The National Interest

Kyle Mizokami

U.S. Air Force, Asia

These five platforms would play a big role.

Here's What You Need to Know: The U.S. Air Force is preparing for future war.

In any conflict in the skies over North Korea, the U.S. Air Force will likely follow a familiar pattern. First, it will need to sweep the skies of enemy fighters—not a difficult prospect considering the decrepit state of the North Korean air force. Concurrent with that will be a campaign to shut down the country’s command and control and air defense systems, and finally a close air support and interdiction campaign designed to support friendly forces and locate and destroy enemy ground forces. Here are five weapons systems the air force would need for these missions in the next war in North Korea.

B-2 Spirit Bomber

North Korea’s air defenses are dense but outdated, relying on anti-aircraft guns and, with the exception of a S-300 long range SAM knockoff, fairly obsolete. Despite their obsolescence, most aircraft would need careful planning to avoid being shot down.

The B-2 Spirit bomber, being stealthy would have relatively little to fear from North Korean defenses. The B-2’s combination of stealth, payload, and range would make it one of the first weapons to be used early in a war scenario, chasing down the DPRK leadership. Uncertainty over where the leadership may try to hide could necessitate flying over large swathes of the country, and a stealthy bomber could also prevent neighboring countries from giving Pyongyang advance warning of their approach.

One arrow in the B-2’s quiver that makes it particularly relevant is the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP. The twenty foot long, thirty thousand pound bomb can reportedly penetrate up to sixty feet of concrete or two hundred feet of earth, making it the most effective nonnuclear weapon against North Korean underground facilities. A B-2 bomber can carry two MOP bombs at once.

KC-135 Stratotanker

The distance between North Korea and U.S. bases on Okinawa, Guam, and even Japan dictate that any future air campaign would need extensive tanker support. Air force tankers would not only supply U.S. Air Force aircraft but also U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and even Republic of Korea Air Force warplanes.

The bulk of aerial tanker duties would fall on the KC-135 Stratotanker. First deployed in 1956, each KC-135 can carry up to 200,000 pounds of fuel for thirsty fighters, bombers, transports and special mission aircraft operating over or near North Korea. The tanker has both boom (U.S. and ROK Air Force) and drogue (U.S. Navy and Marine Corps) refueling systems, and some can refuel two aircraft at once. 167 KC-135s are still operational worldwide.

C-130J Hercules

North Korea will be a difficult country to get into, and one of the first things allied forces on the ground would do is begin securing North Korean airports and military airfields to bring in supplies and reinforcements. These facilities could sustain destruction in a war that might prevent most aircraft from using them until air force RED HORSE engineering units arrive to repair the damage.

The C-130J Hercules’ ability to conduct relatively short takeoffs and landings, as well as operate from unimproved surfaces such as hard-packed dirt and gravel make it an excellent candidate for operating from airstrips near the front lines. In production for more than half a century, the latest -J version can carry up to eighteen tons of cargo. Alternately, the C-130J can carry 128 combat troops, ninety-two paratroopers, or up to seventy-four litters in the aeroevacuation medical role.

F-16C Fighting Falcon

A second Korean conflict with require a multirole fighter capable of close air support and interdiction tasks. The nature of the North Korean air defense threat, largely comprised of outdated fighters and air defenses, means a fifth-generation fighter is useful but not essential to prosecuting the war in the air. A fourth-generation fighter capable of quickly switching from air-to-air to air-to-ground roles in the same mission, downing MiG-29s one moment and dropping bombs on hardened artillery sites the next is perfectly up to the task.

The workhorse fighter of a second Korean conflict will be the Fighting Falcon. Nearly one hundred USAF F-16s are based in South Korea and Japan, including two squadrons of “Wild Weasels” tasked with suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Air Force F-16s will carry Sniper targeting pods paired with JDAMs and laser-guided bombs to deliver precision ordnance on ground targets, AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles to target North Korean radars, and AIM-9X Sidewinder and AMRAAM missiles for air-to-air engagements.

RQ-4 Global Hawk

A key USAF requirement for Korean War II is a high altitude, long endurance drone capable of keeping watch on North Korean strategic assets, particularly its land-based missiles and missile submarines. A persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability will allow the United States to hunt down mobile missile systems stashed in valleys, hillsides, and built-up areas, handing off targeting information to other forces.

The RQ-4 Global Hawk is ideally suited to the role. Capable of flying for more than thirty-four hours, Global Hawk could fly from airfields as far away as Guam, spend half a day over North Korea, and go home again—freeing up tarmac space in closer air facilities. Global Hawk’s ability to conduct surveillance day or night is a major plus and its unblinking gaze will be invaluable in tracking enemy movements. Another less well known feature that will be important over North Korea: Global Hawk’s Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) will provide a secure communications link between troops on the ground and close air support aircraft.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in 2017.

Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Jake Carter

David Axe

Taiwan, Asia

The S-400 could cause issues for Taiwan's air force.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Assuming Taiwanese fighters survive the first round of Chinese attacks, either by dispersing to highways or caves or through some heroic defensive effort by Taiwan's own surface-to-air missile batteries, the planes still must contend with Chinese SAMs, now including S-400s, firing missiles across the strait.

The Chinese military's new S-400 surface-to-air missile system can hit targets more than 150 miles away, if the reported result of the type's first-ever test in Chinese service is accurate.

The Taiwan strait is just 140 miles across at its widest point, meaning that, in theory, Chinese S-400s could target Taiwanese warplanes shortly after they take off.

But the short distance separating China and Taiwan works both ways. At the same time that China is fielding S-400s and other long-range surface-to-air missiles, Taiwan is deploying air-and surface-launched munitions that can target the Chinese missile launchers.

The People’s Liberation Army’s rocket force conducted its first live-fire drill with its first regiment of Russian made S-400s in November 2018, The Diplomat reported, citing Russian sources.

A Russian-style missile regiment usually includes two battalions together possessing 16 launchers. An S-400 launcher packs four missiles at a time.

According to The Diplomat, a Chinese S-400 intercepted a "simulated ballistic target" around 250 kilometers, or 155 miles, away. The Taiwan Strait separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland varies between 81 and 140 miles wide.

Annexing Taiwan is the primary military ambition of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese war plans apparently anticipate a massive air and missile bombardment of Taiwanese defenses followed by an amphibious assault across the strait under heavy fighter cover.

To defend against attack, the Taiwanese air force operates around 330 F-CK, F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters, a not insignificant force. Taipei is upgrading its F-16s and F-CKs  with new sensors and weapons. But at first glance, China possesses the aerial advantage in a cross-strait battle.

"Taiwan faces one of the most difficult air-defense problems in the world," the California think-tank RAND reported in 2016. "What makes Taiwan’s air-defense problem so difficult is the combination of its proximity to China, coupled with the massive investments that the People’s Republic of China has made in a range of systems that threaten Taiwan’s aircraft—not just while they are in the air but also while they are on the ground."

Assuming Taiwanese fighters survive the first round of Chinese attacks, either by dispersing to highways or caves or through some heroic defensive effort by Taiwan's own surface-to-air missile batteries, the planes still must contend with Chinese SAMs, now including S-400s, firing missiles across the strait.

"On the slight chance that an aircraft could get off the ground, it is likely to face attack before it can reach altitude or combat speeds," RAND concluded.

To counter this daunting threat, Taiwan has invested heavily in missiles that are capable of suppressing Chinese SAM sites. The Taiwanese arsenal includes hundreds of ground-launched ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike Chinese S-400s.

Taiwan's fighters are getting ground-attack cruise missiles. In 2014, the Taiwanese air force finished modifying 71 F-CK fighters to carry new Wan Chien stand-off air-to-surface missiles. The air force planned to modify the other 56 F-CKs to a similar standard by 2017.

The Wan Chien missile system bolsters the fighter fleet by "increase[ing] combat effectiveness and [providing] the capability to strike airports, harbors and missile and radar positions," according to Jane's.

But RAND advised Taiwan's leaders to try winning the fighter battle ... by not fighting it, and investing in surface-to-air missiles instead of warplanes. China's S-400s would have nothing to shoot at, while Taiwan's own SAM batteries plucked Chinese fighters from the sky.

"Although it might be painful for leaders in Taiwan to think of a major divestment of its fighter force, the expectations about the efficacy of that force need to be curtailed," the think tank recommended. "There is a substantial opportunity cost for keeping the current, large fighter force, which will limit needed SAM investment that could offer greater air-defense protection in the most intense scenarios."

"To continue to provide a credible deterrent and be seen as having the potential to contest its own airspace, Taiwan needs to invest in and invigorate its SAM force. These should get priority over fighters."

David Axe edits War Is Boring. He is the author of the new graphic novels MACHETE SQUAD and THE STAN. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters. 

Kyle Mizokami

Submarines, Europe

The accident killed ten naval personnel.

Here's What You Need to Know: The K-431 incident was one of several involving Soviet submarine reactors.

In 1985, a Soviet submarine undergoing a delicate refueling procedure experienced a freak accident that killed ten naval personnel. The fuel involved was not diesel, but nuclear, and the resulting environmental disaster contaminated the area with dangerous, lasting radiation. The incident, which remained secret until after the demise of the USSR itself, was one of many nuclear accidents the Soviet Navy experienced during the Cold War.

The Soviet Union’s nuclear war planners had a difficult time targeting the United States. While the United States virtually encircled the enormous socialist country with nuclear missiles in countries such as Turkey and Japan, the Western Hemisphere offered no refuge for Soviet deployments in-kind.

One solution was the early development of nuclear cruise missile submarines. These submarines, known as the Echo I and Echo II classes, were equipped with six and eight P-5 “Pyatyorka” nuclear land attack cruise missiles, respectively. Nicknamed “Shaddock” by NATO, the P-5 was a subsonic missile with a range of 310 miles and 200- or 350-kiloton nuclear warhead. The P-5 had a circular error probable of 1.86 miles, meaning half of the missiles aimed at a target would land within that distance, while the other half would land farther away.

The missiles were stored in large horizontal silos along the deck of the submarine. In order to launch a P-5 missile, the submarine would surface, deploy and activate a tracking radar, then feed guidance information to the missile while it flew at high altitude. The system was imperfect—the command link was vulnerable to jamming, and the submarine needed to remain on the surface, helpless against patrol aircraft and ships, until the missile reached the target. Eventually the P-5 missiles were withdrawn and the P-5 missile was replaced with the P-6, a similar weapon but one with its own radar seeker for attacking U.S. aircraft carriers.

