Ideas on Europe Blog

Map of the Belt and Road Initiative, Eurasian Economic Union and their overlap in Central Asia, prepared by Natalia Leskina

Natalia Leskina

China, Russia and their regional projects intersecting in Central Asia – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – have been in the limelight recently. Despite the fact that educational component pays an important role in both the EAEU and BRI, the information about their educational initiatives remains scarce. That is why with my colleague Emma Sabzalieva we started our research by asking: how are Russian and Chinese led visions for Eurasian higher education regionalism developing in Central Asia, and to what extent do these visions overlap? how do the Central Asian states approach this presumed role in Eurasian higher education regionalism?

Despite common expectations that the interests of Russia and China in Central Asia are in competition and could lead to confrontation, researchers have found out that instead, they operate harmoniously in the region. This has been explained by “the division of labor”: in other words, Russia’s military power does not confront China’s economic power.

But this explanation does not match the higher education policy area, where similar ideas on a Eurasian higher education area are fostered by Russia and China: both EAEU and BRI include higher education as a complementary to other competences, and the regions are planned to be built in similar ways through the mutual recognition of qualifications, joint degrees, and academic mobility. Both competition and collaboration can be found in the overlap of the EAEU and BRI educational components in Central Asia.

 

Why to use “points of correspondence” instead of collaboration/ competition?

We found out that relations between China and Russia are more nuanced than the collaboration/competition dichotomy. This finding led us to search for concepts that would adequately grasp the regional dynamics at play. In doing so, we turned to the original concepts developed by China, Russia and Central Asian states.

Thus, we introduced the “points of correspondence” concept to describe the current configuration in Eurasia. This concept is derived from the Russian term “sopryazhenie” (сопряжение) and Chinese zui jia qi he dian (最佳契合点) and means “the ongoing pursuit to find ideas and policy tools that best fit one another” without flowing into each other.

At the third Ghent – Russia Colloquium in 2019, Prof. Yang Cheng compared Sino-Russia relations with a family: even if you do not like each other, you are linked and therefore you need to compromise and find a way to live together because of the common duties. This way of thinking is incorporated in the “points of correspondence” that allow both competition and collaboration.

It also shows how the position of Central Asian states allows this co-existence and also is a tool to exert their agency that shapes Eurasian regionalism. At the same time, each of the parties has its own understanding of what “points of correspondence” actually means.

 

“Points of correspondence” as coordination between Russia and China

For Russia “points of correspondence” means “coordinated and parallel development” of the China-led BRI together with the EAEU. In practical terms it implies that Beijing should respect Moscow’s interests in the post-Soviet space, i.e. any integration issues have to be discussed at the regional level instead of bilateral agreements that may seem to be behind Russia’s back.

BRI also seeks connectivity with the regions already in place. But China has a slightly different view on the coordination: it understands the need to show respect for Russia’s interests and to this end is ready to engage in official dialogue, but at the same time Beijing still prefers to handle issues at the bilateral level.

Effectively, in 2019 China and Russia signed a cooperation agreement between the EAEU and BRI following a joint statement four years before. But Beijing still puts great emphasis on bilateral agreements in higher education: in 2017 China had signed bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of qualifications with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The same comes to the allocation of mobility scholarships and participation in the BRI university alliances.

 

“Points of correspondence” as a way of exerting agency by Central Asian states

In general, the Central Asian states welcome both BRI and EAEU, but to a different extent. Kazakhstan has its own vision of a Eurasian higher education area and actively promoted it so far, making wide-ranging propositions from the development of mobility to the recognition of qualifications and a Eurasian university ranking. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan welcome both BRI and EAEU, emphasizing the need for new technologies and innovations to revitalize the economies of the region. Turkmenistan and, until recently, Uzbekistan remain on the most neutral end of this spectrum of responses to the new initiatives.

Instrumentally, Central Asian states engage China and Russia in points of correspondence as a way to balance their ambitions in the region. Simultaneous participation in overlapping regionalisms allows them to choose bilateral or multilateral format, to engage with China’s or Russia’s vision, depending on the issue at stake, and ultimately, to shape the actual regionalism on the ground.

The “points of correspondence” emerging between the EAEU and BRI in Central Asia characterize the development of Eurasian higher education regionalism and add new nuances to the research of education areas beyond Europe. At the same time, our findings raise questions about the extent to which “points of correspondence” could travel beyond this area and factors that contribute to their emergence.

 

 

Our paper is part of Special Issue of Eurasian Geography and Economics on Sino-Russian relations edited by Fabienne Bossuyt and Marcin Kaczmarski. Here you can read our article in full. If you are interested to know how our article came into being, you can read Emma’s blog. This article was presented at the Knowledge Politics and Policies section of the virtual ECPR General Conference in 2020.

 

Natalia Leskina is a doctoral researcher at the Department of International Relations at Ural Federal University, Russia. Her research interest is higher education regionalism with a regional focus on the post-Soviet space.

 

The post Constructing a Eurasian higher education region: “Points of correspondence” between Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

Today’s modern European democracy grants every adult citizen – regardless of race, gender, social status, wealth, or education – the right to vote in the form of universal suffrage. The right to vote (or active suffrage) is not to be taken for granted, as until the second half of the twentieth century not all adults were permitted to vote in Europe. Despite the relative electoral passivity (based on low turnout figures in most European states), the right to vote is the most important tool in the people’s hands to shape the policies of their countries by deciding whom they trust to govern. Suffrage is a powerful mean, which ultimately affects every single person in- and even outside of the given community or state. Therefore, I find it vital to review the principles of both active and passive suffrage, and propose regulations to redefine the characteristics of and the dynamics between voters and candidates.

 

Active suffrage

Today, every adult citizen has equally one vote, which is granted on the single condition of being a citizen of the state and reaching a certain age (usually 18). The adult citizen’s vote defines the fate of the community or state by empowering certain political groups with certain ideologies and policies. The fact that decides whether the individual’s vote leads to prosperity or failure is that how well people can judge the complex and broad range of matters related to governance, which include the subjects of economics, politics, social issues, laws of nature, armed forces, foreign policy, and even history – amongst others. Arguably, the overwhelming majority of the adult citizens do not comprehend even the basics of these subjects, because they are either uneducated or uninterested – often both. Due to the lack of understanding, election campaigns focus on targeting people’s emotions instead of their intellect, as it is easier to manipulate than convincing them. In turn, people vote without knowing the exact programmes and previous results of the contesting political forces, concentrating on catchy campaign promises, sympathy, appearance, race, or religion instead. The result is a blind-leading-blind-society, in which one expert vote stands against ten inexpert votes, and in which the clueless majority rules over expertise and knowledge.

Let me translate my argument to three simple examples, which highlight the enormous shortcomings of universal suffrage. Should one have the intention of driving a car, reaching the legal age limit and possessing a driving licence are mandatory. In order to obtain the right to drive, one must pass a theory exam (including first aid), take driving lessons, and complete the driving exam eventually. The margin of error is very thin, as one has to score almost 100% on each of these exams to succeed. For the purpose of driving safely, one must know and apply numerous rules regarding traffic regulation, operation of vehicle, and first aid perfectly. Should the driving licence be our birth-right as the suffrage is now, everybody, who can afford a car, could sit in and drive as pleases. Let us imagine the disaster it would bring to the roads! The point of going through all the necessary procedures of learning and applying is to avoid disastrous accidents and deaths by providing the right to drive only to those, who can provably drive safely.

Also, should one desire to work in a senior role at any enterprise, the necessary qualifications and experiences are required by the ownership to ensure that the applicant is going to enhance prosperity. Supposing that the director and the managers are not experts, the enterprise is going to stagnate or decline, harming the well-being of all employees. Therefore, only those should be allowed to fill these positions of responsibility, who provably and completely understand the job that has to be done. However, being an expert is only one side of the story. Should the employees be allowed to decide who to nominate as director on a democratic election, less qualified candidates could enter the competition, in which popularity would become a dominant factor instead of expertise. In order to convince the employees, and get elected into the powerful position, the director elects would promise almost anything (e.g. higher wages, more paid holidays, reduced working hours). Employees themselves could stand for election, regardless of education, experience, or general knowledge. It seems to be an equal opportunity for everyone, which sounds incredibly fair, but it is actually not. The immediate results would be loss of revenue and bankruptcy, which is quickly followed by unemployment and poverty. Therefore, it is essential to leave positions of responsibility to proven experts, who are chosen by people with at least a basic knowledge of matters.

The most ordinary example of universal suffrage is the example of family. Let us say that a family of five (mother, father, and their three children) wants to decide on a new form of decision-making by introducing democratic principles. Assuming that only the father and the eldest daughter would like to run for the position, they prepare their programmes, which they intend to present to the other members of the family in order to get elected. Father, knowing the exact figures of revenue and expenses, tries to put together a programme, which is sustainable and reasonable. Whereas, the eldest daughter, knowing nothing of the exact figures, tries to present an appealing deal with lots of promises in order to gain popularity. Father would argue that separating funds for rent, bills, food, and other necessities are more important than spending on sweets, toys, and games. At the end of the debate, mother, being convinced by reason, votes for father, but the children, anticipating more pleasure and treats, vote for the eldest daughter. When the vote is done, the children’s will is going to prevail over their parents’, as the rule of democracy is that everybody has one vote and the majority decides. The result of the vote is three inexpert votes against two expert votes, which means that the election is won by someone, who does not understand anything about how the household should be managed. Should the rent and bills not be paid, the family is out on the street in a short period of time. The eldest daughter could also pass a legislation to refuse attending classes in school, even tough it is in the children’s essential interest, what they do not necessarily understand yet, but their parents do.

As the examples intend to present, most people should not be permitted to get involved into decision-making due to their lack of knowledge; moreover, they themselves are in the need of appropriate leadership. Therefore, the abolishment of universal suffrage and the redistribution of votes are essential to accomplish. The solution is to launch an educational course on state affairs organised and financed by the state. The course could be designed to be as simple as possible, minimising the physical attendance in a few hours each month. The core of the course would be a book – written by experts, not politicians –, covering the basic overview of state affairs. This book must be explained and discussed on the course, whilst read and memorised at home. At the end of the course, the citizen can decide to take an exam and thus earn the right to vote. In order to succeed in passing the exam, the citizen should score at least 91%, which would make them eligible to a certificate, fulfilling the precondition of suffrage. Should one fail, the exam can always be repeated. Should one not pass the exam until the next elections, the citizen is not permitted to vote (the participation on referendums is an exception, as it is not binding legally). The certificate must be renewed before every general election. The preparation course, the learning material, and the exam would cost nothing to the citizens, as it would be covered by the state entirely. Nobody would be deprived from suffrage, because the chance is given to match the basic conditions of knowledge required; therefore, it is up to the citizen’s commitment and determination to learn and earn the right to vote.

 

Passive suffrage

It is important to enlighten the voters, but it is not enough alone to create an enlightened democracy; the preconditions to stand for election (or passive suffrage) must also be redefined, focusing on the topics of expertise, accountability, and campaign regulations.

Our hearts have many desires, which cannot be all expressed for the sake of our well-being; therefore, it is our brains’ duty to control our emotions, filtering them by letting through only the constructive ones. It is almost the same with all different demands and wishes of the different people within a community or state. Their voices must be heard, but should not everything be accomplished, as it is likely to be rather destructive for the well-being of the entire community. Therefore, an enlightened government should endorse only those demands, which are going to benefit the state and the people within. It is imperative and in the interest of every citizen to entrust governance to a provably expert leadership.

However, most politicians are far from being experts. It might be sad, but the harsh truth is that they do not have to be, as there is not a single legislation in any country, which would require candidates to prove their expertise. Candidates have to fulfil only one condition to be elected into office: popularity. Many actors, comedians, and businessmen got elected into high positions due to their popularity (e.g. US) – expertise was irrelevant. The fact that popularity is far more important than expertise and competence reduces trust in democracy on long-term, and causes one of the root causes of the multiple crises we witness today globally (e.g. climate crisis). In my view, an independent committee of experts should approve the candidacy based on expertise and competence (e.g. qualification, experience, language skills) before each election campaign. This way, the wheat can be separated from the chaff before elections, avoiding potential disasters of bad policy-making.

The next step is the regulation of campaigning, which means that the politicians must summarise their campaign promises and publish them. This contract of election would ensure the presentation of a clear programme, which must be accomplished as much as possible. It would be the duty of an accountability committee to supervise that the agreement is fulfilled. Should the elected political force purposefully neglect the fulfilment of their campaign promises, legal consequences are to be implemented. I find this element crucial, as politicians are allowed to promise whatever they want, fooling their voters deliberately, but they are not held accountable for their promises and wrongdoings at the end of their terms. The worst that can happen is that they are not reelected, which is not of any consolation to the deceived.

The regulation of campaigning would also include the restriction of political adverts and the introduction of real debates on exact policies. This would end smear campaigns and dissolve the odd mixture of politics and showmanship, in which cheap manipulation dominates over expertise by using dirty language and fake statements in every political advert or appearance. Also, the blurry and meaningless programmes, and populist lies would disappear once and for all. All elected candidates shall be legally obliged to account for their results in office after their terms – without exception.

 

Conclusion

As a result of politicians purposefully and constantly lying to the voters, people put up with the fact that politicians are not trustworthy or outright liars. Many voters would not even bother to vote, let alone take the time to research each party’s agenda. Many of those that decide to vote, doing it based on half-truths or beliefs instead of facts. The communist-turned-extreme liberal parties of Eastern Europe are one of the best examples of how a dictatorial political party can change its cloak from one day to the other to pose and sell itself as the most liberal one in the new era – and most people bought it. Infamous examples of recent years, such as the deceitful 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum and U-turn in policy of Greece’s Syriza, the deception of Brexit’s Leave campaign, and the breakthrough of Trump’s incompetence, all share one common feature: deliberate and shameless lying to the voters in order to gain popularity, thus power.

Regrettably, deceit is embedded in the fundament of democracy; therefore, the abolishment of this dysfunctional system is vital, and begins with the reformation of suffrage, which has two directions: one from below (active suffrage) and one from above (passive suffrage). The result is a new, revolutionary, enlightened political system, in which the candidates are proven experts and the voters are expected to be aware of the basic consequences of their decisions. In enlightened democracy, political parties and their candidates would have to prepare and present their programmes to a very different type of voter that is not a mere political consumer anymore, but a conscious citizen. As a result, sustainable prosperity, political stability, and general well-being would prevail over corruption and inertia.

In enlightened democracy, active suffrage would not be an unconditional birth-right anymore, but earned by learning. Also, the preconditions of passive suffrage would require one to be a proven expert on the given field, to convince the voters in a civilised manner, and to be accountable for their results at the end of their terms. The success of every other reform that aims to improve our life in a united and enlightened Europe depends on this foundation.

