The National Interest

James Stevenson

History, Europe

It’s hard to blame strategic bombing advocates for crediting the aerial onslaught for the surrender — and credit it they did. But the fallacy in this post hoc thinking derives from the belief that the order of events was the cause of the result without considering other factors.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The concept of "strategic bombing" is a good one - deprive an enemy of his ability to manufacture military equipment, and you deprive him of his ability to wage war. If used correctly, strategic bombing could shorten wars without costing soldiers' lives. That was the theory, anyway.

In the years after World War I, the brain trust of the U.S. Army evolved two conflicting opinions on how best to apply air power in the next war.

The Army Air Corps’ emerging bomber faction believed directly attacking the vital centers of a country, instead of bombing combat troops, was the best solution. This theory held that destroying an enemy’s war-making capabilities, its will to wage war, would lead to victory without the need to risk soldiers or even spend money on them.

These beliefs were incorporated into the phrase “strategic bombing,” pioneered by Giulio Douhet, an Italian military theorist who in the 1920s argued — horrifyingly — for the widespread use of chemical and biological weapons. Douhet later served as chief of aviation under Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini.

The second group looked to aviation as a kind of mobile artillery to support ground troops. After all, no one ever won a war without troops conquering territory — so the addition of aerial artillery would make soldiers that much more effective.

This thinking coalesced around the phrase “army cooperation” in the United Kingdom and “close air support” in the United States.

In the spring of 1943, American and British forces successfully defeated the German and Italian armies in North Africa. This experience informed U.S. Gen. Pete Quesada and others who wished to experiment in the unperfected art of “close air support” that would pay off once the invasion of France began.

But first, the Allies’ strategic bombing advocates wanted to put their theories to the test.

The occasion came during planning for the invasion of Sicily and mainland Italy. The first stop was Pantelleria, an island that been occupied in the distant past by Carthaginians, Romans, Moors and Normans, and which Mussolini had made into a penal colony.

The onslaught on this small, 32-square-mile island — 10 square miles larger than Manhattan — was known as Operation Corkscrew. It would have been a trivial footnote in history except that it appeared to offer an opportunity to provide ostensible evidence that bombing alone can win wars.

Thus, the bombing of Pantelleria became an experiment, one anticipated to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that bombing would ratify what up to then had been a matter of faith, but would soon offer proof that through bombing alone, surrender was a certainty.

“All these forces were assembled to test the assertion that if you destroy what a man has, and remove the possibility of his bringing more in, then in due course of time, it becomes impossible for him to defend himself,” Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle said.

If bombing alone did not force a surrender, the Allies planned to invade the island by June 11. In an attempt to avoid the need for an invasion, the Allies generated 5,284 sorties, dropping a total of 12.4 million pounds of bombs on Pantelleria.

The Allies’ rain of bombs began on May 8, 1943. As June 11 approached, cannons from five British cruisers and seven destroyers intensified the downpour.

In some respects, the presence of warships contaminated the results of the strategic bombing test, but one could look the other way and pretend the ships’ guns were the functional equivalent of small bombs.

“I want to make the capture of Pantelleria a sort of laboratory to determine the effect of concentrated heavy bombing on a defended coastline,” Gen. Dwight Eisenhower told Gen. George Marshall.

“When the time comes we are going to concentrate everything we have to see whether damage to material, personnel and morale cannot be made so serious as to make a landing a rather simple affair.”

The person in charge of the aerial operation, Lt. Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, had been convinced of the strategic bombing theory for a long time. He believed that if you knew where to drop enough bombs, you could have a decisive result.

“Spaatz … committed to the assault the entire Strategic Air Force and part of the Tactical Air Force, an armada of four heavy-bomber groups, seven medium-bomber groups, two light-bomber groups, and eight fighter groups, a total of … [1,017] operational aircraft,” Wesley Craven and James Cate wrote in the official history Army Air Forces in World War II.

“Against this concentration the Axis had 900 operational combat planes within range of the island, most of them committed to tasks other than defending Pantelleria.”

On June 11, the Italians surrendered — 33 days after the bombing began.

It’s hard to blame strategic bombing advocates for crediting the aerial onslaught for the surrender — and credit it they did. But the fallacy in this post hoc thinking derives from the belief that the order of events was the cause of the result without considering other factors.

For one, the Allied bombers were virtually unopposed for more than a month. Allied bomber crews would face a far bloodier situation during the strategic bombing campaign in the heavily-defended skies above Germany.

The results were also unanticipated. The 11,000 defending Italian soldiers on Pantelleria dug in deeper and twice refused requests to surrender. However, when Allied troops finally began their approach to the island, the Italians gave up.

Secondly, the Italian troops — along with a handful of Germans — did not mount a robust anti-aircraft defense.

“In the opinion of a small group of captured Luftwaffe technicians, a company of German soldiers would have made a better showing than” all the Italians, a 1959 Air Force historical review stated. Had the defenders been all German, the bombers would have “been less successful.”

But the bombing itself was hardly successful. It inflicted little damage on the island’s coastal defenses and anti-aircraft batteries, and the damage which did exist could have been repaired by a determined crew.

Around 22 percent of the B-17 Flying Fortresses involved in the bombing hit their targets within a 100 yard radius. “For the medium bombers,” the review noted, “approximately 6.4 percent, … [and] for light and fighter-bombers about 2.6 percent.”

The abysmal and unopposed performance should have been a warning of how much worse bombing accuracy would become over Germany with fighter and flak opposition, particularly in the winter months, rather than a celebration of the proof that strategic bombing alone would force a surrender.

Claiming Pantelleria was a strategic bombing success is like a basketball team bragging about successfully making unopposed layups.

According to one of Eisenhower’s biographers, the bombing of Pantelleria was “one of the greatest examples of overkill of the war.”

Eisenhower’s comments to Britain’s Fleet Adm. Andrew Cunningham aboard the cruiser HMS Aurora tends to confirm the “overkill” comments. “Andrew, why don’t you and I get into a boat together and row ashore on our own,” Eisenhower said. “I think we can capture the island without any of these soldiers.”

The experience on Pantelleria also refuted one of Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold’s “truisms” scattered throughout his autobiography, Global Mission. “Normally it takes five years from the time the designer has an idea until the plane is delivered to combatants,” Arnold wrote.

Pantelleria was an exception. A group of A-36 Apaches — a ground support variant of the P-51 Mustang — took part within seven months of the plane’s first flight and less than three years after the P-51’s first flight. A-36s would make 138 sorties over the island, dropping 57.5 tons of ordnance.

Finally, Eisenhower clearly wasn’t convinced that bombers alone could win wars — because he continued to rely on massed ground forces for the invasion of France the following year.

The Allies landed in Sicily and continued to the Italian mainland, landing there on Sept. 3, 1943. Italy capitulated five days later.

The speed with which Italy surrendered, six times faster than Pantelleria, might also be an insight into a country’s “will to wage war.” Forty days prior, Mussolini had been ousted and arrested. That likely had more to do with collapsing Italy’s will to wage war than bombing from above.

This article by James Stevenson originally appeared at War is Boring in 2016 and first appeared on TNI several years ago.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

With more than 100,000 soldiers deployed across a border stretching nearly 550 miles (872 km) at heights well over 15,000 feet above sea level where temperatures could soon drop to minus 30 degrees Celsius, it has been described as a frontline without parallel in modern military history. After months of a build-up of forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian Army and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) fortunately aren't fighting one another – but now as winter has set in both sides are battling an extreme cold as well as boredom and increased fatigue.

With more than 100,000 soldiers deployed across a border stretching nearly 550 miles (872 km) at heights well over 15,000 feet above sea level where temperatures could soon drop to minus 30 degrees Celsius, it has been described as a frontline without parallel in modern military history. After months of a build-up of forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian Army and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) fortunately aren't fighting one another – but now as winter has set in both sides are battling an extreme cold as well as boredom and increased fatigue.

In addition to the extreme cold, where even touching bare metal can be hazardous, soldiers must deal with equally extreme wind chills brought on by the high-speed winds that whip down from the mountains across the Ladakh Valley. According to a report from The Indian Express, all of this is exacerbated by the rarefied atmosphere, which comes from a combination of lack of oxygen and a function of the altitude. Past deployments of Indian forces along the LAC saw an attrition rate as high as 20 percent, mostly due to medical-based non-fatal causalities.

The falling temperatures can bring on frostbite, snow-blindness, chilblain, and even peeling of skin due to the extremely dry conditions – while most soldiers will still face nausea, headaches, and disorientation. Maintaining readiness is a challenge both the Indian Army and the PLA face.

On the Indian side of the LAC, soldiers wear bulky layers of clothing to stay warm but that can impact efficacy and notably affect mobility. Keeping the soldiers fed is a problem, as it is impossible to bring in fresh fruit or vegetables, but even canned food is a problem as it is difficult to consume too much in the altitudes. Instead, soldiers rely on a very high caloric diet of fruits, dried fruits, and even chocolates.

The Chinese PLA forces may have it slightly better, as Beijing has rushed in pre-fabricated dormitories to address the extremely low morale that comes with the extremely low temperatures. To bolster the spirits of the men serving along the LAC, the PLA has provided recreation centers that include fitness facilities, heated swimming pools, hot tubs, and even libraries with computers and video game systems to help address the boredom and general malaise that have set in.

Both sides are reportedly facing a shortage of specialized cold climate clothing.

Despite the harsh conditions, neither side has shown a break in their resolve even as talks to deescalate have continued. Instead, India and China have continued to deploy more units and heavy equipment to the poorly demarcated border region. By some accounts, Indian and Chinese tanks are just 400 meters apart at some spots.

India has reportedly deployed numerous T-72 and T-80 tanks, along with BMP-2 armored personnel carriers (APCs) that can run on a special fuel mix designed specifically for the high altitudes and low temperatures. China meanwhile has deployed its specially-designed T-15 light tank and T-99 main battle tank to the region.

While neither side seems ready to escalate the standoff into a full-blown war, as neither side will back down, the biggest threat now is the extreme cold. There will likely be only losers this winter, even if neither side actually fires its guns in anger.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Peter Suciu

Security, Europe

What does the Greek military plan to do with the armored vehicles?

The Greek military could soon have some slightly used “Guardians” to help protect its rugged countryside. Over the summer the U.S. Congress approved the sale of 1,200 used 4x4 M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) at what can only be described as a truly discounted price, and those vehicles could soon be headed to Greece. The ASVs had been used by U.S. Army military police units, and were offered to Greece for around 70,000 euros ($83,700) each—which is a considerable savings for cash-strapped Athens, as the vehicles originally cost $800,000 a piece to produce.

However, the sale price to the Greek military didn’t include the platform’s armaments, so Athens will have to supply its own machine guns and grenade launchers. Yet, even in used condition and without armaments the M1117 could be just what the Greek military needs—an affordable platform with plenty of spare parts to ensure that the Guardians will remain operational for years, even decades, to come.

Light Rugged Vehicle

The 4x4 wheeled armored vehicle platform was developed by Textron Marine & Land Systems’ (TMYL) Cadillac Gage in the late 1990s for the United States Military Police Corps, and the first prototypes were delivered in 1997. The M1117 entered serial production in late 1999 and was ready for deployment just as the United States became involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Guardian was widely deployed in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where it was involved as mission essential equipment, and provided operational capability in both missions.

In fact, it was serendipitous that the M1117 was actually one of the first American military vehicles to be built with a specialized mine-resistant hull. It was produced with armor that can withstand a 5kg mine explosion and even stand up to 155mm artillery blasts that are as close as fifteen meters from the vehicle. The floor shield was also sloped to expel any explosive power generated by mines, while the sloping also helped the vehicle to traverse through water and mud.

The Guardian was developed with rugged terrain in mind and this included an 8.3-liter Cummins diesel engine that produces 260 hp, and offers top speed of around sixty mph off road, while it was also fitted with run-flat tires. The vehicle provides 360-degree vision for the crew, features an air-conditioning system to ensure comfort in extreme summer heat—all features that were welcome in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The vehicles provided protection to military police crews from small arms fire and mines but also offered quick insertion capability and maneuverability in urban areas. The M1117 was developed with worldwide deployment in mind, and was made to be compatible with the C-130 cargo plane. In fact, five of the vehicles could be accommodated in a single C-17 aircraft. Even today it has continued to be the only combat vehicle that can roll on and off while remaining combat loaded.

M1117 Variants

Textron has produced several variants of the M1117 Guardian including an infantry carrier, which has a crew of two and can carry eight passengers; a command and control vehicle, which is also able to carry a crew of two as well as four battle staff; a recovery vehicle; a Reconnaissance Surveillance & Target Acquisition (RSTA); and ambulance version.

Additionally, Textron developed the M1200 Armored Knight FiST-V (Fire Support Team Vehicle), which was designed using the Guardian ASV as a base. It featured a sensor package, which can locate and assign targets for indirect fire and laser-guided weapons. Most of the M1200 variants have been used in operations in Iraq.

It isn’t clear which of the M1117 Guardian ASVs could be heading to Greece, but it has been reported that those will be able to carry five soldiers. Regardless of which model(s) Athens receives, it is clearly getting a serious vehicle on the cheap.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Wikimedia.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Public Health, Americas

Given the number of deaths in nursing homes, this move makes sense.

Health-care personnel and residents of long-term care facilities have been tabbed as the first groups that will have access to a coronavirus vaccine, according to a new proposal from an independent advisory committee within the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

On Tuesday, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices met virtually to discuss who would receive the long-awaited first vaccine doses once they are cleared for public use, and the proposal eventually passed thirteen to one.

The recommendations now must be approved by CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield before the vaccine can be distributed to states.

There are roughly twenty-one million health-care workers and three million long-term care facility residents in the United States, according to the committee.

“To date, more than 240,000 health-care workers have contracted COVID-19 and 858 have died. According to estimates, deaths in long-term care facilities account for 40 percent of all COVID-19 deaths nationwide,” the CDC said in a statement.

“These factors contributed to the committee’s recommendation to prevent spread by protecting those on the front lines, health-care workers treating COVID-19 patients, and protect the most vulnerable, those elderly persons living in long-term care facilities. The committee intends to meet again following (the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s) authorization or approval for vaccine-specific recommendations.”

The committee defined health-care workers as paid and unpaid individuals serving in health-care settings who have the potential for direct or indirect exposure to patients or infectious materials. Long-term care facility residents were defined as adults who reside in facilities that provide a variety of services, including medical and personal care, to people who are unable to live independently.

Meanwhile, children and young adults are expected to get the vaccine last.

The panel meeting comes as states are busy preparing to distribute the vaccine in as few as two weeks. Moderna and Pfizer both requested emergency use authorization for their respective vaccines last month. The FDA reviews are expected to take several weeks—although the agency has scheduled a meeting for December 10 to discuss Pfizer’s request specifically.

Last month, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar said that about forty million doses of coronavirus vaccine will be available by the end of 2020, enough to inoculate about twenty million people since the vaccine requires two doses.

Trump administration’s vaccine chief Moncef Slaoui contended on Tuesday that the entire U.S. population of 330 million could be vaccinated by June, and that there could be enough doses to immunize the rest of the world’s population of 7.8 billion by early to mid-2022.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Security, Europe

Moscow is pushing foward with developing a variety of new weapons.

The Russian military has been busy conducting numerous tests of its latest military hardware in its northern waters. Just days after a Mach 9 Tsirkon hypersonic missile was launched from a Project 22350 frigate in the White Sea against a target in the Barents Sea, a cruise missile was test-fired from a nuclear-powered submarine in the same region.

According to Tass, the nuclear-powered submarine Kazan successfully launched the missile while in the White Sea as part of the final stage of state trails the Russian Defense Ministry reported earlier this week.

“Today, the Project Yasen-M lead nuclear-powered underwater missile-carrying cruiser Kazan successfully fired an anti-ship cruise missile against a sea target,” the Defense Ministry said. “The target position was successfully struck by the warhead of an Oniks cruise missile.”

The test launch was conducted on Monday afternoon, and vessels of the Northern Fleet’s Belomorsk naval base provided security of the water area during the test-fire. The Kazan is the second Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack submarine to enter service with the Russian Navy. It is an upgraded Project 885M design that has been described as being far more capable than the lead boat of the class, K-560 Severodvinsk.

The Yasen-M is part of a modernization effort that was meant to account for the sixteen-year gap between the commissioning of the Severodvinsk and Kazan. The Yasen-M line is expected to occupy the same performance league as the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class of fast-attack submarines.

Lessons Learned, Technology Upgraded

The Project 885M lead nuclear-powered submarine Kazan was laid down on July 24, 2009 and floated out on March 31, 2017. The Russian Navy took delivery of Kazan in 2018, and in addition to incorporating new technological developments that emerged since the construction of her sister submarine began in 1993, the upgraded boat also takes advantage of lessons learned that came from tests of the platform.

According to state media, the submarine entered the final stage of state trials with the crew and the acceptance team on November 21. During the combat training naval ranges, the submarine’s crew will practice maneuvering in the surface and submerged positions at various depths, and additionally will check the operation of the submarine’s basic systems. When it is deployed to the sea, specialists will check the Kazan’s systems and assemblies and shipborne armament.

The submarine is currently undergoing trials and is expected to join the Russian Navy as early as the end of this month. The nuclear-powered submarine will operate in the Northern Fleet. The Project 885 and 885M nuclear-powered boats carry Kalibr-PL and/or Oniks cruise missiles as their basic armament.

The addition of Kazan is part of the Russian Navy’s major efforts to modernize its submarine force and equip its Northern Fleet. This comes as the Arctic region has become ever more militarized in the context of global Russian-North Atlantic Treaty Organization competition. Five additional boats of the class are currently in various stages of construction at the Sevmash Shipyard, which is part of the United Shipbuilding Corporation.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

Michael Rubin

Security, Europe

Simply put, too often, the United States plays checkers while other countries play chess. It is time for Washington, Paris, and others in the international community to think several steps ahead and anticipate the next war in the Caucasus if only to prevent it. Diplomats may value quiet, but they should be wary when past precedent and current evidence suggests quiet is not the foundation for peace, but rather the calm before an even greater storm.

The guns are silent, Russian peacekeepers both separate Armenians and Azeris and guard ancient Armenian monasteries to prevent their destruction by Azerbaijani soldiers and Syrian mercenaries. The joint Turkey-Russia truce monitoring center will soon begin operations in Azerbaijani-controlled portions of Nagorno-Karabakh. American and French diplomats assigned to the Minsk Group, meanwhile, seek to return to a diplomatic process shredded when Azerbaijani forces backed by Turkey launched a surprise attack on Artsakh, as Armenians called the self-declared independent entity in Nagorno-Karabakh.

It might seem the war is over but Western diplomats should be wary: The modalities surrounding the Lachin corridor—the land route connecting Armenia to Armenian-held portions of Nagorno-Karabakh through Azerbaijani-controlled territory—are not been fully resolved, and the route remains dangerous for civilians who are subject to sniper fire and kidnapping, Russian peacekeepers notwithstanding.

Lachin might be an irritant, but it is not the major problem. The November 10 ceasefire was a barebones document, written in a hurry. The clause which may sow the seeds for a new war is the last: “The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport links between western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with a view to organizing the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions.”

There are two problems: First is the use of the plural “links” to connect the two portions of Azerbaijan separated by Armenia. That suggests more than one road or railroad and the further bifurcation of Armenian territory. That might be a diplomatic spoiler to any hope that peace will quickly follow the ceasefire, but it is unlikely alone to be a casus belli.

Rather, the second problem will be the Turkish truck traffic which will use the new route both to consolidate Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and extend Turkey’s economic and cultural ties to Central Asia. Should the traffic flow normally, there will be no issue. But should a sniper, for example, kill a Turkish truck driver, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will both blame Armenia and demand a buffer zone to ensure safe passage along the routes. Such a scenario is not far-fetched: Whether with regard to the “Reichstag Fire” coup or false flag terrorism, too often elements within Turkey seek to spark a crisis which Turkey then seeks to use to its advantage.

That Erdoğan has previously converted demands for “counter-terrorism” buffer zones into territorial gain will only encourage him to try the same tactic again. Turkish forces remain entrenched in northeastern Syria, where they issue Turkish identity cards, impose Turkish education, and build Turkish post offices.

And just as ethnic chauvinism toward Kurds appears to have motivated Erdoğan’s moves into northern Syria, so too does Erdoğan’s disdain for both Armenians and Christianity color his moves now. Indeed, it was no coincidence that when Erdoğan picked the date for Turkey and Azerbaijan to launch their assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, he chose the closest Sunday to the 100th anniversary of the 1920 Turkish invasion of Armenia.

No Armenian government, neither that of incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan nor any opposition figure, will be able to accede to a Turkish ultimatum to cede control over wide swaths of Armenian territory. Any buffer zone demand will, in effect, partition Armenia. The Armenian military, however, will be unable to match Turkey in either equipment or manpower. The only wildcard in such a scenario is Russia but the events of the past month suggest Erdoğan’s overconfidence trumps his fear of Russian deterrence.

Simply put, too often, the United States plays checkers while other countries play chess. It is time for Washington, Paris, and others in the international community to think several steps ahead and anticipate the next war in the Caucasus, if only to prevent it. Diplomats may value quiet, but they should be wary when past precedent and current evidence suggests quiet is not the foundation for peace, but rather the calm before an even greater storm.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a frequent author for TNI. 

Image: Reuters.

David Axe

Security,

It couldn’t figure out how to sink one of its own.

Here's What You Need to Remember: To even try to sink an American flattop, you first must hit it. That's not easy, either. No carrier sails without an air wing with as many as 50 fighter aircraft plus several escorting destroyers, cruisers and submarines. A virtual wall of defensive weaponry surrounds the flattop out to a distance of several hundred miles.

A Chinese admiral and pundit told a trade-show audience that Beijing could resolve China's territorial disputes by sinking two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and killing thousands of American sailors.

Rear Adm. Lou Yuan's threat isn't an empty one. The Chinese military has deployed an array of weaponry that it acquired specifically to target American flattops.

But a U.S. Navy test in 2005 proved that even if you hit them, carriers are really hard to sink.

Lou made his provocative comment on Dec. 20, 2018 at the Military Industry List summit, according to media reports.

“What the United States fears the most is taking casualties,” declared Lou, an anti-American author, social commentator and military theorist at the PLA Academy of Military Science.

Sinking just one carrier could kill 5,000 Americans, Lou pointed out. Sink two, and you double the toll. "We’ll see how frightened America is" after losing 10,000 sailors, Lou crowed.

Leaving aside the likelihood of a full-scale war breaking out between the world's two leading military powers and economies, sinking a carrier is easier said than done. History underscores the difficulty of the undertaking.

In 1964 Viet Cong saboteurs managed to damage and briefly sink the former U.S. Navy escort carrier Card while the vessel, then operating as an aircraft ferry for U.S. Military Sealift Command, moored in Saigon.

But the last time anyone permanently sank a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in combat was during World War II. Twelve American carriers sank during the war, usually following intensive air attacks. The last to sink, USS Bismarck Sea, fell victim to Japanese kamikazes in February 1945.

In subsequent decades, American flattops suffered serious accidents including collisions and fires, but none sank. It's very difficult to sink a buoyant, thousand-feet-long ship that's mostly made of steel.

The U.S. Navy knows this from experience. In 2005, the Navy itself targeted the decommissioned carrier America in order to determine just how much punishment the vessel could withstand before slipping beneath the waves.

"The ship was pummeled by explosions both above and below the waterline," The War Zone reporter Tyler Rogoway explained in 2018. "After nearly four weeks of these activities, the carrier was scuttled. On May 14, 2005, the vessel's stern disappeared below the waterline and the ship began its voyage to the seafloor."

"America stood up to four weeks of abuse and only succumbed to the sea after demolition teams scuttled the ship on purpose once and for all, it's clear that America was built to sustain heavy damage in combat and still stay afloat."

Consider also the carrier-shaped pontoon ship that Iran built as a scale target for a 2015 war game. While small and flimsy compared to a real flattop, the pontoon vessel itself endured an intensive assault. "Iran struck the faux carrier with a barrage of anti-ship missiles, then swarmed it with small boats and then landed commandos on it," Rogoway reported.

Still, the fake flattop apparently remained afloat.

To even try to sink an American flattop, you first must hit it. That's not easy, either. No carrier sails without an air wing with as many as 50 fighter aircraft plus several escorting destroyers, cruisers and submarines. A virtual wall of defensive weaponry surrounds the flattop out to a distance of several hundred miles.

Still, China or another country could attempt to target the carriers with submarines, cruise missiles and ballistic rockets. 

"They will employ multiple systems in order to confuse and overwhelm U.S. defenses," naval historian Robert Farley wrote in 2017. "They will rely on the threat of attack to keep U.S. carrier battle groups as far as possible from the main theaters of operation."

"But the observation that the enemy has a missile or torpedo that can kill a carrier only begins a conversation about carrier vulnerability," Farley continued. "Shooting anything at an aircraft carrier is a costly, difficult operation."

The carrier's attackers could face withering counterfire from the vessel's defenders. "Beyond the monetary cost, launching an open attack against an American carrier strike group, with its own cruisers, destroyers and submarines, is almost certainly a suicide mission."

And if the United States' reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks is any indication, Washington surely would deploy all its remaining military might, including its surviving eight or nine carriers, against country behind the sinking.

"So there are two questions that remain for anyone who thinks they even have a shot at taking down one of these enormous steel behemoths," Farley explained. "Can you do it? And even if you can, is it worth it?"

David Axe serves as the new Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. (This first appeared last year.)

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

Security,

The Cold War revisited.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Both the Soviets and the Americans had options in Asia. The strategic environment was far more fluid than in Europe, allowing a variety of different choices to disrupt and destabilize the opponent. This made the course of war far less predictable. At its (nonnuclear) worst, war could have raged across Asia on multiple fronts, from Korea to Japan to the Sino-Soviet border.

Nearly every analyst during the Cold War agreed that, if Moscow and Washington could keep the nukes from flying, the Central Front in Europe would prove decisive in war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The NATO alliance protected the Western European allies of the United States from Soviet aggression, while the Warsaw Pact provided the USSR with its own buffer against Germany.

But when the Cold War really went hot, the fighting took place in Asia. In Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union waged proxy struggles against the United States, and both sides used every tool available to control the destiny of China. However, while few believed that the Pacific theater would determine the victor of World War III, both the United States and Soviet Union needed to prepare for the eventuality of war there.

Scholars have devoted far less attention to the planning of World War III in East Asia than to the European theater. The two classic novels of the Third World War (Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising and John Hackett’s The Third World War) rarely touched on developments in Asia. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Naval War College traced the potential course of war in East Asia as part of a series of global war games. These games lend a great deal of insight into the key actors in the conflict, and how the decisive battles of a Second Pacific War might have played out.

The Players:

China

How would China have reacted to the onset of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Beijing certainly regarded the survival of NATO as critical to its security from the 1970s on. The existence of NATO prevented the USSR from concentrating the bulk of the Red Army and of Soviet strategic aviation against China; a Soviet victory in the West would have put China in great peril. By the 1980s, China stood at a massive technological disadvantage against the USSR. Moreover, Beijing worried (perhaps rightly) that even if the USSR held its nuclear fire against NATO, it would view a strategic exchange with China as less risky. Thus, there was no guarantee that China would open a second front against the USSR.

Japan

Japan combined extraordinary economic strength with significant military power and a crucial geographic position. A Japan committed to the United States could effectively prevent the sortie of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, while enabling attacks against the Soviet Far East. A neutral Japan limited these options, but still provided the NATO alliance with a strong economic foundation in case of a protracted war. Washington had the advantage; it only depended on how and how much.

Korea

Would North Korea have joined a general Soviet war against NATO by invading South Korea? Such a move would have put extraordinary pressure on U.S. forces, although by the 1980s South Korea could probably survive with only measured U.S. assistance. However, Pyongyang answered to two masters; it required the support of both Beijing and Moscow. Given the unlikelihood that China would support a Soviet war against NATO, the prospect of Beijing’s acquiescence in a second Korean War would have been extremely sketchy.

Southeast Asia

The Soviets had an ally in Hanoi, but no means to support that ally against either China or the United States. Moreover, the Vietnamese had little to gain from joining a conflict; they were substantially controlled by Laos and Cambodia, and could do little more than harass shipping lanes in the South China Sea. However, given the bloody nose that Vietnam had inflicted on both countries in 1975 and 1980, neither Washington nor Beijing would have had much interest in reopening the conflict, especially with far more pressing issues at hand. That said, Vietnam could still make some mischief with U.S. allies in the region, and the PRC still had scores to settle.

The Chess Pieces:

Soviet Pacific Fleet

The Soviets took the Pacific seriously. By the 1980s, the fleet included two Kiev class aircraft carriers, and one Kirov class battlecruiser. In peacetime, the ships of the fleet sailed widely, regularly visiting Southeast Asia and even the Indian Ocean. Wartime, however, would have tightly constrained their operations. The Sea of Okhotsk served as a bastion for the SSBNs of the fleet, and naturally as a target for U.S. attack. Soviet objectives would have included the neutralization or defeat of Japan, the defense of the Russian Far East and potentially the penetration of the Pacific in order to attack maritime supply networks and distract U.S. attention from Europe.

U.S. Pacific Fleet

The United States Pacific Fleet commanded the balance of power in the region. With several carrier battlegroups supported by a variety of amphibious assault ships, battleships, nuclear attack submarines and a large array of land-based aircraft, the U.S. Navy could have undertaken both offensive and defensive operations to control the pace and course of the war. Moreover, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense force and the Royal Australian Navy could have both offered extensive support to the Americans. The central objectives for Allied naval forces would first have been to detect and defeat any Soviet efforts to penetrate attack submarines into the Pacific or Southeast Asian shipping lanes. Second, the U.S. Navy had taken upon itself a mission of attacking the periphery of the USSR directly, in order to distract the Red Army from the Central Front in Europe. At a minimum, this would have involved missile and airstrikes against Soviet installations throughout the Far East. At a maximum, it could have involved amphibious assaults against lightly defended Soviet targets.

The War Games

The Naval War College examined the potential for World War III in Asia as part of its global war game exercises in the 1970s and 1980s. Played annually between 1979 and 1988, each of the games explored alternative strategic and technological aspects of a confrontation between the superpowers. Although generally focused on Europe, the games always included an East Asian component. While the early wargames saw some variance (informed to some degree by the Sino-Vietnamese War), they held to a basic pattern; the Soviets hunkered down, while U.S. and allied naval forces chipped away at the bastions and tried to distract the Russians from Europe.

The 1984 wargame played out much differently. Instead of sitting on its hands, the Soviets opened the war with a massive air and missile assault against Japan. This assault destroyed most Japanese air assets on the ground, along with those of the US. special operators delivered by submarine and by clandestine civilian ship-launched unconventional attacks against U.S. bases across the Pacific, including Guam and Pearl Harbor.

The Soviets unleashed Pyongyang early in the conflict, redirecting U.S. attention towards the Korean Peninsula. Washington had effective answers; it quickly undertook offensive anti-submarine operations in the Sea of Japan, decimating Soviet SSN and SSBN forces. Soviet surface ships also came under attack. Nevertheless, in a daring move the Soviets launched a successful amphibious assault against Hokkaido. Although the operation suffered heavy losses, it succeeded in establishing a beachhead in Japan (though this was later withdrawn under fire).

The United States took a more aggressive stance in the 1988 wargame. Instead of waiting for a Soviet attack, Washington immediately began air and unconventional offensives against installations in the Soviet Far East, designed to decimate Soviet air defenses and threaten the survival of military-industrial installations. For their part, the Soviets hoped that a reticent military stance and a diplomatic offensive could keep Japan out of the war. This gambit succeeded to a point, as the Japanese suspended active military cooperation with the United States. American pressure eventually forced Tokyo to yield, and the Soviet opened offensive operations against the archipelago. By this time, however, the U.S. Navy had devastated Soviet naval forces, confining the Pacific fleet to its bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Late in the war, the Soviets gave Pyongyang the green light to invade South Korea. However, this operation backfired, as the North Koreans failed to make substantial progress against combined U.S. and South Korean forces. Moreover, the Soviet move confirmed the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and helped drive Beijing into a much more hostile disposition towards the Soviets.

Both the Soviets and the Americans had options in Asia. The strategic environment was far more fluid than in Europe, allowing a variety of different choices to disrupt and destabilize the opponent. This made the course of war far less predictable. At its (nonnuclear) worst, war could have raged across Asia on multiple fronts, from Korea to Japan to the Sino-Soviet border. At its best, the combatants might have observed an uneasy quiet, at least until it became necessary to outflank a stalemate in the West. But as was the case in Europe, everyone concerned is fortunate that tensions never led to open combat.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. (This first appeared several years ago.)

Kyle Mizokami

Security,

The ultimate Cold War nightmare scenario.

Here's What You Need to Know: The projections are devastating.

It is no exaggeration to say that for those who grew up during the Cold War, all-out nuclear war was “the ultimate nightmare.” The prospect of an ordinary day interrupted by air-raid sirens, klaxons and the searing heat of a thermonuclear explosion was a very real, albeit remote, possibility. Television shows such as The Day After and Threads realistically portrayed both a nuclear attack and the gradual disintegration of society in the aftermath. In an all-out nuclear attack, most of the industrialized world would have been bombed back to the Stone Age, with hundreds of millions killed outright and perhaps as many as a billion or more dying of radiation, disease and famine in the postwar period.

During much of the Cold War, the United States’ nuclear warfighting plan was known as the SIOP, or the Single Integrated Operating Plan. The first SIOP, introduced in 1962, was known as SIOP-62, and its effects on the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact and China were documented in a briefing paper created for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and brought to light in 2011 by the National Security Archive. The paper presupposed a new Berlin crisis, similar to the one that took place in 1961, but escalating to full-scale war in western Europe.

Although the war scenario was fictional, the post-attack estimates were very real. According to the paper, the outlook for Communist bloc countries subjected to the full weight of American atomic firepower was grim. The paper divided attack scenarios into two categories: one in which the U.S. nuclear Alert Force, a percentage of overall nuclear forces kept on constant alert, struck the Soviet Union and its allies; and a second scenario where the full weight of the nuclear force, known as the Full Force, was used.

Under SIOP, “about 1,000” installations that were related to “nuclear delivery capability” would be struck. The scenario, which assumed advance warning of a Soviet attack and an American preemptive strike, would see the Alert Force attacking 75 percent of these targets. The attack would be a largely “counterforce” strike, in which U.S. nuclear forces attacked Soviet, Warsaw Pact and Chinese command-and-control and nuclear forces. The report states that 83 to 88 percent of all targets would be destroyed with 70 percent assurance.

In an Alert Force attack, 199 Soviet cities with populations of fifty thousand or greater would be struck. This would turn 56 percent of the urban population and 37 percent of the total population into casualties, most of whom would eventually die due to a post-attack breakdown of society. In China, forty-nine cities would be struck, turning 41 percent of the urban population into casualties and 10 percent of the overall population. In eastern Europe, only purely military targets would be struck, with a projected 1,378,000 killed by American nuclear attacks.

An all-out Full Force attack would be much worse. A Full Force attack would devastate 295 cities, leaving only five cities with populations of fifty thousand or more unscathed. 72 percent of the urban population and 54 percent of the overall population would become casualties—as the National Security Archive points out, that amounts to 108 million likely killed out of a total population of 217 million. In China, seventy-eight cities would be struck, affecting 53 percent of the urban population and 16 percent of the overall population. Casualties in eastern Europe would more than double, to 4,004,000.

Overall, an all-out U.S. attack on the Soviet Union, China and satellite countries in 1962 would have killed 335 million people within the first seventy-two hours.

The SIOP-62 report does not attempt to estimate U.S. casualties in a nuclear war. However, a 1978 report prepared for the Pentagon’s Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), “The Effects of Nuclear War,” spelled out in grim detail what would happen if the Soviet Union unleashed its arsenal on the United States.

The OTA report states that, in the event of a Soviet attack against U.S. nuclear forces, other military targets, economic targets and population targets, an attack could be estimated to kill between sixty and eighty-eight million Americans. With enough warning, major cities and industrial areas could be evacuated, but that would only lower the number of dead to between fifty-one and forty-seven million. Attacks on U.S. allies, including the NATO nations, Japan and South Korea, would undoubtedly occur but are not modelled in the study.

Another report, “Casualties Due to the Blast, Heat, and Radioactive Fallout from Various Hypothetical Nuclear Attacks on the United States,” postulated a Soviet attack against “1,215 U.S. strategic-nuclear targets. The attack involves almost 3,000 warheads with a total yield of about 1,340 megatons.” Because the attacks are carried out against hardened facilities, particularly MX and Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic-missile silos, the attacks are envisioned using SS-18 “Satan” ICBMs, each carrying ten 550-to-750-kiloton warheads. Attacks against U.S. bomber and refueling forces are carried out by ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles fired from off the coastline.

The result of even this modest attack, which largely spares U.S. cities to attack nuclear forces in the Midwest, is thirteen to thirty-four million deaths and twenty-five to sixty-four million total casualties. Still, bombarded by 1,215 nukes, the United States would lose far fewer people than Strategic Air Command estimated the Soviet Union would lose in 1962.

The discrepancy is probably because of the larger yields of U.S. nuclear weapons in the 1960s versus Soviet nukes in the 1980s, but also because at the time of the SAC report, Soviet nuclear forces were primarily bomber-based. The Soviet Union had between 300 and 320 nuclear weapons in 1962, all but forty of which were bomber-based. Bomber bases may have been closer to major population areas. A major draw of U.S. nuclear weapons to Soviet cities would have also been the presence of local airports, which would have functioned as dispersal airfields for nuclear-armed bombers. On the other hand, the Soviet attack would largely hit ICBM fields and bomber bases in low-population-density regions of the Midwest, plus a handful of submarine bases on both coasts.

As devastating as these projections are, all readily admit they don’t tell the entire story. While these three studies model the immediate effects of a nuclear attack, long-term problems might kill more people than the attack itself. The destruction of cities would deny the millions of injured, even those who might otherwise easily survive, even basic health care. What remains of government—in any country—would be hard pressed to maintain order in the face of dwindling food and energy supplies, a contaminated landscape, the spread of disease and masses of refugees. Over a twelve-month period, depending on the severity of the attack, total deaths attributable to the attacks could double.

While the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union has ended, the United States now faces the prospect of a similar war with Russia or China. The effects of a nuclear war in the twenty-first century would be no less severe. The steps to avoiding nuclear war, however, are the same as they were during the Cold War: arms control, confidence-building measures undertaken by both sides and a de-escalation of tensions.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in 2017.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Kyle Mizokami

Security,

The USS Halibut was a one-of-a-kind submarine.

Here's What You Need to Know: Halibut was the perfect ship for the task.

One of the most unusual submarines of the Cold War was named after one of the most unusual fish in the sea. Halibut are flatfish, bottom-dwelling predators that, unlike conventional fish, lie sideways with two eyes on the same side of the head and ambush passing prey.

Like the halibut flatfish, USS Halibut was an unusual-looking submarine, and also spent a considerable amount of time on the ocean floor. Halibut was a “spy sub,” and conducted some of the most classified missions of the entire Cold War.

USS Halibut was built as one of the first of the U.S. Navy’s long-range missile ships. The submarine was the first built from the ground up to carry the Regulus II missile, a large, turbojet-powered cruise missile. The missile was designed to be launched from the deck of a submarine, with a ramp leading down into the bow of the ship, where a total of five missiles were stored. This resulted in an unusual appearance, likened to a “snake digesting a big meal.” Halibut also had six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes, but as a missile sub, would only use torpedoes in self-defense.

Halibut was a one-of-a-kind submarine. At 350 feet long, with a beam of twenty-nine feet, she was dimensionally identical to the Sailfish-class radar picket submarines, but her missile storage spaces and launch equipment ballooned her submerged displacement to five thousand tons. Her S3W reactor gave her an underwater speed of more than twenty knots and unlimited range—a useful trait, considering the Regulus II had a range of only one thousand miles.

Regulus II was quickly superseded by the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile, whose solid rocket fueled engine made for a more compact missile with a much longer range. The combination of the Polaris and the new George Washington–class fleet ballistic missile submarines conspired to put Halibut out of a job—Regulus II was canceled just seventeen days before the sub’s commissioning.

Halibut operated for four years as a Regulus submarine. In 1965 the Navy, recognizing that a submarine with a large, built-in internal bay could be useful, put Halibut into dry dock at Pearl Harbor for a major $70 million ($205 million in today’s dollars) overhaul. She received a photographic darkroom, hatches for divers to enter and exit the sub while submerged, and thrusters to help her maintain a stationary position.

Perhaps most importantly, Halibut was rebuilt with spaces to operate two remotely operated vehicles nicknamed “Fish.” Twelve feet long and equipped with cameras, strobe lights and sonar, the “fish” could search for objects at depths of up to twenty-five thousand feet. The ROVs could be launched and retrieved from the former missile storage bay, now nicknamed “the Bat Cave.” A twenty-four-bit mainframe computer, highly sophisticated for the time, analyzed sensor data from the Fish.

Post overhaul, Halibut was redesignated from nuclear guided-missile submarine to nuclear attack submarine, and assigned to the Deep Submergence Group, a group tasked with deep-sea search-and-recovery missions. In mid-July 1968, Halibut was sent on Velvet Fist, a top-secret mission meant to locate the wreck of the Soviet submarine K-129. K-129 was a Golf II–class ballistic missile submarine that had sunk that March, an estimated 1,600 nautical miles off the coast of Hawaii.

K-129 had sunk along with its three R-21 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The R-21 was a single-stage missile with a range of 890 nautical miles and an eight-hundred-kiloton nuclear warhead. The loss of the submarine presented the U.S. government with the unique opportunity to recover the missiles and their warheads for study.

Halibut was the perfect ship for the task. Once on station, it deployed the Fish ROVs and began an acoustic search of the ocean floor. After a painstaking search and more than twenty thousand photos, Halibut’s crew discovered the ill-fated Soviet sub’s wreckage. As a result Halibut and her crew were awarded a Presidential Unit Citation, for “several missions of significant scientific value to the Government of the United States.” Halibut’s contribution to efforts to recover K-129 would remain secret for decades.

In 1970, Halibut was again modified to accommodate the Navy’s deep water saturation divers. The following year, it went to sea again to participate in Ivy Bells, a secret operation to install taps on the underwater communications cables connecting the Soviet ballistic missile submarine base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula with Moscow’s Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok.

The taps, installed by divers and their ROVs, allowed Washington to listen in on message traffic to Soviet nuclear forces. Conducted at the bottom of the frigid Sea of Okhotsk, the Ivy Bells missions were conducted at the highest level of secrecy, as the Soviets would have quickly abandoned the use of underwater cables had they known they were compromised.

Halibut was decommissioned on November 1, 1975, after 1,232 dives and more than sixteen years of service. The ship had earned two Presidential Unit citations (the second in 1972 for Ivy Bells missions) and a Navy Unit Citation. The role of submarines in espionage, however, continued: she was succeeded in the role of special missions submarine by USS Parche. Today, USS Jimmy Carter—a sub with a particularly low profile—is believed to have taken on the task. The role of submarines in intelligence gathering continues.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared in 2016.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Kevin Knodell

History, Asia

How did German soldiers find themselves in a war in Asia in the 1930s?

Here's What You Need to Know: The strange tale of the Germans in China’s wars demonstrates how quickly loyalty and national interest can shift—and alliances with them.

Most people who stayed awake for at least half of their high school history class knows that the Axis Powers in World War II consisted of Germany, Italy and Japan. But few know that German tactics and weapons—not to mention some actual Germans—helped the Chinese Nationalists stall Imperial Japan’s conquest of China.

For about a decade, German soldiers advised Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in his campaigns against Chinese Communists … and also against Germany’s future allies, the Japanese.

It’s one of history’s most unexpected—and frankly unknown—wartime partnerships. It all began in the aftermath of the Chinese revolution of 1911, as warlords carved up the country and battled each other for power.

European and American arms dealers, unable to find customers in the war-weary countries of the West in the years after World War I, found enthusiastic buyers in the Chinese. The warlords imported firearms and heavy weaponry and, in some cases, manufactured their own copies.

One of the most powerful, the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin had his own private air force of almost 100 of the latest aircraft, including light bombers. He also maintained close ties with Japan, in particular courting investment from the Japanese South Manchuria Railroad Company.

Some warlords hired foreign military instructors, many of them World War I veterans. The advisers made their way to China in both official and unofficial capacities. The influx of foreign soldiers would soon include Germans.

Rise of the Nationalists: 

The greatest threat to the warlords were not each other, but revolutionaries under the banner of the Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang. Led by Sun Yat-Sen, a republican and educated medical doctor, the Kuomintang sought to unify China and transform it into a modern state.

The Kuomintang, aligned with the Chinese Communist Party and backed by Soviet advisers under the command of Vasily Blyukher, launched the Northern Expedition to defeat the warlords.

Under the military leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, the Nationalist army scored victory after victory against the warlords. With the death of Sun Yat-Sen of liver failure, Chiang began to consolidate control of the movement. That put him at odds with the Communists, several of whom were themselves plotting to take control of the revolution.

When the army reached Shanghai in 1927, Chiang enlisted local crime syndicates, notably the powerful Green Gang, to crack down on labor unions and violently purge Communists from the ranks. He then expelled Blyukher and the other Soviet advisers, unceremoniously sending them back to Moscow.

The last major warlord was Marshal Zhang Zuolin. Failing to protect Japanese investments, Zhang had fallen out of favor with his backers in Tokyo.

On June 4, 1928, while traveling an SMR rail line, a bomb detonated underneath Zhang’s armored train, killing him. Most believe the Japanese Kwantung Army planted the explosive device.

Zhang was succeeded by his son Zhang Xueling, the Young Marshal. The Young Marshal, whom the Japanese expected to be a spineless puppet they could easily control, surprised everyone by quickly aligning himself with the Nationalists. The warlord era was fast ending.

But Chang realized he had a problem. Severing ties with the Soviets had left him without any significant foreign backer. There were still a few warlord holdouts—who often did have foreign backing—plus a growing Communist insurrection. Japan also loomed just across the China Seas.

On the advice of a German-educated friend, Chiang looked to Berlin to fill the void the Soviets had left. Germany was an attractive partner to Chiang. Berlin had lost all of its holdings in China after World War I and would be less likely to interfere in China’s politics than comparable Western powers.

And the forced downsizing of Germany’s once-mighty army also resulted in a wealth of highly experienced but unemployed German soldiers who’d be eager for work in China.

Here Come the Germans!: 

Chiang sent an invitation to Gen. Erich Ludendorff to bring military and civil experts to China. Ludendorff declined the invitation, fearing his high profile would attract unwanted attention. Still, he saw potential in the offer, and recommended retired Col. Max Bauer—a logistics specialist with war experience—to lead a proposed German Advisory Group.

After a quick tour of China, Bauer returned to Berlin and handpicked a team of 25 advisers. Immediately upon arriving in November 1928, the advisers set to work training young Chinese officers.

Despite most of the advisers being retired—and technically civilians—in the employ of the Chinese government, the activities of German military men abroad was a touchy subject due to post-war limitations on what Germany could legally do.

As a result, Bauer gave strict orders to the group to avoid diplomats and journalists. Despite this, American military observers in 1929 reported seeing Chinese troops undergoing close-order drill under German supervision.

Bauer worked to standardize the acquisition of equipment and weapons, urging Chiang to cut out expensive middlemen and buy directly from manufacturers.

Unsurprisingly, many of these manufacturers were German, resulting in increased business for German companies. But the retail boom was cut short by Bauer’s unexpected death in May 1929.

Bauer was succeeded by Col. Hermann Kriebel, a Nazi fanatic. He had been a member of the paramilitary Freikorps and had a long record of putschist activity with Hitler in Bavaria. One rumor has it that as a member of the German 1919 Armistice delegation, his parting words were, “See you again in 20 years.”

Kriebel was arrogant, contemptuous of the Chinese and clashed with Bauer’s selected officers. His attitude almost doomed the mission, and Chiang demanded he be replaced.

Kriebel was succeeded by Gen. Georg Wetzell. He helped plan anti-Communist operations and advised Gen. Ling during the 1932 Shanghai War against the Japanese. He also convinced Chiang to set up an artillery school. Chinese artillery would play a huge role years later against Japanese invaders.

Gen. Hans von Seeckt, an influential German army staff officer and Wetzell’s successor, built Chinese capacity further. Seeckt, vividly recalling the bloody cost of static trench warfare, believed in a war of movement.

He used his connections with German industrialists to bring in a huge influx of modern German equipment, ranging from helmets to artillery. One journalist suggested that as much as 60 percent of Chinese war material at this time was imported from Germany.

The last and arguably best chief adviser was Gen. Alexander von Falkenhausen. He had been military attaché in Tokyo from 1910 to 1914 and traveled to China to observe the revolution in 1911. During World War I, he served in France, East Prussia and Turkey and as a commander was credited with two victories over the British in East Jordan in 1918.

As a world traveler and professional soldier who’d worked in a variety of cultures, Falkenhausen was immune to the extremism that drove many of his predecessors. He also had little love for the Nazis, having lost his brother to a violent internal struggle in the party that solidified Hitler’s control.

As a result, he was better able to develop close personal and professional ties with the Chinese.

Chinese in Germany: 

With Germans increasingly entrenched in China, some of their Chinese counterparts found themselves in Germany. Chinese businessmen, government officials and students hoped to learn from Germany’s rapid rebound from an economically crippled failed state into a world power. German industry was of particular interest.

The Nazis were split on their opinion of the Chinese. Joseph Goebbels and Hermann Goering in particular were in bitter disagreement. Goebbels was decidedly pro-China and favored continuing German business interests—he also viewed Chiang as a burgeoning fascist.

Goering, however, saw the Japanese as the stronger and most worthy power in Asia—especially considering their disdain for the Soviets—and pushed for the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan.

One of the most notable Chinese in Germany at the time was Chiang Kai-Shek’s adopted son Chiang Wei-Kuo. He went to study military tactics with the German army, training in military schools and taking part in military operations.

He even commanded troops during the annexation of the Austria.

As Falkenhausen took over the group in 1936, tensions between Japan and China were escalating. Around the same time, The Young Marshal Zhang Xueling, tasked by Chiang to eradicate the communists, was fed up with battling fellow Chinese while the Japanese only grew stronger.

Zhang conspired with Communist leader Zhou Enlai and proceeded to kidnap Chiang and force him into a truce with the Communists. Upon his release, he promptly had Zhang imprisoned. Falkenhausen set to work advising Chiang on how best to resist Japanese aggression. One of the great ironies of this episode is that Falkenhausen and Chiang’s interactions were always in Japanese, their only common language.

Japan Invades: 

The July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident marked the beginning of Japan’s full-scale invasion of China. The poorly-trained Chinese troops in the north were quickly routed. When the fighting broke out in Shanghai, Tokyo expected a quick victory.

However, among the Chinese troops dispatched to Shanghai was the German trained — and equipped — 88th Division. Against all expectations, the division’s infantry inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese in vicious urban combat. The Japanese responded by shelling and bombing the Chinese troops—and by sending in tanks.

During this time, German advisers including Falkenhausen were often near or in the fight in Shanghai, despite Berlin’s preference that they not get directly involved.

“We all agreed,” Falkenhausen wrote, “that as private citizens in Chinese employment there could be no question of leaving our Chinese friends to their fate. Therefore I assigned German advisers wherever they were needed and that was often in the front lines.”

Despite being present for some heavy combat, no Germans advisers are known to have died.

The Chinese held out until November, but eventually retreated in the face of Japanese armor, air and naval attacks. Tokyo was badly bruised by the Chinese defensive and livid at being defied by an “inferior” race.

Particularly embarrassing was the showdown at Sihang Warehouse, in which a lone battalion from the 88th Division held out against Japanese attacks in full view of the international district.

But now the Japanese were ready to strike at the Chinese capital of Nanjing. En route they took out their frustration on Chinese civilians, killing and looting wantonly. Even Kriebel, who had been so contemptuous of the Chinese before and was back in China as the German consul general in Shanghai, expressed his disgust at the atrocities.

But the march on Nanjing was just a preview of how ugly things were to become.

Fall of Nanjing: 

Chiang called a meeting of his generals with Falkenhausen to plan their next move. Generals Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi—the latter a favorite of Falkenhausen—advocated withdrawing forces from Nanjing to regroup.

Next, the generals proposed declaring Nanjing to be an undefended city so that the Japanese wouldn’t have any excuse to slaughter civilians.

Falkenhausen backed Li and Bai. The only dissenter was Gen. Tang Shengzhi, who demanded a last stand against Japan in the capital. Chiang, wanting to preserve his prestige and at least make an effort to defend Nanjing, deferred to Tang.

John Rabe, a German businessman and prominent Nazi living in Nanjing, was aghast “[Nanjing] cannot be effectively defended,” he wrote. “Sitting in this crook in the Yangtze is like sitting in a mousetrap.”

“I continue to hope that Hitler will help us,” Rabe continued. “A man of firm will and steady eye — the same as you and I — has deep sympathy not only for the distress of his own people, but for the anguish of the Chinese, as well.”

Rabe speculated that if Hitler were to demand a stop to the Japanese advance, it would halt immediately.

The consequences of this last stand were disastrous. The Chinese defenders were obliterated. Many of the remnants of the elite 88th Division were destroyed in the fighting, though some were able to rejoin the army in the west or blend into guerrilla bands in the countryside.

However, the worst consequence was one of history’s bloodiest massacres, today known as the Rape of Nanjing. Japanese troops entered the city in December 1937 and indulged in an orgy of rape of pillage that lasted until late January.

Although exact numbers are disputed, most historians agree that thousands of women and girls were raped by Japanese troops—and somewhere between 180,000 and 300,000 civilians died.

Rabe, along with other Western residents of the city, labored hard to aid the refugees and was instrumental in setting up the International Safety Zone. He was known for wearing his Swastika armband as he escorted Chinese nationals around, standing up to Japanese soldiers and officials.

Despite the initial hesitance of other American and European expats to work with an avowed Nazi, Rabe earned the respect of both westerners and the residents of Nanjing.

Unfortunately for Rabe’s faith in Hitler and in Germany’s commitment to China, the defeat at Nanjing led Hitler to believe that China was a lost cause. It was the beginning of the end for Sino-German ties. To Hitler, the Japanese had proven to be a superior race to the Chinese.

But one more battle was to take place before Germany quit China for good.

In the Battle of Taierzhuang in early 1938, Chinese troops under Generals Li and Bai engaged Japanese troops in the small town of Shantung. The Chinese troops, led by German-trained battalion commanders, maneuvered at night to avoid Japan’s superior air assets and used German-built howitzers to smash Japanese entrenchments.

German Legacy:

The Chinese prevailed at Taierzhuang. After the battle, the Japanese demanded that the Germans withdraw the advisory group. Hitler complied without reservation. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop told Falkenhausen to withdraw, which he did only under extreme pressure.

Falkenhausen and his staff reluctantly returned to Germany. Unlike former Italian advisers who profited by selling detailed aerial surveys of China to Japan, many of the Germans refused to divulge Chinese secrets to Japan, even under pressure from the Nazis. Chiang Wei-Kuo, by that time commanding a panzer on the border with Poland, was recalled back to China.

Westerners were horrified by the devastation in China. Urban warfare up to this point had been a fairly rare occurrence in modern warfare. Certainly the scale of death and destruction, particularly among non-combatants, seemed new. In a few years, such bloodshed would all too common all over the world.

After the German Blitzkrieg tore through Western Europe beginning in late 1939, Falkenhausen was appointed to serve as the German military governor of Belgium—a position in which he took neither joy nor pride. Among his tasks were the suppression of Belgian resistance and the rounding up of Jews and other undesirables.

Throughout much of his tenure in Belgium, Falkenhausen was secretly in touch with anti-Nazi conspirators and those helping to rescue Jews.

The rescuers included Qian Xiuling, a Chinese woman who had married a Belgian man she’d met while studying chemistry at the Catholic University of Louvain. Qian’s cousin was an officer in the Chinese army and had been trained by Falkenhausen. He told her through correspondence that if she needed anything, she should go to Falkenhausen.

The general helped Qian save the lives of many Jews and dissidents. After an attempt on Hitler’s life in July 1944, Falkenhausen was imprisoned and spent the remainder of the war in concentration camps, at one point being interned in Dachau.

He was eventually liberated, but then subsequently arrested by U.S. troops. He was sent back to Belgium to be put on trial for crimes against humanity. Qian and others he had aided came to his defense, but he was nevertheless sentenced to 12 years hard labor.

He was pardoned after only three years and moved back to Germany. Chiang, having heard of his fate, began sending money and gifts to his old comrade. But Faulkenhausen was so embittered by his experiences that he lived out the rest of his life a jaded, reclusive old man. He died in 1966 at the age of 88.

In 2001, when a journalist asked an aging Qian how she saw Falkenhausen, she replied simply, “A man with morals.”

Rabe fared little better after the war. Living in Germany again by then he was arrested first by the Soviets and then by the British. Although never directly implicated in any crimes, his history as a high profile party member meant he had to be declared “de-Nazified.”

Unable to find work, he sold off his collection of Eastern art to buy food and quickly became destitute. According to some accounts, he received aid from prominent citizens of Nanjing who had heard of his plight. This help ceased after the Communists took Nanjing from the nationalists.

Rabe died of a stroke in 1950. His headstone has since been moved to Nanjing and his house made into a museum.

The strange tale of the Germans in China’s wars demonstrates how quickly loyalty and national interest can shift—and alliances with them. It also reveals that personal ties formed in the crucible of combat can transcend these shifts and last a lifetime.

Unfortunately for men like Falkenhausen, the saga also shows how steep the price of integrity can be.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring here.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

TNI Staff

Security, World

Buying a fighter is less about aircraft performance or even military requirements than pure simple geopolitics. Buying a jet means you as a military are tying yourself into a strategic alliance with another country and its hardware.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The F-35 will continue to dominate the skies - but the F-15, particularly with its impressive upgrades pack, isn't going anywhere.

Editor's Note: This article was first published several years ago. In the time since, the United Arab Emirates has requested to purchase F-35 fighters, though the contract has not yet been approved.

When the Boeing F-15A first flew in July 1972, the Eagle was the ultimate air superiority fighter. Fast, high-flying, agile and built around a massive APG-63 pulse-doppler radar, the Soviet Union had nothing that could match it. Overtime, McDonnell Douglas—the F-15’s original manufacturer before its merger with Boeing—adapted the airframe into a potent multirole fighter that eventually became the F-15E Strike Eagle. While both the air superiority oriented F-15C and the strike-oriented F-15E will remain in service with the U.S. Air Force for decades to come, by far the most advanced current version of the Eagle has been ordered by Saudi Arabia. But will that be enough compete with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?

Saudi Arabia has ordered some 84 new-build F-15SAs and 70 upgrade kits to retrofit their existing Strike Eagles to the new standard. When the massive $29.5 billion contract was signed December 2011, it was the largest foreign military sale in the history of the United States. In the ensuing years, Boeing has developed and tested the upgraded jets, which are powered by General Electric F110 engines rather than Pratt & Whitney F100s. The company is finally starting to get ready to deliver the aircraft. The first of the new jets rolled out of the Boeing plant in Saint Louis, Mo., earlier this earlier in April.

Perhaps the single most significant upgrade found in the F-15SA package is a fly-by-wire flight control system—previous versions of the Eagle used a hybrid computer augmented stability system. The addition of the fly-by-wire system allowed Boeing to reactivate the F-15’s two dormant outboard wing hardpoints that had always been present, but never used. The problem previously had been stability differences induced by carrying weapons on stations one and nine.

Additionally, the F-15SA is equipped with the advanced APG-63 v.3 active electronically scanned array (AESA)—though, potentially, future customers might order the more capable APG-82 that is being retrofitted to U.S. Air Force’s own Strike Eagles. The F-15SA is also equipped with BAE’s advanced Digital Electronic Warfare System (DEWS), which has digital radio-frequency memory jamming capability.

The new digital system looks across an entire frequency band continuously rather than scanning through a frequency band—which means that even low probability of intercept (LPI) signals might be detected (radars on stealth fighters like the F-22 and F-35 use LPI techniques to try mask their emissions for electronic support measures suites). Further, its interferometric antennas can generate far more accurate bearing measurements than the current system.

The DEWS’ performance is probably comparable to the F-22’s or F-35’s electronic support measures suites since it is based on those systems. It’s head and shoulders better than anything currently fielded by the U.S. Air Force’s own Strike Eagles. U.S. Air Force jets won’t have anything comparable until the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System (EPAWSS) is fielded.

The F-15SA is also equipped with Lockheed Martin’s AN/AAS-42 infrared search and track system. And all of that information from the radar, infrared search and track and the electronic warfare system are fused together—similar to the F-22 and F-35—into a coherent picture. That picture is displayed on large-format color displays that are similar to those found on the F-35—in both the front and rear cockpits. Both aviators are equipped with the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. Taken together, the F-15SA is an extremely formidable multirole fighter—possibly the single best fourth generation fighter the United States has ever produced.

But is that enough to compete with the F-35 on the open market place? Longer-term, it looks like the F-35 will be the dominant player on with fighter market—at least in parts of the world aligned with the West. Stealth is a major selling point with the inevitable proliferation of advanced Russian and Chinese-built surface-to-air missile systems. Further, the F-35 has the backing of the United States government—which is a huge trump card for the program. In the short-term, Boeing may have opportunities to sell the F-15 to wealthy customers who need a very capable long-range jet and who can afford the Eagle’s hefty price tag. Those customers are likely to be in the Middle East or Asia—nations that are not likely to be cleared to receive the F-35 in the near term.

But one also has to remember that buying a fighter is less about aircraft performance or even military requirements than pure simple geopolitics. Buying a jet means you as a military are tying yourself into a strategic alliance with another country and its hardware. For many nations, making sure they are able to tie seamlessly into the Pentagon’s forces is of paramount importance. So even if you buy American, unless it’s a variant operated by the U.S. military, you might end up with an expensive boutique fleet with a lot of expensive maintenance bills.

Image: Reuters.

Charlie Gao

Security, Russia

While the Su-57 is fast, it does represent a step backward in speed compared to the MiG-31.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The MiG-31 is the standard long-range interceptor of the Russian Air Force.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’ s Air Defense Forces (VPVO) needed a series of heavy interceptors to patrol its massive borders. Most regular “light” fighters like the early MiGs were not up to the task, as they lacked the range and speed to intercept to rapidly climb and intercept supersonic American bombers, who were expected to zoom over the Arctic to drop bombs on the Soviet Union.

As a result, a specialized class of aircraft was created for this purpose. The first was the Tupolev Tu-28 and Tu-128. These aircraft would lay the template for later interceptors: they were large for good endurance, fast, and were armed solely with missiles.

This design was obsolete from the time it entered service in the 1960s, as the B-58 Hustler that was in service at the time could outpace it. However, the MiG-25 “Foxbat” was also in development at the time. This aircraft would go on to become the definitive interceptor of the VPVO.

Blisteringly fast and armed with the massive R-40 air-to-air missiles, the Foxbat stood ready to defend the Soviet Union’s borders against all threats. Its airframe also saw adaptation into more tactical roles, photo reconnaissance and strike versions of the MiG-25 were created for the Soviet Air Force (VVS).

In the 1980s, the MiG-25 was followed up by the MiG-31, which added in a second weapons systems officer on all models and increased the flight performance, radar and weapons of the craft. Early versions also featured a cannon, but this was quickly deleted once it was determined that such extras were not necessary on a pure interceptor.

Nowadays the MiG-31 is the standard long range interceptor of the Russian Air Force (the VPVO was merged with the VVS in the 1990s) and is expected to serve into the 2030s. A “mid-life upgrade” of the MiG-31 is currently being procured: the MiG-31BSM. This modification integrates many new strike weapons onto the MiG-31 and modernizes most systems. The MiG-31 was also chosen as the primary carrier aircraft for the Kinzhal hypersonic missile.

But in August 2018, Russian outlets announced that experimental design work was beginning on a next generation pure interceptor that is meant to replace the MiG-31. Following the naming convention of Russia’s other next generation aircraft projects (PAK (XX)), the new interceptor project is called PAK DP, or Prospective Aviation Complex Long-range Interceptor.

The continuation of a line of dedicated interceptors is interesting because the existing PAK-FA/Su-57 fighter in many ways could fulfill the same role as the MiG-31. It has a highly advanced radar, it can supercruise (maintain Mach 1+ flight without the use of afterburners), and it could be armed with long range air-to-air missiles.

While the range is less than a MiG-31, air-to-air refueling can make up the gap. But since the capabilities as they stand are so similar, why the need for a separate airframe? Sukhoi fighters have also served in the interceptor role before, the Su-27P variant of the Flanker was meant explicitly for the VPVO. There are a couple reasons why the Russian government still considers the PAK DP to be necessary.

The first is that the PAK DP might build off the multirole nature of the earlier MiG-31 and MiG-25 conversions. An aircraft close to the original conception of the F-111 could be in the cards for Russia in the PAK DP: something that can carry a ton of long-range missiles and also perform strike with a wide range of munitions (including hypersonic ones)while moving very fast.

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Another possible reason is that Russia wishes to keep the heritage of MiG alive within United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). Since Sukhoi has done the majority of the design work and has had its name attached to the PAK FA (in the Su-57 designation), MiG needs a next generation project of their own to work on. The MiG-35, while advanced, is still not of the PAK family of next-generation craft and MiG not have an aircraft to work on in the future.

The last reason is that the VVS might want to future proof their interceptor force against future developments in UAV technology. While the PAK FA is fast, it does represent a step backward in speed compared to the MiG-31. While the SR-71 Blackbird is retired, UAVs incorporating some of its technology may come online in the future. Russia might need a plane that can really push the limits of speed to intercept them and keep its airspace safe.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This first appeared in August 2018.

Image: Wikipedia.

Michael Peck

Security, Asia

What do we know about China’s big bomb?

Here's What You Need to Know: China has joined the “Mother of All Bombs” club.

A Chinese arms maker back in 2019 unveiled a weapon similar to America’s GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, or MOAB (hence the nickname “Mother of All Bombs”). The Chinese version was dropped from an H-6K bomber, the Chinese version of the 1950s Soviet Tu-16 aircraft.

Photographs on China’s state-owned Global Times news site showed earlier in the year what appeared to be a large bomb falling from a bomb bay, and then a large explosion. Chinese military analyst Wei Dongxu told Global Times that based on photographic evidence and the size of the H-6K’s bomb bay, the bomb was five to six meters long (16.4 to 19.7 feet long). Chinese media also suggested that the bomb weighed several tons, and was so big that the H-6K could only carry one.

“The massive blast can easily and completely wipe out fortified ground targets such as reinforced buildings, bastions and defense shelters," or knock down trees so troops can rappel down from helicopters, Wei said.

According to Global Times, military observers claimed that “the weapon will also spread fear among enemies if a weapon of this caliber is deployed.”

If any weapon can inspire, it’s giant bombs like these. The MOAB is the biggest non-nuclear bomb in the U.S. arsenal, and the biggest non-nuclear bomb that America has ever dropped. The MOAB is 30 feet long, weighs 21,600 pounds, and is so big that it isn’t dropped by bombers, but rather is shoved out the back of a C-130 transport (the Air Force wants to equip the B-52 to carry them on its wings). Guided by GPS to its target, the MOAB works not by hitting the ground and exploding like a regular bomb, but explodes a few feet above the target in an airburst that destroys everything in the surrounding area with a massive overpressure. This means the force of the bomb isn’t wasted burying itself in the ground, but spreads through the air.

While the United States has giant bunker-buster bombs like the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the MOAB can also destroy cave and tunnel complexes through overpressure that slams through the openings. In fact, the MOAB’s combat debut was in April 2017 in Afghanistan, where it reportedly destroyed three tunnel complexes and killed ninety-four Taliban fighters.

Not to be outdone, Russia has its FOAB (“Father of All Bombs”), which Moscow claims is four times more powerful than America’s MOAB. It is a thermobaric weapon, a fuel-air explosive that releases and detonates an explosive vapor of devastating power (NORINCO denies reports that China’s weapon is thermobaric).

So, what do we know about China’s big bomb? Not much, and what there is may be mere hype. Chinese analyst Wei told Global Times that “the Chinese bomb is smaller and lighter than the US one, enabling it to be deployed on the H-6K bomber. The US bomb is so large that it has to be carried by a larger transport aircraft rather than a bomber, Wei said, noting that a bomber can fly faster and is better at targeting than a transport aircraft, and the Chinese bomb's designer must have had this in mind when it produced the bomb to fit the H-6K.”

But nothing comes for free, and if China has devised a smaller and lighter bomb than MOAB, the drawback may be less explosive power. And to be fair to history, all of these giant twenty-first-century bombs trace their lineage back to Britain’s “Dam Busters” of World War II, and legendary bomb designer Barnes Wallis, who devised the six-ton Tallboy and ten-ton Grand Slam bombs.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Robert Farley

History, Asia

These warships were incredibly large and were rightly respected for their might.

Key point: Japan industrialized quickly and rose to become a great power. Here is how it hoped its large battleships would prevail in World War II.

Japan withdrew from the London Naval Treaty in 1936. The chief Japanese negotiator, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, feared that concessions on the part of his negotiating team would lead directly to his assassination upon return to Japan. Japanese nationalists believed that the Washington Naval Treaty system was holding Japan back and preventing it from becoming a first-rate power. Freed from the constraints of international treaties, they believed that Japan could build a world-beating fleet that would push the Western powers out of Asia and help usher in a new era of Japanese dominance.

This first appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

Musashi was the second ship of the Yamato class, the first of this new generation of battleships. The Imperial Japanese Navy believed that the United States would never build battleships too large to move through the Panama Canal, and calculated that the maximum displacement of such ships would amount to about sixty thousand tons. Ships of that size could not, it was thought, carry guns larger than sixteen inches. The IJN’s engineering problem was thus to design and build battleships that could destroy the largest ships the Americans were likely to build. The Japanese ships were to have a speed of at least thirty knots, carry eighteen-inch or larger guns, and have a long range with good fuel economy. With three triple 18.1-inch gun turrets, the Yamato class met one of the three conditions. Initially designed with diesel engines for economical cruising, problems with the diesels led to the use of a standard, fuel-intensive power plant. A well-armored thirty-one-knot version was rejected as too large (the Yamatos displaced sixty-five thousand tons), and the IJN unwisely decided to sacrifice speed for armor, settling on twenty-seven knots. As it was, its armor weighed more than an entire World War I dreadnought, and could absorb enormous damage. Musashi and its sister were immensely powerful ships, but the sacrifice of operational mobility for surface tactical effectiveness would limit the impact that they would have on the war.

The IJN ordered five ships of the Yamato class, but only Musashi and its elder sister were completed as intended. Shinano, the third sister, was completed as an aircraft carrier support vessel. Japan took elaborate precautions to prevent details of the ships’ construction from reaching the United States. Indeed, the United States only acquired good intelligence as to the size and armament of the battleships in 1944. When Japan surrendered, the IJN attempted to destroy all photographic and technical data on Yamato and Musashi, leaving Western analysts guessing as to its exact characteristics well into the Cold War.

Named after an ancient province on Honshu, Musashi was laid down in March 1938, and commissioned in August 1942. It arrived in Truk in January 1943, and became Admiral Yamamoto’s flagship in February. Because of its speed and enormous fuel requirements, the IJN had not used Yamato in the Guadalcanal campaign, and was similarly reticent about Musashi. While Japanese caution in context of oil shortages is understandable, the course of the war in 1942 and 1943 demanded a more risk-acceptant posture; this was not a time at which the IJN should have emphasized fuel economy. Musashi sortied three times in efforts to intercept U.S. naval movements, but never engaged the enemy. In February 1944 it was withdrawn from Truk out of concerns over U.S. carrier raids. In March, it received light damage from a U.S. submarine attack.

Musashi served at both the battles of Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. At the latter it, Yamato, and three other battleships served as the core of Adm. Takeo Kurita’s strike force, intended to destroy U.S. landing craft off Leyte. Before that could happen, however, Kurita’s task force needed to run a gauntlet of submarine and carrier aircraft attacks. During the latter, Musashi became the focus of U.S. naval aviators. Despite withering antiaircraft fire, it received enormous punishment from American pilots. Over five hours of attacks, Musashi took nearly twenty bomb and torpedo hits each, slowing its speed and causing extensive flooding. No other battleship could have survived half that, but eventually the flooding got the best of damage control crews, and at 19:36 on October 24, 1944, Musashi rolled over and sank. Nearly a thousand of its 2,400-man crew sank with it.

Its loss was in vain; although an elaborate sacrifice of carriers decoyed American battleships away from Leyte, Kurita’s attack on U.S. transports and escort carriers was foiled by the extraordinary courage of a few American destroyer captains. In 2015, Paul Allen, cofounder of Microsoft and owner of the Seattle Seahawks and Portland Trailblazers, led a team of researchers who discovered Musashi’s wreck. It lies in several pieces at the bottom of Sibuyan Sea.

Over the years, a variety of reports of turned up on the expected successor classes to Yamato. The next iteration would have been slightly larger, slightly more heavily armored, and would have carried six twenty-inch guns in three twin turrets, probably with roughly the same speed and range as Yamato. Designs for these ships were finalized, but wartime demands meant that they were never laid down. Indeed, the effort that went into Musashi’s construction would better have been spent on aircraft carriers and other ships. Expectations of a further follow-on class, with a speed above thirty knots and four twin twenty-inch guns, have emerged over the years, although the construction of such ships would have been purely notional.

The Yamatos were the zenith of the Japanese battleship aesthetic, with a beautiful swept-back pagoda mast that managed to convey speed, grace and power. This, undoubtedly, is one of the reasons why the ships have continued to hold a place in the public imagination, even seventy years on. However, Musashi has never earned the popular cultural attention of its sister, HIJMS Yamato. The latter took the starring role in the animated television show (and later film) Space Battleship Yamato, known in the United States as Star Blazers. Yamato also served as the subject of a live-action film in 2005.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. This first appeared earlier and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Steve Weintz

Security,

The first-ever hydrogen bomb blast, Ivy Mike, required American weaponeers to create an vast new industrial capacity for manufacturing liquid hydrogen in its "heavy" form of liquid deuterium.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Really huge nuclear weapons fell out of favor in America as missile accuracy increased. More accurate delivery platforms mean less need for big explosions to kill a target (and smaller delivery vehicles—a big warhead needs a big missile or plane or sub). But historian Alex Wellerstein notes that American bombs could have gotten much, much more powerful without growing bigger.

(This is a combination of two previous articles posted last year. They are reposted here for your reading pleasure.)

Russia: 

The Bomb represents the ultimate expression of might, so the biggest bombs express that power to its extremes. The United States and the Soviet Union built bigger and bigger bombs to deter each other. Eventually, Washington stopped testing such large weapons due to improved accuracy of their delivery methods. Only 3 percent of the superpowers' stockpiles consisted of nuclear weapons with yields greater than four megatons, but those weapons more than any others symbolize the terror of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union's swift strides towards nuclear arms alarmed American officials in the 1950’s. "First Lightning" (called "Joe-1" in the West)—the first Soviet nuclear test—announced the Moscow's new military power less than three months after lifting the Berlin Blockade in May 1949. The twenty-two-kiloton shot copied the U.S. Trinity test as closely as possible to achieve early success; the rushed development actually stalled the Soviet program for over a year, with the second test occurring in September 1951.

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This phase of the Cold War went hot on the Korean Peninsula and President Truman gave the go-ahead for the "Super," as it was called. Edward Teller—a brilliant, vain and pugnacious physicist who fled Hungary for the United States to join the Manhattan Project—was smitten by the idea of thermonuclear fusion and argued forcefully for U.S. research into bigger bombs. Pursuit of the "Super" alarmed Soviet leaders and scientists. As they explored the possibility, however, the Soviets had an advantage over the Americans: lithium.

The first-ever hydrogen bomb blast, Ivy Mike, required American weaponeers to create an vast new industrial capacity for manufacturing liquid hydrogen in its "heavy" form of liquid deuterium. The Ivy Mike device was liquid-fueled and a handful of emergency-capability (EC) liquid-fuel bombs were later built; several B-36 bombers were modified to top off the liquid hydrogen in flight en route to their targets.

But the Soviets dispensed with liquid fuel for dry powdered lithium deuteride, a chemical compound of lithium metal and hydrogen gas. Lithium comes in two "flavors" or isotopes: Lithium-6 and Lithium-7. Lithium-7 was thought by both sides to be inert and unsuitable as bomb fuel. The Soviet Union had plentiful sources of Lithium-7, but the United States did not. As a result, Soviet weaponeers worked on dry-fuel bombs from the start. The fourth Soviet nuclear test in 1953 registered an impressive 400 kilotons from the "Sloika" design.

America’s disastrous Castle Bravo H-bomb test in 1954 revealed Lithium-6's fusion potential and provided the Soviet Union with needed information; a mere eighteen months elapsed between the Castle Bravo test and the Soviet test of November 1955: an air drop of a fully weaponized hydrogen bomb. At 1.6 megatons, the yield of RDS-37 was impressive—but it would be dwarfed by the monsters to come.

In 1958 the Soviet Union matched the America’s voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing; in September 1961, after raising the Berlin Wall, Nikita Khrushchev ordered testing resumed. On October 23, a 12.5-megaton airdrop pounded the high Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya. The resulting blast was nearly as large as Castle Yankee—America's second biggest test—but only the Soviet Union’s fifth-biggest.

The biggest bomb ever built or tested—the RDS-220 ("Big Ivan" or "Tsar Bomba")—rattled the planet one week later on October 30, 1961. The result of a crash program directed by Andrei Sahkarov, the Tsar Bomba was a conservative design accomplished with astonishing speed: in only four months. The 100-megaton (possibly 150-megaton) design was an impractical weapon—only a single modified Bear bomber could carry it, slowly—but a billy-hell of a propaganda show.

Even though Sakharov had the third-stage fission tampers replaced with inert lead due to concerns about fallout, the Tsar Bomba still yielded fifty-six megatons, enough to blow a hole in the atmosphere and cause damage hundreds of miles away. Had the third stage tampers been uranium this one bomb would have raised global fallout levels by 25 percent. Every person born before October 1961 has bits of the Tsar Bomba (and other bombs) in their bodies to this day.

If the Tsar Bomba explosion was a stunt, the other biggest Soviet tests weren't. 1962 was the last year of atmospheric nuclear tests for the Soviet Union and the United States, and both sides rushed to prove weapon designs. The fourth, third and second largest Soviet nuclear tests all seem related to ICBM-warhead development: Test 147 on August 5, 1962 yielded over twenty-one megatons; Test 173 nineteen megatons; and Test 219 a whopping 24.2 megatons—nearly half the Tsar Bomba's yield.

This city-busting warhead wound up on R-36 ICBMs (NATO designation SS-18 "Satan"), huge missiles capable of obliterating deeply buried targets or entire metro areas. Although photos and data from Test 219 are not publicly available, Alex Wellerstein's NUKEMAP drives home the power of such a bomb. Dropped on downtown Los Angeles, the air blast would level the Coliseum (four miles away) and burn down all of Beverly Hills (nine miles away).

America: 

Recent reports of collapse at the North Korean nuclear test site under Mt. Mantap provide a sobering reminder of the sheer power of nuclear weapons. North Korea’s sixth (and final?) test had a likely yield well above one hundred kilotons, enough to corroborate the regime's claim of thermonuclear capability.

Really big nuclear explosions require the lightest elements rather than the heaviest. Fission explosions rely on the energy released by splitting heavy atoms of uranium or plutonium into lighter elements, and require lots of fissionable material. Fusion explosions release vastly more energy than fission blasts by fusing together lightweight hydrogen nuclei into slightly heavier helium. However, getting hydrogen to fuse requires immense temperatures and pressures, which only a fission explosion can readily generate.

Thus fusion (“H-bomb”) weapons rely on fission (“A-bomb”) triggers or primaries to heat and compress fusion fuel enough for thermonuclear fusion. In the fractions of a second between the primary's detonation and the bomb's explosion the primary's immense energy gets channeled into the fusion fuel. Hydrogen bombs are thus two-stage weapons: first a small fission explosion drives a much bigger fusion explosion.

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Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw fusion or thermonuclear weapons as the vital next step in trumping each other's nuclear arsenals. In pursuit of weaponizing the power of the sun both nations created the largest artificial explosions yet witnessed by humans. Edward Teller, who along with Stanislaw Ulam conceived the successful H-bomb concept, began thinking about “the Super,” as it became known, even as the Manhattan Project struggled to build a working fission bomb.

As the Korean War flared both the United States and USSR accelerated their nuclear programs. Despite serious reservation by some in the nuclear weapons community, President Truman launched the U.S. thermonuclear effort in 1950. Soviet scientists pursuing a different design had access to ideal fusion fuel—the chemical compound of the lightest metal, lithium, and a heavy form of the lightest gas, hydrogen. This powdery substance, lithium deuteride, itself came in two "flavors," one incorporating the Lithium-6 isotope and another incorporating Lithium-7. The Soviets swiftly built facilities for manufacturing Li-7 deuteride while the Americans, lacking sources of Li-7 focussed on liquid deuterium.

By late 1952 the Soviets had tested their first fusion-driven device with limited success. After an immense investment the Americans succeeded in producing abundant liquid heavy hydrogen (deuterium) and an eighty-ton science experiment to use it. Not in any sense a weapon, the Mike (for "megaton") shot of Operation Ivy yielded 10.8 megatons of explosive force when detonated November 1, 1952. Ivy Mike proved the Teller-Ulam design by leaving a mile-wide hole in Eniewetak Atoll.

And yet, Ivy Mike was only the fourth biggest U.S. nuclear test.

Operation Ivy’s other test puts Mike in perspective. Weapons designer Ted Taylor thought the H-bomb to be overkill and to prove his point designed the biggest pure-fission bomb ever tested. Ivy King (for “kiloton”) yielded five hundred kilotons at the cost of four critical masses of uranium alloy—so much fissile material that the weapon had to be transported with chains of neutron-absorbing boron and aluminum to prevent a premature chain-reaction. Ivy King worked, but wasn't the future.

By early 1954, hot on the heels of the Korean conflict, the United States had new H-bomb designs ready to test. The six-shot series of Operation Castle would prove these new designs at Bikini Atoll. As with Operation Ivy, an armada of ships and an army of people shipped out the Central Pacific to dredge islands, build test equipment and ready bunkers.

The bombs prepared included a weaponized version of the Ivy Mike device—the liquid-fueled EC-16 hydrogen bomb, along with others trying out the new American dry fuel made of mixed Li-6 and Li-7 hydride. Scientist thought Lithium-6 was far less reactive to neutrons thrown from fission primaries and thus expected yields of six to ten megatons.

Nature (only partly) surprised them on the first test. The Castle Bravo shot yielded fifteen megatons—the biggest American nuclear test ever—and the worst radiological disaster in American history. It was two hundred and fifty times bigger than Hiroshima, Castle Bravo vaporized an island, contaminated three atolls and hundreds of people, caused major diplomatic incidents and introduced the word “fallout” into public discourse.

The size of the explosion resulted from Li-6's previously-unknown affinity for neutrons; the supposedly regular-gas bomb fuel turned out to be premium hi-test. Nature wasn't involved in another factor, the wind: despite warnings from meteorologists Test Director Alvin Graves ordered the shot fired. Graves, who had survived near-lethal radiation exposure, had little patience with those urging caution.

Despite the disaster the U.S. military carried on with Operation Castle, and conducted two of the other three biggest American tests. Unlike the land-based and heavily instrumented Castle Bravo test, Castle Romeo tested a weapon in its bomb casing mounted aboard a barge afloat in Bikini’s lagoon. The first test destroyed most of the test equipment on Bikini, and big test were blowing holes in Bikini’s reef. Because it used pure Li-6 hydride the Romeo shot was almost canceled; it became the third biggest American test at eleven megatons yield.

Castle Yankee was the second biggest American test at 13.5 megatons. As the fifth test of Operation Castle, Yankee again used a bomb casing on a barge, and again used the Li-6/Li-7 mixed fuel used in Castle Bravo. The 13.5 megaton blast produced a fireball four miles wide; 2.5 megatons of the 13.5 came from pure fusion alone.

The Castle Bravo, Romeo and Yankee tests proved the H-bomb design that became the first U.S. “city-killers”: high-yield thermonuclear weapons capable of completely destroying a target even if the weapon missed by miles. These Mk17 and Mk 24 bombs looked the part—nineteen feet long, five feet wide, ten tons heavy—big enough for a cowboy to ride into Armageddon.

Weapons development moved fast during those years. Only four years after Operation Castle, Operation Hardtack came to Bikini and Eniewetak Atolls as American weaponeers raced to test refined H-bomb designs before an unofficial testing moratorium announced by President Eisenhower. Hardtack Poplar, the fifth biggest American nuclear test, yielded 9.3 megatons from a bomb that would become the biggest ever deployed by the United States: the Mk-41 twenty-five-megaton three-stage device.

Hardtack Poplar tested only the first two stages, resulting in a very “clean” explosion—one with far less fallout. The third stage of the operational weapon was a internal casing of fissile uranium containing the first two stages; the immense neutron flux from the second-stage fusion explosion causes the third stage to fission and produce huge amounts of energy and radioactive waste. In Poplar the uranium casing was replaced with an inert lead one.

After Operation Hardtack the moratorium on testing delayed new designs, and when US testing resumed in 1962 no tests greater than four megatons are conducted. The United States turned to underground tests at the Nevada Test Site which is unable to contain megaton-class shots. The last known U.S. multi-megaton shot was Cannikin—a five-megaton blast a mile beneath Amchitka Island in the Aleutians.

Really huge nuclear weapons fell out of favor in America as missile accuracy increased. More accurate delivery platforms mean less need for big explosions to kill a target (and smaller delivery vehicles—a big warhead needs a big missile or plane or sub). But historian Alex Wellerstein notes that American bombs could have gotten much, much more powerful without growing bigger:

“By 1962, after the Dominic series, they thought they might be able to pull off 50 Mt in only a 4,500 kg (10,000 lb) package—a kind of ridiculous 11 kt/kg ratio.”

Could there have been a five-ton fifty Megaton bomb? It’s just as well that it was never (knowingly) explored. After all, the genie, however great, never stays in the bottle.

Steve Weintz, a frequent contributor to many publications such as WarIsBoring, is a writer, filmmaker, artist and animator. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikipedia.

Kyle Mizokami

Security, Asia

Today we’ll look at how the Type 99 stacks up to two important contemporaries, the American M1A2 Abrams and the Russian T-90A tank.

Here's What You Need To Remember: For a main battle tank, the Type 99 is light, maneuverable, and fast. It doesn't pack the firepower of the Abrams, but it has a much higher range with comparable armor.

China has a lot of tanks. Like, eight to nine thousand of them.

Who else would bother to maintain such a ridiculous number?

The United States. And Russia. (Note that such counts include vehicles in storage and reserve. The numbers for tanks in operational units are lower in every case).

However, the majority of Beijing’s tanks are old designs, particularly Type 59 and 69 tanks more or less directly copied from the 50s-era Soviet T-54 tank. Such is their profligacy that I once had the pleasure of bumping into one in a children’s playground in Tianjin serving the needs of the (young) people.

However, China’s top of the line tank, the Type 99, has commanded healthy respect from international observers, even though it has never been exported, nor used in combat. The reason is simple: the reported performance parameters are equal to many top Western designs, and the Type 99 also packs a few unique tricks of its own.

Today we’ll look at how the Type 99 stacks up to two important contemporaries, the American M1A2 Abrams and the Russian T-90A tank.

Before we get our hands greasy with the technical details, we should consider: does China even need tanks?

It’s a reasonable question to ask. China’s major military efforts have been directed towards the Pacific.

Some might ask, how likely are the U.S. Army’s M1 Abrams tanks ever to clash with the Type 99?

To which one should consider: can either vehicle swim across the Pacific Ocean and exchange shots over Scarborough Shoal?

Kidding aside, it seems a pretty unlikely except in amphibious invasions scenarios fit for Operation Flashpoint computer games. On the other hand, Taiwan has expressed interest in purchasing Abrams tanks, and Australia operates 60 as well, so never say never.

However, the question is more relevant when we consider the Russian T-90. Moscow currently maintains good relations with Beijing, with which it shares a border, but the two powers are not close allies, having nearly come to war during the late 1960s.

Most importantly, Russia is selling its weapons to India and Vietnam—including systems which are quite clearly earmarked to oppose the Chinese military, such as the Brahmos cruise missile, and, well…over 1,000 T-90 tanks, many of which are deployed along its Himalayan border.

China fought a war with India in 1962 over that border, and another with Vietnam in 1979 to punish the nation for opposing the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. (Vietnam would like to order T-90s as well.)

Today, the Chinese military persists in seeing India—a potential future superpower—as a threat, and has extensively militarized their shared border and built roads allowing heavy military vehicles to pass through the steep mountains. China is also allied with Pakistan, which has repeatedly warred with India, and occasionally transfers military technology to it.

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Lastly, one should consider the scenario of a potential civil war or government collapse in North Korea. What Beijing’s policy would actually be in such an event is the trillion dollar question, but one scenario would involve Chinese ground forces intervening to restore order in North Korea—leading to potential clashes with Korean troops.

So, even though an actual armed conflict would be unnecessary and vastly counterproductive for everyone involved—like most wars!—there are some contexts in which tank combat could occur on China’s borders, particularly verses Russian-made tanks.

Enough politics, onto the lumbering death machines!

First, to introduce the contenders…

The Abrams, of course, is the classic American design which devastated Soviet-made Iraqi armor in the 1991 Gulf War without losing a single tank to enemy fire. The Abrams isn’t exactly new, but the Army has continuously tweaked the ammunition, armor package, and sensors to keep it up to date.

The T-90 is Russia’s first post-Cold War tank. Though not quite a peer of the Abrams, it still boasts significant improvements in accuracy and protection, particularly in models equipped with later-generation explosive reactive armor. While Russia is introducing its revolutionary new T-14 tank, for now its 550 T-90As remain its frontline armored vehicle.

Moscow has developed the more advanced T-90AM but did not place it into full production.  However, 354 of the similar T-90MS export variant have been sold to India for deployment on its border with China. In total, India has over 1200 T-90s, while Algeria eventually intends to operate over 800.

China’s Type-99 combines a hull that closely resembles an elongated T-72 with a Western-style turret inspired in part by the German Leopard 2. First appearing as the Type 98 prototype tank in a National Day parade in a 1999, the vehicle was re-designated the Type 99 and entered service in 2001. At 57 tons, it comes in between the 70-ton Abrams and the 48-ton T-90 in terms of weight. Several upgrades, including the new Type 99A2 variant, boast advanced new technologies. Beijing fields nearly 500 Type 99s in sixteen armored battalions, and has produced 124 of the newer 99As so far. The type is not offered for export, though some of its technology is used in China’s VT4 export tank.

Firepower:

The Type 99 and the T-90 rely on a 125 millimeter cannons using carousel autoloaders descended from Soviet-era designs. This weapon proved underpowered verses Abrams and Challenger tanks in the Gulf War, but new improved tungsten ammunition leaves it capable of piercing the frontal armor of an Abrams at shorter combat ranges.

The new Type 99A2 comes with a longer barrel main gun, which in theory should impart higher muzzle velocity to sabot shells and improve their armor penetration and accuracy.  It also boasts fancy new stabilizer technology.

Reportedly, China intends to eventually install a larger 140 millimeter gun on the Type 99, but early tests have cracked up the weapon. This, incidentally, mirrors Russia’s plans to up-gun its new T-14 Armata tank to a similar caliber weapon.

The Abram’s Rheinmetal 120 millimeter gun, equipped with politically-controversial M829 depleted-uranium rounds, can penetrate around 15-25% more armor. The U.S. now produces new generations of M829 rounds capable of piercing the advanced Kontakt and Relikt reactive armor systems developed by Russia (more on those below).

China has developed its own depleted uranium ammunition for its 125 millimeter gun, which it claims can penetrate the M1 up to ranges of 1.4 kilometers.

The Abrams uses a fourth crewmember to load the gun, which American tankers argue is more reliable, offers a higher rate of fire, and gives the tank a spare hand if one of the other crew members is incapacitated. However, the space needed to accommodate a fourth crew member makes the M1 larger and heavier.

The Type 99 and T-90 both can fire anti-tank missiles from the gun tube, while the Abrams cannot.  (The Type 99 uses AT-11 Refleks missiles licensed from Russia).  This could theoretically be useful for combat at very long ranges, or against low-flying helicopters.  However, tank-launched missiles have existed for fifty years without seeing much use.

