Agrégateur de flux

EU countries managed to break a months-long deadlock to agree their position on reforming Europe's electricity market on Tuesday (17 October), readying them for talks with the European Parliament to finalise the law in the coming months.

As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was leaving Israel following a visit in which he expressed solidarity with the country following the 7 October terrorist attack by Hamas, rocket fire from Gaza forced him to take cover.

Humanitarian corridors need to be set up in Gaza, and refugees need to be provided with the necessary aid, Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu told his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, adding that Israel has the right to defend itself against...

January 2025 is practical for Bulgaria to join the Eurozone after the original plan of joining in 2024 was postponed due to inflation and a lack of political will to adopt the necessary legislation, according to the Bulgarian government. The...

The German government is currently preparing specific actions to tackle alarming rates of antimicrobial resistance which if implemented, could save up €462 million as well as prevent €462 million infections annually.

Concerns about a refugee crisis, financial strains, permanent displacement, and possible militancy in Sinai worry leaders in Cairo.

DÉCRYPTAGE - Bruno Le Maire rechigne à mener la liste présidentielle lors du scrutin européen de juin 2024. La majorité se cherche un autre champion du côté de Bruxelles, en la personne de Stéphane Séjourné ou de Thierry Breton.

The FBI continues to probe all of its former special agents who became private investigators and worked for the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. The Bureau in January arrested Charles McGonigal, who had been the special agent in charge of counterintelligence

Kyiv is questioning how to solve the maintenance issues relating to French defence electronics group Thales's radar and electronic warfare

Nadeem Anjum's (IO, 02/09/22) recent reappointment as head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) until September 2024 should mean more steady

Latest figures in France's draft 2024 budget show that the rate of inspections carried out by the Defence Intelligence and

London - Eastern Europe-focused Sastre Consulting beefs up investigation practiceSastre Consulting, which specialises in due diligence, asset tracing and litigation

Neo Forensics, the freshly launched investigations firm registered in London under the NFTech Investments UK monicker, is the latest venture

The strategic case for adhering to the laws of war.

A plan to return the Gaza Strip to Palestinians and keep Israel safe.

How Europe would benefit from a new government in Warsaw.

Le Parti socialiste a voté à 54 %, dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi, un moratoire sur sa participation à la Nupes. L'union de la gauche, née lors de législatives de juin 2022, battait de l'aile depuis l'absence de condamnation claire par La France insoumise des attaques menées par le Hamas contre Israël. 

Six years ago, I testified before the United States Senate and suggested the return of mass and attrition as foundational force planning principles within the national defense strategy. I went on to note the need was urgent given our existing capability gaps against China and Russia in particular.

Fast forward to 2023 and a war of mass precision, at range and at scale, is taking place in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the US military did not use the intervening years to get well.

Congress and the Budget Control Act certainly did them no favors, either. But even worse is the seeming inability in Washington to plan beyond a preferred outcome, rather than a more likely—and bloody—reality. 

Policymakers should not be lulled into complacency by faulty assumptions of a technologically unmatched and better trained military, as years of prioritizing capability over capacity have created a brittle force. The war in Ukraine should also dispel any considerations that long and violent wars are unlikely. 

These myths become ever more apparent as China continues to achieve parity with—or exceed—the United States military in several modernization areas, including land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, shipbuilding, integrated air defense systems, and land-based (stationary and mobile) intercontinental ballistic missile launchers.

Furthermore, China has the world’s largest standing army, navy, coast guard, maritime militia, and sub-strategic missile force. As of 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had 355 battle force ships, and the US Navy had 296. In the years since, that gap has only widened. Modern projections indicate that by 2035, China’s navy will grow to 475 ships, while the United States will remain stagnant at just 305 ships as ship retirements take their toll on the aging fleet. China’s fleet is also undergoing rapid modernization, with the PLAN of the future consisting of increased quantities of modern aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and nuclear-powered submarines.

China’s widening lead in terms of sheer quantity is reinforced by its staggering industrial ability to produce warships. Information from the Office of Naval Intelligence reveals the ever-growing gap between the shipbuilding industries supporting the American and Chinese navies. The briefing notes that Beijing’s fleet is being built by a robust Chinese military-civil shipbuilding industry, “…more than 200 times more capable of producing surface warships and submarines,” than the American shipbuilding industry. If conflict broke out and losses had to be replaced, Washington would have to make tough choices with limited production capacity, while Beijing could start putting down hulls of all shapes and sizes.

