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Sarah de Heer is a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Law at Lund University. In her doctoral research, she examines the impact of AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine on the right to health in Sweden. More specifically, Sarah scrutinises to which extent the conformity assessment procedure, which allows medical devices to be placed on the internal market of the European Union, can safeguard the quality pillar under the right to health. Sarah’s doctoral research is funded by Wallenberg AI, Autonomous Systems and Software Program – Humanity and Society (WASP-HS).

Imagine the following: you visit your General Practitioner, as you are experiencing unexplained weight loss and belly pain that spreads to the back. Your General Practitioner decides to test your blood by using an AI-driven medical device in precision medicine that predicts the likelihood of pancreatic cancer. Based on your blood sample, demonstrating a high likelihood of pancreatic cancer, the multidisciplinary team suggests starting chemotherapy. Since multiple combinations of various medicinal drugs can be included in the chemotherapy treatment plan, the tumour in your pancreas is tested with another AI-driven medical device in precision medicine to determine the drug sensitivity of the medicinal products. Based on these results, you are given the medicinal products that have showed high sensitivity and are expected to give you the best results. After treatment, the tumour appears to be in remission.

The above scenario appears to be promising: quicker and more accurate diagnosis and treatment thanks to the combination of precision medicine and AI. While precision medicine modifies healthcare diagnosis and treatment towards the data of an individual belonging to a specific (sub)group of the general population, this tailored approach of medicine is time-consuming and costly. Adding AI allows precision medicine to become faster and more scalable. However, the addition of AI – while undoubtedly revolutionary for the healthcare sector – has its own disadvantages stemming from their inherent characteristics of AI, which includes inaccuracy. The question then becomes: what if the AI-driven medical device in precision medicine is inaccurately trained, which leads to incorrect output? Going back to the scenario: imagine that AI-driven medical devices incorrectly predict that you do not have cancer or recommend a cancer treatment that does not suit you best and actually results in severe and irreversible side effects.

Unfortunately, this is not an unlikely scenario. To train an AI-driven medical device in precision medicine to identify, for instance, pancreatic cancer requires the training, validation, and testing datasets to be complete and accurate. While this is a particularly demanding task, it is a vital one to ensure the health of all individuals of the population. If the datasets, upon which the AI-driven medical device in precision medicine were to be trained, only include data of certain segments of the population, this would result in enhancing the health of individuals similar to the datasets but leaving individuals belonging to different demographics behind. Consequently, the overall health of some individuals may be improved, while simultaneously deteriorate for others. As such, the right to health may either be enhanced or be impeded depending on whether the individual resembles the dataset used.

The right to health, a fundamental right, rests upon four pillars, namely 1) availability, 2) accessibility, 3) acceptability, and 4) quality.[1] While AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine may both positively and negatively affect the pillars of availability, accessibility and acceptability, this doctoral project specifically scrutinises the quality pillar of the right to health. However, quality is not a fixed standard with a clear interpretation or methodology. Rather, seeing the ever-changing nature of medical science and legal requirements[2], the notion ‘quality’ is a moving target that is continuously evolving.[3] Moreover, as the interpretation of quality hinges on the context in which it is used, there is no sole global interpretation. Zooming in on the European Union, the provision of health care should be – amongst others – safe and effective.[4]

In short, the safety aspect of quality requires that healthcare materials, including AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine, should not harm or inflict avoidable injuries.[5]  The effective requirement under the quality pillar entails that the provision of health care should be based on evidence[6] and is aimed at improving an individual’s health condition[7]. Both the safety and effectiveness of AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine hinges heavily upon the datasets used for training, testing and validation.

To ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices that are placed on the internal market of the European Union, the manufacturer needs to successfully complete the conformity assessment procedure under the Medical Devices Regulation[8]. Further, the Artificial Intelligence Act complements the conformity assessment procedure, where the medical device includes an AI component.[9] Thus, the regulatory framework consisting of the conformity assessment procedure of AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine comprises the Medical Devices Regulation and the Artificial Intelligence Act. Under the conformity assessment procedure, the manufacturer needs to submit evidence demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of their AI-driven medical device in precision medicine to a third party, namely the Notified Body.[10]

During the conformity assessment procedure, this so-called ‘conformity assessment body’ reviews the evidence submitted by the manufacturer. These Notified Bodies issue certifications indicating the conformity of the requirements as indicated in the Medical Devices Regulation and the Artificial Intelligence Act.[11] As such, Notified Bodies are indispensable in verifying the evidence attesting the safety and effectiveness of AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine. After having successfully completed the conformity assessment procedure, the manufacturer may draw up the EU Declaration of Conformity[12] and affix the AI-driven medical device in precision medicine with the CE marking[13]. Both demonstrate the compliance with EU Law, including the provisions on safety and effectiveness. Thus, the EU Declaration of Conformity – and consequently the CE marking – bring along a significant legal assumption.[14]

However, the question is to which extent can the manufacturer provide evidence attesting the safety and effectiveness of an AI-driven medical device in precision medicine? Let alone, to which extent can the Notified Body accurately examine the evidence submitted by the manufacturer of the AI-driven medical device in precision medicine? Seeing the inaccuracy surrounding AI, the manufacturer and the Notified Body are faced with an immense task, as they are tasked to ensure the pillar ‘quality’ under the right of health of AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine, thereby enhancing the health of individuals of all demographics of the population.

In short, the use of AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine may lead to quicker and more accurate health care. Their use, however, brings along challenges, especially caused by training AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine with improper datasets that may – for instance – be incomplete or not representative. This may lead to enhancing the pillar ‘quality’ under the right to health of those individuals who represent the datasets, while simultaneously leading to a decline of the pillar ‘quality’ of those individuals who do not resemble the datasets. Moreover, the four pillars, ‘availability’, ‘accessibility’, ‘acceptability’, and ‘quality’ are interlinked. This means that enhancing quality may also positively affect the other pillars. The other side of medal, however, is that a decline in quality may have a negative impact on the other pillars ‘availability’, ‘accessibility’, and ‘acceptability’. As such, individuals matching the datasets may experience an overall increase of their right to health, while individuals not mirroring the datasets may see their overall right to health backsliding.

Thus, there is a need for caution when implementing AI-driven medical devices in precision medicine in the healthcare sector. Specifically, it is vital that the regulatory regime is fit to address the problems associated with faulty datasets. Furthermore, Notified Body – in its capacity of overseeing the conformity assessment procedure – ought to be given the tools to ensure that quality, and thus the overall right to health, is enhanced for not only a selective group of the population but for everyone.

[1] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) (Document E/C.12/2000/4), para. 12.

[2] Santa Slokenberga, ‘The standard of care and implications for paediatric decision-making. The Swedish viewpoint’ in Clayton Ó Néill and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of Global Health Rights (Taylor & Francis Group 2021) 122, 128.

[3] Alicia Ely Yamin, ‘The right to health’ in Jackie Dugard, Bruce Porter and Daniela Ikawa, Research Handbook on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights As Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2020) 159, 162-163.

[4] Additionally, the provision of healthcare should also 1) patient-centred, 2) timely, 3) efficient, and 4) equitable. Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm. A New Health System for the 21st Century (National Academy Press 2001), 39-40.

[5] European Commission, Future EU agenda on quality of health care with a special emphasis on patient safety (Publications Office 2014), 25-26.

[6] Helen Hughes, ‘Patient Safety and Human Rights’ in Clayton Ó Néill and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of Global Health Rights (Taylor & Francis Group 2021) 259, 261.

[7] European Commission, Future EU agenda on quality of health care with a special emphasis on patient safety (Publications Office 2014), 25-26.

[8] For more information about the conformity assessment procedure of medical devices, please see Article 52 Medical Devices Regulation.

[9] For more information about the conformity assessment procedure for AI systems, please see Article 43 Artificial Intelligence Act.

[10] Article 53 Medical Devices Regulation and Article 43 Medical Devices Regulation.

[11] Article 56 Medical Devices Regulation and Points 3.2 and 4.6, subpara. 2 Annex VII Artificial Intelligence Act.

[12] Article 10(6) Medical Devices Regulation.

[13] Article 20(1) Medical Devices Regulation.

[14] Article 19(1) Medical Devices Regulation.

The post AI-Driven Medical Devices in Precision Medicine – ensuring the pillar ‘quality’ under the right to health appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Author: Wendy Kwaku Yeboah is a PhD candidate in EU law at the University of Bologna, with a particular focus on EU health law and its digitalisation. Her research explores the regulation of cross-border telemedicine within the framework of the EU internal market, examining both the constitutional and operational dimensions of EU health governance. She investigates how EU law shapes access to healthcare across borders, the challenges of ensuring patient safety and data protection in digital health services, and the evolving role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in this field.

