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« Un nouveau rêve américain » – Trois questions à Sylvain Cypel

IRIS - Sat, 01/08/2015 - 11:19

Sylvain Cypel est journaliste, spécialiste des États-Unis. Il répond à mes questions à propos de son dernier ouvrage « Un nouveau rêve américain » (Ed. Autrement).

L’élément ethno-racial a-t-il pris le pas sur l’enjeu socio-économique aux États-Unis ?
Cela a été évident lors des élections présidentielles de 2012. A l’époque, les États-Unis étaient loin d’avoir surmonté les conséquences de la crise financière de 2008-2010. L’emploi n’avait pas retrouvé son niveau d’avant-crise. Beaucoup d’emplois industriels avaient été perdus. Un chômage des jeunes durable était apparu, phénomène très nouveau aux Etats-Unis, et beaucoup devaient abandonner leurs études pour éviter de se sur-endetter. Certes, le sentiment général était que l’économie s’améliorait, mais la campagne républicaine, axée sur l’échec de la politique socio-économique de Barack Obama, n’a pas eu l’impact escompté. Au contraire, Barack Obama a finalement été réélu de manière assez aisée. Et il l’a été prioritairement sur des enjeux de société. D’abord, il a fait le plein parmi ceux que l’on appelle aux Etats-Unis les « minorités ». Obama a recueilli plus de 70 % des suffrages des Américains d’origine hispanique ou asiatique, et plus de 90 % de ceux des Afro-américains. Cet élément a été déterminant. De plus, les femmes ont voté à 55 % pour lui. Les ressortissants des minorités ont rejeté massivement la logique des propositions avancées par le camp conservateur : de la réduction des aides sociales aux mesures plus répressives à l’encontre des immigrés. A l’inverse, les démocrates leurs sont apparus beaucoup plus disposés à favoriser leur intégration. Quant aux femmes, tous les sondages montrent que sur les enjeux sociétaux, comme l’accès à une assurance santé universelle, le droit à l’avortement ou la limitation des ventes d’armes, elles sont désormais bien plus progressistes que les hommes.
Aujourd’hui, les difficultés socio-économiques restent beaucoup plus graves aux États-Unis que ne le laissent croire les seules données économiques car la répartition des fruits de la croissance retrouvée sont toujours presque uniquement dévolus aux plus aisés. Les inégalités sociales continuent de s’accroitre. Mais on a vu récemment, avec la multiplication d’assassinats de jeunes noirs par la police et l’attentat contre une église noire de Charleston, combien les enjeux « raciaux » restaient prégnants dans ce pays. Il est trop tôt pour savoir quelles seront les thématiques qui domineront la campagne en vue de l’élection présidentielle de novembre 2016. Mais il est clair que si le parti républicain poursuit dans la voie qu’il a choisie depuis huit ans, il sera de nouveau aisé pour le candidat démocrate de mobiliser en sa faveur une coalition desdites « minorités ».

L’homme blanc qui se sent en danger fournit 80% des troupes du Tea Party…
Le Tea Party est effectivement un regroupement massivement blanc. Et le mâle blanc en constitue l’ossature : il lui fournit près des deux-tiers de ses membres. Ce regroupement politique apparait comme une tentative de résister au phénomène le plus marquant aux États-Unis aujourd’hui : cette société se « mondialise » plus qu’aucune autre au monde, et à un rythme plus rapide que n’importe où ailleurs. Avec un million de nouveaux arrivants chaque année, presque tous issus d’Amérique latine, d’Asie et d’Afrique, et des populations immigrées faisant plus d’enfants que les autres Américains, le basculement est annoncé par les démographes pour 2042 : les « Blancs seulement », ceux qui ne s’identifient pas autrement lors du recensement, seront devenus minoritaires aux États-Unis. Ils ne seront plus que 43 % en 2060.
D’ores et déjà, la montée en puissance des « non-Blancs » se manifeste dans tous les domaines de la vie sociale, économique et politique. C’est ce qui effraie la partie des Blancs les plus conservateurs – surtout les hommes –  qui éprouvent le sentiment de perdre à la fois leur domination, qu’ils perçoivent implicitement comme légitime, et le mode de vie qui y correspond. C’est d’autant plus vrai qu’une part massive de ces classes moyennes blanches, longtemps privilégiées dans le système économique américain, a été emportée par la crise et voient son niveau de vie régresser depuis des années. Au lieu d’en rendre responsable le système économique du capitalisme financier, elles s’en prennent à la concurrence montante des minorités. La rage de cette part de la population est d’autant plus vive qu’elle se sent impuissante à modifier le cours des choses.

