/>

⁶ In October 1970 President Tito made a tour in 5 out of 6 states of the EEC.

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treatment and emphasized the principle of non-discrimination. A Joint EEC-Yugoslavia Committee has been set up and diplomatic relations have intensified⁷.

Since 1977, the Community has assisted Yugoslavia in accessing the resources of the European Investment Bank (EIB). Until 1980 two loans totaling ECU 50 million were granted for the interconnection of the Yugoslav high-voltage electricity distribution system to the Greek and Italian networks and for the construction of a Transyugoslav road section.

After the agreements concluded since 1970, negotiations continued in 1978 between the EEC and the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which finally concluded a *cooperation agreement*.

The Agreement was signed in April 1980 and entered into force in April 1983. It was concluded for an indefinite period and included provisions on trade, financial assistance and cooperation in the fields of industry, science and technology, energy, agriculture, transport, environment and tourism.

The commercial and financial provisions of the Agreement were implemented by an interim agreement which entered into force on 1 July 1980 and remained in force for a period of five years (until 30 June 1985)⁸. Following its entry into force, the Community has abolished customs duties and quantitative restrictions on almost all current industrial products.

For a small number of sensitive products, these concessions have been subject to tariff ceilings. In the agricultural sector, tariff quotas have been opened or tariff concessions have been granted for

a number of important products for the Yugoslav economy. In particular beef (baby-beef), tobacco, wine and cherries.

The financial cooperation referred to above was formalized by a financial protocol under the Cooperation Agreement which provided for loans of up to ECU 200 million during the period 1980-1985. The 200 million ECU has been fully used by the Yugoslav authorities for three projects:

- the modernization of road networks;
- the modernization of railways;
- and the extension of the electricity distribution network.

This financial protocol expired on 30 January 1985 and a new protocol (the most important one with a Mediterranean country) was concluded for the period 1 July 1985 to 30 June 1991, with an allocation of an EIB loan for an amount of ECU 550 million.

However, apart from the financial protocol, the European Investment Bank has also granted an additional loan of ECU 60 million for the financing of the North-South highway, which is of considerable interest for links between Greece and other countries of the Community.

In October 1986, a bilateral textile agreement for the period 1987-1991 was concluded. They culminated in the initialling of a protocol to the cooperation agreement defining the basis for trade in textile products for the next five years.

In view of the progress made the Community « *has taken full account of the privileged relations with Yugoslavia by making appreciable improvements in both the legal content and the*

⁷ „Yugoslavia and the European Community”, *Europe Information*, Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 20/1979., pp. 1-8.

⁸ But it was agreed to extend these provisions until the conclusion of the Protocol extending the Cooperation Agreement to Spain and Portugal: On 10 December 1987 three protocols on trade provisions were signed. The first has significantly improved the access of Yugoslav products to the Community market and by two adaptation protocols (EC and ECSC) Spain and Portugal acceded to the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. Source : Relations CEE/Yougoslavie : L'Accord de coopération de 1980, Commission Européenne - MEMO/90/21, 30 mai 1990.

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economic substance to the supplementary protocol.»

Pursuant to the provisions of the Second Financial Protocol and the Additional Protocol to the Cooperation Agreement (1980), negotiations should have started as from 30 June and 31 December 1990.

	1968	1977	1985	1986	1987	1988	1990	1991
Import EC	480	1565	4783	4893	5251	5765	7700	5800
Export EC	808	3556	5834	5853	5398	5661	8500	5300
Balance	328	1991	1051	960	147	-104	-800	-500

In this context, the Commission submitted to the Council a communication, to define the framework and means of relations between the Community and Yugoslavia from 1991/92...⁹

Trade - EEC / Yugoslavia
(million ECU) (1991: first nine months)

⁹ Relations CEE/Yougoslavie : L'Accord de coopération de 1980, *op. cit.*

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The reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the objectives of the fighting parties

The process of disintegration, the Serbian military and political goals, the "Slovenian card"

The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began with the re-intensification of internal crises in the 1980s. The SFRY was divided into six republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and two autonomous territories Vojvodina and Kosovo.

In 1981, the first phenomena of crisis emerged in Kosovo, which was the only territory of the federation where the South Slavs were in a minority. In Kosovo, the Albanian population has multiplied much more rapidly than other nations since 1960 (see table on page 7).