This piece builds on my doctoral research and reflects the presentation I gave at a EUHealthGov panel during the UACES 2025 conference. I am grateful to the EUHealthGov network for providing financial support for my participation, and to all panel participants for their valuable contributions to the discussion. Any errors are solely my responsibility.

Telemedicine moved from niche to necessary during COVID-19. The EU has since built important pieces of a digital health architecture – but cross-border care still runs into legal grey zones and uneven infrastructure. Here’s what works, what doesn’t, and what to fix next.

Why telemedicine matters now

The pandemic turbo-charged digital care and exposed long-standing weaknesses in health systems. Backed by unprecedented EU recovery funding, telemedicine has become a mainstream complement to in-person services – linking patients and clinicians across distance and time. But when care crosses borders, telemedicine stops being just a technical solution and becomes a legal, ethical, and governance stress test for the internal market.

What counts as telemedicine (and why definition matters)

Telemedicine is not one thing. It spans teleconsultation, telediagnosis, remote monitoring, and tele-expertise, often threaded with AI-enabled tools. This multifunctionality puts it at the crossroads of health policy, the internal market, and fundamental rights. Member States retain control over how they organise and finance care; the EU leans on internal-market powers to harmonise the digital rails (data protection, digital identity, AI). The result? An innovation that is inherently cross-border is governed by rules that are still mostly national.

The EU’s legal framework for telemedicine rests on solid principles but remains weak in practice. The Court of Justice has long confirmed that healthcare falls under the free movement of services, and Directive 2011/24/EU established the foundations for patient mobility, supported by mechanisms such as National Contact Points and the eHealth Network. Yet the directive was not designed with digital care in mind and leaves unresolved key issues like quality standards, liability, interoperability, cybersecurity, and AI-assisted decision-making. As a result, much is left to national discretion, creating a fragmented landscape that complicates life for both providers and patients.

EHDS: building the backbone, not the whole body

The European Health Data Space (EHDS) Regulation is a potential game-changer for telemedicine’s plumbing. By standardising formats and enabling secure access to electronic health records (and, progressively, imaging, labs, and discharge reports), it tackles one of the biggest blockers: data that won’t travel.

But the EHDS is infrastructure, not a telemedicine code. It doesn’t settle who is responsible when care goes wrong, how AI recommendations fit with clinical judgment, or how remote-only practice should be accredited. One telling sign: a clause that would have actively promoted cross-border telemedicine fell out during negotiations.

Data and ethics: where the rubber meets the road

Telemedicine runs on sensitive data. GDPR provides a common floor, but national overlays (medical secrecy, access rules, secondary-use controls) differ widely. In practice, providers face divergent consent models, storage requirements, and audit expectations.

Layer in the AI Act and the stakes rise. High-risk health AI must meet transparency, traceability, and human-oversight requirements. That is good for trust, but unresolved in cross-border settings are basic questions: Which authority supervises? How is accountability shared between clinician, institution, and vendor when an algorithm errs? How do we preserve clinical judgment without neutering useful automation?

Ethically, telemedicine can strain informed consent and continuity of care, and—without inclusive design—amplify digital divides for older adults, rural communities, and people with disabilities.

Cross-border telemedicine still faces stubborn obstacles. Liability and jurisdiction remain unclear when adverse outcomes arise, often relying on ad hoc contracts that cannot scale. Professional qualifications are mutually recognised in theory, yet remote-only practice is frequently caught in national grey zones or subject to extra conditions. Reimbursement rules, designed for physical travel, rarely fit virtual care, leaving both patients and providers in doubt. On top of this, uneven digital infrastructure—ranging from electronic health record maturity to coding standards and connectivity—makes even routine cross-border consultations technically complex and unequal.

A realistic way forward (that could start tomorrow)

No grand telemedicine regulation is likely adopted overnight. But the EU and Member States can take pragmatic steps that add up. My research suggests we need a three-pronged approach.

First, targeted telemedicine-specific reforms. We can’t keep expecting a directive that merely mentions telemedicine to govern its complex cross-border realities. We need clear liability frameworks for cross-border care, harmonized professional recognition for digital practice, and coherent reimbursement standards specifically designed for virtual care.

Second, rights-based innovation. The solution isn’t choosing between innovation and patient protection – it’s designing systems that deliver both. We need telemedicine frameworks that enhance rather than replace clinical judgment, data governance that enables sharing while protecting privacy, and digital tools that reduce rather than increase health inequalities.

Third, coordinated but targeted implementation. Yes, the European Health Data Space will help with infrastructure, but we cannot mistake better data sharing for comprehensive telemedicine governance. We need telemedicine-specific interpretations of the GDPR and AI Act to avoid regulatory confusion.

Here’s my central argument: The EU stands at a crossroads. We can either continue with our current fragmented approach and watch telemedicine’s transformative potential slip away, or we can seize this moment to build a truly integrated Digital Health Union.

The bottom line

In conclusion, the pandemic taught us that health crises don’t respect borders. Our coordinated European response showed us that cooperation saves lives. Now, as we build back better, we must ensure our legal frameworks are as innovative as the technologies they govern.

Telemedicine is now a central pillar of European healthcare – not a pilot project. The EU has assembled critical pieces (GDPR, AI Act, EHDS), but they amount to an incomplete kit for cross-border care. To unlock the internal market’s advantages without compromising patient rights, the EU needs a tighter weave between infrastructure and rules: clear liability and jurisdictional defaults, workable accreditation for remote practice, interoperable data that clinicians can actually use, and reimbursement that follows patients – not borders.

Get those elements right, and telemedicine can deliver what it promised in the pandemic’s crucible: resilient, inclusive, and truly European care.

The post Cross-Border Telemedicine in the EU: Promise, Pitfalls, and the Path Ahead appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Andrea Pareschi (University of Bologna and Ca’ Foscari University of Venice)

Across EU member states, Eurosceptic parties – especially on the radical right – are thriving. Not long ago, they had only limited support and were stuck in opposition. But in recent years, many of them have ‘come in from the cold’ and gained real traction. Since 2023, parties vehement in their criticism of the EU have come out on top in parliamentary elections in Slovakia, the Netherlands, France and Austria. In other places – like Finland, Romania, Germany, and Portugal – Eurosceptic parties came in second. And after the 2024 European elections, right-wing Eurosceptic groups Patriots for Europe (11.7 per cent of the seats) and European Conservatives and Reformists (10.8 per cent) are the third and fourth largest in the European Parliament.

Against this background, it is more important than ever to properly understand the different types of Euroscepticism among parties, since that helps us identify what kind of challenges they pose to the EU. The most common way to do so still amounts to the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. First introduced by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, this approach basically separates those who oppose the EU on principle from those who just have specific issues with it. Lately, however, a number of researchers have started using the ‘hard Eurosceptic’ label only for parties wanting out of the EU altogether. What I have argued in a recent research note is that this narrower view drifts away from what Taggart and Szczerbiak originally meant – and that it actually hides how much principled opposition to European integration is really out there.

To begin with, it is really instructive to go back to the two scholars’ original work. Initially, Taggart and Szczerbiak linked hard Euroscepticism to rejection both of EU membership and of the project of European integration. Yet, they soon accepted that classification should not revolve around party stances towards membership, which are too superficial to convey a party’s ‘deeper position […] on the broader underlying issue of European integration’. Instead, they argued that the main thing to look at should be ‘underlying support for or opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU’. Their following contribution to the Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism made clear that a party’s stance on the European integration project should be the main factor, when it comes to deciding whether the party is hard Eurosceptic, soft Eurosceptic, or none.

A drift has instead come to affect the concept of hard Euroscepticism. Too often, these days, hard Euroscepticism is equated to the ‘nuclear option’ of exit, whereas every other kind of party stance or behaviour attacking the EU is seen as soft Eurosceptic. To be fair, there are some understandable reasons for this shift. Twenty years after Taggart and Szczerbiak proposed their definitions, the idea of a European integration project looks a lot fuzzier. Does European integration have a stable, recognisable core at all? Some scholars would say no. If one takes this view, indeed, interpretations of hard Euroscepticism centred on exit are justified. If, in other words, the EU is whatever political actors make of it, then the only party position which corresponds to uncompromising opposition to it is wanting out. If one, instead, takes the view that an essence of European integration exists, things are different. In this case, manifest and consistent rejection of such an essence is surely the most appropriate litmus test for hard Euroscepticism.