Les jeunes se détournent-ils de l’idée de l’« exceptionnalisme américain » ?
Cela semble indubitable parmi les jeunes urbains des grandes villes américaines et de leur proximité. L’« exceptionnalisme américain », c’est l’idée que les États-Unis ont par nature une mission universelle et sont destinés à diriger le monde. Républicain ou démocrate, il n’est pas un candidat en campagne électorale qui oubliera de déclarer que l’Amérique est « la plus grande nation au monde ». En même temps, Obama a mené sa politique internationale en tenant compte des limites de la puissance américaine et en s’appuyant sur le sentiment croissant aux États-Unis que le pays, contrairement à ce qui a été pensé au sortir de la Guerre froide, n’a plus les moyens de décider ni d’agir seul comme il l’entend – et surtout, que la calamiteuse guerre en Irak a démontré combien cette attitude peut lui être néfaste.
Les républicains, eux, dénoncent l’affaiblissement international de leur pays et prônent le rétablissement de la « grandeur » américaine, qu’Obama aurait ternie. Mais la réalité est qu’avec le temps, les États-Unis perdent leur primauté dans de très nombreux domaines, hormis le secteur militaire et la haute technologie. Là encore, l’Homme blanc enragé, à l’identité malheureuse et beaucoup plus prompt que les autres Etatsuniens à dénoncer un « déclin » de l’Amérique qu’il impute aux bouleversements que vit sa société, se sent de plus en plus isolé et perdu. Mais aujourd’hui la plupart des Américains éduqués qui s’ouvrent au monde – et ils sont de plus en plus nombreux, Blancs inclus – jugent que la coopération est à la fois nécessaire et préférable à la domination.

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

ELIAMEP joins the debate on the Ukrainian crisis

ELIAMEP - Sat, 01/08/2015 - 05:21

Twenty three years after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, tensions among the United States, Russia and the European Union on Ukraine are escalating. As the Ukrainian crisis  keeps unfolding, the country has become the centre of international attention. Joining the debate the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) offers research material on developments in Ukraine and international politics.

Material collected by Dr  Evangelos Ilias-Tembos, Expert- First Counsellor, Ηellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [European Union & European Defence Policy] & Senior Research Fellow of ELIAMEP:

Articles by ELIAMEP Researchers:

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Associate Professor Dim. A. Sotiropoulos discusses Mr Tsipras’ options on ABC, 30/07/2015

ELIAMEP - Fri, 31/07/2015 - 14:54

Associate Professor  at the University of Athens and  Senior Research Fellow at ELIAMEP Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos gave an interview on ABC discussing the policy options of Greek Prime Minister Mr Alexis Tsipras. You can read the article here.

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

ELIAMEP contributed to an EPC study on EU enlargement in the Balkans

ELIAMEP - Fri, 31/07/2015 - 14:08

The South-East Programme of ELIAMEP participated in a joint research project, under the auspices of the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, which examined the EU member states’ policies towards the EU enlargement in the Balkans. The project, which ran throughout 2014 and early 2015, brought together a large group of researches from seventeen EU member states, and resulted in the compilation of an edited report titled “EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans”. The report, which was recently published by the EPC, provides a detailed account of how different EU member states understand the past, present, and most importantly the future of the EU enlargement process, with a particular emphasis on the Balkans. On behalf of ELIAMEP’s South-East Programme, Dr. Ioannis Armakolas and Dr. Giorgos Triantafyllou, Head, and Research Fellow of the Programme, respectively, wrote the report’s chapter on Greece, discussing issues such as the official Greek position towards EU enlargement in the Balkans, the current political landscape in Greece, and the various positions of the Greek political parties towards the EU perspective of different Balkan countries. Along this line, the South-East Programme of ELIAMEP, in the following months, will initiate a series of public events and discussions on the topic of EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, aiming to raise awareness and promote the relevant public debate in Greece.

The report is available here.

