European Union

A historic work experience - a study visit at the European Parliament Information Office in London

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Look! A distraction!

Another day, another upheaval in British politics. In the 21 days since the EU referendum, we’ve had more changes of more consequence than in any time since the second world war.

All very grand to say that, but where are we going with all this?

Until yesterday, it was very hard to say, precisely because so much was up in the air. However, with Theresa May’s installation as Prime Minister and his first round of senior appointments to her Cabinet we now have a bit more of a clue.

The starting point is that there is no Tory split, and there is little chance of one any time soon. With the speedy and painless removal of Cameron and Osborne, May has led the pragmatists that make up the bulk of the parliamentary party over to a Brexiting position and brought in the more genuinely sceptic into some positions of consequence. We can take the comparison with Labour as the most instructive one here.

May is also trying to not be overly-defined by Brexit – to listen to her speech outside Number 10 last night, it was only a part of her bigger project to tackle social injustices – and so she has taken several steps to try and achieve this.

The first is to ensure Leavers got the Brexit briefs. David Davis will head up the new department running the negotiations with the EU27, while Liam Fox takes on the establishment of new trading links with the rest of the world. This makes it much harder for critics to say May is backsliding in her approach, but it also ring-fences Brexit so that other ministers have half a chance to get on with their own projects. That’s a sensible move, if an optimistic one: as Brexit proceeds, it’s clear that it will touch (or, more accurately, go to the heart of) many areas of public policy, so May will find herself arbitrating more and more between competing dynamics.

Secondly, she’s played the distraction card, early and hard.

It would be fair to say that in the round ofi nterviews I’ve done since last night, the main topic has been Boris Johnson. I’ve been asked why he got appointed, was he any good, and was it true he ruffles his hair to make it look even more dishevelled than it seems. Let’s tackle the first two elements of this.

Johnson has been brought in close to May by his selection as Foreign Secretary. He was clearly as shocked as everyone else by the decision, because he’d worked out the consequences.

Cast out by his failure to contend the Tory leadership, he looked like toast, destined for a career on TV chat shows. But May has taken the emblematic Brexiteer and stuck him in a position that plays to his strengths, while also limiting his capacity to cause trouble, either for the UK or for May.

It’s fair to say that the past couple of decades have seen a considerable down-grading of the status of foreign ministers, especially in Europe. Prime Ministers and Presidents have become much more engaged in international diplomacy (think of the EU, but also the G7 or G20): at the same time, the intrusion of international cooperation into the full spectrum of public policy has meant other ministers also are taking more of a role. Consequently, foreign ministers’ traditional gate-keeping role has shrunk considerably. They now do some coordination, manage a centre of diplomatic expertise and sell their country around the world.

Seen in that light, Johnson is ideal as Foreign Secretary: charismatic, charming, intelligent, multilingual. Yes, he’s got some apologies to make, but as the UK’s salesman, he’ll do a stand-up job.

Moreover, recall that he’ll be a Foreign Secretary deprived of the two key tasks he might have done: re-forming the UK’s relationship with the EU, and setting up new trading arrangements with everyone else. A man who’ll be spending much of his time on a plane to press the flesh is also a man with less energy and less opportunity for plotting. And ultimately, if he’s no good at his job, he’ll not be able to blame anyone else: it’s not a push to imagine May say, more in sorrow than anger, that Johnson is simply not up to the job and she’ll have to move him on (and out).

So far, then, so clever. Unite the party, sell potential opponents a dummy [sic], contain Brexit and generally make a good fist of things. What could go wrong?

Plenty.

Firstly, we still lack a clear timetable on Article 50 notification. Logically, this will still be in the autumn, when the new government is a bit clearer about things. The EU27 will wait until then too, because they have process and substance debates to settle themselves. But if we get to October without a firm date for notification, then things get much harder for May. The EU27 will be very unhappy (but will have to wait), markets will start making waves, and Brexiteers will start wondering what’s going on.

This said, it’s hard to see this being an issue, as May looks to be very firmly pursuing Brexit, albeit on her timetable and terms. It’d be surprising if we don’t have some indication in the next week on this.

