

# CERPESC

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ANDRÁS ISTVÁN TÜRKE

« BORN TO BE WILD »

## SOUTH SUDAN AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE

(2011-2024)



CERPESC - CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE RECHERCHE POUR LA PESC  
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## Introduction

**B**efore 2011, until the declaration of independence of the Republic of South-Sudan (Juba), Sudan was the largest country in Africa and the seventh most populous. It was ruled by General Omar al-Bashir between 1989-2019.

The main religions in the country are Islam (70%), animism (25%) and Christianity (5%). The growth rate in 2003 was 6.1% with an inflation of 8.8% and an unemployment rate of 18.7%. According to the IMF, Sudan spends 4.9% of its GDP on its military apparatus.

The relations between the government and the Darfur rebels are manifested in a particularly complex network of conflict at the national level, and sometimes with international elements of destabilization. In Sudan there are conflicts between the different Arab and African ethnic groups throughout the country, and several divisions aggravate the internal politics of the country:

As in Chad the North-South conflict is predominant: After independence in 1956 the South of the country was under the control of the Catholic missions while the Northern, Islamic part was controlled by the military regimes which were supported by Iraq, by Libya and (sometimes as mediator) by Egypt.

The hostilities between the parties of traditional Islam and modern fundamentalists are other factors of destabilization.

This analysis seeks to answer the basic questions how has the South Sudan issue been handled by Khartoum since Sudan's independence in 1956? And how has South Sudan's political life changed since the proclamation of independence on 9 July 2011?

Has the long-awaited peace and economic prosperity arrived? Is it really Khartoum who has been the only one who has interfered the development of this region?

Or maybe the first 14 years of the new state weren't such a success story after all? How did the cooperation between the former allies develop? Did local conflicts develop over the oil reserves? And finally, how did the relationship with neighboring Sudan develop?

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## I.

### **Antecedents:**

**History of independent Sudan before partition  
and the South issue**  
– *Discord in diversity*

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## 1.1. Islamist Expansion, a Medium Oil Power and Several Internal Cleavages<sup>1</sup>

The formerly British-Egyptian condominium (1889-), Sudan gained independence in 1956 and came under Soviet « guidance » during the early years. Conflicts quickly escalated between the Islamic-Arab north and the Christian-animist, predominantly black, south.

The British governors had already recognized that the three southern provinces of the British Sudan – **Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria** – had not been Arabized or had undergone very little Arabization and Islamization. The traders of the northern tribes with an Arab identity, the Jellabas, had over the centuries exerted only a superficial cultural influence on the peoples living along the White Nile, and had even incited hatred against the northerners in the ethnically diverse region through the slave trade.

In 1929, the colonialists announced the Southern Program, which meant the “closure” of the three southern provinces. Not only foreigners, but also northerners could only enter the area with permission.

The British aimed to “save” the south from the results of the slow but effective process of Arabization and Islamization, so that the proselytizing and at the same time spreading the English language activities of the Christian missions could prevail without any disturbance. The colonialists did not make the region an independent colony, but governed it from Khartoum, they prepared the ground for the region's later violent Arabization, marginalization, and civil war.

The 1955 southern **Torite rebellion**, accompanied by the massacre of the northern garrison, sparked the civil war, during which the southerners united in the

Equatoria-based and led Anya-Nya movement, which became famous in the national army in Khartoum for its guerrilla fighting style and bushwhacking tactics. The southern resistance was militarily supported mainly by Israel.<sup>2</sup>

Sudan's post-independence history was marked by the dictatorships of three generals: **Ibrahim Abboud** (1958-64), **Jafar M. Nimeiry** (1969-85) and **Omar al-Bashir** (1993- 2009). The latter two extended Islamic law to the country.

Since 1956 the country suffered the most coup attempts in Africa totalling 20 coup attempts, of which 7 were successful (2021), globally this is the second rank behind Bolivia.

The goal of General Abboud's right-wing coup on November 17, 1958, was to prevent the secession of South Sudan at all costs. The US through the CIA, and Great Britain also played an active role in the removal of the right-wing Prime Minister, Abdallah Khalil. With Abboud, British orientation came back to the country.

In 1964, the Free Officers movement forced Khalil to resign. Their program called for democratization and a peaceful resolution of the South Sudan question. Between 1964-68 a unity government with the communists was formed: However, democracy triggered a power struggle between parties and sects, the economy collapsed, the country fell into anarchy. In the southern provinces the deployed military maintained order. Changes of government followed one after the other and the former colonial societies regained power.

During President Nimeiri, in 1969 the new regime enjoyed the support of the left, and a mixture of socialism and Nasserism became the designated path of development. The president persecuted religious fanaticism. General autonomy for South Sudan, and

<sup>1</sup> Sudan: Dossier, CERPESC, [https://europavarietas.org/csdp/soudan\\_dossier](https://europavarietas.org/csdp/soudan_dossier)

<sup>2</sup> Illés, Zoltán: « Dél-Szudán függetlensége », *Kül-Világ*, 3/2011, 1. [https://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00039/00025/pdf/EPA00039\\_kulvilag\\_2011\\_03\\_illes.pdf](https://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00039/00025/pdf/EPA00039_kulvilag_2011_03_illes.pdf)



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economic, social and cultural development of the region were promised. A **Minister of Southern Affairs** was appointed.

In 1973 the constitution was promulgated and Islam became the state religion and the single-party system, the SSU (Sudanese Socialist Union) was also introduced.

To pacify South Sudan it was necessary to make reconciliation with neighboring countries. This is why in February 1972 the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (Ethiopia) was concluded. This agreement ended the **North-South War (1955-1972)** and gave relative regional autonomy to the 3 southern provinces within a confederal framework. In addition, cultural and religious freedom was

guaranteed. And a **Southern Regional Autonomy Act** (amendable by a 3/4 majority of the Assembly) was signed.


In 1973 the constitution was promulgated, and Islam became the state religion. The relative internal autonomy given to the southern provinces stabilized the regime. After several coup attempts, in July 1977, during the secret meeting between President Nimeiri and Sadek el Mahdi, head of the Sudanese National Front, a "national reconciliation" was announced. Hassan el Tourabi (Muslim Brotherhood) was appointed Chairman of the committee responsible for revising the legislation in order to "Islamize" it.

Between 1979-81, following the discovery of oil in the South, Nimeiri's failed attempt to change the borders to include the wells of the Southern region into the Northern region. Unity was therefore annexed to the North at that time. In 1980 the Jonglei Canal Project, intended to collect water from the Nile for Egypt, seriously threatened Southern Sudan.

In June 1983 the **Economic Conference on the Problems of the South** in Juba drew up a provisional assessment of the Southern Development Plan (1977-83). Of the \$225 million planned over six years for the South, 20% had actually been paid.

In 1983, after the **abolition of internal autonomy of the Christian territories in the South**, Sharia law became exclusive. This is why in May 1983 black units of the Sudanese army rose up against their Arab command and Colonel John Garang created the SPLA. The second civil war broke out (1983-1995) in the south between the government and the SPLA.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been massively present in Sudan since 1949.<sup>3</sup> Unlike the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Sudanese Brotherhood is an



<sup>3</sup> Islamic organisation founded by Hassan el Banne in Egypt in 1928 which fights against the modernity of the West and reforms in the world of Islam which bring closer to Western standards and promote the purity of the Koran. They fought against Arab nationalism (Nasser).

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integral part of the government party, the *Ummah*, and cooperated with General Muhammad an-Nimery (1977-85) and from 1989 Omar al-Bashir until 1999.<sup>4</sup>

During these periods their leader, **Hassan al-Turabi** became the "No. 2" of Sudan. That is, the ideological & religious leader with a wide political influence, by affecting the sharia, on the measures taken by the government that sometimes added fuel to the fire of the various internal conflicts. In 1979 he became Minister of Justice.

But, what is even more important, Turabi had the ambition to become leader of the Islamic Revolution at the world level. The movement has concentrated in Sudan the most important banks (international Islamic financial network) and NGOs (Arabization and Islamization of black African populations and mediators in inter-Muslim conflicts) of the Islamic world, created the CPAI (an international forum for meeting and coordination of Islamist organizations), hosted Osama bin Laden and set up training camps for fighters of the Islamist movement.

Its international relations are part of a network linked to Algeria, the Horn of Africa, Yemen in the North of Afghanistan, or Bosnia. This activity was based on the financial support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia until 1991 (when Sudan supported Iraq) and after that of Iran.

Sudan has become the epicenter of the international Islamist movement. As a logical consequence of this

activity, Sudan became a potential target of the United States (air raid in 1998) and Turabi's increased power threatened President el-Bashir (Turabi was in favor of a law limiting the power of the head of state and he was against the re-election of el-Bashir), the latter dissolved parliament in 1999, imprisoned Turabi, and imposed a state of emergency in December 2005<sup>5</sup>.

The other most important factor in the region is the oil issue. Since the completion of the *Greater Nile Oil Pipeline* (Unity, Sector 1 – Heglig, Sector 2 - Port Sudan, 1600 km) in 1999, and the Petrodar pipeline in April 2006 (Melut Bashin - Port Sudan, 1380 km) Sudan has become a medium oil power thanks to the combination of two factors: It has oil and a sea gateway that are generally very favorable for oil exports. The problem is that the oil wells are located mainly in the territories of South Sudan and a lesser part in Darfur, two hotspots of the country.

