Foreign Affairs

No sooner had embattled Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled office than his old nemesis, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was back on the scene. Her return, which could upset the fragile balance among the three opposition leaders that helped boot Yanukovych, has already sparked concerns that this week marked the end of one president's rule but not the start of something new.

Yanukovych's decision to snub the EU has made his job a lot harder. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens have taken to the streets in support of European values, his own political base has lost trust in him, and Russia may soon decide it prefers to work with a less toxic partner. The EU might just come out of all of this a winner.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not a crazy, irrational, or reckless zealot searching for opportunities for aggression, as this sweeping intellectual profile shows. That means there’s room for the United States and Iran to improve ties—if Washington can convince Khamenei it’s not determined to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

U.S. Treasury official Harry Dexter White is best known as one of the leading architects of the Bretton Woods system that shaped the global economy after World War II. But he was also a spy for the Soviet Union, providing secret information and giving advice on economic issues. Why did he do it? Newly uncovered documents show that this champion of postwar global capitalism was actually a passionate believer in the success of the Soviet experiment with socialism.

It’s easy to be pessimistic about the Arab Spring, given the post-revolutionary turmoil the Middle East is now experiencing. But critics forget that it takes time for new democracies to transcend their authoritarian pasts. As the history of political development elsewhere shows, things get better.

Compared with other developed countries, the United States has very low taxes, little income redistribution, and an extraordinarily complex tax code. If it wanted to, the government could raise taxes without crippling growth or productivity. Tax reform is ultimately a political choice, not an economic one—a statement about what sort of society Americans want.

In 64 BC, the great Roman lawyer and orator Marcus Tullius Cicero ran for consul. His younger brother, Quintus, thought Marcus had a chance -- as long as he ran a good campaign. So Quintus wrote a detailed strategy memo laying out just what Marcus needed to do to win. It’s the best guide to electioneering you’ll ever read, presented here with a commentary by the legendary political consultant James Carville.

Most experts think the global recession was caused by a collapse in demand -- and so, in good Keynesian fashion, they want governments to ramp up spending to compensate. But the West’s recent growth was dependent on borrowing. Going even further into debt now won’t help; instead, countries need to address the underlying flaws in their economies.

Unions underwrote the affluence of U.S. workers in the last century. They ensured that manual work paid white-collar wages and gave laborers a voice in politics. But now, unions are declining, and the working and middle classes are paying the price. Reviving labor won’t be easy -- but doing so is critical to preserving America’s economic and social health.

Global health programs now teeter on the edge of disaster. The world economic crisis and the politics of debt reduction are threatening everything from malaria control and AIDS treatment to well-baby programs and health-care worker training efforts. And even if the existing global public health architecture survives this time of parsimony and austerity, it will have been remodeled along the way.

Terrible rulers, sullen populations, a terrorist fringe—the Arabs' exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral one. Then, a frustrated Tunisian fruit vendor summoned his fellows to a new history, and millions heeded his call. The third Arab awakening came in the nick of time, and it may still usher in freedom.

Success in Afghanistan would not be as difficult or expensive as it was for the United States to win wars in Europe or counter the communist threat. Given the risks and the opportunities ahead, an investment in South Asia is worth making.

Over the last three decades, public funding for global health organizations has dried up. Private companies are writing checks to fill the gap, and, accordingly, they are bending the agenda toward their interests. Realigning priorities, however, will mean getting more private firms involved, not less.

Deterrence is not automatic. While feasible, it will be much harder to achieve in the 1960s than is generally believed.

THE present tacit moratorium on the Formosan problem does not give hope that the question will simply resolve itself by the passage of time; it does provide an opportunity to ponder a solution of one of the major foreign policy dilemmas facing the United States. Before pressure to admit Communist China to the United Nations becomes irresistible, the United States should relieve itself of the anomaly of supporting a government which is held to be sovereign where it exerts no authority and which lacks sovereignty where it does. For it must be remembered that the United States holds the legal status of Formosa to be in abeyance. It maintains that neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Peace Treaty with Japan has operated to make Formosa and the Pescadores formally part of China. To endorse the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Formosa was thought unwise, presumably because to do so would automatically link the question with that of representation of the two rival Chinese régimes, and thereby give legitimate title to whichever régime was victorious in the civil strife.

FORMOSA—symbol of the struggle between freedom and Communism in the Orient—poses a test of how far United States foreign policy can combine the ideals of freedom with the flexible realism required by the harsh facts of world politics. Our friend and long-time ally, Chiang Kai-shek, presently holds Formosa (Taiwan); the Communists hold the mainland. We are unhappy that a great nation with the cultural traditions of China should be under the control of a totalitarian régime which does not share our belief in freedom. But for the present, at least, unless we wish to risk an all-out war, our desire to see the return of freedom to continental China cannot overcome the stark fact of the possession and control of the mainland by the Communists.

The notion that world government is a fairly simple possibility is the final and most absurd form of the "social contract" conception of government which has confused modern political thought since Hobbes.

Note: Where the period of republication of particular items for mass consumption is relevant to the discussion, this information is supplied in parentheses in the footnotes. Thus (1925-1939) means "originally published in 1925, republished until 1939," and (1925 to present) means "originally published in 1925, republished up to the present time." THE stress laid by Stalin on the importance of theory is so foreign to American habits of mind that we are prone to underestimate the influence which theory plays in determining his action. Any such tendency would lead us into especially grave error when we come to estimating the importance of his theoretical conception of the nature of revolution; for on this he has been amazingly consistent.