Secondly, there’s the containment issue mentioned above. Brexit is almost inevitably going to eat up much government time and effort, both on the big questions and the fine print. Even if Article 50 is essentially a process of the UK deciding whether to accept the EU27′s offer – rather than a negotiation of equals – there’s still lots of scope for disagreement and surprise.

And this leads to the third element. As decisions and choices are made, some people are going to be unhappy. The Brexit coalition was always far too broad to be satisfied by any given deal, so May has to decide who she’s going to annoy. Right now, that looks like being the harder end of the spectrum, who reject the EEA/Norwegian style model that May seems to favour.

That’s not only an issue with the public, but also within the party. Recall that there is a very small majority, so it only takes a small number of rebels to make May’s life very hard, especially because she doesn’t look like someone going for a snap election.

This is the final paradox. An autumn election would be a distraction, but it would strengthen May’s personal mandate and muzzle Tory critics much more (both through the manifesto commitments and the likely increase in Tory majority). Unfortunately, this is a card she can best play now: if she waits until things look more tricky, then the benefit is likely to be much smaller.

If the past three weeks have been unsettled, then you shouldn’t hold out for a quiet summer.

The post May’s foreign policy gambit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Promoimpresa
Freedom of establishment
EU law precludes concessions for the exercise of tourist and leisure-orientated business activities on State-owned maritime and lakeside property from being extended automatically without any selection procedure for potential candidates

Germany v Commission
State aid
The General Court sets aside the Commission decision ordering Germany to recover from Deutsche Post part of the subsidies paid in respect of former civil servant postal workers’ pensions

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Theresa May has picked the team to take Britain out of the EU.

Staunch Brexiter David Davis will oversee negotiations as Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, which provides the apt acronym “SSEE U!”

Mr Davis is an optimist, to put it lightly. The former Europe minister (two decades ago) revealed a rather punchy Brexit plan in the aftermath of the vote: first, sign trade deals with anyone and everyone outside the EU, including the US and China, creating the world’s largest trade bloc. The bulk of this can be done in two years, he says.

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Although the EU has become a leading multilateral actor in the field of security sector reform (SSR), it continues to face significant challenges that hinder its potential for delivery. In the run-up to the prospective adoption of an EU-wide strategic framework for supporting SSR, this study aims to shed light on the realities faced by SSR policy makers and practitioners. By looking at the EU’s SSR track record, as well its involvement in the complementary process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), this study provides an assessment of the lessons learnt and highlights the ways forward for the EU as a security provider, particularly ahead of the launch of its maiden Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS).
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

EU countries will have to introduce stronger controls on “blank-firing” guns, to prevent them being converted to fire live ammunition, under Internal Market Committee amendments, voted on Wednesday, to a draft update of the EU firearms directive. The changes approved by MEPs ensure that any firearm which has been converted to firing blanks continues to be covered by EU gun control rules. This closes a legal loophole which became evident in the aftermath of last year’s terrorist attacks in Paris.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

EU countries will have to introduce stronger controls on “blank-firing” guns, to prevent them being converted to fire live ammunition, under Internal Market Committee amendments, voted on Wednesday, to a draft update of the EU firearms directive. The changes approved by MEPs ensure that any firearm which has been converted to firing blanks continues to be covered by EU gun control rules. This closes a legal loophole which became evident in the aftermath of last year’s terrorist attacks in Paris.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

One year after the conclusion of the landmark deal on Iran's nuclear programme agreed in Vienna, the European Union is pleased to note that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is being implemented. This demonstrates that with political will, perseverance and multilateral diplomacy, workable solutions can be found to the most difficult problems.

The European Union will continue to actively support the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA throughout the lifetime of the agreement, as well as the UNSC Resolution 2231. The EU and its Member States underline the need for Iran to strictly adhere to all its commitments under the JCPOA and to continue to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They also call upon Iran to refrain from activities that are inconsistent with UNSC Resolution 2231. The European Union confirms the support to the High Representative's coordinating role of the Joint Commission foreseen under the agreement and calls for assistance to the IAEA in its responsibility to monitor and verify Iran's nuclear-related commitments. The upholding of commitments by all sides is a necessary condition to rebuild trust and allow for steady and gradual improvement in relations between the European Union, its Member States and Iran as stated by the July 2015 Foreign Affairs Council.

