Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

To meet decarbonization targets, demand for low-emission hydrogen is increasing. A considerable share of supply will come from latecomer countries. We study how latecomer countries and firms participate in the emerging global low-emission hydrogen economy and how industrial policies can help maximize societal benefits. This requires a specific conceptualization of industrial policy: First, the latecomer condition calls for specific policy mixes, as latecomers typically cannot build on established innovation systems and network externalities, and rather need to combine FDI attraction with measures strengthening absorptive capacity and ensuring knowledge transfer from FDI to domestic firms; second, low-emission hydrogen is a policy-induced alternative that requires creating entirely new firm ecosystems while competing with lower-cost emission-intensive incumbent technologies. Hence, industrial policies need to account for enhanced coordination failure and internalization of environmental costs. We analyze the published national hydrogen strategies of 20 latecomer economies and derive a novel typology differentiating four hydrogen-specific industrial development pathways. For each pathway, we assess entry barriers and risks, identify the policies suggested in the country strategies, and discuss how likely those are to be successful. The novel pathway typology and comparison of associated policy mixes may help policymakers maximize the gains of hydrogen investments.

Climate extremes like prolonged droughts or excessive flooding disrupt the intertwined lives of rural women with agriculture in the Global South, especially those dependent on traditional practices like shifting cultivation or rain-fed irrigation. Agriculture is not just food production or a livelihood for these women but an extension of the care work that helps them feed their families. On the other hand, traditional hetero-patriarchal social norms continue to disempower them to make choices related to agriculture and food production as they often lack the decision-making and ownership rights on the land they toil. Women belonging to marginalized tribal communities facing compound intersectional challenges due to gender, caste, ethnicity, illiteracy, poverty, and language find it even harder to define their life goals and act upon them. This chapter shows how specific gender-transformative adaptation measures, such as promoting women’s land rights, providing access to climate-resilient seeds, and offering training in climate-smart agricultural practices, can bring in, albeit small, transformative changes. Based on ethnographic research, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions with Mal Pahariya women and NGO workers in Jharkhand, India, this chapter shows how these measures, if designed effectively, can tackle the root causes embedded in the existing social, political, economic, and cultural context that aids gender inequality and injustice to persist. The study also shows that food and nutrition security, leadership, economic decision-making, and capacity building by learning new skills can emerge as co-benefits that can help them address other daily challenges.

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

Our paper examined the impact of economic sanctions on food prices and security. Anecdotal evidence suggests that food security is threatened in nations subject to sanctions. However, the causal link has not been proven. We employ a two-way fixed-effects approach and leverage the entropy balancing technique to ascertain the existence of a causal link. Our analysis relies on the Global Sanctions Database for sanctions and the FAOSTAT database for food security proxies: food prices and prevalence of undernourishment (PoU). Sanctions increase food prices: during the sanctions period, real food prices are higher by 1.24 percentage points compared to the non-sanctions period. Although the increase in food prices is marginal, overall food security is threatened, as the PoU is 2.1 percentage points higher during sanctions compared to periods without sanctions.

We study peer effects in consumption patterns and their associated welfare implications among rural farm households in northern Ghana using a panel data set. We construct a social interaction network based on household-specific locations and employ a spatial econometric approach that leverages the structure of the peer networks to identify peer effects. The results indicate that peers' consumption patterns significantly influence individual consumption decisions, with the magnitude of this effect varying across farm households depending on their resource endowments. We also find that information exchange and partial risk-sharing behaviors drive these peer effects. Overall, our findings suggest that government interventions aimed at enhancing household consumption through transfers would be more effective if targeted at households with relatively large peer networks. In addition, anti-poverty and income-improvement programs can leverage peer networks to enhance their overall impact.

This study investigates the trade impacts of trade facilitation (TF) and computes ad-valorem tariff equivalents of trade facilitation for Africa. Its contribution is twofold. First, a structural gravity model is used to estimate the impact of TF on trade at a disaggregated level. We also extend our results using different indices that measure TF. Second, in a partial equilibrium framework and using some counterfactuals, it simulates the impact of TF in African countries. Our findings indicate that time to trade has a strong and negative impact on trade, whereas logistics performance and the trade-enabling index positively and significantly impact trade. The analysis suggests that African countries benefit most from TF improvements, particularly those with long delays and weak infrastructural and logistics performance. We find that a one-day custom delay has a 0.9% tariff equivalent. At the product level, the agriculture, food, and some manufacturing sectors, which are the leading African imports, benefit the most from implementing TF. In contrast, mining-related products, which are the major export components of Africa, benefit the least. An ambitious and realistic TF implementation of reducing trade delay by half enhances Africa’s exports and imports by 30.2% and 12.7% respectively.

