Charlie Gao
Security,
SIG’s “Copperhead” pistol is one of the smallest guns of its type on the market.Key point: The gun was designed to provide security details with a compact submarine guns, but it might have gone too far.
SIG’s “Copperhead” pistol is one of the smallest guns of its type on the market. With a 3.5 inch barrel and an MSRP of over 1800 dollars, the gun is a very niche product. The odd design is a result of being built for the U.S. Army’s subcompact weapon (SCW) project. Unfortunately for SIG, the competing B&T APC9K won the contract. But does the Copperhead have wider appeal?
The SCW project was meant to provide U.S. Army personal security details (PSDs) with a compact nine-millimeter submachine gun (SMG) capable of being concealed in a very small space. Submachine guns have a long tradition of being used in such roles.
The U.S. Secret Service used the Uzi, which featured a folding stock, as a PSD weapon. But as firearms technology advanced, the open bolt nature of the Uzi came to be considered a liability, as it could cause the gun to discharge when dropped and was less accurate than closed bolt designs.
The next wave in concealable nine-millimeter submachine guns was the H&K MP5, which featured a roller-delayed blowback system for smooth recoil and a highly modular design. The MP5 is still widely used for PSD-type work worldwide, especially in the ultra-short MP5K configuration.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, nine-millimeter gun was looking obsolete. New cartridges, which resembled miniature rifle rounds like FN’s 5.7mm and H&K’s 4.6 millimeter were packed into compact guns like the MP7 and P90 for personal defense. These were quickly snatched up by organizations that did PSD work, as they were compact and could defeat threats in body armor.
But around the early 2010s, something changed again. The nine-millimeter SMG saw a resurgence, with designs like the Scorpion EVO 3 (2009), SIG Sauer MPX (2013), and B&T APC9 (2011) coming out. Part of the reason was the continued popularity of the MP5 in Europe and Asia. Many companies saw the opportunity to grab some of those sales for themselves.
The MPX’s special sauce is its short-stroke gas operating action, which allows the gun to be “tuned” to a specific type of ammunition to lower wear on parts and reduce recoil. The gas operation also allows the bolt mass to be lower compared to straight blowback designs, so the gun shifts around less in the user’s hand when firing.
However, this comes at a cost. The MPX is significantly more expensive than the blowback Scorpion EVO 3 due to the complexity of the gas system.
The Copperhead is the MPX’s design taken to its logical extreme as a PSD gun. With a barrel shorter than that in most compact pistols (a Glock 19 has a barrel of around four inches), the Copperhead is extremely short. It also features SIG’s special miniature pistol grip, which is also used on their compact Rattler carbine.
But in shrinking the gun down, SIG may have gone a bridge too far. While the U.S. Army SCW wanted a tiny SMG for the PSD role, stocked pistols or more svelte guns may be a better choice. Compared to ultracompact variants of the Scorpion and APC9, the SIG Copperhead appears to have more wasted space or bulk. This is no accident, as the MPX is designed to accept trigger groups and grips from standard M4 or AR-15 style rifles. But when the MPX is scaled down to the ultracompact level, it results in a design that looks a bit too big for what it offers.
Charlie Gao studied Political and Computer Science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues. This first appeared several weeks ago.
Image: A German soldier with the 291st Infantry Division (right), explains the functions of the MP7-PDW to a British soldier (left) assigned to 2nd Parachute Regiment, Vaziani Airfield, Republic of Georgia, July 30, 2017. U.S. Army/Joseph E. Cannon.
Warfare History Network
History,
In January 1945, this U.S. Army officer found himself part of a landing force preparing to invade Luzon, the largest of the Philippine Islands.It was an amphibious commander’s worst nightmare—swarms of enemy tanks, spitting death with every cannon shell and machine-gun burst, smashing through the American beachhead. Stunned GIs were crushed in their foxholes by the unstoppable leviathans, or bayoneted by accompanying infantry. The few Allied fighting vehicles then on shore stood no chance against this mechanized onslaught. By dawn, after destroying ammunition dumps, supply depots, and motor pools, the Japanese attackers finally halted. Victorious, they had hurled their foe back into the sea.
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For Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, the threat of just such an armored counterthrust, an imagined nightmare scenario, made for many anxious moments. In January 1945, this U.S. Army officer found himself part of a landing force preparing to invade Luzon, the largest of the Philippine Islands. Swift’s task as commanding general of I Corps was a straightforward one: cover the flank of Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger’s Sixth Army as it liberated the capital city of Manila, thus fulfilling General Douglas MacArthur’s vow to the Filipino people.
Much like MacArthur, “Bull” Swift was also returning to the Philippines. He had been there before, as an aide to General John J. Pershing in 1908. Swift later patrolled the Mexican border alongside George S. Patton, Jr., before heading overseas with the 86th Division during World War I. Entering battle again in 1944 as commander of the First Cavalry Division, he earned rare praise from MacArthur for his efficient work throughout the Admiralty Islands campaign.
In charge of I Corps since August 1944, this ramrod-straight cavalryman had been serving his nation as a soldier for more than 40 years. He was, at age 62, the oldest and most experienced corps commander in the U.S. Army. As such, Innis Swift could be trusted to carry out the toughest assignments in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Theater of Operations.
There was nothing glamorous about the job awaiting I Corps on Luzon. Swift’s 60,000 troops were to come ashore near San Fabian and fan out rapidly along a line extending 15 miles north and east of the Lingayen beachheads. The I Corps front controlled access to Luzon’s Central Plains, a large, mostly wide-open avenue of approach that led 135 road miles to Manila. This ground had to be secured before the men of Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold’s XIV Corps could make their “glory-ride” on the capital of the Philippines. Afterward, I Corps would pivot toward the rugged Sierra Madre mountain range of northern Luzon and mop up any Japanese still holding out there.
But a very dangerous man stood in the way of Bull Swift’s plans.
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, age 59, was the Imperial Japanese Army’s canniest tactician—a man nicknamed the “Tiger of Malaya” for his stunning conquest of British-held Singapore in 1942. Now, three years later, Yamashita commanded some 262,000 combatants of the 14th Area Army in an assignment most considered utterly impossible. Conventional military wisdom dictated that Luzon was too large and the Allied invaders too powerful for any defensive campaign to possibly succeed.
Yet Yamashita reckoned the more Americans he could tie down in the Philippines, the fewer men MacArthur would have available for an assault on Japan proper. By utilizing the forbidding terrain of northern Luzon together with the warrior spirit of his troops, the Tiger of Malaya hoped to upset Allied strategic timetables for months or even years.
After taking command of the Philippine Islands in October 1944, Yamashita made several controversial decisions. First, he chose to leave Manila unguarded, as that city possessed little strategic value. Japanese Navy forces not under his command would later wreak terrible carnage there. He further forbade ground commanders from entering combat whenever or wherever conditions favored the Allies in naval, air, and mechanized firepower. Henceforth, no effort would be made to defeat amphibious landings on the beaches, nor were the Central Plains to be occupied.
Instead, Yamashita established his main defensive zone along the Caraballo Mountains north and east of Lingayen Bay. For months, Japanese soldiers had been building elaborate bunker systems, stockpiling munitions, and camouflaging artillery positions in this region. Their front line stretched in a 50-mile arc from Rosario in the north down to the vital railhead of San Jose. It was here that supplies from depots in Manila were unloaded and then transported by truck into 14th Area Army’s mountain redoubts.
Until those warehouses could be emptied, however, San Jose needed to remain in Japanese hands. This crossroads barrio (village) also protected the entrance to Balete Pass, a major route through the Caraballos that led to Yamashita’s headquarters near Baguio. To further complicate matters, in mid-January a division of infantry was slowly marching north through the area to join the 14th Area Army; these riflemen required protection from marauding American armor.
The defense of San Jose would require a thorough yet unconventional plan. The Tiger of Malaya thrived on such problems, though, and on January 11, the 14th Area Army ordered into action its most mobile, battle ready unit. The 2nd Tank Division set out that very night, its destination a triangular sector safeguarding the approaches to San Jose and that town’s vital transportation hub. Under cover of darkness, miles-long tactical columns of armored fighting vehicles, tractor-towed field guns, and truck-mounted mobile infantry began making their way along Luzon’s dust-clogged roadways.
The selection of the 2nd Tank Division to conduct what was essentially a strongpoint defense violated all conventional tactical doctrine but acknowledged both the realities of combat on Luzon as well as the 14th Area Army commander’s unfamiliarity with armor. Said one Japanese officer, “General Yamashita, being an old time infantry soldier, did not believe in mechanized warfare.” Rather, he directed the unit to dig in on key terrain—in effect transforming its tanks into pillboxes.
While this scheme forfeited the principles of maneuver and mass used with great success by other combatant nations’ armored formations, it did offer some benefits. Well-camouflaged battle positions proved all but undetectable by aerial reconnaissance, while tanks fighting behind earthen fortifications were less vulnerable to Allied antiarmor weapons. Lastly, shortages of spare parts, ammunition, and especially diesel fuel meant a static defense was the only realistic course of action left open to Yamashita’s tankers.
Code named Geki (“Attack”) Force, the 2nd Tank Division represented an extraordinarily lethal presence on the battlefield. Under the command of Lt. Gen. Yoshiharu Iwanaka, it had available in January 1945 approximately 11,200 men and 1,500 vehicles of various types. Despite suffering losses to American submarine activity during its 1944 deployment from Manchuria to Luzon, Geki Division largely remained intact well into the new year. Some small tank and infantry detachments were sent to reinforce the defenses on Leyte that previous autumn.
The Third Tank Brigade, commanded by Maj. Gen. Isao Shigemi, was Geki Force’s primary maneuver echelon. This formation, which contained the 6th, 7th, and 10th Tank Regiments, normally operated with the 2nd Mobile Infantry Regiment. In early January, though, two battalions of those truck-mounted riflemen were detached to defend other positions in the south. Partly to make up for the 2nd Tank Division’s shortfalls in foot soldiers, Yamashita forwarded several hundred personnel of the 26th Independent Mixed Regiment and the 356th Independent Infantry Battalion to help hold San Jose.
Fire support was provided by 105mm and 150mm field pieces of the 2nd Mobile Artillery Regiment. Other combat elements included one company each of antitank (AT) guns and combat engineers. Logistical sustainment groups consisted of a maintenance company and transportation section; motorized signal and medical detachments completed the division’s organizational structure.
The 2nd Tank Division’s primary weapon system on Luzon was the Type 97-kai Shinhoto Chi-Ha medium tank, some 175 of which were assigned. Weighing 17.4 tons combat loaded and powered by a 170-horsepower V-12 diesel engine, the Type 97 could achieve road speeds of 24 miles per hour. Geki Force’s tanks came equipped with a high-velocity 47mm cannon and 7.7mm machine gun in the turret, as well as one hull-mounted machine gun. It took five men (gunner, tank commander, loader, driver, and hull gunner) to crew a Shinhoto Chi-Ha.
On hand as well were about 20 light tanks designated the Type 95 Ha-Go. Used primarily as a command vehicle on Luzon, this nimble cruiser tipped the scales at eight tons. Its Mitsubishi V-6 engine, rated at 120-horsepower, drove the Type 95 to a top speed of 28 miles per hour. Armament included a 37mm cannon and two 7.7mm machine guns. Each Ha-Go was crewed by three men: a driver, hull gunner, and tank commander, who also operated the turret weapons.
The 2nd Tank Division also fielded several experimental turretless tank destroyers as well as specialized engineer vehicles and self-propelled howitzers. Mechanics even got into the operation of a few antique tanks—Japanese and American—left over from the 1942 invasion. Anything with tracks, it seemed, was pressed into service by Iwanaka’s troopers.
Tank for tank, Geki Force’s armored fighting vehicles were no match for the M4 Shermans operated by I Corps. The Shinhoto Chi-Ha’s 47mm AT projectile could only penetrate an M4’s side or rear at close range, while U.S. 75mm shells punched right through Japanese steel plate at any distance or angle. The Shermans coming ashore on Luzon enjoyed every tactical advantage—mobility, firepower, and armor protection—except one. Against Iwanaka’s 220 tanks Swift could muster a mere 59 M4s.
Actually, the U.S. Army possessed more than 500 armored vehicles in the Philippines, but senior commanders held most of them back lest the 2nd Tank Division suddenly appear as the vanguard of a massive counteroffensive. American intelligence officers did not yet know that the Japanese had instead dug in their tanks to protect the transportation network at San Jose. The job of finding and then destroying Geki Force would have to be performed by the riflemen of Bull Swift’s 6th, 25th, and 43rd Infantry Divisions.
While the soldiers of all three divisions were battle tested, their experiences thus far had been in the rainforests of New Guinea or the Solomon Islands. Captain Michael Kane, a rifle company commander in the 20th Infantry Regiment, 6th Infantry Division, remembered his men needed to “unlearn” these jungle fighting skills before “relearning” more conventional, open terrain tactics. Kane added that his troops familiarized themselves with such antiarmor weapons as the “bazooka” rocket launcher and rifle grenade before sailing to Luzon.
Also training hard were gunners of the U.S. infantry’s AT platoons, who thus far had rarely used their towed 37mm cannons against Japanese armor. Destined too for tank-killing duty were the six 105mm M7 self-propelled howitzers in each infantry regiment’s Cannon Company. Though designed for use as an artillery carriage, these lightly armored vehicles would soon be advancing alongside U.S. riflemen as direct-fire assault guns.
Several attached units augmented I Corps’ infantry strength. The veteran 98th Chemical Mortar (CM) Battalion could rapidly drop sheaves of 4.2-inch high-explosive and white phosphorus rounds, suppressing or even eliminating fortified targets. Finally, spread across the corps were 59 M4 Sherman and 17 M5A1 Stuart tanks of the 716th Tank Battalion (TB). Their mission was to provide infantry support, although most tank gunners secretly itched to see a Type 97 in their sights. Many of them would get this opportunity before long.
The first waves of GIs to come ashore on January 9, 1945 (“S-Day” to Allied planners), quickly overran Lingayen Bay’s beachheads. As these assault echelons surged inland, however, Maj. Gen. Swift and his subordinate commanders grew increasingly concerned over the whereabouts of the 2nd Tank Division. The Americans had never faced such a large concentration of Japanese armor, and the threat of this potent force turning up behind U.S. lines continued to worry I Corps’ officers. Aerial reconnaissance overflights furnished few clues, and reports from friendly Filipinos often proved unreliable.
Patrols from the 43rd Infantry Division discovered their foe’s main defensive belt on January 11 while advancing up the coast near Rosario. There, along a ridgeline eight miles north of the Lingayen beaches, American attackers collided with Yamashita’s well-concealed riflemen. All attempts to turn the Japanese lines were met by an avalanche of artillery and small-arms fire. The I Corps’ rapid advance had ground to a halt.
In the meantime, Geki Force was completing its move into the San Jose region. Lt. Gen. Iwanaka established his command post, along with the division’s logistics trains and a small headquarters guard, two miles north of town. Five miles farther on, the 10th Tank Regiment entrenched at Lupao. In a barrio named Muñoz, nine miles southwest of San Jose, the 6th Tank Regiment began constructing strong earthworks. Small outposts stationed to the west provided early warning of advancing Allied units.
Geki Force anchored its northern flank at San Manuel, a village located alongside the Agno River about 40 miles northwest of San Jose. There Maj. Gen. Shigemi determined to make his final stand. “We will hold present positions to the death!” he declared in mid-January, dramatically concluding, “The enemy must be annihilated!”
While the Japanese were committed to a strongpoint defense of San Manuel, Lupao, and Muñoz, Yamashita did authorize several limited counterattacks intended to disrupt the U.S. offensive. One such probe, which took place over the night of January 14 near a settlement named Malasin, marked the first contact between the 2nd Tank Division and I Corps. During this brief fight, three light tanks blundered into a roadblock set up by Company A, 103rd Infantry Regiment, 43rd Infantry Division. One Ha-Go was taken out by bazooka fire, prompting the others to turn around and flee.
The Japanese struck again on January 16-17 when a combined armor/infantry team under the command of 1st Lt. Yoshitaka Takaki set out from its base at Binalonan on a nighttime raid. They got as far as Potpot, a tiny hamlet defended by the same Company A, 103rd Infantry that first encountered Geki Division at Malasin.
Two of Takaki’s lead tanks caught the Americans completely by surprise around midnight. With machine guns blazing, they drove straight through Company A’s perimeter before racing off into the gloom. AT gunners knocked out a third vehicle but then got caught up in a tenacious attack that lasted for more than two hours. At one point a platoon of Shermans from Company C, 716th TB went forward to help contain this menace.
