ELIAMEP

President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis spoke on the future of Europe in a interview with Athina 9.84 and journalis Ioannis Papageorgiou. You can accesse the podcast here.

It appears that the EU’s solution to its current directionless and delegitimised state is a multi-speed Europe. It is ironic that the 27-nation bloc prepares to mark 60 years since its founding treaty by accepting that an ‘ever closer union’ is officially no longer on the table. Some will argue that the big four which have been backing this idea, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, are trying to cut their losses short rather than admit failure, which makes embracing divergence, whitewashing growing inequalities within and between states and appeasing populists the optimal strategy. A multi-speed Europe is, in any case, already a reality on the ground, as both the Schengen border-free zone and the eurozone attest. The next logical step for the capable and the willing is to pool resources, generate economies of scale and create structures for a new round of common projects.

Yet, there are a number of problems with regard to this proposition. First, the kind of flexibility implied in multiple speeds, has been in short supply throughout the existence of the European project. Creating pockets of deeper cooperation and enabling a well-regulated flow of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, on the basis of clusters of interests, simply surpasses the EU’s current technical and institutional capacity. Building it up will take time – time, however, is in equally short supply, considering the pervasive sense of insecurity that Europeans feel and how this is affecting their voting patterns. There is also the issue of preserving the national interest, anchored in a European method of consensus building. In spite of its well-known asymmetries, the EU project allowed for coalitions to be built, for issue linkages to grow and for win-win outcomes to emerge. By its nature, a tiered EU will render such complex interactions difficult, stoking the weaker members’ fear that they will be left behind or isolated. Finally, different speeds may ultimately translate into different classes of membership, contradicting the founding ideals of the Union. It remains a moot point whether the big four can guarantee that the criteria for entering or leaving tiers will be transparent or applied in an equitable manner.

At the same time, the current impasse serves no one, except for the anti-EU, anti-immigration forces. Those who want to integrate faster should have this opportunity. The real question is what kind of political and economic integration would serve the EU project better? The eurozone architecture may act as a stark reminder that economies operating on multiple models cannot co-habit in a monetary union without a fiscal union. A small, exclusive club could have both, dispensing with the laggards locked in a straitjacket of euro rules and austerity. If this thinking is followed through, the real danger then is that a multi-speed Europe will promote uniformity at the expense of unity. Populists would have a field day, as they would seek to project the idea of ‘uniformity’ well beyond immigration policies. Politics could turn poisonous, as European citizens might want to have concrete answers to how the political will to promote mini unions suddenly emerged, when initiatives like the Five Presidents’ Report had been received coldly in the Council, if not with indifference. If the answer is ‘Brexit and Trump happened’, European leaders would have to be aware that  planning a shift of this order comes with tremendous responsibility and would require a strategic commitment to unity.

The EU has been good but not excellent at managing diversity. It has created tools, yet left countries struggling with asymmetric burden sharing, as evidenced in the eurozone crisis and the migration crisis. Allowing for significant financial assistance, solidarity has been absent as an organising principle in a Union that bore the promise of shared prosperity and deepening of democracy. Before the capable and the willing proceed, they should take stock of the pervasive sense of insecurity that has enveloped achievers and under-achievers, first-tier, second-tier and third- or fourth- tier European citizens, and fine-tune their preferences in a way that reduces EU-wide feelings of marginalisation and mistrust.’

By Dr Eleni Panagiotarea

Source: Reconnecting Europe blog

You can download the article in PDF here.

If there is any EU country where stability is taken for granted and future perspectives are optimistic, this surely will be Germany. After 12 years at the helm as chancellor by conservative leader Angela Merkel, however, some Germans are no longer averse to political change. The next election (“Bundestagwahl”) has been set for September 24. Until recently the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) had been seen as favorites to continue their political dominance. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) – although part of a grand coalition in the last four years – had been regarded as obsolete to offer an effective challenge.