Bonn, 14. Juli 2025. Finanzierung ist entscheidend für die Umsetzung der ersten Globalen Bestandsaufnahme des Pariser Abkommens – das muss die EU anerkennen. Sie muss zudem einen ambitionierten NDC vorlegen, der ihrer Verantwortung und der Dringlichkeit der Klimakrise gerecht wird.

Angesichts der nächsten rekordverdächtigen Hitzewelle in Europa und dem erstmaligen vorübergehenden Überschreiten der 1,5-Grad-Schwelle im globalen Durchschnitt sind wirksame Klimaschutzmaßnahmen dringender denn je. Dennoch wurde die jüngste Runde der UN-Klimaverhandlungen in Bonn von einem altbekannten Hindernis überschattet: unzureichende Klimafinanzierung und ein damit einhergehender Vertrauensverlust in den multilateralen Prozess.

Als 62. Tagung der Nebenorgane (SB 62) bekannt, markierten die Verhandlungen in Bonn den ersten formellen Meilenstein auf dem Weg zur Klimakonferenz COP 30 im November in Belém. Erneuerte, aktualisierte und ambitionierte national festgelegte Beiträge (NDCs) mit einem Zeithorizont bis 2035 werden im Zentrum der COP30 stehen, da die Staaten ihre Klimaziele mit den Vorgaben des Pariser Abkommens in Einklang bringen müssen. Doch statt Aufbruchsstimmung spiegelten die zwei Wochen von SB62 eine tiefe Systemkrise wider. Der anhaltende Unmut über das im November letzten Jahres auf der Klimakonferenz in Baku verabschiedete Klimafinanzierungsziel war in verschiedenen Verhandlungssträngen spürbar. Während die Nebenorgane traditionell Fachfragen klären sollen, um die Weichen für die politische Entscheidungsfindung auf den COPs zu stellen, kam diesmal selbst die fachliche Arbeit durch ungelöste Finanzierungsfragen ins Stocken. Das wurde vor allem bei den Diskussionen über das Globale Anpassungsziel (GGA) deutlich: Die Arbeit an einem Indikatorensystem zur Messung von Bedarf und Fortschritt verkommt ohne die nötige Finanzierung zur bloßen Symbolpolitik. Ohne konkrete Zusagen erscheinen vielen Entwicklungsländern technische Ergebnisse eher als symbolisch denn als umsetzbar.

Brasilien plant, als COP30-Vorsitz klimapolitische Führungsstärke zu zeigen. Mit dem Rückzug der USA aus dem Pariser Abkommen – und damit aus wichtigen Klimaverhandlungen – wächst der Druck auf die EU, bei der Klimapolitik und der Klimafinanzierung eine Führungsrolle zu übernehmen. Die Entwicklungen der letzten zwei Wochen haben Europa jedoch deutlich ausgebremst. Die Europäische Kommission wurde für ihren Vorschlag kritisiert, die Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2040 um 90 % gegenüber 1990 zu senken, um die internationalen Klimaverpflichtungen zu erfüllen. Die Kritik entzündete sich dabei an Kohlenstoffmärkten und Ausgleichsmechanismen, die zu einer Verlagerung der Verantwortung und potenziellen Verzögerungen beim Erreichen der Klimaziele führen könnten. Nur wenige Tage später lehnte das Europäische Parlament, mit Unterstützung rechter Parteien und der Europäischen Volkspartei, einen Eilantrag zur Beratung über den Vorschlag ab. Nun sollen ausgerechnet die rechtsextremen „Patrioten für Europa“ – notorische Klimaskeptiker – die Verhandlungen über das neue Klimaziel der EU leiten. Die klimapolitische Glaubwürdigkeit der EU in Belém – einschließlich der Vorlage eines ambitionierten und fristgerechten NDC – steht auf dem Spiel.