Since 2006, production of 500,000 barrels per day brings in more than 2.5 billion dollars per year (and exploitation is gradually increasing). Among the hydrocarbon concessions, the Europeans (France, Austria and Sweden) were also present on site.<sup>6</sup>

How can we estimate the importance of the country's reserves compared to the whole of Africa, which produces 7.8 million b/d of oil and 11% of world production? As for oil reserves, Sudan (a possible future member of OPEC) is positioned after Libya, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria (11.3-36 billion

<sup>4</sup> In the meantime (1986-1989, democratic period) the National Islamic Front founded by Turabi has become the third political force in Sudan.

<sup>5</sup> MAULION, Fabrice, *L'Organisation des Frères Musulmans – Évolution historique, cartographie et éléments d'une typologie (I)*, Paris, Université Panthéon-Assas - Paris II., 2004, 200-233.

<sup>6</sup> As for the most important oil and gas concessions were in 2001: Sector 1 (Unity): Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company / produces 90% of the oil and is owned by CNPC for 50%, Petronas for 30%, ONGC-Videsh (India) for 25%, Sudapet for 5%. Sector 2 (Heglig): Talisman Energy Inc. (Canada); Sector 4 (Kaikang) Petronas Carigali (Malaysia), Sudapet (Sudan), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC); Sector 3: Gulf Petroleum Corporation (Qatar); Sector 7 (Mellut) . Sudapet, CNPC; Sector 5a: Lundin OI AB International Petroleum Corporation (IPC, Sweden), Petronas Carigali, OMV Sudan Exploration GmbH (Austria), Sudapet; Sector 5 (Central): TotalElfina (France); Sector 6 /in South Darfur/: CNPC Source : « Oil revenues allow Khartoum to purchase advanced MiG-29s from Russia », *Sudanreeves.org*, December, 26. 2001, <http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-req-viewarticle-artid-410-allpages-1-theme-Printer.html>

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barrels), with Gabon and Congo (1.5-2 billion barrels).<sup>7</sup>

In addition to these internal divisions, the foreign elements that destabilize the central power in Sudan are mainly the instability on the border with Chad (refugees from Darfur), Uganda and Ethiopia. The border with Uganda is threatened by raids by the LRA (*Lords Resistance Army*).

The border regions with Eritrea (which supports the Sudanese rebel group, the Eastern Front, in Kassala) and with Ethiopia are violated by organized criminal gangs. Struck by the action of Sudanese Islamists, the refugees have found asylum in Eritrea.<sup>8</sup>

Ethiopia and Eritrea served as a rear base for **John Garang, former leader of the SPLA/SPLM**,<sup>9</sup> since both countries supported the rebels of South Sudan against the government in Khartoum.

From 1980 the **Darfur region** was administered by a regional government and an elected governor. In the 1980s, the conflict between the non-Arab African *Fur* and *Zaghawa* communities in West Darfur was renewed, and since 1984 famine has reinforced the differences.<sup>10</sup> Since 1973, Libya has armed the Chadian opposition through Darfur, but it was in 1986, as a result of two events, that the Arab groups began to be massively armed:

After the destruction of Ibn Omer's camps in Chad by French forces and its Chadian allies (Hissene Habré), as part of **Operation Épervier** (Sparrow-

hawk), Ibn Omer took refuge in Darfur. He was welcomed by Sheikh Musa Hilal, the newly elected leader of the Arabs of Mahamid Rizeigat in North Darfur.<sup>11</sup> Thus the Arabs of Darfur obtained several weapons. On the other side, it was Hissene Habré who armed the *Furs* because they entered into conflict against their *Zaghawa* rivals.<sup>12</sup>

In addition, that year, Sudanese Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi had Arab communities armed in South Darfur to send them to fight against the SPLA/SPLM of John Garang in South Sudan. In Darfur, the first war between Arab communities and the Fur broke out in 1987 and lasted until 1989. During this war, the first *Janjaweed* militia organization was formed between the Arab groups.<sup>13</sup>

President Bashir, after taking power in 1989, bridged the gap between Arab and non-Arab communities in the region: He disarmed the non-Arab communities, but continued to provide weapons to loyal Arabs. In 1991 an armed Arab group attacked the Zaghawa, Fur and Massalit to challenge the dar system. The government encouraged the establishment of an Arab Alliance to monitor non-Arab groups.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>7</sup> MOLELI, Patrick-R. Monzemu, « Odeur du pétrole, Afriquespoir », [http://www.afriquespoir.com/Ae36/index\\_fichiers/petrol.htm](http://www.afriquespoir.com/Ae36/index_fichiers/petrol.htm) , (Accessed: January 18, 2007.)

<sup>8</sup> RODIER, Alain « La crise au Darfour », *Raids*, N° 223, décembre 2004, 20.

<sup>9</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, London, Boulder London, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, 2006, 169.

<sup>10</sup> « Sudan Civil War » , *GlobalSecurity.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan.htm>, (Accessed: January 15, 2007)

<sup>11</sup> *Steps towards the stabilization of Governance and livelihoods in Darfur, Sudan*, United States Agency for International Development, March 2005, 19., [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pnadc781.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadc781.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> "This strategy gradually turned against the Chadian leader because the Sudanese Zaghawa (...) mobilized at the end of the 1980s alongside Hassan Djamous' successor, Idriss Deby,..." and in Chad, the arrival of Idriss Deby, a faithful and reliable ally of Omar el Beshir, had mechanically calmed the situation in Darfur. Source : MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre, op. cit.*, 45-46.

<sup>13</sup> Türke, A. I. : La complexité de la crise du Darfour, CERPESC Analyses 08/AF/03/2008 - March 2, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (State Publication 11182, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, September 2004, <http://www.state.gov> )



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## 1.2. Administrative Reform and the outbreak of a center-periphery conflict and the civil war

The reason for several center-periphery conflicts in Sudan is that Khartoum exploited peripheral regions of the Nile Valley: from the Red Sea to the east, the Southern Blue Nile, the Great South, Kordofan and Darfur. The *dar* system prevented the implementation of agricultural megaprojects. Under the cover of decentralization, budgetary contributions for basic services were greatly reduced, administrative boundaries reorganized. The administration depriving traditional leaders, set up by the English, became systematically corrupted by the central government. The absence of investments in the field of water in addition multiplied the negative effects of the drought.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, in order to reduce the region's lobbying capacity, the 1994 constitutional reform (implemented in 1996) establishing a pseudo-federalism<sup>16</sup> divided the Darfur region into three parts. As a result of the reform, the territory of the *Fur* community was cut into three, and became a minority in each part with a visible loss of influence.

The reform created several new positions in the local administration for Arabs and especially Arabs of Chadian origin. It must be added that a wave of Arab immigration<sup>17</sup> from Chad changed the lines of power between the communities for 20 years (1973-1994) in favor of the Arabs.<sup>18</sup>

Curiously, **the internal conflicts in Darfur have gone beyond inter-ethnic frameworks and have led to a more or less unitary massive rebellion against the government when the center-**

**periphery conflict, between Khartoum and South Sudan began to be effectively controlled.**

This center-periphery conflict, often considered as the struggle between the Muslim North and the Christian and animist South, has existed at the time for 21 years in Sudan. In figures, it is about 1.5 million dead, more than 4 million displaced and 600,000 refugees in neighboring states.

At the end of the **first civil war (1955-1972)** the rebels succeeded in having a relative regional autonomy of the 3 southern provinces in a confederal framework and a total cultural and religious freedom.

The **second civil war (1983-2005)**<sup>19</sup> broke out because of the management of oil wealth and in the 1990s, in the eyes of Hassan al-Tourabi it was "*perceived as the internal front of the West's war against Islam.*" an undeniable element of internal stability to be able to start "*the international crusade.*"<sup>20</sup>

After several rounds of talks, the government and the SPLA/SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement) of Colonel **John Garang**<sup>21</sup> found the path of negotiations through the **Machakos Protocol (July 20, 2002, Kenya)** developed until the signing of the **Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, Nairobi, Kenya, January 9, 2005.)**

However, on July 30, 2005, John Garang, leader and founder of the SPLM, who became vice-president of Sudan under the peace agreements, died in a helicopter crash, rekindling tensions.

What were the most important elements of these agreements ?

<sup>15</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 717.

<sup>16</sup> AYAD, Christophe, « Le Soudan entre guerre et paix », *Politique internationale*, N° 108 (été 2005), 153.

<sup>17</sup> Especially the Chadian Mahamid and Mahariya sections of the Abbala Rizeigat of Darfur. See FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, London, Zed Books, 2005, 45.

<sup>18</sup> FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, *op. cit.*, 45.

<sup>19</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, « Accord avec le Sud, guerre au Darfour », *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>20</sup> MAULION, Fabrice, *L'Organisation des Frères Musulmans*, *op. cit.*, 221.

<sup>21</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. Sudan – *The Elusive Quest for Peace*, *op. cit.*, 169.

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As for the economic and financial aspect, the establishment of a dual banking system (Islamic in the North and classical in the South) and the distribution of oil profits (1/3 for the South of the 500 million dollars in 2001).

The political aspect of the treaties is that Colonel Garang became the vice-president with a veto power over the decisions of the head of state, al-Bashir. The government of the pre-interim period is composed of 28% members from the SPLA and 6% from the southern forces not members of the SPLA.