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This week, the government published some commissioned research on the financial impact of Brexit on UK universities. The work looked at the likely impact of changing demand from EU students in response to various changes in fees and finances. The broad picture of the impact was that while numbers would fall markedly, that would be partly offset by the rising tuition fees. In the case of ‘cluster 1’ (Oxford and Cambridge) that would mean an increase in income, but for the rest of the sector, a drop (especially for cluster 3 (roughly, pre-1992s)). This is much as you’d expect, given the relevant international prestige of institutions and their exposure to international markets. But what the analysis is not, is a full estimation of costs of Brexit to HE. Even within the narrow coverage of the report – students – it does not take account of those factors that are not immediately financial in nature, such as social attitudes in sending countries towards the UK, or the soft power gains of exposing students to life here. Likewise, the scoping of foregone benefits from students remaining to work after their study is limited by some significant gaps in what data is to hand. But students are only one vector of Brexit impacts. Even with continuing participation in Horizon Europe, the UK will lose out on research funding opportunities, mostly because of staff deciding to move out of the country. The attractiveness of British HE as a global convenor of research and higher education more generally is compromised by the restriction of access to the EU. All of which suggests that the costs to the sector will be much more considerable than this report outlines. In some senses, this is a similar situation to the City: a reputation as a global centre seems to work against public policy solutions. Instead, the sector can shrug it all off and thrive mightily [sic], just like before. But this is not a case of carrying on regardless. All clusters are contingent and chipping/hacking away has an effect. In extremis, that might mean a failure of the cluster altogether; maybe not immediately, but further down the line, when it is all but impossible to stem the flow. I’d suggest we run a workshop about this, but that’s not really going to cut it.

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In the last decade, a number of European donors, including the EU, has framed their development policy within a human rights-based approach. Donors have also increasingly been willing to sanction their partners for non-compliance with human rights. Recently, the promotion of LGBTI human rights have been subsumed in several donors’ development policies. The EU, for instance, adopted in 2013 Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons.

The EU’s expansive LGBTI rights frame has, however, been politicized, both within Europe and in beneficiary states. EU heads of delegations have been expelled from the Gambia and Tanzania because they criticized the treatment of LGBTI persons in these countries, and aid has been cut back as a result. In a recent article we shed light on why and how politicization of LGBTI human rights promotion occurs within donor states and in partner countries.

Our findings add nuance to the debate on human rights promotion by showing that it is primarily not the validity of a universal LGBTI human rights norm that is politicized, but rather the way in which this norm is applied in a conditional strategy that causes politicization.

 

Politicization in beneficiary states

In beneficiary states, contestation of LGBTI human rights promotion is based primarily on grounds that it challenges the principle of state sovereignty. The more human rights issues are stringently applied in a conditional strategy, the more such rights norms are exposed to politicization. Postcolonial studies have argued that universal justice and principles developed in the Global North constitute a form of neo-colonial intervention in the Global South. Such efforts may in turn result in an outright rejection of LGBTI human rights among some actors in the Global south, where LGBTI human rights promotion is perceived as the imposition of ‘homocolonialism’.

Adding to this literature, we find a more nuanced applicatory contestation in partner states. Human rights activists from the Global South contest the practice of aid conditionality but also insert themselves as change agents aiming to reshape the policies of international norm promoters. For instance, a coalition of civil society organisations in Uganda managed to influence several donors on how to shape their response to a harshly anti-LGBTI bill that was passed in 2014. While Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark adopted aid-cuts immediately, civil society’s influence on Swedish and UK authorities contributed to shaping their responses in a way that would cause less harm to the LGBTI population on the ground in Uganda.

At the same time, when local human rights activists increasingly cooperate with Northern states, they play into the homophobe pretext of the Ugandan government and their supporters, which politicize the LGBTI human rights norm based on the norm itself.

 

Politicization in donor states

In donor countries, politicization occurs through the application of the LGBTI human rights norm. Domestic civil society groups and parliaments tend to call for an accountability-driven approach towards development partners in order to show to their constituents and voters that they are actively ‘doing something’. EU diplomats, on the other hand, often argue for behind-the-scenes political dialogue with partner authorities. And some member states have historically conditioned interests that may lead them to be more stringent in specific cases at the same time as the EU aims at generalized LGBTI rights policy prescriptions

Our research also shows that there is a marked difference between the positions of domestic audiences in member states despite their similar degree of influence, and also that such pressure is much less visible at the EU level. This has resulted in the Council of the EU taking deliberate steps to depoliticize aspects of LGBTI human rights promotion in response to its contestation, aiming to respond with more context-sensitive solutions. This conciliatory approach has been contested by the European Parliament but the EP’s contestation was not as effective as in member states. Hence, policies are significantly more affected by political pressure from constituents ‘at home’ in the member states, which corresponds to domestic development and LGBTI rights policy priorities.

In sum, our case study of EU-Uganda relations finds that while the application of aid conditionality based upon LGBTI rights depoliticizes development aid within the EU as it makes it seem more accountable to domestic audiences, it politicizes aid externally because of the pressure exerted. In this case, our results indicate that that the promotion of human rights norms is contextual and not necessarily universal – unlike the claims themselves.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article ‘The politicization of LGBTI human rights norms in the EU-Uganda development partnership’

 

 

Johanne Døhlie Saltnes is post-doctoral researcher at ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. Her research focuses on EU development policy, rights-based approaches to development and EU-Africa relations.

Twitter: @johannesaltnes

 

 

Markus Thiel is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, Miami and director of FIU’s Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. Dr. Thiel’s research interests are the political sociology of the EU and European (Union) Politics more generally, as well as Nationalism & Identity Politics.

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Since 2018, Italy and Malta have restricted access to their ports for NGO migrant rescue vessels. While both countries have faced criticism for this policy, it should be noted that since the 1990s, most EU member states have erected barriers along their borders to prevent irregular migration. There is, therefore, a degree of hypocrisy in other EU states portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ over their approach to the issue.

Tensions within the EU over responsibility for migrants rescued at sea escalated in June 2018 when Italy and Malta effectively closed their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels. Although the duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is a fundamental rule of international law, it is not clear which state is legally responsible for their disembarkation. In practice, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that the master of a ship is obliged to rescue persons in distress at sea, yet it does not specify the procedures for disembarkation of such persons.

Migratory pressures are not distributed equally across the EU’s member states. Moreover, recent influxes of irregular migrants to the member states located on the EU’s southern borders have resulted in tensions between these states and other member states which are more protected against direct irregular entries. The former have long complained of the Dublin Regulation’s ‘first country of entry’ rule which puts an unfair ‘burden’ on them, as well as of the lack of solidarity from other member states to deal with a situation that is entirely due to their geographical position.

With regard to the Dublin rules, by establishing state responsibility for the processing of an asylum request, the assigned member state is required to grant reception conditions to applicants of international protection including housing, food, clothing, healthcare and education for minors. According to the OECD, the cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers is estimated to be around ten thousand euros per application for the first year but can be significantly higher if integration support is provided during the asylum phase. Since the practice of providing international protection is costly, states have an incentive to discourage asylum seekers from seeking international protection in their territories and instead encourage them to do so in other EU member states with better conditions.

By accident of geography, member states located on the EU’s external southern borders stand at the forefront of irregular migration flows from Africa and Asia, thus carrying a disproportionate ‘burden’. Italy has become one of the primary host countries of the EU and the EU’s smallest member state, Malta, has had to deal with high per capita irregular arrivals in recent years. It could be argued, therefore, that the less affected member states ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the southern member states when it comes to the distribution of asylum seekers.

Despite widespread criticism of the Italian and Maltese governments’ decision to close their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels, there is not one European government that currently stands out for its open immigration stance. In practice, all member states are protecting both their internal and external borders from irregular migration.

Hence the hypocrisy of portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ for having closed their ports when member states of the EU and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1,000 km of walls since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to prevent irregular migration. Ten member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, the UK, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built such border walls, with a sharp increase during the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ involving the creation of seven new barriers. As a result, the EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to fifteen by 2017.

Furthermore, following the outbreak of the crisis, several Schengen members resorted to reinstating internal border controls to prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers from other member states.

Table 1: ‘Temporary’ reintroduction of border control at internal borders

Note: Compiled by the author using data from the website of the European Commission

Although the Schengen Borders Code allows for the temporary reintroduction of border controls in the case of serious threat to national security, this was the first time they were reinstated for an extended period. Internal border checks have effectively been prolonged several times since 2015 and are set to expire on 12 November 2019. Rather than being reintroduced in exceptional circumstances, internal controls have become the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control. This illustrates a lack of solidarity as well as lack of trust among EU member states, where precedence is given to national over shared interests.

Solidarity is one of the critical challenges facing EU asylum and migration policymaking and is becoming increasingly relevant as divisions and distrust persist among member states. As long as the principle of solidarity remains voluntary, it is unlikely that EU member states will pull together and agree on a long-term strategy, particularly one involving reform of the Dublin system to include a permanent relocation mechanism that would help member states facing disproportionate migratory pressure.

So what does the future hold for this policy domain? Will it continue to be dominated by the construction of walls and fences as well as permanent controls at internal borders? And could this lead to the end of Schengen, the most tangible success of European integration? There is a strong likelihood that EU asylum and migration policymaking will continue to be characterised by short-term ad hoc and unilateral measures since most member states perceive no benefits in developing long-term solutions.

This article was first published on the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) blog on European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) on 28 August 2019.

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As we were racing fast to leave 2020 behind, 2021 came as a slap on the face as the COVID-19 mutations promptly popped up in different parts of the World, including in the UK, Brazil and South Africa, which have made the successful vaccination roll out across the globe all the more crucial. While all celebrated the arrival of vaccines for COVID-19, they did not expect the failures in producing and distributing these life-saving vaccines to cause another European Union crisis. Neither friction was envisaged among the EU and the Member States, nor between the United Kingdom and the EU. While the EU’s handling of this crisis highlighted the EU’s weakest spot: slowness, thoroughness and its non-complying MSs. However, its manoeuvrers to take control of the vaccine crisis meant differentiation through non-compliance, indifference to institutional forbearance and extension of substantial and non-ideological material for the Eurosceptics in the EU and the UK.

From the very beginning, the European Commission and MSs have agreed on joint action against COVID-19 at the EU level; later adopted a centralised EU approach to secure supplies and support developing a vaccine.

However, when the AstraZeneca, pharmaceutical company producing the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, began to suffer from manufacturing problems at one of its European factories and has declared that it will deliver less to the EU than it had planned in the coming months. Thus, the EU’s vaccine target-of 70 per cent of all adults by the summer- was put at grave risk. And from this moment onwards the EU’s common vaccine policy began to go downward spiral.

Chinese Sinopharm vaccine. Photographer: Zhang Yuwei/Xinhua/Getty Images

First, not known for its burden-sharing stance, but infamous for being the most non-compliant member of the EU, Hungary did not disappoint. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban criticised the EU’s vaccination efforts allegedly for being slow and ineffective.  Then broke ranks with the EU by licencing the Russian Sputnik vaccine and authorising the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, ultimately disregarding the European Medicine Agency, which has not yet approved the use of these vaccines in the EU.

Second, when the EU was still drawing up its response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the mid-2020, the UK was still eligible to join the EU’s vaccine scheme, but the UK government opted out and pursued its vaccine strategy. The UK acted fast and decisively in concluding vaccine deals than the EU had done. We know now that the UK entered into a binding much robust contractual vaccine deal with AstraZeneca three months before the EU concluded its deal with the firm. However, the AstraZeneca’s manufacturing failures intersected the faith of the UK’s and the EU’s success in meeting their vaccine targets.

Following this crossing, the Commission’s rhetoric and positions have astonished those who thought that the EU is always the most cool-headed and sensible one in the room. The Commission first implicitly accused the AstraZeneca of giving preferential treatment to Britain in delivering its vaccine and asked some of the shortfalls to be made up with vaccine allotted for Britain and threatened that if AstraZeneca disagrees, supplies to Britain of other vaccines made in Europe may be affected.

However, it did not end here.

Just after publishing its redacted version of the vaccine contract with AstraZeneca on 28th of January and claiming that supply commitments within the deal are binding, on the same evening, the Commission briefly invoked the article 16 of the Brexit deal’s Northern Ireland protocol;  had they not retreated, border restrictions between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland would have worked as part of the Commission’s efforts to clamp down on vaccine exports from the EU.

There are three interconnected points I like to make.

My first point covers Hungary’s non-compliance with the EU’s common vaccine policy. Professor Frank Schimmelfennig argues that bad-governance countries with lack of the functioning rule of law and weak administrative capacity, like Hungary if they do not like an EU rule or decision, do not have to negotiate with the EU and ask for a formal exemption.  This is because these MSs can always find a way around by non-compliance with that rule or aspects of a common EU policy, just like the Hungarian government did thorough exploiting the EU’s slow progress in vaccine suppliance, and overriding the EU’s EMA–hence the outcome was a differentiation in the EU integration through non-compliance. Therefore, the EU should have been better prepared to have its MSs with the traits highlighted by Schimmelfennig to refuse to comply with the regulation of the EU’s vaccine scheme. Additionally, the EU should have adopted a toolbox for those non-complying MSs to keep every other MSs united. However, what is more, alarming is how Hungary’s position could pave the way for the other MSs, with similar political traits to Hungary, to challenge the EU’s unity and solidarity–thumps-down to the EU.

My other point involves the EU’s attempt to invoke Article 16 of the Brexit deal. One can say that the Commission did this out of desperation since it has been a one long dark year for everyone, but it may have severe repercussions for the EU’s stance on the rule of law. By Institutional forbearance Steven Levitsksy and Daniel Ziblat’], in their now much celebrated book titled, How Democracies Die, means that elected officials cannot exercise legal action that intentionally privileges one group of individuals at the expense of another. This helps to comprehend how Commission’s brief invocation of Article 16 is alarming and what dire consequences it would have on the EU’s stance on the rule of law. Yes, the Commission was privileged to act in this way, but not exercising that legal right could have been more beneficial to the EU and its relationships with the UK. The EU now has set precedence; we do not know which side will invoke Article 16 next and its consequences.