The introduction of the P-6 gave the Echo II a new lease on life. By 1985, the submarine K-431 was already twenty years old but still technically useful. Like all Echo IIs, K-431 was powered by two pressurized water reactors that drove steam turbines to a total of sixty thousand shipboard horsepower. As old as it was, K-431’s nuclear fuel supply needed replenishing, and by early August the process had started at the Soviet Navy’s facilities at Chazhma Bay.

On August 10, the submarine was in the process of being refueled. Reportedly, the reactor lid—complete with new nuclear fuel rods—was lifted as part of the process. A beam was placed over the lid to prevent it from being lifted any higher, but incompetent handling apparently resulted in the rods being lifted too high into the air. (One account has a wave generated by a passing motor torpedo boat rocking the submarine in its berth, also raising the rods too high.) This resulted in the starboard reactor achieving critical mass, followed by a chain reaction and explosion.

The explosion blew out the reactor’s twelve-ton lid—and fuel rods—and ruptured the pressure hull. The reactor core was destroyed, and eight officers and two enlisted men standing nearby were killed instantly. A the blast threw debris was thrown into the air, and a plume of fallout 650 meters wide by 3.5 kilometers long traveled downwind on the Dunay Peninsula. More debris and the isotope Cobalt-60 was thrown overboard and onto the nearby docks.

According to Nuclear Risks, the accident scene was heavily contaminated with radioactivity. Gamma ray radiation was not particularly bad; at an exposure rate of five millisieverts per hour, it was the equivalent of getting a chest CT scan every hour. However, the explosion also released 259 petabecquerels of radioactive particles, including twenty-nine gigabecquerels of iodine-131, a known cause of cancer. This bode very badly for the emergency cleanup crews, especially firefighters who needed to get close to the explosion site, and the nearby village of Shkotovo-22. Forty-nine members of the cleanup crew displayed symptoms of radiation sickness, ten of them displaying acute symptoms.

One bright spot in the incident was that it had involved the new fuel rods and not the old ones, and thus large amounts of particularly dangerous isotopes generated during nuclear plant operation, such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, were not present. While the Chazhma Bay region appears contaminated to this day with radiation, it is unknown how much of it is the result of the K-431 incident and how much the result of the many nuclear-powered submarines that were junked and forgotten in the area.

The K-431 incident was one of several involving Soviet submarine reactors. Ten Soviet submarines experienced nuclear accidents, and one other, K-11, also suffered a refueling criticality. The U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet, by contrast, suffered zero nuclear accidents—not only during the Cold War but all the way up to the present day. The accident rate is even more disturbing when one considers the loss of a submarine or crew to a nuclear accident could have inadvertently led to a military crisis between Washington and Moscow. As tensions between the two capitals begin to reach Cold War levels, accidents such as the K-431 incident are important reminders that events can and will happen that threaten to spiral dangerously out of control, and that cooler heads must always prevail.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Kyle Mizokami

Tanks, Europe

Two tank philosophies, totally at odds with each other. What were they?

Here's What You Need to Know: The side with the Sherman won the war.

American tanks in World War II were generally inferior to their German counterparts. German tanks boasted better armor protection and more firepower.

But armor and lethality don’t tell the whole story. The same American tanks were superior to their rivals in other important ways. The M-4 Sherman, in particular, helped the U.S. Army win the war—even though, in battle, German tanks destroyed them en masse.

The Sherman’s inadequacies were products of its origins. Before the war, American tank design and development was bipolar—a result of the competing demands of the Army’s infantry and cavalry branches.

The infantry wanted a tank that—no surprise—could support the infantry on the battlefield. Infantry generals favored a vehicle with a big gun that could sit still and take out enemy bunkers.

The infantry walked into combat. They weren’t all that concerned about a tank’s speed.

By contrast, the cavalry—the Army’s scouts—preferred a fast-moving tank that could speed through gaps in enemy lines. The freewheeling cav didn’t fret armor protection.

Two tank philosophies, totally at odds with each other. And the Great Depression exacerbated the problem—the R&D money ran out.

The American tank force idled until the war jumpstarted it.

From Export to Expediency

Shortly after the outbreak of World War II, the United States began supplying the United Kingdom with tanks. Losing France was a staggering blow to the Allies’ industrial production—the U.K. couldn’t produce everything it needed on its own.

The British Army, partly out of desperation, bought American tanks.

The first American export, the M-3 Grant, had a 75-millimeter low-velocity gun mounted in the hull for engaging infantry, and a high-velocity 37-millimeter anti-tank gun in the turret.

That may sound impressive, but the Grant packed two guns because the Americans lacked a single gun capable of engaging both infantry and tanks. The Grant’s layout also gave it a high profile on the battlefield, making it easy to spot … and thus destroy.

The Grant’s baptism of fire was the battle of Gazala in North Africa in the spring of 1942. The British Army deployed 167 Grants against Panzer III and IV tanks from the German 15th Panzer Division.

Although the German Afrika Korps ultimately forced back the Brits, the appearance of the 75-millimeter gun—a first for the British—was a shock to the Germans.

As adequate as the Grant was, the war was forcing the creation of faster, more lethal tanks almost by the month. A new, more lethal version of the Panzer IV, the so-called “Mark IV Special,” had appeared three months before the battle.

Enter The Sherman

Back in America, tank designers were already working on a successor to the Grant. The new Sherman packed a single 75-millimeter gun. Crew was just five, compared to the Grant’s seven. The M-4 featured a host of improvements based on British experience with the Grant in North Africa.

With steady upgrades, the Sherman would be the main American tank for the remainder of the war.

Even at the time of introduction, the Sherman was really nothing to get excited about. Protection was unremarkable and required constant improvement—such as an extra inch of steel plate welded to the hull to protect main gun ammunition, plus a “wet stowage” system which bathed the ammunition in water to prevent it from detonating in the event of a direct hit.

The Sherman’s 75-millimeter gun was also nothing special. It was powerless against the latest German tanks—particularly the Tiger and Panther. The gun was more suitable for taking out less well-armed targets—half-tracks, artillery, infantry.

U.S. intelligence had assessed the Sherman as equal to the Panzer IV, the mainstay of the German tank force. America concluded the Sherman was good enough. Unfortunately, the U.S. had failed to accurately forecast production of newer, more powerful German designs such as the Panther and Tiger.

The U.S. military believed that although the Sherman was inferior to those tanks, the new German models would rarely appear on the battlefield.

That proved wrong.

Numbers, Numbers, Numbers

The Sherman wasn’t the best tank, but thanks to efficient American production methods it would be the most prolific. The United States built a staggering 49,234 Sherman tanks between 1942 and 1945.

The majority went to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, which underwent a massive wartime expansion. Washington provided 21,959 tanks to Allied forces. The United Kingdom, Free French Forces, Poland, Brazil, New Zealand, China and the Soviet Union all deployed M-4s.

A lot of armies depended on American factories to keep them in Shermans. Assembly lines had to keep moving, no matter what. In order to maintain a high level of production, managers kept design changes to an absolute minimum.

Introducing a new tank design, or even making significant changes to the existing one, would mean fewer tanks.

The Army Ground Forces, which oversaw the ground combat branch’s equipment, kept an eye on the long game. Mindful of the Army’s poor experiences fielding equipment in World War I, the AGF wanted mature, reliable vehicles. Tanks built in Detroit only to break down in France were worse than worthless.

The Army was well aware that German and Soviet tanks were getting bigger and more powerful, but the United States would have problems keeping up. German and Russian tanks on the Eastern Front could move by train, but American tanks had to be loaded onto and off of cargo ships—a much more expensive mode of transportation that imposed lots of its own constraints on vehicle design and production.

Heavier tanks would have caused problems up and down the line for the Americans.

An Ecosystem of Weapons

Finally, the Army viewed the tank force holistically within a veritable ecosystem of weapons. Infantry, tanks, artillery, engineers and planes were all part of the same team.

By this way of thinking, tanks shouldn’t take on other tanks. Instead, the armored vehicles should exploit gaps in enemy lines, rush in, start blowing up stuff. Infantry, airplanes, artillery and tank destroyers—vehicles similar to tanks, but lightly armored—would engage the enemy’s tanks while American tanks were running rampant.

There was a problem with this reasoning. Just because the Army wanted its Shermans to avoid the more powerful German Panthers and Tigers didn’t mean those encounters didn’t happen.

Making matters worse for American tankers, the Army’s inability to properly forecast German tank production—which was much higher than anyone predicted—meant there were a lot more of these tanks on the battlefield than the Army had originally counted on.

The U.S. did eventually field a new, heavier tank in early 1945. Sporting a 90-millimeter gun and thicker armor, the M-26 Pershing rectified many of the Sherman’s worst failures. In the fighting around Cologne, the M-26 bested German Panthers — even if the new American vehicle was underpowered and less reliable than the Sherman.

Postwar American tank development ensured that U.S. tankers were never again outmatched on the battlefield. The M-60 series of tanks, followed by the M-1 Abrams, were at least the equals of Soviet models.

This was largely due to the fact that American forces were by now permanently stationed in Europe and didn’t have to rush overseas in the event of war. American tank designers were limited only by their imaginations—and cost.

For its part, the M-4 was good in 1942, adequate in 1943, and totally outclassed by 1944. Unfortunately for American tankers, the war lasted until 1945.

Still—as maligned as the Sherman often is, it’s important to view it in context. The side with the Sherman won the war.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in 2014.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

David Axe

Norway, Europe

Oslo has increased its defense spending and developed a new military strategy to deter Russia.

Here's What You Need to Remember: To better prepare for war, the government plans to add nearly $2 billion to the existing, eight-year spending plan. 

Norway’s got a new military strategy. To deter and, in the event of war, defeat Russian forces, Oslo is bolstering its northern garrison and investing in submarines, stealth fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

But the Norwegian government doesn’t plan to replace a navy frigate that ran aground and sank in 2018. That decision alone represents a de facto 20-percent cut to the fleet’s open-ocean surface fleet.