After looking at what existing research says on the substantive core of the European project, I attempt a redefinition of hard Euroscepticism which is rooted in such a fundamental basis. A party is then defined as hard Eurosceptic if it systematically demonstrates principled opposition towards either of four elements. First, the EU as an integrated common market. Second, the legitimacy of the institutions which form the supranational layer of the EU. Third, the possibility of expanding the EU’s competencies. Fourth, any of the core values set out in the Treaty on European Union and the Copenhagen criteria for eligibility to join the EU. Following Taggart and Szczerbiak’s logic, I suggest that a party should count as hard Eurosceptic if its policies imply being strongly and consistently opposed to any of the above elements.

There are two main reasons why it makes more sense to define hard Euroscepticism this way, instead of the other. First, tying hard Euroscepticism only to exit ends up limiting the label to opposition parties. As a matter of fact, the conditions leading even strongly anti-EU governing parties to pursue EU withdrawal only materialise very rarely. Many of those parties have realised that it is more effective to oppose the EU from within, as like-minded political forces abound in other countries. If only rejection of membership amounts to hard Euroscepticism, the category is applied to parties which flirt with exit while in opposition only to be pulled back once they, having entered government, confront the EU through less blunt strategies. This makes the category too unstable, turning it into the by-product of tactical moves rather than a consistent position.

Second, as a definition based on exit gradually empties the box of hard Eurosceptic parties, very different political forces end up being squeezed together into the adjacent box of soft Eurosceptic ones. There,  ‘Euroalternativist’ parties, that support the EU’s institutional structure while demanding different policies, are unsuitably mixed with parties which barely agree on the ‘principle’ of cooperation, refusing both the ‘practice’ and the ‘future’ of European integration. Conversely, the approach I propose labels as hard Eurosceptic any party demanding little less than a total overhaul of the key tenets of the EU. Soft Eurosceptic parties are only those whose opposition to European integration is indeed contingent.

Within my article, I have dwelled on two parties which serve as good examples: Matteo Salvini’s League and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz. Having not campaigned for exit, they are classified as soft Eurosceptics by renowned contemporary overviews. Nevertheless, the League regards the supranational layer of the EU as bereft of legitimacy, at odds with the ‘Europe of peoples’ (and its wholesale indifference to migrants’ human rights may negate an EU core value). Fidesz may cross the line on more than one criterion, too. Anyway, nowhere is this more evident than in its sweeping refusal of multiple EU core values. Arguably, a definition qualifying both parties as hard Eurosceptic fits better, as they both fundamentally oppose the European project on principle.

In conclusion: pushing for EU withdrawal certainly makes a party hard Eurosceptic, but if hard Euroscepticism means fundamental opposition to European integration, there is so much more to it than demanding exit. Within national politics, a hard Eurosceptic party may choose different options: asking for a referendum on membership, calling for complete renegotiation of all Treaties, demanding retroactive opt-outs, and so on. At EU level, a hard Eurosceptic party may confront the substantive core of European integration through the behaviour of its representatives in institutions such as the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

My recent article with JCMS aims, as a minimum, to stoke debate on how interpretations of European integration should bear on definitions of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. More ambitiously, this contribution warrants adding a piece to current debates around Euroscepticism. Radical right Eurosceptic political forces are bidding to get into the EU control room by forging linkages with the mainstream centre-right, which at times appears receptive to the lure of the so-called ‘Venezuela majority’. Are hard Eurosceptic parties across EU member states actively seeking to modify the essence of the European project? May any such attempts be traced back to coordinated action among them? Last but not least, is there any evidence showing the success of such endeavours? In the Europe of 2025, these are all questions worth asking.

Andrea Pareschi is affiliated with the University of Bologna and the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, European Politics and International Relations. His research interests comprise European politics, Euroscepticism, mass-elite congruence, and the EU issue in British politics. His articles have appeared in Journal of Common Market Studies, Italian Political Science Review, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, and other reviews. https://unibo.academia.edu/AndreaPareschi

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By Jérôme Deyris (Centre for European Studies at Sciences Po, France), Bart Stellinga (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy) and Matthias Thiemann (Centre for European Studies at Sciences Po, France)

In November 2017, Dutch central bank governor Klaas Knot expressed worries that ‘inflation expectations are bearing an awful lot of weight in monetary policy these days, considering the range and depth of unanswered questions about them’. Yet, five years later, he stressed that ‘the ECB needs to be clear that its primary mandate is to safeguard medium-term inflation and that it will not hesitate to act to prevent a de-anchoring of [inflation] expectations’. What made this central banker first express doubt and then reaffirm the relevance of a concept – inflation expectations – considered a cornerstone of monetary policymaking?

In our recent JCMS article we argue that this shift is not an example of neutral policy learning, but instead a strategic move in the battle over shaping the ECB’s monetary policy. We show how national central bank governors opportunistically invoke or challenge monetary theories, concepts, metrics, and data to support or undermine a particular course of action. In this vein, we demonstrate how governors from the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the German Central Bank (the Bundesbank), so-called “hawks” who generally prefer restrictive monetary policies, systematically differ in their rhetorical strategies from governors from the Banca d’Italia and Banco de España, so-called “doves” who favour accommodative policies.

Crucially, these actors shift rhetorical strategies once economic circumstances change and particular concepts or data metrics become more or less relevant to make the case for their policy preferences. Depending on the “inflation season” (so whether inflation is below or above target) governors may strategically adopt or abandon data and policy principles. Such migrations are symmetric: when economic circumstances change, hawkish central bankers embrace ideas that had been defended by the opposing, dovish camp, while dovish governors “migrate” in the opposite direction. Our analysis thus shows that central bankers’ policy preferences strongly affect their engagement with monetary theories and metrics, challenging the common portrayal (also by themselves) of central bankers as neutral, science-based policymakers.

Strategic migrations of hawks and doves

To make our case, the article is based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of all public speeches by governors of the “big five” Eurozone countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. These central banks carry substantial weight in internal ECB discussions and provide a balanced sample of doves (Italy, Spain) and hawks (Germany and the Netherlands), with France occupying an intermediate position. We focus on two periods in particular: the 2014-2017 period, during which inflation fell below the ECB’s 2% target, with threats of deflation, and the 2021-2023 period, in which inflation surged.

During the low-inflation period (2014-2017), the “hawkish” Dutch and German governors adopted a rhetorical strategy to challenge the ECB’s unconventional accommodative monetary policies, such as quantitative easing and negative interest rates. They argued that low inflation was mainly caused by decreasing energy prices, suggesting this would boost the economy without the need for an external intervention. They used long-term inflation expectations data, which are inherently more stable, to argue that there was no risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations, thus casting doubt on the need for further action. When these metrics started to decrease, they expressed doubts about the indicators themselves, pointing to their limitations in capturing “true” inflation expectations. Finally, the hawks argued that accommodative policies could have undesirable side effects for financial stability that should be factored into monetary policy decisions.

Meanwhile, “dovish” governors from Italy and Spain defended the opposite position to support these accommodative policies. They stressed weak demand rather than energy prices as the main driver of low inflation. They primarily used short-term indicators to warn about the danger of de-anchoring inflation expectations, triggering the above cited statement by Knot (DNB) that the link between inflation expectations and actual inflation is not that clear. Finally, the doves argued that the ECB’s price stability mandate should override all other considerations, with any negative side effects of the ECB’s expansionary course to be addressed by other policies. In the words of Italian governor Visco: ‘the primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability and […] should any threat to financial stability materialize, macro-prudential measures should be used instead’.

When inflation rose substantially after 2021, these rhetorical strategies reversed completely. Desiring bold, restrictive actions, the same hawks who had dismissed inflation expectations as being unreliable now suddenly cited them as a crucial justification for tighter policy (see Figure 1). The doves who had previously championed bold action for price stability now emphasised supply-side factors exclusively, using the hawks’ earlier argument that energy price fluctuations would automatically correct undesirable price dynamics. They warned of the financial instability risks from aggressive monetary tightening, arguing that the uncertain consequences of monetary policy action called for restraint, when earlier they had asked to ignore them. In return, Bundesbank governor Nagel echoed the doves’ argument from the 2014-2017 period that “the monetary policy stance is not the instrument of choice for addressing financial stability issues. The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability. And this target has definitely not yet been achieved”.

Figure 1 Shifting concerns about inflation expectations

This figure is based on a manual coding of all paragraphs in governors’ speeches that mention “inflation expectations”

Three rhetorical strategies

Our work highlights that central bankers, not unlike politicians, use rhetorical strategies to further their policy preferences. We identify three types of tactics. The first is “selective blindness”: systematically highlighting data that supports their stance while ignoring contradictory evidence. For example, in 2014-2017 doves cherry-picked short-term inflation expectations to push for bold, expansionary policies, but in 2021-2023 pointed to long-term measures to call for restraint.