The European Union notes that its sanctions-related commitments under the JCPOA have been fulfilled in accordance with the agreed implementation plan. On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), when the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran had implemented its nuclear-related commitments, economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. On the same day, a comprehensive Information Note on the lifting of sanctions was issued in order to provide clarity to EU business operators on the new regulatory environment.[1] It is in the interest of the European Union that the lifting of economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions delivers benefits to the Iranian people.

The European Union acknowledges that clarity regarding the lifting of sanctions is key to allow a full reengagement of European banks and businesses in Iran. In this context it notes the extensive guidance that was provided on the scope of sanctions lifted and those that remain in place.  The EU is committed to continue actively engaging with the private sector and encourages all parties to the JCPOA to continue their outreach efforts in this regard. For Iran to fully benefit from the lifting of sanctions, it is also important that it overcomes obstacles related to economic and fiscal policy, business environment and rule of law. The European Union and its Member States stand ready to cooperate with Iran in these areas and to provide technical assistance, including on compliance with FATF requirements, and to consider the use of export credits to facilitate trade, project financing, and investment.

The European Union reaffirms its commitment to further developing relations with Iran, in particular in areas such as trade, energy, human rights, civil nuclear cooperation, migration, environment, fight against transnational threats such as drugs, humanitarian cooperation, transport, research, education, culture and regional issues.  In this regard it takes note of the final joint statement from the visit to Tehran of the High Representative with a group of Commissioners. The European Union supports a strategy of gradual engagement that is comprehensive in scope, cooperative where there is mutual interest, critical when there are differences and constructive in practice. As part of that, the European Union intends to open an EU Delegation in Iran.

The JCPOA is for the benefit of the entire region and creates the opportunity for improved regional cooperation that should be seized by all parties. The European Union calls on all parties to work towards a cooperative regional environment and to help reduce tensions. The EU reaffirms its commitment to help make an improved regional situation a reality.

[1] Information note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and restrictive measures

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/86b884f4-4812-11e6-8673-bc764e090014_3.56_thumb_169_1468315938_1468315938_129_97shar_c1.jpg

The 18th bilateral summit between the EU and China takes place on 12-13 July in Beijing. Discussions focus on political and economic relations as well as global and regional issues, in the framework of the jointly agreed EU-China 2020 strategic agenda for cooperation.

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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The shockwaves of the UK’s Brexit referendum resemble those of an ocean-depths earthquake, creating tsunamis that grow and accelerate as they spread outwards. Nobody can yet tell the damage they will do to the 60-year project of European integration or to the global economy, but their effects will be felt for years to come.

It will no doubt be to David Cameron’s eternal regret that as Britain’s prime minister he paid no heed to the warning that earlier referendums on EU-related issues had come to grief in France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark.

The UK’s outlook is for internecine political strife and longer-term economic decline, but it’s the wider European picture that is the more important. The UK’s bitter membership debate and the vote to leave by a substantial majority of over a million people has greatly exacerbated popular discontent around the EU, and notably in France and Germany.

Both have elections next year, and the triumph of eurosceptics in the UK may well trigger similar protest votes.  Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel and French president François Hollande need to react with a credible plan of action that can allay voters’ doubts and discontent.

“Unless ideas for reforming the EU are bold and eye-catching, voters across Europe will dismiss them”

What, then, might a credible plan look like? It would not only have to be acceptable to EU governments that in many cases have resisted genuine EU reform for 20 years, but also convincing to public opinion in Europe that is increasingly impatient with the EU’s shortcomings. Unless ideas for reforming the EU are bold and eye-catching, voters across Europe will dismiss them, boosting the popularity of eurosceptic political parties.

Sitting tight and hoping for the best is no longer an option for Europe’s mainstream parties. In Germany, the eurosceptic AfD has been gnawing away at the traditional support base of Merkel’s centre-right CDU party. In France, the fear is that even if the Front National’s Marine Le Pen doesn’t make it into the presidency next Spring her party will nevertheless be a dominant force.

There’s no shortage of ideas for tackling the EU’s creaking and overly-secretive decision-making arrangements. Political scientists have been putting them forward for many years. A credible reform agenda for EU leaders could begin with a pledge to lift the veil of secrecy around Council of Ministers meetings that are in effect the EU’s legislature. Incredible though it must seem, there is no public record of their deliberations, and of who said what or how they voted.