Norwegian prime minister Erna Solberg revealed the new strategy in mid-April 2020. The 123-page defense plan cites Russia, and to a lesser extent China, as a major threat. “These are countries where the authorities do not see the value of neither democracy, rule of law, nor the fact that people have undisputed rights,” Solberg said.

To better prepare for war, the government plans to add nearly $2 billion to the existing, eight-year spending plan. Oslo in recent years has spent around $7 billion annually on its 23,000-person military.

As part of the new strategy, the army’s northern brigade will get an additional battalion with several hundred troops. The army also will receive around a hundred new G5 armored personnel carriers from Germany to replace aging, American-made M-113s.

The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, which fires a version of the U.S. AIM-120 missile, will get a new sensor. Oslo will buy new long-range and short-range air-defense systems to complement the army and air force’s combined force of around 72 medium-range NASAMS launchers.

The navy is getting four new Type 212 submarines from Germany to replace six older boats. Upgrades will prolong the service lives of the fleet’s four Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates and six Skjold-class corvettes.

But the fleet will not replace a fifth frigate, Helge Ingstad, which ran aground and sank in 2018. Salvagers raised the vessel, but the government determined it was not economical to repair her. Losing Helge Ingstad without a replacement amounts to a one-fifth cut to the fleet’s major surface combatants.

It’s not clear how Oslo plans to compensate for this loss. But it should try, the U.S. think-tank RAND advised. “As a major coastal and maritime nation, Norway is dependent on control of sea lines of communication for allied reinforcements as well as economic function,” RAND noted.

NATO officials recommended Oslo at least consider buying unmanned surface vessels, according to RAND. “Given finite resources and the unexpected loss of a frigate in 2018, allied officials highlighted the need to consider how best for Norway to deliver a mix of naval missions – either through different force mixes or other novel (e.g. unmanned) solutions.”

Norway’s new strategy does not alter the air force’s existing plan to acquire 52 F-35A stealth fighters to replace older F-16s plus five P-8 patrol planes to replace P-3Cs. Norway also is buying into NATO’s new fleet of up to nine A330 aerial tankers.

But RAND urged the Norwegian defense ministry to use the F-35s in new ways. “The F-35A represents a significant development not only for Norwegian air power, but also for how situational awareness, low observability and sensor and data fusion can enable future operations across all domains.”

“Allied officials emphasised the need for Norway to continue to experiment with novel [concepts], including by linking the aircraft with land- and sea-based capabilities, to maximise the [F-35’s] full potential.”

David Axe was defense editor of The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Kyle Mizokami

Special Forces, Americas

The best of the best. Period.

Here's What You Need to Know: The ranks of U.S. operatives have more than doubled in size since 2001.

Special operations forces have been at the forefront of U.S. combat operation in the last two decades. They are nearly at the forefront of risky combat missions—and suffer higher casualties as they are often deployed to remote locations and exposed to greater risks. 

A companion article details the special operations units of the U.S. Army and the distinction between various tiers of special operations units.

In this second part we’ll dive into the special operations units of the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, and look at recent challenges facing the special operations community.

The Marine Raider Regiment

 The Marine Corps historically resisted the creation of elite special operations units, instead designating some reconnaissance units as ‘Special Operations Capable’ with training for airborne and seaborne insertion. 

Today, these include four Force Reconnaissance Companies, primarily assigned to support to Marine expeditionary forces, and three Divisional Reconnaissance Battalions which incorporate Deep Reconnaissance Platoon including specialized combat divers to perform beach and landing zone reconnaissance, and direct air and artillery strikes.

During World War II, however, the Marines briefly operated two unconventional Raider battalions involved in some spectacular island assaults, including an epic submarine-launched raid on a Japanese seaplane base. But the Marine brass disliked the concept and disbanded the units in 1944.

The Marines were finally compelled to form dedicated special forces battalions 2003 by Special Forces-loving Rumsfeld defense department. In 2015, Marine special forces battalions were then integrated into a new Raider Regiment based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

The Raider Regiment counts three Raider battalions consisting of four companies. Each company has four fourteen-man teams called MSOTs. There’s also a Raider Support Group with three more battalions including specialist multi-purpose canine handlers, surveillance and forward observers.

Raiders trainees undergo a three-stage screening, followed by a nine-month training program in skills ranging from demolitions, diving, foreign languages, close-quarters combat and wilderness survival. Raiders have been involved in actions ranging from brutal urban warfare against ISIS in Mosul, Iraq and Marawi in the Philippines, to counter-terror actions in Mali.

Navy SEALs

The U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) teams have their origin in underwater demolitions teams assigned to scout out beaches and clear defensive obstacles ahead of amphibious landings in World War II ranging from Omaha Beach to the fortified island of Tarawa. 

The SEALS were officially formed in 1962 and were soon engaged in spy missions and riverine combat tasks in Vietnam, and participated in Operation Phoenix, a program to assassinate village leaders sympathetic to the Viet Cong.

Later SEAL ops include securing the governor-general of Grenada in his palace, infiltrating Iraqi-occupied Kuwait City, and taking back oil tankers seized by pirates. 

Just to begin training, SEAL candidates must demonstrate extraordinary physical endurance. The over year-long training program spans topics ranging from airborne and diving operations as well as marksmanship and demolitions.

But of those that pass initial screening, only one out of three make it through the initial physical conditioning unit, the third week of which is known as ‘Hell Week,” in which trainees perform 20 hours of intense physical activity per day.

The basic SEAL unit is sixteen-man SEAL platoon, which sub-divide into two squads. The Navy has roughly 3,000 Navy SEALS in eight SEAL teams, each consisting of six platoons and three eight-person special task support units.

Additionally, there are two sixteen-man SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams equipped with specialized Mk.VIII Mod. 1 submersibles which can carry up to six SEALs for underwater insertion, and three teams operating small boats for littoral operations.

DEVGRU

The Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) is more popularly known by its former designation SEAL Team 6. Its operators are all experienced Navy SEALs who have undertaken an even more grueling training process with a 50 percent washout rate and occasional fatalities. 

Like the Army’s Delta Force, DEVGRU is a Tier 1 unit involved in counter-terrorism and preemptive assassination operations, famously including the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Unit members also specialize in hostage rescue and protect high-ranking individuals. 

DEVGRU is organized into four assault squadrons (Red, Gold, Blue and Silver); an over 100-strong sniper/advanced reconnaissance squadron (Black); a special boat squadron (Gray); and a training squadron (Green).

Air Force Special Operations

The Air Force has its own 15,000-person strong Special Operations Command, first formerly established in 1983. These involves a mix of aviation and commando-style units.

Special Ops air wings fly a wide range of unique aircraft which often work closely with special forces units of other branches.

Many of these fly variants of the venerable C-130 transport plane. For inserting and recovering commandos behind enemy lines there are MC-130 transport planes modified for low-altitude insertion and recovery and refueling helicopters, as well as CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.

To provide long-endurance precision air support, there are ponderous but deadly “Spooky” gunship transports bristling with howitzers, Gatling guns and missiles. And to impede enemy communications and remotely detonated mines, there are EC-130H aircraft with powerful jammers.

To map out just where hostiles are in the first place, AFSOCOM has a fleet of small U-28, C-145 and C-146 surveillance planes stuffed to the gills with hi-tech sensors used in low-profile spy flights across Africa and Southwest Asia alongside MQ-9 Reaper drone squadrons.

Special Tactics Squadrons

But there’s also a ground-pounding side to Air Force Special Ops in the form of Special Tactics Squadrons. These include specialists that are detached to support other special operations units.

Air Force Combat Controllers help assess landing zones and airfields in remote, and perform traffic control in these austere conditions. Two-man Tactical Air Control Parties focus on directing air strikes in support of other ground forces. Pararescuemen, or PJs, assist in search-and-rescue missions behind enemy lines or difficult to access areas, as well as provide emergency medical care. 

There are even Special Operations Weathermen designed to assess weather conditions in the field that could impact the success of a mission.

Most STSs are grouped under the the 24th Special Operations Wing, including the 24th STS, a Tier 1 unit that habitually embeds personnel with Delta Force and DEVGRU.

Challenges for U.S. Special Forces

Despite official secrecy, units like DEVGRU have been celebrated in press coverage and films like American Sniper, The Green Berets and Lone Survivor.

But as special forces undertake a large share of military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria, they are subject to being word down with near continuous combat deployments abroad

Furthermore, despite the axiom that one “cannot mass produce special forces,” the ranks of U.S. operatives have more than doubled in size since 2001 in an effort to keep pace with demand.

These stresses may be contributing to an institutional crisis. In the last few years, there have been several exposés of breakdowns in discipline and systemic misconduct in special forces units, ranging from the murder of a Green Beret in Mali by Navy SEALs and Marine Raiders in North Africa to reports that SEAL teams were exhibiting high rates of drug and alcohol abuse, and mishandling or even mutilating with hatchets the remains of enemy combatants.

These scandals are leading for calls within the community to acknowledge the problem and reestablish standards and norms of conduct.

Another challenge lies in the shifting priorities of the Defense Department. While SOCOM will likely remain at the forefront of future counter-terrorism/insurgency operations in Africa and West Asia, the Pentagon is reorienting itself away from such missions towards preparing for possible ‘great power’ conflict with Russia and China.

Special Operations forces may thus develop new tactics on how their unique capabilities could counter Russia’s own unconventional warfare tactics in Eastern Europe, or employed to surveil and raid militarized islets in the Pacific Ocean.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in October 2019.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Russell Rhodes Jr.

Peter Suciu

Bradley Vehicle, World

Some 2,200 Bradley vehicles were deployed during Operation Desert Storm, and only three were lost to enemy fire.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The U.S. military had sought to replace the M2 Bradley twice before and in the process has spent $20 billion to develop a replacement. As a result the Bradley will likely remain in service for at least another decade.

Named after U.S. General Omar Bradley, this vehicle was developed to address the Soviet Red Army's new era of APCs, notably the BMP-1 (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty 1) or "infantry fighting vehicle," which was a drastic change in Soviet armored warfare doctrine. As the first mass-produced infantry fighting vehicle deployed by the Soviet military, the BMP-1 combined the properties of an APC with those of a light tank. It also provided a way for infantry to operate from the relative safety of its armored, radiation-shielded interior and to fight alongside the vehicle in uncontaminated areas. The BMP-1 offered mobility along with fire support and unlike earlier APCs, it was also able to fight alongside main battle tanks.