The fighting ended at dawn when those two rogue vehicles that had earlier sped past U.S. lines clattered back up the road to Potpot, only to be stopped by now-alert gun crews. American casualties were light, two GIs killed and 10 wounded, while Takaki’s losses amounted to 11 tanks destroyed or damaged plus some 50 infantrymen fallen.
Even as the shooting stopped in Potpot, a new player was entering the game. Troops of the 25th “Tropic Lightning” Division stepped in on January 17 to fill a widening gap between I Corps’ 43rd Infantry Division to the north and the 6th Infantry then pressing southward. Backed by Company C, 716th TB, the 25th immediately started moving on San Manuel. Leading off was the 161st Infantry Regiment, veterans of fierce combat on Guadalcanal and the northern Solomon Islands.
Before they could capture San Manuel, however, the 161st‘s soldiers needed to neutralize a combat outpost at Binalonan. Later that afternoon, the 3rd Battalion entered the northern part of town where at 1730 hours they dispatched a single prowling Shinhoto Chi-Ha. Five more tanks then charged down the street, spewing machine-gun fire in all directions before bazooka teams and AT grenadiers could stop them. By nightfall, American riflemen had established a firm foothold in Binalonan.
The next morning 3/161st Infantry, aided by three M4s of Company C, succeeded in capturing this crossroads village. While some personnel and vehicles managed to slip away, the Japanese casualty count at Binalonan added up to nine tanks, two 75mm field guns, five trucks, one artillery tractor, and 250 combatants. U.S. losses included 19 men killed and another 66 wounded.
Not every battle fought against Geki Force ended in such a lopsided victory for the Americans. On the same day that U.S. patrols entered Binalonan, a column of Shermans cautiously approached the community of Urdaneta, 61/2milesto the south. Led by Lt. Robert Courtwright of Company A, 716th TB, this three-tank section was screening the advance of 6th Infantry Division foot soldiers.
Lying in wait for Courtwright’s M4s was Warrant Officer Kojura Wada. His three Type 97 tanks sat just off the road concealed in a mango grove and were perfectly positioned to ambush the Americans. Wada later recalled this tense moment: “I heard faint track noises…. One, two, three enemy tanks appeared among the palm trees; the white star painted on the front of each tank was clearly visible. They were 100 meters away—70 meters—50 meters—30 meters—but [still] they did not notice our tanks, because we were well-camouflaged.”
At a range of 25 yards, the Japanese opened fire. “Driver Yamashita shouted ‘Hit!’” Wada related. “The leading tank caught fire and turned to the opposite side of the road…. The second enemy tank also caught on fire after several hits.” Wada estimated his gunner put 60 47mm AT rounds into the third Sherman, which although disabled was able to return fire—knocking all three Shinhoto Chi-Has out of action.
In this engagement Courtwright suffered two tankers dead and two wounded. One of his M4s was declared a total loss, while the other two eventually returned to service. Sixth Infantry Division troops seized Urdaneta later that day, destroying nine Japanese tanks and killing 100 riflemen. The 2nd Tank Division’s outpost line had been smashed; could its bastions in San Manuel, Lupao, and Muñoz hold out long enough for those supplies and redeploying infantry to pass through San Jose?
The barrio of San Manuel sat between Highway 3, a major north-south thoroughfare, and the Agno River. While the surrounding countryside was mostly flat, an 850-foot-tall ridgeline one mile to the north provided excellent observation. The Villa Verde Trail, a footpath winding through the Caraballo Mountains, served as the garrison’s sole route of escape.
Occupying this village were at least 1,000 soldiers, plus 45 Type 97s and Type 95s of Shigemi’s 7th Tank Regiment. To protect their vehicles, Shigemi’s crews constructed sturdy adobe revetments that were then carefully concealed. Alternate fighting positions—75 of them—allowed for a semi-mobile operation in which armor could move back and forth as necessary to defend in depth. Street intersections and choke points were covered by indirect fire, while well-concealed riflemen and AT gunners shielded against enemy assaults. The Japanese then burrowed deep and waited, sworn by their commander to hold San Manuel at all costs.
On January 19, a mixed group of Filipino guerrillas, riflemen from the 161st Infantry, and M5A1 Stuart light tanks belonging to Company D, 716th TB set out to scout the area. Shigemi’s gunners let them get close before opening up, destroying two M5A1s and killing or wounding everyone on board. The Americans then fell back, electing to “soften” their objective with a five-day bombardment. Several battalions of field artillery, working with naval aviation and light bombers from the U.S. Fifth Air Force, flattened San Manuel while ground troops moved in to completely surround the township.
First, that bare ridge to the north was captured so forward observers could use it to call fire down on Japanese emplacements. Next, at 0725 hours on January 24, the 161st Infantry attacked. Advancing southward was 2nd Battalion with the main effort. A supporting assault conducted by 1/161st Infantry and Company C, 716th TB swept up along the Binalonan Road to strike San Manuel from the west.
Both attempts stalled in a hail of small-arms, mortar, and tank fire. Within minutes Company C lost six Shermans, while the 1st Battalion took more than 60 casualties. An unexpected counterthrust by three of Shigemi’s tanks pushed 2nd Battalion out of San Manuel later that morning.
The 161st tried again at 1700 hours. Backed by fast-firing 4.2-inch mortars assigned to Company D, 98th CM Battalion and the M7 howitzers of Cannon Company, 2nd Battalion succeeded in grabbing a toehold on the edge of town. One M7 was wrecked in a suicide attack, but by sundown the GIs had killed five Japanese tanks and were inside San Manuel to stay.
This small victory came at great cost. Technician 4th Grade Laverne Parrish, a medic assigned to 1/161st Infantry, carried to safety five men at San Manuel before he was fatally wounded by mortar fragments on the morning of January 24. For these acts of valor, together with other heroic deeds performed earlier at Binalonan, Parrish received a posthumous Medal of Honor.
For the next two days, U.S. infantry, M7 assault guns, and M4 tanks fought street to street against Shigemi’s detachment. No longer able to withstand the Americans’ relentless attacks, his last remaining soldiers staged a breakout around 0100 hours on January 28. Leading the way were 13 Type 97s. The 161st Infantry’s regimental history tells what happened next:
“The tanks assaulted in waves of three, each tank followed closely by foot troops…. Riflemen in pits opposed them with rifle AT grenades, bazookas and caliber .50 machine guns. Two 37mm guns had the tanks within range. The first tank was hit but overran the forward position, spraying blindly with machine guns and firing 47mm point-blank.
“Ten of the tanks were halted,” concluded the American account, “the leading one just 50 yards inside our front. All had been hit several times. Hits and penetrations were made with AT shells, AT grenades, bazookas and caliber .50 machine guns.”
Perhaps 400 survivors somehow made it out, fleeing northward into the mountains. Shigemi was not among this number, though, having committed ritual suicide earlier that morning. U.S. commanders declared San Manuel secure after four days of intense combat; their casualties numbered 60 dead and 200 wounded. More than 775 Japanese died in the struggle.
With San Manuel firmly in American hands, Swift could turn his attention toward San Jose. On January 30, he ordered the 25th and 6th Infantry Divisions to conduct a pincer-like maneuver designed to cut the major roads leading in and out of this key transportation center.
Speed was paramount; Swift wanted to seize the foe’s routes of retreat before Geki Force slipped through his grasp. At Pemienta U.S. forces succeeded, ambushing a road column of eight Shinhoto Chi-Ha tanks, another eight artillery tractors, and 125 men. They were less fortunate at Umingan, where on January 31, an attack by the Tropic Lightning Division’s 27th Infantry Regiment bogged down in the face of withering automatic weapons fire.
Its forward progress stymied, the 27th held fast while on February 1 an adjacent unit, the 35th Infantry, bypassed Umingan for the nearby barrio of Lupao. Intelligence reports said a company of Japanese riflemen occupied Lupao; in reality, at least 40 tanks plus AT guns and engineers fighting as infantry were dug in there.
First Battalion went in on the afternoon of February 2. Caught in a murderous crossfire, the assault got nowhere. Next, field artillery and 4.2-inch mortars plastered the town with highexplosive and white phosphorous rounds. Another attempt made the next day also failed. Taking Lupao was going to be harder than first thought.
Fighting grew more intense on February 3, when the 3rd Battalion joined the battle. Much like its sister regiment at San Manuel, the 35th Infantry here employed M7 self-propelled howitzers as assault guns to good effect. Their 105mm cannons made short work of Japanese emplacements, enabling American infantrymen to take the southern tip of Lupao.
Once inside the village, advancing GIs played a savage game of cat and mouse with Lupao’s defenders. Bazooka rockets and AT grenades took their toll on dug-in tanks, while snipers and machine guns hidden in the rubble dropped attacking riflemen by the score. A series of ferocious Japanese counterstrikes kept the 35th Infantry off balance, preventing it from pushing through the objective.
A fresh battalion, the 2nd, took over starting February 5. Together with Cannon Company’s ubiquitous M7 assault guns and a detachment of Shermans, the 35th gradually squeezed shut their enemy’s perimeter. On February 7, some riflemen from Company G were moving forward when Japanese gunfire ripped through their ranks. Several soldiers fell while the rest took shelter in a roadside ditch. Though wounded himself, Master Sgt. Charles L. McGaha crawled out on three occasions to retrieve injured men. For this feat, McGaha would receive the Medal of Honor.
That night the Lupao garrison’s last eight tanks tried to bolt. Bazooka fire knocked out three; the rest were later found abandoned. By 1130 hours on February 8, it was all over. In this week-long battle the 35th Infantry Regiment lost 96 killed and 268 wounded, while Japanese casualties exceeded 900 men. Thirty-three demolished tanks were counted in and around the barrio.
While the 35th Infantry was busy clearing Lupao, other I Corps columns maneuvered on San Jose to the south. In the 6th Infantry Division’s zone, patrols from the 20th Infantry Regiment encountered a robust Japanese force defending Muñoz on January 31. This strongpoint was in fact larger than the one up the road at Lupao and would also require a week of hard fighting before the enemy was defeated.
Joining the 20th Infantry for this battle were several battalions of reinforcing field artillery plus two platoons of 4.2-inch mortars belonging to Company A, 98th CM Battalion. Company C, 44th TB also rolled up from corps reserve once it became clear there would be no armored counterblow on Luzon. These newly arrived tankers surveyed their objective with trepidation, as the battalion history related: “Tank operations were limited by the terrain, boggy ground and deep water-filled irrigation ditches. The town of Muñoz was fortified with antitank guns, 105[mm] artillery pieces and 57 light and medium tanks, all of which were dug in and with a three-foot thick top of logs and sandbags over them. In addition, numerous alternate positions were available so the tanks that were in one place one day would be in an alternate position the next.”
The battle for Muñoz began on February 1 when 3/20th Infantry assaulted from the southwest. Little headway was made against heavy resistance, so the next morning 1st Battalion joined the attack. Despite the welcome firepower of M4 tanks and M7 howitzers, the Americans could not advance more than a few yards at a time. The battle settled into a siege on February 4; powerful artillery and mortar barrages kept the Japanese pinned down while American riflemen carefully worked their way forward.
Captain Michael Kane, commanding Company B, 20th Infantry, vividly described one small-unit action that occurred on February 5: “Company B located a tank 75 yards to their front. Immediately they requested one of our supporting tanks to engage the enemy tank. Our tank came up to within ten yards of the Storage Building and, after the crew had been oriented as to the location of the enemy tank, they fired a 75mm round at the Jap[anese] tank, hitting and destroying it. However our tank, before it could withdraw, was hit by a 47mm shell from a mutual[ly] supporting tank…. Our tank burst into flames but the crew escaped safely.”
Technical Sergeant Donald E. Rudolph, an acting platoon leader, became a one-man army that same day when he advanced down a line of eight pillboxes, tossing hand grenades through their firing slits to eliminate the gunners inside. Later, he hopped aboard a Japanese tank that was firing on his troops to drop a white phosphorous grenade down its turret hatch. Rudolph received both the Medal of Honor and a battlefield promotion to second lieutenant for these acts of bravery.
Even though the entire 20th Infantry Regiment was now in action, by February 6 less than half of Muñoz had been brought under U.S. control. It was decided that evening to pull back and let seven battalions of 105mm, 155mm, and 8-inch artillery pulverize the place in an all-night bombardment. Fifth Air Force fighters also prepared to conduct a napalm strike the following morning.
Unknown to the Americans, on February 4 Yamashita ordered Geki Division to pull out of this sector. Due to communications problems, this directive did not reach Iwanaka’s headquarters until two days later. Nevertheless, under cover of a diversionary attack the remnants of Muñoz’s garrison withdrew toward San Jose before sunup on February 7.
They could not know that the 6th Infantry Division had taken San Jose days earlier. Furthermore, the highway leading there was now barricaded by U.S. infantry, artillery, and tanks. Roadblocks set up by the 63rd Infantry Regiment surprised the Japanese column’s lead elements, while nearby a group of tankers from Company C, 44th TB were awakened by the sound of unfamiliar vehicle engines.
“It sounded like an American Caterpillar going full speed,” Company C’s battle report later detailed. “As the vehicle sped by, they recognized it to be a Japanese medium tank. Immediately the alert was sounded and everyone was up.” More enemy armor then approached, shooting wildly into the night.
Another witness chronicled this chaotic encounter: “Japanese tanks pulled into firing position farther up the road, and started shelling the entire Company C area. Although their fire was far from ineffective, one by one they were picked off as the American tankers lined their sights in on the enemy’s lurid muzzle blasts. Some gunners searched for targets by spraying machine-gun tracer bullets in a wide arc. When one struck a Jap[anese] tank, it would spark as it ricocheted off. The vehicle would then be destroyed by 75[mm] cannon fire.”
Sunrise revealed a gruesome scene. Practically the entire garrison of Muñoz—an estimated 2,000 men—perished in this six-day fight. A physical count of wrecked Japanese equipment totaled 48 medium and four light tanks along with 16 AT guns, four armored cars, and four 105mm howitzers. U.S. casualties amounted to 97 dead and 303 wounded.
The 2nd Tank Division had been annihilated. While it held the approaches to San Jose long enough for badly needed supplies and infantry reinforcements to make their way north, the price paid was staggering. In three weeks of fighting, Geki Force lost at least 195 of its 220 tanks. No longer did Maj. Gen. Swift’s soldiers need to fear a mechanized counterattack. All that remained of Japan’s armored might on Luzon were a few three-vehicle platoons scattered across the island.
The last recorded tank versus tank fight in the Philippines took place during mid-April as American patrols neared Yamashita’s headquarters near Baguio. Outside of town, two Japanese tanks packed with high explosives made a suicide run against some Shermans of the 775th TB. Both vehicles managed to ram their targets, but neither charge detonated. Other M4s quickly knocked out these armored kamikazes. It was a fittingly courageous yet futile conclusion to the story of Japanese tanks on Luzon.
This article first appeared at the Warfare History Network.
Image: Wikimedia
Kyle Mizokami
Security, World
Here is the list.Key Point: These are some of the best handguns to make the cut. Which would you try out?
The revolver was one of the first multi-shot handguns. The revolver concept was preceded by the so-called “pepperbox” handgun, which used multiple barrels to arm an individual with multiple ready-to-fire bullets. This was later refined to the revolver concept, which saved weight by using a single barrel served by a revolving, cylindrical magazine holding six or more bullets. Although semiautomatic pistols have overtaken revolvers on the U.S. market, there are several good revolver designs that command attention. Simpler, less prone to jamming and capable of firing more powerful ammunition than the semiautomatic, revolvers still have their place.
Ruger LCR
The Ruger LCR was introduced in the mid-2000s as a lightweight, concealable self-defense weapon. Just 13.5 ounces and 6.5 inches long, the LCR fits easily into a pocket, hip or ankle holster. Like most small revolvers, it has a five-round cylinder. Ruger originally introduced the LCR in .38 +P configuration, meaning it can fire both typical .38 Special ammunition and higher-pressure, harder-hitting +P rounds. The gun’s 1.87-inch barrel, aluminum and polymer frame, and corresponding light weight make it the easiest of the pocket revolvers to shoot, although it still has a considerable amount of recoil. The double-action design means a single pull of the trigger will advance the cylinder to a fresh round and cock the pistol. As a result the LCR lacks a hammer, making it easier to draw from behind clothing without snagging.