A next step would be to bring national parliamentarians into the process of EU-level decision-taking. Until 1979, double mandates enabled some national MPs to sit in the delegated European Parliament, and that’s worth re-considering.

Other possible reforms include the creation of an EU Senate to make the European Parliament bi-cameral. Its members could include nationally-elected EU Commissioners, headed by a Commission president universally elected in EU-wide polling.

There are endless possibilities for shaking up the EU, but the key question is the future nature of the EU itself. Britain’s decision to leave opens the way to a very different and far more flexible European Union.

“Countries where freedom of expression is endangered and political pluralism threatened could be ‘re-classified’ as a signal to their electorates”

It is conceivable that today’s EU of 28, or rather tomorrow’s of 27, will consist of concentric circles and an abandonment of the founding fathers’ vision of perfect equality between member states regardless of their size or clout.

The inner core would of course be the eurozone’s strongest members; many of these have been urging new governance rules introducing checks to prevent countries from irresponsibly taking on debt.

This would add up to some form of ‘political union’ as these rules, and their enforcement, would override sovereignty. It is something Berlin has long urged and Paris has resisted because it would spell the end of the sweeping presidential powers with which Charles de Gaulle endowed the Fifth Republic.

Beyond this core, there would be an outer ring of eurozone countries with weaker economies – Greece, Portugal and perhaps Spain. This ring might also include in some manner economically-stronger non-eurozone Scandinavian countries.

The next concentric ring might consist of EU countries whose governments pose political rather than economic challenges. Poland, Hungary and increasingly the Czech Republic have been flouting the norms of liberal democracies that are the cornerstones of European integration. Countries where freedom of expression is endangered and political pluralism threatened could be ‘re-classified’ as a signal to their electorates.

That leaves the outer ring. This would be made up of a single country no longer in the EU – the United Kingdom. Limiting the impact of Brexit is in the common interest, and some sort of special association status – membership-plus of the European Economic Area – might be a halfway house. It would keep the UK within the single market, maintain the EU’s four freedoms, including movement of people, and require budget contributions. And like any fair compromise, it would be unpalatable for all concerned.

The post Brexit calls for urgent EU reform appeared first on Europe’s World.

On a visit to the US last month, Ukraine’s prime minister Volodymyr Hroysman said the country’s three main ‘enemies’ are populism, corruption and Russia. As Hroysman is a member of Petro Poroshenko’s team, it is worth analysing how his mentor is coping as President and Commander-in-Chief with these ‘enemies’.

The first, populism, is an abused term used everywhere to negatively denigrate one’s opponents, and most people, including Ukrainian politicians, use it without understanding what it means. It was always ridiculous for Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions to accuse the opposition of being ‘populists’ when they themselves (oligarchs) were the biggest populists (towards working-class voters) in Ukraine. It was also a sign of the term being politicised when it was primarily used against Yulia Tymoshenko – if she is a populist then so is every other Ukrainian politician.

Poroshenko, who has routinely derided Tymoshenko for populism, has never undertaken any steps to deal with the issue. He has never invested in Ukraine’s political party system, and the absence of parties is a major problem; after all, parliamentary democracy cannot function without political parties. Poroshenko has always had close relations with oligarchs, who are the main funders of populist political projects. His failure to reduce their influence is something commonly accepted by experts all over, and it is almost universally thought that the next three years will see no change. Oligarchs are as bad for the development of European-style political parties as they are good for populism, as they often create election projects that use populist rhetoric. Their monopolisation of the economy prevents the growth of small and medium-sized businesses, which produce less than 20% of Ukraine’s GDP and are often forced to operate in the shadow economy – where half of Ukraine’s GDP has come from for the last two decades, double the size of Italy’s underground economy.