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Un nouveau directeur adjoint à l’IHEDN :

IHEDN - Fri, 31/07/2015 - 13:34

Par décret du Président de la République en date du 29 juillet 2015, M. l’ingénieur général de l’armement de 1ère classe ...

en lire plus

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

España: Mejorar su prestigio dándose a conocer mejor

Real Instituto Elcano - Fri, 31/07/2015 - 13:27
Opinión - 31/7/2015
Carmen González Enríquez
España puede escalar puestos en la competencia internacional por el prestigio –cada vez más relacionado con el éxito económico y político- por la vía de dar a conocer mejor al mundo su realidad.
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Article by Dr Evangelos Venetis on Libya published in Kathimerini, 19/02/2015

ELIAMEP - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 17:04

The content is available in Greek

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die Krise in Burundi: Scheitert Arusha?

SWP - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 15:41
Julia Grauvogel,
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

What future – in the short term – for the Six-Party Talks?

IRIS - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 15:40

In June 2015, will the Six-Party Talks process be only nominally alive? Initiated in 2003 following the North Korean regime’s sudden withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this collective forum comprised of representatives from China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and the United States has languished in a semi-vegetative state for the past six years. Yet again, the fault for this lies with Pyongyang, with its abrupt decision to quit the Six-Party Talks (SPT) in April 2009 in the aftermath of a United Nations resolution sanctioning the country for carrying out a new (illegal) ballistics testing. So far, the sixth round of this ambitious collective initiative aimed at finding a peaceful and balanced solution regarding the North Korean nuclear weapons program was the last. But a seventh could quite possibly be called for in the coming months…
The permanent unpredictability of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, its renewed propensity to explore the limits of (verbal) provocation (towards both the South Korean and American administrations), and the understandable reservations of several participants to the process (Washington, Seoul) regarding the seriousness and « sincerity » of the DPRK to comply with past agreements, might prolong the current paralysis, at least until the end of this year. And this despite Beijing’s constant and worthy efforts over the last few years to revive this complicated initiative.
So, in summer 2015, should we consider this collective mechanism as dormant or simply dead in the water? Or, to the contrary, as a still-relevant initiative ready to be revived?

Trying to answer this tricky question requires adopting a three-point methodology, as much to hedge our bets as to adapt to the genuine unpredictability of the North Korean stance on this specific matter. Hence, three working hypotheses have been selected to approach the « truth, » a highly volatile concept in the context of the DPRK regime.

Working hypothesis n°1 deliberately adopts a pessimistic approach with the following premise: Pyongyang has no serious intention of complying with the rules of the SPT, to honor its past commitments, or to adopt the appropriate behavior requested to restart the process. Here, the DPRK regime mainly sees the SPT framework as a tool, a leverage, or a delaying tactic in an attempt to appear “engaged” – more or less – on the international community’s radar without compromising any of its assets. In this hypothesis the North Korean regime does not want to take any steps forward to create the appropriate environment necessary for productive talks or fulfill the preconditions demanded by the other SPT participants.

Working hypothesis n°2 is more optimistic, based on the premise that for specific reasons known only to the North Korean leadership, Pyongyang is committed to readjusting its position and policies and to create a favorable environment with the five other members of the SPT. This would allow for a seventh round to take place in the short term, with Seoul and Washington responding favorably to this more constructive – and relatively unexpected – approach, with the backing of Beijing and Moscow.

Positioned somewhere in between the two above options, working hypothesis n°3 adopts a more realistic and pragmatic perspective. According to its premise, the North Korean government would eventually be interested in resurrecting – step by step – the dormant SPT process; not for the sake of pleasing Seoul, Washington, Moscow, Tokyo, or Beijing, or to present a more favorable face to the international community, but rather to keep alive a channel of communication with Washington. In this scenario, Pyongyang is attempting to portray itself – for as long and as shrewdly as possible – as the « good guy » wishing to repent. This allows the regime to extract benefits (security guaranties; humanitarian, financial, and economic assistance; energy; etc.) while buying its time to achieve a larger goal (e.g. to complete its ballistic and nuclear programs) by reducing external pressure. With this pragmatic approach, neither Washington (with presidential elections looming in November 2016) nor Seoul would feel compelled to fall into the trap by allowing the resurrection of the collective mechanism.
With Pyongyang’s habit of favoring hard-to-defend defiant posturing, one can certainly not take for granted the veracity any of these three possible premises; the DPRK may currently be working on a set of different options, be it a more radical approach (e.g. a more aggressive posture to put pressure on Washington and Seoul) or a less expectable by welcome conciliatory approach (e.g. set of confidence-building measures with Seoul, Washington, and Beijing). Time will tell.

Let us come back to our three-tier methodology and dedicate some more time to each of them to assess the merit of our approach in view of recent events in and around North Korea.