By contrast, the U.S. Army relied on World War II-style half-tracks and the Vietnam War-era M113 APC to deliver troops to the edge of a battle zone. After seeing the potential of the BMP-1 when it was used by Egyptian and Syrian forces in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and in the early stages of the Soviet-Afghan War, U.S. planners were convinced that a similar vehicle was needed to confront the Soviet threat in Europe.

Instead of an APC, which would just transport troops to the front lines, the new vehicle began as part of the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV), which could also allow the soldiers to fight from inside the vehicle as needed. The MICV program that was soon merged with the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle program, as these had similar requirements for a new light armored vehicle. However, that required the addition of a turret with a 25mm M252 Bushmaster chain gun, 7.62mm M2440 machine gun and BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles.

With the added armaments the M2 required a crew of three including the commander, gunner and driver, but only had the capacity to carry six fully equipped soldiers. 

The M2 was designed to provide protection for those inside from small arms fire and artillery, as well as TOW or Stinger missiles. The troop compartment was also designed with six external firing ports – two on each side and two on the passenger ramp.

The M2 Bradley entered service in 1981, replacing the M113, while at the same time the M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV) was also introduced. Classified as an armored reconnaissance and scout vehicle, the M3 was designed to carry additional TOW missiles and more ammunition for the 25mm and 7.62mm machine gun.

Both versions upgraded in 1988 as the M2A2/M3A2 with new composite armor, improved ammunition storage, and improved suspension system and a higher water barrier skirt that improved amphibious operations. However, with the M2A2-A3 versions the side ports have been removed as these were seen to be ineffective for use in combat.

Some 2,200 Bradley vehicles were deployed during Operation Desert Storm, and only three were lost to enemy fire. The M2 Bradleys actually outperformed the M1 Abrams tank and destroyed more Iraqi armored vehicles. However, in the Iraq War the Bradley proved to be vulnerable to improvised explosive device (IED) and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks and in 2007, the Army stopped using the Bradley in combat in favour of the MRAPs.

Earlier this year the United States Army ended its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program, the most recent effort to replace the Bradley. The U.S. military had sought to replace the M2 Bradley twice before and in the process has spent $20 billion to develop a replacement. As a result the Bradley will likely remain in service for at least another decade.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based freelance writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including "A Gallery of Military Headdress," which is available on Amazon.com.

This article is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Flickr

David Axe

Nuclear Weapons,

Limited nuclear war won't stay limited.

Here's What You Need to Remember: As part of the wider strategic escalation between the two countries, the United States under Pres. Donald Trump moved to acquire new, smaller-yield nuclear weapons -- and began writing doctrine for employing them even in cases where the threat is non-nuclear.

A “small” nuclear war would kill or injure more than 90 million people within just a few hours.

That’s the startling conclusion that a team of researchers at Princeton University reached when they simulated an exchange of small-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia.

Princeton’s Science and Global Security project team on Sept. 6, 2019 released a video of the simulation, with tiny missiles arcing over continental maps and pinprick blasts erasing cities and countries as the body-count rises.

The video underscores what experts for years have been saying. There’s really no such thing as a small nuclear war. Any wartime use of atomic weapons would be catastrophic, even civilization-ending.

The Science and Global Security team developed the simulation to depict what it described as “a plausible escalating war between the United States and Russia using realistic nuclear force postures, targets and fatality estimates. It is estimated that there would be more than 90 million people dead and injured within the first few hours of the conflict.”

The Princeton simulation relies in part on NUKEMAP, an on-line atomic-strike simulator that historian Alex Wellerstein developed. “We live in a world where nuclear weapons issues are on the front pages of our newspapers on a regular basis, yet most people still have a very bad sense of what an exploding nuclear weapon can actually do,” Wellerstein explained.

“This project is motivated by the need to highlight the potentially catastrophic consequences of current U.S. and Russian nuclear-war plans,” the Princeton team stated.

“The risk of nuclear war has increased dramatically in the past two years as the United States and Russia have abandoned long-standing nuclear arms control treaties, started to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons and expanded the circumstances in which they might use nuclear weapons.”

As part of the wider strategic escalation between the two countries, the United States under Pres. Donald Trump moved to acquire new, smaller-yield nuclear weapons -- and began writing doctrine for employing them even in cases where the threat is non-nuclear.

This is a bad idea, Deverrick Holmes explained for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C. “Embracing the concept of limited nuclear war is folly to the highest degree, and we fool ourselves if we think using low-yield nuclear weapons will somehow help halt the escalation to all-out destruction.”

“We already know this,” Holmes added, “we have tested the proposition before.”

In 1982, the Reagan administration organized a war game known as “Proud Prophet” involving high-level defense officials. During the exercise, which played out over two weeks, the United States wanted to test the theory of limited nuclear strike. What they found was that the Soviet Union perceived even a low-yield nuclear strike as an attack, and responded with a massive missile salvo.

“The result was a catastrophe,” said Paul Bracken, a political scientist and Department of Defense advisor. “A half-billion human beings were killed in the initial exchanges and at least that many more would have died from radiation and starvation. NATO was gone. So was a good part of Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. Major parts of the Northern Hemisphere would be uninhabitable for decades.”

Post-Proud Prophet, the rhetoric and policies coming out of the Reagan administration shifted dramatically. Bracken writes, “Launch on warning, horizontal escalation, early use of nuclear weapons, tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges — these were banished conceptually and rhetorically.” The exercise brought to light the inherent flaws of using nuclear weapons to maintain stability, and the Reagan administration stopped working to respond to nuclear escalation, instead focusing on reducing risks altogether.

The Reagan administration gazed upon the simulated horrors of simulated nuclear war and made an effort to change its policies in order to minimize the chance of any atomic exchange.

It’s not clear that the Trump administration will have a similar change of heart, even when confronted with a depiction of a “small” nuclear war that kills 90 million people in a virtual instant.

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared in 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Nimitz-class, World

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is unquestionably a symbol of American might and power projection abroad.

Here's What You Need to Know: Each carrier has approximately 60 aircraft onboard and this includes a variety of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with up to 90 of various types. Typical aircraft on a Nimitz-class carrier include 12 F/A-18E/F Hornets, 36 F/A-18 Hornets, four E-2C Hawkeyes and four EA-6B Prowlers fixed-wing and helicopters, including four SH-60F and two HH-60H Seahawks.

At 1,092 feet, the Nimitz-class supercarriers are more than three times the length of a football field, and with a crew of 3,200 sailors and 2,480 airmen, these are essentially floating cities. The lead ship of the class, USS Nimitz—nicknamed "Old Salt"—was commissioned in May 1975, was named after Adm. Chester Nimitz, who led the U.S. Navy through World War II.

The ship was first deployed to the Indian Ocean during the Iran Hostage Crisis and has since logged untold miles, providing security at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and later service in the Persian Gulf after Operation Desert Storm. Most recently USS Nimitz was deployed against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, where her F/A-18s took part in the Battle of Afar in 2017.

A total of 10 Nimitz-class carriers have been built, and the last of the class, USS George H.W. Bush, was commissioned in January 2009. These nuclear-powered carriers, which have two reactors and four shafts for propulsion with a top speed of 30+ knots (34.5mph), were the largest warships in the world until the USS Gerald R. Ford, the lead ship of her class of carriers entered service in 2017. Each of the Nimitz-class has an expected 50-year service life with one mid-life refueling. These warships, which have a displacement of 102,000 tons, were all built by Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding (now Northrop Grumman Ship Systems) based in Virginia at a unit cost of approximately $8.5 billion (constant year FY 12 dollars).

Each carrier has approximately 60 aircraft onboard and this includes a variety of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with up to 90 of various types. Typical aircraft on a Nimitz-class carrier include 12 F/A-18E/F Hornets, 36 F/A-18 Hornets, four E-2C Hawkeyes and four EA-6B Prowlers fixed-wing and helicopters, including four SH-60F and two HH-60H Seahawks. In addition, the carriers could also deploy the S-3B Viking, before these were phased out and replaced the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The flight deck, which measures 1,092 feet by 252 feet, is equipped with four lifts, four steam-driven catapults and four arrester wires. The carriers are capable of launching one air every 20 seconds.

The air wings of the carriers are customized according to the nature of operations, with the usual air wings replaced with 50 army helicopters on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower for its operations in Haiti in 1994. Similar considerations can be made when a carrier is used for disaster response and humanitarian assistance.

In addition to the aircraft, the most recently built Nimitz-class carriers are now armed with three Raytheon GMLS mk29 eight-cell launchers for NATO Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, which has semi-radar terminal guidance. There are also four Raytheon/General Dynamics 20mm Phalanx six-barreled Mk15 close-in weapons systems that have a 3,000rpm rate of fire.

While the last of the Nimitz-class carriers have been commissioned, and the class will eventually be replaced by the Gerald R. Ford-class, these ten carriers will still strike fear into potential U.S. adversaries for many years to come.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and website. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article was first published several years ago and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Peter Suciu

Japanese Military, Pacific

Given that it took fourteen years to develop, it is not surprising that the Type 74 was essentially obsolete by the time it entered service.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The country has focused more energy on its Type 16 Mobile Combat Systems (MCS), a more affordable anti-tank platform. Perhaps such a move should have been made while the Type 74 was in development.

As an island nation that hasn’t taken part in a major conflict since the Second World War, Japan developed a rather impressive main battle tank (MBT) with its Type 10. This is also notable as Japan produced what can only be described as exceptionally poor tanks during World War II.

During the Cold War, the Japanese military developed new tanks, which were a serious step in the right direction from the underwhelming Type 97 “Chi-Ha” medium tanks, but still fell short of anything the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) might have faced in an invasion from the Soviet Union.

Among those was the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries produced Type 74, which was developed as supplement to the earlier Type 61. It features innovations from other tanks of the era including the American M60 and German Leopard 1, but the biggest problem was that while it was developed in the 1960s by the time it entered widespread use in the 1980s it was clearly a generation behind.

Development of the tank was slowed because the designers sought to introduce innovations that proved to be too complex. One of those was an autoloader, which proved to be unreliable for use in combat. A remote-controlled anti-aircraft gun was also designed, but eliminated by the time the Type 74 entered production. The turret shape, which was similar to the French AMX-30 turret, was also refined to accommodate the extra loader—a fact that further delayed the production.