Former leader of SPD, and current Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, acknowledged the risk of another lost election, hence, he decided to step down in favor of Martin Schulz, former president of the European Parliament, who has brought about a wave of enthusiasm among disenchanted voters of the center-left political spectrum, who, for the moment, like what they see. Current opinion polls indicate Schulz is more popular than Angela Merkel. More importantly, the SPD has gone beyond 30 percent threshold for potential votes in all surveys while its percentage under Gabriel had been less than 25 percent. All of this suggests, the result of the September 24 election is more open than in the pre-Schulz period.

Hence, a growing number of analysts and journalists are beginning to talk of a “Schulz effect” in German politics. Traditionally, German politicians holding top EU jobs are considered “politically dead” in their own country. Indeed, this had also been the case with Schulz in the past. In the European election of May 2014, he faced Jean Claude Juncker for the position of president of the European Commission. Yet, he failed to inspire German citizens despite their common nationality.

Although it’s the same Schulz, the situation three years later differs for one main reason. Chancellor Merkel has caused some unhappiness with her “open door” policy on refugees. Recent terrorist attacks in some German cities – especially the Christmas market attack in Berlin – has increased a sense of unsafety and xenophobia. As a result, Merkel is no longer portrayed as the incomparable national leader. Her image, indeed, is slipping. The general criticism of her, starting from her management of the refugee crisis, is also expanding into other aspects of politics so that some voters are keen to find an alternative. This explains the rise of small parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AFD) and the Liberals (FDP) irrespective of their political orientation or extreme character. And it now explains the rise of SPD, boosted by the leadership change.

Martin Schulz is a very experienced and smart politician. He knows that SPD will not preserve its current high percentage if he does not persuade public opinion that he can implement a new political program. Supporting the grand coalition, the party has agreed with the CDU and CSU on almost all of critical political decision. So, it now needs to find some departure points. As President of the European Parliament, Schulz stood beside Merkel on various fronts, including the refugee crisis! His only disagreement was on dealing with the European economic crisis, where he is more open to the “mutualization of debt” proposal, which is an anathema to conservatives.

However, he will possibly bury this issue during the pre-election campaign due to its sensitivity for the German audience and a possible political cost for himself. Instead, he seeks to draw a line between himself and his predecessor by moving the SPD more towards the Left. In a recent important speech, he distanced “himself” from Gerhard Schroeder’s “Agenda 2010.” This concept set the basis for the reform of the German social security system and the labor market and, ultimately, the country’s economic progress and growth.

By promising “social justice,” Schulz can certainly give a new political direction to his party. He has also showing willing on a future political coalition between the SPD, the Greens and the Left, as is currently happening at the regional level in Berlin and Thuringia, even if the CDU and CSU win the September election. Nevertheless, a problem for Schulz is that September 24 is a long way off. His economic agenda may sound attractive, but is already being picked apart by serious scholars as a threat to the national economy.

And Germany is a country where the rational elements in economics and politics have so far not given way to the populism and the illusions seen in other European countries. It is the efficiency and sustainability that matter more than mere words or pre-election promises.

Source: china.org.cn

The question should be reversed: Can the EU have any kind of meaningful role without being strategic? The EU has not fared very well in comparison with its main competitors in terms of protecting its members and its citizens’ interests. Nor has the EU risen to the challenge of stabilizing its neighborhood. Furthermore, various crises have exposed a lack of geopolitical reflexes. And the EU is paying a price for those failures. Britain’s vote to leave the bloc has dealt a heavy blow to the EU’s unity and its capabilities in the spheres of foreign policy and defense.

Ironically, however, and in combination with the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, Brexit has also created a brief window of opportunity for the EU to reconsider its options and launch a new effort in various sectors of European politics, including defense and security. Acting collectively, the EU has the necessary economic weight but lacks the diplomatic and military weight to be a global actor. Both problems can be addressed, as the human, technological, and financial capabilities do exist. What is seriously questioned is the necessary political will—given that individually, no member state is sufficiently strong to flourish in this brave new world. The last wake-up call for Europe, perhaps.