My third point concerns how the EU’s position in the UK and the UK’s relatively successful vaccine scheme may contribute to Euroscepticism in the EU and the UK. Wolfgang Münchau sai:d “{F}or starters, the EU has just provided a hindsight argument in favour of Brexit. The UK would not have proceeded with vaccinations as quickly if it had subjected itself to the same policy.” Thus, the Eurosceptics in the EU did not escape praising Brexit. For instance, although the Hungarian PM Orban does not campaign for Hungary’s exit from the EU since Hungary benefits a greater deal from its membership of the EU both economically and politically, he applauded Brexit for swift vaccines authorisation, which meant he exploited the opportunity well enough for his Eurosceptic audience. Furthermore, I agree with Münchau who also said: “The last thing the EU ever wants to do is give people a rational, non-ideological reason for Euroscepticism.”, which is in line with what Professor Simon Hix  predicts that the UK public will become more Eurosceptic now that it has left the EU, and because the UK is a weaker partner in this relationship. Sadly, the current row between the UK and the EU over Oxford Astra-Zeneca vaccine and the Commission’s unfortunate attempt to invoke Article 16 is supplying the UK tabloids with lots of material feeding into the Eurosceptic sentiment of the UK public, as well as into the political parties’ rhetoric– once again thumps-down to the EU.

Let’s hope the EU will learn its lesson from this vaccine debacle and next time around it will be better prepared and organized to act swiftly and decisively in global emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Failure to do so undermines the entire premises on which this union was conceived and stands.

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The so-called “refugee crisis” revealed the urge to ensure the functioning of the Schengen area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the need to operationally assist those Member States most affected by the sudden and extraordinary arrival of mixed migratory flows, and the need to effectively and uniformly implement the EU measures adopted in regard to migration, asylum and border management matters. Against this background, the decentralized EU Agencies, Frontex, EASO and Europol, have emerged as key actors, not only in providing emergency operational assistance to the frontline Member States, but also in implementing the hotspot approach. The expansion of the operational role, multilateral cooperation, presence on the ground and institutional significance within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of Frontex, EASO and Europol, is now unquestionable. Hence, this book entitled “EU Migration Agencies: The Operation and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol” comparatively analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol. Special attention is paid to the expansion of the legal mandates of these AFSJ agencies, the reinforcement of the activities they undertake in practice on the ground and to what extent a gap exists between these two dimensions.

The evolution of the operational tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed and two trends are highlighted. Firstly, while the Regulations of these AFSJ agencies continue to stress that their operational role is limited to providing the competent national authorities with the technical assistance they may require, the tasks of Frontex, EASO, and to a more limited extent, Europol, have an operational nature on the ground. Secondly, Frontex, EASO and Europol are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management measures, as well as ensuring that the concerned Member States do not jeopardize the functioning of the Schengen area or the CEAS. These two emerging trends are discussed in turn.

In this book is pointed out that Frontex, EASO and Europol closely accompany the frontline Member States in the implementation of EU migration, border management and asylum policies. These agencies focus on operationally supporting the competent border, asylum and law enforcement national authorities in effectively implementing EU law. The expansion of EU competences in AFSJ matters has gone hand-in-hand with the reinforcement of their administration, which no longer falls exclusively on the Member States, but rather, on a conundrum of diverse actors, among which Frontex, EASO and Europol play a prominent operational role. The growing integration that the AFSJ is experiencing has led to a Europeanization of its administration. It is necessary to ensure a uniform and effective implementation of EU border management, asylum and migration laws. The long-standing notion of administrative and implementation power in AFSJ matters is therefore progressively shifting. The deepening of the operational powers and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is eroding the exclusive procedural autonomy that Member States previously enjoyed, when implementing EU law. These AFSJ agencies increasingly steer and shape the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management laws and policies at the national level.

Furthermore, the extent of the operational functions of Frontex, EASO and Europol may theoretically range from merely coordinating and providing technical assistance to the Member States, to developing full-fledged enforcement and coercive powers. Since Frontex, EASO and Europol do not have independent executive competences, their tasks can no longer be described as merely technical or supportive. Despite the lack of transparency and the vague legal provisions regulating the activities that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake in practice on the ground, their tasks do have an operational nature. The issue is that the legal frameworks of Frontex, EASO and Europol lag behind the real operational powers that these agencies exercise on the ground, which creates legal uncertainty.

The reinforcement of the legal mandates and inter-agency operational cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol thus reveal a trend, under which these AFSJ agencies are mandated to increasingly develop operational and implementation activities. The operational and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol has followed a constant and linear progression since their respective establishment. While Europol, due to its still markedly intergovernmental nature, is starting to operationally assist the national law enforcement authorities in their national investigations about illegal migrant smuggling, Frontex and EASO already conduct significant operational tasks on the ground and ensure the implementation of the adopted European measures at the national level. Whereas the current tasks already represent an erosion of the operational powers and implementation prerogatives of the Member States, none of these AFSJ agencies have been bestowed centralized, fully autonomous operational and enforcement powers on the ground.

The reinforcement of the operational tasks and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol is not in itself an issue. What is problematic is the broad formulation of these AFSJ agencies’ legal bases and the lack of transparency surrounding their operational activities and cooperation, rendering the task of determining the degree of discretion they enjoy difficult. The key challenge involves determining the degree of discretion that Frontex, EASO and Europol enjoy and whether the institutional balance in the EU is respected. In this light, and despite the fact that Frontex, EASO and Europol have not been vested with strictly delegated powers, this book followed the CJEU’s non-delegation doctrine as useful guidance to analyze the legality of these AFSJ agencies’ operational functions under EU constitutional law. The CJEU, in Short-Selling, updated and relaxed its initial Meroni doctrine, by no longer confining delegation to clearly defined executive powers, but rather to powers precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority.

Unlike in the case of Short-Selling, the operational powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol are neither circumscribed by well-detailed conditions that limit their discretion, nor clearly detailed in a legal framework or their Regulations. These AFSJ agencies’ operational tasks are not restricted to merely providing technical support to the frontline Member States, but rather, they develop expanding cross-agency operational cooperation and activities on the ground. These agencies’ tasks entail the exercise of discretional prerogatives that are not narrowly delineated or clearly conditioned in any national or EU legal instrument. For instance, Frontex and EASO played a strong recommendatory role in the hotspots, which in principle, is compatible with the non-delegation doctrine, since the concerned Member States are not bound by Frontex and EASO’s recommendations. Nonetheless, the national authorities, subject to extraordinary migratory pressure, may decide to rubber-stamp the recommendations put forward by the agencies. Frontex’s influence over the Greek officials in determining the nationality of the arriving migrants, Europol’s advice and operational support to the national enforcement authorities to dismantle migrant smuggling networks, and EASO’s admissibility assessment of the asylum applications or the detection of vulnerable applicants encompass in practice discretional and political choices. In these cases, the responsibilities of the agencies are blurred, since the national authorities adopt a final decision based on the assessment of the agencies.

Although fully autonomous enforcement and coercive powers are not possible under the current Treaties and would breach the non-delegation doctrine, the ambiguity and lack of transparency surrounding the operational tasks that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake on the ground challenge the determination of their discretion and whether they actually make policy choices. In the author’s view, the main limitation and control of Frontex, EASO and Europol’s distinctive operational and implementation role comes from the Member States. While it is true that Frontex, EASO and Europol assist the Member States in matters closely linked to their national sovereignty prerogatives, the competent national authorities that vote at the management boards tightly control their recently reinforced operational, implementation and supervisory functions. Only two representatives of the European Commission have voting rights in Frontex and EASO’s management boards and this figure falls to just one representative in the case of Europol. The presence of the European Parliament in Frontex, EASO and Europol’s management boards is non-existent. Member States also exert their influence over the appointment and supervision of the executive directors, who lead the governance, management and daily administration of Frontex, EASO and Europol.

Member States’ reluctance to fully abandon their well-established bilateral practices, share information and operationally cooperate with Frontex, EASO and Europol in core national sovereign matters, like border management, asylum or migration, is especially reflected in these AFSJ agencies’ management boards. The Member States will thus maintain control of the strategic decisions and the daily management of Frontex, EASO and Europol. While centralizing on the executive, decisional and enforcement powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol will ensure a fully effective and harmonized implementation, it is important to bear in mind that these agencies represent an institutional trade-off or a common ground between intergovernmentalism and communitarization in the AFSJ. That is, Member States do not wish to relinquish further sensitive competences to the EU Institutions; but at the same time, they increasingly need supranational operational assistance regarding matters that can only be effectively managed in an integrated manner at the EU level. For this reason, whereas Europol, Frontex and EASO have been conferred upon significant operational tasks, none of these agencies are vested with full decisional, enforcement or coercive powers, which remain as an exclusive competence of the competent national authorities.

Hence, this book makes four main contributions. First, it maps Frontex, EASO and Europol as EU decentralized agencies, which are clearly distinguished by their operational powers and by the possibility to directly assist the competent national authorities on the ground. In particular, the establishment and early operational functions conferred on Frontex, EASO and Europol are studied. Second, it comparatively analyzes the reinforcement of the operational tasks vested on Frontex, EASO and Europol, as well as the extent of their assistance on the ground and influence on the implementation prerogatives of the national authorities in the aftermath of the “refugee crisis”. Third, it explores the bilateral and multilateral inter-agency cooperation between Frontex, EASO and Europol. Specifically, the expanded multilateral and operational cooperation that takes place in the hotspots is studied. Fourth, the limitations to the reinforced operational activities and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed. The constitutionality and legal bases of these AFSJ agencies, as well as the degree of discretion that they enjoy according to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) non-delegation doctrine, is examined. The internal administrative organization and governance of Frontex, EASO and Europol is also studied as to determine the influence and real control that the Member States and civil society may exert over the increasing operational powers these AFSJ agencies have been conferred on.

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It was one year ago today that Britain left the European Union, and one month ago that we also left the EU’s Single Market and customs union.

So far, NOT so good.

Putting up costly and complicated barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world is causing enormous headaches and losses for our businesses, without any apparent benefits.

Also today, the government announced that the UK is applying to join a trade bloc thousands of miles away – the Asia-Pacific free trade pact, or CPTPP, of 11 countries.

Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, said:

“One year after our departure from the EU we are forging new partnerships that will bring enormous economic benefits for the people of Britain.”

But in the EU, we already enjoyed comprehensive free trade agreements with three of the big economies in the CPTPP – Canada, Japan and Singapore.

And in any case, our exports to the CPTPP countries only account for around 8% of UK exports – tiny, compared to the 43% of all our exports that go to the EU, more than any other destination in the world by far.

 MISSING THE POINT Anyway, all this misses the point.

Being a member of the European Community was never just about trade. It was always about peace, first and foremost.

And attempting to increase trade with countries thousands of miles away also misses the point.

Most countries do most of their trade with their neighbouring countries – for good, practical reasons.

Also, in a world attempting to tackle global warming, doing more trade with countries thousands of miles away isn’t going to help. It will make the problem much worse.

 BREXIT AND VACCINES Today, some Sunday newspapers are attempting to justify Brexit because of the EU’s failure to secure vaccines in time, compared to Britain’s success.

Supply problems, especially with the AstraZeneca vaccine, have indeed hampered the EU – which was slower than the UK in securing contracts with pharmaceutical companies.

That was a serious mistake, as was the European Commission’s knee-jerk reaction on Friday to invoke Article 16 of the Brexit agreement, which would have put a border on the island of Ireland specifically for vaccine exports.

But within hours, the Commission realised its error and rapidly climbed down from its threat of invoking Article 16 (which, incidentally, Boris Johnson also threatened to invoke just two weeks ago).

If only our government was more willing to promptly acknowledge its errors of governance, that have resulted in over 100,000 Covid-19 deaths, the worst in Europe and close to the world’s worst, and contracts worth hundreds of millions of pounds going to mates of government ministers, without any proper tendering process or accountability, and resulting in the NHS either not getting PPE, or else receiving unusable PPE.

Vaccine supply problems in the EU, although of course a gravely major setback, will be resolved soon.

And as I explained in my feature article yesterday, the EU’s model of purchasing vaccines as a bloc for 27 countries, will probably have to become the model for the planet’s acquirement of vaccines in future global pandemics (as for sure, more are on the way).

The UK is proud to have, so far, vaccinated more people than any other country in Europe.

But as the World Health Organization pointed out yesterday, ‘vaccine nationalism’ will only prolong the pandemic.

Until all the world becomes vaccinated, rather than just richer countries, there is the danger, says WHO Director-General, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, that:

“the faster the virus will take hold, the potential for more variants will emerge, the greater the chance today’s vaccines could become ineffective, and the harder it will be for all countries to recover.”

So, the only way to beat the global pandemic is for countries to work together, not apart, and to ensure that treatments, tests, and vaccines are equitably and widely distributed to all countries world-wide.

 UK NATIONALISM Countries working together is also the way to ensure peace, prosperity, and security for our continent of Europe – the very reason that the European Community was established in the first place.

In the long run, UK nationalism – of any kind – is not going to work. We need to be a part of our European family of nations, and not apart.

No longer having any say in the running and future direction of our continent represents a loss of British sovereignty.

In time, the country will discover that Brexit means going backwards, not forwards. We will need a new democratic opportunity to reconsider Brexit, although that may be some years away.

In the meantime, please share the 8½-minute video embedded below as widely as you can. You might already have seen it, but many haven’t.

The video explains why Britain joined the European Community in the first place. The very same reasons why Britain is likely to want to join the EU again, one day in the future.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• My campaign page on Facebook: Reasons2Rejoin
• And LinkedIn

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• Join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

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By Bjarke Refslund, Aalborg University, Department of Sociology and Social Work

The impact of European Union legislation varies across different policy fields and across countries. Some policy areas like competition rules are highly, and directly affected, while other areas like social policies and labour market policies are only indirectly affected. Moreover, the member states varies in terms of compliance with European legislation. Some scholars and observers argue national policy actors are severely limited in their ability to regulate policy areas strongly influenced by Europeanisation, in particular Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law (what has been called judge-made law. National policy-makers, nevertheless, appear to have more political room for manoeuvre than often portrayed in the literature and in public debates, as I show along with my co-authors Jaehrling, Johnson, Koukiadaki, Larsen and Stiehm in our recent article in JCMS.

In the article, I and my co-authors investigate how public procurement policies have developed over the recent years in Denmark, Germany and the UK in the light of the prominent impact of Europeanisation within this policy field, in particular the 2008 CJEU Rüffert (C346/06)-ruling. Drawing on qualitative data, mainly interviews, from a comparative European project on precarious employment and social dialogue, the results show enduring national policy variation and how national actors, despite legal uncertainty utilise public procurement to endorse their own policy goals. Sometimes the actors directly challenge the case law, or at least utilise the legal uncertainty to further their own national policy agenda.