The second strategy involves “strategic scepticism”: expressing doubts about theories and metrics when these could support undesirable policy actions. For example, when market-based inflation expectations indicators suggested that expansionary action was needed, the Dutch and German governors questioned their reliability due to measurement problems, or even called the concept into question. When such indicators supported hawkish stances during 2021-2023, these methodological concerns disappeared.

The third tactic is “weaponised uncertainty”: framing economic uncertainty to justify either caution or bold action. In 2014-2017, hawks argued that uncertainty warranted caution, while doves claimed that decisive action would reduce market uncertainty. Again, these framings reversed during the high-inflation period.

Conclusions

Overall, these findings advance our understanding of the politics of European central banking and beyond. Our paper challenges the Eurosystem’s portrayal as a cohesive epistemic community and with it the notion that European monetary policy can be “scientifically” depoliticised. It shows that national preferences remain important drivers of technocrats’ behaviour, even when they are expected to make decisions “as Europeans”. And we show that economic concepts can be flexible instruments rather than rigid guidelines constraining technocrats’ actions.

We end on a potentially more positive note, as there may also be an upside to central bankers’ strategic exchanges. By presenting arguments on inflation dynamics in a pointed manner and counterbalancing each other’s blind spots, their public interventions help the internal debate move toward a balanced compromise. This may be preferred over a “groupthink” dynamic in which all birds flock to one viewpoint at first and then migrate to another later.

Jérôme Deyris is a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for European Studies at Sciences Po, France. His PhD, completed in 2023 at Université Paris Nanterre, explored the drivers and consequences of green central banking. He is now involved in a larger project to study the political economy of independent central banks.

https://www.sciencespo.fr/centre-etudes-europeennes/en/directory/deyris-jerome/

Bart Stellinga is a senior research fellow at the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). He obtained his doctorate at the University of Amsterdam in 2018. In his academic work he focuses on how policymakers aim to limit financial instability through financial regulation and monetary policy.

https://english.wrr.nl/about-us/office/bart-stellinga

Matthias Thiemann is Professor of European Public Policy at the Centre for European Studies at Sciences Po, France. In his research he focuses on two areas: the regulation of financial markets and the role of public development banks in the European Union. Most recently, he published “Taming the Cycles of Finance” at Cambridge University Press.

https://www.sciencespo.fr/centre-etudes-europeennes/en/directory/thiemann-matthias/

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By Desmond Dinan (George Mason University) and Sophia Russack (Centre for European Policy Studies)

The reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen in 2024 was more than just continuity at the top of the EU executive. It revealed how power is distributed in Brussels, between the European Council and European Parliament (EP), between national governments and the Commission, and increasingly between the Commission President and the rest of the College. In particular, the process by which the second von der Leyen Commission came into being illustrates two long-term shifts: the presidentialisation of the Commission and the growing, if contested, politicisation of its appointment.

Presidential power and party politics

Von der Leyen consolidated the trend, begun under José Emanuel Barroso and intensified under Jean-Claude Juncker, of centralising power in the hands of the President. She abolished the Vice-President tier, designed diffuse and overlapping portfolios, and ensured that no other “heavyweight” rivals sat at the table. These choices made her the ultimate arbiter within the College.

At the same time, party politics shaped the process more than ever before. Although von der Leyen formally ran as a Spitzenkandidat (the lead candidate of a European political party), her nomination owed more to package-deal bargaining among national leaders. Being a Spitzenkandidat gave her political cover, but the real driver was intergovernmental pragmatism and political party negotiating, especially between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Party of European Socialists. Von der Leyen’s re-election in the EP was smoother than in 2019, but also more transactional. Her speech to MEPs emphasised competitiveness, defence, and migration, while downplaying the once-flagship Green Deal. Symbolically, the Spitzenkandidaten model survived. Substantively, its impact was limited.

Constructing the College

National governments still nominate Commissioners, but von der Leyen exerted clear influence. She informally vetted candidates and, in a striking move, forced out France’s Thierry Breton, a vocal critic. This highlighted the President’s capacity to shape the team, though in practice the decision also reflected personal and political tensions.

The new College was younger and more male-dominated than her first. Party-political calculations were evident: the European People’s Party was over-represented, while the Socialists and liberals held key portfolios as part of a fragile balance. Von der Leyen also created three new portfolios, defence industry, housing, and the Mediterranean, both to reflect pressing EU challenges and to appease national governments and MEPs.

The design of the College reinforced her leadership style: overlapping responsibilities, blurred mandates, and a lack of heavyweight figures all strengthened her own central role.

Accountability under strain

The EP’s confirmation hearings offered another insight. Long a forum for scrutiny, in 2024 they became largely symbolic. All candidates were approved, including those facing strong criticism, thanks to a pre-arranged deal between the main party groups. The hearings looked more like the politics of performance than an exercise in accountability.

The final confirmation vote passed with the lowest share of support ever for a new Commission. That outcome reflected both the EP’s fragmentation and its reluctance to challenge the process head-on.

Why it matters

The making of von der Leyen’s second Commission highlights the maturing of a presidentialised executive in Brussels. The Spitzenkandidaten process remains part of the story, but as a political ritual rather than a binding rule. National leaders in the European Council still control the decisive steps. Parliament’s role is visible, but limited.

In a more fragmented and polarised EU, executive power has concentrated further in the Commission President’s hands. Von der Leyen’s second term shows how this dynamic works in practice: national bargaining determines the President, presidential control shapes the College, and parliamentary oversight struggles to keep pace. What looks like continuity at the top is in fact a window into how EU governance is evolving—more presidential, more politicised, but not necessarily more accountable. Opaque working practices, such as vaccine procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, paired with the frequent sidelining of key stakeholders and formalised procedures in her first term, fuelled doubts about the level of accountability in decision-making.

Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, one of Europe’s leading think tanks on EU affairs. She holds a PhD from Maastricht University. Her academic and professional work has positioned her as a prominent expert in the field of EU institutions and EU democracy.

Desmond Dinan is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Virginia, USA. He teaches and writes on EU history, institutions, and governance. His latest book is A Concise History of the European Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2025).

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Many are fleeing from countries torn apart by war and instability, in some cases worsened by conflicts in which Britain and its allies played a part.

Under international law, they are not ‘illegal’.

Refugees often have no choice but to travel by irregular means. Britain has closed almost all safe routes, yet once here, most are eventually recognised as genuine asylum seekers.

They don’t expect much in return, and they don’t get much.

• If destitute, they may be housed in temporary hotels or unwanted council properties.
• Their cash allowance is just a few pounds a day – and even less if hotel accommodation is provided.
• Most are barred from working while waiting for their claims to be processed.

And yet, once recognised as refugees, many repay society many times over: working as doctors, nurses, care staff, cleaners.

Meanwhile, Britain’s contribution to the global refugee crisis remains tiny: less than 0.5% of the world’s refugees are here.

At the end of 2024, there were approximately 42.7 million refugees globally, within a record 123.2 million people displaced worldwide. [UNHCR figures]

So why the fury? Why the language of “illegals” and “invaders”?

Nearly 90% of the world’s countries were invaded by Britain at some point in history. Hundreds of thousands of Britons set sail to conquer, colonise, and plunder abroad.

Stuart Laycock’s book All the Countries We’ve Ever Invaded records that only 22 nations escaped British intrusion.

And Britain did not arrive in peace. It came with armies, with weapons, with the intent to seize land, wealth, and even people through the brutal slave trade.

It could be said that Britons were the most prolific illegal immigrants in history. The global imbalance of wealth today – rich nations and poor nations – still bears the marks of colonial plunder.

Our wealth was built in part on the theft of others’ lands and lives.

Many of the countries most affected by past colonialism are the same ones struggling with today’s displacement and refugee crises.

So do we really have the right to complain about tens of thousands of devastated people arriving in peace, when Britons not so long ago arrived on their shores with violence and devastation?

History shows who the real invaders are.

Top photo: Asylum seekers crossing the English Channel. Credit: Sandor Csudai, Oxford Human Rights Hub

Bottom image: Painting by Francis Holman, Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1780). HMS Sandwich in the foreground. The Royal Navy was central to building and maintaining the British Empire.

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The UK is caught up in the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War.

Millions of people worldwide are fleeing war, torture, persecution and climate breakdown.

Only a relatively small fraction ever reaches Britain, but their arrival dominates the headlines.

Other European countries such as Germany, France and Italy consistently accept far more asylum seekers than the UK.

The UK is not even in the top tier of host nations – far poorer countries close to conflict zones host many more refugees and shoulder far greater responsibility.