Europa muss unverzüglich handeln, um seine Glaubwürdigkeit als global führender Akteur zu festigen – insbesondere in einer Zeit, in der das UN-Klimaregime unter zunehmendem Druck steht und Klimafinanzierung immer stärker geopolitische Machtverhältnisse verschiebt. Erstens muss Europa einen neuen, ambitionierten NDC vorlegen, welcher seiner historischen Verantwortung gerecht wird, verbindliche nationale Maßnahmen anstelle von internationalen Kohlenstoffgutschriften vorsieht und die Ergebnisse der ersten Globalen Bestandsaufnahme (GST) von 2023 in Dubai berücksichtigt. Als erste umfassende Bewertung des kollektiven Fortschritts bei der Umsetzung der Ziele des Pariser Abkommens bestätigte die GST die allbekannte Tatsache, dass die bisherigen Bemühungen nicht ausreichen, um die Temperatur- und Resilienzziele zu erreichen. Die GST fordert eine Verdreifachung der Kapazitäten für erneuerbare Energien, eine Verdopplung der Energieeffizienz und einen schrittweisen Kohleausstieg. Sie ist der erste UN-Klimabeschluss, der auf eine Abkehr von fossilen Brennstoffen drängt und betont, dass die Länder ihre Anpassungsbemühungen dringend beschleunigen müssen.

Zweitens muss sich die EU das Thema Klimafinanzierung auf der COP30 und darüber hinaus konstruktiv auf mehreren Verhandlungsebenen zu eigen machen. Viele Länder des Globalen Südens empfinden die steigenden Militärausgaben in Europa und den USA bei einer gleichzeitig unzureichenden Klimafinanzierung als Heuchelei und als Verletzung der im Pariser Abkommen eingegangenen Verpflichtungen der Industrieländer.

Die COP30 ist entscheidend, um das Vertrauen in das Pariser Abkommen wiederherzustellen, und die EU und Deutschland dürfen diese Chance nicht verspielen. Deutschland sollte sich proaktiv an den Verhandlungen über einen ehrgeizigen NDC der EU und eine solide Klimafinanzierung beteiligen. Dabei geht es nicht nur um weitreichende Klimamaßnahmen, sondern auch um die Stärkung des technischen Fortschritts und des Multilateralismus. Die EU und Deutschland müssen ihre Führungsrolle beim Klimaschutz sowohl als geopolitische Verantwortung als auch als strategisches Gebot begreifen. Belém muss zum Wendepunkt werden.

The global system of development cooperation is in a state of flux. In a new policy brief we discuss how and why the very foundations of international aid and development are being shaken by geopolitical shifts, contested norms, and institutional upheaval. The brief argues that the crisis is not a mere cyclical downturn, or nor is it only about money, but a fundamental reordering of the global development landscape. In short, a “tipping point” in the sense of a dramatic moment when incremental changes coalesce into a transformative shift, for better or worse, is in the offing. We ask what might come next.

“Sustainability” is a diverse and contested concept that cannot be reduced to a single definition or practice. We propose the concept of “plural sustainabilities” to raise awareness of how different worldviews, knowledge systems, and values shape understandings of sustainability, recognizing the context-specific and culturally rooted approaches to sustainability found across the globe. Thereby, we use the concept of sustainability as a “boundary object”—a flexible term that connects different perspectives—and illustrates a plurality of sustainability concepts and practices through examples from various countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Indonesia, Ghana, Germany, Tanzania, and China. These examples highlight how local knowledge, cultural philosophies, national narratives, grassroots initiatives, and international policy frameworks contribute to sustainability. Through our discussions, we advocate for a “scientific multilingualism”— a more inclusive and pluralistic approach to sustainability research that values diverse way of living, interacting with, and making sense of the world. “Plural sustainabilities” calls on researchers to critically assess the development models advanced in the name of sustainability, particularly those influenced by national governments and international organizations. These models often, whether intentionally or not, perpetuate the same extractive practices and socio-environmental injustices they aim to resolve. A truly critical approach must go beyond surface-level commitments and explore how political decisions and institutional practices—both public and private—shape sustainability efforts in ways that may reinforce existing power structures. Recognizing and challenging this political use of sustainability is essential to support alternative, context-based responses grounded in plural worldviews, local knowledge, and transformative action.