The security arrangements also provided for the establishment of the **JiUs (Joint Integrated Units)**: a new force of 40,000 men with a common headquarters, on an equal footing of SPLA and regular forces.<sup>22</sup>

The question is whether the crisis in Darfur since 2003 could be considered as the third phase of the North-South conflict?

Essentially no, because the Darfur region is geographically part of the Northern bloc, in addition it is an entirely Muslim region with a mixed population: Non-Arab and Arab.<sup>23</sup> The common aspect with the South is the marginalization vis-à-vis the center, Khartoum. This marginalization has become widely known through the analysis and tables of the **Black Book** published in 2000 and 2002.<sup>24</sup>

While the South has virtually no choice but war, Darfur has long kept faith in Khartoum's promises of rewards - never realized. They revolted when the

concrete benefits of twenty years of war became evident, thinking that violence led to the opening of negotiations on the role of Darfur.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, the **Naivasha Agreement** is also proof that the recognition of customary rights in the South can be successfully challenged against the law of the Sudanese State. Thus the *Unregistered Land Act* (1970), which *de jure* outlaws the Dar land system in the South, by declaring that all land not registered by a private owner now belongs (since April 1970) to the State, can be subject to possible revision.<sup>26</sup>

The domino effect has been achieved: after settling the status of the 3 southern provinces, and the Nuba Mountains<sup>27</sup> region and the Abyei area, the Darfur problem remained to be challenged.

Even if it was the United States that did not hesitate to consider the events in Darfur as a genocide, President Bush and his team played on the different ambiguities of the situation. The problem of Darfur was difficult to interpret by the 2 paradigms of American diplomacy that were based on the North-South conflict in Sudan: the "Garang lobby" (senators, humanitarians and auxiliaries of Congress) and the "group of realists" (State Department, CIA, DIA).

Finally, "the US administration's interest in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular declined considerably after Bush's re-election and the signing of the CPA in early 2005."<sup>28</sup>

<sup>22</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, « Accord avec le Sud, guerre au Darfour », *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>23</sup> But these Arabs are very different from the Arabs of the Nile Valley.

<sup>24</sup> A case in point: in 1999 the Northern region (12.2% of the population) had 60.1% of the places in the federal government with 15 ministers, and the Western region (31.7%) had 16.7% with 5 ministers. see *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*, Table 10 et 12, <http://www.sudanjem.com/2009/02/the-black-book-imbalance-of-power-and-wealth-in-sudan/> (Accessed: January 15, 2007)

<sup>25</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, « Accord avec le Sud, guerre au Darfour », *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>26</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », *op. cit.*, 122, 125.

<sup>27</sup> The Nuba Mountains are a more or less ethnically homogeneous region, home to the Nuba ethnic group (who do not identify as South Sudanese). The Nuba were also marginalized by Khartoum's policies and entered the civil war on the side of the SPLA in the 1990s. Blue Nile State was the only northern state to elect an SPLM candidate as governor in the April 2010 elections. The Funji and Udu, however, largely identify as southerners and seek to join South Sudan, but the CPA did not give them this opportunity. Source: Illés, Zoltán: « Dél-Szudán függetlensége », *op. cit.* 12.

<sup>28</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, *op. cit.*, 229-232.

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Why this ambiguity regarding US relations with Sudan? Without being able to discuss all aspects, namely that the exchange of information between US intelligence and the **Sudanese Mukhabarat**<sup>29</sup> dates back to the mid-1990s, or much earlier. In 1993, the Clinton administration put Sudan on the terrorist list - but it did not remove the CIA station from Khartoum until late 1995.

Although Khartoum has been seeking reconciliation since 1996, the mission of the CIA-FBI task force failed in 2000. This may be one of the reasons why US intelligence was poorly informed about the background to 9/11. In 2003 the Mukhabarat transmitted information, considered very important by the State Department concerning the formation of pro-Hussein networks.<sup>30</sup>

But if the Sudanese Mukhabarat is ready to cooperate, moreover it is capable of providing very useful information in the fight against terrorism, what is the real interest of the United States which plays several double games on the theater, under pressure from the Sudanese government which has been trying to stop following the Turabian path since 1999? Especially since the Sudanese secret service could *"serve as the eyes and ears of the CIA"* in Somalia.

Compared to the United States, the diplomacy of the European Union and/or its Member States concerning Sudan seemed to be occasional, ad hoc, isolated, sometimes divided and somewhat embarrassed without having a consensus of objectives on the international scene. The Irish Presidency of the European Union declared an embargo (arms,

munitions and military equipment) on 28 January 2004 against Sudan.<sup>31</sup>

And as a consequence of the fact that the lowest common denominator for a soft consensus within the EU was humanitarian, the EU General Affairs Council has repeatedly asked the Sudanese government, as on 26 April 2004, to allow completely free access to the region for the UN and for the various humanitarian organisations.<sup>32</sup>

In order to prevent diplomatic pressure that would have forced it to take undesirable political and military measures, Khartoum has applied with considerable efficiency the blackmail by blocking humanitarian missions.<sup>33</sup>

In South Sudan rebels forced humanitarian organizations to set up next to their military bases to prevent government air raids. They often loot food stocks or divert them before distribution. The distribution of aid is only authorized by, or under the coordination of "local committees." The government for its part can veto humanitarian action at any time, for example, by the UN OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan), which is almost absent from government-controlled areas.<sup>34</sup>

The example of SRRA (Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), the "humanitarian arm" of the SPLA in South Sudan, shows that the combatant parties themselves create and have recognized their own NGOs and humanitarian organizations in order to guarantee for themselves a logistical base for supplies. SRRA even signed an agreement recognizing the OLS, although it is the branch of a belligerent party.

<sup>29</sup> The CIA and FBI sometimes maintained a more friendly relationship with the Mukhabarat than with their French counterparts.: *« They've not only told us who the bad guys were, they've gone out and gotten them for us. Hell, we can't get the French to do that. »*

<sup>30</sup> Ken Silverstein, « Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism – Despite once harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum regime has supplied key intelligence, officials say », *Los Angeles Times*, le 29 avril 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU concerning the imposition of an arms embargo on Sudan, le 28 janvier 2004

<sup>32</sup> Remarks by Minister Brian Cowen at the General Affairs and External Relations Council press conference in Luxembourg, 26 April 2004

<sup>33</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, op. cit., p. 235.

<sup>34</sup> LAVERGNE, Marc – WEISSMANN, Fabrice, « Soudan Qui profite l'aide humanitaire? », WEISSMANN, Fabrice (dir.), *A l'ombre des guerres justes*, Flammarion, Paris, 2003., pp. 160-162.

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The SPLA was not able to guarantee the supply of its troops by air without such intermediaries. Sometimes this aid was the basis of counter-offensives, when several thousand inhabitants died of hunger. Indeed, on the theater, several humanitarian organizations were far from neutral: the DI (*al Da'wa al Islamiya*) and the IARA (*Islamic African Relief Agency*), NGOs linked quite strongly to the government and on the other side it is mainly CFI (*Christian Fellowship International*) and CSI (*Christian Solidarity International*) who fight against conquering Islam.<sup>35</sup>

Relations between the Sudanese government and France had been quite close since the 1990s because of common interests (notably the fight against Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni, the **Carlos affair**,<sup>36</sup> relations at the level of the intelligence services).<sup>37</sup> During the negotiations between Tourabi and Pasqua, France's role as mediator between Sudan, the EU, the United States, and the IMF was also called into question.

France, which provided AML 90 light armored vehicles, Puma helicopters, and 155 mm self-propelled guns for the Sudanese army, was often accused of defending Sudan, especially in Europe, by the IMF of supporting the Khartoum government with Spot satellite images of the position of the SPLA forces in South Sudan and for the intervention in the DRC and CAR for a right of passage for Khartoum's troops in order to take the SPLA<sup>38</sup> guerrillas from behind. It is difficult to ignore these facts when looking for the causes of French opposition.

## I.3. The Abuja peace process

In a paradoxical situation, in the shadow of the ceasefire agreement signed in N'Djamena, without consequences, the new president of the African Union since July 2004, Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigerian) started the Abuja peace process. The UN set up the **JIM (Joint Implementation Mechanism)** but expressed its refusal of a robust military action.<sup>39</sup> The mediators proposed to discuss these humanitarian, security, political and economic issues while the parties preferred the humanitarian and security aspects. The rebels were against the neglect of the political dimension of the conflict which was rather favorable to Khartoum.

In September 2004, the Abuja process was disrupted when Khartoum openly stated that the **Naivasha security talks (peace process between North and South Darfur)** would be blocked if it were put under pressure on the Darfur issue.<sup>40</sup> By taking advantage of the election campaign in the United States, this blackmail could well have had no consequences.

In June 2004, Kofi Annan appointed **Jan Pronk as Special Representative**, and launched UNAMIS, a preparatory mission in Sudan by Resolution 1547.<sup>41</sup>

On 29 September 2004, Gutbi al-Mahdi was welcomed by Mr Solana in Brussels.<sup>42</sup> The official communiqués do not allow us to know the details of this meeting which, in our opinion, should have been very interesting: Gutbi al Mahdi, at the time advisor to President al-Bashir, was one of the "fathers" of the

<sup>35</sup> LAVERGNE, Marc – WEISSMANN, Fabrice, « Soudan - Qui profite l'aide humanitaire? », *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

<sup>36</sup> Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (born 12 October 1949), also known as Carlos the Jackal is a Venezuelan who conducted a series of assassinations and terrorist bombings from 1973 to 1985. In 1994 he was ultimately captured in Sudan and transferred to France, where he was convicted of multiple crimes.