And with increasing conflicts and the growing impact of climate change, the number of refugees worldwide will massively increase. It is neither practical nor reasonable for Britain, or any country, to turn its back on this problem.

Parties like Reform argue the “answer” is simple: deport them all, send them straight back. But that isn’t a real solution.

International law prohibits sending people back to danger.

Why? Because if every country turned its back on refugees, the result would be even more chaos, desperation, and human tragedy. 

These laws were written after the Second World War, when millions of Europeans themselves were displaced, to ensure this nightmare never happened again.

And there’s a moral question too: if the UK were under threat and we had to flee, wouldn’t we also want to reach a safe country, preferably one where we could speak the language, or where family already lived?

Indeed, those are the two main reasons why some – just some – refugees risk the treacherous journey across the English Channel.

Most of the world’s refugees never come to the UK, and most don’t want to. In relative terms, it is just a tiny few.

These desperate people don’t hand over their life savings to gangsters for a so-called ‘illegal’ and very dangerous crossing because they can’t be bothered to take a ferry or a plane.

The truth is there is no legal or regular route available to them – the rules state they can only claim asylum once on UK soil, not in advance of arriving.

And once assessed by UK authorities – a process that shockingly can take years – most are found to be genuine refugees fleeing war, torture, famine, and persecution.

So, what is the real answer? Pragmatic solutions exist:

• Provide safe and legal routes – so people can apply for asylum without risking their lives in dangerous crossings.
• End hotel use – convert empty public buildings or fund proper local housing.
• Clear the asylum backlog – process claims in weeks, not years.
• Let asylum seekers work – so they can pay their way and help the nation.
• Share responsibility – cooperate with France, the EU and the UN.
• Support local councils – fund communities that provide housing.
• Address root causes  – war, dictatorship and climate change.

This isn’t about being “weak” or “tough.” It’s about being fair, efficient, and humane.

The refugee crisis is global, and it’s only going to grow. No single country can solve it alone.

But Britain can choose whether to fuel division or show leadership. Isn’t it time we stopped shouting about blame and started talking about answers?

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On Thursday 28 August 2025, in a report about asylum seekers on BBC Newsnight, it was reported that there are an estimated 810,000 unauthorised migrants in the UK, with the implication that this included asylum seekers.

It is misleading to suggest that asylum seekers are part of the UK’s “unauthorised migrant” population.

According to the Migration Observatory, the estimate of 810,000 unauthorised migrants refers to people living in the UK without any current legal right to remain, such as those who overstayed visas or entered without permission.

Asylum seekers are not counted as “unauthorised”.  They have the legal right to remain in the UK while their cases are assessed, and most of those cases are found by the Home Office to be genuine.

According to official Home Office statistics, as of June 2025 there were around 70,500 asylum applications awaiting an initial decision, representing about 90,800 people. These individuals are legally present in the UK while their cases are processed.

By quoting the 810,000 figure in a segment about asylum seekers, Newsnight gave the misleading impression that asylum seekers are included in that number. This risks fuelling misunderstanding and prejudice.

• I have submitted a complaint to the BBC about this misleading report on Newsnight, because accuracy matters.

During Newsnight on 28 August 2025, in a segment about asylum seekers, the presenter asked:

“How many illegal immigrants are there in the United Kingdom?”

The reporter replied:

“There were around 10.7 million migrants in the UK, of which around 810,000 are thought to be unauthorised – so-called illegal migrants – according to estimates from the Migration Observatory.”

Placed in the context of a discussion about asylum seekers, this gave the misleading impression that asylum seekers are included in the 810,000 estimate.

According to the Migration Observatory, the figure of 810,000 unauthorised migrants refers to people with no legal right to remain, such as visa overstayers or those who entered without permission.

Asylum seekers are not counted as “unauthorised”.  They have the legal right to remain while their cases are decided, and most are later recognised as genuine refugees.

I have asked the BBC to acknowledge this error and clarify the correct meaning of the 810,000 figure.

• Update 5 September 2025:

The BBC has replied to my complaint about the Newsnight broadcast on 28 August.

The BBC defended the report by their journalist Ben Chu and wrote:

“At no stage did he say asylum seekers were ‘illegal migrants’ or ‘unauthorised’. Considering this, we’re happy that Ben’s comments were accurate and clear.”

But this entirely misses the point. The entire segment was about asylum seekers. The presenter asked:

“How many illegal immigrants are there in the United Kingdom?”

Ben Chu then quoted Migration Observatory figures for “so-called illegal migrants” and a graphic was shown with the number of “unauthorised migrants.” The problem? Asylum seekers are not “unauthorised migrants”.

The Migration Observatory is explicit about this. By failing to make that clear, the programme conflated two unrelated categories and gave viewers the misleading impression that asylum seekers were included in the 810,000 estimate.

As I wrote in my response to the BBC:

“So I must ask: what have ‘unauthorised migrants’ to do with asylum seekers? Why introduce statistics about an unrelated category in the middle of a report about asylum seekers, without making absolutely clear to the audience that asylum seekers are not part of that figure?”

The BBC Editorial Guidelines require not only literal accuracy but also that audiences are not misled.  On this occasion, the broadcast failed that test.

I have asked the BBC to reconsider, and if necessary I will escalate my complaint to the Executive Complaints Unit.

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• Video: Why human rights matter

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by Emilio Del Pupo (University of Helsinki)

What does sustainability really mean in EU trade deals—and who gets to define it?

Ever since the EU and Mercosur began negotiating a new trade agreement in 1995, one group has made its opposition heard loud and clear: European farmers. But instead of sticking to opposing the deal with old-school protectionist arguments, over time many agri-food groups began speaking a new language—one filled with concerns about the environment, animal welfare, food safety, and even climate justice.

In a new article for the Journal of Common Market Studies, I explore how agricultural lobbies strategically used sustainability arguments to push back against trade liberalisation. This wasn’t just greenwashing. It was a calculated effort to adapt to a new political environment where EU trade policy is more transparent, more contested, and more responsive to public opinion than ever before.

Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament holds formal powers over trade agreements, meaning that in theory the Commission can no longer ignore political pressure during negotiations. The effects have been far-reaching. Trade deals like the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement (EMAA) have become flashpoints for broader debates about environmental standards, democratic accountability, and the global responsibilities of European trade.

During the EMAA negotiations, European farming groups—traditionally seen as defenders of the status quo in matters such as the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—shifted their discursive strategies. They began calling for mirror clauses, which would ensure that imported products meet the same standards as domestic ones. They invoked the idea of food sovereignty, arguing that European producers should not be undercut by imports from regions with weaker regulations. And they linked their cause to popular environmental concerns—warning that ratifying the deal would accelerate deforestation, worsen climate change, and undermine the EU’s Green Deal ambitions.

In short, they reframed protectionism as sustainability.

From Exceptionalism to Post-Exceptionalism (or not quite)

This discursive turn reflects a broader shift in how agricultural interests operate in EU politics. In the past, these groups often relied on arguments about food security, cultural identity, or rural livelihoods to justify continued subsidies and market protections. Today, many still want to preserve those benefits—but they’re doing so by speaking the language of sustainability and ethical trade.

This shift is part of what scholars call an incomplete move from agricultural “exceptionalism” to “post-exceptionalism.” Under the old model, agriculture was treated as a special sector—shielded from market competition because of its social and strategic value. That model has been challenged by growing public awareness of climate change, biodiversity loss, and the environmental impact of industrial farming. In response, many farmers are now repositioning themselves: not as obstacles to sustainability, but as guardians of it (although not without some resistance to these reforms).

And they have found allies in surprising places. Environmental NGOs and agricultural unions—often at odds on the issue of farming subsidies and how they should be utilised—have sometimes formed coalitions to oppose trade agreements. In France, for instance, major farming groups worked alongside green organisations to pressure the government into delaying the ratification of the EMAA. Their shared concerns? Pesticide use, animal welfare, carbon leakage, and the fear that trade liberalisation would erode Europe’s regulatory standards.

Sustainability as a rhetorical battleground

While many of these sustainability arguments are made in good faith, they also serve tactical goals. Drawing on interviews with EU officials, agricultural lobbyists, and civil society representatives—alongside a close analysis of policy documents, stakeholder materials, and media reporting—my research shows that they are often deployed selectively, to block imports, preserve subsidies, or resist regulatory change. Sustainability becomes a kind of discursive currency: a flexible tool used by actors with very different interests to make their claims more politically acceptable.

This has important consequences. It means that sustainability, far from being a settled norm, is a battleground—a contested space where powerful actors shape its meaning to suit their own purposes.