The proportion of 67:24 Albanians/Serbs changed to 85:10 and Albanian nationalism was becoming stronger. Serbia found that the situation of the Serbian minority was beginning to be threatened with autocratic efforts by autonomous organs, led by the Albanians¹⁰.

Although the Serbs always had reservations against the two autonomies. The agrarian potential

of Vojvodina and the mines in Kosovo were important for the federation.

This time Serbian worries were not without bases: Serbian emigration (50-200.000 according to sources), resulting from the hidden discrimination against the Serbian minorities in Kosovo has become more and more obvious. Kosovo became for Yugoslavia what Bosnia and Herzegovina was for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The constitution of 1974 guaranteed the rights of the federated republics in the territory of Kosovo (except the right of secession) which did not satisfy Kosovo Albanians (the Kosovars).

The two crucial issues were:

1.) Albanians claimed autonomy (ie, having the same rights as the federated republics, which Serbia refused).

2.) The richer members of the federation (Slovenia, Croatia) were against continuing subsidies from the poorest region of the federation¹¹.

The amendment of the federal constitution was an impasse, because of the criterion of unanimity. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts alerted the Serbian nation that the loss of "historic territories"¹² has become a reality¹³.

¹⁰ According to the Slovenian political scientist, Anton Bebler, Kosovo played the same role in the fall of Yugoslavia that Bosnia played in the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Source : JUHÁSZ József, *Volt egyszer egy Jugoszlávia : A Délszláv állam története* (Il était une fois la Yougoslavie : L'histoire de l'État sud-slave), Budapest : Aula, pp. 192-193.

¹¹ JUHÁSZ – MARKUS – TÁLAS – VALKI, *Kinek a békéje ?*, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

¹² Notably Kosovo, and the decrease of the Serb minority of Krajina in Croatia (etc.). Kosovo has a symbolic value because of the Battle of Kosovo Polje which opposed the Ottoman Empire to a coalition of Christian princes of the Balkans on 15 June 1389. The main contingents of the coalition were those of the Prince of Serbia Moravian Lazar Hrebeljanović and one sent by the king of Bosnia Tvrtko I. This defeat raised Serbia to the Ottoman Empire.

¹³ JUHÁSZ József, *Volt egyszer...*, op. cit., pp. 190-199.

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The Serbian answer - after Milosevic came to power in 1986¹⁴ - was typical, and unfortunately Serbian methods did not attract the attention of the Western European powers. It was the Serbian parliament (and not the parliament of the federation that would have been competent on this subject) which took the decision on the dissolution of the institutions of Kosovo's autonomy...¹⁵

Milosevic put at the heart of the political debate the issue of Kosovo, Serbian nationalism, which was influenced by the emigrants from Kosovo, and the Kosovo problem became a top priority.

After the dissolution of the Association of Yugoslav Communists in January 1990, Milosevic's goals were changed: the goal of Serbia's reconstruction in Yugoslavia with the re-federalization of the country was transformed into the goal of creation of a "Serboslavia".

This Serbia is no longer part of the entire SFRY. This « small Yugoslavia » consists of Serbia (with Vojvodina and Kosovo) from Montenegro and other more or less Serbian territories, such as Lika-Banija-Kordun in Croatia (etc.)¹⁶.

In most states of the federation national homogenization resulted in nation-states that were (re)formed, except Muslims. In their case the process of nationalization only began in 1992. The republic's frontier lost the defensive role (which was previously very useful against the attempts of Italy after the Second World War).

At that time, the West was trying to recognize Ante Markovic as the "Yugoslav Gorbachev", who guarantees the pacifism of the transition, which is

particularly important for the Europe of Maastricht: an ally in South-East without the waves of immigrants and without the recomposition of debt¹⁷. No doubt this would have been the most optimal solution, but several phenomena indicated that it was not feasible. Instead of seeking an optimal solution the West has favored it.

What are these phenomena and when did they emerge? The republics of the SFRY began to demand more autonomy and suggested the revision of the federal constitution (1974). Especially Slovenia and Croatia were for the refoundation (and not for the dissolution) of the federation. As for the events in the SFRY, the most important international aspect at the time (1990-91) was the question of a possible dissolution of the Soviet Union.