Working hypothesis N°1, the pessimistic assessment: the DPRK is not serious about creating the necessary conditions for a rebirth of the Six-Party talks and is not motivated to do so.
Looking back over information coming out of North Korea over the past few months, even if an open-minded approach is adopted, it is difficult to distinguish any significant decisions, postures, or declarations indicating a desire by Pyongyang to prepare the field for serious participation in dialogue or the negotiation process.

– The North Korean leadership remains as provocative as ever: North Korean Diplomats disrupted a UN human rights panel in New York in early May; Pyongyang threatened the United States with a nuclear attack on April 26; the North Korean regime slammed South Korean President Park’s speech on the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in late March; North Korean media called the attack on the American ambassador in Seoul a « deserved punishment » in early March; Pyongyang said there would no longer be any chance for inter-Korean dialogue in early March; « North Korea threaten missile attack on anti-Pyongyang leaflets » (Yonhap news agency, March 2); « N. Korea says it won’t talk with ‘gangster-like’ U.S » (Yonhap, February 4); « N. Korea ridicules former S. Korean president over memoir » (Yonhap, February 4); « North Korea Tests Five Missiles » (New York Times, February 8); etc. This list – telling, but not exhaustive (!) – speaks for itself.

– Invitations and suggestions to adopt a more constructive policy remain largely if not totally unheard: « U.S. urges N. Korea to show denuclearization commitment » (Yonhap, April 17); « DPRK rules out dialogue with Japan » (Xinhua, April 2); « UN presses North Korea to Account for Abductions » (New York Times, March 9); « North Korea negative about six-way nuclear talks » (Yonhap, March 2); « U.S. urges N. Korea to cease threats after missile launches » (Yonhap, February 2). Here again, there are no obvious signs of any desire by Pyongyang to extract itself from diplomatic isolation.

– Recent positive examples in international diplomacy (e.g. West-Iran and Southeast Asia-Burma talks) seem to be disregarded: « N.K. fails to learn lesson from Iran nuclear deal » (Yonhap, April 22). In June 2012, Robert King, then-US envoy on North Korean human rights issues, suggested to Pyongyang to take similar steps (political and economic reforms) to those recently taken by Burma, arguing that the benefits for the Burmese regime (e.g. sanctions eased then lifted; investors flocking the country; return to the global stage) were self-evident. Three (long and agitated) years later, this sage advice has manifestly not been espoused by Pyongyang.

Working hypothesis N°2, the optimistic projection: Pyongyang is committed to readjusting its policy to create a favorable environment with the five other members of the SPT, allowing for a seventh round to take place before the end of 2015.
Consider here that despite Kim Jong-un’s rather poor, if not terrible, record since coming into power in December 2011 (and now that the three-year long period of mourning is over), Pyongyang and its current leadership feel more compelled – under parallel pressure from Beijing and Moscow – to partly give up its brinkmanship policy and try to reintegrate (after a long absence) into the club of responsible nations. In this scenario, going forward would start by convincing Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo of a genuine political will to leave the current deadlock and embark upon a more cooperative chapter.
That said, we have so far not witnessed any tangible signs from Pyongyang giving credit to this bold thesis, to say the least. We cannot not interpret the polite refusal of Kim Jong-un to attend World War II celebrations in Moscow on May 9 – despite the personal invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin – as supportive of this theory. Nor can we consider that the recent civilian inter-Korean representatives meeting in Shenyang (China, May 5) – dedicated to preparatory talks on plans to jointly celebrate the 15th anniversary of the historic inter-Korean Summit (June 13-15, 2000, in Pyongyang) – necessarily indicates a change of strategy by the North Korean regime.
However, after eight years of permanent defiance, of verbal/frontal opposition with both the Blue House and the White House, the North Korean leadership under young Kim Jong-un may finally recognize that its hard-line posturing has not achieved as much as expected (despite two nuclear tests and a long series of ballistic missile tests, not to mention the torpedoing of the South Korean Cheonan corvette in the Yellow Sea) and that it may be time to reassess the benefits of this strategy.
This reassessment comes during a period of uncertainty regarding the identity of the next US president, his/her political party, and stance on non-proliferation issues. In the meantime, the North Korean regime could finally consider that the current Blue House policy vis-à-vis Pyongyang – no more free gifts [1] to the North but the door always open for discussion, negotiation, and reconciliation – may be worth giving a try; a position that probably finds some supporters in Beijing still working hard to keep the idea of a possible and desirable resurrection of the talks alive.