One of the most striking findings in my study is how EU institutions themselves have adapted to this new terrain. The European Commission, facing resistance from both member states and civil society, has proposed an additional sustainability instrument to accompany the EMAA. The European Parliament has issued multiple resolutions stressing the need for stronger environmental and labour provisions. And national governments—particularly France, Germany, and Spain—have invoked domestic concerns to delay or condition support for the agreement.

The Commission has also made other moves in the direction of trying to appease the ire of European farmers, such as offering strengthened protection of the Geographical Indications of agri-food products as a sort of reassurance that the old ways of European agriculture would not be destroyed by the EMAA (the creation of a 1 billion Euro fund, to cushion the impact of the agreement on European agriculture does not hurt either).

These are not just symbolic gestures. They show how politicisation is also changing the way agri-food trade is governed in Europe. Decisions that were once made quietly behind closed doors are once again being contested in public arenas—through parliamentary debates, media campaigns, and transnational advocacy networks, this time with agriculture as the main sticking point.

The EMAA negotiations offer a window into this changing landscape. Through interviews, document analysis, and stakeholder materials, my article traces how sustainability arguments were used, by whom, and to what effect. It shows how politicisation—when understood as a strategic process of meaning-making—can reshape the dynamics of agri-food trade governance, even when formal institutional rules remain largely unchanged.

So what comes next?

The EU is likely to continue embedding sustainability provisions in future trade deals with other agricultural powerhouses—with Indonesia already in the pipeline. But the political meaning of sustainability is unlikely to stay fixed. As long as actors compete to define what “sustainable” trade should look like, its boundaries will remain fluid and contested.

Democratic contestation is essential to making EU trade policy more legitimate and responsive. But it also means we need to stay attentive to how ideas like sustainability are used—and by whom. Just because a policy is framed as “green” does not mean it is progressive. And just because a lobby claims to defend rural livelihoods does not mean its proposals will benefit the public or the planet.

Agri-food politics in the EU have long moved beyond debates over CAP reform and now hang over the fate of this and many more trade agreements to come. Once the tractors start rolling again, the Commission will be ignoring them at their own peril.

Emilio Del Pupo is a doctoral researcher in the Latin American Studies programme at the University of Helsinki. His research focuses on EU–Mercosur trade politics, agri-food, and the role of non-state actors in shaping global trade governance. In addition to JCMS, he has previously published in Journal of Civil Society, Globalizations, and National Identities.

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Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (tur. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) conducts an active and multidimensional foreign policy aimed at strengthening relations with all neighbouring regions. In the international sphere, the primary ambition of the authorities in Ankara is to transform Turkey into a regional power capable of influencing the political landscape in its immediate vicinity. The Western Balkans region, comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, is a key area in the AKP’s political strategy, since Turkey has long maintained strong ties (both religious and cultural) with these countries. 

In accordance with principles of AKP foreign policy doctrine, the Turkish government seeks to promote multifaceted regional cooperation, thereby cultivating Turkey’s image as a country committed to ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans. In addition to conventional diplomatic apparatus, an extensive public diplomacy structure is also entrusted with implementation of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the Western Balkans. Drawing on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, these institutions are involved in a range of initiatives at various levels (from intergovernmental to municipal), with the aim of facilitating Turkey’s soft power projection in the region. 

AKP foreign policy doctrine and the Western Balkans 

The Justice and Development Party, which originated from a moderate Islamist milieu, won an absolute majority in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Immediately after taking power, the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continued negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the European Union, thus ensuring steady growth in public support. However, the religious foundations of the AKP political ideology soon became apparent, largely due to the influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the creator of the strategic depth concept. In line with his vision, adopted by the AKP as the new doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s goal was to achieve a dominant position in the international system by expanding the scope of its diplomatic activities to neighbouring regions (i.e. the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus) . 

In AKP political discourse, Turkey has been depicted as a state whose historical and geographical identity is inextricably linked with the Balkan Peninsula. Consequently, the Balkans became the region in which the Turks elected to initiate implementation of the strategic depth doctrine in the early 2000s. Several factors affected this choice, including efforts to strengthen Turkey’s image as a reliable partner of the European Union ahead of its expected accession to the EU. Another indication of Turkey’s constructive engagement in regional affairs was its endorsement of NATO expansion into the Western Balkans. Furthermore, comprehensive assistance (including financial support) provided by the Erdoğan government led to a rapid rapprochement between Turkey and most Balkan countries. However, soon it became evident that the AKP’s actions were driven by ideological motivations. For instance, a substantial proportion of Turkish funds, initially designated for infrastructure investments, was reallocated to renovation of Ottoman heritage sites. Local authorities widely viewed this as an attempt to preserve Turkey’s dominance in the Western Balkans. 

Having recognised limitations of foreign policy model based on historical sentiments,  in the mid-2010s the AKP government shifted its approach towards prioritising economic cooperation. This strategic realignment resulted in the establishment of free trade agreements with all Western Balkan countries. In order to maintain strong socio-cultural linkages between Turkey and the region, the Justice and Development Party has been increasingly relying on public diplomacy agencies tasked with promoting Turkish soft power in the Balkans. These organisations provide a wide range of services in the fields of education, administration, development and humanitarian aid, as well as renovation of historical heritage. Therefore, their activities are generally appreciated by local communities. However, the AKP’s frequent use of public diplomacy to achieve specific political goals raises legitimate concerns. 

Turkey’s public diplomacy activities in the region 

Among Turkish public diplomacy organisations currently operating in the Western Balkans, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) plays a key role. This institution has been present in the region since the late 1990s and has conducted a variety of initiatives there. In this regard, the Ottoman heritage restoration project has recently been identified as a high priority by the Turkish authorities. Each year, a substantial proportion of the agency’s total budget (approx. 30 million euro) is dedicated exclusively to the renovation of Ottoman monuments in the Western Balkans. As per published reports, from 2008 onwards TİKA undertook the restoration of more than hundred historical buildings in the region, approximately half of which were Ottoman mosques. Furthermore, numerous sites are currently undergoing reconstruction work, and some other renovation programmes are in the preparatory phase. According to official data, TİKA has completed over 4000 projects in the Western Balkans to date. In recent years, there has also been a significant increase in the organisation’s spending on improving economic relations with countries in the region, which is in line with the AKP’s updated foreign policy strategy. In addition to the pragmatic aspects of this particular engagement, trade and commercial initiatives allow Turkey to establish contacts on a larger scale with non-Muslim countries in the region (especially with Serbia). In this context, TİKA often acts as an intermediary, facilitating closer relations between Turks and their partners in the Western Balkans. 

Another Turkish governmental organisation involved in the Western Balkans is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). The institution was founded in 2010 and has since been directly affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In comparison to TİKA, the scope of its activities is much more narrow. The primary function of the YTB is to oversee various programmes dedicated to Turks residing abroad, as well as to representatives of so-called related communities (i.e. Turkic ethnic groups). The rationale behind establishment of the YTB was to unify all members of the Turkish diaspora around the AKP socio-political narrative. The government thus decided to create an institutional structure whose operation was to be predicated on shared historical memory and ethno-cultural affinities. The Western Balkans is one of the regions in which YTB operates most dynamically, organising cultural exchanges and educational programmes for students. According to data published by YTB, the institution’s involvement in the region has been steadily increasing year by year, especially in countries with a significant Turkish minority (Kosovo and North Macedonia). 

The Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) was created in 2009 under the auspices of the AKP government with the aim of promoting Turkish history, culture, art and language. YEE offers a comprehensive selection of activities, encompassing Turkish language courses, organisation of cultural events and art exhibitions, and provision of financial support for scientific research. Turkish cultural centres are currently located in 11 cities in all six Western Balkan countries, which demonstrates the crucial role of this region for the AKP. The activities of the Yunus Emre Institute in the Western Balkans can be categorised into two primary domains: education and culture. First of all, YEE is a leading institution for teaching Turkish as a foreign language. Serving as the main tool in promoting Turkish culture in the Western Balkans, the Yunus Emre Institute contributes to the steady growth in popularity of the Turkish language. As a result, in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, Turkish is often chosen by students as their preferred foreign language. According to data published at the end of 2020, since the inauguration of the first cultural centre in Sarajevo in 2009, more than 20,000 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have completed Turkish language courses.  

One of the newest organisations of Turkey’s public diplomacy is the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV). According to its founding charter, the institution’s mission is to enhance regional cooperation within the domain of education. As a transnational educational entity, the Turkish Maarif Foundation is responsible for organising thematic courses (from kindergarten to university level), awarding scholarships, managing educational institutions and dormitories, publishing scientific works, and performing various other tasks in accordance with the regulations of the host countries. The Turkish Maarif Foundation was established in 2016 to counter the influence of the Gülen Movement, which the AKP perceives as a threat to national interests. As demonstrated by official figures, currently TMV manages over twenty kindergartens, schools and universities across five Western Balkan countries (with the exception of Montenegro). It is important to note that the Turkish Maarif Foundation has recently become the subject of accusations for its propagation of AKP’s political agenda, whilst concurrently interfering in the domestic affairs of host countries. Therefore, the institution’s expansion in most countries in the region has been substantially restricted. 