The Type 74 tank’s main armament was the NATO standard British Royal Ordnance L7 105mm cannon, with the barrel produced under license while the mantlet, breech and recoil system were developed at Mitsubishi. The gun initially could only handle armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) and high explosive plastic (HEP) rounds, but it was later modified to fire armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) and high-explosive anti-tank multi-purpose (HEAT-EMP) rounds. A total of fifty rounds could be carried for the main run, with fourteen stored in the turret bustle and ready for use. Secondary armament consisted of a 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun along with a 7.62 co-axial machine gun.

The Type 74 was powered by Mitsubishi 10ZF Model 22 air-cooled turbocharged diesel engine, developing 750 hp. This provided a top speed of just over 60 km/h, and the tank could be equipped with a snorkel to ford rivers to a depth of three to four meters.

Given that it took fourteen years to develop, it is not surprising that the Type 74 was essentially obsolete by the time it entered service. Some 893 of the tanks were produced, and while it was due to be replaced by the more modern Type 90, with the end of the Cold War the 700 Type 74s remained in service until at least 2006.

More recently the JGSDF has shifted gears and while the Type 90 and the newer Type 11 tanks remain in service, the country has focused more energy on its Type 16 Mobile Combat Systems (MCS), a more affordable anti-tank platform. Perhaps such a move should have been made while the Type 74 was in development.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Stephen Silver

Jetpack,

At least one military has reached an agreement to purchase jetpacks. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: Jetpack Aviation has reached a deal to provide its JB-12 jetpacks, to “an unspecified Southeast Asian military.” The company told the site that it has sold two of the jetpacks to that military for $800,000.

When Jetpack Aviation, the Southern California-based company that makes actual jetpacks, has been in the news in the past year, it has mostly been in relation to the mystery of the Jetpack Man. Those were the repeated sightings of what appears to be a man in a jetpack, flying over the Los Angeles area, usually near Los Angeles International Airport.

Jetpack Aviation has said that they don’t believe that the “Jetpack Man” has anything to do with them or their technology, with its founder saying in a TV interview that he believes the “Jetpack Man” is neither a jetpack nor a man, but rather likely a drone that is meant to look like a man with a jetpack.

However, Jetpack Aviation is now in the news for something completely unrelated.

The Drive reported this week that Jetpack Aviation has reached a deal to provide its JB-12 jetpacks, to “an unspecified Southeast Asian military.” The company told the site that it has sold two of the jetpacks to that military for $800,000.

The JB-12 is an update of the company’s previous model, the JB-11. The new model, unlike the old, is “specifically intended for military use.”

“The company does say that the JB12 weighs approximately 105 pounds, though it's unclear if this is an empty weight or with a full load of fuel, either kerosene or diesel. It is powered by six turbojet engines is capable of hitting a speed of around 120 miles per hour,” per the Drive. The JB-11 was heavier, with an empty weight of 115 pounds.

“The ratification of this deal demonstrates that the JB12 JetPack provides defense forces with exceptional aerial capabilities to fulfill a wide array of mission requirements. The maneuverability of the JetPack, its small form factor, which fits inside a set of standard Pelican cases, and ease of integration with our Speeder platform to complement the JB12’s capabilities, were all factors that informed the sale,” David Mayman, the company’s founder and CEO, said in the press release. “This order represents a significant step forward for us as it confirms that our development program is meeting military needs.”

The “Jetpack Man” was most recently sighted, once again in Los Angeles, in early August. Several pilots at LAX said they saw the familiar sight at the airport, about a year after his last appearance.

A Boeing 747 pilot reported seeing an object that might have resembled a jet pack 15 miles east of LAX at 5,000 feet altitude,” an FAA spokesman told Los Angeles’ ABC 7 at the time. “Out of an abundance of caution, air traffic controllers alerted other pilots in the vicinity.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters.

Kyle Mizokami

U.S. Military, Americas

Let's look at the overarching structure of U.S. special forces, and the diverse special operations units fielded by the U.S. Army.

Here's What You Need to Know: Members of special operations undergo extreme tests of physical and mental endurance.

The United State’s Special Operation Command (SOCOM) counts over 70,000 personnel drawn from elite units in the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps and Navy. At times it virtually resembles a fifth service of the U.S. military with its own aircraft, boats and support services.

Special operations forces are employed for high-risk missions where use of blunt conventional firepower is constrained by political or tactical factors, and where finesse and discretion are required. That includes ‘direct action’ missions such as hostage rescue and capture or assassination of critical enemy personnel, as well as communicating with and training regional allies, and performing reconnaissance deep inside hostile territory.

Members of special operations undergo extreme tests of physical and mental endurance as part of their training. Culturally, special ops units place greater emphasis on smarts and individual initiative, and eschew being labeled ‘soldiers’, instead calling themselves ‘operators’ or unit-specific titles like Raider, Ranger or SEAL.

In this first part of a two-part series, we’ll look at the overarching structure of U.S. special forces, and the diverse special operations units fielded by the U.S. Army.

The Elite within the Elite

U.S. special ops units fall broadly into two categories. Tier 2 and 3 units are usually assigned to service- or region-specific commands, operating only under the auspices of SOCOM when coordinating with other special forces units.

Meanwhile, Tier 1 units, also known as Special Missions Units, are directly commanded by the national-level Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which undertakes critical, classified missions approved at the highest level. For example, JSOC has organized task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to hunt down senior leaders of Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban.

Known Tier 1 units include the U.S. Army’s Delta Force, Ranger Regimental Reconnaissance Company, and Intelligence Support Activity; the Navy’s DEVGRU (SEAL Team 6); and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron. JSOC occasionally also integrates lower-tier units when necessary to fulfill operational requirements.

Special ops units also often work closely with U.S. civilian intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA’s shadowy Special Activities Division, which draws many of its personnel from the Special Ops community.

75th Ranger Regiment

The U.S. Army Rangers date back to six battalions formed during World War II. The Fifth Ranger battalion famously scaled a ninety-foot high cliff at Point du Hoc on D-Day to attack Nazi gun batteries, while the First, Third and Fourth were wiped out in the Battle of Anzio.

Today’s Rangers wear a tan beret and are grouped under the 75th Regiment, which itself traces its lineage to Merill’s Marauders, a unit known for its exploits fighting Japanese forces in China.

The regiment’s three Ranger Battalions are organized similarly to a conventional airborne infantry formation, However Rangers undergo a two-month intensive Ranger School where they wilderness fighting skills, with units focusing on desert, mountain and swamp terrain.

The Rangers specialize in combat missions that involve insertion of relatively large units into hostile territory—particularly seizing airports and other key installations, as well as killing or capturing enemy leaders. One Ranger battalion is always on standby for deployment overseas within eighteen hours.

The Ranger Special Troops Battalion includes the elite Regimental Reconnaissance Company with training in underwater as well as airborne insertion. This Tier 1 unit fields six-person teams that can direct air strikes at key targets, or serve as pathfinders that land ahead of an airborne force to locate and illuminate safe landing zones.

The Green Berets

First formed in the 1950s, standard Army Special Forces units are popularly known as the Green Berets. Though trained in a wide range of skills, the Green Berets particularly specialize recruiting, organizing and training local forces; and accompanying or leading them in combat operations supporting U.S. objectives. Such local allies could be members of a regular military unit like the Afghan or Iraqi Army, a tribal militia, or even an underground resistance force. 

Green Berets famously inserted into Afghanistan in 2001 road on horseback alongside local anti-Taliban fighters, coordinating their ground offensive with U.S. forces, and calling down airstrikes on points of resistance. In the anti-ISIS campaign, Green Berets worked closely with Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria.

While conventional military units depend on support units for fire support, transportation, medical care and resupply, Green Berets training emphasizes ability to operate independently of such structures for long periods of time as reflected by the sobriquet “Snake Eaters.”

Their training also emphasizes studying local cultures and their language and communication styles. For that reason, it’s sometimes styled a “thinking-man’s special forces”—though the term may need revision, given the branch admitted its first female operator in 2018.

The Green Berets operate in five regular and two National Guard Special Forces Groups tied to different regional commands, each fielding three or four battalions.

The basic Green Beret unit is the twelve-operator “A-Team,” led by a captain. Six A-Teams are assigned to each Special Forces Company, and seven companies in each battalion.

Delta Force

 Special Forces Operational Detachment D (SFOD-D) was founded in 1977, and remains the most elite and secretive of the Army’s special forces units. It focuses on direction action counter-terrorist missions such as hostage rescue and capture or killing of high value targets, as well as protection of high-ranking individuals

Delta operatives train on marksmanship, espionage, tactical driving, demolitions and infiltration skills. You can read more about the unit’s extreme training regimen in this earlier article. 

Delta Force is estimated to count roughly a thousand personnel, and has four operational “Saber Squadrons,” each with two assault troops and one reconnaissance troop. Support units include E Squadron, which flies light planes and helicopters on spy missions, G Squadron which performs advanced reconnaissance operations, and a Combat Support Squadron harboring technical specialists in demolitions, signals intelligence and so forth.

160th “Night Stalker” Special Operation Aviation Regiment

 In 1980, Delta Force’s first operation, a complicated attempt to rescue hostages in Iran, came crashing down in flames when a Marine helicopter collided with an Air Force refueling plane.

Afterwards, the Army decided it needed an elite helicopter unit to support its commandos and formed the 160th “Night Stalkers” regiment. The 160th has been involved in virtually every U.S. military conflict since, whether inserting Delta force commandos in Grenada, hunting down Iranian minelayers, dropping elite operatives into the war torn streets of Mogadishu, or flying under Pakistani radars carrying Navy SEALS on a mission to kill Bin Laden.

The first battalion of the 160th operates several types of scout/attack choppers. The MH-60 DAP gunships hefts a 30-millimeter chain gun and Stinger air-to-air and Hellfire anti-tank missiles. There are also diminutive AH-6 and MH-6 “Little Bird” choppers that can mount infrared sensors, minigun and rocket pods, and even external seating for up to four commandos.

The Second through Fourth battalions fly MH-60M Blackhawks and heavy MH-47G Chinook transport helicopters. These are specially modified with inflight-refueling capacity, low-altitude terrain-following radars for skimming close to the ground, and fast-rappelling ropes and hoists.

The 160th is also fields a “stealth” Blackhawk model incorporating radar-absorbent materials and other defensive upgrades.

The regiment’s nearly 200 aircraft are rounded out by two companies equipped with MQ-1C Predator surveillance drones.

Whenever the Pentagon need elite helicopter pilots for dangerous and/or clandestine missions, the 160th’s is likely involved.

Intelligence Support Activity

 The Army’s most obscure special-ops unit is the roughly 300-strong Intelligence Support Activity, formed in 1981, which has gone by various codenames over the years. The unit’s bland title is belied by its Tier-1 status.

ISA focuses on gathering human intelligence based on contact with field agents, and signals intelligence (intercepted communications) to support Delta Force and DEVGRU operations. 

ISA agents often are proficient in multiple relevant languages, and other skills traditionally associated with civilian intelligence-gathering activities. ISA operatives have scaled mountains in Afghanistan to listen in on Taliban radio communications and assisted with recon prior to the Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden.

A companion article will look at Special Operations units of the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, as well as recent challenges facing the Special Forces community.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Steven Lewis

David Axe

Great Power Competition, Americas

It's a possibility the U.S. military must prepare for.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In the event of war with the United States over disputed Pacific territories, Chinese forces likely would attempt to neutralize forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan and Guam and at sea, Goldsmith explained.

The U.S. military must find ways of defeating any attempt by China to launch surprise strikes using non-nuclear weapons, analyst Sam Goldsmith argued in a new article for Naval War College Review.

“China likely would aim to confine itself to the use of conventional weapons during any potential high-intensity conflict with the United States—particularly given that China already possesses a lethal array of long-range, conventional, theater-strike options,” Goldsmith wrote in “U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability.”

“Such a strategic, conventional, first-strike option is one that the United States should seek to deny China by developing an effective conventional access strategy.”

In the event of war with the United States over disputed Pacific territories, Chinese forces likely would attempt to neutralize forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan and Guam and at sea, Goldsmith explained.

Next, the People’s Liberation Army would attack U.S. reinforcements heading west to the Pacific theater, Goldsmith added.

In carrying out this strategy, the PLA will employ each of its four subordinate service branches: the PLA Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLAN submarines would execute undersea attacks against U.S. ships and submarines in port or at sea and strike at land targets with cruise missiles.

The PLAAF would execute air strikes against U.S. aircraft on the ground or in the air, as well as U.S. ships and submarines in port or at sea. Strikes against U.S. bases would occur with extended-range missiles launched from PLAAF combat aircraft or conventional ballistic missiles launched from the Chinese mainland.

“The U.S. military should consider introducing a conventional access strategy, designed specifically to balance the PLA’s counterintervention strategy,” Goldsmith proposed. “The purpose would be to provide the U.S. military with an improved capacity to deter a PLA conventional first strike, and, if necessary, degrade PLA capabilities with long-range conventional strike forces, to facilitate access for follow-on U.S. forces.”

A U.S. conventional access strategy would require four distinct capabilities. A theater-wide passive-defense capability would enhance the ability of forward-deployed U.S. forces to survive initial PLA conventional strikes.

A conventional theater-strike capability would enable the U.S. military to begin degrading PLA capabilities immediately at the outset of a conflict, without access to in-flight refueling tankers or usable runways.

A theater-recovery capability would restore basic runway access in the aftermath of PLA conventional strikes.

A rapid-response capability would allow long-range [U.S. Air Force] bombers and fighter escorts to deploy rapidly to U.S. bases in the western Pacific, capitalizing on freshly repaired runways as well as prepositioned stocks of aviation fuel and conventional earth-penetrating ordnance.

Consider Goldsmith’s proposal in light of a related plan that the Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments published in May 2019.

To blunt China’s advantage, CSBA analysts recommended the Pentagon pursue “a military strategy of maritime pressure, which includes a new inside-out defense operational concept.”

“The strategy of maritime pressure aims to persuade Chinese leaders that attempting military aggression in the Western Pacific will fail, thus discouraging them from trying it,” CSBA explained.

Some troops -- in particular, U.S. Army and Marine forces with mobile rocket launchers, supported by a few U.S. Navy ships and small contingents of U.S. Air Force warplanes -- would hunker down on and around islands near China, preparing to hit Chinese troops from inside China’s own expanding lines.

These “inside” forces would help poke holes in Chinese defenses that could help follow-on forces reach the combat zone.

It would be risky. “Implementing this inside-out defense concept will require some U.S. forces to operate and survive within range of Chinese missiles,” the analysts noted.

Goldsmith’s own proposal posits one approach to ensuring those inside forces can blunt and survive the initial Chinese onslaught and then receive reinforcements. Land-based rockets, rapid-repair capabilities and concepts for quickly deploying aerial reinforcements could help U.S. forces to recover from, and reverse, surprise Chinese advances.

David Axe served as defense editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared in 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

Caleb Larson

Drones,

The United States Air Force successfully conducted an unmanned test flight of a General Atomics Avenger drone—controlled not by a pilot on the ground, but rather by the Skyborg autonomy core system.

Here's What You Need to Remember: While the Air Force Skyborg autonomy core system is still in its infancy, the artificial intelligence piloting program is rapidly gaining experience, and could fly alongside manned pilots in the not-so-distant future.

The artificial intelligence pilot is steadily gaining experience and expanding the number of drones it can fly.

The United States Air Force successfully conducted an unmanned test flight of a General Atomics Avenger drone—controlled not by a pilot on the ground, but rather by the Skyborg autonomy core system. The flight came several months after the Skyborg technology flew a Kratos UTAP-22 Mako drone, and marked the second kind of aircraft that the autonomous piloting program is able to fly.

“This type of operational experimentation enables the Air Force to raise the bar on new capabilities, made possible by emerging technologies,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Dale White explained in an Air Force press release about the recent flight. “And this flight is a key milestone in achieving that goal.”

The Air Force Skyborg effort is in essence a complex artificial intelligence system that hopes to eventually allow low-cost, unmanned aerial platforms to fly in tandem with manned fighters. Having an autonomous, intelligent plane in the air alongside other Air Force platforms is of obvious benefit: by flying ahead of manned airplanes, unmanned and expendable airframes can be placed in high-risk airspace to fly scout and reconnaissance sorties to evaluate potential threats—or even, in theory, to pull the trigger on enemy aircraft or ground installations.

The Skyborg program however would like to take unmanned flight a step further. Rather than flying just one or several autonomous airplanes, the Air Force hopes that Skyborg could enable larger swarms of unmanned aircraft to fly in coordinated teams rather than just solo multiplying their combat effectiveness.

The General Atomics Avenger drone is one  of the company’s most advanced—and though company material on the drone does not state it explicitly—is thought to incorporate some radar-mitigating stealth features into its airframe. The Avenger utilizes a serpentine air intake duct intended to hide the engine's compressor blades from enemy radar and reduce potential radar return. In addition, the Avenger’s fuselage appears to be contoured in a stealthy fashion, and incorporates rectangular exhaust nozzles which are useful for preserving rearward stealth.

Air Force material on Skyborg is careful to state that Skyborg-flown unmanned systems would compliment rather than replace manned pilots, but will “provide them [pilots] with key data to support rapid, informed decisions.” In this way, Skyborg could “provide manned teammates with greater situational awareness and survivability during combat missions.”

“Flying the Skyborg ACS on platforms from two different manufacturers demonstrates the portability of the Government-owned autonomy core, unlocking future multi-mission capabilities for the Joint Force,” Maj. Gen. Heather Pringle, Commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory as the Skyborg Technology Executive Officer explained.

So while the Air Force Skyborg autonomy core system is still in its infancy, the artificial intelligence piloting program is rapidly gaining experience, and could fly alongside manned pilots in the not-so-distant future.

Caleb Larson is a defense writer with the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture.

This article was first published earlier this year and is being reposted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters 

Dan Goure

Defense Contracting,

How is antitrust legislation connected to national security?

Here's what you need to know: There is a real danger in allowing the FTC to set the kinds of limits on vertical mergers that it is seeking in the case of Illumina and Grail. Not only could this impair the ability of the medical system to detect cancers more easily, but it could also set a dangerous precedent for vertical mergers in the defense, aerospace, and other sectors.

The defense and aerospace sector is in the midst of overlapping structural and technological revolutions. The Department of Defense (DoD), with strong Congressional support, is pushing defense companies to be more innovative. The military services have also taken up the mantra of calling for faster change and greater innovation. Emblematic of this drive was the first strategic message to his service by the Air Force Chief of Staff General C.Q. Brown titled “Accelerate Change or Lose.”

The change to which he is referring will be comprehensive: organizational, operational, and technological. The DoD is supporting this effort to move faster and be more innovative by adopting new ways of contracting with the private sector, and by creating special funds to help small, innovative companies enter the defense market.

An important tool that contributes to the private sector being more innovative and accelerating change is mergers and acquisitions. In response to the trend of reduced defense spending, as well as reductions in the number of major programs, the defense and aerospace sector has been in a continuous state of consolidation since the end of the Cold War.

In addition, until the recent drive toward shortening acquisition timelines, major programs often took fifteen years or more to go from initial design to full-rate production. Scale and financial resources were also important for the ability of defense companies to survive changes in national security priorities or decisions to cancel major acquisition programs. Therefore, small and mid-sized firms often found it extremely difficult to thrive in the defense and aerospace sector. As a result of these factors, the number of major prime contractors has shrunk to, at best, two or three companies in each defense subsector.

Mergers and acquisitions will continue to be an important tool for defense and aerospace companies in accelerating change, improving their performance, reducing costs, and providing the rapid innovation demanded by the Pentagon. Recent examples include the merger of L3 and Harris; the merger between Raytheon and United Technologies; the acquisition of Sanders Electronics from Lockheed Martin by BAE Systems; the acquisition of OrbitalATK by Northrop Grumman; and finally, the proposed acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne by Lockheed Martin.

But where mergers and acquisitions may be particularly significant is in bringing unique products to bear on critical defense problems. The acquisition of small and mid-sized companies (particularly those without a foothold in the defense sector) by larger firms is an important way of providing them with the access to customers, financial and human resources, and management support required to enter and survive in the defense market.