Working hypothesis N°3, the pragmatic vision: the « talks only to talk, » to buy some time until…
Based on past experience, numerous disappointments, and various unpleasant surprises when dealing with Pyongyang and its highly sophisticated nuclear policy, one cannot escape the need to consider the likelihood of a less glamorous and more realistic assessment of its probable short-term commitment vis-à-vis the sleepy SPT. The assumption here is that the least open and least democratic regime in Asia may pretend to be interested in the rebirth of this dormant, and may even go as far as to start responding favorably to the demands of the five other participants, but remains fundamentally much more motivated by the project of buying time (while extracting assistance and various benefits from the international community, a tactic Pyongyang has proven itself comfortable with) for a ‘higher’ purpose…

Excluding this scenario may present some risks. True, many governments (including major ones like Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, and possibly Tokyo) may be eager to reopen a « dialogue » with Pyongyang after such a long deadlock and its many highly tense phases. But there is a significant difference between (misguided?) eagerness and reality on the ground. Keeping the door open for genuine negotiations while excluding any step towards this action in absence of tangible commitments from Pyongyang – a policy consistently observed by the Obama administration since 2008 and President Park Geun-hye since 2012 – does not at all imply gullibly reading into any conciliations from the DPRK as a radical shift of policy or the promise of happier, easier, and rosier tomorrows.
Having achieved an Asian foreign policy (partial) success in Burma – with President Thein Sein adopting a reformist agenda – the White House under its current tenant is not willing, a year and a half before the end of his final term (-January 2017), to take the politically suicidal risk of being fooled by a regime more willing to nominally engage the powerful nation than to heed its words; a dictatorial regime that, incidentally, regularly threatens to use nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike targets on US soil. Along with the relative « Burmese success, » President Obama’s foreign policy achievements include the significant betterment of bilateral relations with Tehran and Havana, an undeniably remarkable legacy that the 44th president of the United States will not want to sacrifice on the altar of the unpredictable Pyongyang.
At the same time, several members of the SPT, including Seoul and Beijing, were remarkably active in the early days of May 2015. On May 5, the South Korean Special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs (Hwang Joon-kook), shortly after a meeting in Washington with his American counterpart (Ambassador Sung Kim, special representative for North Korea policy), declared: « As a result of close consultations among the five parties, there is a degree of consensus formed on conditions for the resumption of six-party talks. Based on this, we are pushing for unconditional exploratory talks [2]. » A bold and encouraging statement that did not go unnoticed in East Asia and beyond; the following day (May 6) this headline appeared in the Indian press: « S. Korea Seeks ‘New Momentum’ with China to revive N. Korea Nuclear Talks [3]. »
And if, against all odds, the SPT were in fact on the verge of an unexpected resurrection?

In light of the latest information to trickle out of the secretive corridors of power in Washington, Seoul, Beijing, or Moscow, these three opposing scenarios – and the many others not included here for reasons of brevity – lead us now to envisage a series of four short questions/answers to extend the thinking on the sometimes elusive Six-Party Talks matter. A set of provocative interrogations to get us started:

Is the resumption of the talks truly desirable?
First of all, in the event the North Korean regime follows up on the idea to join the recently much-discussed « exploratory talks » (without any preconditions), reviving this sleepy forum would entail: meeting and talking to Pyongyang, being ready to listen to (some of) its demands, and – eventually, after some (positive) steps, time, and (eventual) progress – to consider the possibility of delivering something to this reclusive state. This could be anything that could be celebrated as a great victory by the regime, and its hyperactive propaganda apparatus, to bolster domestic legitimacy; nothing that would in fine pressure the North Korean leadership to modify its policies or consider even low-level reforms.
The « exploratory talks, » if confirmed and meaningful enough to survive the year, will in any case not count on the indispensable strong American engagement. At the moment, the current US administration has not the time, the authority, nor any desire to assume the entailed risks (even with the likely prospect of another Democrat victory in the November 2016 elections) to engage in a serious deal with the North Korean regime.