Public authorities are prominent buyers of goods and services in areas like cleaning and construction, but the procurements spans widely, and at EU level 14 per cent of GDP is spent on public purchase of services, works and supplies according to the EU commission. Following this the role of state, regional and local public entities such as municipalities and hospitals as ‘socially responsible customers’ has been increasingly discussed. In particular how public buyers balance social (like fair wages and working conditions) and economic (low prices which in turn often result in low wages and poor working conditions) implications of public spending. While the role of public procurement has historically been debated, the Rüffert-ruling caused great commotion and uncertainty, as it appeared to severely limited national polities ability to promote social goals with public procurement. However, more recent rulings like the RegioPost ruling combined with the new Procurement Directive has given renewed prominence to the social dimension of public procurement. Nevertheless, in most national settings legal uncertainty remain.

Policy-makers may have different goals with public procurement. For example, some national and local authorities are highly inclined to curb labour market precariousness and securing decent working conditions (and other social goals) when procuring, whereas other policy-makers are more inclined to secure the lowest prices, which in turn may result in poor wages and working condition for the affected workers. The contradictions between these two legitimate goals underlines the inherent discussion of the ‘social dimension’ of European integration, where it has often been argued that the social consequences receive only secondary prominence compared to the economic freedoms in the Single marked as argued by for instance Fritz Scharpf. The tension has been further reflected in recent discussion on the Social dimension in particular the ‘EU social pillars’.

The findings in our research show how both national authorities, but equally important local governments for instance in municipalities, use procurement policies to achieve social goals such as certain wage levels and issues related to working conditions. Hence, some policy-makers are actively promoting social goals with their public procurement policies through labour clauses or legislation enforcing labour clauses that define certain wages and working conditions that suppliers must meet. Our results additionally highlight how political differences are important for how the political actors behave, which has also been shown by other researchers. The results show that governments (local as national) that are dominated by Social democrats or other left-parties are more inclined to apply e.g. labour clauses and promote social goals via public procurement. However, centre-right parties are also actively utilising public procurement to reach social goals, although to a lesser extent.

Although the overall policy implications of Europeanisation are quite similar in the three countries, there is significant variation in the policy trajectories on public procurement. These differences reflect the traditions for wage setting and the historical role of public procurement. Danish legislators at the national level and their German peers in some Länder are more prone to utilise social clauses, whereas their UK peers mainly rely on voluntary agreements. Overall, this illustrates how national policy-makers themselves defines the room for national ‘push-backs’ against Europeanisation for instance through policy innovation and through defining new regulatory measures.

In sum, our article illustrates that despite increasingly Europeanisation of national policies due to the influence of the CJEU, there is still a lot of leeway for national actors to shape policy decisions. These policy decisions may even act against overall Europeanisation. This active contestation is reinforced by the ambiguity of the EU legislation and case-law, which some national actors utilise to promote their own policy goals, whereas others are more reluctant for political reasons or out of fear of the risk of infringing EU law. We also show that public procurement is used as a tool to promote social goals, as in particular the experience from some German Länder and Denmark shows, where the institutional contexts is also more favourable for this than in the UK, where labour clauses remain voluntary. This illustrates overall how the impact of Europeanisation remains uneven across Europe, and how national policy-makers actively challenge Europeanisation, when it runs counter to their own policy goals.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article Moving in and Out of the Shadow of European Case Law: the Dynamics of Public Procurement in the Post‐Post‐Rüffert Era

 

 

Bjarke Refslund is associate Professor in Industrial Relations and working life studies, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University. His research focus on industrial relations, comparative employment relations and political economy and industrial sociology.

 

 

 

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Differentiated integration is a political reality in the European Union. However, public opinion remains divided, both across countries and among individual citizens. This fact highlights important challenges for the workings of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and Mateusz Morawiecki stood by each other when faced with the EU’s rule of law requirements. Photo: Czarek Sokolowski/AP/NTB

During the recent tense and aggressive debate on the EU budget and the COVID-19 relief fund, Prime Ministers Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland) and Viktor Orbán (Hungary) threatened to veto the budget if the EU did not abolish the fund’s requirements on the rule of law. At this point, it seemed a real possibility that the fund would be set up excluding these two countries. In response, Morawiecki staunchly repeated his (and Orbán’s) long-held belief that such a ‘two-speed’ EU is both undesirable and unnecessary. Possibly, this is because they believe that such “differentiated integration” would relegate their countries to the periphery of the Union.

Differentiation in half of all integrated policy areas

Nevertheless, differentiated integration has indeed become a reality in multiple policy fields. While the number of member states has increased, the Union has become more heterogeneous. The most prominent cases of differentiated integration are, of course, the Schengen agreement and Euro currency, in which not all EU member states participate. More generally, however, we know that almost half of all integrated policy areas contain some form of differentiation (Leuffen et al. 2013).

At the same time, EU matters have become increasingly politicized and affect not only supra-national, but also national elections. We observe a polarization of debates and a higher frequency of referenda on EU policies, as well as a rise of Eurosceptic parties across member states (see, for example, Börzel and Risse 2018 and Schimmelfennig 2018).

Integration gridlock

An extreme consequence of this sort of dissatisfaction is the threat of disintegration. This problem is exemplified by the gridlock during the budgetary negotiations in light of the COVID crisis. The situation exposes the more general dilemma related to differentiated integration.

This is because public support for integration in the South is linked to the demand of moving forward, towards deeper integration. However, the Eastern states block deeper integration because they oppose the linkage of a social deepening to a normative deepening.

The very same states that brought about the gridlock in the first place also oppose differentiated integration.

The solution to this would be differentiated integration as an alternative to uniform deepening. But it is the very same states that brought about this gridlock in the first place that also oppose differentiated integration – at least in what concerns redistribution. This shows how sensitive the issue is. The increasing politicization of the matter makes it even more important to widen our understanding of how citizens feel about differentiated integration.

Divided public

In an article recently published in the Journal of European Public Policy, we use survey data to shed light on how individual-level preferences for differentiated integration are formed. A first look at how public opinion on differentiated integration evolved over time shows that, nowadays, a slim majority of respondents support differentiated integration – specifically, the general idea of a “two-speed Europe”.

There is some fluctuation over time, but public opinion is mostly two-fold: about half of the respondents oppose differentiated integration (DI), the other half supports it. However, support of DI reached a significant low in 2015. This stands in stark contrast to general support for the EU, which increased rather steadily from just below 50% in 2011 to almost 60% in 2017.

North vs South, left vs right

Taking a closer look at the individual level, the data suggest that social dispositions play an important role in citizens’ preferences for differentiated integration. More specifically, when it comes to explaining citizens’ support for differentiated integration, socio-demographic variables seem to matter very little compared to attitudinal variables. This is in contrast to what explains general support for the EU (see i.e. Andersen & Reichert 2009).

For example, we find evidence that support for differentiated integration correlates with liberal economic values. This means that there is support amongst citizens that also support free trade and a market economy, while there is scepticism amongst those with concerns about equality. Additionally, citizens in the political right are more supportive of differentiated integration than citizens in the centre or the left.

At the country level, our analysis reveals important variation in levels of support for differentiated integration across the EU. For example, citizens of the Northern and Eastern member states are more prone to support differentiated integration, and citizens of Southern member states are markedly more prone to oppose it.

Debate on legitimacy

A possible explanation supported by our evidence points to the negative (and still prevalent) repercussions of the Eurozone crisis, which mostly affected the south of Europe. To some citizens, differentiated integration might mean an attempt to dilute EU solidarity and to further divide the more prosperous from the less prosperous states. In other words, their opposition to differentiated integration might pertain to what they believe it implies for their member states.

To some citizens, differentiated integration might mean an attempt to dilute EU solidarity and to further divide the more prosperous from the less prosperous states.

Our findings should be taken seriously by the Conference on the Future of Europe. A substantive amount of EU citizens, especially those with strong preferences for equality (as well as those in the South), seem to think of differentiated integration as a process of discrimination and a threat against EU solidarity. If the attempt is to change their minds, or to reconcile their views with what those in favour of differentiated integration see as the correct way forward for the EU, then public debate must include convincing arguments about why and under which circumstances it is legitimate and fair.

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As we move into the new phase of Brexit – ‘long Brexit’ as I find I’m thinking about it – it’s useful to cast an eye back on one of the more obvious difficulties that the UK government faced during 2020: trying to do two things at once. While this shouldn’t be in the same ballpark as an individual “walking and chewing gum”, there’s good reason to treat it as if it is. At the heart of it is the notion of opportunity costs and finite resources. Doing something (anything) means you can’t do something else, and using your capacities for one purpose ties them up should you want to use them for a different purpose. For a person, that’s very clear: I’m sure we can all think of people who try to juggle too much at once, often resulting in them being unable to properly achieve any one thing. Something’s gonna give, somewhere. With a state, this should be less of an issue. There are many individuals and (relatively) huge resources, with scope to increase these in a way that one person cannot. Indeed, states spend their time doing lots of things simultaneously. But even here, we can notice that in the usual run of things, there are priorities to be made and focus to be made. Governments typically concentrate their efforts on specific things, leaving the rest to tick over. And that gives us a clue as to the issue here. 2020 was not ‘the usual run of things’ but rather a highly atypical coincidence of two huge events: Brexit and Covid. Each alone would have represented a massive challenge for a government. In particular, each has had profound effects across public policy, the economy and society, and so could not be contained within the usual structures of government. Moreover, in each case there was a necessity to translate policy decisions into effective action by economic and social agents: businesses needed to change processes for importing and exporting to the EU; everyone needed to work to reduce transmission of the virus. This, in of itself, need not have been a problem, since the kind of policy and implementation in each case did not necessarily have to pull in different directions. Working for home is not incompatible with working out EORI numbers, for example. But problems of interaction did still occur. Firstly, the need for the highest-levels of government to be closely involved in both Covid response and negotiations on the future relationship meant that neither one had the undivided attention of those concerned. I won’t speak of the Covid side of things, but it was certainly evident that Number 10 took a somewhat erratic path through the negotiations. Notwithstanding their model of backloading the process to increase pressure on the EU to make concessions, the decision to introduce the Internal Market Bill reads like the product of a hastily-assembled gambit that wasn’t thought through at anything like sufficient length. Likewise, the historic unwillingness of Boris Johnson to get across the fine print cannot have been aided by the need to deal with the sharp rise of Covid cases in December, leaving him unable to provide anything more than emotional support to the negotiators in the room and making any political breakthrough in his discussions with Ursula Von Der Leyen or Charles Michel more convoluted. Secondly, the political choices made during 2020 increased the difficulty of the next steps. Central in this was the decision not to seek an extension to the transition period ahead of the June deadline: While it made sense in terms of the narrative of ‘getting Brexit done’, it ensured that the hot end of negotiations would occur during the already-anticipated second wave, and that there would be the economic disruption of the post-transition arrangements stuck on top of the economic disruption of Covid. Thirdly, the overlapping of the two events means that we enter 2021 with the conditions for increased dissatisfaction with the outcome of negotiations (again, I can’t speak on Covid, other than to note the relatively poor comparative performance on cases and deaths). Already in 2020 we saw the dangers of such disconnection and discontent: the rhetoric of the meaninglessness of the Withdrawal Agreement, followed by that Internal Market Bill, was the feeding ground for those who wish to propagate a framing of being stabbed in the back. The prospect of a UK Dolchstoßlegende opens up the prospect of not only continuing instability in EU-UK relations, but also scope for instability around the Johnson administration; an administration that has never looked the most robust, even with its big majority. The absence of scrutiny, let alone involvement in the formulation of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement means that the political threshold to reopen – or reject – it is relatively low. This might well have been a problem even without Covid – the ‘renegotiation’ of the Withdrawal Agreement by Johnson is a case in point – but again it is plausible to argue that riding both horses at once exacerbated the issue. Of course, we can’t always chose when things happen, but maybe when we can we should bear in mind that the more we can focus on one thing at a time, the better for all involved.

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Introduction

 

The European Union is undoubtedly one of the greatest examples of inter-state co-operations that have ever existed. However, despite its stunning achievements in the last half a century, the EU had become the sick man of the world by the twenty-first century. The symptoms of her illness are the obvious and many crises we have witnessed on the surface since 2008; however, it is only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath, the roots of these crises (e.g. financial, immigration, economic, foreign affairs) are partly structural, but predominantly ideological. After the Second World War, extreme liberalism emerged as the most attractive ideology in Western Europe, and gained absolute dominance in the whole of Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Compared to the exclusion and terror of extreme nationalism and Bolshevism, extreme liberalism was cheered as an inclusive ideology, which was supposed to be able to promote openness and pluralism. However, it was clear soon enough that the political Left (often disguised as Centre or mainstream) is en bloc unable and unwilling to offer real solutions to those problems affect the people the most, which led to the rapid loss of its credibility.

 

The ultimate reason behind the rise of populism (both on Left and Right) and the cementation of illiberalism is the utter failure of extreme liberal governance. Radicals on the Right had set the Russian and Turkish illiberal democracies as an example to follow, attempting to get ever closer to govern with catchy promises. Despite the relative attention gained by radical political forces, the overwhelming majority of the European people are dissatisfied with the political elite’s incompetent crisis management in general. More specifically, the people desperately seek a third way, which is neither liberal nor conservative, but trustworthy, expert, and decisive. Therefore, the time is ripe to offer such an alternative by reforming our mindset and resetting our priorities.

 

The most severe crisis of Europe is the sinking of European identity into oblivion. In order to successfully challenge political extremism on both poles, we must rediscover our spiritual and moral origins, and live in accordance with them, translating and fitting their values into our modern era. The return to the real European values and heritage is the primary precondition of reforming the European Union into an enlightened and united superstate.

 

The pillars of European identity

 

By conquering the whole of the Mediterranean, from Hispania to Asia Minor and from Northern Africa to Gaul, the Roman Republic – and its successor the Roman Empire – created a solid legal and political entity, which was capable to host, preserve, and further develop the Hellenistic culture dominated the known world at the time. As the consequence of Roman military victory, the eastern Greek-Hellenistic civilisation could spread into the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea without obstruction, allowing the cultural transformation of the Roman Empire under the influence of Hellenism. It is not a surprise that the Romans admired the culture of the ancient Greek city states, as their cultural and intellectual superiority have laid down the foundation of civilisation already centuries before. By learning, applying, and constantly developing various sciences known already in the great empires of the Middle East, the Greek city states – especially Athens – lit the fire of civilisation in the darkness of barbarism.

 

The emergence of the Graeco-Roman civilisation was interpreted in Rome as the cultural triumph of the militarily conquered Greece over Rome. As a result of their openness, and solving the challenge of living in the intersection of numerous cultures, realising that they live in symbiosis with each other, the Romans could further develop a value system, upon which European culture was born and raised. To the contrary of the Greek city states, Rome never isolated itself, but was open to learn, and form the foreign elements of other cultures to its own image, for openness did not mean the loss of identity; moreover, it helped them to express their intellect even better. Rome understood that connectivity is crucial for a civilisation to grow and flourish, and applied this mindset on a high level and to a great effect, which enabled the Latin city state to be the centre of a civilisation. The Graeco-Roman (or classical) civilisation, completed by the Judaeo-Christian tradition, gave us that intellectual heritage, which is the foundation of the entire European culture and value system.

