Defence`s Feeds

Ahead of Interoperable Open Architecture 2015, Defence IQ is joined by Professor David Miskimens, Project Management and Mission Assistance, Defense Acquisition University, a DoD training establishment tasked with  acquisition certification and leadership training,

From the perils of information legislation to bad advice from self-proclaimed experts, the field of cybersecurity for critical national infrastructure is peppered with pitfalls. Here,  Defence IQ  examines 8 hard truths that the ICS Cyber Security Summit hopes to discuss to be

Cyber attacks now present a clear threat to all businesses and customers. While the problem is recognized among most large-scale enterprises (i.e. those with the capital to invest in high-end cybersecurity), there remains an inability for any network to remain 100 percent secure. This

The need for militaries to begin looking deeper into urban operations is becoming far more urgent, according to leading defence and strategic analysts. Meanwhile, armed forces worldwide are upscaling their drive to find equipment suited to help infantry undertake this type of warfare,

Singaporean Bronco New-Gen Aromored Articulated All-Terrain Tracked Carrier

Chinese Jonyang JY813 Articulated All-Terrain Tracked Carrier

Written by Marcin Grajewski

The recent interview by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in which he advocated ‘a joint EU army’ as a means to strengthen European foreign policy and ‘allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world’ has revived an on-going debate in think-tank and academic circles about how to maximise the effectiveness of existing national and Europe-wide efforts in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The European Council adopted an extensive set of conclusions on the subject in December 2013.

This note highlights a selection of recent studies, reports and commentaries by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes that analyse issues surrounding the development of CSDP.

Commentaries

© TebNad / Shutterstock

Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker’s call for a common European army  European Policy Centre (EPC), March 12, 2015

Does the EU need its own army?  Carnegie Europe, March 11, 2015

The illusion of an independent EU army  Carnegie Europe, March 10, 2015

If not now, when? The Nordic EU battle-group

European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), February 17, 2015

The EU and the UN: together for peace

European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 18, 2014

Europe’s global power potential: locked in the EU28’s defence silos  Friends of Europe, December 4, 2014

2014: a centenary and a discovery  Egmont, December 2014

Analyses

The EU neighbourhood in shambles  Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 3, 2015

More Union in European defence  Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), February 26, 2015

European Defence Trends  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 6, 2015

Report: EU as a security provider  Clingendael, December 18, 2014

Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), December 15, 2014

Peacemaking: Can the EU meet expectations?  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December, 2014

Europe’s changing security landscape: What role will the EU play in security and defence?

Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 12, 2014

Actors in the European defence policy area: roles and developments

Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 24, 2014

Constructing the defence dimension of the EU

International Security Information Service Europe, June, 2014

Security and defence: an issue for the European citizen?

Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), March, 2014

Livre blanc français de la défense 2013 : lignes de forces autour de la sécurité-défense européenne

L’Institut royal supérieur de défense, December, 2013

Why do Europeans need armed forces?  Fride, November, 2013

 Related publications

Why peacekeeping matters to Europe  Friends of Europe, March 11, 2015

The Wales pledge revisited: A preliminary analysis of 2015 budget decisions in NATO member states

European Leadership Network, February, 2015

In the belly of the beast: A European view on sending arms to Ukraine

Brookings Institution, February 4, 2015

Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2015: How others deal with disorder  Fride, January 12, 2015

A new European security order: The Ukraine crisis and the missing post-Cold War bargain

Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, December 8, 2014

Integrating EU defence and migration policies in the Mediterranean  Fride, November, 2014

EP publication

The Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy

European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), European Added Value Unit, June 2013

Read this At a glance on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in PDF
Filed under: International Relations, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), CSDP, Marcin Grajewski, what think tanks are thinking

Indonesian Pindad SS2 Assault Rifle

This year’s Arctic Patrol and Reconnaissance event will bring the Arctic and Observer nations together to discuss the latest operational challenges and developments in the region. Cooperation will be a major theme of the conference, both across operations and joint exercises and