Seoul: beneficiary or hostage of the SPT?
Obviously, and even if Pyongyang keeps on thinking that its first and foremost interlocutor on the nuclear and disarmament issues remains Washington, there is no state more concerned by any move – positive or dramatic – engaged by the defiant North Korean regime than Seoul. This premise remains valid under the current administration of President Park Geun-hye, whose consistently bold, balanced, and open-minded policy vis-à-vis her difficult and often abrasive northern neighbor should be commended.
Since her very first day in office in February 2013, the first female head of state in the Korean Peninsula has consistently repeated that the end of this exhausting and costly state of crisis with the North lies in dialogue, reconciliation, and a common future. In January of this year she confirmed again that she was willing to hold a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un without any pre-conditions. « My position is that to ease the pain of division and to accomplish peaceful unification, I am willing to meet with anyone, » President Park said. « If it is helpful, I am up for a summit meeting with the North. There is no pre-condition [4]. » A month later, she instructed her staff to prepare a « roadmap for Korean unification »; such a reunification could bring an « economic bonanza [5] » to neighboring countries as well as the two Koreas. Politically speaking, this policy is indisputably courageous, considering the very low return on investment so far and the total absence of the most elementary respect shown to her [6] by the North since she took office two years ago.

Can the international community (excluding the SPT participants) put some ‘real pressure’ on the eventual revival of the Talks?
The plain truth is that in 2015, the international community at large remains extremely weak when it comes to dealing with North Korea, the most isolated country on the planet in the 21st century. The most powerful international institutions (United Nations, IMF, World Bank) do have a certain capacity – but no real authority – to intervene in the volatile and complicated North Korean equation. Likewise, the inter-Korean dispute remains out of reach for the European Union – an otherwise influential regional institution – due to reasons of distance and geography. The fact that Pyongyang disregards the authority of such supranational entities and is much more interested in dealing face to face with Washington does not facilitate the task.
Incidentally, and to be frank, this situation is not considered a tragedy by influential capitals, in Europe as well as in the Middle East or Asia. Being involved in far-away and quasi-intractable issues usually does not bring much in the way of dividends to bold candidates.

Should we welcome the recent reconciliation between Pyongyang and Moscow?
Despite being personally invited to Moscow by President Putin to attend World War II celebrations (May 9), and after a long silence, Kim Jong-un finally declined the invitation [7]; Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK (the ceremonial North Korean head of state), will travel to Russia to attend the ceremony on behalf of his boss. Whatever the reasons behind this not-so-unexpected volte-face by the North Korean leader, they will probably not harm the diplomatic rapport [8] Moscow and Pyongyang have managed to (re)build over the last few years (during which time relations between Pyongyang and Beijing were suffering a spectacular cooling [9]). However, the attractiveness of Russia on the world stage has been considerably reduced in the wake of its dangerous maneuvering in Crimea and in the context of the current Ukrainian crisis. For the moment, the « benefits » of this new honeymoon between North Korea and Russia – two (relatively) isolated actors – remain to be seen as far as the SPT are concerned, even if some signs suggest possible advantages [10].

*****
Despite a recent surge of track one and track two diplomacy activities mechanically generating some level of hope, no one – even in secretive Pyongyang – can take for granted the eventual resuscitation of the Six-Party Talks in the short-to-medium term. The obvious and respectable goodwill towards this dormant forum displayed by several main players (Seoul, Beijing) will inevitably be confronted by the unpredictable, pathologically-defiant, and risk-prone Pyongyang under the still partly obscure and little documented leadership of the young Kim Jong-un. Political and domestic issues impacting others (presidential elections in the USA in November 2016) will play a major role as well in the still uncertain future of this crucial initiative, while the « rest » of the international community, largely out of the picture in this « small Great game, » will patiently and powerlessly hope for a positive evolution in the strategic and volatile Northeast Asia region.

References:
[1] « Seoul spurns Pyongyang’s call for lifting sanctions, » Yonhap news agency, May 7, 2015.
[2] Yonhap, May 5.
[3] Indiaeveryday, May 6.
[4] Reuters, January 11, 2015.
[5] Korea Times, February 16, 2015.
[6] The Diplomat, April 29, 2014.
[7] New York Times, April 30, 2015.
[8] ‘’DPRK, Russia ink protocol after inter-governmental meeting’’, Xinhua, April 27, 2015. ‘’ Western Relations Frosty, Russia Warms to North Korea’’, New York Times, March 11, 2015.
[9] An easing is however observed between Pyongyang and Beijing in May 2015, as noted in the following article: ’’N. Korean official calls ties with China ‘precious treasure’’, Yonhap, May 7, 2015.
[10] ‘’Xi’s visit to deepen, celebrate China-Russia relations’’, Xinhua, May 6, 2015. One can assume that a closer Moscow-Pyongyang connection associated with a strengthening Moscow-Beijing axis (two partners of the SPT) may be in a position to deliver some positive benefits vis-à-vis North Korea.