The war in the Ukraine has prompted the US Army to move significantly faster in munitions production and surge their defense industrial base to keep pace with demand for shells. But this surge is the exception and not the rule when it comes to the investment portfolios of the Armed Forces faced with looming budget cuts.

Worse yet, the inadequate levels of precision munitions on hand for the US military lays bare the fact that Washington has allowed America’s defense industry to size and scale to just one war at a time. The consequences of this atrophy are now painfully apparent as horrific wars are simultaneously underway in Europe and the Middle East. Washington should not be forced to choose which of our allies it can support at any given time.

All of these signs indicate that it is time to dump the failed Pentagon one-war planning and adopt a “three-theater” force-sizing construct that accounts for the vast range of activities the military performs.

To remain a global power, the United States must preserve a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Furthermore, Washington must remember that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to maintaining American security, and that the “ways and means of doing so differ from theater to theater,” as noted by my colleague Giselle Donnelly.

This means that not only must the active duty military grow—and budgets alongside it—but also be coupled with bolstered manufacturing ability to support those in uniform for a new era of protracted engagements. These engagements will require a strong industrial base to provide necessary capabilities for rapid repair in theater and sustained production. Just as equipment without soldiers to man them are essentially paperweights, so too are the armed forces without a robust and healthy industrial base necessary to maintain combat power.

Without a strong defense industrial base, America is destined to lose the next war more quickly.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness.

This article was first published by the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Creative Commons.

As Israel prepares for a massive military operation against Hamas in Gaza, risks of an escalating regional conflict loom large. The most critical additional threat to Israel is from Hezbollah, the militant group and political party based across Israel’s northern border in Lebanon.

Hamas and Hezbollah are both backed by Iran and see weakening Israel as their primary raison d’etre. However, the two groups are not the same. Their differences will likely influence their actions – and Israel’s – in the days and weeks to come.

Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has, to date, not gone to war purely for the Palestinian cause. That could change. Hezbollah has not yet fully entered the current conflict, but the group has exchanged fire with Israel, across the northern border with Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran has said that an expansion of the war may be “inevitable”.

What is Hezbollah?

Named the “party of God”, Hezbollah bills itself as a Shia resistance movement. Its ideology is focused on expelling western powers from the Middle East and on rejecting Israel’s right to exist.

The group was founded in 1982 – in the middle of the 15-year Lebanese civil war – after Israel invaded Lebanon in retaliation for attacks perpetrated by Lebanon-based Palestinian factions. It was quickly backed by Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which supplied funding, weapons and training in an effort to expand Iranian influence in Arab states.

Hezbollah’s military force continued to develop after the Lebanese civil war came to an end in 1990, despite most other factions disarming. The group continued to focus on “liberating” Lebanon from Israel, and it engaged in years of guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah then largely focused its operations on retaking the disputed border area of Shebaa Farms for Lebanon.

In 2006, Hezbollah engaged in a five-week war with Israel in an attempt to settle scores rather than with an aim to liberate Palestine. That conflict killed over 158 Israelis and over 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians.

From 2011, during the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s power grew further as its forces assisted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran, against mostly Sunni rebels. In 2021, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the group had 100,000 fighters (though other estimates range between 25,000 and 50,000). It boasts a sophisticated military arsenal equipped with precision rockets and drones.

The group has also functioned as a political party in Lebanon and holds significant influence, often described as a “state within a state.” Eight members were first elected to the Lebanese parliament in 1992, and in 2018, a Hezbollah-led coalition formed a government.

Hezbollah retained its 13 seats at the 2022 election but the coalition lost its majority and the country currently has no fully functioning government. Other Lebanese parties accuse Hezbollah of paralysing and undermining the state and of contributing to Lebanon’s persistent instability.

What is Hamas?

“Hamas”, which translates literally as “zeal,” is an Arabic acronym for the “Islamic resistance movement”. The group was founded in 1987, in Gaza, as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a prominent Sunni group based in Egypt.

Emerging during what’s known as the first intifada or uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation, Hamas quickly adopted the principle of armed resistance and called for the annihilation of Israel.

Palestinian politics shifted significantly after 1993’s Oslo accords, a series of agreements negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) with the aim of establishing a comprehensive peace agreement.

Opposed to the peace process, Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, established itself as the primary force of armed resistance against Israel. It launched a series of suicide bomb attacks that continued through the early years of the second intifada (2000-2005), before shifting to rockets as a primary tactic.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas operates as a political party. It won parliamentary elections in 2006, and in 2007, it gained control of the Gaza Strip in a bloody battle with rival party Fatah that left over 100 dead. Hamas has controlled Gaza ever since, showing little tolerance for political opposition. They have never held elections, and political opponents and critics are frequently arrested with reports of torture.