 

Due to the purposeful destruction of the original Jesus-like Christianity by the Catholic Church, the concept of Judaeo-Christian heritage might need some explanation. The difference between Christianity as an underground movement and as the religious institution created by the Catholic Church could not be bigger. Based on the Bible, moreover on Jesus’ words, it is obvious that the latter has nothing to do with the former. From times of the Apostles until the institutionalisation of Christian communities, Christianity was the embodiment of Jesus’ teachings. Being faithful to their principles and values, Christians truly cared for each other and for anyone in need, whilst waiting enthusiastically for the promised return of their Lord. There was love amongst them, which proved their faith real. They also understood and recognised their Hebrew-Jewish roots. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob (Israel), Joseph, Moses, Aaron, Joshua, David, Solomon, and all the prophets – amongst many others – were Hebrew-Jewish. Jesus himself was born from Jewish parents in the Jewish city of Nazareth. Christianity roots back to the Torah and to the numerous prophecies talking about Jesus as the Messiah in great lengths and specifics. Christianity is inseparable from Judaism; in fact, the latter gave birth to the former. Jesus transformed the Old Covenant into a newer and thus different alliance, in which the salvation of the individual became the core message (New Covenant or New Testament).

 

This Jesus-like Christianity, together with its Judaic self is another fundamental pillar of European identity. The Judaeo-Christian heritage and the Graeco-Roman culture are yet to break into the public’s interest and attention, but I am certain that it cannot be delayed for much longer. It is clear that from time to time they always came back to the stage of European culture and politics – even when faced certain persecution.

 

The adversaries and allies of European identity

 

In the end days and after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the Catholic Church has gained an immense ideological power and influence, which resulted in the systematic exploitation of the society, the rapid spread of anti-Semitism, merciless terror, and the death of intellect in Europe. Philosophy, art, literature, and science did not exist anymore, only in the narrow and dumb narration of the Church. Instead, torture, murder, and public execution were all part of the daily routine in the Church’s business.

 

The first real intellectual challenge to this plagued ideological system emerged in the era of Renaissance (rebirth), which was the attempt to resurrect the Graeco-Roman culture. The rediscovery of classical Greek philosophy and Roman Humanitas inspired many to develop the idea of humanism (as they called it), which was recognisable in art, architecture, politics, science, and literature. Experienced primarily in the Italian city states between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, this era is mainly famous for its geniuses (e.g. Bruno, Da Vinci, Dante, Galilei, Machiavelli, Michelangelo, Petrarch), who could present an alternative to the Church’s rotten spirituality, expressing the virtues of the long-forgotten antic world. Despite the harassment and persecution, extraordinary talents and uplifting ideas were born and flourishing, proving that Europe did not cease to be the world’s grey matter. Whilst Renaissance tried to reach back to Graeco-Roman antiquity, and reinstate its ideas and culture, Reformation aimed to search the roots of real Christianity – as once taught by Jesus –, reforming the sick Catholic Church. Reformation – initiated by monk Martin Luther in the sixteenth century – was an absolute direct hit in the Church’s dark heart, unlike arts and sciences, which were more of gentle and indirect expressions of the desire for something else than Catholicism. Although, both Renaissance and Reformation were constructive forces, which fought valiantly to resuscitate the values of the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian world; overpowered, they ultimately failed to complete their missions.

 

It was not until the unfolding of the Enlightenment movement that the Catholic Church began to lose its power significantly, when feudalism started to crumble and eventually collapsed. The Glorious Revolution in Great Britain was the first remarkable act to open political and economic institutions, which would include not only a narrow circle of the elite, but broader segments of the society too. Along colonial expansion, international trade, creation of financial markets, and the accumulation of capital, the Glorious Revolution established fundamental conditions to the Industrial Revolution, ending feudalism in Great Britain. Even more exceptional was the storm brought by the French Revolution a century later. Influenced by the achievements of the Enlightenment movement, and their manifestation in the birth of the United States of America and in the Industrial Revolution, the ideology of classical liberalism implemented the principles of social contract, constitutional state, democratic governance, and basic human rights. The achievements of Enlightenment are the liberation of intellect, the prosperity of science, technological advancement, rule of law, general liberty, improved working conditions, emancipation, broadening suffrage, and general well-being.

 

Conservatism, supported by the aristocracy and clergy, tried to reinvent itself as enlightened absolutism in order to forcefully regain its power – without lasting success. Later, conservatives gave their full support to extreme nationalist political forces, such as the Nazis in Germany, the fascists in Italy, and the autocratic governments of Hungary, Poland, and the alliance of Little Entente. Whilst nationalism in the nineteenth century was moderate, democratic, and even liberal, extreme nationalism of the twentieth century was violent, aggressive, and oppressive. Originally, liberal nationalists primarily fought for the creation of nation-states independent from dynastic feudalism, broad range of autonomy for ethnic minorities, and the inclusion of every single person in the state as citizens, but conservative extreme nationalism was focused on destruction.

 

Classical liberalism did not face extreme nationalism as its only adversary, but Bolshevism from the Left as well. Both ideological extremities did their absolute best to crush any moderate political ideologies in between. After the defeat of extreme nationalism in the Second World War, Western Europe was strongly influenced and gradually conquered by American extreme liberalism, whilst in Eastern Europe, millions of people suffered under Bolshevik terror. Extreme liberalism in the West and Bolshevism in the East reproached every form of nationalist consciousness; therefore, even the thought of patriotism disappeared from the identity of those generations.

 

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, extreme liberalism has been the absolute dominant ideology in Europe. Extreme liberalism has influenced people in the West since the generation of 1968, unleashing a spirituality, which quickly led to a value system disorder. The symptoms are clearly to be seen in the ardent support of homosexual propaganda – which supports same-sex marriages, child adoption, and genderism –, radical feminism, illegal immigration, multinational companies, and wealthy individuals, whilst ignoring the overwhelming majority of citizens and salaried workers. The value system disorder caused by extreme liberalism is a direct threat to our societies, which is materialising in the forms of anti-social legislation and praise of deviant behaviour. Libertine-ism, excess, consumerism, and numerous perversities combined with the ideology of capitalism created an amoral extreme liberal social, political, and economic system in Europe. Despite its moral erosion, the influence of extreme liberalism had been unchallenged until the financial crisis in 2008, when it became obvious that it is not only ideologically insolvent, but also inexpert, and thus incompetent in governance. The disastrous economic and social consequences have alienated a significant amount of people, who express their dissatisfaction and anger towards the mainstream political parties, marking the beginning of a radical ideological-political turnaround in the member states of the European Union. Exploiting the ordinary people’s desperation, populism began to rise and spread.

 

The essence of populist rhetoric and propaganda is the conscious and calculated manipulation of emotions by twisting and bending the facts or ignoring them altogether. Its language is vulgar, negative, unintelligent, fearsome, intimidating, and hateful, whilst its message is based on this communication and on irresponsible frequent promising, generating false hope deliberately. Populism promises protection, security, and peace to its followers, but in fact, it creates fear and hatred, and builds up a semi-autocratic governmental system. It appears mostly – but not exclusively – on the political Right as a method of extreme nationalists to get closer to governance. The best known examples of populism on the Right are the success of Brexit (from the campaign to quitting) and Trump’s political breakthrough in 2017. Despite the current trend and popularity, populism in itself is going to collapse sooner than later, because it is nothing, but a radical protest ideology, which does not stand on its own feet, but exists only as the opposition of extreme liberalism. For that very reason, populism is nothing, but a political-ideological dead end.

 

Reacting to populism from the Right, Viktor Orbán (Prime Minister of Hungary) declared the ideology of illiberalism, which describes a method of democratic governance, which is not liberal. The main pillars of an illiberal state – according to him – are the values of Christianity and nationalism. Illiberalism is populist in its rhetoric and propaganda, but also different from populism, because when it seizes power, it is somewhat capable of successful governance. Illiberalism, which is also called Christian democracy by Orbán, is the twenty-first century version of extreme nationalism in a resurrected form. Illiberalism preaches conservative values to its followers, steps up as the apparent supporter and protector of Christian religion, and praises national homogeneity and unorthodox economic policy, whilst it is extremely inflexible and exclusionary. Despite standing at different stages, the examples of Putin’s Russia, Erdogan’s Turkey, and Orbán’s Hungary show that in an illiberal state, power concentrates around the self-assigned strong leader. This leader and his party intend to demolish the crucial elements of democracy gradually, silencing the critical press, and make the functioning of non-governmental organisations impossible. Although, the political branches seemingly remain separate and independent, neither the opposition nor the media has any real power to act. The political opponents call it pseudo-democracy or autocracy, whilst the illiberal forces and their allies argue that it is still a democracy, only that is not liberal – thus illiberal.

 

Conclusion

 

My verdict is that neither extreme liberalism nor their extreme nationalist challengers is a desirable alternative to the great many European moderate conservatives and patriots, and moderate socialists and liberals, who are compelled to choose between these two extreme ideologies. European identity must be redefined upon the pillars of Graeco-Roman values (e.g. virtue, honour, valour, restraint, love of justice), Judaeo-Christian heritage (e.g. comradeship, social justice, generosity, solidarity), and the achievements of Enlightenment (e.g. science, expertise, progress), resulting in the idea of enlightened Europism, which is the translation and integration of traditional European values into the modern era of science and technology. It is my proposal as a third alternative, which would hopefully prepare the way for the total political unification of Europe, enabling us to successfully deal with European affairs of the present and future. Once extremism is isolated and vanquished, necessary reforms related to the suffrage, political system, economy, social system, armed forces, and foreign policy can be introduced and implemented. This blog is going to focus on the introduction of these reforms.

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Among the more minor consequences of Brexit has been the opportunity for me to give evidence to Parliament. In the case of talking with the Commons Committee on the Future Relationship with the EU (formerly the Exiting the EU Committee), that has always been a very constructive and engaging experience. Which makes it all the more frustrating to find my evidence quoted quite as much as it is in the Committee’s final report (although do note the various Conservative amendments to expunge references to a single European committee). That report concerns the arrangements for Parliamentary scrutiny of relations with the EU in the wake of both the conclusion of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement and the rolling-up of the Committee itself. The messages of the report are much as one might expect, from a neutral perspective: the UK-EU relationship will be an important one and the effects of managing the TCA are likely to cut across public policy, so it makes sense to review and strengthen scrutiny provisions. One of the points I made – and which the report notes – is that scrutiny comes with the benefit of improving sight of looming issues. More knowledge and understanding of what’s happening will help with avoiding problems in the first place, and managing those that can’t be avoided. That’s something that would presumably be of value to government, whatever its wider views about Parliamentary involvement in public policy: allowing Parliament to interrogate key issues and individuals raises the quality and quantity of evidence available, however you’re making decisions. But the impression given to date is that government seems more intent on take back control to itself than in creating efficient, effective and inclusive ways of making policy. The decision not to extend the Committee’s life for a period to allow for full scrutiny of the TCA itself is Exhibit A here. Brexit is done, so ipso facto there’s no need to talk about it any more. The argument by government that EU issues will be spread across the full range of other committees fails to address the likely outcome that it becomes no-one’s responsibility and there is little scope to deal with more systemic and cross-cutting issues. Sadly, the likely outcome of all of this is that this government will get to have minimal scrutiny of its EU-related decisions, and that only a major failure on those decisions will change matters. But that in turn requires Parliament to maintain its pressure to be able to run an effective system of scrutiny. This report is an excellent step in that direction and it is to be hoped that it results in appropriate action sooner, rather than later. However, with a government that seems intent on ignoring the EU at every possible moment, we might not get our hopes up too high.

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Abstract

This insightful book analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL). Exploring the recent expansion of the legal mandates of these decentralized EU agencies and the activities they undertake in practice, David Fernández-Rojo offers a critical assessment of the EU migration agencies. 

The book identifies two key trends in the administration of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Fernández-Rojo discusses how on one hand the new legal frameworks of FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL stress that their operational roles are limited to providing national authorities with technical assistance, while on the other hand these agencies are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the enforcement of EU migration, asylum and border management measures. The book expertly illustrates how FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL establish an effective and uniform national implementation of laws and policies, with a focus on their multilateral cooperation in the hotspots established in the aftermath of the refugee crisis.

Examining the de jure and de facto operational powers and cooperation of EU migration agencies, this book will be critical reading for academics and students of law, international relations and political science. Its assessment of the effectiveness of policy implementation will also be beneficial for legal practitioners, policy makers and NGOs.