<sup>37</sup> MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, *op. cit.*, p.8

<sup>38</sup> JULLIARD, Jacques « Soudan : le marché de la honte », *Le Nouvel Observateur*, le 01 septembre 1994

<sup>39</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M., *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>40</sup> « Dispelling the Myths: Genocide in Darfur », *Waging Peace*, octobre 2006, [http://www.wagingpeace.info/files/20061025\\_Dispelling\\_the\\_Myths\\_Web.pdf](http://www.wagingpeace.info/files/20061025_Dispelling_the_Myths_Web.pdf)

<sup>41</sup> June 11. 2004

<sup>42</sup> Agenda Archive, September 29. 2004, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>



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Mukhabarat.<sup>43</sup> He also promoted cooperation between the Mukhabarat, the CIA and the FBI.<sup>44</sup>

On 9 January 2005, the Luxembourg Presidency of the EU expressed its strong concern about a possible negative influence of the North-South peace process in Sudan, the Darfur crisis, and by the same logic, it welcomed the decision of Mr Garang (president of SPLM/A) to attend the Abuja process.<sup>45</sup>

On 11 April 2005, at the EU-Africa Summit, the European Union reinforced its decision to continue supporting AMIS mission<sup>46</sup> according to the list of priorities drafted by the African Union. Both sides stressed the importance of the civilian component of the mission and the rapid complementation of the police component of the mission.<sup>47</sup>

In January 2006, the debates on the presidency of the African Union revolved around the following question: how to avoid such a delicate situation that Omar al Bashir, President of Sudan, becomes President of the AU, an organization that fulfills the role of mediator in the conflict in Darfur.<sup>48</sup> Chad - in a state of belligerence with Sudan - declared its official opposition to the Sudanese presidency at the head of the African Union.<sup>49</sup>

The AU parties eventually found a compromise among themselves: Denis Sassou-Nguessou (of Congo) became the AU chair who pledged to elect al-Bashir as president in 2007. (But in 2007, John Kufuor, the president of Ghana, became the AU chair.)

And to end the tensions between Chad and Sudan, the new African Union chair and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi took charge of mediation, and the adversaries signed the Tripoli Agreement on February 8, 2006.

However, in 2007, the important changes on the international scene regarding the Darfur crisis were the result of the following factors:

On 31 July 2007, UNAMID, the hybrid UN-AU mission was finally authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 after being approved by the Government of Sudan on 12 June. The planned strength is 19,555 military personnel, 6,432 police officers, and a significant civilian component, meaning that this mission will be the largest mission in the history of the UN since its creation.

A second important factor was the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy in France, in May 2007. In his electoral program, the crisis management in Darfur was a relevant element from the beginning. Thanks to the new momentum of the President and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner, the idea of a European operation to stabilize the Darfur/Chad/CAR region was born in July 2007. EU Joint Action No. 677 on the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation was born on October 15, 2007. It was based on UN Security Council Resolution 1778.<sup>50</sup>

According to the mandate, this force of 3,000-4,000 people was intended to stabilize the border region between Chad, CAR and Sudan/Darfur<sup>51</sup> and secure

<sup>43</sup> « Profile : Gutbi al-Mahdi », *History Commons*, le 5 février 1998, [http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=gutbi\\_al-mahdi](http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=gutbi_al-mahdi)

<sup>44</sup> Ken Silverstein, « Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism – Despite once harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum regime has supplied key intelligence, officials say », *Los Angeles Times*, le 29 avril 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/29/world/fg-sudan29>

<sup>45</sup> Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Sudan – Signing of the comprehensive peace agreement on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi

<sup>46</sup> Besenyő, Janos - Szabo, Zsolt: *AMIS: Peacekeeping in Darfur. The African Union Mission in Sudan, 2004-2006*. Warwick: Helion, 2024.; Besenyő, Janos : *Darfur Peacekeepers*. L'Harmattan, Paris, 2021.

<sup>47</sup> European Union-Africa Ministerial Meeting, Final communiqué, le 11 avril 2005

<sup>48</sup> OTTLIK Judit, « Szudáni javaslat árnyéka vetül az Afrika csúcsra », *Magyar Nemzet*, le 23 janvier 2006, <http://www.mno.hu>

<sup>49</sup> *Chad and the Darfur conflict intertwined*, Human Right Watch, February 2006, <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/chad0206/2.htm>

<sup>50</sup> September, 25 2007.

<sup>51</sup> In Tchad : Wadi Fira, Ouaddai, Salamat in CAR : Vakaga, Haut-Kotto

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the Darfur refugee camps (250,000 refugees in Chad; 30,000 in CAR, these two countries are engaged rather alongside the SLM/A) and the UN mission in Chad and CAR (MINURCAT).

Between the mandate and the objectives of the operation there is an important difference: **French military documents emphasize that the most important objective is to secure Chad** which was in contradiction with a purely humanitarian mission.

## I.4. Sudan after 2008

On 10 May 2008, the Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, attacked Khartoum and Omdurman, killing more than 220 people. It was the first time that the Darfur conflict had reached the capital, marking a significant escalation in a conflict that had already claimed up to 300,000 lives and displaced 2.5 million people since 2003.

On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity (and then genocide in 2010). In retaliation, thirteen NGOs were expelled from the country. All of this did not prevent al-Bashir from winning the presidential elections in 2010.

In December 2010, Bashir stated that if South Sudan secedes, he would change the constitution and then we will no longer talk about cultural and ethnic diversity. In Sudan, once again, *"the [Islamic] Shari'a will be the main source for lawmaking....and Arabic language will be the official language of the state."*<sup>52</sup>

After the financial and economic crisis worsened, the 30-year-old president, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown by a popular uprising on 11 April 2019. **Abdel Fattah al-Burhan** became the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of the Republic of Sudan.<sup>53</sup> Unlike his predecessor, he is not considered a "pillar" of the regime and has no known links to the Islamic Movement.

The military staged a new coup on 25 October 2021. The civilian government was dissolved and a state of emergency was imposed across the country.

In **October 2020** in **Juba** (South Sudan!) the **agreement** between the Sudanese government and representatives of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, an

<sup>52</sup> "Sudan's Bashir endorses lashing of YouTube woman, says North will transform into Islamic state", *Sudan Tribune*,

<sup>53</sup> Since 2021: Chairman of the *Transitional Sovereignty Council* of the Republic of Sudan (*de facto* head of state of Sudan). The Transitional Military Council (TMC) was the military junta governing Sudan that was established on 11 April 2019, after the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état that took place during the Sudanese Revolution.

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alliance of five rebel groups, was initialed. However, the differences between the two non-signatory rebel groups and the Khartoum authorities have become increasingly deep.

These include

- > the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu
- > and the Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdel Wahid al-Nur

Khartoum authorities oppose these two non-signatory rebel groups on the issue of the separation of state and religion to make Sudan a secular state. In addition, the SPLM-N has called for the end of the old regime and the return of civilians to power.<sup>54</sup>

On 15 April 2023, conflict broke out between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), plunging the country into chaos.

Since then, the civil war in Sudan has left at least 5,000 dead and at least 5.2 million people displaced. On 12 September 2023, Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, deplored the deaths of hundreds of people in ethnically motivated attacks by the RSF and allied militias in West Darfur.

<sup>54</sup> Dregnounou, Laetitia Lago: Soudan : « Rencontre à Juba sur l'évolution de l'accord de paix de 2020 ». *Africanews.fr*, 02/12/2022 <https://fr.africanews.com/2022/12/02/soudan-rencontre-a-juba-sur-levolution-de-laccord-de-paix-de-2020/>

# CERPESC ANALYSES

## II.

**The History of South Sudan after Independence**  
**(July 9, 2011 - 2025)**  
– « *Born to be wild* »



# CERPESC ANALYSES

## II.1. Trapped in internal contradictions

Nilotic peoples make up almost the entire population of South Sudan (approximately 12.5 million inhabitants). English is the official language (it is spoken by only 3 to 5% of the population; Juba Arabic, a lingua franca derived from Sudanese Arabic, is the most widely spoken language), and Christianity is the majority religion (60.5%, animists represent 19.5% and Muslims 20%). With independence, the sharia-based legal system was also abolished.

The country is populated by about 64 ethnic groups, the **Dinka** are the largest ethnic group recorded (4.500.000), followed by the **Nuer** (2.000.000) and the **Shilluk** (1.965.000). The area of

South Sudan is one quarter of the area of present-day Sudan, 644,329 km<sup>2</sup>. Despite exporting a few hundred thousand barrels of crude oil per day at the dawn of its independence, it is the poorest and one of the most underdeveloped regions on the continent.