The historical influence of colonial powers and the continued, deep-rooted engagement of international development actors in shaping social protection systems is widely recognised across academic and policy arenas. Nevertheless, evidence of the role of coloniality in social protection remains limited. This Discussion Paper explores the enduring impact of colonialism on contemporary social protection systems by considering the role of coloniality in social protection in the Global South, and Africa in particular. It does so by employing a three-fold methodology, namely (i) an examination of empirical and theoretical literature, including scholarship on coloniality, policy transfers and political settlements in the realm of social protection, among other topics; (ii) semi-structured interviews with international and regional stakeholders from academia, civil society and international organisations; and (iii) country case studies in Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania. 
The paper proposes a “social protection and coloniality” analytical framework to allow for analysing and unpacking the role of coloniality in social protection. It zooms in on three key components through which coloniality in social protection is manifested, resisted or countered: (i) colonial legacies, (ii) postcolonial influences and (iii) domestic political economy factors. This framework provides a novel lens to examine historical path dependencies and pathways that have shaped and continue to influence contemporary social protection systems in the Global South. It enables the identification of context- and country-specific issues, bringing them to the forefront while emphasising enduring colonial footprints and their interplay with domestic factors. 
Findings suggest that colonial legacies and postcolonial influences continue to shape social protection across Africa, as moderated by domestic political economy factors. It advocates for more equitable partnerships and critical reflection among international actors. The paper also calls for stronger integration of local knowledge to support country-driven social protection frameworks. By addressing these challenges and promoting context-specific solutions, it is possible to develop social protection systems that are more home-grown and less reliant upon external influences.

Tanzania has made notable progress in expanding its social protection system, yet the influence of colonial governance models, entrenched donor dependency and limited population coverage of existing provisions remain significant. This case study critically explores the historical and contemporary processes of social protection policymaking in Mainland Tanzania, drawing on qualitative interviews and documentary analysis.
Colonial legacies continue to shape Tanzania’s economic structure and institutional frameworks. Extractive colonial economies prioritised cash crops and mining, embedding a dependency that persists today and limits fiscal space for domestic investment in social protection. The British administration introduced formal governance and social protection institutions that remain pertinent today, but they continue to largely exclude the informal sector and rural populations, despite recent efforts to introduce social insurance schemes for informal sector workers (e.g. National Informal Sector Scheme, NISS). 
Postcolonial dynamics also play a defining role. Tanzania’s early Ujamaa socialist model under President Julius Nyerere fostered broad welfare ambitions, many of which were later dismantled under neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s. Since then, global policy agendas and actors have heavily influenced domestic policymaking. Donor-driven programmes dominate key areas such as cash transfers (e.g. the World Bank-supported and targeted Productive Social Safety Net programme), and development partners use various policy transfer mechanisms to shape domestic policies and programmes. The scarcity of domestic resources significantly hinders the pursuit of universalist social protection investments.
Despite this, the role of domestic actors remains pivotal. Nyerere’s legacy continues to inspire social policy thinking, and civil society and political elites actively shape – and sometimes contest – social protection arrangements. At the same time, limited implementation capacity and corruption undermine effectiveness of social protection delivery, particularly in rural regions.
The study identifies pathways forward: strengthening domestic financing through better taxation and value-chain participation; enhancing government leadership and coordination; integrating informal, community-based social protection mechanisms; and promoting regionally driven, South-South cooperation. These shifts require reimagining social protection, rooting it in Tanzania’s socio-cultural and economic fabric to build a more inclusive and resilient system.

This case study examines how social protection policymaking in Côte d’Ivoire has been shaped by a complex interplay of colonial legacies, postcolonial ideologies and domestic political-economic dynamics. Through stakeholder interviews and documentary analysis, it offers a nuanced understanding of the development of social protection arrangements in the country.
The findings show that colonial rule established deep structural legacies that continue to constrain the scope and direction of social policy. The French administration embedded economic dependencies – most notably through integration into the CFA franc monetary zone and an economy centred on raw material exports – which continue to restrict the fiscal space needed for comprehensive, state-led social protection. In addition, the legal and administrative architecture introduced under colonialism remains influential, shaping how social protection is conceptualised and implemented. This has fostered an insurance-based model that prioritises formal sector workers, despite Côte d’Ivoire’s large informal economy. 
Postcolonial policy influences constitute another, perhaps even more important factor shaping social protection in Côte d’Ivoire. Neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, guided by international financial institutions, led to a retrenchment of state welfare functions and cemented external actors’ roles in shaping domestic policy. Today, international partners such as the World Bank, UNICEF and the ILO play key roles in designing social protection strategies and programmes, largely thanks to their technical and financial assistance. At the same time, the country lacks a strong government-owned social policy vision, as the Ivorian development model primarily emphasises economic growth. Yet, some of the primary contemporary reforms – such as universal health coverage (CMU) and social insurance schemes for informal workers (RSTI) – reflect domestic social protection priorities under strong domestic leadership.
The study highlights the need for a stronger government vision to advocate for a holistic social protection framework rooted in local realities. Moving towards a strong, domestically driven social protection expansion also requires strengthening domestic resource mobilisation, reducing reliance on external debt and leveraging regional cooperation. Collaboration with civil society organisations and leveraging informal social protection arrangements can also help develop and deliver contextually appropriate and inclusive social protection.