Analyze presented by Olivier Guillard during the World Korean Forum organized in Paris in June 2015.

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Kongo: »Überall wird über Politik diskutiert«

SWP - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 13:25
Kongo-Expertin Claudia Simons über Defizite internationaler AkteurInnen, Perspektiven und die...
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The good, the bad, and the powerful: Representations of the local in peacebuilding

SWP - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 12:08
Andreas T. Hirblinger,
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The good, the bad, and the powerful: Representations of the local in peacebuilding

SWP - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 12:08
Andreas T. Hirblinger,
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Nachrichten aus den kurdischen Gebieten, 29.07.2015

SWP - Thu, 30/07/2015 - 09:35
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali

European Peace Institute / News - Wed, 29/07/2015 - 20:52

In a break from recent tradition, European member states are currently contributing significant military capabilities to a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in Africa. Europeans are providing more than 1,000 troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by staffing a wide range of operations including an intelligence fusion cell, transport and attack aircraft, and special forces.

Yet for European troop-contributing countries (TCCs) that have spent several years working in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan, participating in a UN mission has been a process of learning and adaptation. For the UN, the contributions of key capabilities by European countries have pushed the UN system to adjust to the higher expectations of the new European TCCs, which has proved difficult in Mali’s complicated operating environment and political situation.

The report examines this complex relationship and shows the challenges and opportunities for both the UN and its European member states participating in MINUSMA. In terms of challenges, the report identifies obstacles facing European TCCs as they adapt to the UN peacekeeping system, the domestic political concerns of European TCCs, and the need for increased partnership among TCCs within the mission. In terms of opportunities, the report finds the potential of European military contributions to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations facing capability constraints and the UN’s ability to learn and adjust to increasingly asymmetric threat environments, as it responds to the needs of European TCCs.

The authors offer a number of recommendations for facilitating and improving the participation of European militaries in MINUSMA and in UN peacekeeping more broadly, including the following:

  • For the UN Secretariat: Develop opportunities for strategic force generation engagement with potential TCCs and conduct formal and informal indicative force generation meetings with TCCs; consider ways to gather more TCC input into the development of concepts of operations, force requirements, statement-of-unit requirements, etc.; provide more predictable and faster mission support during mission start-up; and consider decentralizing authority in-mission and at headquarters in New York to speed up decision-making processes.
  • For European states: Engage in a structured and sustained dialogue with the UN to ensure that lessons from the experience in MINUSMA are identified jointly and improvements are pursued; work with the UN to develop media strategies to help domestic audiences better understand UN peacekeeping; ensure that staff who have acquired UN competence are considered for key posts at the Ministry of Defense, the permanent mission to the UN, the reconnaissance mission, and UN negotiation teams; and ensure a thorough understanding of UN planning and decision-making processes at headquarters and in the field.
  • For the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU): Initiate a lessons-learning exercise on the ASIFU experience in MINUSMA to improve the current intelligence aspects in this mission and to make improvements on intelligence aspects in other and future UN missions; develop a UN secure data network; and continue to improve cooperation between information gathering and analysis components in the mission.

This report is part of IPI’s Providing for Peacekeeping Series.

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Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wally Struys, « Vandeput (très) ambitieux pour la Défense, mais après 2019″, interview, L’Echo, Bruxelles, 12 juin 2015.

RMES - Wed, 29/07/2015 - 09:34
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wally Struys, « Le SIPRI surévalue les dépenses militaires belges », interview, L’Echo, Bruxelles, 15 avril 2015

RMES - Wed, 29/07/2015 - 09:33
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wally Struys, « les budgets de la Défense, chronique d’une mort annoncée ? », Conférence aux stagiaires du CSEM, Ecole royale militaire, Bruxelles, 6 mars 2015.

RMES - Wed, 29/07/2015 - 09:31
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wally Struys, « Les contraintes du financement de la Défense belge », Conférence à la SROR Liège, 11 mars 2015

RMES - Wed, 29/07/2015 - 09:30
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wally Struys, « Le budget de la défense : Apocalypse now ? », dans Revue militaire belge, n°9, Bruxelles, décembre 2014

RMES - Wed, 29/07/2015 - 09:28
Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Canada : de l’antiterrorisme à l’islamophobie

IRIS - Tue, 28/07/2015 - 16:08

Dans un rapport rendu le 8 juillet 2015, le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense canadien a établi une liste de vingt-cinq recommandations visant à « combattre la menace terroriste au Canada ». Quels que soient les éléments de langage mobilisés, le terrorisme dit « islamiste » demeure la cible prioritaire et, sous cet angle, le comité ne fait que suivre une ligne stratégique déjà ancienne, confinant à l’islamophobie.