This is why the international community has categorically refused to encourage efforts to dissolve the SFRY. Moreover, the Powers were against the reform of the federation in order to avoid setting a precedent by recognizing the newly born States: For global security the great powers were afraid of the phenomena of destabilization of peace caused by a possible fragmentation of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, NATO itself would have needed a peaceful continental corridor in the Balkans. The instrument of this policy applied by the EU and the US was "economic blackmail". The financial aid has become accessible only to the federation (ie "in block"), where the agreement of the different parties is guaranteed.

¹⁴ This year the SFRY was chaired by an Albanian from Kosovo, Sinan Hasani.

¹⁵ MESIC Stjepan, *Jugoszlávia nincs többé* (La Yougoslavie n'existe plus), Budapest : Helikon, 2003., p. 17. ; But the Hungarian sources claim that on 28 March 1989 the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" of the federal institutions recognized the right of Serbia to have the same state right as the other members of the federation. That is to say, the annexation of the two territories (Kosovo and Vojvodina), which have as follows lost their rights. We doubt the independence of "these institutions," not specified in the text, and favor the version of Mesic. Even the Hungarian version stresses that Macedonia and Slovenia were against, while Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina played tactical games. (see JUHÁSZ – MARKUS – TÁLAS – VALKI, *Kinek a békéje ?*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.)

¹⁶ see Memoirs of Borisav Jovic, 28 June 1990. ; JUHÁSZ – MARKUS – TÁLAS – VALKI, *Kinek a békéje ?*, *op. cit.*, p. 17 and p. 20. ; Demonstrations organized by the authorities for Kosovo Serbs throughout the federation resulted from tensions in Vojvodina (yoghurt revolution on 5-6 October 1988) and Slovenia.

¹⁷ MARKUS – TÁLAS – VALKI, *Kinek a békéje ?*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

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Births, deaths and natural growth in Kosovo by years and ethnicity