Over this time, Hamas’s armed wing has become increasingly sophisticated. Its arsenal now comprises thousands of rockets, including long-range missiles and drones.

How are Hamas and Hezbollah different?

Hamas has increasingly received funding, weapons and training from Iran, but it is not in Iran’s pocket to the same degree as Hezbollah, which is backed almost exclusively by Iran and takes its directives from the Islamic Republic.

What’s more, as a Sunni organisation, Hamas does not share the Shia religious link to Iran that characterises Hezbollah and most of Iran’s proxies. As a result, while Hamas no doubt benefits from Iran’s patronage, it tends to operate more independently than Hezbollah.

In contrast, Hamas has received support in the past from Turkey and Qatar, among others, and operates with relative autonomy. The group was also long at odds with Iran over their opposing stances in Syria.

Right now, this is very much a war between Israel and Hamas. Hezbollah remains, however, a threat to Israel. If activated by Iran, its full involvement would rapidly change the course of the conflict and likely open up a regional war.

Julie M Norman is an Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations & Co-Director of the Centre on US Politics at UCL.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Creative Commons. 

In the wake of the horrific attack on Israel staged by Hamas terrorists on October 7, the relationship between Qatar and Hamas is coming under intense scrutiny among American observers. Some have argued that the United States should punish or at least heavily pressure Qatar, possibly alongside Turkey, as a result of their relations with Hamas and the wider Muslim Brotherhood. But shaking the foundations of the U.S.-Qatar security relationship, which has served the United States well since 1996, would be very unwise.

First, it is important to put Qatar’s relationship with Hamas in its U.S. and Israeli context. Hamas was at the center of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy of avoiding any serious discussion of a Palestinian state. It has been widely reported in the Israeli press that Netanyahu made remarks at a 2019 meeting with Likud leaders suggesting that Israelis who oppose a Palestinian state should support the (mostly Qatari) transfer of funds to Gaza because maintaining a separation between Gaza and the autonomous zones in West Bank under the Palestinian Authority would prevent it from being established. That was not Qatar’s motivation in providing funds to keep Gaza afloat in the absence of a normal economy, but Qatar was clearly acting with the knowledge and acquiescence of Israel’s leadership.

Second, Qatar has two larger neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seriously considered undertaking an act of military aggression against Qatar in 2017 at the outset of their blockade of travel and trade with Qatar. The large U.S. base near Doha seriously constrained any plans for such aggressive action, even as President Trump briefly seemed to support the Saudi-UAE side. While these countries have normalized relations and reopened embassies subsequently, the same rulers remain in power, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia remains a mercurial figure. Even after Qatar’s military buildup in subsequent years, it remains heavily overmatched by its neighbors. Thus, it would be highly irrational for Doha to use the Al Udeid basing rights as leverage against Washington, and it would shake the Qatar-U.S. relationship to the absolute core if the latter sought to move the base to either of those countries.

There are also several well-known obstacles to moving U.S. air assets to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. The State Department already paused the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to the UAE due in part to concerns about potential Chinese influence and presence. It is also doubtful that Saudi Arabia would completely fund a U.S. base the way Qatar has. As the Biden administration’s recent negotiations with MBS over potential normalization with Israel have shown, MBS makes “asks” of the United States, not the other way around. Finally, it bears remembering that Qatar allowed Al Udeid to be used for attack missions in Iraq, even after Qatari officials had stated their opposition to the 2003 invasion. The UAE limited the use of the Al-Dhafra base during the 2003 invasion to non-lethal refueling and reconnaissance missions. Though the invasion of Iraq was clearly a mistake, the flexibility provided by our arrangement with Qatar when the chips were down, even as they wisely counseled us against it, was critical to the undertaking.

Finally, Qatar is currently undertaking delicate negotiations on behalf of both the United States and Israel with Hamas to seek the release of Israeli, American, and other hostages. Qatar is also presumably continuing to act as an intermediary between the United States and Iran as we seek to avoid escalation into a wider regional war and maintain some of the forbearance they have shown recently in their nuclear program. There will be a time for Washington and Doha to discuss Qatar’s relations with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Still, there is no reason to shake the foundations of the bilateral security relationship at the moment. While there is no prospect of near-term normalization with Israel, they will continue to have contacts on the issue and any new framework for governance in Gaza. That may be more productive under a new Israeli government—the events of the last two weeks have demonstrated the bankruptcy of Netanyahu’s approach toward the Palestinian issue.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Sven Hansche / Shutterstock.