The independence of the South, desired by the majority of the population of this region, is supported in particular by the United States. The work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has included establishing a central bank in Rumbek, the region's main city, which is being reorganized with the status of a nation-state.<sup>55</sup>

The biggest challenge facing the newborn state is to transform its leadership from an army into a government and its people from warriors into professionals. The strength of the Sudan People's



<sup>55</sup> Illés, Zoltán: • Dél-Szudán függetlensége, *op. cit.* 1. [https://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00039/00025/pdf/EPA00039\\_kulvilag\\_2011\\_03\\_illes.pdf](https://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00039/00025/pdf/EPA00039_kulvilag_2011_03_illes.pdf)

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Liberation Army is 40,150 men (2011). In 2009, it acquired at least thirty-three Ukrainian T-72s. On August 12, 2010, it purchased four Mi-17 helicopters from Russia. When the secession took effect, the peace agreement required the JIUs to be disbanded and the southern and northern soldiers to be integrated into the ranks of the SPLA and the Sudanese Army (SAF), respectively. But the SAF did not want to take back the units serving in the south as part of the joint forces.

In office since July 9, 2011, **Salva Kiir** (« *The man in black hat* ») is the President of the Republic of South Sudan, on July 27, 2011 the country becomes the 54th member country of the African Union.

In 2011, the new state began its operation with 10 more states and one special district, Abyei. Why? The

2005 Sudanese peace agreement left the status of the **Abyei** district unsettled. Abyei's land is fertile even in the dry season, and the Diffra oil field in its territory contains 0.6 % of Sudan's oil reserves.

Here, the members of the Missirija tribe spend only part of the year in the region, but in the referendum they want similar rights as, for example, the Dinka tribe or other ethnic groups living there.

Omar al-Bashir rejected the Abyei Boundaries Commission's decision to establish the boundaries of the area, which was part of the CPA. After bloody clashes between the Sudanese army and the SPLA in 2008, the borders drawn by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague awarded Abyei a smaller area than the ABC decision, but this was accepted by both parties.

## Major Armed & Rebel Groups in South-Sudan (2010-2011)

	Name	Creation	Ethnic	Leader(s)	Number	Location
(SPLM/A)		(1983-2017)	mainly Dinka	(John Garang) Salva Kiir	25-30.000	South-Sudan
SSDF	<i>S. S. Def. Forces</i>	2017-18				
SSPDF	<i>South Sudan People's Defence Forces</i>	2018-			53.000 - 90.000	
SSDM/A	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army	2010	Nuer-Murle	George Athor	? 1800	Jonglei Upper Nile
SSDM/A-Cobra faction	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army-Cobra faction	2010-2014	Murle	David Yau Yau	3000-6000	Jonglei Pibor (Boma)
SSLM/A	South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army	1999	Nuer	Peter Gatdet Yak	3000	Upper Nile (Gatdet, Mapei)
NDM	National Democratic Movement	2016	Nuer	Gabriel "Tang-Ginye" (long pipe) Gatwech Chan	? 300	Juba
n/a	n/a	? 2010	Nuer	Gatluak Gai	? 350	Unity (Pakur, Koch)


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Map | African Politics

## South Sudan's 10 States and 3 Administrative Areas

Last updated: Feb. 28




Source: Wikipedia

The Abyei referendum was to be held at the same time as the southern referendum, according to which the territory would have either remained part of Southern Kordofan or joined the Northern Bahr al-Ghazal province, i.e. South Sudan.<sup>56</sup>

On December 30, 2010, the Sudanese parliament approved a law that would have allowed the people of Abyei to decide whether to join the South or the North in a referendum. However, by the time the referendum began, they could not agree on whether the nomads could vote, so the vote on Abyei's affiliation was postponed indefinitely.

Members of the tribes in the region regularly fight each other for cattle and water, as well as for oil, and these fights not only stopped, but intensified again after the declaration of independence. Since the central government is unable to maintain public order, the word of armed cowboys is law in the tribal areas. According to UN statistics, more than 3,000 people died in tribal wars in South Sudan in 2011.

South Sudan had not yet been formed when, as a **result of the regional elections** (between 11 and 15 April 2010), a **significant wave of disintegration** began in the future new country, as the results were



disputed and numerous local militias (mainly breaking away from the SPLA) were formed.

Salva Kiir (Dinka) of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) received almost 93% of the vote,

<sup>56</sup> Illés, Zoltán: • Dél-Szudán függetlensége, *op. cit.* 9.

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and the Shilluk Lam Akol 7% (SPLM-DC<sup>57</sup>). The winners of these elections would later continue in office upon South Sudan's independence after a referendum in 2011.

In the states of Upper Nile and Jonglei a rebellion was launched in April 2010, when **George Athor** defeated in the 2010 South Sudanese general election, rejecting the results and using his private army to battle the government. In addition to his Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM), 6 other more significant fighting groups can be highlighted (see map). After the government forces killed its leader, in December 2011, SSDM accepted the amnesty offer of the South Sudanese government and laid down its arms in 2012.

The leader of another 300-strong insurgent group also defected from the SPLA. According to Pagan Anum, Gabriel Tang-Ginye had received the weapons and equipment from Khartoum. Most of the weapons used by the rebels are of Sudanese, Chinese (e.g. ammunition, assault rifle) or Iranian (e.g. RPG-7) origin.<sup>58</sup>

Internal fighting was immediately accompanied by an external threat. 20% of the new state's borders are disputed territory with Sudan (Unity and Jonglei). The negotiation process was restarted on June 12, 2011 between the parties in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the AU, between South Sudan and President Bashir. The parties agreed to demilitarize the Abyei region, which had been occupied by northern troops since May 22.

In December 2011, the forces of Sudan and South Sudan already clashed on a disputed border section by **Jau** (Ruweng area).

According to Khartoum's strange argument, only soldiers of the northern wing of the (southern) SPLM (SPLM-N) live in Jau, which means that it is still part of Sudan. In many places, it is simply impossible to determine where the borderline between the two countries lies, and the oil dispute between the two countries has also worsened, while Khartoum refused to release the oil of the south already in the pipes and tanks of the north to the world market until the two countries reached an agreement.

In June 2013 Kiir dismissed two of his senior ministers, suspected of being involved in a vast corruption scandal, and a month later, his vice president **Riek Machar** along with 29 ministers from his government, (with Rebecca Garang, widow of John Garang one of the vice-presidents). The president also suspended his rival, Pagan Amum, secretary general of the ruling party (Sudan People's Liberation Movement - SPLM) - after he stated his ambition to run for president of the Republic in the elections scheduled for 2015 (Elections were ultimately postponed).

So in 2013 the Machar leaded opposition formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (**SPLM/A-IO**) also known as the anti-governmental forces (AGF) which is opposed to the "historical" SPLM led by Kiir. In fact the split between the two parties is mostly along ethnic lines, with the SPLM-IO representing the same Nuer ethnic group as leader Machar.<sup>59</sup> His rebels was accused of using child soldiers around the northwest town of Wau.<sup>60</sup> Their allies are the militant organization in central and eastern Greater Upper Nile, the **Nuer White Army** fighting since 1991, under the direction of Bordoang Leah.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> SPLM-DC: SPLM Democratic Change, DC since 2016.

<sup>58</sup> « Pendulum swings: The rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan », *HSBA Issue Brief*, 12/2013.

<sup>59</sup> Martell, Peter: *First Raise a Flag: How South Sudan Won the Longest War but Lost the Peace*. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. 2018. 269-275. (Chapter 15. « Freedom Next Time »)

<sup>60</sup> Patinkin, Janson: « Ceasefire monitors accuse South Sudan forces, rebels of civilian killings », *Reuters*, May 30, 2018. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southsudan-security/ceasefire-monitors-accuse-south-sudan-forces-rebels-of-civilian-killings> (Accessed: January 9, 2020.)

<sup>61</sup> Pospisil, Jan: *Konfliktlandschaften des Südsudan: Fragmente eines Staates*. Transcript, 2021. 112



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Table 1 South Sudanese militia commanders as of October 2013

Commander	Force name/ affiliation	Location	Status	Notes
David Yau Yau	SSDM/A-Cobra	Pibor county, Jonglei	Active	Was field commander for Athor; accepted amnesty in September 2011; re-defected in April 2012 and went to Khartoum. Reportedly located in Manyading in October 2013.
James Arezen Kong Kong	SSDM/A-Cobra	Pibor county, Jonglei	Active	1st in command under Yau Yau; former Pibor Defence Forces (PDF) and then SPLA. Reportedly located in Fertait in October 2013.
Adoch Agul	SSDM/A-Cobra	Pibor county, Jonglei	Active	2nd in command under Yau Yau; former PDF and then SAF; sent by SAF to join Yau Yau in August 2012; one of his deputies, Peter Bureti, participated in violent attacks in Gumuruk area.
Gayin Ngarubin Torokon	SSDM/A-Cobra	Pibor county, Jonglei	Active	Former PDF; integrated into SAF; sent by SAF to join Yau Yau in August 2012.
Longaben Wayah	SSDM/A-Cobra	Pibor county, Jonglei	Active	Former PDF; integrated into SAF; sent by SAF to join Yau Yau in August 2012.
James Lopia	SSDM/A-Cobra	Pibor county, Jonglei	Active	Has about 250 armed soldiers; in July 2013 he was reported to be around Fertait. <sup>6</sup>
Johnson Olony	SSDM/A-Upper Nile	Fashoda county, Upper Nile	Negotiating integration	Was one of Robert Gwang's deputies; blamed for a series of attacks on Kaka town; negotiating integration in Juba, most of his 3,000 men wait in Fashoda county.
Alyuak Ogot Akol	SSDM/A-Upper Nile	Some 360 men spread across Upper Nile and South Kordofan (Kuek Magenes, Ruwat, Umjalala, Umrawat, Hamra, Abu Jepeah)	Accepted amnesty	Former commissioner of Manyo County, dismissed in 2008 and defected; allegedly linked to SPLM-DC. In October 2013, 250 of his men turned themselves in to the SPLA in Manyo county, Upper Nile. <sup>7</sup>
Gordon Kong	SSDF	His troops are in Bwat, Tadamun county, Blue Nile	Reportedly accepted amnesty, then reneged	His troops make frequent forays into Upper Nile; his troops may have dwindled; many came in with John Duit.
Muntu Mutallah Abdallah	SSDF affiliate	Co-located with Gordon Kong's troops in Bwat, Blue Nile	Active	Ethnic Brun; former commissioner of Maban; began his insurgency after 2010 elections.
Mohamed Chol Amir	SSDF affiliate	Co-located with troops of Gordon Kong and Muntu Abdallah in Bwat, Blue Nile	Active but may be considering integration	Ethnic Dinka; former commissioner of Renk.
Kamal Loma <sup>8</sup>	SSDF affiliate	Co-located with Gordon Kong's troops in Bwat, Blue Nile	Active and recruiting	Ethnic Maban; SPLA command in Upper Nile were not aware of this group.
James Bogo	SSDF affiliate	Bwat, Blue Nile	Active and recruiting	Ethnic Shilluk; working with Kamal Loma.
Bapiny Monituel	SSLM/A	Now in Juba negotiating with SPLM/A	Accepted amnesty	Bul Nuer from Mayom; took over leadership of SSLA in September 2012. His forces are awaiting integration in Mayom.
James Gai Yoach	SSLM/A	Now in Khartoum; some 300 of his men are in South Kordofan/Unity border areas	Arrested in Khartoum in September 2012 with some of his men	A Jagei Nuer, he was leader of SSLM/A after Gadet's surrender to SPLA, with Bapiny Monituel as his deputy. Was active in South Kordofan, Unity, and had forces in Upper Nile.
Karlos Kuol	SSLM/A	Was in Khartoum, now in Juba negotiating with the SPLM/A	Accepted amnesty	A Bul Nuer from Mayom, he was Gadet's 2nd in command; he stayed in Khartoum when Gadet joined the SPLA. Puljang commanded his forces in South Kordofan.
Matthew Puljang	SSLM/A	Was based in Kilo 23, now in Mayom	Accepted amnesty	A Bul Nuer from Mayom, now awaiting integration
Bipen Machar	SSLM/A	Was based in Kilo 23, now in Mayom	Accepted amnesty	A Bul Nuer from Mayom, came into Mayom with 3,000 men awaiting integration.

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**Between 2013 and 2020**, the country experienced a particularly deadly and **bloody civil war** (UN: “outright ethnic war”) between supporters of President Kiir, and those of the vice president of the Republic, Riek Machar. It left nearly 400,000 dead and 4 million displaced between 2013 and 2018. Government and opposition forces clashed fiercely over the Ruweng area because of its vast oil resources.

On **August 26, 2015** a **first peace agreement** between the government and the rebels was signed. This agreement provided for the sharing of posts local executives of the 10 states between the two parties. The rebels benefited, under this agreement, from the positions of governors of the three states of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei located in the north of the country, rich in hydrocarbons.

But the civil war gained new momentum on October 2, 2015 when Kiir filed a **decree establishing a Federation of 28 states**. He justified this increase from 10 to 28 federated states to allow for the decentralization of power.

The former South Sudanese vice president, Riek Machar, protested against this presidential decree which jeopardized the peace agreement of August 2015 because it was based on 10 federated states and 3 special administrative areas (Abyei, Ruweng and Pibor, claimed by Sudan).

By creating 28 new states (on 14 January 2017, by a new presidential decree, the number of federated states increased from 28 to 32) the *status quo*, the sharing of power between the government and the rebels was therefore called into question.

Machar was sworn in on April 26, 2016. Less than six weeks later, fighting broke out once again between government forces and soldiers loyal to Machar. Hundreds were left dead, Machar and many

of his followers fled to the neighboring DRC. Kiir appointed Taban Deng Gai as his vice president. By the end of 2016, UN sought an arms embargo against South Sudan. The embargo was blocked, and fighting continued. The conflict also contributed to a famine declared in parts of the Unity State in June of 2017.<sup>62</sup>

The **second peace agreement**, the agreement of **September 12, 2018** signed at the headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, under the aegis of IGAD, provides for the principle of power-sharing within a national unity government, formed in February 2020 with Kiir as president and Machar as vice-president. But it has remained largely unimplemented (« a *paper peace* »).<sup>63</sup>

By May 2018, the SPLM/A-IO had set up a "parallel bush government" in Upper Nile and the people in rebel-held areas no longer accepted South Sudanese Pound (SSP) which had lost its worth due to hyperinflation, and instead used US dollars and Ethiopian birr. In 2019, 7 million South Sudanese were left hungry in the wake of conflict-related food insecurity. 8.4 million people, more than 70% of the population required humanitarian assistance, including 4.5 million children. In 2020 Machar re-sworn in as Vice President.

In 2021, South Sudan ranked last in the world in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) and in 2022, 8 million people suffered from malnutrition. Transparency International ranked the country 178 out of 180 nations on their corruption perceptions index. Between June and September 2021, at least 440 civilians were killed in the Tambura region (southwest) during fighting. More than 2 million South Sudanese have fled the country (mainly towards Uganda) in what constitutes "*the largest refugee crisis in Africa*", according to UNHCR.

<sup>62</sup> « Timeline: South Sudan's history at a glance », *Concernusa*, Jan. 10, 2022. <https://concernusa.org/news/timeline-south-sudan-history/>

<sup>63</sup> « Soudan du Sud : le chef de l'ONU salue la signature du nouvel accord de paix », *ONU Info*, Sept. 13, 2018. <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2018/09/1023582>

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In April 2022, after mediation by neighbouring Sudan (!)<sup>64</sup>, a new agreement was reached in Juba, President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar agreed to form a unified command of the armed forces.

As in so many countries in Africa, the agreement was reached at “tribal level”, because it provides for a distribution – 60% for the president’s camp and 40% for Machar’s – of leadership positions in the army, police and national security forces.<sup>65</sup>

By 2024, the SSPDF still did not have a unified army. Equipment is primarily of Soviet origin, with some light arms of Chinese origin, EU and UN arms embargoes (all types of military equipment) remain in place. Former rebels will not be able to join the army, as their DDR process has not yet begun.<sup>66</sup>

As the full-scale DDR programme for the entire territory of Sudan, the **MYDDRP**, Multi-Year DDR Programme, launched in June 2009, has not yet been completed. Despite the fact that Phase I of the MYDDRP was concluded in December 2012, phase II did not gain significant momentum and was severely weakened with the eruption of civil war in December 2013.<sup>67</sup>

Since the civil erupted in Sudan in 2023, South Sudan has received over 830,000 refugees and returnees equivalent to over 7 % of its population. In September 2024, it was announced that the elections in South Sudan (initially planned for December 2024) would be postponed to December 2026, and the transition period agreed under the accord would be extended by another two years to February 2027.<sup>68</sup>

## II.2. South Sudan's regional foreign relations

South Sudan's neighboring countries were basically in favor of the new country's independence. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have supported the southern rebels for decades, and have been clear advocates of holding a referendum since the 2005 peace agreement.

All three countries clearly benefit economically from the creation of an independent South Sudan. In addition, common cultural roots, black African origins, and fear of militant Islamism contribute to the fact that South Sudan and the aforementioned countries are expected to pursue similar foreign policy goals.

Egypt, another important player, and the African Union were more skeptical about independence, but realistically assessing the situation, they also accepted the creation of South Sudan.

When the SPLA in South Sudan had to leave Ethiopia, which had been its main base until then, in 1991, John Garang and his family were able to move their headquarters to **Kenya** (Nairobi). The SPLA leadership often visited the Kenyan capital in the following years, many of them also own property in the city.

At the same time, thanks to its successful diplomacy, Kenya has always been able to maintain balanced relations with Khartoum, so it is no coincidence that Kenya played a key role in the long peace negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the

<sup>64</sup> mediation by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, N° 2, in the Sudanese ruling council

<sup>65</sup> « Les deux hommes forts du Soudan du Sud s'engagent sur une disposition clé de l'accord de paix de 2018 », *Lemonde.fr*, Apr. 4, 2022. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/04/04/les-deux-hommes-forts-du-soudan-du-sud-s-engagent-sur-une-disposition-cle-de-l-accord-de-paix-de-2018\\_6120494\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/04/04/les-deux-hommes-forts-du-soudan-du-sud-s-engagent-sur-une-disposition-cle-de-l-accord-de-paix-de-2018_6120494_3212.html)

<sup>66</sup> *Military Balance*, IISS, 2024. 519.

<sup>67</sup> Lamb, Guy - Steiner, Leo: « The Conundrum of DDR Coordination: The Case of South Sudan. » *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 9/2018, 5.