Although the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB or Diyanet) is not a typical public diplomacy organisation, it nevertheless plays a pivotal role in promotion of Turkey’s soft power. The institution was founded in 1924 as a governmental body to oversee religious affairs on behalf of the republican state authorities. Following the AKP’s rise to power, Diyanet has become a central institution in the process of resurgence of Islam in Turkish public life. In addition to its primary religion-related duties, the institution collaborates with Turkish public diplomacy organisations and engages in a range of social and cultural projects. In this way, the Directorate’s activities are closely aligned with government policies. Consequently, the authorities in Ankara have gained another platform through which they can shape international public opinion. In recent years, the non-religious aspect of Diyanet’s operations has become a point of contention, particularly in the Western Balkans. Excessive involvement of DİB’s employees in promoting the AKP’s political narrative has been perceived as an attempt to subordinate the region by Turkey. For instance, some Bosnian members of Riyaset, the major Muslim organisation in the Balkans, publicly condemned the Directorate’s activities outside the religious sphere and accused it of promoting politicised Islam in the region. 

Conclusion 

Further growth of Turkey’s regional role, however, is contingent upon the advancement of the Western Balkan countries’ integration with the European Union. It is acknowledged that national governments perceive their potential accession to the EU as a primary objective. Nevertheless, they are not opposed to the prospect of cooperation with other external actors, especially in the absence of a comprehensive EU enlargement strategy. Turkey’s already established presence in the Western Balkans provides the country with a vital opportunity to leverage its influence. On the other hand, it is evident that perceptions of Turkey in the Western Balkans vary significantly between countries, largely attributable to the substantial differences in the historical experiences of individual nations. Generally speaking, Turks are viewed rather favourably in the Muslim-majority countries in the region, while in predominantly Christian countries, the views on Turkey are more mixed. Consequently, it is not possible to assert that the AKP foreign policy model has been wholly effective and successful, nor that the narrative disseminated by the AKP government and its institutions has been particularly appealing to any country in the Western Balkans. On reflection, it appears that the strategy of delivering a uniform message to neighbouring regions, as adopted by the AKP in the early 2000s, has considerably hampered the expansion potential of Turkish foreign policy. In promoting Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision, politicians of the ruling party frequently disregarded the interests and expectations of their partners. Hence, the ultimate failure of the strategic depth doctrine can be attributed to difficulties with correct understanding of local specifics and inconsistent actions in the international environment. 

In the context of exploring ways to improve the Turkish foreign policy strategy towards the Western Balkans, it is recommended that representatives of public diplomacy organisations devote more attention to inform the Western Balkan public about less controversial areas of Turkey’s involvement (e.g. labour activation, technology transfer, infrastructure development, support to the health sector). It is also of paramount importance to increase the level of transparency, for example by including comprehensive financial statements in annual reports. In addition, some experts have pointed to significant shortcomings in the public diplomacy model established by the AKP. These include inadequate coordination of activities, incompatibility between the scope of several programmes and the target groups, and subordination of some initiatives to the political interests of the ruling party. In light of the above mistakes, there is a high probability that the credibility of Turkish organisations involved in public diplomacy in the Western Balkans will be irreversibly damaged, which may have a detrimental effect on Turkey’s overall image in the region.

The post In the EU’s shadow: Turkish regional cooperation initiatives in the Western Balkans appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Laia Comerma (Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance)

When the European Union (EU) published its 2021 Trade Policy Review, a new buzz phrase took over policy and academia on EU trade policy: ‘open strategic autonomy’ (OSA). This was followed in 2023 by the Economic Security strategy, furthering a shift that brought Europe in line with the global trends towards the ‘geopoliticisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of trade and investment. This global trend has materialised with the spread of multiple trade defence instruments around the world, famously foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanisms. Since the Trade Policy Review, the EU has aimed to catch up and has enacted itself an array of new trade defence instruments to complement the traditional ones of anti-subsidies, anti-dumping and safeguards, that now take a key role to implement its economic security goals, as discussed in my newly published JCMS article.

The dragon in the room

These instruments – particularly the FDI screening regulation, the anti-coercion instrument, the international procurement instrument, the foreign subsidies regulation, and the 5G cybersecurity toolbox, amongst others like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism or the Trade Enforcement Regulation – have the aim of ensuring the EU’s economic security and resilience going forward, as well as its strategic autonomy, aiming to strike a new balance between security and competitiveness.

Several factors have been associated with the need for their enactment, among them the supply chain disruptions triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, and the protectionist policies adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations in the United States. Yet, in my article, I demonstrate that an analysis of the EU’s communicative strategy around those instruments, both at the political level (i.e. by EU institutions) and at the media level, indicates that these reforms are mainly associated with concerns about an assertive China. These findings are based on an software-powered text analysis of a dataset of 810 documents published between 2010 and April 2024 by the three main EU institutions – Council, Commission and Parliament –, and the five most influential outlets in Europe at least since 2020: Politico, The Economist, Financial Times, Reuters and Euractiv. The aim was to identify the main narratives used to justify the instruments and how they were linked to China.

This is not incompatible with their application being country-agnostic or horizontal. Yet, both EU institutions and the main pan-EU media outlets have employed a heterogeneous set of China-related narratives to legitimise these instruments, to shape a specific perception of China amongst the European public.

Indeed, China has been instrumentalised in both media and policy discourse, albeit in different ways by both these actors, as a means to justify the necessity and existence of these instruments. This instrumentalization of China has been more comprehensive, strategic and targeted than references to the United States or Russia, who are only mentioned in the context of great-power competition.

Overall, Chinese investment in Europe, especially in strategic sectors like 5G networks, has been framed by the three main EU institutions as a security threat, whilst trade with China in the areas of procurement and subsidies has been depicted as unfair, thereby justifying the introduction of instruments aimed at addressing these imbalances.

Interestingly, my JCMS article illustrates that the framing of China with respect to each of the instruments is targeted to adapt to the heterogeneity of the instruments and their purpose. Media, in particular, have promoted two distinct narratives regarding China: one portraying it as a threat in the context of investment, and another framing it as a source of unfairness in trade. This dual portrayal reinforces the perception of China as a competitor and political rival rather than an economic partner, fostering a vision of China as a ‘threatening other.’ This aligns with the broader trend towards the ‘securitisation’ of Chinese investment in Europe.

Moreover, since 2023, the analysis of the communicative discourse around these instruments by EU institutions shows that the TDIs have become increasingly integrated into broader strategic frameworks, moving beyond their original focus on ‘strategic autonomy’, and towards achieving broader geopolitical and economic security aims. This is coherent with the integration of those strategies with the EU’s trade policy across the board.

What might this mean going forward?

Is the Commission actually targeting China with those instruments? The short answer is that we don’t know yet. While these instruments have arguably been designed to be country-agnostic and thus apply to any country equally who violates the trade rules and standards that each of the instrument deals with, the truth is that China has been overly targeted and framed in the communicative discourse around the justification for the legitimacy and necessity of these instruments. We will need to pay attention, as the first investigations and screenings unfold, to the impact that this has on inward Chinese investment to the EU, even though much of this data is often confidential and the instruments will probably have a deterrence effect that can hardly be quantified.

Additionally, these findings raise the question of how these instruments, and the broader ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ and Economic Security strategies will impact the EU’s identity as ‘Normative Power Europe’. This means how far the EU can continue employing selectively protectionist measures before its normative identity as a liberal, normative power is fundamentally challenged. While several scholars have argued that the EU continues to advocate for economic openness and positions itself as a defender of multilateralism, the use of unilateral trade instruments signals a significant shift towards a more assertive and less open trade policy.

Moving towards this new paradigm of selective openness and increased assertiveness to protect Europe’s interests, in this new world increasingly marked by tit-for-tat strategies and divide-and-rule tactics, the EU has, in effect, adopted more protectionist measures to prevent coercion and exploitation. This raises important questions about the EU’s evolving identity: Is the emergence of a ‘Geopolitical’ or ‘Geoeconomic Power Europe’ replacing ‘Normative Power Europe’? Or can the two coexist and potentially reinforce one another, rather than being in conflict?