Year	Births						Deaths						T
	Total	Albanians	Serbs	Turk	Roma	Others	Total	Albanians	Serbs	Turk	Roma	Others	
1948	27792	18899	6698	56	417	1723	10324	7020	2488	21	155	640	
1949	31643	21517	7626	63	475	1962	12927	8790	3115	26	194	801	
1950	35222	23951	8489	70	528	2184	12991	8834	3131	26	195	805	
1951	29299	19923	7061	59	439	1817	14833	10086	3575	30	222	920	
1952	35619	24221	8584	71	534	2208	13867	9430	3342	28	208	860	
1953	34595	23525	8337	69	519	2145	16726	11374	4031	33	251	1037	
1954	38595	26245	9301	77	579	2393	13201	8977	3181	26	198	818	
1955	36736	24980	8853	73	551	2278	15292	10399	3685	31	229	948	
1956	37819	27950	5230	420	0	4219	13692	10349	2399	249	0	695	
1957	34159	23997	7114	697	0	2351	15300	11996	2365	252	0	687	
1958	39285	28452	7513	641	0	2679	11598	8885	1901	212	0	600	
1959	37364	26707	7339	409	0	2909	12878	9860	2188	141	0	689	
1960	41631	30545	7509	387	0	3190	13365	10426	2114	135	0	690	
1961	40561	29931	7115	316	0	3199	11759	9139	1931	102	0	587	
1962	41366	26710	6166	275	0	8225	15024	11776	2368	137	0	743	
1963	41525	31706	6463	321	0	3035	12423	9803	1845	107	0	668	
1964	42557	32748	6473	323	0	3013	12731	10219	1774	98	0	640	
1965	43569	34594	5795	305	131	2745	11767	9308	1752	77	0	630	
1966	42429	33689	5770	297	127	2546	10266	8241	1440	75	61	449	
1967	44001	34937	5984	308	132	2640	11308	9070	1636	81	57	464	
1968	44627	35434	6069	312	134	2678	10781	8557	1709	86	49	380	
1969	46480	36905	6321	325	139	2789	10892	8539	1714	89	64	486	
1970	44496	36409	6030	296	260	2501	10829	8246	1792	95	59	637	
1971	47060	38923	5111	213	352	2461	10312	7979	1558	87	60	628	
1972	47943	39936	4990	222	363	2432	10270	7845	1702	48	60	615	
1973	47714	39647	4984	243	419	2421	10358	7963	1527	62	57	749	
1974	49847	41733	4944	245	509	2416	10075	7906	1473	63	69	564	
1975	49310	41334	4870	298	479	2329	10018	7792	1528	50	64	584	
1976	51355	43379	4819	278	506	2373	10149	7945	1530	64	67	543	
1977	49849	42244	4549	263	545	2248	9811	7646	1460	56	76	573	
1978	49027	41663	4368	242	567	2187	9776	7642	1459	64	92	519	
1979	48125	41255	4012	235	434	2189	9575	7368	1507	40	94	566	
1980	53147	45584	4256	254	709	2344	8909	6846	1368	67	93	535	
1981	48111	41263	3675	228	714	2231	9677	7457	1445	60	119	596	
1982	52865	45288	4140	229	821	2387	10479	7925	1687	66	153	648	
1983	49645	42400	3778	175	674	2618	11040	8501	1583	48	115	793	
1984	55243	47172	4065	264	1083	2659	10573	8017	1551	75	155	775	
1985	53925	46309	3714	311	916	2675	11826	8905	1801	69	165	886	
1986	54519	47087	3636	315	1024	2457	10446	7819	1585	81	199	762	
1987	56221	48830	3645	290	1135	2321	10307	7864	1576	60	201	606	
1988	56283	49063	3454	245	1131	2390	10257	7770	1608	57	167	655	
1989	53656	46809	3242	236	1106	2263	10181	7637	1654	66	205	619	
1990	55175	47865	3458	270	1111	2471	8214	5840	1437	45	175	717	
1991	52263	45313	3368	266	1010	2306	8526	6432	1324	54	152	565	
1992	44418	38511	2862	226	859	1960	8004	6038	1242	50	142	530	
1993	44132	38263	2844	225	853	1947	7804	5888	1211	49	139	517	
1994	43450	37672	2800	221	840	1917	7667	5784	1190	48	136	508	
1995	44776	38822	2885	228	866	1975	8671	5749	2030	69	222	601	
1996	46041	39918	2967	234	890	2031	8392	5482	2008	55	166	681	
1997	42920	37212	2766	219	830	1894	8624	6506	1339	54	153	571	
1998	41752	36324	2463	251	960	1754	8123	6450	1295	18	48	312	
1999	40020	34817	2361	240	920	1682	7569	5870	1124	15	50	510	
2000	38687	36658	6	232	290	1501	7115	6720	48	17	46	284	
2001	37412	35548	4	224	320	1316	6672	6071	44	22	42	493	
2002	36136	35174	5	100	316	541	5654	5357	32	18	38	209	
2003	31994	30917	18	125	380	554	6417	5987	119	16	40	255	
2004	35063	33812	3	153	432	663	6399	6137	81	12	30	139	
2005	37218	35982	4	175	430	627	7207	6825	118	13	31	220	
2006	34187	32977	8	156	247	799	7479	7072	96	29	25	257	
	2570859	2119679	269905	14503	30007	136766	617350	472359	99817	3924	5789	35461	195
	100	82,5	10,5	0,6	1,2	5,3	100	76,5	16,2	0,6	0,9	5,7	1

For years 1948 - 1955 and 1965 - 1969, data on births were not processed by mother's ethnic background.

For years 1948 - 1955 and 1966 - 1969, data on deaths were not processed by the ethnic background of the dead person.

For years 1991-1997, the ethnic structure for births is the assessments of the SOK including deaths for the period 1991-1994

For 1998-2001, is assessment of SOK for births and deaths.

Source: 1990-1997 "Kosovo Vital Statistics 2004", page 7

The background of the Kosovo problem: Maturity and mortality rate (1948-2006)

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But the process of disintegration in the SFRY was inevitable. The political crisis at the federal level began on 15 May 1991 when the Serbs were blocking the election of the Croatian candidate

with the Serbian blocking the election of the Croatian candidate for the Federation's presidency. In order to understand the reasons, it must first be known that within the State Presidency the distribution of votes was as follows: each republic and each autonomous territory had delegated one representative. To have a rather collegial decision (but at least to obtain the absolute majority) it was necessary to have 5 votes.

But Serbia, with the votes of the two autonomies (Serbia itself decisively influenced the delegation of their deputy), and Montenegro succeeded in blocking the function of this organ at the summit of the SFRY.

Theoretically it was the president (this is the rotating presidency every year among the delegates of the entities) of the federation who was the supreme commander of the federal army. But since 1991 (since the Croatian presidency of Stipe Mesic) he never managed to get the majority to make a decision on the federal army. Such a situation accelerated the autocratic tendencies of the leaders of the federal army where the Serbs were overrepresented¹⁸.

The political games of the Serbian leaders have succeeded in creating a very delicate situation vis-a-vis the other members of the federation. The Presidency of State lost *de facto* the political control over the federal army. Army leaders have benefited and have successfully sought to legitimize their own activity (of course, with the agreement of the Serbian government) without being able to be accused (for a very long period) of being Putschist *de iure*.

Serbian diplomacy has remarkably succeeded in convincing the great powers that it alone can handle this delicate situation and guarantee the stability of the federation. Paradoxically, in this context, the strengthening of Yugoslav unity even by violating the right of the two autonomy seems rather favorable to the West.

Unfortunately, it will be noted the ignorance of the heads of state of Western states, who did not recognize the importance of violations of the federal constitution by the Serbs (see Kosovo and in particular the creation of the "High Command Staff"¹⁹ which took the decisions, "replacing" the State Presidency.)

The role of the JNA

At the time, the JNA (the SFRY's army) should be seen as an autonomous political actor, which remained centralized by avoiding transitional reforms. Thus it has become the only actor which seems capable (and ready) to defend the unity of the federation.

In the meantime, the objectives of General Kadijevic and Adjic met early Milosevic's tactics to re-establish the unity of Serbia and transform Yugoslavia into "*Serboslavia*".

But in accordance with the expectations of the international community, this last aim has sometimes been tactically mixed with the defense of unity: Practically it was impossible (avoiding the war) to integrate all Serbs into a state without the safeguarding of the federation. So Serbia and Montenegro have proposed reforms within the framework of the federation²⁰.


First, Slovenia was most threatened by Serbian plans. Ethnically Slovenia was the most

¹⁸ MESIC, *Jugoszlávia nincs többé*, op. cit., p. 11, p. 252 et p. 284.

¹⁹ The establishment of this body was only possible after the declaration of a state of emergency

²⁰ JUHÁSZ, *Volt egyszer...*, op. cit., pp. 216-220.

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Serbian autonomous territories outside Serbia

Serbian Territories declared autonomy:

1 Kraina of Knin, then "Serb Republic of Kraina", 2 Western Slavonia, 3 Eastern Slavonia, 4 Bosnian Kraina, 5 Northeast Bosnia, 6 Romanija, 7 Eastern Herzegovina ;

Muslims territory declared autonomy:

8 Sandjak;

Albanian territories declared autonomy :

9 "Republic of Kosovo"; 10 West Macedonia

A: Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Vojvodina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia

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Source : <http://terkepek.adatbank.transindex.ro>

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homogeneous republic of the federation, and its more developed economy hardly tolerated Serbian domination at the federal level. The « *Yugoslav Gorbachev* »²¹ recognized, that without Slovenia the balance between the Croats, the Muslims and the Macedonians is no longer sustainable vis-à-vis the Serbian bloc.

It is the reason of the "Slovenian card" why Serbia refused to give its (formal)²² approval for the Croatian presidency of the federation. Milosevic and the generals knew that the approach of a confederation (following the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia) would have been accelerated by the President Stipe Mesic.

At this point, it must be stressed that Serbs benefited from the sympathy of the international public opinion because of Tito, ally of the winners, however the Croats were associated with the Nazis because of the collaboration of the Ustasha regime. The Diaspora (more than 1 million people) was the only means of expression of the Croatian people under the authoritarian regime of Tito.

The Bosnian Muslims were to them considered as those who "betrayed" the Christians by converting to Islam for material benefits under the Ottoman Empire.

Serbian propaganda effectively threatened the Europeans by the formation of an Islamic state by an independent Bosnia and the French military were persuaded that it was a religious war²³.