Die europäische Wasserpolitik ist im Aufbruch: Am 4. Juni 2025 legte die EU-Kommission eine Wasserresilienzstrategie vor. Sie stellt eine Neuausrichtung und Neuvernetzung des EU-Politikfeldes Wasser dar. Angesichts sich verschärfender  Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und der bereits angespannten Wassersituation und Wassernotlagen in der EU ist sie erforderlich. Die EU-Wasserresilienzstrategie enthält sehr gute Ansätze, bedarf allerdings weiterer Ergänzung: Ein klimaresilientes Wassermanagement sollte Leitbild der EU-Wasserpolitik sowie mitgliedstaatlicher Wasserbehörden und lokaler Verbände bei der Umsetzung der Wasserrahmenrichtlinie werden. Grünes Wasser ist dafür zentral: Landwirt:innen sollten zu Grünwasserwirt:innen werden. Die EU-Wasserpolitik muss zudem stärker als vorgeschlagen Synergien zwischen Politikfeldern schaffen und integrativ für andere Richtlinien und Verordnungen wirken. Der WBGU empfiehlt überdies eine gemeinsame EU-Wasseraußenpolitik und ein koordiniertes Engagement für neue Governanceformen auf internationaler Ebene.

European water policy is changing rapidly: on 4 June 2025, the EU Commission presented a Water Resilience Strategy. It represents a realignment and re-networking of the EU policy field of water. This is necessary in view of the intensifying impacts of climate change, the already strained water situation and water emergencies in the EU. The EU Water Resilience Strategy contains some very good approaches, but needs to be supplemented further. Climate-resilient water management should become the guiding principle of EU water policy and of member-state water authorities and local associations in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive. Green water is key for this: farmers should become green-water caretakers. Furthermore, EU water policy must create more synergies between policy areas than has hitherto been suggested, and exert an integrative effect on other directives and regulations. Moreover, the WBGU recommends a common EU foreign policy on water and a commitment to new forms of governance at the international level.

Lead authors: Aletta Bonn, Jörg E. Drewes, Anna-Katharina Hornidge, Kai Maaz, Karen Pittel, Hans-Otto Pörtner, Sabine Schlacke, Claudia Traidl-Hoffmann, Joscha Wullweber. Co-authors: Julia Behrens, Mareike Blum, Catharina Caspari, Verena Engelhardt, Saba Fazal Firdousi Adam Ali, Tallulah Gundelach, Paula Haufe, Oskar Masztalerz, Katharina Michael, Alexander Mitranescu, Katharina Molitor, Jürgen Orasche, Marion Schulte zu Berge, Astrid Schulz, Jan Siegmeier

With President Trump’s return to office, United States (US) trade and development policy has undergone a decisive shift – marked by sweeping cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shifting alliances, escalating trade tensions, and a broader retreat from multilateralism. The expiration of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2020 and the scheduled end of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2025 had already raised concerns among sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Recent shifts under the renewed “America First” agenda – particularly the introduction of new tariffs – have now effectively brought AGOA to an early end.
This policy brief examines the potential effects of the shift from duty-free treatment under the US GSP and AGOA to the new Trump-era tariffs, including a universal 10% tariff applied to all US trading partners and so-called “reciprocal” tariffs announced for 57 countries on “Liberation Day”. Applying a multi-region Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, we find the following:
• Notable adverse effects for specific SSA eco-nomies, such as Lesotho, Madagascar, Chad, Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, and Malawi.
• Limited aggregate impact on AGOA-eligible countries with overall exports declining by up to 1.1% and real gross domestic product (GDP) largely unchanged.
• Most affected sectors include wearing apparel, leather products, and other manufacturing.
• The US and China would bear the largest losses under the new tariff regime.
Given the relatively weak ties of SSA to the US as well as declining utilisation rates of US preferential trade programmes over time, the limited aggregate effects for all AGOA-eligible countries are not surprising. However, empirical results likely understate the full impact of new Trump-era tariffs and do not capture the indirect effects like reduced foreign investment, weakened supply chains, rising poverty, or the loss of capacity-building linked to AGOA. Moreover, our simulations do not account for potential retaliatory measures, so an intensified global trade war and economic downturn might further harm SSA economies. For these countries, the risks are compounded by limited fiscal space and growing debt vulnerabilities. This underscores the importance for SSA countries of continuing to build more resilient and diversified trade structures, deepening regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and pursuing value chain upgrading. At the same time, the European Union (EU) must reaffirm its role as a reliable, development-friendly partner by defending World Trade Organisation (WTO)-based rules, renewing its GSP ahead of 2027, and avoiding retaliatory tariffs that harm vulnerable countries. Strategic engagement with the Global South – through initiatives like Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs) or Sustain-able Investment Facilitation Agreements (SIFAs) – offers a timely opportunity to strengthen trust and promote sustainable, inclusive trade.