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Smith & Wesson 686
One of the most popular revolvers in production, the Smith & Wesson 686 revolver is a medium (“L frame”) revolver chambered in the powerful .357 Magnum caliber. The 686 is designed to handle the heavier magnum round while pairing it with a heavier barrel and a six-round cylinder. Like all .357 Magnums, the 686 can shoot the less powerful .38 Special ammunition. The 686 features a four-inch barrel, has an overall length of 9.6 inches and weighs two-and-a-half pounds. It also adjustable sights, a double-action firing system and a stainless steel finish. A deluxe model comes with a larger, seven-round cylinder.
Ruger GP100
Sturm Ruger’s answer to the Smith & Wesson 686, the Ruger GP100 was introduced in the early 1990s. The GP100 was the successor to Ruger’s Security Six and Speed Six pistols, but uses a large frame very similar to the 686’s L frame. The GP100 is slightly heavier and the design slightly more angular than the 686, but it makes an excellent introduction to full-size revolvers and an outstanding home-defense weapon. The GP100 has since branched out into many other calibers, including .22LR, .327 Federal Magnum .and 44 Special.
Ruger Blackhawk
Sturm Ruger’s other line of popular revolvers has a distinctly Old West flavor to it. The Ruger Blackhawk line of pistols look similar to the old Western Colt Single Action Army revolvers of the nineteenth century, but with a host of modern features to keep them viable in the twenty-first. Cold hammer-forged barrels and a stout, beefy frame make the Blackhawk a manageable firearm in .357 Magnum, .41 Remington Magnum, the traditional cowboy calibers .45 Colt and, unusually, the World War II–era .30 Carbine. Like old-time cowboy revolvers, the Blackhawk’s cylinder must be loaded through a loading gate.
Taurus Model 85 Ultra-Lite
Although the semiautomatic pistol market has a large number of foreign competitors, Taurus is the only major overseas player in the revolver market. Among the Brazilian company’s many offerings, the most popular is the Model 85 Ultra-Lite. The Model 85 is a good choice as a home-defense handgun or concealed-carry piece, in the same class as the Ruger LCR. The .38 Special pistol can handle +P ammunition, with a five-round cylinder and comfortable rubber grips. The Model 85 is seven ounces heavier than the LCR but, unlike Ruger’s compact revolver, has a hammer allowing for single-action operation. This allows the Model 85 to be cocked first with a hammer, resulting in a much lighter trigger pull.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.
Image: Reuters
Kyle Mizokami
Security,
The LCR will be on the market for a long time to come.Key Point: The snub-nosed revolver era began soon after World War II, but Ruger brought it into the modern era.
One of the most unexpected surprises of recent years is the resurgence in snub-nose, concealed-carry revolvers.
Largely displaced in the 1980s by a frenzy of interest in low-cost, high capacity 9-millimeter pistols, new interest in these short, compact revolvers was led in the late-2000s by the Ruger LCR, an entirely new revolver design that skillfully blended steel, aluminum, and even polymer into a very lightweight weapon.
The modern snub-nose revolver era began in the early 1950s, after World War II, with the production of the Smith & Wesson Chief’s Special Model 36 revolver. Five shot revolvers chambered in .38 Special, they were designed for police use and home defense. The small, handy revolver, although not exactly fun to shoot, was discrete enough to sit in a desk or bedside table, or in a shoulder, ankle holster, or even coat pocket. Snub-nose revolvers, as well as revolvers in general, were popular in the United States and for decades were a large chunk of the handgun market.
The rise of polymer-framed, high capacity nine-millimeter pistols, the so-called “Wonder Nines” typified by the likes of the Glock 17 was a tectonic shift in the world of handguns. Not only did such handguns—which were often as inexpensive or cheaper than revolvers—gut revolver sales but their scalability led to smaller compact and subcompact versions with up to double the magazine capacity of a five-shot subcompact revolver. The Glock 26 for example, weighs exactly as much as a Model 36 revolver yet can carry a minimum of ten rounds with a flush magazine, and considerably more than that if magazine weight and bulk isn’t an issue.
In recent years subcompact revolvers have started to claw back, their resurgence led by the Ruger LCR. First introduced in 2009, the LCR was a clean-sheet design unlike any revolver Ruger, or any other handgun manufacturer for that matter, had ever built before. The original LCR weighed just 13.5 ounces unloaded. It has a 1.87-inch barrel and an overall length of 6.5 inches. It has a five shot magazine and can accept both .38 Special and higher pressure .38 Special +P rounds.
The LCR achieves its lightweight through a combination polymer and aluminum frame. The frame is polymer in the grip area, where strength is not needed, but 7000-series aluminum in the barrel and cylinder housing. The five shot cylinder is made of stainless steel for maximum strength but also fluted to save weight. The barrel is also made of stainless steel.
The LCR does away with the external hammer, resulting in a gun with fewer protrusions that could be caught up on clothing when being drawn. As a result—unlike many revolvers with external hammers—the LCR cannot shoot in single action mode and is double action only.
Traditionally, revolvers have two firing modes: single and double action. In single action mode, the hammer can be cocked back to lighten the trigger pull with the subsequent shot. This reduces trigger pull weight, trigger travel distance, and can make for more accurate aimed shots. The downside is that it dramatically slows down firing, with the hammer needing to be cocked back with each shot. In double action mode, a single longer, heavier trigger pulls both cocks and fires the pistol. Despite the disadvantages, a hammerless revolver can be more quickly produced in an emergency and with more confidence that it will not be caught up in the user’s undershirt when being drawn.
One of the best features of the LCR is the Hogue wraparound rubber grip. Older snub-nose hammerless handguns, such as the Smith & Wesson 442, lack a recoil-insulating grip at the top of the backstrap, where the webbing of the hand comes in contact with metal. The combination of a two inch or less revolver barrel and .38 Special rounds makes for considerable felt recoil, quickly making the handgun uncomfortable and eventually painful to shoot. The LCR, on the other hand, has a rubber grip that rides much higher than other snub-nose revolvers, fully protecting the user’s hand from the force of recoil and providing for a much more pleasant shooting experience.
In the decade since its introduction, the Ruger LCR has branched out into several calibers and subtypes. From the original .38 Special +P model the LCR is now available in .22 WMR, .22LR, 9 Millimeter, .327 Federal Magnum, and .357 Magnum. (The latter uses a stainless steel, instead of aluminum, cylinder to handle the higher pressures of the Magnum round.) The Ruger LCRx series offers the LCR with longer three-inch barrels and low-profile external hammers, resulting in a double action/single action revolver.
The Ruger LCR series of revolvers are small, powerful handguns packed with the latest in technological innovations. From one handgun in 2009 today there are eighteen different variations, with differences both cosmetic and substantive, for a wide variety of gun owners and their needs. The LCR will be on the market for a long time to come.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
Image: This is an image of a Ruger LCR chambered in 38 Special +P. Wikimedia/Jephthai. Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported.
Kyle Mizokami
Security, Americas
A good, high-ammo gun to hit a few tin cans with.Key Point: These guns can hold a lot of rounds despite beign a small weapon. It is a good choice for causal, competitive shooting.
The Kel-Tec PMR-30 is a rarity among handguns on the market today: a pistol with a magazine holding more than seventeen rounds. The PMR-30 actually holds thirty rounds and does so with some clever engineering that reduces it to a lightweight package attractive to casual shooters, backcountry shooters, or people interested in a firearm for home defense.
This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.
High-capacity handguns have traditionally been a difficult engineering proposition. The first, if not one of the first, was World War I’s Luger P08 with thirty-two-round drum. Meant to provide plenty of firepower to clear trenches, the Luger with drum magazine was unwieldy and heavy, and dropped from German arsenals shortly after the war. The next major advancement occurred decades later, when the Glock 17—with its seventeen-round, 9mm Luger magazine—hit the market in the early 1980s.
The Kel-Tec PMR-30 blows every other gun out of the water in ammo capacity. The gun’s double-stack magazine holds thirty rounds of .22 Winchester Magnum Rimfire (WMR) ammunition. That’s five times as many rounds as the typical revolver, more than four times as much as a M1911A1 handgun and 70 percent more ammunition than a Glock 17.
All of that comes at a price, though: while the PMR may hold five times as many rounds as a Smith & Wesson 686 revolver, the .22 WMR is far less capable of incapacitating a target as the .357 Magnum. That having been said, the guns are completely different and there are different reasons for owning each.
The PMR-30 is relatively new, sleek looking autoloading handgun. Introduced in 2011, it has an overall length of 7.9 inches and a 4140 steel barrel length of 4.3 inches—typical for the handguns in its size class. It weighs just fourteen ounces unloaded, thanks to Kel-Tec’s use of polymers. By comparison, the Glock 17 weighs twenty-two ounces unloaded. Almost the entire exterior of the gun is made of polymer, with the slide made of Zytel reinforced with 4140 steel.
The pistol has fiber-optic sights with orange high visibility dots in the rear and a yellow dot in front. The trigger is described by the manufacturer as in the five-pound range, and trigger pull is described by one reviewer as short but with a “mushy” reset. Unlike other American-designed handguns the magazine release is at the heel, making it ambidextrous. An under-barrel rail allows for the attachment of popular accessories, including a flashlight or aiming laser.
The PMR-30 has an integral safety system consisting of a safety lever at the base of the frame, where it can be reached by the thumb. Pushing it to the “safe” position disconnects the trigger from activating the sear, preventing the hammer from falling. The safety can only be engaged when the hammer is fully cocked, allowing the pistol to be carried or stored in the “cocked-and-locked” position.
Kel-Tec’s high-capacity pistol is generally described as very reliable, with one reviewer stating his review weapon went through close to 700 rounds without a mishap. Another reviewer claimed that recoil “isn’t a consideration although the .22 Magnum exhibits a healthy muzzle blast.”
One major drawback for a .22 WMR gun is the ability for even novice shooters to repeatedly score hits on the target. Higher-caliber handguns generate significant amounts of recoil, making it difficult to hit the target with follow-up shots. A low-recoil gun makes it easier to plant more shots where you want them, opening up multiple wound channels.
Another reason to choose the PMR-30 is if one is generally afraid of guns and gun recoil but wants a firearm as a self-defense tool. A soft-shooting gun like the PMR-30 would generate less anxiety for someone afraid of gun recoil, making that person more confident in their shooting abilities—especially during high stress situations.
The PMR-30 is is light enough to be packed in and forgotten, then punch holes in soda cans in a friendly shooting contest. It is a reliable, low-recoil handgun whose large ammunition capacity can give the user the confidence he or she can live through an extended shooting engagement without reloading. Kel-Tec’s pistol can admirably fill a number of niches, from fun shooting to self defense, offering a little something for everyone.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
This first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.
Image: Kel-Tec.
Robert Beckhusen
Security,
It was only a matter of time.Here's What You Need To Remember: The Blackbird wouldn’t stay officially secret for much longer. Pres. Lyndon Johnson would run for election in 1964, and to counter criticisms from Republican Sen. Barry Goldwater, revealed the SR-71 during a speech on July 25.
There are few secret projects like U.S. Air Force black projects, and that was certainly the case for the famed SR-71 Blackbird.
The SR-71 was no ordinary aircraft but a big, beautiful and state-of-the-art spy plane designed in the 1950s and early 1960s to fly quickly at high altitudes over the Soviet Union, filling in for the U-2 Dragon Lady which had become vulnerable to then-new surface-to-air missiles.
Designer Lockheed and the Air Force treated the project with intense secrecy, and when still totally classified, the CIA recorded any hints that reporters, analysts or civilian plane watchers might have as to the jet’s existence. It didn’t matter who suspected it. If airport cab drivers were spreading rumors about secret doings at Lockheed, the agency wanted to know.
To keep the program under wraps, Lockheed engineers quietly worked on the plane at the company’s Skunk Works division in Burbank, California and the Air Force’s isolated Nevada base — known as Area 51 — beginning in 1958. The first Blackbird flew four years later.
The government surrounded the Blackbird with so much silence because it was an experimental plane and the first stealth aircraft, owing to its radar-reflective design. The SR-71's extreme performance — a speed of Mach 3.3 at an altitude of 85,000 feet — was highly sensitive information.
However, aviation experts and the press picked up on the project and did so relatively quickly, sometimes through sheer guesswork, according to the CIA’s recently declassified official history obtained by Governmentattic.org.
The first outsider to notice was John B. Pearson, a retired admiral who was then working for North American Aviation, the company which built the legendary F-86 Sabre and X-15 rocket plane. As it was his job to study the military aircraft industry, he suspected by April 1962 that the Air Force, Lockheed and the CIA were up to something big.
He had several reasons for the hunch. For one, Lockheed’s chief SR-71 designer, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, had become hard to reach. Pearson also speculated to a friend working at Hughes Aircraft Company that engineers developing the firm’s GAR-9 missile must be assisting a secret aircraft program at Lockheed, because the F-108 Rapier — the only known plane which could fire the missile — had been cancelled.
In fact, Lockheed was developing an (eventually cancelled) interceptor version of the Blackbird which would have carried the GAR-9. “The old friend was noticeably startled and changed the subject which Pearson took as another clue,” the CIA recorded in a document listing examples of industry suspicions of the Blackbird project.
In any case, Pearson knew his stuff — and he knew that a long-range, high-speed and high-altitude surveillance plane was exactly what the Pentagon needed given the growing vulnerabilities of the U-2.
In January 1963, a manager named William Clegern at a Denver technology firm speculated that “Lockheed was working on a super U-2,” according to the CIA history. Like Pearson, Clegern had made an educated guess, although he had some help from an “unrecalled source” during a visit to Los Angeles.
In a tightly-knit industry with overlapping suppliers of hardware and spare parts, word got around —and traveling vendors were often a source of grist for the rumor mill.
Robert Widmer, then vice president of Convair, reported that it was “generally known” in the industry, particularly on the West Coast, that Lockheed was working on a similar but more advanced successor to the U-2.
Pearson and his colleagues at North American Aviation were also aware that the Pentagon was pouring millions of dollars into developing the huge J-58 turbofan engine — of which the SR-71 fitted two.
“They observed that the funds allotted to developing the J-58 did not seem to them justified unless there was some high altitude airplane available in which to utilize the J-58,” the CIA noted.
By March, Pearson and his coworkers studied shipments of liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel, movements of test pilots and even subcontractors working on specialized precision valves to deduce not only the existence of a new spy plane, but guess its specifications. They weren’t dead-on accurate, but they were close.
Taxi drivers shuttling Lockheed contractors from Los Angeles’ airport to the company’s terminal started asking questions. Even airline crews had spotted the A-12 Oxcart — a shorter version of the SR-71 flown by the CIA — in flight.
And the media got involved.
In January 1963, Fort Worth aviation newspaper Cross Country News reported that sources spoke of a “highly guarded … super-sonic transport” in the works at Lockheed, apparently mixing up the Blackbird with the U.S. supersonic transport program.
“Even in the X stage Lockheed officials say nothing,” the paper reported. “No details came from this tip, from sources considered highly reliable.”
Then disaster struck. On May 24, an A-12 stalled, went into an unrecoverable spin and crashed during a test flight in Utah. Fortunately, pilot Kenneth Collins ejected and survived.
Even in remote Utah, it’s hard to hide a crash. A local deputy witnessed the incident and a vacationing family snapped away with a camera. The CIA promptly seized their photographs and paid $25,000 each to the deputy and the family to keep quiet, according to a 2010 story in the Seattle Times.
The Associated Press reported on the incident and described the crashed aircraft as a “jet trainer.” The same day, the Las Vegas Review-Journal published a story stating the plane was an F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bomber, citing Air Force officials.
The “Thunderchief” claim was an elaborate cover story. But by July, Robert Hotz — longtime editor ofAviation Week and a former bomber pilot during World War II — “indicated his awareness of developments at Burbank.”
And in November, a Los Angeles Times reporter began making phone calls to engine maker Westinghouse, asking questions about CIA involvement in a secret project in “the desert.” TheFontana Herald News ran an article in November “speculating about a ‘super secret project site.’”
The Blackbird wouldn’t stay officially secret for much longer. Pres. Lyndon Johnson would run for election in 1964, and to counter criticisms from Republican Sen. Barry Goldwater, revealed the SR-71 during a speech on July 25.
More than a half-century later, the SR-71 is a museum piece. But secret aircraft projects, and strange sightings over the western United States, have not stopped. When observers notice and publicize their suspicions, an anonymous official is somewhere, surely, typing away notes.
This article was first published last year.