By Thanos Dokos

Source: Carnegie Europe

You can read here the article on future perspectives for Turkey, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 8 March  2017 [in Greek].

Ambassador (retired) Alexandros Mallias wrote an article in Kathimerini newspaper discussing Greek-American relations under Trump. You can access the article here (in Greek)

Research Fellow of ELIAMEP Dr Eleni Panagiotarea wrote in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini on the second review of the third Greek bailout. You can read the article here (in Greek).

In  ELIAMEP Policy Paper No. 26 Dr Theodore Tsakiris analyses relations between Russia and Turkey placing emphasis on the decision of the countries to construct ‘Turkish Stream’ pipeline. He examines the new perspectives of energy cooperation and assesses challenges and opportunities for Greece.

You can find more information for this event on the Greek version of our website.

The Second Economic Forum took place in Delphi from 2 until 5 March 2017. ELIAMEP constitutes a programming partner. President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis talked about the future of the European Union and Europe. Director General, Dr Thanos Dokos, chaired a panel on geopolitics in Eastern Mediterranean. And  Member of the Board of Directors, Professor George Pagoulatos, spoke about the impact of Brexit and the new globalization.

You can find here more information

You can read here the article on the crisis on foreign policy and security, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 23 February  2017 [in Greek].

The Enlargement has been on the EEC/EU agenda all along its history and was believed to be its “most successful” policy. Although enlargement policy was built on values and rules, geopolitics have traditionally been a strong driving force behind it, while tension between widening and deepening has always been present. The fifth enlargement was instrumentalised by the prevailing policies of extreme neoliberalism causing public opinion reaction and nurturing “enlargement fatigue”. The implicit enlargement agenda in the neighbourhood policy has been put to the service of anti-Russian strategies which have utterly failed while jeopardising good neighbourly relations with Moscow and contributing to the negative turn of the Putin regime. During the last decade, enlargement policy has rapidly degenerated and today it is essentially at a standstill in all three of its dimensions (Balkans, Turkey, European neighbourhood countries). This is a negative development both for the EU and its neighbours. The revival of the policy is conditional upon a necessary, but improbable, major shift in the EU, with the strengthening of solidarity.

Author: Axel Sotiris Wallden

Essay: The demise of EU enlargement policy

Dr. Panagiota Manoli, Head of the Slavic, East-European and Eurasian Studies Programme of ELIAMEP participated at the 7th European Forum of Think Tanks, organised in La Valetta on 27 and 28 February 2017, by the Jacques Delors Institute with the support of the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the European Union. This Forum linked to the Think Global – Act European (TGAE) initiative, is entitled “The EU’s Neighbourhood: How to Stabilise the Ring of Fire?” and it gathers a group of 40 prominent speakers and researchers engaged in the EU Neighbourhood Policy on the fields of security, governance, economy and migration.

Professor George Pagoulatos wrote on the need to conclude the bailout review in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini. The article was published on 19 February 2017 and is available here.

President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis wrote an article in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini on the Greek crisis. This article was published on 19 February 2017 and is available here (in Greek).

On Tuesday 14 February 2017, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) organized “New Pact for Europe” National Reflection Group. The event took place in Aegli Zappeiou in the context of the New Pact for Europe Programme.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Ελληνικά.

The Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC) issued a joint paper exploring if a viable solution in Cyprus is feasible. This paper is available here. Last year ELIAMEP and HALC also issued a joint paper proposing measures to better deal with the refugee crisis.

Research Fellow of ELIAMEP Dr Eleni Panagiotarea analysed in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini if a pan-EU ‘bad bank’ could be a solution for Greece. You can read the article here (in Greek).

ELIAMEP Research Fellow Dr Angeliki Dimitriadi contributed with a chapter on the Greek case in the edited volume: Beyond the migration and asylum crisis – Options and lessons for Europe. This ebook is edited by Ferruccio Pastore and is published by Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. You can find here more information.