“Poroshenko is building a hybrid Ukraine that inherently generates political instability”

The ‘enemy’ of corruption has never been tackled by Poroshenko; and when the New York Times criticised him for this, he described it as part of the ‘hybrid war’ being conducted against Ukraine. Not a single member of Yanukovych’s mafia cabal has been brought to justice. As journalist and MP Serhiy Leshchenko wrote, ‘nowhere is the rottenness of Ukrainian politics more evident than in the prosecutor’s office’. It seemed, after the deaths under Viktor Yanukovych of people wanting a fair and democratic Ukraine, that punishments of corrupt officials should have been a matter of honour for the new government. But instead, Berkut snipers who murdered protesters have been allowed to flee Ukraine, others (such as Party of Regions MP Yuriy Ivanyushchenko) have been removed from Interpol lists of wanted Ukrainians and a third group (such as gas lobby leaders Yuriy Boyko, Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin) have been given immunity from prosecution. President Poroshenko’s four prosecutor-generals have shown no commitment to fighting high-level corruption.

Leshchenko and other journalists and politicians from Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina (Fatherland) party have repeatedly raised the president’s failure to combat corruption, but to no avail. Ukraine is in the midst of a battle between genuine pro-European political forces including Batkivshchina and civil society who are psychologically in Europe confronting Poroshenko’s faction that wants Ukraine to remain in the twilight zone between the Soviet past and European future. In other words, Poroshenko is building a hybrid Ukraine that inherently generates political instability as it fails to fulfil people’s expectations for justice.

“Poroshenko’s four prosecutor-generals have shown no commitment to fighting high-level corruption”

The third ‘enemy’ is Russia. This is an area in which Poroshenko has failed in four ways. First, he has been unwilling to reform Ukraine’s intelligence services and clean out Russia’s spies. The intelligence services are not only important for the ongoing war against Russia but also for the fight against high-level corruption. Ukraine has a Security Service (SBU), but is it Ukrainian? When one intelligence officer is caught spying in the West, it is a major scandal; but in Ukraine, there have been thousands found since 2014. The SBU recently published a list of 1,397 of its own officers who betrayed Ukraine in the Crimea. Even the Deputy Commander of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) – Ukraine’s official name for military operations in the Donbass – was a Russian spy.

The second was the signing of the Minsk accords, which benefitted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s transformation of the separatists into a large and well-equipped army and placement of the economy and finances of the DNR and LNR under the control of a Russian shadow government. Instead of dismantling the separatist institutions, as the Minsk accords outlined, they were consolidated. European leaders on the other hand were able to wash their hands of Ukraine by claiming Minsk had brought peace to Europe.

The third area is Western military support for Ukraine.  A lack of reforms in the SBU and its continued infiltration by Russia makes it problematical for it to run the ATO, as NATO and the West more generally are concerned that weapons sent to Ukraine would be stolen (through high-level corruption) or even sold to Russia. If Ukraine declared the Donbass conflict to be a war, not a terrorist threat, its commanders would be the military rather than the clearly unreliable SBU.

“Even the Deputy Commander of Ukraine’s military operations in the Donbass was a Russian spy”

Additionally, in providing immunity from prosecution for the gas lobby, Poroshenko is failing to assist the US in the pursuit of criminal charges against Firtash, who is waiting in Vienna for a response to American demands for his deportation to stand trial in the US. It is in Ukraine’s interests to do everything it can to please American politicians (who are influential in NATO) in order to receive political support, military equipment and training. By instead supporting the old boys’ network and putting personal gain first, the president is damaging Ukraine’s national security.

The last factor is the vast unpopularity of the commander-in-chief among Ukrainian soldiers. During my two visits to the front line in March and May of this year, I heard not a single soldier voice support for Poroshenko. Most soldiers said their enemies are Russia, politicians and incompetent and corrupt generals in Kiev. I mentioned this to the US government’s representatives at a seminar I gave last month in Washington DC, and they were genuinely shocked, indeed no one could imagine hearing such negative and at times threatening views of their commander-in-chief on an American or British military base, particularly during wartime.

Prime minister Hroysman pointed to Ukraine’s three ‘enemies’ of populism, corruption and Russia. What a pity that his mentor President Poroshenko is failing or unwilling to deal adequately with any of them.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Petro Poroshenko

The post Poroshenko is failing to combat Ukraine’s three “enemies” appeared first on Europe’s World.

The priorities of the Slovak Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers are being outlined to parliamentary committees by Slovak ministers at a series of meetings, during this week and in September.
Committee on Development
Committee on International Trade
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on Legal Affairs
Committee on Culture and Education
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Regional Development
Committee on Transport and Tourism
Committee on Fisheries
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP