Agrégateur de flux

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

Heßler/ Kommission
Beamtenstatut
EU-Beamte: Der Anspruch auf einen Steuerfreibetrag für ein in Ausbildung befindliches Kind erlischt spätestens mit Vollendung des 26. Lebensjahres des Kindes

Heßler v Commission
Staff Regulations of Officials
EU officials: entitlement to a tax abatement for a child receiving training ends at the latest on the child’s 26th birthday

Heßler kontra Bizottság
Tisztviselõk személyzeti szabályzata
EU officials: entitlement to a tax abatement for a child receiving training ends at the latest on the child’s 26th birthday

Heßler / Commission
Statut des fonctionnaires
Fonctionnaires de l’Union européenne : le droit à un abattement fiscal pour un enfant en formation prend fin au plus tard au 26e anniversaire de l’enfant

Today, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement to bolster EU legislation on payment services to better fight payment fraud, boost transparency on fees, and increase consumer protection in this area.

Council agrees position on simplification package to boost Europe’s defence industry and readiness.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

The press briefing ahead of the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (Employment, social policy and health) will take place on Thursday, 27 November 2025 at 14.30.

The Council agreed its negotiating mandate on a draft law preventing and combating child sexual abuse online.

Press briefing ahead of the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) will take place on 27 November 2025 at 15.30.

On November 25, 2025, the President of the European Council, António Costa, participated in the closing session of the EU-Africa Summit, held on November 24 and 25, 2025, in Luanda, Angola.

Council and Parliament reach provisional agreement on cats and dogs protection.

The meeting of the European Council will take place on 18 and 19 December 2025 in the Europa building in Brussels. It will be preceded by the EU-Western Balkans summit on 17 December 2025.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

At the 7th European Union-African Union summit in Luanda (Angola) on 24-25 November 2025, the EU and African Union leaders agreed on a joint declaration.

Press briefing ahead of the upcoming Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council will take place on 26 November 2025 at 14.30.

On November 24, the President of the European Council, António Costa, participated in the European Union-African Union Summit in Luanda, Angola.