Warfare History Network
History,
This tank was based on a modified Czechoslovakian Panzer 38(t) chassis.By 1943 it was obvious to the Germans that their tank production could not keep pace with battlefield losses. One of their efforts to expedite weapons production was the conversion of old, outdated tank chassis into tank destroyers, or Jagdpanzers. Early efforts demonstrated the rushed and sometimes rough mating of a small, old tank with a large, powerful gun. The Marder series especially appeared cumbersome and top heavy. The most successful conversion was the Jagdpanzer 38(t), commonly referred to as the Hetzer.
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A Versatile Czech Chassis
With international tensions rising in Europe, in 1937 the Czech Army began a search for a new modern tank. After exhaustive testing, the Czechs adopted the LT vz 38. It had riveted armor with a maximum thickness of 25mm and a minimum of 10mm, which was comparable to similar tanks of the era. A four-man crew included the driver, bow gunner, gunner, and commander. The main gun was a Skoda A7 37mm cannon, equivalent in performance to the Germans’ own 37mm or the British 2-pounder. A Praga inline 6-cylinder gasoline engine gave the LT vz 38 a top speed of 26 miles per hour and a range of 125 miles. All around, it could outperform or was at least comparable to any tank in the German Army with the exception of the PzKpfw. IV with a short-barreled 75mm gun, but this tank was available only in small numbers.
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When France and Great Britain sacrificed Czechoslovakia to the Nazis to gain Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace in Our Time,” the Germans were more than happy to get their hands on the famous Czech arms industry and its products. The vz 38 was not in service with the Czech Army yet, but the Germans eagerly adopted all existing models for themselves as the PzKpfw. 38(t), with the “t” designating the Czech origin of the vehicle, and kept the production lines rolling. The Germans used the PzKpfw. 38(t) to equip their 7th and 8th Panzer Divisions for the invasion of Poland in 1939 and France in May 1940. The PzKpfw. 38(t), with various upgrades, remained in frontline service with the Wehrmacht as a light tank until 1942, when new Soviet armored vehicles such as the T-34 medium and KV series of heavy tanks outclassed it.
However, the chassis and powertrain were still quite viable. These became the bases for a variety of German tracked vehicles, including self-propelled artillery, tank destroyers, assault guns, reconnaissance vehicles, a self-propelled 20mm antiaircraft gun, and an assortment of weapons carriers. The most successful of these was the leichte (light) Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer. The term “Hetzer,” or “baiter,” was never official nomenclature but rather a misunderstanding between German Army officials and Czech manufacturers. The name stuck unofficially.
An Effective Tank Destroyer Design
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) retained the Praga AC/2800 water-cooled inline, six-cylinder engine, the 150- to 160-horsepower transferred through a semiautomatic five-speed Praga transmission and Wilson clutch and steering brakes to the final drive. The original front drive sprocket, rear idler wheel, and leaf spring suspension of the PzKpfw. 38 was retained, but the four rubber-tired steel road wheels were larger than the originals and the track had only a single return roller on top. Relatively lightweight at 16 tons (the design specs calling for 13 tons) and with a 35cm wide track, the Hetzer had a ground pressure of 0.76kg/cm2. Although at 26 mph (42 kph) it was nowhere near as fast as the 55-60 kph originally called for in the design parameters, it had good cross-country performance, and although sluggish at low speed it could be quite nimble with the engine kept revved up to high rpms. It also featured a pivot steer, with one track going forward while the other reversed, enabling it to turn around basically within its own length.
The new hull was designed with armor protection and not crew comfort in mind. The frontal armor was of rolled steel plates interlocked and welded, 60mm thick with the top sloped at a 60-degree angle and the lower plate sloped at 40 degrees. The side and rear armor was of a lower quality alloy steel and only 20mm thick. The top plates sloped at 40 degrees, and the lower hull and rear sloped at 15 degrees. Top armor was only 8mm thick, and the bottom plate 10mm.
One German after-action report by a battalion commander of a Hetzer unit noted the effectiveness of this armor. “The frontal armor resists penetration by the Russian 7.62cm antitank guns. Up to now, losses have only occurred due to penetration of the sides and rear. It is therefore especially important to only present the strong front to the enemy.”
It was a low, compact armored vehicle, the hull 15 feet, 9 inches long, just over eight feet wide, and less than seven feet tall, hardly higher than a standing man. Main armament was the reliable and powerful 75mm L48 PaK39, with a secondary armament of a top-mounted 7.92mm machine gun. Small, low and easy to hide, fairly nimble, and with a powerful gun, the Hetzer made an excellent tank destroyer.
The same colonel quoted above said, “The ‘leichte Panzerjager 38’ had passed its test in fire. The crews are proud of this Jagdpanzer and the infantry have faith in it. Especially praised is the … machine gun. The effective weapons, low profile, and well-sloped armor make it fully adaptable to both its main roles in combating enemy tanks and supporting infantry in both attack and defense.”
“In a short period, one company destroyed 20 tanks without a single loss. A task group destroyed 57 tanks, of which two were JS 122s at a range of 800 meters.”
The Hetzer’s Shortcomings
As with many wartime improvisations there were, of course, problems. Due to the width of the hull, the 75mm main gun had to be mounted on the right side, the mount supported by the thick upper plate. This limited the gun to a relatively narrow traverse of only five degrees left and 11 degrees right; anything further, or if engaging a crossing target, the driver had to turn the vehicle toward the target. The extra weight on the right side put undue pressure on the suspension’s leaf springs and also made the vehicle nose heavy, with the rear end sitting 10cm higher than the front. As production continued, improvements were made, such as beefing up the leaf springs and drive train and lightening the gun mantle. Other various modifications to ease manufacture and maintenance, such as small hatches in the armor for the fuel, oil, and antifreeze caps, were also incorporated over the life of the vehicle.
Nothing could be done to make more room inside the small hull, and the crew had little space. The driver, gunner, and loader were all seated in a line up the left side of the hull. The commander was perched in the right rear with the recoil guard of the main gun all but isolating him from the rest of the crew, hurting the vital teamwork of the whole crew. His view was restricted to the SF14Z scissors periscope forward and a small rear-facing fixed periscope.
The driver was squeezed into the front left corner with the transmission and gun mount right at his elbow. Steering was via two horizontal rather than vertical joysticks with exposed linkages, and his field of view was poor with only two periscopes pointing straight forward. Since he could not communicate well with the commander, there were three lights on the driver’s control panel which the commander could turn on and off to signal the driver to go left, right, or straight. Driver safety was limited to a thick leather pad above his head and a small, thick rubber pad on his left.
Because the gun was mounted on the right, the loader had to feed it from the wrong side, reach over it to switch the safety, breech block opening lever, and extractor release, as well as reach across the recoil path or the gunner to pull some of the stowed ammunition. The loader had a single periscope fixed in the 9 o’clock position to see out the left side of the vehicle.
The gunner was seated directly to the left of the gun breech, with hand-cranked traverse and elevation wheels directly on the right. His gunnery sight was the SFl.Z.F.1a periscope, which ran up through the roof. The reticule on the sight consisted of seven triangles that were four mils apart, enabling the gunner to aim without obscuring the target, calculate range, and lead a target. The reticule could be dimly lit for lowlight shooting. An adjustable range drum was graduated in 100-meter intervals for the trajectory of the four different types of ammunition used. When the whole crew was buttoned up, there was essentially no vision to the right side of the vehicle.
A remote-control MG-34 7.92mm machine gun was mounted on the roof for close-in defense against infantry. Behind the loader were the controls, rather like a submarine periscope with two folding handles, a rotating 3x periscope to aim through, and a trigger lever on the handlebar. While it did work, it was limited to a belt of only 50 rounds inside a metal drum; with a cyclic rate of fire of 800-900 rounds per minute, it was only good for a few short bursts. Reloading required the loader to pop out the hatch and expose himself to enemy fire.
The Hetzer’s Deadly Armament
It was the PaK 39 that was the heart of the whole system, and although only 75mm it was powerful enough to handle any Allied tank with the exception of the Soviet heavies like the Josef Stalin. Four types of ammunition were carried, with a total of 41 rounds. The Pzgr.40 high-velocity, sub-caliber, tungsten core round was the best antitank shell, firing a 4.1kg projectile at 930 m/s. Striking at a 30-degree angle, this round could penetrate 120mm of armor at 500 meters and 97mm at 1,000. The sight drum was graduated to 2,000 meters for this load.
The tungsten-cored Pzgr. 40 ammunition was often in scarce supply, and the runner up for anti-tank performance was the more plentiful Pzgr. 39 armor piercing, ballistic-capped with explosive filler and tracer element, launching a heavier 6.8kg projectile at a lower muzzle velocity of 750 m/s. It could pierce 106mm and 95mm of armor at 500 and 1,000 meters respectively.
The Gr. 38 HL/C round was designed around the shaped charge HEAT (high explosive antitank) principle used in the bazooka and panzerfaust, but was actually much less effective against armor than either of the other two AT rounds as well as being much less accurate. It could be used in lieu of the standard high-explosive round for soft targets.
With the Pzgr. 39 or 40 ammunition, the Hetzer was capable of first-shot hits at 1,000 meters. The German Army testing procedure assumed correct range estimation and a competent gunner and expected with Pzgr.39 ammo a 99 percent chance of a first-shot hit at 500 meters and a 71 percent chance at 1,000 meters. The small vehicle, camouflaged and waiting in ambush, could be deadly with such shooting. An Allied tank column would not know the Panzerjager was there until the lead tank burst into flames.
Hetzer Teams in Action
A German Army after-action report from the Eastern Front detailed what Hetzers with good crews could do, even against the Soviet giants.
“The 3rd Company with four Jagdpanzer 38s was in a firefight with a JS-122 at a range of 1,200 meters. The Russian heavy tank fired 10 rounds at the commander’s Jagdpanzer that had taken up a good position on a reverse slope. All 10 rounds came directly at the Jadgpanzer but always landed 100 meters too short.”
This shows the value of what tankers call a hull-down position. Basically, if the driver could see the target the gunner could engage it. The gun itself needed only 1.4 meters of clearance to fire; thus, in a hull-down or defilade position, the Hetzer presented a target only .77 meters tall.
“The company commander immediately sent a Jagdpanzer off to the right along a concealed route through a depression to attack from the flank. The sixth shot from this Jagdpanzer 38 penetrated the side of the Josef Stalin 122, and it burned out. This reemphasized the experience that if possible a single Jagdpanzer 38 should never engage in a firefight. When firing the powder smoke is blown back and envelops the commander’s scissors periscope and strongly hinders the ability to observe and correct the gunner’s aim. A second Jagdpanzer can observe the flight and strike of the rounds and relay corrections by radio to quickly destroy enemy tanks.”
So, teamwork was not only important with the individual crews, hampered by the recoil shield around the commander’s position, but also with the other vehicles in the company. The tactical use of terrain, cover, and concealment was nearly as important. Deploying single Hetzers, especially without infantry support, was almost certain to end in failure.
Postwar Service in the Swiss Military
Even after the end of the war in Europe, some Hetzers were manufactured from existing stocks and production facilities in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs built 180 for their own military forces, mostly used for training, and Switzerland ordered 158 export models of the Hetzer, which were given the Swiss Army nomenclature G-13.
Why, one would ask, with all the Hetzer’s little problems, would a postwar nation want them? The Swiss military system and doctrine was defensive in nature. When needed, the Swiss could mobilize some 500,000 troops. Every soldier, after serving his mandatory time in the armed forces, took all his equipment, including his rifle, home and was subject to periodic training. Individual marksmanship was especially emphasized, with nearly every town having shooting competitions on weekends, and the reservists issued both practice and ready ammunition.
The Swiss had authorized a marked increase in defense funding in 1936 and purchased weapons that they could not manufacture. They realized well, perhaps better than some larger and more powerful nations, the importance of armor and aircraft. One of the main rearmament purchases was for 100 Czech LT zv 38 tanks. Only two dozen had arrived, without the main gun yet installed, before the Germans took over Czechoslovakia and confiscated all existing tanks.
The Swiss armed their tanks with an odd 24mm gun and distributed them in three eight-tank companies, one each in support of their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Brigades, but this was obviously little more than a token gesture. Although they had extensive fortifications in the Alps and could produce artillery pieces up to 150mm, their antitank arm was extremely weak. The German General Staff drew up two major plans to invade Switzerland, but both projects were fortunately dropped. Switzerland breathed a sigh of relief in 1945, but the nation was determined not to be caught in such an uncomfortable situation again.
Thus, the Hetzer was a good choice to quickly and cheaply begin to build up Swiss antitank capabilities, and its design was perfectly suited to their strictly defensive military doctrine. Additionally, the existing LT vz 38s had given them experience with running and maintaining the same automotive systems and could provide spare parts in a pinch.
The Hetzers were but a first step, and the Swiss postwar arsenal came to include exports such as the French AMX-13 and British Centurion tanks, as well as a host of infantry anti-tank weapons. The Swiss began building their own tanks in the early 1960s. Still, the G-13 soldiered on, with most converted to diesel engines in the early 1950s, until the last was retired in 1970.
This article first appeared at Warfare History Network.
Image: Wikimedia
Kyle Mizokami
Security, World
Or are they?Key Point: These guns are reliable and well-known. Here are why they are relied upon by many.
American law enforcement faces a unique challenge: keeping the peace in a country with an estimated three hundred million guns in circulation. Although the overwhelming majority are owned by law-abiding citizens, a not-inconsiderable number are owned by criminals. When carrying a duty weapon, that it is comfortable and capable of matching the firepower of the majority of criminals is a key considerations.
Approximately 93 percent of gun homicides in the United States are committed with handguns. Concealable and intimidating, handguns are an attractive choice for criminals. As a result, it is rare that a law enforcement officer needs more than a handgun to equal the firepower of criminals, although the 7 percent of gun homicides committed with rifles and shotguns shows a need for police to also have long guns available and at the ready. With that in mind, here are five guns well suited for police, including handguns, rifles and shotguns.
Glock 22
Originally developed to fulfill a pistol requirement for the Austrian Army, the Glock 17 became a worldwide phenomenon, winning fans with armed forces, police organizations, and gun enthusiasts everywhere. The G17 was one of the first “Wonder Nines,” high-capacity nine-millimeter pistols that carried fifteen or more rounds of ammunition in a double-stack magazine. The Glock 22 is the 17’s cousin, modified to carry fifteen rounds of .40 caliber ammunition—and still weighing just over thirty-two ounces, making it comfortable to carry all day. The gun achieves this by using a metal slide but a polymer frame, saving weight. The G22 is used by several law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the FBI.
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Glock 21
One of the very first Glock variants was the Glock 21. The G21 is essentially the exact same pistol as the Glock 17, only scaled up to accept the .45 ACP round. The Glock 21 can carry ten rounds of .45 ACP ammunition, two rounds more than the dominant .45 ACP platform for the past century, the 1911A1 series of pistols. At thirty-eight ounces loaded, the Glock 21 weighs ten ounces less than a 1911A1 pistol. This is primarily due to the use of a polymer frame and simplicity of design, which includes fewer steel parts. Although the Glock 21 has a lighter recoil, it is still very acceptable and similar to the heavier 1911A1. It is also considerably easier to maintain than John Browning’s 107-year-old design. The G21 is a useful option for police who want a heavier round but an ammo magazine that allows for a greater margin of error.
Sig Sauer P226
A rise in gun violence during the 1990s, and a handful of incidents in which law enforcement armed with revolvers were outgunned by better-armed criminals, led to the widespread adoption of semiautomatic handguns. One of those adopted by police across the United States was the Sig Sauer P226. The P226 was developed to replace the M1911A1 in U.S. military service, but while the Beretta Model 92 won the contract, the former handgun went on to win several high-profile police contracts, including the New York and San Francisco police departments, Texas Rangers, Michigan State Police and the Ohio State Highway Patrol. The P226 also features a decocking mechanism to lower the hammer, and a manual safety.
Remington 870
For decades the most popular long gun carried by police was the pump-action shotgun. Stored in a patrol car, the shotgun gave police the ability to overmatch the firepower of one or more criminals armed with handguns, or face down a riot or mob with a fearsome amount of firepower. Introduced in 1950, the Remington 870 may be sixty-eight years old but is still one of the leading-edge shotgun designs. Available in a dizzying array of variants, the most popular police version is the riot version, with a five-round internal magazine and an eighteen- or twenty-inch barrel. The 870 enjoys strong aftermarket support with a wide variety of chokes, lights, lasers and other accessories to tune the shotgun to a police department’s precise needs.
AR-15/M-4 series
An increasing number of police departments are arming their patrol units with AR-15 platform rifles. Designed by Eugene Stoner in the early 1960s, Colt sold a fully automatic version of the rifle known as the M-16 to the U.S. Air Force and later U.S. Army. The basic pattern of the M-16 persists to this day in the M-4A1 carbine, M-16A4 rifles and specialized rifles such as the M110 sniper rifle. At the same time, civilian use of the AR-15 surged with the sunsetting of the federal assault-weapons ban. The widespread use of AR rifles lowered costs, making them more affordable to police departments. Many departments use actual M-16s declared excess defense articles by the Pentagon, and released to law enforcement under the “1033 program.” An AR-15 with a thirty-round magazine provides a considerable amount of firepower for a police officer waiting for backup to arrive, and an offensive weapon for ending active-shooter situations.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
This first appeared in 2019 and is being reposted due to reader interest.
Image: Reuters.
Gun News Daily
Security, Americas
Check them out.Key Point: These small guns are able to keep you and your family safe. However, they do have some disadvantages to keep in mind.
The .380 ACP semi-automatic pistol is one of the most popular categories of concealed carry weapons in the United States and has been for years.
It’s easy to see why: .380 pistols are typically small enough to carry in the pocket, they are unquestionably smaller and lighter than competing 9mm single stack autos or .38 snubnose revolvers.
But despite those advantages, .380 pocket pistols have also been plagued by a number of downsides. The Ruger LCP II, released by Ruger at the end of 2016, sought to remedy many of those downsides.
In this review, we will cover the disadvantages of the .380 pistol that the LCP II sought to remedy, what makes the LCP II an improvement over the original LCP, and the uses for and specifications of the LCP II.
WHAT ARE THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE .380 POCKET PISTOL?
.380 pocket pistols are incredibly easy to conceal, and this is what is largely attributed to their long time popularity in the United States.
Examples of popular small pocket .380 autos include the original Ruger LCP, Taurus TCP, Smith & Wesson Bodyguard .380, and the Kel-Tec P3-AT to name a few. Every one of these pistols are incredibly easy to conceal in your pocket.
Unfortunately, each of these pistols and others in their class suffer from a number of serious flaws.
These flaws include, but are not limited to:
THEY HAVE TERRIBLE TRIGGER PULLS
.380 pocket pistols have a well-deserved reputation for having some of the worst trigger pulls of any semi-automatic pistols on the market.
The trigger pull on most .380 autos is exceptionally long and gritty. In other words, it’s not pleasant to shot at all.
While larger .380 pistols such as the Walther PPK/S, Walther PK380, Bersa Thunder 380, and Glock 42 don’t have this problem, the truly small pocket pistols such as the LCP and TCP most certainly do.
THEY’RE DIFFICULT TO SHOOT
.380 pocket pistols are traditionally difficult to fire for a number of reasons: in addition to the horrid trigger pulls like we just discussed, they also suffer from being extremely snappy due to their small size.
Granted, .380 pocket autos are not guns that you take to the range for fun. They are meant to be defensive arms that can be easily carried in the pocket. Nonetheless, the fact that they are difficult to shoot can be a major problem for training and self-defense purposes.
THEY HAVE POOR ERGONOMICS
Last but not least, and while this is entirely personal preference, many regard .380 autos as having poor ergonomics due to the fact that their extraordinarily small size means you can’t get a full grip on them. This only naturally makes it more difficult to fire properly like we just talked about.
Ruger sought out to remedy much of these problems with the LCP II. Did they succeed? Let’s find out by comparing it to the original LCP.
BATTLE OF THE RUGER .380S: LCP VS. LCP II
The original Ruger LCP has been perhaps the most well-known and popular .380 pocket pistol since it was first introduced in 2008. Nonetheless, it still suffers from many of the issues that we just talked about in the previous section: the trigger pull is awful, they are difficult to shoot, it can be difficult to get a good grip on the pistol for some shooters, and the slide won’t even lock back on the last round fired.
Ruger listened to the criticism, which resulted in the birth of the LCP II. While the LCP II is still a small pocket pistol, Ruger made a number of improvements to it.
The biggest improvement, by far, is the trigger pull. The trigger pull on the LCP II most closely resembles the trigger on larger striker fired polymer pistols such as the Glock. It is considerably lighter and smoother than the original LCP and other comparable .380 pistols, and it also features the Glock-style bladed safety that must first be depressed in order for the trigger to be pulled.
Overall, the trigger on the LCP II makes it infinitely easier to shoot than the original LCP. Ruger markets the trigger as having a six pound pull. The reason the trigger pull is lighter is because it is a SA trigger versus the DA trigger on the original LCP.
The LCP II also features forward and rear serrations on the slide, whereas the original LCP only featured serrations on the rear. The serrations on the LCP are also wider in order to get a better grip in slippery conditions when racking the slide.
The trigger guard on the LCP has also been enlarged in order to accommodate a gloved finger without risking pulling the trigger.
The grip is also slightly enlarged in order to get a better grip, with an improved stippling job as well to better accommodate wet or slippery conditions.
All of these features together, the improved trigger, the enhanced serrations, the stippling on the grip, and the slightly wider grip size all combine to make the LCP II a better handgun to shoot than the original LCP.
Yes, the LCP II is still a .380 pocket pistol and as a result is still snappy. It’s not a range gun, and should not be treated as such.
Yet one more advantage for the LCP II is the fact that the slide locks back on the final round fired to signal you are empty. When you insert a fresh magazine, it will be easier to rack the slide this way as well. In contrast to this, the original LCP did not lock back on the final round.
While the LCP II will accept the same 6 round magazines as the original LCP, it also will not slide lock on the last round with those magazines because they were not designed to do so. Therefore, if you want the slide to lock back, you need to use the magazines that were made specifically for the LCP II.
One thing that was not improved over the original LCP, however, is the sights. The sights on the LCP II are built into the top of the slide like its predecessor. Both the front and rear sights are black which can make it difficult to see them if you are aiming against a dark background.
USES FOR THE RUGER LCP II
There are two primary uses for the LCP II: concealed carry and/or as a back-up pistol.
Ruger sells the LCP II with a neoprene pocket holster (which has the Ruger logo on it), and it actually works quite well. It covers the trigger guard of the pistol and has a hook and sticky material to stay secure in your pocket so it is easy to draw the pistol from your pocket without bringing the holster with it.
That being said, the LCP II can also be carried IWB or in an ankle holster just as easily as it could be carried in a pocket. But if carry options are limited to just a pocket carry for you (i.e. you have to wear shorts with a tucked in shirt), the LCP II will be a great option.
As a back-up weapon to a larger pistol, the LCP II would also be a great choice as it has a very similar manual of arms to larger pistols such as Glocks while also being small enough to easily conceal carry as we have just seen.
LCP II SPECIFICATIONS
Here are some basic facts for the Ruger LCP II:
Caliber: .380 ACP
Capacity: 6+1
Weight: 10.6 ounces
Length: 5.17 inches
Width: .91 inches
Frame: Glass Filled Nylon
Barrel Length: 2.75 Inches
Barrel Material: Alloy Steel
Trigger Pull: 6 pounds
Sights: Integral
Finish: Blued
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Ruger LCP II simply represents the beginning of the evolution of the .380 pocket pistol. Ruger has proven that you don’t need to have an arduous and gritty trigger pull on a .380 auto and it’s likely that more manufacturers will now follow their lead.
With a much lighter trigger, enhanced slide serrations, wider grip, impressive stippling job, and the ability to slide lock on the last round, the LCP II is a definitive improvement over other comparable .380 pocket guns.
This article by Alex Joseph originally appeared at Gun News Daily in 2019.
Image: Ruger.
TNI Staff
Security,
The Navy’s carrier air wings would have greatly benefited from an A-12-like capability had the program survived.Here's What You Need To Remember: Though it was not immediately apparent at the time, with the cancellation of the A-12 program and the retirement of the A-6E, the U.S. Navy gave up its long-range strike capability in favor of an air wing that focused on sortie generation. While that was not a problem in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, with Russia resurgent and the emergence of China as a great power challenger, it is a serious issue for the viability of the carrier fleet.
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During the closing stages of the Cold War, the United States Navy was developing a new long-range stealth bomber that could strike at even the most heavily defended targets from the deck of an aircraft carrier. But the ill-fated program was cancelled; leaving a gap in naval aviation capability that has not been filled to this day.
Called the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics A-12 Avenger II—a product of the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program—the new bomber would have replaced the long-serving Grumman A-6E Intruder. However, as the Soviet threat evaporated, then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney cancelled the A-12 program on January 7, 1991, due to massive cost and schedule overruns as well as severe technical problems. But while the stealthy A-12 had its problems, the bomber’s demise led the Navy to today’s problem: A carrier air wing that does not have the range or penetrating strike capability to defeat advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
While the Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighter will finally bring X-band stealth technology onboard the carrier and the forthcoming MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueling tanker will help to extend the range of the existing air wing, those aircraft do not make up for the lack of a heavy hitting long-range bomber platform that can strike deep into the heart of enemy territory. Even with the F-35C and MQ-25, the Navy’s carrier air wings would not be able to strike at Chinese targets in the Western Pacific without putting the carrier at considerable risk. Beijing is able to threaten U.S. Navy carriers with anti-ship ballistic missiles such the DF-21D and the DF-26— the later of which has a range of roughly 2000 nautical miles—by forcing those vessels to operate further out at sea.
The Navy had envisioned the need for a carrier-based penetrating strike aircraft with extended ranges during the 1980s given rapidly advancing Soviet capabilities. Indeed, as former Center for a New American Security scholar Jerry Hendrix, a retired naval aviator, noted, the initial requirements for the A-12 called for an aircraft with a 1,700 nautical mile combat radius and an internal payload of 6,000lbs with a radar cross section comparable to the Northrop B-2 Spirit strategic bomber.
Had the A-12 program panned out, the Navy would still have a potent long-range carrier-based penetrating strike capability that would have been superior to anything currently envisioned. However, technical problems and requirements changes—all of which negatively impacted strike capability—whittled the A-12’s unrefueled combat radius down to 1,000 nautical miles and eventually down to 785 nautical miles. Eventually, as technical problems and program snafus mounted—largely due to “criminal” program management—Cheney was forced to cancel the entire program.
Though it was not immediately apparent at the time, with the cancellation of the A-12 program and the retirement of the A-6E, the U.S. Navy gave up its long-range strike capability in favor of an air wing that focused on sortie generation. While that was not a problem in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, with Russia resurgent and the emergence of China as a great power challenger, it is a serious issue for the viability of the carrier fleet. The Navy’s carrier air wings would have greatly benefited from an A-12-like capability had the program survived.
Analysts have proposed solutions such as a long-range stealthy unmanned strike aircraft as a solution to the Navy’s long-range penetrating strike gap, however, there are problems with that solution. Current Pentagon policy prohibits autonomous weapons from making the decision to take a human life on its own volition, which means that human operators have to be in the loop even when the aircraft is deep inside enemy territory. However, adversaries such as Russia and China will attack the vulnerable data-links that control such an unmanned aircraft through electronic attacks, cyber-warfare or a combination of methods. Drones have been hacked before—by insurgents, no less—thus positive control cannot be guaranteed.
Human pilots, however, cannot be hacked and can make on-the-spot judgments to engage or change targets etc. without the need to home phone—so to speak. Thus, a modern incarnation of a manned carrier-based long-range penetrating strike aircraft might be a solution to the Navy’s range problem. Modern materials, sensor and propulsion technology—particularly advanced adaptive-cycle engines that are currently in development—would solve most of the technical challenges that stymied the A-12 program.
Given that advanced adaptive cycle engines which are currently in development promise to reduce fuel burn by more than 35 percent, a new carrier-based bomber should be able to meet a 1100 nautical mile combat radius requirement even given the size constraints of carrier aircraft. Thus, the Navy should consider the development of a next-generation carrier-based long-range penetrating strike aircraft. Like the original ATA, which was also slated to replace the Boeing F-15E, a modern incarnation of such a warplane could also replace the Strike Eagle while supplementing the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35C on the carrier flight deck. It will not be cheap, but given that President Donald Trump has signaled his intent to invest heavily in the nation’s defense, it is an option that the Navy should consider.
This article first appeared several years ago.
Image: Flickr.
Peter Suciu
History, Europe
Did it work?After the so-called “miracle of Dunkirk,” in which the British military were able to successfully evacuate the majority of the British Expeditionary Force, along with a large number of French troops, after France fell to the Germans in late May and early June 1940, the British government was presented with a serious problem.
Much of its heavy equipment and even vast quantities of small arms had been left on the continent. While the British Army still was producing its Bren Gun, it simply needed weapons that could provide some added firepower. To solve that problem the British Army rushed into development the Sten Gun, the simple weapon that cost just $10 to produce. In addition, the United States also supplied some quantities of its Thompson submachine gun—but there remained a great demand for more weapons.
At the same time the Royal Air Force (RAF) determined that a submachine gun would be necessary for the defense of its airfields—yet instead of following the British Army’s lead with the Sten Gun, it opted to create a direct copy of the German MP28/II submachine gun, an updated version of the World War I era MP18.
The result was the Lanchester; a 9mm, blowback submachine gun that fired from an open bolt and which proved to be far more rugged and reliable than the Sten Gun even if it was heavier and a bit more costly to produce.
The project to develop this weapon was headed up by George Herbert Lanchester, an English engineer who ran the Lanchester Motor Company before selling his family’s company to BSA. After the outbreak of World War II, George Lanchester went to work at the Sterling Armaments Company, which subsequently produced the copy of the German machine pistol. So while named for Lanchester, he didn’t technically design the firearm—but copied a proven design and one that was actually fairly simple to produce.
The MP28/II was itself little more than an update of the MP18, the first widely employed submachine gun, which had been used to much success by German “storm troopers” at the end of the First World War.
What is notable is that the MP28 was produced by the German firm Haenel under the direct supervision of Hugo Schmeisser, and it served as inspiration for the Finnish Suomi Model 31—which itself served to influence the PPSh-41. In this way the British Lanchester and Soviet PPSh-41 were loosely related through the MP28.
However, while the Suomi and PPSh-41 improved upon the MP18/28, the Lanchester was still just an outright copy to the point that the British weapon could use the magazine and even the bolt assembly from the German gun. Where the German weapon essentially used a Mauser rifle stock, the British Lanchester utilized the wood butt and stock that were designed for the Lee-Enfield No. 1 Mk III rifle. The only notable improvements were that the Lanchester featured a brass magazine well, which made it an even more rugged firearm. It also featured a bayonet mount—a feature lacking in most other submachine guns of the era as well as the MP28. The brass well along with a brass butt plate were also employed as the metal was impervious to corrosion from saltwater—which became important in the Royal Navy’s decision to adopt the weapon over the Sten Gun.
The Lanchester measured 2-feet, 10-inches in length and weighed 12 pounds loaded. It was chambered for the German-designed 9x19mm Parabellum round, which of course was used in the MP18/28. It could be fitted with a 50-round magazine, but was also compatible with the Sten Gun’s 32-round magazine. The Lanchester featured a blowback action and fired from an open bolt with a rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute, and an effective range of 150 meters.
As with the MP18/28 the metal hardware could be swung open for cleaning, making it easy to field strip as well. This proved highly important as many RAF airmen and Royal Navy sailors hadn’t been as accustomed to cleaning and servicing small arms as their Army counterparts.
The Lanchester was produced in two versions, and this has led to some confusion. The two versions included the “Mk 1” and the “Mk 1*,” whereby the latter was a simplified version of the former and omitted the fire mode selector and with simplified rear sights. Only a true “Mk 1” was capable of semi-automatic and full-automatic fire, but many of those Lanchesters were modified to the Mk 1* version.
In total, less than 100,000 Lanchesters were reportedly produced during the war with Sterling being the main producer of nearly 75,000 units. Other firms, including Greener and Boss each also produced far lower numbers, with the former producing approximately 17,000 while the latter produced less than 4,000 in total. By contrast millions of Sten Guns were produced, which is why that firearm is remembered (for good and bad), while the Lanchester is largely forgotten.
The biggest negative, apart from its weight, was that not only did it cost more—the Sten cost around £2 ($10) per unit while the Lanchester cost around £14—but the latter weapon required a far more skilled craftsman and used more materials, including all-important brass.
Yet, the Lanchester, despite being based on an old design, was rugged and reliable. While the Sten Gun was retired soon after the war, the Lanchester remained in service with the Royal Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy and other Commonwealth navies at least into the late 1960s. It was used by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines during the Malayan Emergency (1947-60) while the British Army actually used the Lanchester in limited numbers in the 1952-60 Mau-Mau uprising in East Africa.
The weapon was finally withdrawn from Royal Navy service in the 1970s, highlighting not only the British ingenuity but also the longevity of the MP18/28.
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.
Image: Reuters
Gun News Daily
Security, World
One of the best?Key Point: These full size .22 pack a punch. Here's why you should consider them.
If there’s one thing that all .22 semi-automatic pistols seem to share in common, it’s that they all hold ten rounds of ammunition in the magazine.
That’s by no means a bad thing, but there’s a lot of people who have strongly desired to own a .22 pistol with an ammunition capacity equivalent to a full size, duty 9mm pistol (which commonly hold fifteen to eighteen rounds in the magazine).
Taurus filled this void in the market by recently releasing the Taurus TX-22 pistol. This is a full-size pistol that holds 16 rounds in the magazine plus an additional round in the chamber. In addition, Taurus specifically designed the TX-22 to have the look and feel of a duty pistol, in contrast to many other rimfire pistols that often have a weaker design.
The TX-22 is also striker fired, with a crisp five pound trigger and suppressor ready right out of the box, coming with a thread suppressor adapter. It also features Taurus’ trademark stippling on the grip for superior ergonomics, and a lightweight aluminum slide that ensures superior reliability as the lighter .22 rounds will have less difficulty in cycling the slide.
Overall, if you are looking for a full size .22 pistol that has the look and feel of a true duty pistol, the TX-22 will be the gun you’ve been looking for.
This article by Will Ellis originally appeared at Gun News Daily in 2019.
Image: Taurus.
Warfare History Network
History, Americas
Here's how it all went wrong for him.Confederate President Jefferson Davis considered his old West Point classmate Albert Sidney Johnston “the greatest soldier, the ablest man, civil or military, Confederate or Union, then living,” and it is safe to say that no other general in either army began the Civil War with a more glittering—or fleeting—reputation.
High Expectations
The towering expectations surrounding Johnston’s Civil War service began even before he joined his first command. As a transplanted Texan, Johnston chose to stick by his adopted state when it seceded in February 1861. Resigning his post as commanding general of the Department of the Pacific two months later, Johnston headed east to meet with Davis in Richmond, Va. Breathless news reports of Johnston’s progress followed him every step of the way, and he was greeted as a hero before he ever set foot in the capital.
Inevitably, perhaps, Johnston could not meet the sky-high expectations. Amid all the hoopla, one salient fact was overlooked—Johnston had never commanded an army of his own. To make matters worse, he was given an assignment that even the most experienced of generals would have found daunting. With less than 50,000 troops at his disposal, Johnston was tasked with defending a 500-mile-long border stretching from eastern Kentucky to western Missouri—an area equal in size to western Europe. Complicating his task was the fact that three major rivers wound their way through his defenses, at the mercy of industrious Union gunboats.
It was sure-fire recipe for disaster, and Johnston was not long in adding to his own cup of woe by failing to adequately safeguard the Confederate strongpoints at Forts Henry and Donelson. In February 1862, Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant easily captured both forts, along with 12,000 Confederate troops. That feat set Grant on the way to becoming the North’s leading commander, and put two large dints in Johnston’s previously spotless suit of armor. Still, his old friend Davis continued to support him. Responding to one Confederate congressman’s complaint that Johnston was “no general,” the president tartly replied, “If Sidney Johnston is not a general, the Confederacy has none to give you.” He angrily refused to remove Johnston from command.
“We Must Use the Bayonet”
Besides, Johnston had a plan for recovering both his reputation and the territory he had lost. Massing his army at Corinth, Miss., he organized a counterattack on Grant’s Union forces encamped around Shiloh Church in southwest Tennessee. On the morning of April 6, 1862, Johnston prepared to lead his army into battle. Picking up a tin cup, he sportively clinked his men’s bayonets. “These will do the work,” he assured them. “We must use the bayonet.” He added, for whatever it was worth, “I will lead you.” Earlier, he had rejected worries that the Union forces were too numerous to attack. “I will fight them if they were a million,” he asserted.
As it was, he did not fight them for long. Sitting astride his horse, Johnston suddenly reeled in the saddle and fell into the arms of Tennessee Governor Isham Harris–on hand that day as a civilian aide. “General, are you hurt?” cried Harris. “Yes, and I fear seriously,” Johnston replied.
Unnoticed in the heat of battle, Johnston had been struck behind the right knee by a Union bullet. Ignoring the wound, the general continued directing the battle while his boot filled with blood. The bullet had severed his femoral artery, and Johnston bled to death in a matter of minutes.
Ulysses S. Grant later rendered his own verdict on his slain opponent. “I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or his ability,” Grant wrote in his Personal Memoirs. “But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated.” It was a verdict that Johnston did not live long enough to appeal.
This article originally appeared on the Warfare History Network.
Image: Wikimedia
Kris Osborn
Security,
The notion of a disaggregated, yet interwoven attack force, less vulnerable to enemy fire, will be launched to hit “multiple landing points” to exploit enemy defenses.Here's What You Need To Remember: While this emerging Navy strategy is, of course, intended to implement a far more effective attack strategy, it is also, by design, intended to save more lives when launching dangerous assaults into heavily-defended enemy areas.
The future of amphibious attack may consist of thousands of disaggregated manned and unmanned surveillance boats, armor-carrying connectors, minesweepers and small attack vessels operating in tandem as the Navy and Marine Corps refine a new strategic approach and continue their pivot toward a new, great-power threat environment.
The concept is to configure a dispersed, yet “networked” fleet of next-generation connectors and other smaller boats launched from big-deck amphib “mother ships.” The larger host ships are intended to operate in a command and control capacity while bringing sensors, long-range fires and 5th-generation air support to the fight.
“We envision fleets of smaller, multi-mission vessels, operating with surface warfare leadership. People talk about a 355-ship Navy, how about a 35,000-ship Navy?,” Maj. Gen. David Coffman, Director of Naval Expeditionary Warfare, told an audience at the Surface Naval Association Symposium.
Coffman explained it as a “family of combatant craft, manned and unmanned, integrated in a distributed maritime operation.”
Since potential adversaries now have longer-range weapons, better sensors, targeting technologies and computers with faster processing speeds, amphibious forces approaching the shore may need to disperse in order to make it harder for enemy forces to target them. Therefore, the notion of a disaggregated, yet interwoven attack force, less vulnerable to enemy fire, will be launched to hit “multiple landing points” to exploit enemy defenses.
“This does not mean we give up the bigs, it means we use them more effectively. They are a big part of our ability to project combat power,” Coffman explained.
New ships, such as future Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCAC), Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV), Amphibious Combat Vehicles, ship-launched undersea drones and even newly up-gunned PC boats, are expected to empower the emerging strategy to introduce a new, more effective and lethal “over-the-horizon ship-to-shore” attack ability.
Future LCAC replacements, such as the now-under-construction Textron-built Ship-to-Shore Connectors, are expected to figure prominently in these anticipated missions. They introduce an unprecedented ability to transport 70-ton Abrams tanks to war and bring an integrated suite of new technologies to amphibious attack missions.
Execution of this new strategy is, depending upon the threat, also reliant upon 5th-generation aircraft, Coffman said; the Corp F-35B, now operational as part of Marine Corps Air Ground Task Forces aboard the USS Wasp and USS Essex, is intended to provide close-air support to advancing attacks, use its sensors to perform forward reconnaissance and launch strikes itself. The success of an amphibious attack needs, or even requires, air supremacy. Extending this logic, an F-35 would be positioned to address enemy air-to-air and airborne air-to-surface threats such as drones, fighter jets or even incoming anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles. The idea would be to use the F-35 in tandem with surveillance drones and other nodes to find and destroy land-based enemy defenses, clearing the way for a land assault.
The entire strategic and conceptual shift is also informed by an increased “sea-basing” focus. Smaller multi-mission vessels, according to this emerging strategy, will be fortified by larger amphibs operating as sovereign entities at safer distances. Coffman said these ships would operate as “seaports, hospitals, logistics warehouses and sea-bases for maneuver forces.”
A 2014 paper from the Marine Corps Association, the professional journal of the US Marine Corps, points to sea-basing as a foundation upon which the Navy will shift away from traditional amphibious warfare.
“Seabased operations enable Marines to conduct highly mobile, specialized, small unit, amphibious landings by stealth from over the horizon at multiple undefended locations of our own choosing,” the paper writes.
In effect, future “ship-to-shore” amphibious attacks will look nothing like the more linear, aggregated Iwo Jima assault. A Naval War College essay on this topic both predicts and reinforces Coffman’s thinking.
“The basic requirements of amphibious assault, long held to be vital to success, may no longer be attainable. Unlike the Pacific landings of World War II amphibious objective areas could prove impossible to isolate,” the paper, called “Blitzkrieg From the Sea: Maneuver Warfare and Amphibious Operations,” states. (Richard Moore, 1983)
The essay, written in the 80s during the height of the Cold War, seems to anticipate future threats from major-power adversaries. Interestingly, drawing from some elements of a Cold War mentality, the essay foreshadows current “great-power” competition strategy for the Navy as it transitions from more than a decade of counterinsurgency to a new threat environment. In fact, when discussing its now-underway “distributed lethality” strategy, Navy leaders often refer to this need to return its focus upon heavily fortified littoral defenses and open, blue-water warfare against a near-peer adversary - as having some roots in the Cold War era.
The Naval War College essay also seems to anticipate modern thinking in that it cites LCACs as fundamental to amphibious warfare, writing that LCACs can “land at several points along an enemy coastline, seeking out enemy weaknesses and shifting forces.”
LCACs can access over 70-percent of the shoreline across the world, something the new SSCs will be able to do as well. Designed with over-the-horizon high-speed and maneuverability, LCACs are able to travel long distances and land on rocky terrain and drive up onto the shore. Referring to a more dispersed or disaggregated amphibious attack emphasis, the Naval War College essay describes modern attack through the lens of finding “surface gaps” to exploit as a way to bypass or avoid “centers of resistance.”
Dispersed approaches, using air-ground coordination and forward positioned surveillance nodes, can increasingly use synchronized assault tactics, pinpointing advantageous areas of attack. Not only can this, as the essay indicates, exploit enemy weakness, but it also brings the advantage of avoiding more condensed or closely-configured approaches far more vulnerable to long-range enemy sensors and weapons. Having an SSC, which can bring a heavier load of land-attack firepower, weapons and Marines, helps enable this identified need to bring assault forces across a wide-range of attack locations. None of this, while intended to destroy technologically sophisticated enemies, removes major risks; Russian and Chinese weapons, including emerging 5th-generation fighters, DF-26 anti-ship missiles claimed to reach 900-miles and rapidly-emerging weapons such as drones, lasers and railguns are a variety of systems of concern.
New Amphibious Attack Platforms
The effort to integrate large numbers of multi-mission smaller craft, naturally hinges upon the continued development of vessels enabled by newer advanced technologies. Textron's upgraded Ship-to-Shore Craft includes lighter-weight composite materials, increased payload capacity, modernized engines and computer-automated controls. Also, SSC’s new Rolls Royce engines have more horsepower and specialized aluminum to help prevent corrosion. Textron engineers also say the SSC is built with digital flight controls and computer automation to replace the traditional yoke and pedals used by current connectors. As a result, on-board computers will quickly calculate relevant details such as wind speed and navigational information, according to Textron information.
The Navy’s 72 existing LCACs, in service since the 80s, can only transport up to 60-tons, reach speeds of 36-knots and travel ranges up to 200 nautical miles from amphibious vehicles. The first several SSCs, which have been built and launched on the water, bring a new level of computer networking, combat-power transport technology and emerging elements of advanced maritime propulsion systems. The new SSC's have also moved to a lower frequency for ship electronics, moving from 400 Hertz down to 60 Hertz in order to better synchronize ship systems with Navy common standards. Along with these properties, the new craft uses hardware footprint reducing advances to lower the number of gear boxes from eight to two.
As part of this overall attack apparatus, the Corps is preparing to deploy new BAE-built Amphibious Combat Vehicles by 2021. By integrating a new, more powerful engine, large weapons and digitized C4ISR systems, the ACV is expected to bring new mechanized firepower to amphibious assaults - when compared to the existing AAV - Amphibious Assault Vehicle. BAE is now beginning Low-Rate Initial Production as part of a Marine Corps plan to build hundreds of the new vehicles. Unlike existing tracked AAVs, ACVs are eight-wheeled vehicles engineered for greater speed, maneuverability and survivability. By removing the need for torsion bars, a wheeled-vehicle such as the ACV can build a v-shaped hull for additional protection, BAE Systems developers say. "The Marine Corps went from tracked to wheeled because of advances in automotive technology," said John Swift, Director of Amphibious Warfare.
These vehicles, if upgraded with advanced AI-enabled networking and computer technologies, could help identify threats, protect SSCs and of course bring needed firepower to amphibious landings. BAE and the Corps are now preparing to fire weapons at the new vehicle until the live-fire attacks achieve "total destruction," as a way to prepare the vehicle for combat, Swift said.
Mine Threat:
Coffman also explained that he envisions unmanned, yet networked LCACs as something which, among other things, can limit risk to Marines from a range of enemy attacks such as deep-water mines.
“We have significant gaps in our capability to defeat 100,000 Russian and Chinese mines which will not be laid in shallow water,” Coffman said. When accompanied by a fleet of small attack and reconnaissance vessels, SSCs will operate with more protection from mines and other enemy threats.
While this emerging Navy strategy is, of course, intended to implement a far more effective attack strategy, it is also, by design, intended to save more lives when launching dangerous assaults into heavily-defended enemy areas.
“Amphibious landings are marked by extremely high costs and heavy casualties, and are considered among the riskiest and least desirable operations to conduct,” the Marine Corps Association essay maintains.
Kris Osborn is a Senior Fellow at The Lexington Institute. This piece was first featured in January 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
Image: Reuters
William R. Hawkins
Security, Asia
Discussion has flourished about what kind of "new" world will emerge after the coronavirus pandemic recedes. There is nothing new about hoping a global crisis will generate peace and cooperation, and nothing new about how it will turn out. The world will go on as before because nothing has changed geopolitically in the last few months other than major trends have accelerated. A quick tour around the Indo-Pacific region shows continued tension and conflict.Discussion has flourished about what kind of "new" world will emerge after the coronavirus pandemic recedes. There is nothing new about hoping a global crisis will generate peace and cooperation, and nothing new about how it will turn out. The world will go on as before because nothing has changed geopolitically in the last few months other than major trends have accelerated. A quick tour around the Indo-Pacific region shows continued tension and conflict.
On May 8, a gun battle erupted when Chinese troops crossed the border into Muguthang Valley in Sikkim province, a long-disputed region under Indian control but which Beijing claims is being illegally occupied. Tensions have been rising since January. In April, a Chinese “surveillance” ship rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in a disputed area of the South China Sea. Both countries claim sovereignty over what Hanoi calls the Hoang Sa archipelago and Beijing calls the Paracel islands. Besides sitting across vital shipping lanes, the islands also mean access to potentially rich undersea energy and mineral resources. Beijing has claimed Sikkim and the entire South China Sea as its territory based on the long past historical domination of these areas by Imperial China.
On May 4, the Ministry of National Defense confirmed that China will establish an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, to match the one they have in the East China Sea where they have disputes with Japan. An ADIZ requires all aircraft to identify themselves, the point of which is to acknowledge the official expansion of Chinese airspace over the expanded maritime domain it claims.
The United States, along with other maritime powers including Japan, India, the United Kingdom, and France have conducted "freedom of navigation" operations to demonstrate their rejection of Beijing's territorial claims. On April 28, the People’s Liberation Army boasted it had “expelled a US warship that trespassed into Chinese territorial waters off the Xisha Islands in the South China Sea.” The story in Global Times, the media outlet of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, featured a photo of a Chinese warship firing a missile, but no shots were fired in the confrontation. By its own accounts, all the PLA did was “organize naval and aerial forces to follow the U.S. guided missile destroyer USS Barry.” They warned it to leave the area and claimed it had been expelled when all it did was complete its transit through the area. A bold PLA claim for propaganda purposes that further raised tensions. As the Global Times story asserted, “US warships and aircraft have been frequently operating in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan Strait recently. Chinese troops will resolutely fulfill their duty, safeguard national sovereignty and security as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea.” In Beijing’s view, it is the United States and its allies who are provoking conflict by upholding international law.