Indonesian Pindad SS1 Assault Rifle

Following months of speculation about future capabilities of the U.S. Air Force’s T-X trainer jet platform, the requirements for one of the Pentagon’s most important and valuable acquisition programmes have

Which countries are most reliant on defence and security equipment imports? According to SIPRI data, India is again the largest defence importer, accounting for 15% of global deals in the sector. That is treble Saudi Arabia and China’s imports, which are the

Swedish AK-5 Assault Rifle

Which countries have the highest volume of defence and security equipment exports? According to SIPRI data, the US is again the largest defence exporter, accounting for nearly a third (31%) of all global deals in the sector. Together with Russia (27%), the two Cold War superpowers acco

Russian Bastion-P Coastal Defense Missile System

On the 16 March 2015 the Council has launched the EU's military advisory mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA), which it established on 19 January 2015. It sets out to support the Central African authorities in preparing areform of the security sectorwith respect to the armed forces of the Central African Republic (FACA).

The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, said: "The EU continues its comprehensive support for stability and security in the Central African Republic. EU experts will now support preparations for security sector reform. This will help the Central Africa Republic turn the corner after this security crisis."

In close cooperation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), this mission will play a critical role in strengthening the security sector. Concurrently, EUMAM RCA will advise the military authorities of the Central African Republic (CAR) on thereforms necessary to transform the CAR armed forcesinto a professional, democratically controlled and ethnically representative army. EUMAM RCA will also support the MINUSCA in achieving its mandate in the area of security sector reform and the vetting process.

EUMAM RCA is located in the country's capital Bangui. Brigadier General Dominique Laugel from France has been appointed EU Mission Commander for a team of up to 60 staff. The common costs of the operation are estimated at €7.9 million for 12 months.

Source

Language Undefined Tag: EUMAMRCA

Greeting’s readers. For this week’s professional discussion we have a piece from our Colonel thinking about how to tend the military bureaucracies. Often derided for the inanity of the extremes, it must be admitted that but for these internal organizing principles and apparatuses large and complex institutions like the armed forces would exceed human administration. Thus, evil though it might perpetuate, the bureaucracy also means that things really do get done rather than collapsing under the weight of every detail. The challenge is in discriminating such that you preserve the good and manage the bad, identify the flab while maintaining the muscle.  So, read the piece, consider the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

I enjoy gardening. There is something both satisfying and therapeutic about working with nature in the pursuit of growth.  I would not however say that I am a good gardener; in fact my gardening skills have been described as somewhat apocalyptic. In an attempt to improve my green fingered skills I often listen in to BBC Radio’s “Gardeners’ Question Time” a thoroughly British institution. A hardy perennial on this show is the subject of pruning which is often necessary to encourage new growth, and it is with the subject of pruning in mind that my thoughts turned to that of military bureaucracy.

It is a given in every military that military bureaucracy is bad and needs pruning.  The former might or might not be the case but the latter is definitely true.  There is a lot of dead bureaucracy out there, bureaucracy that has served its purpose and is no longer required.  This needs cut back to focus on the essential bureaucracy, for bureaucracy is essential.  Now my well thumbed copy of Charles Handy’s “Understanding Organisations” (an excellent book, every field grade officer should own it) uses German sociologist’s Max Weber’s definition of a bureaucracy as:

1. A division of labour in which authority and responsibility is clearly defined for each member, and is officially sanctioned.
2. Offices or positions are organized into a hierarchy of authority resulting in a chain of command.
3. All organisational members are to be selected on the basis of technical qualifications through formal examinations or by virtue of training and education.
4. Officials are to be appointed, not elected.
5. Administrators work for fixed salaries and are career officers.
6. The administrative official does not own the administered unit but is a salaried official.
7. The administrator is subject to strict rules, discipline, and controls regarding the official duties.

From this definition it is very clear that we, the military, are indeed a bureaucracy (whether we like it or not). What I want to talk about however, is the manifestation of bureaucracy in the rules, regulations, requirements and paperwork peculiar to our institutions.