Critical Acclaim

‘In this detailed and precise guide, the author traces how Europe’s border, police, and asylum agencies are evolving in an interactive system of governance. EU Migration Agencies maps out lines of authority, pathways of power, and unexpected feedback loops.’
– David Scott FitzGerald, University of California, San Diego, US

‘David Fernández-Rojo has produced an excellent and invaluable book on a topic of great importance and complexity, namely the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of three key agencies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL. His comparative analysis offers crucial insights to understand central aspects for the future of the European Union such as the Schengen area, the Common European Asylum System or the so-called hotspots.’
– Diego Acosta, University of Bristol, UK

Contents

1. Introduction to Frontex, EASO and Europol as Operational Decentralized Agencies 2. The Establishment and Initial Operational Role of Frontex, EASO and Europol 3. The Reinforced Operational Tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol and the Impact of their Activities on the Ground 4. Bilateral and Multilateral Operational Cooperation among Frontex, EASO and Europol 5. Limitations to the Reinforced Operational Tasks and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol 6. Conclusions and Perspectives: An Integrated Administration of Border Management, Migration and Asylum Matters in the EU Bibliography Index

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PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic65

The conclusion of the EU-UK Trade & Cooperation Agreement (TCA) over Christmas meant that the end of the transition period a few days later saw the start of a new phase of the relationship between the two parties. Since there are many others who are much better placed to analyse the contents of the TCA (e.g. Steve Peers, Chris Grey, and the entire UK in a Changing Europe massive), I will limit myself here to discussion of just one aspect, namely the structuring of future EU-UK relations within the treaties. As the diagram above indicates, the TCA joins the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) in creating an architecture not solely of commitments but also of continuing change, review and negotiation. Put simply, Brexit is not ‘done’, merely shifted into a new framework. To illustrate the dynamic nature of the relationship, we might usefully consider four distinct areas. Firstly, the TCA /WA creates a number of grace periods. These are agreed non-applications of rules or processes immediately after the end of transition/start of the TCA (i.e. 1 January 2021). In all the cases listed these are functions of the very rushed timetable from end of negotiations to start of implementation and the consequent inability of the UK to put in place replacement systems or processes. Such grace periods should be considered relatively unusual, for the reason just mentioned: international treaties do not normally get done at such breakneck speed and they do not normally involve divergent regulation. This second point matters a lot in enabling a more phased introduction of the TCA model, since the starting point on 1 January was one of complete alignment on EU standards. The variable length of the grace periods is thus a function of the likely speed at which divergence and/or issues might be expected to emerge: higher for food standards (which involves health), lower for rules of origin (where integrated supply chains cannot change speedily). A further should be made on the data adequacy provision in Art.FINPROV.10a, both for its semi-automatic extension and for the particularity of what follows. Unlike the other cases, where the UK will simply start following pre-agreed rules, this will require the EU to make a new unilateral declaration on adequacy for the UK to maintain existing data flows. This does not allow for any negotiation by the UK, only demonstrating its continuing implementation and enforcement of the necessary standards. The Commission did leave this hanging over the UK during the autumn, so it would be naïve to expect it to be without problem this summer. The second category is that of more conventional transitional arrangements. Unlike the grace periods, these allow for temporary situations to apply while more major adaptations can take place. In the case of references to the Court of Justice on citizens’ rights matters, the emphasis is on sunsetting this legal avenue, as free movement of people becomes a more historic right: the anticipation is that eight years should be long enough for any significant issues to have worked their way through to the courts. By contrast, both the rules of origin and fisheries transitions are designed to phase in new arrangements in a more progressive manner than a simple step-change: the adjustments allow for a longer process of change that better reflects the ability of each side to operationalise it. The final transitional arrangement is the limited shelf-life of Title VIII (energy) of the TCA. While it can be extended beyond June 2026, by mutual agreement, the Title also clearly sets out plans for further, specific negotiations, notably to implement a new energy interconnector agreement by the middle of next year. This is best understood as an early case of the two sides identifying specific needs for resolution, but not being able to tie that off straight away: thus Title VIII will grow, rather than shrink, over time, whether within the TCA text or not. The interconnector example is the only specific and scheduled case of the third category: negotiations. The commitment to develop a new framework for mutual recognition of professional qualifications is left hanging in the TCA and there appears to be no sign of any immediate urgency to get this moving. The other case of a commitment to negotiate falls under the fisheries section of the TCA. Annual rounds of discussions will continue using the Common Fisheries Policy framework through the 5.5 year adjustment period, using the TCA’s indications on reducing the EU’s share of access to UK waters. Thereafter, from 2026, the UK will be treated like other fishing states, albeit with one major caveat, namely that the EU can apply tariffs on UK fish if it suffers further reductions in its share (Bryce Stewart explains more). With the exception of the fisheries negotiations, all that has been listed so far has been about bedding into a new relationship, but this is not the end of the structuring of relations. Perhaps most consequential of the four categories is that of review, since these all carry the potential for more major changes to the TCA/WA arrangements. Most fundamentally of all, the TCA carries a general review clause (Art.FINPROV.3), first at the end of 2025 and then every five years thereafter. No limits are placed on that review and so we might expect it to become a convenient point for both sides to (re)consider what they do with each other and how. The timing of that first general review also matters, since it will follow the outcome of the first consent vote on the Northern Irish Protocol, the start of the emergency brake provisions in the UK’s Trade Scheme, and will coincide with the end of the fisheries adjustment period. Each of these might generate significant issues that require more general attention in the general framework. A similar bunching occurs in 2030, when the TCA’s provisions on fish will be specifically reviewed just ahead of the second general review. All of this runs alongside the rolling reviews that the WA’s Joint Committee will be pursuing in its Northern Irish Protocol implementation (as specified in its recent Decisions). As the graphic at the top suggests, it might be expected that the TCA’s Partnership Council also ends up establishing such reviews, as it gears up its work and identifies points of interest. Summary While the signature of the TCA might have brought to a close of the ‘hot’ phase of Brexit, it certainly does not mean that the UK and EU have now entered a stable new relationship. At best, the TCA/WA is a framework within which both parties will have to actively work to establish new norms of interaction and (hopefully) rebuild some of the trust that was lost during the period since 2016. If the cataloguing above appears extensive, then that is because both of the time-constrained nature of the TCA negotiations and because of the continuing uncertainty of the UK about what it wants to do with its new situation. Only with the passage of time will it become evident how that fits with (or changes) the TCA/WA.

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Heute, am 4. Januar 2021, nimmt das neue Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA) seine Arbeit hier in Brandenburg an der Havel auf. Nachdem ich ja schon im September und im November über erste Details informiert hatte, gab’s heute eine Pressekonferenz mit Außenminister Heiko Maas, auf der weitere Information bekannt wurden.

Das neue Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten in Brandenburg an der Havel – demnächst (Foto: Dr. Ronny Patz, Creative Commons CC-BY-SA 4.0)

Das hochfrequentierte, lokale News-Portale “Meetingpoint Brandenburg” – die zukünftigen Behörden-Mitarbeiter*innen sollte das lesen — berichtet von einer Online-Pressekonferenz mit Außenminister Heiko Maas, dem Ministerpräsidenten von Brandenburg Dietmar Woidke, und dem Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Brandenburg, dass das Amt in den nächsten Jahren auf 700-1000 Mitarbeiter*innen anwachsen soll, mehr als die Hälfte davon neu und viele sicher aus der Region.

Eine Behörde dieser Größe in einer Stadt mit knapp über 70.000 Einwohnern wird das Stadtbild nicht nur ein bisschen verändern sondern könnte Brandenburg nachhaltig prägen. Bislang ist zwar wohl (Hörensagen!) noch keine formale Kooperation mit der Technischen Hochschule Brandenburg (THB) vereinbart, aber wenn das Amt und die Hochschule intelligent sind, holen sie das bei nächster Gelegenheit nach. Auch die Unis und Hochschulen in Potsdam, Magdeburg und natürlich auch Berlin sind nicht weit.

Die Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung (maz) berichtet ebenfalls, dass der Mitarbeiter*innen-Stab des BfAAs noch in diesem Jahr von aktuell ca. 80 auf bis zu 300 Personen anwachsen soll – 15,25 Million Euro seien budgetiert, davon der Großteil für Personal. Der Aufbaustab für das BfAA war bislang der Zentralabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes zugewiesen (siehe Screenshot des Organigramms vom November 2020), vermutlich ist das jetzt (oder wir demnächst) dann in die Behörde ausgelagert. Die heutige Pressemitteilung des Landes Brandenburg hebt auch hervor, dass das BfAA “Nebenstellen” in Berlin und Bonn haben wird.

Der Aufbaustab für das BfAA in der Zentralabteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (eigene Hervorhebung)

Warum das Amt so groß wird, wird deutlich, wenn man sich z.B. die aktualisierte Datenschutzerklärung der Stipendienseite der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung anschaut:

Dort wird die Verarbeitung von persönlichen Daten mit einer Abrechnungsprüfung durch das BfAA “im Auftrag der Zuwendungsgeber (das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung sowie das Auswärtige Amt)” begründet. Das heißt, wenn es um die Mittelvergabe geht ist der Auftrag des neuen Amtes nicht nur auf humanitäre Projekte beschränkt sondern umfasst wohl ein breites Feld an Zahlungen (inkl. Stipendien) mit Auslandsrelevanz.

An der Eingangstür zum Gebäude, wo das BfAA seinen Sitz haben soll (das Schild hängt an der Kirchhofstraße 1-2, 14776 Brandenburg) gab es heute Mittag noch keinen BfAA-Briefkasten und in den Büros brannte außerhalb des dort ansässigen Blutspendezentrums auch noch kein erkennbares Licht. Aber da das Schild dort hängt, ist das wohl die Adresse.

Die virtuelle Pressekonferenz vor dem BfAA-Banner hielt Oberbürgermeister Scheller offenbar aus der Technischen Hochschule, deren Logo man auf dem Pult in diesem Foto von heute sehen kann (siehe Pressebericht der Stadt).

Das heißt, vermutlich wird ein Großteil der BfAA-Arbeit aktuell noch aus Berlin erledigt, bis das Gebäude bezugsfertig ist (sonst wär das Foto vermutlich dort entstanden). Wie viele der geplanten Mitarbeiter*innen dann da drin Platz finden werden ist von außen nicht einsehbar (Fotos sind von der Vorder- und Hinterseite, Lizenz siehe oben).

Also dann: Herzlich willkommen, liebe aktuelle und zukünftige Mitarbeiter*innen des BfAA in der Stadt Brandenburg an der Havel. Auf gute Nachbarschaft!

(Dieser Beitrag wurde nach Erstveröffentlichung um wenige Details erweitert.)

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The turn of the year has brought me something I never envisaged at the beginning of 2020: residency in Portugal. The certificate available to British citizens who arrived before the end of the transition period on December 31st gives me the right to spend five years in the country, at which point I can renew it or apply for Portuguese citizenship.

While I’ve made no firm decisions about where I’m going to be in the long term, for a time at least I’m joining what Samantha North calls ‘digital émigrés‘ – a growing group of international professionals who, being able to work remotely, up sticks and go abroad because they find their home country no longer suits them. They’re a more settled variant of the digital nomads which Lisbon has increasingly been attracting: cosmopolitan, welcoming to foreigners and – apart from the cost of accommodation – inexpensive, the Portuguese capital has sun, sea and co-working spaces.

Some of the more recent arrivals may be part of the Brexodus trend which has led British citizens to secure their right to live in another European country before the UK’s departure from the European Union. ‘Brexiles’ sometimes attribute their decision to a change in perception of the UK, their faith in a tolerant, cosmopolitan society replaced by a view of an insular country wary of foreigners.

In reality, of course, each person’s decision to uproot and go elsewhere is made up of myriad factors and feelings, not least their particular circumstances at the time. Life in a foreign country carries irremediable challenges: no matter how well you integrate, master the language or love your adopted country, you are always an incomer. That’s why, having been tempted by several other countries, I’ve always decided, in the end, that home was home. Living in Britain assured me the comfort of communicating in my native language and being surrounded by familiar cultural references. I also had the profound sense of safety that comes from the conviction that your society is liberal, humane and stable.

So it’s a surprise to find myself contemplating life in another country for the first time. My last minute dash for Portuguese residency, just three weeks before the Brexit deadline, wasn’t just because I’d lost my face-to-face work during the pandemic and, like many others, the ability to do things important to me. It was also due to what the UK’s Covid response revealed about the country’s priorities and values. Theatres and performance venues have been shut down without the compensation that would ensure their survival, and millions of freelance, creative people have been excluded from the generous financial support offered to the majority. Cafes, restaurants and pubs have been subject to so many restrictions and on-off closures that it’s likely that many will never re-open. It all adds up to a society which places little value on the kinds of shared experience and communal life that only take place in public space. And because of the long-term implications of these measures, I could see Britain, in the medium term at least, becoming a greyer, more privatised and monocultural place.

In contrast, European countries that I’ve been following throughout the pandemic seem committed to preserving their way of life, demonstrating how each country’s response is a distinctive reflection of its politics and culture. Visiting friends in Paris in the summer, I was impressed by how readily the French had recovered their savoir-vivre and were – while angry debates about holidays were raging in Britain – happily resuming their summer trips to other regions and continental countries.

Here in Portugal, bars and cafes – seen by George Steiner as a defining feature of European life – remain open, albeit with some restrictions. The calmness I recognise from my first visit to Lisbon some twenty years ago prevails, along with a sense that life goes on. Shops are open, and it’s still possible to visit a museum or attend a performance. On the streets and in homes, the sociability characteristic of southern Europe is visible and audible. ‘The Portuguese don’t want to give up their culture,’ a local told me. Hearing about how government decisions are being made in the UK, she laughed loudly and told me that the constitution formed after the dictatorship would prevent such a situation in Portugal.

At Christmas the authorities published advice with a focus on enabling the elderly to have dinner with their families and to see their grandchildren. I’ve been amused by an article about Portuguese police visiting those who live alone – a refreshing contrast to the many reports of the enforced isolation of the elderly in the England of 2020, when even those suffering from dementia or the last weeks of their lives have been forbidden contact with their loved ones.

All of which has brought the questions with which I began my research into European cities into sharp focus: what does it mean to ‘belong’ to Europe? What are European values? And how do I do maintain my European values in a country that seems ever-further removed from them. Unexpectedly, I’ve been forced by my nation’s response to a global crisis to take a deeper look at the question of ‘how to remain European’ than I ever anticipated when the UK left the EU at the beginning of 2020. One of the likely results is that my three cities will become four, and the book evolve into a more personal story about affinity with place.

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In this blog post, Chris Lord reflects on lessons from PLATO for doctoral supervision. As an international, cross-disciplinary and cross-sectoral PhD network, PLATO has created an unusual opportunity to compare supervision practice. But its innovative supervision arrangements and collaborative nature have also placed unusual demands on supervisors and PhD researchers.

What to expect from a supervisor? And from a PhD researcher? Supervisees and supervisors jointly developed PLATO’s Supervision Charter at the project’s first supervision workshop in Oslo

PLATO is an Innovative Training Network (ITN) funded by the EU’s Marie Sklodowska Curie programme. The network consists of 15 PhD researchers from nine different European universities. PLATO investigates whether recent crises in European have amounted to a legitimacy crisis, defined as a crises that calls into question the very rightfulness of the EU as a justified form of political power. Each of the 15 PhD dissertations makes it own distinctive contribution to answering that research question. PLATO is an original form of collaboration at doctoral level, so what lessons can we draw for PhD supervision?

First, PLATO has created an unusual opportunity to compare practices in supervision. 26 supervisors and co-supervisors have been involved in supervising the 15 PLATO projects. Some have more than 30 years experience with doctoral PhD supervision. Others have views of PhD supervision that are shaped by their own recent experiences as supervisees. All work in countries, universities and even academic departments with somewhat different practices, procedures and concepts of the relationship between supervisors and PhD researchers.

Second, PLATO is an unusual way of researching a PhD, especially in the social sciences. PLATO is a form of PhD research together and apart. Each doctoral researcher has her or his own independent investigation. Yet each also contributes to a process of collaborative research within the network of researchers. That places unusual demands on supervisors as well as PhD researchers. It also means that PhD supervision is less of a one-to-one relationship between doctoral researchers and their supervisors.

What follows describes PLATO’s originality in greater detail. It then makes some observations on supervision from the perspectives of its PhD researchers and their supervisors. Some of those reflections relate to any supervisory relationship. Others tell us something about the specific problems and possibilities of researching a PhD in a network, rather than a through a more one-to-one relationship between PhD researchers and supervisors.