The Taiwan Strait deserves mention as tensions are mounting there in the wake of the re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen. She leads the Democratic Progressive Party which is based on Taiwanese nationalism. The DPP has been growing in strength as younger generations have come to identify themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese. Taiwan has been governed from Beijing for only four years (1945 to 1949) out of the last 125. A May 11 article in the South China Morning Post claimed that Beijing was trying to tap down rising “nationalist fervor” on Chinese social media calling for an invasion of Taiwan. The article also noted, “recently a number of commentators and retired military commanders have called for Beijing to retake control of the island….Some former military leaders have argued that the United States – which is bound by law to help the Taiwanese government defend itself – is presently unable to do so because all four of its aircraft carriers in the Pacific have been affected by the Covid-19 outbreak.” After the U.S. aircraft carriers Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan had to return to port to handle flu cases among their crews, China sent its carrier Liaoning with its escorts through the “first island chain” into the Pacific to demonstrate it was the local superpower. The United States responded by bringing in reinforcements and stepping up its operating tempo to counter any perception of weakness.
A previous SCMP article cited Chinese strategists as fearing an invasion of the democratic island would be too costly and that Beijing will have to mobilize greater strength to do so. However, a lengthy essay published on May 12 by the PLA reported “The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has carried out combat readiness patrols in the Taiwan Strait region on many occasions…since February this year” and that its troops “are determined and capable of thwarting all ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities.” The article carried a direct threat to America at its conclusion, stating in bold type. “The Taiwan question is China's core interest and the bottom line of China that cannot be challenged” and that if the United States “repeatedly probes and even breaks through China's bottom line, it will eventually bring fire to itself.” President Xi Jinping is adamant that Taiwan “must and will” be absorbed into the mainland and during his tenure in office if possible.
Further north, Japan has released its 2020 East Asian Strategic Review. The report proclaims a "free and open Indo-Pacific" that goes beyond the Japan-U.S. alliance to expand military cooperation with South Korea, Australia, India, and within ASEAN. It has already signed “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements” with the armed forces of Australia, the UK, Canada, and France. Another is pending with India. It also uses military aid to build ties within Southeast Asia. These efforts are all meant to build a coalition to contain a China that is threatening islands that form a strategic link between Tokyo and Taipei.
The carrier Ronald Reagan, which is based in Japan, is now back at sea. And to fill in the gap while the carrier Theodore Roosevelt recovers in Guam, the amphibious assault carrier America (which now embarks F-35B fighters) and the guided missile cruiser Bunker Hill have been operating off the coast of Malaysia near an area in dispute between Indonesia and China, and also showing the flag off Vietnam. China’s aggression in Southeast Asia is not confined to the sea. Beijing has built a series of dams at the headwaters of the Mekong River to produce electricity for southern China. But these dams also give Beijing leverage over Southeast Asian lands which depend on the Mekong for rice irrigation and fishing. Food security is already jeopardized by drought and has been further endangered by erratic water flows from the Chinese dams.
China has reacted strongly to an Australian demand for an investigation into the origin of the coronavirus outbreak. Beijing is threatening trade with Canberra. The Global Times stated on May 13 how China views commerce as a part of foreign policy, “When the world enters the buyer's market, China has the right to select trading partners that can maximize its interest.”
The United States has increased its backing for those resisting Chinese aggression since “the pivot” from the Middle East to the Pacific Rim instituted by the Obama administration. President Barack Obama was, however, reluctant to strike at the economic roots of Beijing’s rise. President Donald Trump has focused on international economics, targeting the outsourcing of American jobs and production capacity to China and Beijing’s theft of intellectual property. He has based his case on national security grounds. The pandemic has highlighted to the American public the dangerous dependency the United States has fallen into with China for a variety of strategic goods starting with medicine and including electronics, steel, auto parts and a host of critical supply chains. Efforts to decouple from China in key areas are underway led by the State and Commerce departments.
It is hoped that many of these industries can be brought back to America but even if they are merely diverted to trading partners who are allies or otherwise aligned with the United States, the gain to security will be substantial. New Delhi is putting itself forward, sending out invitations to 1,000 American firms doing business in China asking them to shift operations to India. Trump has been actively courting Prime Minister Narendra Modi on a variety of high-tech projects and arms sales. India has been designated a Major Defense Partner of the United States.
The Japanese government is also offering incentives to its firms to shift critical production out of China. Business firms may resist efforts to put national security ahead of private profits. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce still says its “policy and advocacy efforts are guided by the belief that commercial engagement and the expansion of trade and investment ties between the United States and China benefit both countries and their business communities.” However, just as the pandemic has postponed the Chamber’s eleventh China Business Conference, the international situation will require commerce to follow the flag and adjust to a world that will operate on the basis of great power competition for the foreseeable future.
William R. Hawkins is a consultant specializing in international economic and national security issues. He is a former Republican staff member on the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Image: Reuters.
Charlie Gao
Security,
An amazing export success.Here's What You Need To Remember: Brazilian experts stress that the FAB’s capability gap with neighboring air forces was only narrowed by the upgrade and that the F-5EM still remains an outclassed fighter in modern air combat due to its shortcomings and old-school design. Regardless, it was the best the FAB could do on a limited budget and the resulting craft was quite good for the money spent.
The F-5E “Tiger” is one of U.S. aerospace industry’s largest export successes. Designed as a budget lightweight fighter, the F-5E is still operated by many nations around the world despite the availability of more modern fighters.
Its continued service is enabled by miniaturization of electronics, which allows for more powerful radars and more systems to be integrated into the same spaces as the original system. This approach is exemplified by the F-5EM operated by Brazil, one of the most advanced variants of the F-5E flying today.
Brazil first acquired F-5Es in 1974 after comparing it to rival NATO light fighters like the Harrier, Jaguar, Fiat G.91 and A-4 Skyhawk. Forty-two units were purchased originally, followed by twenty-six more in the 1980s.
These aircraft served in without much modification until CRUZEX I aerial exercise in 2002. The exercise simulated conflict between the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) and a French Armee de l’Air force equipped with Mirage 2000s with E-3 Sentry AWACS support. The results were abysmal, with France expected to take air superiority in a real conflict despite some good simulated kills by FAB Mirage IIIs.
This sparked a significant push to modernize the FAB’s capability to defend Brazil’s airspace. Modernization of the Mirage III was explored but deemed to be cost ineffective. The F-5E showed much more promise.
In the 1990s, Chile, facing a similar need to modernize, created their own variant, the Tiger III Plus with assistance from Israel Aircraft Industries. A similar program with newer technology could be done with the FAB’s F-5Es.
The program began in the 2000s when a contract was awarded to the Brazilian firm Embraer to modernize forty-six F-5Es with European and Israeli technology. The key aspect of the modernization was to “extend” the legs of the F-5E from being a short-range “point defense” fighter to something that could cover more ground over Brazil’s rather large borders.
To this end, the radar was upgraded to the SELEX Grifo-F, which involved lengthening the nose cone of the aircraft to account for the larger radar antenna. But while the new radar was better, the F-5EM was designed with a secure data link to connect to FAB E-99 AWACS aircraft and ground radars, which were envisioned to vector the F-5s onto a target.
The role of the data link in FAB doctrine is significant. In addition to the dominance displayed by the French Mirages working with E-3s during CRUZEX, the FAB always favored vectoring their fighters from more powerful radars due to poor experience with the original F-5E radar. During a night intercept of a British Vulcan bomber in 1982, the F-5E’s onboard radar was unable to effectively search for the massive aircraft, the fighters were reliant on ground radar.
To take advantage of the additional range given by the data link and radar systems, the Israeli Derby active-radar medium-range air-to-air missile was integrated into the F-5EM. While lighter and shorter ranged than heavier missiles like the AMRAAM and R-27, the missile gave the FAB much-needed beyond-visual-range capability in air-to-air combat, the third nation after Chile and Venezuela to gain such capability.
Many other systems were added or upgraded on the F-5EM. In addition to the Derby, Israeli Python III short-range missiles were integrated. The Israeli DASH helmet mounted display was installed in the cockpit to cue those missiles, making the F-5EM a formidable close range fighter.
A radar-warning receiver, onboard oxygen generation system, hands-on throttle and stick, and INS/GPS navigation are all included. The addition of all these systems came at a cost though. The starboard M39A2 20mm cannon was removed to make space for electronics in the jet.
Finally to address the F-5E’s meager internal fuel capacity, provision for air-to-air refueling was added.
The F-5E modernization program continued through the 2000s and 2010s, with the final jet being delivered in 2013. Eleven additional F-5Es were acquired from the Jordanian Air Force in 2009 to increase the number of the type in FAB service.
The type is expected to serve on to 2025, with the integration of the new A-Darter beyond visual range air-to-air missile expected to happen soon. The new Gripen Es being acquired by the FAB are expected to supplement the shorter ranged F-5EMs.
Brazilian experts stress that the FAB’s capability gap with neighboring air forces was only narrowed by the upgrade and that the F-5EM still remains an outclassed fighter in modern air combat due to its shortcomings and old-school design. Regardless, it was the best the FAB could do on a limited budget and the resulting craft was quite good for the money spent.
Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This article first appeared earlier this year.
Image: Wikipedia.
Walter Olson
Politics, Americas
Coronavirus liability or civil liberties lawsuits?Last week in this space I noted that many businesses are faced with puzzling dilemmas as they try to reopen with social distancing without running afoul of the Americans with Disabilities Act. One issue I didn’t mention: if they require the wearing of face masks as a condition of entering the premises, they may run into some customers who claim to have non‐obvious disabilities which entitle them, as an accommodation under the ADA, not to have to wear a mask. Even if they strongly suspect such a customer of pulling a fast one, it may seem the less risky legal course just to back off, given that the law confers on business no right to demand medical documentation.
One issue I did mention last week is that the ADA creates legal risks should a business screen those who enter the premises for fever using some method such as a contact‐free temperature gun. (Amazon announced last month that it was checking more than 100,000 employees a day this way, and checks at store entrances are familiar in some Asian countries.) Two new articles make it clear that this is one of those situations where you can look forward to being sued if you do and sued if you don’t.
Consider first a Slate article arguing against legislation to protect businesses from lawsuits related to COVID-19. The gist of its argument is that we already have a litigation system under which “liability is not likely to present a huge problem” or pose “burdensome difficulties” for businesses that “take reasonable action to keep their customers safe.” Welcome news, and so simple too!
But now that you think of it, how do we identify in hindsight a business whose safety efforts have fallen short of what is reasonable? The Slate article has some ideas on that:
A business that might be considered to have properly reopened can still find itself liable to customers for failure at the level of implementation of whatever safety protocols are required. …. what if a reasonable business would do more, such as taking the temperature of each customer as they enter the business? (Even though that’s not being widely done in the United States right now, it’s an easy precaution to take — and can at least bring down the rate of transmission.)
In sum, then, if someone sues you claiming to have contracted the virus at your business establishment, and their lawyer’s main theory is that you should have been doing front‐door temperature checks, Slate is going to nod and say the system is working as it should.
Meanwhile, the New York Times reports that the venerable American Civil Liberties Union has issued a new report that is strenuously critical of temperature‐sensing technologies as a screen against contagion in public places, even when done by businesses on private property. (You may wonder how the ACLU came to see pushing back against private business practices as part of its mission — especially when it lets slide so much rights‐mangling activity by governments — but that’s another, and sadder, story.)
The ACLU report makes much of various facts that hardly anyone disputes — temperature sensors are far from ideally accurate, some people return “hot” results who do not have COVID-19 while others who do have it are not running a fever, and so forth. The argument for sensors has never been that they are perfect, but that by detecting at least some potentially contagious arrivals, they shift the odds and thus reduce overall spread of the disease in conjunction with de‐crowding, mask use, and other measures. The report concludes that temperature sensing should go forward only if public health authorities affirmatively call for its use, and it flags possible theories, from data privacy to disparate racial impact, by which lawyers might trip up unwary businesses that go forward with it absent such a mandate.
In its wisdom, the American legal system does not give you a way to avoid legal exposure, with all its costs and miseries — but at least it gives you some choice as to which set of lawyers you will have to face off against.
This article by Walter Olson first appeared in CATO on May 20, 2020.
Image: Reuters.
David Axe
Security,
The German air force will select its new fighter aircraft in early 2020.Here's What You Need To Remember: With Russian and Chinese air-defenses proliferating and improving in capability, more countries are considering acquisitions of SEAD aircraft. Beside Germany and Finland, Canada, India and Switzerland also are considering Super Hornet purchases. Boeing reportedly considers the EA-18G a viable add-on for each country.
Airbus is offering Germany a version of the Typhoon multi-role fighter aircraft that can perform the suppression of enemy air-defenses, or SEAD, mission.
The SEAD Typhoon would be a new variant of the twin-engine plane and would require extensive modification of the basic Typhoon design.
Germany currently operates a significant portion of the dedicated SEAD fleet in Europe. Forty of the Luftwaffe’s 93 Tornado fighter-bombers are electronic combat/reconnaissance, or ECR, variants. The Italian air force possesses 15 Tornado ECRs.
The German air force plans to replace all 85 Tornados with a new fighter starting in the 2020s. Just two designs are in the running for the multi-billion-dollar acquisition: the Typhoon and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet from American plane-maker Boeing.
Notably, Boeing already builds a SEAD version of the Super Hornet called the EA-18G Growler. The company reportedly is seeking permission from the U.S. State Department to export the Growler to Germany. The State Department in early 2019 cleared the company to offer the EA-18G to Finland.
The German air force will select its new fighter aircraft in early 2020, German minister of defense Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer announced in late September 2019.
The plane will replace the Luftwaffe’s Tornados and complement the service’s roughly 140 Typhoons. Berlin recently eliminated the Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter from the competition.
Defense News called the move “not altogether surprising.”
Berlin for some time has officially favored an upgraded version of the fourth-generation Eurofighter Typhoon — built by a consortium of Airbus, Leonardo and BAE Systems — as the Tornado replacement. The main argument is to keep European companies involved in building combat aircraft and, perhaps even more importantly, staying clear of disturbing Franco-German momentum in armaments cooperation.
In offering a SEAD version of the Typhoon, Airbus clearly anticipates that Germany will want to preserve its niche defense-suppression capability. Aside from Germany and Italy’s Tornado ECRs, the only dedicated SEAD aircraft in the NATO inventory are the roughly 150 EA-18Gs that Boeing is building for the U.S. Navy.
Australia also operates 11 EA-18Gs alongside 24 F/A-18E/Fs in a mixed fleet that Boeing sees as a model for other potential Super Hornet operators, including Finland and Germany.
Typically, a SEAD aircraft features a two-person crew, radar-detectors, radar-jamming pods and a radar-seeking missile of some type. The SEAD Typhoon is no exception.
“The ECR/SEAD configuration shown by Airbus comprises a pair of escort jammer pods on the underwing stations currently typically used to carry drop tanks, while three 1,000-liter tanks would be carried on the centerline and two inboard underwing pylons,” Jane’s reported.
“These three stations are currently 'dry,’ and would need to be plumbed to carry fuel tanks. The aircraft is also shown carrying the SPEAR-EW weapon recently showcased by [missile-maker] MBDA as a future SEAD weapons system, wingtip emitter-locator stations and both short- and long-range air-to-air missiles.”
“The ECR/SEAD Eurofighter would ‘almost certainly’ be a twin-seat aircraft with the rear cockpit devoted to operating the complex mission systems,” Jane’s added, citing an Airbus official.
With Russian and Chinese air-defenses proliferating and improving in capability, more countries are considering acquisitions of SEAD aircraft. Beside Germany and Finland, Canada, India and Switzerland also are considering Super Hornet purchases. Boeing reportedly considers the EA-18G a viable add-on for each country.
The U.S. Navy meanwhile wants to buy up to 48 more Growlers in order to boost, from five to as many as 11, the number of SEAD planes in each carrier air wing.
Giving the Typhoon a SEAD role helps the European fighter to compete with the F/A-18. Typhoon users including the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Austria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.
But there’s still one major capability the Typhoon design lacks. The German air force as part of its commitment to NATO must contribute tactical fighters to the alliance’s plans for “tactical” nuclear warfare. Under the NATO scheme, fighters from across the alliance would drop American nuclear bombs.
The Tornado is compatible with nukes but neither the F/A-18E/F nor the Typhoon can carry atomic weapons. German officials have asked Airbus and Boeing to explain how they would add nuclear capability to their fighters so that the Luftwaffe can continue to honor its atomic obligation to the trans-Atlantic alliance.
David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared last year.
Image: Wikipedia.