Evaluation of Serbian objectives and tactics

At the international level, this match was won by the Serbs who played perfectly the chess game: By the agreement of Brioni, for the Serbian authorization of the election of Stipe Mesic (at the head of a presidency that was perfectly blocked),

Serbia succeeded in forcing Croatia and Slovenia (through an international support) to sign a moratorium that postponed the official declaration of their independence for three months.

But it became clear that the dream of the Serbian generals on the safeguarding of the SFRY and even the peaceful solution by a reform of the federation proposed by the Serbian Prime Minister of the Federation, Ante Markovic, were unfeasible.

Finally, Serbia also accepted the possibility of a confederation, or dissolution, as an alternative of the same rank of the federation. But with the condition of the revision of the borders. However, it refused to recognize, after possible secession, the right of the republics to integrate territories whose population wanted to remain "in Yugoslavia".

Milosevic acknowledged that it was no longer possible to prevent the independence of homogenous Slovenia. As for the Serb generals, it has not become clear that only after the fall of the offensive against Slovenia (officially to guarantee the borders of the federation).

Historically Croatia is on the historical border between the Catholic and Orthodox worlds. The Serb goal for Croatia was more different because of a simple reason: Croatia had an important Serb minority (12%) unlike Slovenia (3%).

That is why even Milosevic was up to the last moment, a supporter of a federation (« small Yugoslavia » or Serboslavia) of which Croatia would have been a member. The occupation in Slovenia greatly reduced Serbia's last chance to safeguard the sovereignty of Yugoslavia more or less in accordance with international law: That is to say, without the demand for a change of borders at the federal level.

²¹ Milosevic, voir JUHÁSZ, *Volt egyszer...*, op. cit., pp. 190-191. et pp. 220-225.

²² The automatism of the rotating presidency is laid down in the Constitution of the SFRY (Section 327, Article 1) and in the Organic Law of the Presidency of State (Article 70) Source : MESIC, *Jugoszlávia nincs többé*, op. cit., p. 29.

²³ De la FORPRONU à l'IFOR - La France en Bosnie 1992-1996. Cahier de la Recherche doctrinale, CDEF/DREX, 2006., p. 26. et p. 36.

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Milosevic, in close cooperation with General Kajdijevic and Adjic, began to occupy systematically the territories of Serbian minorities (see the table on Serbian territories), and the ethnic cleansing.

The method applied was that even if the Serbian population were mainly trying not to accept the policy of Greater Serbia, the secret agents, and paramilitary groups were infiltrating and beginning to destabilize the region by pacting with the extremists on the spot. The aim was to make it known that it was because of the Serbian victims in Croatia that the federal army had grouped itself in Croatia.

The presence of the army encouraged revolts even if the Federal Army was absent from acting directly²⁴. At the time, the Federal Army was tasked to hinder to the crisis management by the Croatian Gendarmerie, just to increase the rate of destabilization. (In Glina this "Serbian army" even fought against its Serbian compatriots: the local majority, the gendarmes were 90% Serbian²⁵.) Such anomalies were not exceptional.

The 3-month moratorium (until 7 October 1991) unintentionally favored Serb objectives. He almost gave them a free hand (while the Serb leaders "forgot" to respect the cease-fire agreement) in the policy of occupation of all possible territories in Croatia, and in the help of a party of the Serb minority in Croatia.

However, Croatia was obliged to respect the moratorium in order, so as not to discredit itself on the international scene. Once the goals were achieved, Serbia changed the tactics. Now it has become the biggest supporter of the deployment of an international force (but of course, with a very

limited mandate) in Croatia, under certain conditions.

This is the total failure of European diplomacy, because it was finally the Serbian version that was realized with the clear violation of international law. The international force of UNPROFOR / FORPRONU has been sacrificed at the level of international politics for the status quo, resulting from the aggressive policy of Serbia at the time : UNPROFOR's staff were deployed between the two armies (Croatian Army + Gendarmerie and the Federal Army), violating Croatian sovereignty which has become an international *fait accompli* since 8 October 1991²⁶.

The worst is that the Bosnian Serbs, with the support of Serbia, acted similarly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and once again, the international community reacted badly.