Signé par une majorité de sénateurs conservateurs, ce rapport souligne avant tout le danger auquel seraient confrontés les citoyens canadiens, eu égard à la montée du terrorisme de type islamiste tant à l’échelle internationale qu’à l’échelon canadien, tout en alléguant, par ailleurs, l’aspect « multidimensionnel » de cette menace. Ce qui étonne, à la lecture de ce texte, c’est qu’à l’inverse d’un rapport rendu en 2014 sous la direction du ministre de la sécurité publique, il prenne systématiquement pour cible la menace « islamique fondamentaliste » (sic). Or, comme l’indique Sylvain Guertin, chef du Service des enquêtes sur la menace extrémiste de la Sûreté du Québec, lors de son audition devant le comité, les dossiers liés à la radicalisation islamiste constituent moins d’un quart des dossiers ouverts par son service, derrière ceux dédiés aux activistes d’extrême droite. Mais, de cette dernière menace, le rapport ne dit mot.

Malgré ses précautions langagières, le document peine à voiler les schèmes ethnocentristes qui le sous-tendent. Se prévalant d’être les représentants « d’une société civilisée », les rédacteurs du rapport exhortent le gouvernement canadien à « affaiblir et vaincre les forces les plus sauvages ».

De fait, sous des dehors libéraux, les sénateurs ne parviennent pas totalement à dissimuler le fond islamophobe de leur discours, particulièrement patent dans un point précis du rapport. Il s’agit d’une critique adressée à la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC), en raison du soutien passager qu’elle a apporté à un texte rédigé sous la houlette de plusieurs associations musulmanes canadiennes, et auquel elle a participé : United against terrorism. Ce texte, diffusé à l’échelle internationale, a pour objectif de prévenir les risques de radicalisation afin d’empêcher ab initio que des actions terroristes puissent être entreprises. Cependant, plusieurs recommandations inscrites à la fin de ce document, qui visent à éviter tout amalgame entre religion musulmane et terrorisme soi-disant « islamiste », semblent avoir provoqué l’ire des sénateurs. Parmi elles :
– La section 5.1 : « Do not conflate religiosity with radicalization or conflate religious devotion with a propensity to commit acts of violence. »
– 5.2 : « … Avoid terms such as “Islamist terrorism”, “Islamism” and “Islamic extremism” in favor of more accurate terms such as “al-Qaeda inspired terrorism”. »
– 5.6 : « … Muslims are very diverse culturally, in religious observance and ethnicity. Do not brush them as one monolithic group and assign guilt by association. »

Ces recommandations paraissent particulièrement congrues de la part d’une communauté organisée vivant dans une démocratie libérale aux aspirations multiculturalistes. Néanmoins, les sénateurs condamnent fermement la participation de la GRC à l’élaboration de ce texte, sans pour autant fournir d’explications claires à ce sujet. Cela n’a rien d’étonnant. Comme j’ai pu le montrer dans une tribune passée, le Canada pâtit de contradictions structurelles inhérentes à son système sociopolitique, fondé de jure sur des valeurs dites universelles mais qui, dans les faits, entendent protéger un modèle « occidental » juché sur des racines culturelles judéo-chrétiennes.

C’est la raison pour laquelle il convient d’entendre les vingt-cinq recommandations du comité sénatorial non seulement suivant une logique sécuritaire, mais comme participant également à la construction d’un arsenal juridique au service d’une guerre culturelle, sinon civilisationnelle. Les sénateurs le suggèrent eux-mêmes : « Les Canadiens doivent faire preuve de vigilance puisque l’extrémisme violent est une menace réelle, tant pour leur vie que pour leur mode de vie. » Face aux projets, comme ceux de United against terrorism, qui ouvrent la voie à une lutte commune contre le terrorisme dans une perspective intégrative de la société, les sénateurs répondent par un discours de défiance visant la communauté musulmane. La logique suit celle du projet avorté de Charte des valeurs québécoises : le modèle multiculturaliste, en tant qu’horizon sociétal, subit les assauts de la radicalisation, non seulement des mouvances extrémistes prétendument islamistes, mais aussi des instances dirigeantes canadiennes elles-mêmes.

Categories: Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

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