Ethen Kim Lieser
Technology,
In LCD and OLED, we have two of the basic TV panel displays on the market today. Each has its pros and cons in its underlying technology and some higher-end models can get quite expensive. So, where do we go from here? Why not take the best qualities of each panel type and create a new groundbreaking, modestly priced hybrid TV?In LCD and OLED, we have two of the basic TV panel displays on the market today. Each has its pros and cons in its underlying technology and some higher-end models can get quite expensive.
So, where do we go from here? Why not take the best qualities of each panel type and create a new groundbreaking, modestly priced hybrid TV?
It appears that Korean tech giant Samsung has already gotten a head start in pursuing this next-gen venture.
As the world’s biggest TV seller, Samsung has relied mostly on LCD, not OLED, for its panel displays. But news out of Korea has indicated that Samsung will halt the production of traditional LCD displays by the end of the year. Driven largely by a supply glut and falling demand, the company is now turning its full attention toward its fast-growing portfolio of TVs that utilize quantum dot technology.
All would be fine and well, but in recent years, Samsung has been stuck in an unusual position of having to look up at its Korean archrival LG, whose OLED offerings have become the darlings of the ultra-competitive TV market. Tests after tests have shown that LG’s OLED panels have better overall image quality, contrast ratios and off-angle viewing than LCD TVs that are enhanced by quantum dots.
These quantum dots are microscopic particles that when hit by light, emit a certain different colored light. The source of this light is the LED backlight, and that light must pass through more layers, such as the LCD layer, to produce the images on the screen. On the other hand, OLED TVs don’t need a separate backlight, as each pixel you see is a self-contained source of color and light.
By combining quantum dots and OLED, you could cull the best strengths of both technologies. In short, the panel design of such a QD-OLED hybrid would simplify the light conversion process—having OLED create blue light and then relying on quantum dots to convert some of the blue into the colors red and green. This could also finally put an end to those pesky issues of image retention and burn-in. Moreover, by using only one OLED color, it could theoretically save on manufacturing costs.
With its sights set squarely on the TV promised land, Samsung has committed $11 billion over the next five years on a new factory in Asan, South Chungcheong Province, that will focus chiefly on QD-OLED hybrids. The new Gen. 8.5 QD line is scheduled to start production in 2021 and will manufacture at least 30,000 units of QD display panels of 65 inches or larger.
The other new tech from Samsung and others is MicroLED, which boasts many of the same picture-quality strengths as the QD-OLED hybrid with no danger of burn-in.
Ethen Kim Lieser is a Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. He currently resides in Minneapolis.
Warfare History Network
History, Asia
The attack transport USS Goodhue endured a day of misery off the coast of Okinawa. Read on for more.More than 60 years ago, in April 1945, the war in Europe was winding down to its inevitable conclusion. Prospects for victory in the Pacific were looking brighter, but the war was far from decided. The Americans had the Japanese on the ropes and the ever-shrinking Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was now limited to the Ryukyus and the home islands of Japan. However, for the American sailors aboard the Bayfield-class attack transport USS Goodhue, the war had yet to begin.
This is the story of one eventful day in the life of the Goodhue during the Pacific War. The officers and ratings of the ship were about to participate in the last great campaign of World War II, the capture of the strategically important island of Okinawa. This sanguinary campaign cost the United States 36 ships sunk, with the loss of nearly 10,000 sailors dead or wounded. The Army lost 4,675 dead and nearly 19,000 wounded. The Marine Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the island, lost almost 19,000 dead and wounded. This was the price that America paid for taking a small piece of real estate that would serve as a springboard for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. If the Japanese resistance was this intense on and around Okinawa, what would it be like in the invasion of the Japanese mainland?
Opposing Operation Iceberg: Japan’s Kamikaze Waves
Planning for the campaign that would be known as Operation Iceberg began in the fall of 1944, about the same time as the commissioning of the USS Goodhue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had evaluated all of the plans that had been discussed to bring about the final Japanese defeat. Which plan was better: bypass the Philippines, advance in China, or occupy Formosa? The Joint Chiefs adopted a strategy involving a landing in the Philippines as well as on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Following the costly victory on Iwo Jima, and while operations in the Philippines were ongoing, U.S. forces landed on Okinawa on April 1, 1945. Thoughts of hope for the future would be on the minds of the American servicemen in the Pacific that Sunday, but the only thing that was on the minds of the Japanese was to stop the American advance at any cost. Countless thousands of Japanese sailors and airmen would die in the attempt to halt the American juggernaut.
Japanese strategists discussed the best way to defend Okinawa. It was first argued that an aggressive attack against the Americans after they landed was the best strategy. Then, the idea was put forward that it might be better to let the Americans land and then grind them down in a battle of attrition. Then there was the darker alternative: that of the massed waves of suicide planes and boats known as the kamikaze. It was the latter two options in combination that American soldiers and sailors would confront at Okinawa.
The USS Goodhue
Scattered kamikaze attacks on American warships had occurred as early as 1943. Vice Admiral Takajiro Onishi had developed the concept of the kamikaze as a desperate suicidal effort to inflict serious damage on warships of the U.S. Navy, particularly its aircraft carriers. In doing so, it was hoped that the American tide would be slowed or even stopped. Although the kamikaze were not unknown to the Americans, the fury of the massed attacks thrown at the fleet off Okinawa was something that had not been previously experienced.
Ward McDonald, a 17-year-old signalman from Seattle, Washington, described the Goodhue’s shakedown cruise off San Pedro, California, in December 1944. “One early morning we got underway for our shakedown cruise … down the coast of California. A gunnery practice at a towed target proved our ability to have a shell from the ship’s 5-inch guns get within a quarter mile of the target. We swung compass, did a few maneuvers as well as swab the decks of vomit as the boys from Nebraska would leave go of their breakfasts. What a sight. I was wondering if they would even allow us to join other ships for a wartime effort. Somehow we made a successful shakedown.”
The Goodhue had two 5-inch dual-purpose gun mounts fore and aft, two single and two twin 40mm antiaircraft guns, and 18 20mm guns with which to protect the 51 officers and 524 enlisted men aboard. The ship was able to carry all the equipment necessary for an amphibious landing, including 1,200 troops and 15 landing craft. Powering everything was one General Electric geared drive turbine that could raise 8,500 horsepower.
“A day or so later during the loading of ammunition, food stuffs, fuel and the like, I noticed large boxes of foul weather gear coming aboard,” remembered McDonald of the days immediately following the shakedown cruise. “It appeared we were headed for a cold climate.” Days later, when the Goodhue was steaming southwest instead of north, McDonald observed, “The foul weather gear had been a ploy…. The military needed to make it appear obvious that we were heading north.”
The Goodhue had loaded her cargo in California and sailed away from the West Coast on January 4, 1945. She arrived at her first destination in the Admiralty Islands on January 21, where the ship picked up more cargo and passengers. Reaching Hollandia, New Guinea, on February 4, the Goodhue received her new commander, Captain J.L. Allen. Under Allen’s command, the ship took its place as the flagship of Transport Division 51. This meant that in any action they would be encountering, the Goodhue would be at the head of the column and most vulnerable to attack.
The Goodhue sailed to Leyte Gulf in the Philippines from February 4 to 12, carrying supplies to bases in the area. The officers and men underwent vigorous amphibious training exercises until February 25. By the end of the month, the Goodhue was loading troops and supplies for the coming campaign against Okinawa. There were more practice landings, and then it was time for the real thing. The ship got underway for Okinawa on March 21, but there would be one more stop along the way.
The small islands of Kerama Retto, just south of Okinawa, were to be secured to serve as a staging area for the invasion of Okinawa itself. A mighty American armada, which included the Goodhue, put troops ashore on March 26 to secure the island group. Compared with what was in store for them, the landings at Kerama Retto were a cakewalk.
Even so, McDonald voiced the opinion of many American servicemen in the area when he said, “March 26, 1945. Hell was upon us in every fashion. From the water we had the dreaded suicide boats, from the air the deadly kamikaze and on the beaches we had the fanatics. There was not to be a breather for anyone…. We encountered 82 air attacks in the next 30 days alone, most of them kamikaze. The reason for all this attention was we were getting very close to the main Japanese strongholds…. They would throw everything they had at us.”
As the kamikaze attacks against the American fleet intensified, the sailors aboard the Goodhue improved their defenses by bringing up on deck several of the Army’s field guns that they were transporting. “They just seemed to appear out of nowhere,” said McDonald of the suicide boats, “and if you weren’t alert they would get beneath your gunnery field and … the charge would blow a sizeable hole in the side of the vessel at the waterline.”
Airborne Attack on the Convoy
The Goodhue was anchored off Kuba Shima when the main landings against Okinawa went in on April 1. More than 1,300 vessels had assembled off the island, and the landing craft had been lowered and were circling in the water while the prelanding barrage softened up the beaches beginning at 5:30 am. Sixty-four American aircraft from the nearby carrier group also attacked the island before the landing craft hit the beach. By the end of the day, a 15,000-yard beachhead was secured and thousands of troops had landed.
At 4:15 pm on April 2, the Goodhue was underway from its anchorage at Kuba Shima to deliver the 307th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. 77th Division to its destination on Okinawa. Cruising in a three-column formation of transports, the Goodhue led the right column with the transports Telfair, Mountrail, Drew, and Montrose falling in behind at 1,200-yard intervals. The distance between the columns was 600 yards. The Goodhue kept pace with the guide ship Chilton, which was leading the center column, and Henrico, which led the left column. As the vessels approached the combat zone, they began to zigzag to avoid enemy submarines.
At approximately 6:30 pm, a dozen kamikazes attacked the small armada of transports and supporting destroyers. The Goodhue’s log noted, “1837 [we] commenced firing with after starboard 20 millimeter guns and 40 millimeter guns on enemy aircraft attacking the convoy from abaft the starboard beam … 1840 … Henrico seen to be hit in midship section … 1842 … Telfair seen to be grazed by suicide plane.”
The Goodhue and her sister ship Telfair were attacked by three planes. The Telfair gunners combined with the firing from the Goodhue to destroy one of the attackers in midair. A second plane rammed into the starboard and port kingposts of the Telfair, then fell over the side of the ship. The third plane was headed straight for the Goodhue.
Hit by a Kamikaze
Radioman Second Class Jack Kenewell recalled the result of the third Japanese aircraft’s attack against the Goodhue: “After knocking one Betty [Mitsubishi G4M bomber] out of the air with a salvo from our 5-inch aft, a Jap suicide plane came in over our bow only seconds later. We didn’t have a chance. He hit our crow’s nest and did some damage … I was bleeding badly with a wound on my chest, neck and feet.”
The Goodhue’s log recorded, “1848 … one enemy plane observed paralleling our course to starboard at 3,000 yds. Plane was seen to change to an approach course at … 1,000 ft. The plane was taken under fire by the forward 5”/38 gun at a range of 1,500 yds.”
The aircraft attacking the Goodhue was a Kawasaki KI-45 Toryu, known as a “Nick” to the Allies. This was a twin-engine, long-range escort and reconnaissance fighter. It was most likely armed with two fragmentation bombs carried under the wings.
The combined fire from the Goodhue and the other transports hit the Nick in the port engine and cockpit area, setting it on fire. The Goodhue’s log reads, “1850 … suicide Japanese plane crashed into the mainmast at the cross trees level. One part continued and exploded over the fantail, the other containing cockpit and at least one bomb, swung over the port side and exploded at about deck level … most of the plane fell flaming into the water.”
McDonald vividly recalled the attack of the kamikazes: “As soon as I stepped out onto the main deck I looked right into the cockpit of a kamikaze approaching us on the starboard side … I watched wide-eyed as the Jap plowed into the starboard side of the USS Henrico … blowing a hell of a hole completely through the superstructure … I was looking at the crew [of a 5-inch gun] about 10 feet away when their eyes grew huge and an expression of fear struck them all…. From the corner of my eye, I caught sight of a huge ball of fire and mass descending upon me…. I instinctively turned to my left and was ducking.”
In the brief moments described by the ship’s log and the narratives of Kenewell and McDonald, 27 men were killed and 117 wounded. Although the impact of the kamikaze had struck and knocked down the Goodhue’s 30-ton cargo boom, the majority of the dead and wounded were hit when bomb fragments and shrapnel rained down on them as the plane disintegrated. The Telfair, Henrico, and Chilton had also sustained major damage. The destroyer Dickenson had taken a direct hit on its bridge, killing 53 sailors, including the captain. The ship was so seriously damaged that it later had to be scuttled.
The Henrico had also taken a direct hit from a suicide plane, later identified as a Frances (twin-engine bomber). This kamikaze had plowed into the superstructure, killing the captain, a colonel of the 77th Division, and scores of Navy and Army personnel.
“Hundreds of Kamikaze Planes.”
Stunned but not wounded, McDonald was taken below for a time. When he came to his senses, he went back out on the deck. “When I stepped out on the after deck, I found death and destruction everywhere I turned,” he recalled. “The first thing I noticed was the after 5-inch gun placement was out of kilter and there were no identifiable body parts of any of the gun crew. They were just gone … screams, moaning, orders being given and bodies everywhere…. As I peered over the top of a ladder onto the deck, I saw a finger with a gold ring still on it … just a mass of flesh everywhere.”
Radarman Third Class Samuel Keels Brockington was drafted into the Navy from Kingstree, South Carolina, in March 1944. He was assigned to the Goodhue that summer. “The man in the crow’s nest where the plane hit was just wrapped in metal,” he remembered, “and pieces of the plane were on the boat.”
Damage control parties extinguished several fires and then began the grim task of collecting the dead and wounded. Radarman Third Class Howard G. Hobbs was assigned to this detail, and the memories of the sights and sounds of that evening haunted him for his entire life. Motor Machinist Mate Third Class Francis “Red” Nagle was in charge of piloting one of the landing craft used to ferry troops and supplies to Okinawa. On the day the Goodhue was attacked, he recalled looking into the sky and seeing “hundreds of kamikaze planes.”
164 Ships Damaged by Kamikazes
The Goodhue’s loss had been severe. With 21 dead and more than a hundred sailors wounded, the transport had lost one-quarter of its crew. Twenty-four soldiers from the 307th Regiment also became casualties. At least five of the 15 attack transports that left Kerama Retto that evening sustained damage from kamikaze attacks. During the Okinawa campaign, 27 of the 36 U.S. ships sunk had been attacked by suicide planes. A total of 371 U.S. ships were damaged at Okinawa. Of that total, kamikaze attacks were estimated to have accounted for 164.
After the attack of April 2, the Goodhue withdrew with a destroyer escort back to the Kerama Retto anchorage for repairs. Along the way the dead were buried on the small island of Zamami Shima, and the wounded were loaded onto hospital ships for treatment.
“That night I worked on the injured doing everything I could,” said Brockington. “The next day they were sent to the hospital ships. I helped sew canvas bags for those who were dead. The evening before the attackn our ship, which was the evening of the invasion on Okinawa, I was talking to a guy from Tennessee. He said, ‘Brock, if we get home let’s do so and so.’ I told him that the invasion that morning had gone well and instead of saying ‘if we get home’ let’s say when we get home. He said that sounded like a good idea. I sewed his body bag the next day.”
Kenewell, who had received some serious wounds when the Japanese plane struck the ship, recalled the condition of the sailors on the hospital ship around him. “I saw some horribly mutilated men, some with shrapnel all over their bodies, others with burns. Undoubtedly these were the worst cases, some with no chance of recovery, dying by inches … some with their eyes burned right out of the sockets. They would never really recover.” After several days of rest at the anchorage, the troops aboard the Goodhue eventually splashed ashore on Okinawa.
The USS Goodhue‘s Battle Star
The USS Goodhue received one battle star for its participation in the Okinawa campaign. The ship was decommissioned on April 5, 1946, and sold to the U.S. Maritime Commission for commercial service in 1947. Renamed the Hawaiian Citizen, she plied the Pacific Ocean for another 34 years, 21 of those as a container ship. The Hawaiian Citizen was finally scrapped in Taiwan in 1982. The ship is gone, but many of her veterans are still around. They gather every year for a reunion and mourn the shipmates lost in the previous year.
The ordeal of the USS Goodhue is not unique among the U.S. Navy warships subjected to the ferocious kamikaze assaults off Okinawa. However, it is representative of the battle that took place there and of the carnage that could well have been expected if an invasion of the Japanese home islands had been necessary.
Duane E. Shaffer is a library director in New Durham, New Hampshire. His late father-in-law served aboard the USS Goodhue.
This article first appeared at the Warfare History Network.