The precedent so created by the international community, even if it was not unique, is very risky. It suggests that a *status quo* resulting from an aggressive and military policy can be validated - even involuntarily and indirectly.

Croatian objectives and issues and the outbreak of the war in Croatia

Croatia's policy was ambiguous at the time. Lost in the presidency of the Yugoslav federation in May 1991, Stipe Mesic was finally elected last president of the federation on 1 July 1991. He has continuously guaranteed, through its function, the existence of the Yugoslav federation until December 5, 1991²⁷.

And international law does not prefer interference in a civil war. Thanks to him, on the international scene the republic seemed to be able to function

²⁴ Except for a few exceptions such as the Federation Air Force raids against the Croatian gendarmerie

²⁵ MESIC, *Jugoszlávia nincs többé*, op. cit., p. 176.

²⁶ The Croats were in favor of the deployment of international forces at the border between Serbia and Croatia.

²⁷ MESIC, *Jugoszlávia nincs többé*, op. cit., pp. 5-36., p. 76 et p. 383

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with some internal problems. The non-resignation of Mesic masked the fact that the civilian control over the army ceased to function: The army chiefs acted effectively alone, without respect for the command of the president of the federation. But if it was really a *coup d'Etat* at the federal level, why did the president refuse to resign?

The political activity of Mesic was based on two reasons²⁸: The first is the Croatian confidence in the European diplomatic management of the crisis until the last minute. At the time, the European objective was to safeguard Yugoslavia and so Mesic preferred to keep its position (rather symbolic than real) at the top of the federation.

The ineffectiveness of this diplomacy has had far-reaching consequences: Europe was incapable of defending its objectives and values²⁹.

The second reason was more practical: the HDZ (Croatian army) was much weaker at the time than the JNA units.

The war in Croatia began already in the summer of 1990, when after the « tree-trunks revolution » in Knin, the Federal army invaded Knin and Pakrac.

In March 1991, following the violence in Pakrac, General Kadijevic tried to make a decision by the Federal Presidency to declare the state of emergency: This decision would have been important to have a free hand at the head of the army, to legalize the intervention in Croatia.

Moreover, Kadijevic succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the Russian generals³⁰. But this time it was their opponents who reaped the fruits of the decision-making mechanism within the Presidency.

After the success of Slovenia (independence by the Brioni agreement) Milosevic started a bloody war in Croatia. On 16 December 1991, after the Kohl-Mitterrand summit, France changed its mind

and the EEC countries decided to recognize together on 15 January 1992 the new states of Europe and the former USSR (In particular Slovenia and Croatia). Provided that the governments of these States guarantee the rights of national minorities.

Croatia has refused it, offering a golden pretext to the Serbs for their military offensive...³¹

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
²⁸ The first one often appears in his book, the second remains rather hidden.

²⁹ Here is the proof that explains the logic of the CEECs when they prefer NATO (*hard security*, piloted by the United States) and not the EU (*soft security*) and European defense.

³⁰ MESIC, *Jugoszlávia nincs többé*, op. cit., p. 31. et p. 33.

³¹ « Ex-Yougoslavie : Après l'annonce du plan Owen-Stoltenberg, la guerre continue », *CPS (Combat pour le socialisme)*, N° 50, novembre 1993., http://socialisme.free.fr/cps50_ex_yougoslavie.htm#_Toc84999437

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Abstract

After the rupture with Stalin in 1948 Tito's Yugoslavia did not become a member of the Warsaw Pact and chose a policy of non-alignment. Shortly after the birth of the European Economic Community, relations between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany became rather tense because of the Hallstein doctrine.

On 19 March 1970, official relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia began with the initial non-preferential agreement signed in Brussels. Since 1977, the Community has assisted Yugoslavia in accessing the resources of the European Investment Bank.

The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began with the reintensification of internal crises in the 1980s. The SFRY was divided into six republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and two autonomous territories, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

In 1981, the first phenomena of crisis emerged in Kosovo, which was the only territory of the federation where the South Slavs were in a minority. In Kosovo, the Albanian population has multiplied much more rapidly than other nations since 1960...



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CERPESC ANALYSES
Special issue / 2016

Editors

Europa Varietas Institute
www.europavarietas.org

Association Objectif Europe III
– Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III

Editor-in-chief

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ISSN 2073-5634