PD Dr agr. Wolfgang Britz is a Senior Researcher and lecturer at the Institute for Food and Resource Economics, Bonn University.

NDC-SDG Connections is a joint initiative of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). The research and visualisation project aims at illuminating synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement, and at identifying entry points for coherent policies that promote just, sustainable and climate-smart development.

The objective of the NDC-SDG Connections is to: foster a dialogue on meaningful interaction between the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, globally and at the national level; to increase transparency with easy accessibility to all climate activities; and to cultivate learning and catalyse partnerships between countries and other actors to raise the ambition of future NDCs. With its second version with data on the updated NDC submissions (V2), the NDC-SDG Connections project opened its data for public re-use. In 2025, the V2 is updated with new data to version 1.2.0.

New Updated NDCs: Azerbaijan, Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Grenada, India, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Mali, Montenegro, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Togo, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United States of America. Namibia’s NDC has been updated to the most recent version.

These are not easy times to think about reforming or even rebuilding the international cooperation architecture to meet the challenges facing humanity. It is therefore only natural to defend what has been achieved as far as possible and, at best, to strive for incremental improvements. However, this entails the risk of remaining stuck in outdated patterns instead of looking for fresh solutions for a thoroughly changed world. In June and July 2025, world leaders will gather in Seville, Spain, for the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4). They will meet in an environment for global development and international cooperation that could hardly be more different from 2002 when the 1st FfD Conference took place in Monterrey, Mexico. However, today’s FfD process seems trapped in a decades-old path dependency.

Bonn, 10. Juni 2025. Der internationale Tag der biologischen Vielfalt fand dieses Jahr am 22. Mai 2025 statt und stand unter dem Motto „Harmonie mit der Natur und nachhaltige Entwicklung“. Dahinter verbirgt sich der Aufruf, Fortschritt mit dem Schutz der Ökosysteme in Einklang zu bringen. Doch nur wenige Tage später steht die Europäische Union an einem beunruhigenden Wendepunkt: Wichtige Mitgliedstaaten und die zuständigen Akteur*innen innerhalb der EU drängen darauf, die EU-Entwaldungsverordnung (EUDR) aufzuweichen, was sowohl die Umwelt als auch die Glaubwürdigkeit der EU gefährdet.

Mit der 2023 verabschiedeten EUDR verfolgt die EU das ambitionierte Ziel, nur noch entwaldungsfreie Produkte auf dem EU-Markt zuzulassen. Dabei geht es vor allem um wichtige Rohstoffe wie Kakao, Palmöl, Soja und Rindfleisch, deren Produktion häufig zum Verlust von Waldflächen führt. Im Rahmen der EUDR müssen Unternehmen, die diese Produkte auf den EU-Markt bringen, eine gründliche Sorgfaltsprüfung durchführen und nachweisen, dass ihre Waren nicht von entwaldeten Flächen stammen und nicht zur Waldschädigung beitragen. Es muss eine Sorgfaltserklärung vorgelegt werden, die sich auf Nachweise wie Geolokations- und Lieferkettendaten stützt und die Einhaltung der Vorschriften belegt. Marktbeteiligte und Händler*innen haften dafür, dass die Produkte die EUDR-Anforderungen erfüllen. Bei Verstößen drohen ihnen hohe Strafen, darunter Geldbußen und Verkaufsverbote. Für die Durchsetzung der Verordnung, etwa durch Kontrollen, Audits und Untersuchungen, sind die zuständigen nationalen Behörden in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten zuständig. Sie sind auch befugt, Sanktionen zu verhängen, nicht konforme Waren zu beschlagnahmen und den Marktzugang zu untersagen. Die EUDR verknüpft somit Umweltschutz mit rechtlicher Haftung – mit dem Ziel einer nachhaltigen Landnutzung und dem Erhalt der biologischen Vielfalt.