Over the past several years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has pursued several misguided antitrust investigations and suits. One of these was against Qualcomm, despite senior DoD officials warning that this would harm national security. The recurring theme in these actions is the need to reign in corporations based on size or market presence. This reflects a growing sentiment at the FTC that corporate success as reflected in size or dominant performance is suspect. As a recent Wall Street Journal editorial observed, the premise of the new approach is that “big is bad.”

Efforts by the FTC to impose outdated antitrust standards on companies involved in multi-year defense procurement contracts could pose a direct threat to national security. Only companies that are uniquely capable of designing, developing, and producing sophisticated stealth fighters, such as the F-35, or secure cloud environments that operate from headquarters in the U.S., such as the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) system, can ever meet DoD’s strict requirements to do so.

These companies need experience, scale, a breadth of talented personnel, and deep pockets. When it comes to bringing commercial products to the defense marketplace, it is also important to have experience in navigating the labyrinth of defense acquisition regulations, accounting standards, and approaches to funding.

It is common for innovative start-ups to focus intensely on developing and proving their technologies. They may expend all their resources to get one prototype developed. Smaller or newer companies may lack the personnel and resources to move their business from the laboratory to manufacturing and distribution. In addition, when it comes to entering the defense marketplace, such companies face additional headwinds if they must wait the eighteen months to two years it often takes to get money for their specific technology included in the defense budget.

This is one example of how innovative smaller companies can be set up to succeed through being acquired by a larger prime contractor. When the merger involves vertical, rather than horizontal, integration, the result is not a reduction in competition but rather an increase in efficiency and lower costs to the customer. The standard approach in a vertical merger is to address any potential competitive issues with behavioral remedies, such as contracts to guarantee pricing or access. These remedies have been proposed by Lockheed Martin in response to criticisms of its proposed acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne

This is where the FTC’s tendency to presume harm even where none can be proven goes beyond constituting a national security threat. It can also harm the nation’s health. For example, the FTC is opposing the effort by biotech corporation Illumina to reacquire another biotech company it had spun off some years earlier, Grail, which has developed a biopsy screening test capable of identifying more than fifty different cancers.

Illumina had branched off from Grail some years back. As in the cases of larger defense firms acquiring smaller companies that lack the resources to fully support their own innovations, Illumina can provide the support needed for Grail’s new technology to reach a global market. Any concerns about the impact of the acquisition competition can be addressed through corrective measures, which Illumina has already proposed.

There is a real danger in allowing the FTC to set the kinds of limits on vertical mergers that it is seeking in the case of Illumina and Grail. Not only could this impair the ability of the medical system to detect cancers more easily, but it could also set a dangerous precedent for vertical mergers in the defense, aerospace, and other sectors.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a Vice President of the Lexington Institute. He served in the Pentagon during the George H.W. Administration and has taught at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities and the National War College. You can follow him on Twitter @dgoure and you can follow the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC

This article first appeared earlier in 2021 and is being reprinted due to reader interest. 

Image:  Reuters

David Axe

F-14 Tomcat, Middle East

The AIM-54 Phoenix is one of the most powerful air-to-air missiles ever.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The only country successfully to wield the AIM-54 in combat has been Iran, which in the early 1970s acquired 79 F-14s and hundreds of Phoenixes from the United States.

The U.S. Navy’s AIM-54 Phoenix, the exclusive long-range weapon of the F-14 Tomcat fighter, is one of the most powerful air-to-air missiles ever to exist.

Thirteen feet long and weighing 1,000 pounds, the rocket-propelled, radar-guided AIM-54 flew at Mach five as high as 80,000 feet while carrying a devastating, 135-pound warhead over a range of more than 100 miles.

Former Navy F-14 pilot Francesco Chierici called the Phoenix “a lethal sledgehammer of a missile.”

But in more than 30 years of U.S. service ending with the type’s retirement from Navy service in the mid-2000s, American Tomcats fired just three AIM-54s in anger. All in 1999 while targeting Iraqi aircraft violating a U.N. no-fly zone.

None of those Phoenixes struck their targets.

The only country successfully to wield the AIM-54 in combat has been Iran, which in the early 1970s acquired 79 F-14s and hundreds of Phoenixes from the United States.

Iranian Tomcats fired many AIM-54s at Iraqi planes during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that began on Sept. 22, 1980. But it’s possible the first Iranian Phoenix kill actually took place before full-scale fighting broke out.

In the fall of 1980, as tensions escalated, Iranian jets flew limited strikes on Iraqi forces just across the border opposite Iran. F-14s flew top cover.

According to aviation historian Tom Cooper, on Sept. 9, 1980, Iranian Tomcat pilot Mohammed-Reza Ataayee and a wingman were protecting a formation of F-4Es bombing Iraqi positions near the border. “My back-seater was 1st Lt. Sultan Pasha-Pour,” Ataayee told Cooper.

Back then, I was a major and the second Tomcat was piloted by Maj. Shahram Rostami … The ground radar announced to us one target that was approaching the border and closing fast, and asked us if it is possible for us to engage it.

At the time the government had given us strict orders to never stray over the border or engage in cross-border combats, in order to give Saddam Hussein no excuse for an invasion. We were to engage only if they violated our airspace. Then we had the right to engage and destroy them.

I told the radar I will head toward TFB.4 [Tactical Fighter Base 4, near Dezful] to land and refuel. After refueling, we took off from Dezful and I was immediately alerted that there was an aircraft roughly 50 or so miles away, in a northern direction.

I saw that this target was coming from direction of Hamedan, meaning from north to south. I asked the radar are you sure it is a foe and not a friend. They said stand by so they could check the status of the target, but after a short delay the radar said, ‘No, this is definitely an enemy.’ For us it was hard to imagine an Iraqi pilot would be as brazen as to enter our airspace. Until then, the Iraqis never had the guts to do so.

I told my [back-seat radar-intercept officer] Pasha-Pour to launch a missile at this target. After a quick pause I repeated my order. He told me to do it. I told him to do it. Finally, he pushed the button.

Because I flew F-5s earlier, I was used to seeing the missile going off the wingtip rails and accelerate really fast. I never fired an AIM-54 before and did not know what a Phoenix launch actually felt like. Once Pasha-Pour pushed the button, I could see nothing. I only heard the sound of something detaching from the belly of my aircraft. I told Pasha-Pour that I think that, unfortunately, the missile malfunctioned and fell to the earth.

Thus I inverted my aircraft to see what was going on below and saw the missile falling away. But then I saw it releasing a smoke trail … only then did I recall that the launch sequence took several seconds.

I rolled out and got back to checking the radar, and saw the countdown until the missile would hit. This was counting down — five, four, three, two, one then zero. And then I saw the target disappear from my radar. The ground radar called to congratulate — that poor guy nearly fainted in excitement!’

The Iranian air force officially credited Ataayee with a kill of an Iraqi Sukhoi Su-20M flown by pilot named Faysal Abdul-Fattah Abdul Rahman, Cooper explained.

But Iraq never actually operated any Su-20Ms. In 1980 it did however operate Su-20s -- not M-models -- that Iraq bought from the Soviet Union in 1973.

According to one Iraqi government study that Cooper cited, the first Iraqi loss in the conflict with Iran was an Su-22 flown by No. 44 squadron commander Maj. Noubar Abdel-Hamid Al Hamadani, shot down on Sept. 14, 1980.

“While the [Iranian] F-14 crew certainly had good reason to claim its first kill on Sept. 9, 1980, currently it remains unknown if Ataayee and Pasha-Pour really scored the first-ever kill by an AIM-54,” Cooper wrote.

“It’s possible that this honor belongs to 1st Lt. Fereydoon-Ali Mazandarani and 1st Lt. Qassem Soltani, who claimed to have shot down a MiG-23 with an AIM-54 on Sept. 17, 1980.”

David Axe served as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article first appeared in 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

Defiant X, Americas

Here's what we know about the program.

Here's What You Need to Know: The Army is looking for a new helicopter.

Most Army and industry weapons experts, engineers and innovators may not use the word “stealth” when describing the service’s emerging Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (helicopter) program, yet developers are clear to discuss the merits of thermal signature management and finding ways to lower the aircraft’s radar signature.

The Director of Army Futures Command Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional team described this in an interesting and impactful way when referring to the kinds of innovative engineering methods employed in the construction of new, less-detectable helicopters now developing for the 2030s.

“We know how to hide in the radar clutter and we understand how that generates standoff and overmatch,” Rugen told The National Interest last year.

An essay by Lockheed-Sikorsky-Boeing on its new DEFIANT X cites airframe enhancements to “improve aerodynamics and reduce the thermal signature.”

“We optimized the design based upon the Army’s requirements. We have done quite a bit to the design and made enhancements to reduce the thermal signature and make changes to the exhaust system,” Jay Macklin, Sikorsky business development director, Future Vertical Lift, told The National Interest in an interview.

Certainly, a cursory look at the airframe of a DEFIANT X appears to reveal a smooth and gradually curved or rounded radar evading external configuration.

The absence of hard edges, protruding structures or sharply angular structures minimize the fidelity of any kind of radar return signal. This is because electromagnetic “pings” need to generate return signals from such hard, angular surfaces to offer renderings of an aircraft’s size, shape, speed and angle of approach.

Multiple pings from different sharp or detectable shapes give radar commanders a much clearer picture of the “dimensions” to a given aircraft. The DEFIANT X also has very thin wing-like structures and, interestingly, central rotor blade structures melded directly into the aircraft.

Essentially, there is no easily detectable “pole” or protruding vertical structure leading from the body up to the rotor blades, something which could generate a more specific or recognizable radar return “shape” rendering.

Thermal management is also of great value, as the more the temperature of an aircraft and the surrounding air blend in with or align with that of the surrounding atmosphere, the more difficult it will be for thermal imaging, heat-seeking sensors to locate it. This means the lower and less detectable the heat emissions or exhaust coming from the helicopter are, the stealthier it can be.

Low radar observability can also be thought of in terms of tactical maneuver as well, given that utility helicopters such as a Black Hawk often fly lower to the ground along a specific, less detectable trajectory. The higher a helicopter is above the ground, the more exposed it might be to longer-range radar “pings” traveling through the air as being at greater altitude increases the aperture or field of view available to radar systems.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article first appeared in March 2021.