Innovative supervision arrangements

Our project introduced several innovative arrangements which had important bearings on the supervisory relationships: co-supervision, network meetings, supervision workshops, and shorter stays with non-academic partners.

First, each PLATO PhD researcher has had a co-supervisor in a partner university. Since most universities require two internal supervisors, most ended up having three PhD supervisors. Of course, there is nothing unusual about co-supervision. It is also becoming increasingly common to create ‘supervisory’ teams. But more unusual is to have a co-supervisor in another university; and for PhD researchers to spend three months working with external supervisors as visiting researchers.

Second, PLATO organised four week-long research schools, attended by all PhD researchers and many of their supervisors, as well as other researchers from partner institutions. The schools were important to the process of supervision. They provided one more opportunity for PhDs and internal and external supervisors to meet to discuss all the normal questions involved in writing a dissertation: research questions, research design, methods and writing up.

PLATO also used the research schools to organise supervision workshops lead by Vitae, a further partner in the PLATO network.

Drafting PLATO’s Supervision Charter at the Oslo kick-off conference: PhD researchers Philipp Lausberg, José Piquer and Joris Melman with supervisors Julie Smith and Dirk De Bièvre

All 15 PhD projects were complemented by short secondments, most to think tanks working on EU affairs, some to civil society organisations. The work placements were an innovative aspect of our doctoral training. The secondments provided insight into research careers other than in universities. Even for those pursuing an academic career, secondments in think tanks provided understanding of one of the main means by which academic research into European integration is turned into policy advice or influences public debate. However, a need to define how the PhD researchers could best benefit from the experience was one further matter they needed to discuss with their supervisors.

The model of collaborative and networked PhD research developed by PLATO has required supervisors to go beyond their core role of advising on the writing of a dissertation

In sum, then, the model of collaborative and networked PhD research developed by PLATO has required supervisors to go beyond their core role of advising on the writing of a dissertation. Supervisors have been indispensable to supporting mobility of researchers within the network. Patterns of mobility required matching the interests of PhD researchers to those of supervisors and coordination of research designs and research outcomes.

Above all, supervisors have had to contribute to guiding the network as a whole: to overall discussion of how the network should answer its shared research question through 15 related PhD projects. The role of the supervisors in coordinating research questions, research design and research outcomes was crowned by a collaborative book project bringing together this research. The book was co-edited by four of the PLATO supervisors. Individual chapters were then based on the frameworks used in the PLATO PhD dissertations. Several meetings on the book, and the editorial role of supervisors, provided an ideal means of co-ordinating and integrating findings whilst respecting each PhD project as an individual investigation.

Vox populi: PhD researchers on supervision

Starting with feedback from our 15 PhD researchers, we asked them to rank what they found most valuable in the roles of supervisors. We gave them the following possibilities.

1. Discussing the structure of my thesis
2. Helping me frame my research question
3. Commenting on my drafts
4. Identifying where I am going wrong
5. Providing me with advice on a research career
6. Providing me with ideas
7. Suggesting books and articles I should read

Note that we did not include the role of supervisors in advising on training in methods needed for their PhD research. That, we assumed, is a necessary requirement of supervision and not something on which it is really possible to have preferences on what is most valuable in the supervisory role.

Commenting on drafts was thought to be the most valuable role. Helping to frame a research question and ‘identifying where I am going wrong’ were not far behind. Easily the least valued role was ‘providing me with advice on a research career’. However, amongst qualitative comments, advising on how to publish was thought to be important. The following is an example:

‘I found that close supervision during the publication process was extremely useful. As I was about to submit an article to a journal for the first time I relied on my supervisor’s experience. My supervisor watched over my shoulder before submitting, during the peer review, the revision process and resubmitting the article. I think this was extremely useful since I had no former experience of the process. Also my supervisor gave great feedback on my response to reviewers. This gave me insight to what journals exactly want’.

Several responses emphasised the importance of the supervisory role in the ‘end game’ and not just in the conceptualisation of the project

Other qualitative comments emphasised the importance of advising on just what is a PhD. We all know that every PhD needs a research question, a research design, a method, a beginning, a middle and an end. But just what those things are – and what they should be in the case of a specific investigation – often remain difficult to define. Yet, several responses emphasised the importance of the supervisory role in the ‘end game’ and not just in the conceptualisation of the project: ‘In knowing what to do to finish a dissertation’. Also important to some were simple tricks of the trade. ‘The best advice I got: “write everday”. It does not need to be great but it forces me to make sense of what I read during the day’.

Supervisors’ difficult judgement call

Discussions in our supervision workshops give some indication of how PLATO supervisors might respond to the foregoing views of what is most important in the supervisory role. The same discussion emerged on the relative importance of supervision in designing and finishing the thesis. As one supervisor put it, ‘the most exacting stage in any PhD supervision is always the first year – when the PhD has to formulate a research question, develop a theoretical model and a research design’.

On the other hand, there was also a discussion on how to encourage completion; and, on the role of the supervisor in identifying where a thesis is more than good enough to be submitted, even if that means saving up ideas and findings for future publications and projects.

The biggest challenge is to get through to a student who is clearly determined on a research path that is not working out

In a sense, all that is obvious enough. But that does not detract from the difficulty of the ‘judgement call’ and the ways it falls on supervisors as well as PhD researchers. The role of supervisors in identifying where things might be going wrong was also discussed. As one supervisor put it, ‘the biggest challenge is to get through to a student who is clearly determined on a research path that is not working out in terms of time-scale, feasibility or results’. But, again, that seemingly obvious part of the supervisory role is anything but self-evident in practice. As another supervisor put it, there is always a risk that a great idea, hypothesis or data mine might simply not yield significant results.

But how far should supervisors aim to solve those problems rather than just talk their PhD researchers through them? ‘Leave them alone, but not too much alone’ summed up the difficult balance most of the PLATO supervisors felt was intrinsic to their role; or, as one put it, ‘avoid being interventionist in a way that stops PhD researchers sorting as many problems as possible for themselves.’

PLATO supervisors Natasza Styczynska, Dirk De Bievre and Bas Denters using the Vitae RDF Development Cards

Whilst, though, we spent some time exchanging thoughts about all those usual problems, PLATO was quite as much an unusual experience for supervisors as for PhD researchers. For sure, our institutions usually require co-supervisors. But the idea that our PhD researchers might have co-supervisors in other universities or pick up all kinds of dangerous advice from casual conversations in a network of researchers, perhaps strains our ideas of control.

Yet, for all the importance of taking a controlled and self-controlled approach to satisfying all the necessary conditions for a successful PhD, there is always that crucial non-linear dimension to research. Cross-fertilisation of of ideas is more likely in networks of PhD researchers and their supervisors than in one-to-one relationships.

Personality types and motivators

At one of our supervision workshops, VITAE introduced us to three personality types. One has a need for achievement; a second a need for affiliation: and a third a need for power. Each of these personality types would be likely to write a different kind of PhD; and each would be likely to pose a different challenge of supervision. The achiever would be good at solving the research problem. (S)he would be creative and resourceful. But (s)he would also be likely to be perfectionist and insist on doing things her own way. The affiliator would be a good listener and good at synthesising ideas. But she would also be likely to lose her way in seeking to include too much and to reconcile conflicting findings and ideas. Finally, the power seeker would be likely to concentrate on what is ‘in it for me’: perhaps to be more interested in a PhD as a personal career move than as an exercise in discovering knowledge.

Of course, the lesson of all this is ‘know your PhD researcher’. If, as suggested by our simple survey ‘identifying where I am going wrong’ is important for PhD researchers, supervisors will need to know where the latter are most most likely to go wrong, depending on the persons they are and not just the researchers they are.

If everyone belongs to one of those three personality types, that will go for supervisors and not just PhD researchers

Yet, if everyone belongs to one of those three personality types, that will go for supervisors and not just PhD researchers. Perfectionism? Insistence on doing things ‘my way’? Avoiding conflict instead of pointing difficulties out? Asking only ‘what is in it for me’ and for my own research, rather than treating a PhD project as something of great value to the student? Surely all those are instances where the personality of the supervisor can have a negative effect on the research.

But are there any lessons for collaborative forms of PhD research where the role of a PhD supervisor is not just to advise on a single project but on how that project can best be developed within a research network? Intuitively, one might think that networked research is best suited to ‘affiliators’ who contribute to the synthesis of ideas through the network. Maybe, though, that is too simple. Whilst collaborative networks of PhD researchers and their supervisors can probably do without ‘power-seekers’, they probably do need a balance of the other types: of achievers ready to challenge any lazy synthesis and affiliators ready, none the less, to persist in bringing findings together where that helps as many as 15 different PhD investigations contribute answers to a common research question.

David McClelland’s theory about human beings and motivation identifies The Affiliator as one of three motivational types (handout by Emma Gillaspy/Vitae at PLATO’s third supervision workshop)

All photos: Marit Eldholm, ARENA, University of Oslo

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In this blog post, first published on E-International Relations, Joris Melman reflects on the public’s distance towards the EU. Even though most Europeans seem to lack interest in (or at least knowledge of) European policy-making, the role of public opinion is bigger than ever. 

The ‘Europe can you hear me?’ campaign aimed to encourage young people to participate in European elections, here from the event in Milan (photo: European Communities, 2009)

There seems to be some irony in the devoted way in which many Europeans followed the US elections. While many Europeans breathlessly watched how CNN’s John King reported the incoming results of yet another US county, some observed the striking contrast with their own continent’s elections. Of course, the Twittersphere was quick to capture this in a witty way (below). It is difficult to decide if we should read this as funny, or mostly as a statement of something true. Apart from bringing about so much political energy among European populations, the US elections simultaneously highlighted something else: the lack of interest most Europeans have in the politics steering the future of their own continent, even though the effect of it on their daily lives is a hundred times bigger.

European people: if Biden can keep Nebraska’s Second Congressional District he can reach the 270 votes even if the suburbs in Philadelphia has a lower turnout than predicted, as long as Milwaukee votes keep Wisconsin blue.

Also European people: what’s the difference between the European Commission and the European Parliament?’

There is nothing new about this observation. It has long been known that citizens experience the EU as a distant entity, and have difficulty in understanding its institutions and its policy making. Some have argued that this is fine, because the EU is mostly concerned with regulation rather than more political redistribution. Hence, it can do without popular contestation. Most others have decried this, and argue that an involved public is crucial if the EU is to be a truly democratic polity.

Yet, there is something paradoxical about this observation of the public’s distance towards the EU. Even though most Europeans seem to lack interest in or at least knowledge of European policymaking, there is a consensus among academics that the role of public opinion for European integration is bigger than ever. One only has to think of Brexit, or the hugely heated public debate following this summer’s negotiations on a European coronavirus recovery fund, where rowdy disagreement between national governments seemed to be caused by their anticipation on domestic electorates’ responses.

The importance of the public’s role is only set to increase as European integration is taking big steps in the formation of a polity. One such step is the EU’s agreement to joint borrowing as a response to the Covid-19 crisis, which has been hailed as a ‘Hamiltonian moment’ – referring to a 1790 agreement between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson which helped to turn the United States into a genuine political federation. Likewise, the buzzword in the European debate these days is ‘strategic autonomy.’ Now that the EU can no longer rely on the US, whilst global economic competition is increasing, many think the time has come for the EU to become more independent in areas like defense and industrial policy. Such steps, however, seem crucially dependent on public support in order to sustain them. Without support, there is a high chance of a backlash. If integration goes faster than citizens can keep up with, they are likely to turn their backs against it.

Yet, the question remains how this fundamental impact of public opinion can be reconciled with the citizens’ apparent disinterest in the EU. Or to put it differently: how should we understand the role of public opinion in the EU? Is it the centerpiece of the integration process, or should we rather think of it as an indifferent mass that allows elites to take the decisions? And in turn, what does this mean for the future prospects for citizens’ involvement in European politics?

Between indifference and politicization

Let’s start by placing the role of the public in some historical context. In the first decades of the post-war period, European integration was an elite process, with political and technical elites making the decisions bringing about the creation and initial development of the European Community. As citizens generally trusted their representatives, and public attention for it was limited, the public was hardly a meaningful actor in the integration process. Academics speak of a ‘permissive consensus’ to describe the role of the public in this period.

This changed as the salience of European integration grew. Following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU became more widely discussed in the media, polarization between political parties increased, and citizens appeared to become more critical. As the EU became ‘politicized’, the influence of citizens on the integration process grew. This became particularly clear in the 2005 constitutional referenda that failed in France and the Netherlands.

As a consequence, political scientists now speak of a ‘constraining dissensus’ that has replaced the permissive consensus. Political leaders now have to look over their shoulders when negotiating at the European level, as outcomes might easily be contested in the domestic arena. The fierce protests in especially Southern European countries during the euro crisis, Brexit, and most recently this summer’s hugely salient debates the EU recovery fund are examples of this phenomenon.

Still, this view of the public is one-sided if we do not distinguish between the functional importance of public opinion for European decision making, and citizens’ actual perception and evaluation of European politics. The fact that citizens’ preferences increasingly affect political decision-making does not necessarily mean that citizens themselves have come to have stronger opinions on EU affairs – it is still possible that many do not care, or do not know.

Most research tends to pay insufficient attention to his distinction. This might be related to the bias of EU experts, as those who participate in heated EU debates on a daily basis might easily overlook the indifference most citizens have towards the EU or even politics in general. But it is equally important to consider the methods used in measuring public opinion. Polls asking how people think about specific questions easily convey the impression that citizens hold meaningful opinions on these items (‘x% of the public trusts the European Commission’, ‘x% of EU citizens supports solidarity with other EU countries’). However, it might of course well be that survey-respondents tick a box without actually really having a clear or stable opinion. To understand questions of citizens’ interest and involvement, it therefore is important to use a wider variety of methods, including qualitative research that studies the convictions and perceptions underlying citizens’ plain pro- and anti-preferences.

The research that does use such methods consistently finds how, even in the constraining dissensus-period, public opinion on the EU is mostly characterized by the distance citizens experience towards it (e.g. Baglioni and Hurrelmann, 2016; Duchesne et al., 2013; van Ingelgom, 2014; White, 2011). Rather than being outspoken, most citizens find it difficult to express a clear opinion on European politics because of its complexity, the limited amount of information they receive, and the little connection it seems to have to their daily life concerns.