Trotz ihrer Bedeutung stößt die Verordnung nun auf Widerstand in der EU. Im Oktober 2024 schlug die Europäische Kommission eine Verschiebung um zwölf Monate vor, obwohl sie eine Woche zuvor eine rechtzeitige Umsetzung zugesichert hatte. Das Europäische Parlament und der Rat stimmten diesem Vorschlag zu und verschoben die Umsetzungsfristen für große und mittlere Unternehmen auf den 30. Dezember 2025 und für Klein- und Kleinstunternehmen auf den 30. Juni 2026.

Im Mai 2025 forderten elf Mitgliedstaaten – Österreich, Luxemburg, Bulgarien, Kroatien, die Tschechische Republik, Finnland, Italien, Lettland, Portugal, Rumänien und Slowenien – weitreichende Änderungen an der EUDR, darunter die Einführung einer neuen Länderkategorie mit „sehr geringem Risiko“ oder „Nullrisiko“, die derzeit nicht in der Verordnung vorgesehen ist. Diese sähe deutlich schwächere Verpflichtungen zur Einhaltung der Vorschriften für Importe aus bestimmten Ländern vor. Insbesondere wären Marktbeteiligte, die aus Ländern mit „sehr geringem Risiko“ importieren, von bestimmten Sorgfaltspflichten befreit, wie z. B. von der Verpflichtung, detaillierte Geolokalisierungsdaten zu erheben oder vollständige Risikobewertungen der Lieferkette durchzuführen.

Kritiker*innen warnen, dass die Einführung einer solchen Kategorie Schlupflöcher schafft und die Wirksamkeit der Regulierung untergraben könnte. Wenn Länder voreilig oder aus politischen Gründen als mit „sehr geringem Risiko“ eingestuft werden, könnten Waren, die mit Abholzung in Verbindung stehen, nahezu ungeprüft auf den EU-Markt gelangen. Die Risikoklassifizierung ist ohnehin bedenklich, da wichtige Exporteure wie Brasilien, Malaysia und Indonesien trotz der anhaltenden Abholzung in diesen Regionen nur als Länder mit „Standardrisiko“ eingestuft werden. Eine aufgeweichte Sorgfaltspflicht könnte das zentrale Ziel der EUDR gefährden, Produkte vom EU-Markt zu verbannen, die die weltweite Entwaldung vorantreiben.

Dieses Zurückrudern sendet eine widersprüchliche Botschaft. Anhand der EUDR wird sich zeigen, ob Europa bereit ist, seiner grünen Rhetorik entschlossene Taten folgen zu lassen. Eine Aufweichung der EUDR würde weltweite Fortschritte in Richtung entwaldungsfreier Lieferketten untergraben und denjenigen in die Hände spielen, die sich wenig um Umweltschutz scheren.

Die Umsetzung wird nicht einfach, auch nicht für Kleinlandwirt*innen. Die Lösung kann jedoch nicht sein, die Messlatte niedriger zu legen, sondern eine gerechte und wirksame Durchsetzung zu unterstützen: durch technische Hilfe, faire Fristen und eine solide Rückverfolgung. So kann die EU zeigen, dass sie es mit ihrem vielbeschworenen Einsatz für die biologische Vielfalt wirklich ernst meint.
In einer Zeit des rasant voranschreitenden Klimawandels und Biodiversitätsschwunds – nicht zuletzt durch Entwaldung – darf die Welt nicht länger zuschauen. Alle Länder müssen ihre Umweltverpflichtungen einhalten, und die EU darf jetzt nicht lockerlassen. Die EUDR ist mehr als nur ein regulatorischer Meilenstein; sie ist ein zentrales Versprechen zum Schutz der Wälder, zur Wahrung der Rechte indigener Völker, lokaler Gemeinschaften  und von Waldschützer*innen sowie zum Schutz unseres Planeten. Es gilt, sie vollständig umzusetzen und nicht zu verwässern, nur weil es gerade einfacher erscheint.

The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, as seen by the U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations. This shift has profound implications for international cooperation, particularly in the fields of development, climate, and global public goods.