<sup>68</sup> « South Sudan: Postponing long-awaited elections ‘a regrettable development’ », *UN News*, November 7, 2024. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156661>



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2005 CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which put an end to the second North-South civil war).<sup>69</sup>

The negotiations, which took place under the auspices of IGAD were mostly held in the Kenyan city of Machakos. Given the political capital invested in the peace process, Kenya has a vested interest in the successful implementation of the CPA and the independence of South Sudan, and it is no coincidence that Nairobi has been supporting the new South Sudanese administration in many ways since 2005.

Kenya has provided millions of dollars in training for South Sudanese government officials and has even sent legal experts to Juba to provide expertise to the parliament. Nairobi has also established a public administration training institute in Juba.

As East Africa's leading economic and financial power, Kenyan companies are present in South Sudan's construction, aviation, insurance and infrastructure development sectors from the beginning. Kenya's largest bank, Kenya Commercial Bank, has opened eight branches in the South.

Three joint projects (opportunities) deserve special attention:

- The first is the construction of a **new seaport in Lamu**, on Kenya's Indian Ocean coast, which would accelerate South Sudan's export/import activities

- The second is the construction of a **new railway line** and the rehabilitation of existing ones between Juba and Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia;

- The third is the construction of a **new 1,400-kilometer oil pipeline** between Juba - Lokichar - Lamu,<sup>70</sup> as part of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project. The owners of the Juba - Lokichar segment are :

Tullow Oil [50.00%]; Africa Oil [25.00%]; and TotalEnergies SE [25.00%].<sup>71</sup>

The two existing pipelines at the time were the Unity - Heglig - Port Sudan pipeline and the other in the Upper Nile region was completed in early April 2006, also leads to Sudan : Melut Bashin - Port Sudan, the Petrodar pipeline 1380 km.

The significance of the new pipeline would be that it would end South Sudan's dependence on Khartoum, as South Sudanese oil can currently only be exported via a 1,600-kilometer pipeline to Port Sudan in the north. Toyota's investment subsidiary and Chinese companies have also announced their interest in the Juba-Lamu pipeline, but no further



Source: <https://www.economist.com/>

<sup>69</sup> Hettyey, András: « Dél-Szudán regionális külkapcsolatai és a függetlenség megítélése a térségben », *Kül-Világ*, 3/2011. 22-36. [http://epa.niif.hu/00000/00039/00025/pdf/EPA00039\\_kulvilag\\_2011\\_03\\_hettyey.pdf](http://epa.niif.hu/00000/00039/00025/pdf/EPA00039_kulvilag_2011_03_hettyey.pdf)

<sup>70</sup> « Lokichar-Lamu crude oil pipeline takes baby steps », *Freight Logistics*, December 4, 2020. <https://magazine.feaffa.com/lokichar-lamu-crude-oil-pipeline-takes-baby-steps/>

<sup>71</sup> « Lamu Port-South Sudan (LAPSSET) Pipeline », *Global Energy Monitor Wiki*, [https://www.gem.wiki/Lamu\\_Port-South\\_Sudan\\_\(LAPSSET\)\\_Pipeline](https://www.gem.wiki/Lamu_Port-South_Sudan_(LAPSSET)_Pipeline)



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concrete steps have been taken due to the ongoing fighting.

Kenya and South Sudan have close security cooperation. This was inadvertently revealed in September 2008 when Somali pirates hijacked a Ukrainian cargo ship bound for Kenya, carrying 33 T-72 tanks, anti-aircraft guns, RPG-7V grenade launchers and a large amount of ammunition.

The shipment was soon discovered to be destined not for Kenya but for South Sudan. (Kenya initially claimed that it had ordered the weapons itself, which is doubtful, as the Kenyan army uses British-made Vickers Mk III tanks.)

The shipment was later released by the pirates, and satellite images show that some of it reached South Sudan. Experts have long known about the military cooperation between the two countries, so the incident, which many say was not the first and will not be the last, came as no surprise to anyone in the region. The Kenyan army has also trained SPLA officers and provides technical support to the South Sudanese army, such as mine clearance<sup>72</sup>.

Kenya also sent peacekeepers and a DC-9 to the AMIS mission in Darfur, while requesting the assistance of international peacekeepers to quell local unrest. There were 856 Kenyans in MINUS in 2006. Incidentally, this undermines one of the main pillars of the Brahimi report.)

The divisions in the Kenyan government became clear at the end of August 2010. When al-Bashir arrived in Nairobi to celebrate the new Kenyan constitution, Kenya (as a signatory to the Rome Statute) should have arrested him. This did not happen.

The fight against the ICC thus steered the Party of National Unity (PNU) towards supporting Sudanese unity, but the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and presumably much of the Kenyan public continued to support independence. The support for the ODM, which is a party of the Luo ethnic group,

also plays a role in the fact that a significant part of the tribes of South Sudan belong to the Nilo-Saharan language family and the Nilotic peoples, just like the Luo (and Kalenjin) of Kenya.

The SPLA used **Ethiopia** as its main base until 1991, and then again from 1993 to 2005, while Khartoum supported Ethiopian rebels fighting against the regime of President Mengistu. After Mengistu was overthrown, the new Ethiopian government suspended support for the SPLA for two years, forcing the SPLA to temporarily relocate its headquarters to Nairobi until 1993.

Ethiopia's relations with North Sudan can be said to be balanced, and the economic cooperation is particularly close: Sudan is the fourth largest investor in Ethiopia, while Ethiopia is Sudan's seventh largest export partner. It is also noteworthy that 100 percent of Ethiopian oil imports come from Sudan. The use of the Port Sudan port is also crucial for Ethiopia, as Eritrea has not had a sea outlet since its independence.

Despite the good relations established with Khartoum, it is clear that Ethiopia - in line with its ally, the USA - fully supported the independence of the South for historical reasons.

Economic relations between Juba and Addis developed favorably in the years surrounding independence.

Although there is no Ethiopian economic presence in South Sudan comparable to that of Kenya or Uganda, the two countries have also signed agreements in the fields of trade, telecommunications, electricity and infrastructure. The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia has also begun operations in South Sudan. New roads have been built in Ethiopia's border region of Gambella to connect the region to Juba via Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei provinces. Ethiopia also expects South Sudan to support it in revising the 1959 Nile Treaty.

<sup>72</sup> Hettyey, András: « Dél-Szudán regionális kapcsolatai és a függetlenség megítélése a térségben », *op. cit.* 22-36.

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In the field of security policy, there is close cooperation between the Ethiopian army and the SPLA. Ethiopia has trained SPLA officers, pilots and engineers, and has also provided military experts to help renew the South Sudanese army. There are also regular consultations between high-ranking general staff officers.

South Sudan has purchased a large number of weapons and ammunition from Ethiopia - even after 2005. It is important to note that Addis has not accidentally tried to stabilize Juba and maintain good relations with Khartoum at the same time. The intention behind this was to prevent another conflict in the region from arising in connection with the secession of South Sudan, which could also endanger Ethiopia's territory due to the long common border.

Ethiopia is in a fundamentally difficult security situation: in addition to its own rebel groups, it is at de facto war with its neighbor Eritrea, and in Somalia, the radical Islamist al-Shabaab poses a threat. The peaceful independence of South Sudan was therefore also a fundamental security interest for Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's traditionally successful diplomacy is due to the fact that, although it supports the South much more discreetly than Kenya and Uganda, the SPLA still views Ethiopia as its most important partner. As the state with the most effective army in the region, its most populous country, and a strategic ally of the US, Ethiopia's word carries decisive weight, which Khartoum knows very well.

Addis, however, was cautious and deliberate in its statements in the months leading up to the referendum, for the aforementioned security reasons. Addis also repeatedly stressed the importance of demarcating the border between North and South,

since its own war with Eritrea was partly triggered by the failure to demarcate the border between the two countries in time. In relation to the referendum, Ethiopia has always been careful to avoid making statements openly supporting independence – unlike Kenya and Uganda. Despite all its diplomacy, it was clear that Ethiopia supported independence, not least because many South Sudanese ethnic groups are close relatives of tribes living in western Ethiopia.

**Uganda** has always had good relations with the South. Several related ethnic groups (Acholi, Kakwa, Lango, etc.) live on both sides of the colonial border and can be considered both Ugandan and South Sudanese. In the 1990s, Ugandan troops fought alongside the SPLA/M in South Sudan against the northern army, while Khartoum supported the LRA rebels in northern Uganda.

Since the signing of the peace agreement in 2005, many Ugandans have moved to South Sudan, so that by around 2011 they constituted the largest foreign population in the country. South Sudan has become the largest market for Ugandan goods, the Ugandans also planned to build an oil refinery, which could also be used to process South Sudanese oil.

**Egypt** still views Sudan as its lost territory over which it seeks to exert influence. An estimated three million Sudanese live and work in Egypt. A key issue for Egypt is the Nile water supply from Sudan, which is regulated by the November 8, 1959 *Cairo Agreement "for the full utilization of the Nile waters"*.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, it has been interested in preserving a unified Sudan from the beginning and opposed the signing of the CPA in 2005 and proposed a confederation arrangement between the two parts of the country. Juba has assured Cairo that he will abide by the 1959 agreement and will not demand more

<sup>73</sup> Agreement (with annexes) for the full utilization of the Nile waters. Signed at Cairo, on 8 November 1959. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20453/volume-453-I-6519-English.pdf>

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than the 18.5 billion cubic meters allocated to all of Sudan.<sup>74</sup>

The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA)<sup>75</sup> came into force on 13 October 2024 despite continued rejections by Egypt and Sudan. The agreement has been signed by Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In 2005, an Egyptian consulate was opened in Juba. Cairo provides development aid to the South (building schools and hospitals) supports educational programs and technical assistance in the field of irrigated agriculture.