Image: Lockheed Martin

Peter Suciu

Aircraft Carriers, World

The entire concept isn't flawed though.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Aircraft carriers on the water are protected by destroyers and submarines, and unless similar craft could be built to fly alongside this "mother ship" it couldn't be properly protected. Even with such screening aircraft, it isn't too hard to see how a missile or just a "kamikaze" could all too easily take out such a craft.

In theory, it probably seems like a perfect solution, a carrier that can fly over land and water and become a floating base in the sky. It is unlikely however that such a weapon platform would, or even could be constructed. Forgetting the fact that the scale of such a craft would likely bankrupt a small nation, it would require a construction facility to be purpose-built just to handle the project, and much of the technology to keep it afloat remains well beyond reality.

However, the concept of an aircraft carrier in the sky has been something military thinkers have considered but in far less high-tech ways than movie magic allows.

The U.S. Navy was actually the first to pioneer the concept of a flying carrier, and it began construction of two rigid airships, the USS Macon and the USS Akron, in the late 1920s. Neither of these airships had a runway, but instead, each carried five lightweight Curtiss F9C Sparrowhawk biplane fighters that could be launched and recovered through a hook system that lowered them into the airstream.

The airships had some advantages. They were twice as fast as surface ships of the era, could fly over land and could see much further over the horizon than any surface ship. But each also had some serious disadvantages, the biggest being that bad weather made the airships difficult to control and essentially grounded them. Tragically both airships suffered notable accidents—in April 1933, USS Akron crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New Jersey killing seventy-three out of seventy-six personnel on board; while two years later USS Macon suffered a less serious crash, which killed two of its eighty-three crew and passengers.

The United States Air Force considered a flying carrier concept during the Cold War, but it was far less ambitious and involved a Republic F-84 "parasite" fighter that could be launched from the belly of a B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bomber for reconnaissance operations. This was followed by a slightly more ambitious plan that would transform the interior of a Boeing 747-200 into a hanger in the sky for a dozen or so small jet fighters that could be launched and recovered. This one never went further than the planning stage. While the Flight Dynamics Laboratory claimed it was possible –how possible or practical remains the issue.

All of these concepts were seriously flawed and were really attempts to find a solution for a problem that didn't exist. To put it bluntly, there is no reason to develop a flying aircraft carrier because there simply is no need for a flying aircraft carrier. Long-range bombers can reach any point on the globe already, and a flying aircraft carrier would be a flying target.

Aircraft carriers on the water are protected by destroyers and submarines, and unless similar craft could be built to fly alongside this "mother ship" it couldn't be properly protected. Even with such screening aircraft, it isn't too hard to see how a missile or just a "kamikaze" could all too easily take out such a craft.

This doesn't mean the entire concept is flawed though.

A more realistic solution might be one conceived by defense contractor Dynetics, with support from DARPA. It involved launching an X-61A Gremlin Air Vehicle—an unmanned drone—from a C-130 Hercules that could be used in a variety of missions including reconnaissance but it isn't too hard to see how it could be utilized in a combat role as well.

The ability to launch and recover a drone at least offers the very practical ability to send a drone to regions not otherwise readily accessible. But for now, the flying aircraft carrier is best left in comic books and the movies.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article first appeared in 2020 and is being reprinted for reader interest.

Image: Flickr

Charlie Gao

T-80,

But how do Korean tankers think the T-80U stacks up against the Korean tanks, which were designed with a more Western philosophy?

Here's What You Need to Remember: The lack of modernization due to the foreign nature of the parts for the tank and lack of will to “domesticize” a foreign design impeded the T-80U from being fully embraced by the South Korean military. As a result, nowadays Korean tankers don’t find the T-80U to be favorable, as it’s still a relic. But it is one that served admirably, and even contributed to the K2 Black Panther project when it was in its infancy.

One of the great ironies of the military balance in the Koreas is the fact that South Korea operates more advanced Russian tanks than North Korea. This situation came about in the 1990s after Russia inherited a $1.5 billion debt to South Korea. A deal was made: Russia would give many items of then top-of-the-line military equipment, in exchange for South Korea canceling 50 percent of Russia’s debt. Interestingly, this included the T-80U Main Battle Tank. Nowadays, South Korea fields three “modern” main battle tanks, the T-80U and the indigenous K1 and K2. But how do Korean tankers think the T-80U stacks up against the Korean tanks, which were designed with a more Western philosophy?

In a pure technical comparison, the T-80U lags behind the K1A1 and K1A2. The T-80U has been kept in a relatively stock configuration, while the K1A1 and K2 have been receiving upgrades from the Korean defense industry. While the T-80U has a Day/Night panoramic commander’s sight in the PNK-4S, the K1A1 and K2 both have thermal commander sights. The Korean defense industry puts out the modern M279 APFSDS round for the 120-millimeter cannons of the K1A1 and the K2, but the T-80U is still using imported Russian ammunition. The K2 also has many features that the T-80U doesn’t have, being one of the newest MBTs in the world.

The reliability of the T-80U also doesn’t gain it favors in South Korean service. Reports state that the T-80U’s reliability isn’t the best, although it is better than the BMP-3. Although some T-80U parts, such as the tracks, are produced in South Korea, the majority of parts must be ordered from abroad. The cost of ordering replacement parts from Russia has been steadily increasing over the years (with the cost of some parts doubling or tripling from 1996 to 2006), so many in the South Korean government are considering getting rid of the T-80U to cut maintenance costs.

Not all is bad, though. Koreans do report some advantages over the K1A1 and K2 domestic tanks. The T-80U’s engine has better acceleration performance and is lighter than the domestic tanks due to its turbine nature. Unfortunately, this also makes it consume more fuel. The reduced weight compared to domestic also allows it to be more nimble in the mountains of Korea.

Soldiers who crewed the T-80U generally didn’t have nice things to say about it. The more cramped internal design compared to the K1A1 and K2 could seem claustrophobic, and in gunnery, the T-80U was found to underperform the domestic tanks, both in accuracy and in reload speed.

However, one must take into account the time period in which these criticisms were made. Most soldiers who made these comments compared the T-80U to the K1A1, which only started seeing service in 2001. Compared to the original K1 tank which was Korea’s most advanced tank at the time, the T-80U possessed far more advantages, packing a 125-millimeter gun to the K1’s 105-millimeter, as well as better advanced armor technology. The T-80U was the most advanced tank on the Korean Peninsula when they first arrived. The lack of modernization due to the foreign nature of the parts for the tank and lack of will to “domesticize” a foreign design impeded the T-80U from being fully embraced by the South Korean military. As a result, nowadays Korean tankers don’t find the T-80U to be favorable, as it’s still a relic. But it is one that served admirably, and even contributed to the K2 Black Panther project when it was in its infancy.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in 2019 and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Great Power Competition, Asia

It would be funny if it wasn't such a dangerous idea.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Cancian ignores the possibility that China might retaliate against American privateering by issuing letters of marque to its own seafarers. 

China has a 9,000-mile coastline and, by one recent count, the world’s second-largest merchant fleet after Greece’s. Thousands of ships in all.

So how could the United States even hope to blockade China and starve its economy during a major war?

One retired U.S. Marine has an idea, and it’s not a good one. Privateers.

“Privateering, authorized by letters of marque, could offer a low-cost tool to enhance deterrence in peacetime and gain an advantage in wartime,” Mark Cancian proposed in an article in Proceedings, the professional journal of the U.S. Naval Institute.

“In wartime, privateers could swarm the oceans and destroy the maritime industry on which China’s economy—and the stability of its regime—depend. The mere threat of such a campaign might strengthen deterrence and thereby prevent a war from happening at all.”

Never mind that, in deploying privateers, the United States might invite privateering along its own shores.

Privateers, in essence, are pirates, albeit pirates with official state sponsorship. In past centuries, governments often authorized, via “letters of marque,” private seafarers to arm themselves and attack rivals’ merchant ships.

The privateers kept the spoils. The sponsoring government benefited from the economic hit its enemy took from each seizure.

Modern privateering “would attack an asymmetric vulnerability of China, which has a much larger merchant fleet than the United States,” Cancian wrote. “Indeed, an attack on Chinese global trade would undermine China’s entire economy and threaten the regime’s stability. Finally, despite pervasive myths to the contrary, U.S. privateering is not prohibited by U.S. or international law.”

Hiring private raiders would be faster than expanding the Navy, Cancian argued. “Letters of marque could be issued quickly, with privateers on the hunt within weeks of the start of a conflict. By contrast, it would take four years to build a single new combatant for the Navy.”

Cancian in his article acknowledged one of the greatest risks privateering could pose to law and order and American credibility in the world. As the Pentagon learned the hard way during the Iraq war, mercenaries can be difficult to regulate and control. And they can be unpredictable.

In 2007, gunmen working for private military company Blackwater murdered 17 civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square. The incident soured U.S.-Iraqi relations and alienated American troops from the very people they were trying to protect.

But Cancian stressed the benefits of recruiting for-profit maritime forces. “The existing private military industry would doubtless jump at the chance to privateer,” he wrote.

“Dozens of companies currently provide security services, from the equivalent of mall guards to armed antipiracy contingents on ships. A large pool of potential recruits has shown willingness to work for private contractors. At the height of the Iraq war, for example, the United States employed 20,000 armed contractors in security jobs.”

Cancian ignores the possibility that China might retaliate against American privateering by issuing letters of marque to its own seafarers. The former Marine seems to think that the United States’s relatively small merchant marine, numbering just 250 U.S.-flagged ships, makes it all but impervious to privateering. “Even if China threatens to dispatch its own privateers, U.S. vulnerability is comparatively small.”

But those 250 U.S.-flagged ships aren’t the only merchant vessels that the United States relies on for trade. Indeed, the U.S. merchant marine is deceptively small because the U.S. tax code and regulations incentivize shippers to flag their vessels under foreign flags.

If China authorized privateering, the raiders could target all shippers serving U.S. ports, not just shippers with U.S.-flagged vessels. The simple truth is that the United States depends on foreign trade nearly as much as China does, and that trade mostly travels in ships.

Privateering would release for-profit killers on the world’s oceans in the same way the so-called “war on terror” released for-profit killers on America’s foreign battlefields. The consequences likely would be ugly.

David Axe served as defense editor of The National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.