Admittedly, most of this research was conducted in the previous decade. In the heated passed 10 years, the public might have become more animated. Indeed, in research that I’m currently conducting myself, some findings hint at such a development. In this research, I organized focus groups in 3 European countries (Italy, France and the Netherlands) to study public opinion on the Euro. Despite Europe’s single currency being narrower as a topic than the EU in general, discussions showed a sense of the increasing importance of European politics. Instigated by Brexit, the perceived threat brought about by the rise of China and a more hostile US, as well as the general political instability associated with the rise of populism, people seem to feel that important things are happening, and the EU has to play a role– although these findings should be taken as very preliminary.

Yet, even if this is true and the public’s interest in European politics grows, it is important to note that this development still takes place in the context of a more general distance most people feel towards the EU, if not politics in general. People might have some awareness of particular developments, but they are still perceived as far away. They are still complex, unconnected to their daily lives, and happening in an arena that is far away from their influence. As a consequence, even those who have a growing sense of the EU’s importance might find it difficult to form an opinion on it.

Public opinion as embedded, diffuse, and moldable

It is crucial to appreciate this, and grasp the consequences it has for understanding public opinion. What it particularly draws our attention to is not to the content of people’s opinions – are they in favor of or against the EU? Do they like its policies? – but rather to the form of their opinions, the type of opinions they have. When looking at opinion in this way, a couple observations are particularly relevant.

Firstly, how is public opinion on the EU often embedded? That is to say, how attitudes towards the EU are absorbed in more general political considerations. Because the EU is seen as too distant and complex to form a clear opinion on, it is likely that opinions on it are a derivative of more general orientations. In other words, opinions on the EU are not necessarily opinions that are actually based on the EU. Even people who express negative attitudes towards the EU – people we might normally frame as ‘Eurosceptic’ – might actually not be that interested in the EU, but express a more general anger towards their national elites, or frustration with the state of society in general.

In turn, we should realize how much of public opinion on the EU is diffuse. Most people do not have clearly demarcated opinions on the EU, based on conscious reflection on the pros and cons of integration. Instead, their attitude towards the EU can better be seen as a vague orientation.

The consequence of this diffuse, wavering public opinion is that it is highly moldable. While people might have general orientations towards project of European integration, their actual opinions are very sensitive to what they hear from elites: politicians, political parties they sympathize with, media they trust. It is not unlikely that it is precisely this ‘moldability’ that, more than strong opinions about Europe, made events such as Brexit possible. People such as Brexit campaigner Dominic Cummings, known for his obsessive use of focus groups he uses to base policy on, know this better than anyone. If we find out which frames resonate with people, public opinion can be steered accordingly.

This should not lead us to relativism about public opinion. Of course, it should not be read as implying that public opinion is meaningless, or that it can be steered in any direction. There are still structural grounds for the formation of opinion, and there still are preferences and values underlying it. The most important one is probably the national lens, which filters people’s understanding of European politics, determines how people perceive their interests, and can function as a benchmark to evaluate membership of the EU against. Yet, it is important to appreciate what the form of public opinion implies for its role.

Weighing the role of public opinion

What this shows us in in the first place that the EU’s current politicization is still in the first place an elite process. Yes, there is more public attention for it, and the debate on it is more polarized and heated than before. As a consequence of this, the role of the public is increasing, as politicians closely follow the polls and respond to them. Still, this does not mean that the public takes an active role. It is still only a passive actor, ambiguously responding to processes at the elite level.

This also means we should not overestimate the role of the public. For example, governments should not be overly afraid for public opinion in negotiating European issues. Instead of behaving as if they are only following what the public demands of them, they should acknowledge that it is their own stories that determine how the public thinks in the first place. Rather than being afraid of the public and telling it what they believe it wants to hear, politicians should show leadership and make clear what exactly is at stake.

Last summer’s negotiations on the coronavirus recovery fund serve as an example. As these negotiations were dominated by the ‘frugal four’ (Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands), these frugal countries’ leaders mostly seemed to speak only to please their citizens. The Netherlands for example rather than explaining to the public why and how solidarity was needed, the main message Prime Minister Rutte communicated was that European cooperation was now demanding too much solidarity, and that he would be as tough as possible in the negotiations to protect the Dutch interest. While appreciated by the public (over 70% supported the governments’ stance), the side effect of such discourse is that both the short and long term willingness of the Dutch public to show solidarity decreases, even when this is hugely important and would be entirely in its self-interest. In this way, politicians’ tendency to act out of a fear for public opinion makes in increasingly difficult to manage the EU.

Germany’s example makes clear that such fear for public opinion is indeed. In general, the German public is seen as very critical of European solidarity. In the euro crisis, it seemed to favor a hard stance against Greece, indicated not only by the polls but also the fact that 12,000 ordinary citizens took to the Constitutional Court to complain about the rescue fund (ESM) that was established to weather the crisis. However, Merkel managed to change things around during this summer’s negotiations, seemingly without problems. In an impressive speech, she argued that Germany could only thrive if Europe did. The result was a remarkably high support for this position which serves as an illustration of how moldable public opinion is, and how leadership can serve the shared European interest.

Again, the fact that public opinion can easily be molded should not be seen as making it unimportant. On the contrary, it is also precisely because it is moldable that it can easily turn into a threat for the integration project. One only needs to think of Brexit. As the EU lacks the ‘naturalness’ that nation states can rely on, there is little protecting it from volatile public opinion. While most people might fear the consequences of an exit from the EU, there is no strong attachment to it either.

Therefore public opinion should not be neglected. Not only because such a strategy would backfire as citizens sense that a highly important political body is being created without them having a say, but also because creating such a body needs the involvement of citizens for its legitimacy. Thus public opinion should be taken more seriously. But this does not mean to treat public opinion as a way for clearly demanding politicians to take particular actions. Instead, it means to reflect on what public opinion actually entails, and to realize that because of its undetermined character, elites have a responsibility in the shaping of public opinion. Their task is therefore to make a bigger effort in educating citizens in what is at stake, rather than telling them what they like to hear, and what seems to be electorally profitable.

Future prospects

However, to what extend this is possible, is a difficult discussion. On itself, it is not overly revolutionary to say that it would be desirable to have an educated European public that understands what is at stake in the European debate, and has the resources to hold policy makers accountable. But the question is how to get here, and if this is possible in the first place.

It is undeniable that there are important hurdles to be overcome. The most obvious one is citizens’ general disinterest and difficulty to make sense of European politics. As long as citizens do not feel there is something at stake that is relevant to their daily lives, and as long as they do not feel having an opinion on such matters would make a difference, it will be difficult to convince citizens that they should think about the EU in a particular way.

Another one is the dominance of national perspectives. As long as citizens view European discussions purely in terms of their national interest, there is a fertile soil for Eurosceptic politicians to portray the EU as a threat from which they will try to protect their citizens. What contributes to this is that there is little that European institutions can do themselves in this regard, as the legitimation of the EU runs through national institutions. It is national governments and national media that are spinning the narrative about Europe.

Yet, it is possible to point at some paths for overcoming these hurdles. Firstly, there might be some potential here for supranational initiatives. An example is the euro, through which European integration entered the daily lives of citizens, and as such might normalize the idea of European governance for citizens. Another one is the Conference on the Future of Europe, an initiative through which the EU hopes to involve citizens in the European project. At the same time, the question is if such initiatives on themselves will have enough force. In the case of the euro for example, the actual evidence of its effect is limited, even if this is a huge step in European integration. While it does seem that citizens accept the euro as a social fact that is there to stay, there is little evidence that it has created a European identity. And likewise, the question with initiatives focusing on citizens’ participation is if these will really be experienced as meaningful by citizens themselves. As long as they have little understanding of what is at stake, such initiatives are likely to be experienced as artificial.

In that sense, the emergence of more trans-European media could have a much more important effect. This would not only make information more accessible and breach the dominance of purely national frames, but would also do an important job in giving citizens a sense of what is at stake. Think of what having an EU commissioner held accountable for their policies in a talk show could do. Yet, while there are some first signs of this happening – think of the success of a medium like Politico, or of how this summer’s negotiations suddenly led to a surge of politicians giving interviews in media outside their own country – the question remains whether the market for such reporting is big enough.

For now, the most direct impact is probably to be expected from the crises Europe is now living through. This fits to the essence of the EU. “Europe will be forged in crises,” said Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, “and will be the sum of the solutions.” And indeed, Europe’s current situation might have the effect of fostering a shared identity. Now that most of us are locked up in our houses because of a pandemic, and at the same time we are faced with external challenges such as the rise of China, Brexit, and a more hostile US, the sense that we are in the same boat is likely to increase resulting in a more legitimate European governance. Later, the climate crisis – of which the current Covid-19 crisis can be seen as a test case – might have the same effect. Admittedly, the effect of both the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate crisis can also go the opposite direction, and can just as well have a divisive effect, depending on how they are handled. Even in this turn of events, however, the crises would still have the effect of drawing the public closer towards European politics.

In any scenario, the prospect of Europeans staying up at night to watch the European elections is still far away. And looking at the current state of affairs in the US, staying away from such a level of politicization also seems desirable. What we should hope for though is that European politics will finally be infused with at least a pinch of this perception of importance. A perception among citizens that European politics is not just something vague happening far away, but that it concerns important decision-making that affects their lives in a fundamental manner. In turn, such a perception should be accompanied by the feeling that having a position on these decisions actually can make a difference. Admittedly, this development is still in its infancy. But it does appear that it has started. And now that the genie is out of the bottle, putting it back seems impossible. The question is now how political elites will deal with it.

References

Buscha, F., D. Muller, and L. Page (2017): Can a common currency foster a shared social identity across different nations? The case of the euro. European Economic Review 100, 318–336

De Vries, C.E. (2018) Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration, Oxford University Press.

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This article was originally published on E-International Relations. 

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Differing political cultures and migration traditions among EU member states have given rise to a variety of national policy approaches toward irregular migration. While in principle this diversity hinders agreement on common asylum and migration policies, EU member states are now increasingly converging toward more restrictive migration policies.

National policy approaches are deeply rooted in historical legacies as well as political, economic and social factors, including issues of religion and cultural identity. Member states are unequal in terms of power, resources, location, experience, institutions, cultural and historical baggage and the number of asylum seekers they receive. As a result, these powerful cleavages make it harder to reach consensus in this policy domain.

Historical experiences

In the aftermath of the Second World War, north-western Europe experienced high levels of immigration due to colonial commitments or recruitment programmes for migrant workers. Hence, such states have a history of taking in large numbers of migrants from multi-ethnic backgrounds, particularly from former colonies. France, for example, saw an influx of Algerians fleeing the Algerian War from 1954 to 1962, whilst in Britain, migrants arrived from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean during the 1950s and 60s. By contrast, the southern and central-eastern member states had little experience with migration.

Beginning in the 1980s, southern members Italy, Greece and Spain were rapidly transformed from countries of emigration to immigration. These member states experienced a dramatic ‘migration turnaround’, from mass emigration during the 1950s, 60s and early 70s, to mass immigration during the 1980s and especially, in the 90s and 2000s. Similarly, Cyprus and Malta, post EU accession in 2004, became immigrant receiving countries.

The migration experience of the central-eastern member states has been quite different. Although they did experience some immigration after the end of the Cold War, it was mainly from migrants with very similar cultures to their own, mainly from Ukraine. This group of states thus had little tradition and experience in dealing with cultural diversity.

Geographic location

EU member states confront irregular migration to differing degrees due to their geographical proximity to zones of instability and conflict. Consequently, the different regions of the EU experience different migratory pressures.

Those member states on the EU’s periphery, namely Italy and Greece, have become the main entry points for irregular migrants by accident of geography, and are responsible for guarding long sea and land borders. As a result, the southern member states agree on the need to overhaul the Dublin Regulation and abolish the ‘first state of arrival’ rule, which places an unfair burden on them. They have also repeatedly pushed for the establishment of an EU mandatory permanent relocation mechanism in order to evenly distribute asylum seekers across the EU member states.

Public opinion

According to the latest Standard Eurobarometer (Autumn 2018), immigration is perceived as the most important concern of European citizens (40 per cent). Public opinion is an important factor influencing member states’ policy approaches to irregular migration as governments need the support of the people to be re-elected. The public’s focus on an issue affects the response of national governments.

In times where a given issue has low salience, national governments are not under pressure to ‘deliver’ a policy that the public accepts, mainly because the public is not especially concerned about the issue itself. However, when an issue is problematised in the media resulting in high salience, the public will be more concerned. The response of the governing party or coalition will therefore tend to be oriented toward public opinion.

The rise of right-wing populism

Following the outbreak of the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, the issue of irregular migration emerged as a key debate in national elections across the EU, with right-wing populist parties gaining support in several member states.

In the 2017 French presidential election, stopping ‘uncontrolled’ immigration was the slogan of the right-wing populist Front National (now ‘Rassemblement National’) candidate Marine Le Pen. In the 2017 German federal elections, the leader of the nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD), Alexander Gauland, stated that Islam is alien to German society and spoke of fighting an ‘invasion of foreigners’. The party was elected to the Bundestag for the first time, winning 12.6 per cent of the vote and more than 90 seats.

At the end of 2017, the coalition government formed by the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) resulted in the first western European state with a governing far-right party. During the campaign, both parties put restrictive positions on immigration and integration at the centre of their electoral campaign. ÖVP leader, Sebastian Kurz, called for limits on the number of asylum seekers entering Europe and reduced social benefits for EU citizens living in Austria.

Irregular migration was also a key issue in Eastern Europe for instance in the run-up to Hungary’s election in 2018. A central pillar of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s campaign was that Hungary would be ‘overrun’ by refugees if he was not elected. He also appealed to the prejudices of his core supporters with talk of the importance of ‘ethnic homogeneity’, and of a ‘Europe under threat of invasion’.

In Southern Europe, in the run-up to the Italian general election in 2018, the electoral campaign of the centre-right coalition was characterised by anti-immigrant rhetoric. Former Prime Minister and leader of Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi, claimed there were 600,000 ‘illegal’ migrants living in Italy representing a ‘social time-bomb ready to explode’, and pledged mass deportations. The leader of the League, Matteo Salvini, declared that if he was elected Prime Minister, one of his principal objectives would be to expel half a million failed asylum seekers.

Towards convergence of migration control policies

National policy approaches to irregular migration quickly diverge as a result of the factors discussed above. At the same time, there has been a visible convergence. Indeed, as the issue of irregular migration gained salience in the political debate, the salience of national identity and secure borders resulted in convergence towards restrictive migration policies. Deterrence has become a key theme in the rationale for EU asylum and migration policies, exemplified in the agreements with Turkey and Libya.

Austria’s motto when it took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2018, ‘a Europe that protects’, reflects the EU approach to irregular migration: the focus on the ‘fight against illegal migration’. Hence, although the EU is more divided than ever over irregular migration, it is united when it comes to the externalisation of migration controls.

This article was first published on the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) blog on European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) on 17 July 2019.

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