The intent of a bureaucratic structure is to enable an organisation to function effectively and efficiently.  Bureaucracy, the manifestation of a bureaucratic structure, is supposed to be the oil that lubricates the cogs of power, not the grit that jams the gearing.  All too often however the means (a bureaucracy) becomes the end; in the British Army we refer to this state as a “self-licking lollipop”. The same is often perceived as true for the forms in which bureaucracy takes, the process seems to become an end in itself.  Yet all those rules, regulations and paperwork we chafe at serve a purpose, or did so at one time.  Where that purpose is redundant the bureaucracy has become dead bureaucracy, the purpose is dead but the process remains; like old growth it too needs pruning.

As a rough bureaucratic gardener’s rule of thumb the more bureaucracy irritates us the greater the requirement for pruning. We chafe most against those elements whose purpose we cannot discern, or whose utility we see as peripheral (at best) to operational output. Few chafe at the requirement to sit a driving test and hold a driving license before driving.  Furthermore that which we chafe against reveals much about our organisation. Bureaucracy is supposed to enable the effective and efficient functioning of the organisation, it assists in minimizing risk; but what kind of risk and risk to whom? Bureaucracy can be a window to the soul of the organisation exposing what is acceptable and what is not, where risk is tolerated and where not.  It can tell us uncomfortable truths about who we are.

In thinking down this path I was struck by elements on both sides of the Atlantic.  In the UK leave for field grade officers and above is self-certified.  For those below field grade an application is made to the chain of command which simply states when you want leave and where you will be spending it.  Here in the US the following are required:  Leave Pass request sheet, Hard Copy DA 31, Leave and Earnings Statement (LES), Travel Risk Planning System (TRiPS) completed and a detailed Travel Plan, Privately Operated Vehicle (POV) inspection certificate (is your car safe to drive), flight itinerary (as applicable), and the AKO MEDPROS printout.  It seems to me a little excessive and I was surprised that anyone let alone field grades, was required to complete this.  Presumably if you have commanded a company or a battalion you can be trusted to plan your leave or does mission command only apply in the field?  In this instance the bureaucracy in camp seems at odds with the command ethos in the field.  Now I can understand the purpose of this bureaucratic requirement, but does one size fit all? What mechanism exists for pruning back this when it is no longer relevant?  When I think of my experience of the US Army’s bureaucracy I think of “bureaucracy by attrition”. It tells me that this is an organisation that does not welcome people “stepping out of lane”; its manifestation and ethos seems at odds with the Army Operating Concept.

Much of the UK bureaucracy that I find irksome, owes as much in my opinion to minimising political and reputational risk as it does to operational effectiveness.  I understand the requirement to maintain an operational training record of all training a soldier receives prior to deployment. I cannot help but feel however, that the bureaucracy that now surrounds this requirement owes more to providing an audit trail in the event of an inquest than it does to ensuring that soldiers are sufficiently trained to deploy. The amount of bureaucracy seems excessive to the (operational) value gained, but guards reputational risk (we train our soldiers effectively) and minimizes political risk (training was resourced correctly).   Likewise I was struck by the bureaucracy regarding working with Personally Identifiable Information (PII).  Successive UK governments have been embarrassed by the loss of PII by different government departments (including the Ministry of Defence).  Naturally this has resulted in a regime to enforce best practice and accountability.  But again, the handling of PII has been normalized, we know how to do it, The annual training and certification programme now seems excessive  to the requirement and indicates the absence of risk tolerance in this area.  It seems to me that the UK bureaucratic emphasis indicates acute political sensitivity and a focus on minimizing (organisational) reputational risk.

We military personnel are largely bureaucrats in a bureaucratic organisation.  We should acknowledge and embrace this, because it is only by doing this that we can recognise the impacts of our bureaucracy on our organisations for good and for ill.  To parody Clausewitz  “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the leader has to make is to establish . . . the kind of ethos on which they are embarking and the bureaucracy to support it.”

 

So my questions for this week are simple:

What does your bureaucracy tell you about your organisation?

What would you prune?

Where would you encourage new growth?

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