Effective sensors for spotting and aiming are arguably as decisive in tank engagements as firepower. Russia has made some strides in tank sights and thermal imagers in recent years, though the general sentiment is that Western sights and sensors remain superior. The T-90A does not carry Russia’s best hardware (some have been upgraded with French Catherine thermal sights), while the T-90MS has an improved Kalina targeting system.

China is known for its excellent electronics, and the Type 99A2 supposedly carries a new infrared tracking system that enables it hunt enemy tanks efficiently and is believed to be superior to the systems on the T-90A.

Protection:

The Type 99 benefits both from composite armor, and Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), bricks of explosives onto the tank that prematurely detonate incoming shells. The new Type 99A2 variant uses a multi-layered system thought to be similar to the Relikt ERA developed by Russia, which uses a radar to detonate the ERA before hostile shells impact. It is intended to defeat tandem-charge missiles capable of overcoming older-generation ERA.  

The T-90A uses the older Kontakt-5 ERA, while the new T-90MS tanks serving in India sport the Relikt system. Though most effective against anti-tank missiles, both systems also diminish the penetrating power of tank shells.

The Type 99 also comes with a Laser Warning Receiver which warns the tank commander if his vehicle is being painted with hostile targeting lasers, affording the driver a chance to back away out of danger. Given all the videos from Syria and Yemen of tanks sitting obliviously as anti-tank missiles meander towards them (often taking 20 seconds or more to impact), this could significantly improve survivability.

The Type 99 also is believed to come with its own unique high-powered ‘dazzler’ laser designed to jam laser- and infrared-guided missiles, damage enemy sights, and blind the eyes of hostile gunners, possibly with a permanent effect. Fortunately, high-power tank-mounted dazzlers have never been used in combat before, so we have no idea how well they would work.

The new A2 is also thought to have a laser-based communication system which can be used to identify friendly vehicles and transmit encrypted data.

The T-90 tank, on the other hand, relies on the Shtora “soft kill” Active Protection System, which not only jams lasers with its own emitters, but also deploys aerosol grenades to create a laser-obscuring cloud around the vehicle.

The M1 Abrams lacks its own Laser Warning Receiver, Active Protection Systems or Explosive Reactive Armor, though it is conceivable future upgrades will incorporate some of these features.

For now, the M1A2 relies on its excellent Chobham composite armor, which has been tweaked over the years and believed to be equivalent to 800 millimeters or more of rolled hardened armor (RHA) verses tank sabot shells, or 1300 millimeters versus the shaped charges used in rockets and missiles. For comparison, the T-90 is believed to have a maximum armor of around 650 RHA. The Abrams also benefit from having separately stowed ammunition, making its less likely to catastrophically detonate when hit by enemy fire.

The Type 99’s combination of composite and modular space armor is believed to offer armor protection close or equivalent to the Abrams.  One sources claims it offers protection equivalent to around 1100 RHA, though the actual effectiveness is classified.

Mobility:

The Type 99 is by far the most nimble of the bunch, able to sprint up to 50 miles per hour on roads. The M1 Abrams and the T-90MS used by India follow behind at 42 and 45 miles per hour respectively, while the T-90A trails at 35. However, the gas-guzzling turbine-powered M1A2 can only travel 240 miles before requiring refueling, while both the Type 99 and T-90 have ranges over 300 miles.  Furthermore, the M1’s greater weight makes it the hardest to transport and deploy.

A last note is the Type 99 features new digital maintenance systems similar to those entering into use in the latest upgrade of the M1 Abrams.

So all in all, while the Abrams arguably retains the best firepower of the three, the Type 99 seems likely to be better protected thanks to its multi-layered defensive systems. And it’s faster and has longer range.

The T-90A is generally outclassed by the other two, but the T-90MS, with its Relikt armor, improved sights and more powerful engines, can hold its own.

However, one should keep in mind the actual performance of the Type 99’s armor, gun and electronic systems is not certain, particularly as the vehicle has not been exported, whereas both the M1 and T-90 have been used in action by multiple operators. Beijing likes to keep the details of its technology close, and also has an incentive to talk up the capabilities of its hardware.

Nonetheless, the majority of the evidence available suggests that, despite its hordes of Type 59s, China is capable of designing and fielding a first-class main battle tank.  This fits in well with President Xi Jinping’s recent push to downsize in quantity, and improve in quality, its armed forces.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared in 2016. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Stephen Silver

Economics, Americas

The company has been so successful, in fact, that there have been delays in the delivery of some products.

Bike maker Peloton, in quarterly earnings released this week, posted a profit of $69.3 million, based on sales that surged 232 percent over the year before, with their 20 cents earnings per share nearly doubling estimates from analysts, per CNBC.

As the coronavirus pandemic continued to keep people indoors and kept some gyms closed or restricted, Peloton continued to take advantage, with Connected Fitness Subscriptions growing 137 percent to 133 million Digital Subscriptions jumping 382 percent, to more than 510.000. There are also now 3.6 million Peloton members.

The company has been so successful, in fact, that there have been delays in the delivery of some products, as well as delays in tech support call volumes, for which Peloton apologized.

“We will continue to work diligently to address delivery and support issues, as we have long prided ourselves on providing superior customer service. With an understanding of what is required to return to our normal standards, we continue to invest in technology, manufacturing capabilities, and people to help us scale and meet the needs of all our customers,” the company said in its shareholders letter.

In the quarter, Peloton announced both the new Bike+ and its new Tread treadmill, while also cutting the prices of its older products. The new Tread is set to launch in early 2021.

Despite the good news, per CNBC, the company’s shares slumped after the earnings announcement, on the concerns raised by supply constraints. They did gain back ground on Friday, however.

“We see Peloton increasingly capitalizing from a secular shift in consumer behavior amid extended social distancing, with elevated demand we're seeing for at-home fitness (longer order to delivery for ‘couple more quarters’) and reflected in sustained low churn levels (0.65 percent vs. 0.90 percent year ago),” analyst Camilla Yanushevsky wrote in a note to clients, as cited by Yahoo Finance. “With over $2 billion of liquidity, we believe Peloton has significant resources to continue investing in product and platform to drive growth.”

“As we’ve said previously, our goal is to become the leading connected fitness and wellness platform. In order to do that we have focused on complementing our incredibly effective and immersive cardio offering with world-class strength and wellness content. We are continuously investing in hardware, software, and content to maintain our leadership position,” the company added in the investor letter.

On the lighter side, Peloton banned all hashtags associated with the QAnon conspiracy theory, and a company called Echelon this fall introduced a new bike it called “The Prime Bike” that it claimed was developed in collaboration with Amazon, leading the tech press to speculate that Amazon was making a move into direct competition with Peloton. However, Amazon later distanced themselves from the product.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Warfare History Network, Brooke C. Stoddard

History, Europe

Oster had long loathed the Nazi regime.

Key point: There were multiple Germany assassination plots to kill Hitler.

Adolf Hitler won victory after victory in the late 1930s: the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the incorporation of Austria into the Reich in 1938, the acquisition of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia in 1938 followed by the control over much of the remainder of Czechoslovakia six months later, and then the conquest of Poland in September 1939. These astonishing successes glorified him in the eyes of millions of Germans and humbled the generals of the German Army, a number of whom thought his recklessness would lead to a crushing German military defeat.

Soon after the victory in Poland, when some Army generals believed Hitler would be satisfied with territorial possessions and come to some accommodation with Poland’s latecomer allies France and Britain, the Führer summoned the cream of the high commanders. Not a few of them believed he would call for a demobilization. Instead, what they got was a shock: Hitler told them he was determined to launch an offensive against France and Britain, and the sooner the better.

German Opposition to the Nazi Regime

Some of these Army generals—Commander in Chief of the Army Walther von Brauchitsch and Chief of the Army General Staff Franz Halder among them—as well as men of lesser rank in military intelligence, plus civilians and politicians, had long opposed or came to oppose the Nazi regime that controlled Germany. They had conspired to overthrow the Nazi leadership, most notably as the Sudetenland issue rose to a crisis. They believed their best chance at overthrowing the Nazi leaders was when the Nazis recklessly hurled Germany into a general European war.

Hitler was willing to risk such a war by invading Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland, and the conspirators were waiting for the right moment when Hitler seemed mad enough to do it. But it was precisely then that Neville Chamberlain engineered an appeasement granting the Sudetenland to Germany. The conspiracy collapsed. The buildup to the invasion of Poland offered another opportunity for revolt, but movement to a coup d’etat never got far, in part because the generals believed that a war against Poland would be brief and contained.

Colonel Hans Oster

Now, suddenly there was another opportunity. Some of the highest ranking Army generals believed an attack on the West (that is, against France and Britain, although also likely involving Holland and Belgium) would only end in a crushing defeat of their country. When Colonel Hans Oster of the Abwehr (military intelligence for the armed services) sounded out generals whom he considered sympathetic to a revolt, he discovered lukewarm support at best. Unlike the opportunity during the Sudetenland crisis, key German troops were not in Berlin where they might be used in a coup, but rather in battle zones or potential battle zones. Moreover, Germany was now at war; a general’s—and every soldier’s—duty lay to his country, no matter how offensive the civilian leadership.

Oster, however, did not give up. He felt that if the invasion of the West—Case Yellow—met with disaster for Germany, then military men as well as the German people would welcome a coup that would throw the mad Nazis out of power. A new German government could negotiate with the country’s enemies and a catastrophic war would be avoided. In Oster’s view, the way to make an invasion fail was to give the invasion plans to the Western Allies.

A Later Change of Heart

Oster had long loathed the Nazi regime. He was a career Army officer, son of a Saxon parson, born in 1887. An artillerist, he won the Iron Cross First and Second Class and the Knight’s Cross with Swords during World War I. He joined the Imperial General Staff in 1917 and, like many of the officer class, was devastated by the German defeat of 1918, which he believed was undeserved. He considered the Weimar Republic decadent and weak, but, having survived as an officer in the much-reduced Army after the armistice, served it loyally. He is said to have at first welcomed the Nazi government because it reinstated some of the principles of the old imperial rule and made the Army and Germany again a source of pride. In his private time, Oster loved riding and playing the ‘cello (oddly, a good many of the Nazi resistors were musically gifted).

In 1933, Oster accepted a job with the Abwehr. In 1934, he turned against the Nazis when the SS murdered his good friend and former Abwehr chief Maj. Gen. Ferdinand von Bredow during the purges of the SS’s rival organization, the SA. In the years that followed, Oster helped to recruit to the coup d’etat cause General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff until he resigned in 1938, turning over his position to Halder.

This article by Brooke C. Stoddard originally appeared on the Warfare History Network and first appeared on TNI in 2018.

Image: Wikipedia.

Warfare History Network

History, Europe

In 2011, a two-ton bomb was discovered in a riverbank in Koblenz; 45,000 people were temporarily evacuated. A year later, a 550-pound bomb was detonated in Munich after an EOD unit was unable to defuse it; windows for blocks around were blown out. It’s estimated that another 2,500 bombs are still buried around Munich.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The astonishing quantity of bombs dropped in Europe during the Second World War - especially in Germany - has guaranteed that many continue to pop up every year.

For the most part, World War II left the U.S. and Canadian homelands physically untouched. There were a few incidents of sabotage and a few small-scale attacks, such as a Japanese submarine’s shelling of an oil refinery in southern California and balloon bombs launched from Japan that floated over the Pacific and set fires in the western United States and Canada.

But there was nothing to equal the millions of tons of bombs dropped on Britain, Europe, and Japan.

During the war, the United States and its allies dropped 2.7 million tons of bombs on European targets. Some bombs were armed with a delayed fuse so that they would explode hours or even days after they were dropped.

“It was a terror tactic,” one news source said, “designed to hinder the cities’ recovery. Half ended up in Germany, and what’s left today buried in German soil makes up the roughly 10 percent of bombs that never went off.”

This fact came to light with a recent news item from northern Germany that said the A-2 autobahn near Hannover had to be shut down while explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) crews blew up two bombs dropped more than 70 years ago and were discovered during a construction project.

As a major target for U.S. and RAF bombers, Hannover was hit hard; on one raid alone, more than a quarter-million bombs were dropped on the city.

Almost every year similar reports come out. This past July, a Berlin neighborhood had to be evacuated when a 500-pound American bomb was unearthed by construction workers.

In Wolfsburg, a city about 150 miles west of Berlin, a 550-pound bomb was found beneath the Volkswagen factory in July 2016. In 2011, a two-ton bomb was discovered in a riverbank in Koblenz; 45,000 people were temporarily evacuated. A year later, a 550-pound bomb was detonated in Munich after an EOD unit was unable to defuse it; windows for blocks around were blown out. It’s estimated that another 2,500 bombs are still buried around Munich.

A news source says that every year at least one or two leftover bombs in Germany explode without warning. And farmers sometimes die when their plows strike buried bombs or artillery shells.

So commonplace are the incidents, in fact, that Germans are rarely surprised by the news. In fact, the KMBD (Kampfmittelbeseitigungsdienst, or War Ordnance Disposal Service, a division of the Brandenburg state government) estimates that more than 2,000 tons of unexploded bombs are uncovered each year.

Britain, too, has its own unexploded bomb problem. In the city of Bath, a 500-pound German bomb was found under a school playground this past May.

No one knows exactly how many bombs are still out there or where they may be lurking, and that’s the problem. Any place that, during the war, was home to an armaments factory, transit hub, depot, or airport is likely to still be sitting on these rusting time bombs.

The deadly legacy of World War II goes on and on.

This first appeared in Warfare History Network here and first appeared on TNI in 2019.

Image: Reuters.