Last but not least, a concern that became ever more relevant since the last European elections in June 2024, where Europe saw a sharp increase in extremist and populist forces in the European Parliament, the EU needs to acknowledge that there are concerns that the OSA instruments could be co-opted for purely protectionist purposes, or at the very least, that they might dangerously shift the EU’s focus from trade openness towards trade defence. This could lead to an increasingly bifurcated trade regime, with continued openness towards allies but heightened assertiveness and greater reliance on autonomous tools against perceived rivals.

In short, even though the current focus of the OSA instruments is to defend multilateralism and the Liberal International Order, they have broader systemic and normative implications that the European Commission still needs to wrap its head around. When it comes to China, it is clear that those instruments were aimed to address the multifaceted concerns that the EU has related to China’s international role and domestic economic policy. But as we move towards their implementation, we will see what the actual impact on an EU-China trade and investment relationship will be, as the last High Level Summit that took place in Beijing on the 24th of July demonstrated, is already fraught with misunderstanding and tensions.

Laia Comerma is a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG-VUB) under the ERC project ‘Europe in US-China rivalry’ (SINATRA). She completed her PhD at the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) and the Barcelona Institute for International Studies (IBEI). Her doctoral dissertation, “The politics of EU-China economic relations: Normative and regulatory disputes in the reconfiguration of global economic governance”, analyses the norms, rules and institutions structuring the foreign policy relation between China and the EU, and how they are being reformed due to their interaction in the fields of investment, trade, and development infrastructure. Her research fields of interest are foreign policy analysis, Chinese and EU foreign policy, and EU–China relations. She holds a MSc in International relations from the London School of Economics (LSE) and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from UPF-UAM-UC3M. 

The post China as a Catalyst of the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Photo courtesy of the Centre for Future Generations: https://cfg.eu/building-cern-for-ai/

For several research fields, large-scale research infrastructures play a crucial role in advancing cutting-edge research, with the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) often being referred to as a particularly successful example. Accounts of how “big science” projects like CERN get off the ground abound in the history of science as well as in popular science. Typically, individual scientists are seen to be pivotal in initiating large-scale research infrastructures (just think of the role of Isidor I. Rabi in the early phase of CERN). However, the specific strategies and tactics that scientists use to put a large-scale research infrastructure on the agenda of policymakers are rarely examined through a theoretical lens, impeding a more systematic understanding of what strategies and tactics may or may not work in advocating for big science. In my recently published article, I address this issue by drawing on the interest group and agenda-setting scholarship to study the strategies and tactics that the Confederation of Laboratories for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research in Europe (CAIRNE) has used to advocate for the so-called CERN for AI. In this blog post, I reflect on which strategies and tactics have proven successful and which have not.[i]

There are multiple, and in part clashing, visions of CERN for AI (this blog post provides a detailed overview). I will focus on the vision of CAIRNE, possibly one of the fiercest advocates for a CERN for AI. CAIRNE promotes a CERN for AI that:

• Consists of a central hub, supported by a network of (CAIRNE) research clusters;
• Is used to conduct research on all aspects of AI;
• Has close links to industry;
• Develops AI that aligns with European norms and values; and
• Is publicly funded.

CAIRNE started to advocate for CERN for AI in 2017, based on two central arguments. First, the organization considers it vital to bring Europe’s top AI researchers together in a central place to coordinate their research efforts and to agree on a few top research priorities for the field. According to CAIRNE, this is needed to help the European AI community overcome its fragmentation. Second, CAIRNE argues that more hardware is needed to enable cutting-edge AI research in Europe and to catch up with AI frontrunners like the US and China. When CAIRNE was founded in 2018, CERN for AI became one of the central issues that the organization advocated for. However, despite CAIRNE’s continuous advocacy, CERN for AI has not (yet) materialized. This may soon change, as the initiative has made it to the highest political level: Ursula von der Leyen recently proposed to set up a “European AI Research Council where we can pool all of our resources, similar to the approach taken with CERN.”

Between 2017 and 2025, CAIRNE used different means to draw policymakers’ and the broader public’s attention to CERN for AI, three of which proved particularly useful. First, CAIRNE engaged with different members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to convince them of CERN for AI’s merit. This parliamentary strategy has paid off, as several MEPs have begun to back CERN for AI during the deliberations for the AI Act. Second, CAIRNE’s founding members invested a great deal of time and effort into promoting CERN for AI by writing countless opinion pieces and giving interviews for prominent media outlets across the EU. For example, their proposal featured in “der Tagesspiegel,” and “Science Business.” This media strategy drew attention to CERN for AI beyond a specialist audience. Finally, and in line with a mobilization strategy, CAIRNE drew attention to CERN for AI among the AI community, think tanks and the broader public by organizing CERN for AI-dedicated events and publishing open letters. Across all these strategies, CAIRNE credibly presented CERN for AI as an issue that needs to be addressed at the EU-level: Firstly, because the funding needed for CERN for AI would likely exceed the capacities of any one EU Member State and, secondly, because the entire European AI research community should benefit from and participate in CERN for AI.

A CAIRNE strategy that created controversy, especially within the European AI community, was the framing of the proposed AI research infrastructure as a CERN for AI. Several people that I interviewed for my article argued that, in principle, it is beneficial to use the renowned CERN “brand” to promote a large-scale, European (AI) research infrastructure. Yet, in the case of the CERN for AI initiative, this strategy backfired. There are two reasons for this. First, at about the same time as CAIRNE started to promote CERN for AI, a group of prominent AI researchers that is now known as “ELLIS” advocated for a networked AI research infrastructure modeled on the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL). Given the EU’s limited funding for AI and the enormous price tag of any AI research infrastructure, ELLIS had no interest in supporting CAIRNE’s proposal. Second, critics of CERN for AI, among them ELLIS members, argued that the CERN label did not make sense in the context of AI because, unlike to the massive colliders at CERN, the computing power necessary for AI research does not need to be centralized. (Somewhat ironically, while criticizing CAIRNE’s framing, ELLIS failed to acknowledge that back in the day, the EMBL was promoted as a Conseil Européen de la Recherche Biologique). Critics of CERN for AI have further argued that using the CERN label for a large-scale AI research infrastructure is “misleading” because the current political circumstances are not comparable to those that eventually facilitated the establishment of CERN.

In the future, scientists and scientific organizations like CAIRNE may therefore want to frame their proposals for large-scale science infrastructures more strategically. Historical research has shown that promoting a “big science” project as a CERN of [insert relevant scientific discipline] does not necessarily have to backfire. What seems to play an important role is that those advocating for a large-scale science project in a research field that does not strictly require big instruments choose a framing that manages to balance the best of both worlds: the unifying moment of centralization and the efficiency of decentralization. Such a framing is also likely to more strongly appeal to policymakers and thus find political backing because a central research facility supported by a network of research clusters would maximize the number of constituencies that see a return on investment from big science.

Dr. Anna-Lena Rüland is a research fellow with the European Research Council-funded project “Addressing Global Challenges through International Scientific Consortia” at the University College London Global Business School for Health. She graduated with a PhD in science policy from Leiden University in July 2024 and currently conducts research on science diplomacy, research security, as well as science, technology and innovation policy.

This blog post is based on her article that won the 2024 Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Knowledge Politics and Policies’. This was the eighth time this prize was awarded. Previous winners are Cecilia Ivardi and Linda Wanklin, Anke Reinhardt, Adrienn Nyircsák, Alexander Mitterle, Justyna Bandola-Gill, Emma Sabzalieva, Olivier Provini and Que Anh Dang.

Cassata, Francesco. 2024. A ‘Heavy Hammer to Crack a Small Nut’? The Creation of the European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC), 1963–1970. Annals of Science: 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2024.2351511.

Hoos, Holger. 2023. ‘AI made in Europe’ am Wendepunkt. Der Tagesspiegel, 7 July 2023.

Kelly, Éanna. 2021. Call for a ‘CERN for AI’ as Parliament Hears Warnings on Risk of Killing the Sector with Over-Regulation. Science Business, 25 March 2021.

Kohler, Kevin. 2024. CERN for AI: An Overview. https://machinocene.substack.com/p/cern-for-ai-an-overview. Accessed 13 February 2025.

Matthews, David. 2024. Call for the EU to Build Publicly Funded Cutting-Edge Artificial Intelligence. Science Business, 4 January 2024.

Rüland, Anna-Lena. 2025. “We Need a CERN for AI”: Organized Scientific Interests and Agenda-Setting in European Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy. Minerva Online first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-024-09568-6

Wulff Wold, Jacob. 2024. Von der Leyen Gives Nod to €100 Billion CERN for AI Proposal. Euroactiv, 25 July 2024.

[i] A slightly different version of this blog post has previously been published for the European Union Science Diplomacy Alliance Newsletter: https://www.science-diplomacy.eu/news/.

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