The **African Union** has been skeptical of South Sudan's independence bid, fearing that it would set a dangerous precedent for the continent and would also accelerate Darfur's secessionist aspirations, while the CPA was also guaranteed by the AU.

The **European Union** is one of the biggest donors to South Sudan and had by 2021 invested over 1 billion EUR since the independence. Regarding relations between the EU and RSS, by 2021, three priority areas were agreed on, based on the partnerships described in the EU comprehensive strategy with Africa:

- Green and resilient economy
- Human Development: education and health
- Good governance, peace and the rule of law for a fairer society<sup>76</sup>

The EU's goals are to achieve food security, diversification of the economy, secure jobs for youth, and combat climate change. The Multiannual Indicative Program (MIP) for South Sudan for 2021-2027 amounted to €208 million for the period 2021-2024 :

- EUR 83.2 million for the first,
- EUR 64.2 million for the second,
- EUR 52 million for the third priority area,
- and EUR 10.4 million for the support measures.<sup>77</sup>

On November 2024 the EU has agreed to earmark a further 96 million euro (103 million USD), to be mobilized over the next three years.

<sup>74</sup> „Secret talks.” Africa Confidential, 51/15., July 23, 2010.

<https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/3616/secret-talks>

<sup>75</sup> Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, <https://nilebasin.org/sites/default/files/attachments/CFA%20-%20English%20FrenchVersion.pdf>

<sup>76</sup> « South Sudan », [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/south-sudan\\_en](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/south-sudan_en) (Accessed: January 9 ,2025)

<sup>77</sup> Multiannual action plan 2023-2024 for South Sudan, European Commission, [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/action-plans\\_en?f%5B0%5D=countries\\_countries\\_multiple\\_%3Ahttp%3A//publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/country/SSD#oe-list-page-filters-anchor](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/action-plans_en?f%5B0%5D=countries_countries_multiple_%3Ahttp%3A//publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/country/SSD#oe-list-page-filters-anchor) (Accessed: January 9 ,2025)

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## II.3. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)


The UNMISS was established on 8 July 2011 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996. The Mission HQ is in Juba. It is composed of 18,134 personnel including 13,264 military personnel, 1548 police including 88 corrections officers (October 2024) and 2,260 civilian workers, as well as small contingents of experts, staff officers, and volunteers.<sup>78</sup>

The top military contributors are Rwanda (2630) and India (2397) and the participation of China should also be highlighted. Given the ongoing, unwanted Rwandan presence in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (Kivu region), it is hardly fortunate that so many Rwandan peacekeepers are present in South Sudan without violating the Brahimi Principles. (In addition pro-government

forces include(d) some elements of the Ugandan army.)

The mandate of the UN mission is based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN and has 4 major axes:

- 1.) Protection of civilians (Prevent, deter, and stop violence against civilians, including politically driven violence; public safety and security; reform the rule of law and justice sector, etc.)
- 2.) Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance
- 3.) Supporting the Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement and the Peace Process (technical assistance and security support for the electoral process, etc.)
- 4.) Monitoring, investigating, and reporting on violations of humanitarian and human rights law



<sup>78</sup> The mission's staffing levels are still not filled. Authorized number of personnel is 19,101 including 17,000 military personnel. UNMISS Factsheet, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss> (Accessed: January 9, 2025.)



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(against women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence, hate speech and incitement to violence, etc.)<sup>79</sup>

UNMISS was already being talked about as a failed mission in 2014, as it quickly lost trust and the appearance of impartiality, **appearing to the public to be a supporter of the rebels**. Neither the Sudanese government officials were fully aware of the limitations of the mission's mandate, nor the people who expected them to rely primarily on the UN to protect them from violent acts. In addition, the government (GRSS) denounced the UN mission in the media and demanded the resignation of the UN Chief.

Three incidents led to a deterioration in relations between UNMISS and the host government:

*"The first was the flight of nearly 20,000 internally displaced persons of predominantly Nuer ethnic background into its two Juba-based camps seeking protection.*

*The second was a host of rumors coming from the government quarters that senior members of the UN mission staff were supporting Riek Machar's rebellion.*

*The third was the early March 2013 revelation that the government security forces had seized a weapons cache in Lakes state, which the government declared was a supply to the rebel movement, saying that this had confirmed earlier suspicions about the conduct of some individual UN leaders, and which the mission said was a mistake in the labeling of weapons that were actually destined to its new Ghanaian contingent in Unity state."*<sup>80</sup>

In the midst of bloody street fighting in the summer of 2016, **government forces attacked the Terrain**

**Hotel** in the capital, Juba, which was housing fifty employees of foreign organizations. The hotel owner reported the gang rape of five foreign women, the murder of a South Sudanese journalist and an American aid worker, and the fact that "everyone in the building was tortured and beaten" by soldiers. During the attack, those in the hotel called for help from nearby UN peacekeepers, but no one came to their aid.

As a result of a **2016 special investigation** that placed sole responsibility for the mission's inaction on the commander of the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan, Lt Gen Johnson Mogo: « *The Special Investigation found that a lack of leadership on the part of key senior Mission personnel culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence.* »<sup>81</sup>

So **the head of mission has been dismissed** by UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon. Since 2016, a South African lawyer and diplomat Nicholas Haysom, is the SR (Special Representative) of the UNSG and Head of the UNMISS.

The above report revealed serious decades-old problems in the field of command & control, as follows:

On the civilian side, « (...) *The Mission's established culture of reporting and acting in silos inhibited effective action during a period in which swift, joint action was essential. The JOC < Joint Operations Centre > and the Security Information Operations Centre (SIOC) were not co-located, as required by UN policy, contributing to a »* poor mission-wide and integrated coordination.

On the uniformed side, « *the Force did not operate under a unified command, resulting in multiple and sometimes conflicting orders to the four troop*

<sup>79</sup> UNMISS, <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/mandate> (Accessed: January 9, 2025.)

<sup>80</sup> Jok, Madut Jok: « United Nations Mission in South Sudan: A Failed Mission or Hostage of Circumstances? », *UNMISS News*, June 11, 2014. <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/united-nations-mission-south-sudan-failed-mission-or-hostage-circumstances>

<sup>81</sup> Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response. *Reliefweb.int* (OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), November 1, 2016. 2. [https://reliefweb.int/attachments/8d02eff1-acaf-3caa-b67a-31b1f27eed1f/Public\\_Executive\\_Summary\\_on\\_the\\_Special\\_Investigation\\_Report\\_1\\_Nov\\_2016.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/attachments/8d02eff1-acaf-3caa-b67a-31b1f27eed1f/Public_Executive_Summary_on_the_Special_Investigation_Report_1_Nov_2016.pdf)

# CERPESC ANALYSES

contingents from China, Ethiopia, Nepal and India, and ultimately ***underusing the more than 1,800 infantry troops at UN House.***

*The Force Commander appointed the Chinese Battalion Commander as the Incident Commander, commanding all the forces at the UN House in addition to his own battalion.*

*Furthermore, the Force Commander ordered the Incident Commander to retain an explicit and ultimately confusing command link to Sector South headquarters in Topping, which was physically cut off from the UN House for the duration of the fighting” in Juba from 8 to 11 July 2016.*

*« This confused arrangement, in combination with the lack of leadership on the ground, contributed to incidents of poor performance among the military and police contingents at UN House. This included at least two instances in which the Chinese battalion abandoned some of its defensive positions at POC 1 on 10 and 11 July. The Nepalese Formed Police Unit’s performance to stop looting by some IDPs inside UN House and control the crowd was inadequate. »<sup>82</sup>*

The « outnumbered, out-gunned » mission was unable to influence the government that it helped to build, his early warning system proved be wanting, which was complemented by the weakness of preparedness and the high level of risk aversion of the military component, including an aversion to active patrolling and mobile presences beyond bases.<sup>83</sup>

According to a July 2023 report UNMISS efforts toward strengthening the ROL institutions and accountability were undermined by its weak coordination with UN Country Team entities, lack of a strategic approach towards partnerships, outreach and capacity development, which were further

compounded by inadequate knowledge management.<sup>84</sup>

## Image sources

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Sudan army

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



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## Abstract

Before 2011, until the declaration of independence of the Republic of South-Sudan (Juba), Sudan was the largest country in Africa and the seventh most populous. It was ruled by General Omar al-Bashir between 1989-2019.

This analysis seeks to answer the basic questions how has the South Sudan issue been handled by Khartoum since Sudan's independence in 1956? And how has South Sudan's political life changed since the proclamation of independence on 9 July 2011?

Has the long-awaited peace and economic prosperity arrived? Is it really Khartoum who has been the only one who has interfered the development of this region?

Or maybe the first 14 years of the new state weren't such a success story after all? How did the cooperation between the former allies develop? Did local conflicts develop over the oil reserves? And finally, how did the relationship with neighboring Sudan develop?



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